

The Effect of Ideological Divergence on Agency-Judicial Interactions: Appendix

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Abstract

The literature on executive-judicial interaction typically focuses on the Supreme Court and the President or the Solicitor General. Bureaucratic interactions with the federal courts, even the Supreme Court, has been given little attention by scholars. This paper examines the effect of ideological distance on the likelihood and volume of bureaucratic amicus brief filings in the Federal Courts of Appeals. The data collected is between 2000-2012 and covers three agencies and two Cabinet departments.

Contents

1	Data Collection	4
2	Data Description	6
2.1	Summary Statistics	6
2.2	Bar Graphs of Total Filings by Agency, Circuit, and Year	9
2.3	Caseload Change over Time	11
2.4	Relationship between ideological distance and DV	11
3	Analysis	13
3.1	Main Results	13
3.2	Marginal Effects	17
4	Robustness Tests	19
4.1	Simple Robust Standard Errors	19
4.2	Main Hypothesis	20
4.3	Outlier Agencies	22
5	Circuit Information	24
5.1	Circuit Workload	24
5.2	Circuit Map	25

List of Tables

1	Summary Statistics for Main Variables	6
2	Summary Statistics for Main Variables, EEOC	6
3	Summary Statistics for Main Variables, FTC	7
4	Summary Statistics for Main Variables, SEC	7
5	Summary Statistics for Main Variables, Workers's Compensation	7
6	Summary Statistics for Main Variables, Wage and Hours	7
7	Summary Statistics for Main Variables, Employee Benefits Security Admin.	8


8	Summary Statistics for Main Variables, Occupational Health and Safety .	8
9	Summary Statistics for Main Variables, Employee Standards Admin. . .	8
10	Summary Statistics for Main Variables, DOJ: Antitrust	8
11	Summary Statistics for Main Variables, DOJ: Civil Rights	9
12	Summary Statistics for Main Variables, Department of Labor	9
13	Summary Statistics for Main Variables, Department of Justice	9
14	Models	16
15	Models for Std. Errors	19
16	Model for H2	21
17	Model Separated by Outliers	23

List of Figures

1	Bar Graphs of Total Filings by Agency, Circuit, and Year	10
2	Agency Filings in relation to Ideological Distance	12
3	Circuit Caseload Changes over Time	24
4	Number of Amici in a Circuit, Ranked Most to Fewest	25
5	Map taken from the United States Courts website.	25

1 Data Collection

Caseload The number of pending, filed, and terminated cases per year in a circuit were gathered from the Caseload Judicial Management Caseload Statistics (2000-2015) website. The values were then logged in order to ease interpretation and normalize the distribution.



Agency Age The creation year for an agency was gathered from each agency's website. In order to create the age variable, I subtracted each observation year from the creation year.

Ideology Scores: Agency The Chen and Johnson (2014) agency ideology scores are bounded between -1 and 1 and anchored to the DW NOMINATE scale. The data spans over the Clinton administrations, the two George H. W. Bush administrations, and the first Obama administration. Of the 72 agencies included in the dataset, I could only locate amicus data for the Department of Labor, the Department of Justice, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, and the Securities and Exchanges Commission.

Ideology Scores: Circuit The Judicial Commonsense database (insert citation) includes judicial ideology scores for Supreme Court justices, Courts of Appeal judges, and the medians for the Supreme Court and each circuit on the Courts of Appeal between 1937 and 2014. The data does exclude the Federal Circuit Court, since that particular circuit is unique in function. The scores are a transformation of the Martin-Quinn scores, bounded between -1 and 1 and anchored to the first dimension DW-NOMINATE scale.

Amicus Briefs The number of amicus briefs were collected from agency websites. The websites typically included a PDF copy of the brief, the date it was filed, the court-level it was filed in (state-district, state-appellate, state-supreme, federal, or Supreme Court), and occasionally the purpose of the amicus brief. The circuit and case number were pulled from agency websites when available, but were typically collected from the PDF file of the brief. Most agencies listed briefs filed between the mid-1990s and 2016, and some agencies had duplicate entries due to dialogue with the court or corrections/additions to a filed brief. Once the dataset was created, all filings not in the Federal Courts of Appeals and between 2000 and 2012 were dropped (the Federal Circuit was also dropped from the usable dataset). The amicus brief data were then aggregated to the agency level for the purpose of this paper.

It is worth noting that the original dataset, by amicus brief unit of analysis, still exists and contains all the courts and years. This could be beneficial to future research, especially at the case-level.

- EEOC
- FTC
- SEC
- Department of Labor
- Department of Justice: Antitrust
- Department of Justice: Civil Rights

Scope of the Data Collected The data covers 2000-2012 and four main government agencies: the EEOC, the FTC, the SEC, the Department of Labor, and the Department of Justice. The cabinet departments were deaggregated to the agencies inside the departments responsible for the actual filings. While the agency ideology scores for the deaggregated cabinet agencies reflects the department as a whole, the polarization scores and the total amici filed are specific to the agencies. In order to test the accuracy of my results, I combine the number of amici filed at the agency level and aggregate the data up to the department level.

2 Data Description

2.1 Summary Statistics

Table 1: Summary Statistics for Main Variables

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Median
Total Amici Filed	1272	.492	.961	0	8	0
Was a amicus brief filed?	1272	.291	.454	0	1	0
Polarization (Strict)	1272	15.357	7.527	9.666	83.909	14.126
Polarization (Loose)	1272	-2.549	18.429	-41.24	77.97	5.862
Age of the Agency/Division	1272	52.189	23.277	2	98	45
Filed Cases (logged)	1272	8.319	.637	6.962	9.677	8.425
Distance: Court-Agency	1272	.318	.201	.001	.834	.313

Table 2: Summary Statistics for Main Variables, EEOC

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Median
Total Amici Filed	156	1.429	1.451	0	6	1
Was a amicus brief filed?	156	.66	.475	0	1	1
Polarization (Strict)	156	15.445	.557	14.358	16.522	15.422
Polarization (Loose)	156	-8.502	.614	-9.977	-7.607	-8.282
Age of the Agency/Division	156	42	3.754	36	48	42
Filed Cases (logged)	156	8.32	.639	6.962	9.677	8.425
Distance: Court-Agency	156	.398	.236	.001	.777	.463

Table 3: Summary Statistics for Main Variables, FTC

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Median
Total Amici Filed	156	.154	.522	0	5	0
Was a amicus brief filed?	156	.122	.328	0	1	0
Polarization (Strict)	156	17.333	6.194	10.571	26.03	19.796
Polarization (Loose)	156	-34.79	4.839	-41.24	-26.301	-35.854
Age of the Agency/Division	156	92	3.754	86	98	92
Filed Cases (logged)	156	8.32	.639	6.962	9.677	8.425
Distance: Court-Agency	156	.38	.218	.003	.813	.425

Table 4: Summary Statistics for Main Variables, SEC

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Median
Total Amici Filed	156	.218	.571	0	3	0
Was a amicus brief filed?	156	.16	.368	0	1	0
Polarization (Strict)	156	18.754	1.796	15.695	21.234	19.215
Polarization (Loose)	156	-24.903	2.825	-29.177	-20.526	-25.351
Age of the Agency/Division	156	73	3.754	67	79	73
Filed Cases (logged)	156	8.32	.639	6.962	9.677	8.425
Distance: Court-Agency	156	.335	.196	.001	.834	.365

Table 5: Summary Statistics for Main Variables, Workers's Compensation

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Median
Total Amici Filed	24	.042	.204	0	1	0
Was a amicus brief filed?	24	.042	.204	0	1	0
Polarization (Strict)	24	13.027	.235	12.797	13.257	13.027
Polarization (Loose)	24	11.036	.38	10.664	11.409	11.036
Age of the Agency/Division	24	2.5	.511	2	3	2.5
Filed Cases (logged)	24	8.257	.655	7.081	9.429	8.343
Distance: Court-Agency	24	.365	.266	.009	.771	.455

Table 6: Summary Statistics for Main Variables, Wage and Hours

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Median
Total Amici Filed	24	.917	.83	0	3	1
Was a amicus brief filed?	24	.667	.482	0	1	1
Polarization (Strict)	24	13.707	.228	13.483	13.93	13.707
Polarization (Loose)	24	8.841	.266	8.581	9.101	8.841
Age of the Agency/Division	24	2.5	.511	2	3	2.5
Filed Cases (logged)	24	8.257	.655	7.081	9.429	8.343
Distance: Court-Agency	24	.365	.266	.009	.771	.455

Table 7: Summary Statistics for Main Variables, Employee Benefits Security Admin.

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Median
Total Amici Filed	156	.744	1.002	0	5	0
Was a amicus brief filed?	156	.436	.497	0	1	0
Polarization (Strict)	156	18.472	19.008	9.887	83.909	14.225
Polarization (Loose)	156	9.861	20.242	-3.928	77.97	4.444
Age of the Agency/Division	156	32	3.754	26	38	32
Filed Cases (logged)	156	8.32	.639	6.962	9.677	8.425
Distance: Court-Agency	156	.284	.19	.001	.771	.253

Table 8: Summary Statistics for Main Variables, Occupational Health and Safety

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Median
Total Amici Filed	156	.013	.113	0	1	0
Was a amicus brief filed?	156	.013	.113	0	1	0
Polarization (Strict)	156	14.604	3.711	9.666	18.064	17.786
Polarization (Loose)	156	12.431	3.542	7.337	17.396	13.749
Age of the Agency/Division	156	35	3.754	29	41	35
Filed Cases (logged)	156	8.32	.639	6.962	9.677	8.425
Distance: Court-Agency	156	.284	.19	.001	.771	.253

Table 9: Summary Statistics for Main Variables, Employee Standards Admin.

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Median
Total Amici Filed	132	.311	.607	0	3	0
Was a amicus brief filed?	132	.242	.43	0	1	0
Polarization (Strict)	132	13.079	.858	12.111	14.455	12.675
Polarization (Loose)	132	9.085	1.823	3.977	10.919	9.613
Age of the Agency/Division	132	34	3.174	29	39	34
Filed Cases (logged)	132	8.332	.637	6.962	9.677	8.425
Distance: Court-Agency	132	.27	.17	.001	.771	.244

Table 10: Summary Statistics for Main Variables, DOJ: Antitrust

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Median
Total Amici Filed	156	.173	.427	0	2	0
Was a amicus brief filed?	156	.154	.362	0	1	0
Polarization (Strict)	156	12.715	.829	11.837	14.577	12.491
Polarization (Loose)	156	7.188	1.962	4.671	12.245	6.41
Age of the Agency/Division	156	73	3.754	67	79	73
Filed Cases (logged)	156	8.32	.639	6.962	9.677	8.425
Distance: Court-Agency	156	.285	.164	.006	.646	.272

Table 11: Summary Statistics for Main Variables, DOJ: Civil Rights

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Median
Total Amici Filed	156	.872	1.243	0	8	1
Was a amicus brief filed?	156	.513	.501	0	1	1
Polarization (Strict)	156	12.715	.829	11.837	14.577	12.491
Polarization (Loose)	156	7.188	1.962	4.671	12.245	6.41
Age of the Agency/Division	156	49	3.754	43	55	49
Filed Cases (logged)	156	8.32	.639	6.962	9.677	8.425
Distance: Court-Agency	156	.285	.164	.006	.646	.272

Table 12: Summary Statistics for Main Variables, Department of Labor

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Median
Total Amici Filed	468	.825	1.24	0	8	0
Was a amicus brief filed?	468	.442	.497	0	1	0
Polarization (Strict)	468	13.625	1.49	11.837	16.522	13.078
Polarization (Loose)	468	1.958	7.583	-9.977	12.245	5.983
Age of the Agency/Division	468	54.667	13.807	36	79	49
Filed Cases (logged)	468	8.32	.637	6.962	9.677	8.425
Distance: Court-Agency	468	.322	.198	.001	.777	.33











Table 13: Summary Statistics for Main Variables, Department of Justice

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Median
Total Amici Filed	468	.825	1.24	0	8	0
Was a amicus brief filed?	468	.442	.497	0	1	0
Polarization (Strict)	468	13.625	1.49	11.837	16.522	13.078
Polarization (Loose)	468	1.958	7.583	-9.977	12.245	5.983
Age of the Agency/Division	468	54.667	13.807	36	79	49
Filed Cases (logged)	468	8.32	.637	6.962	9.677	8.425
Distance: Court-Agency	468	.322	.198	.001	.777	.33

2.2 Bar Graphs of Total Filings by Agency, Circuit, and Year

Below are the total number of briefs filed by an agency in a given circuit in a year. The Wage and Hours Division and Workers' Compensation Division are both new agencies, but were part of the Employee Standards Administration before 2011. That is the reason that there are a lower number of amicus briefs for those agencies.

Figure 1: Bar Graphs of Total Filings by Agency, Circuit, and Year




2.3 Caseload Change over Time

The graph below shows the change in filed cases over time in a given circuit. The Ninth Circuit has the highest volume of cases, while the First and D.C. Circuits receive the least. The case volume is relatively stable over time, though increases and decreases vary over circuit. The figure detailing caseload changes can be found with circuit information at the end of the appendix.

2.4 Relationship between ideological distance and DV

Below are the scatter plots that should help visualize the relationship between the total number of briefs filed and the ideological distance between the court and agency. There seems to be quadratic relationships within the EEOC, the FTC, the WC, the WH, and the Employee Standards. Unfortunately, it is difficult to say for certain given the low number of non-zero observations for some of these agencies.

Figure 2: Agency Filings in relation to Ideological Distance



3 Analysis

3.1 Main Results

The main analysis is broken down into three models: one for civil rights agencies (the EEOC and the DOJ’s Civil Rights Division), one for economic agencies (all other agencies), and one for the combined agencies. In the civil rights model, both distance and squared distance was significant when interacted with agency age. Judicial caseload interacted with age, however, was not significant. The coefficient signs on the ideological distance and ideological distance squared interaction terms are in opposite directions. When interacted with age, squared distance has a negative impact on the probability a filing. When the non-squared distance term is interacted with agency age, it is a positive sign and there is an increase in filing probability. Substantively, as agencies get older, the probability of amicus brief filings increases, at least until a critical point. When the ideological divergence increases to a point at which the agency’s chances of persuasion are less than the cost of filing, the likelihood of an agency filing a brief tapers off.

The economic agency model had the same effects and even greater significance in terms of ideological distance and agency age. The greater statistical significance stems from the higher sample size and smaller confidence intervals. It is plausible that if the sample of civil rights agencies was increased, there would be more significance in those results. In economic agencies, however, the magnitude of the marginal effect of ideological distance, both squared and linear, is lower than for civil rights agencies. While the ideological distance at the decreasing level is similar, the effect of ideological distance past the critical point is much smaller.

In the main model, the sign on both ideological distance coefficients interacted with agency age is maintained. Ideological distance at the lower and higher ends results a decreased probability of filing, but there is a higher probability when the ideological distance is moderate. The results from the combined model are the most significant set, but it is still too early to confidently report the effects of ideological distance. The limitations imposed by the data and the small sample size result in extremely large confident

intervals. The coefficient signs and significant imply that ideological distance may have an impact and are encouraging toward future research in this area.

The effect of agency age interacted with the court's workload is only significant in the combined model. The marginal effects of the civil rights model imply that as an agency increases in experience, there is actually an increase in filing probability. The size of the confidence interval increases dramatically, however, at the same point as the probability/age interaction seems to curve into a parabola. Had the confidence intervals been smaller, it would be logical to assume that the results show a quadratic, non-linear, positive relationship between age and filing probability. The increasingly large confidence intervals indicate, though, that this visual relationship could potentially be an artifact of the data. It would be interesting to see if the relationship maintained this shape with the addition of new data, and if so, the theoretical reasons behind it.

The economic agency model has a seemingly normal confidence interval in comparison to the civil rights model. Interestingly enough, the initial effects seem to indicate that age interacted with workload has the opposite effect in economic and civil rights agencies. The results imply that as the judicial workload increases and agency age increases, there is actually a decrease in filing probability. In the context of my theory, this means that as the information advantage of the agency increases, the filing probability actually decreases. The lack of statistical significance and the substantial confidence intervals prevent any real, meaningful results from being derived from the model, but it does hope of future results should the sample size be fine-tuned and increased.

The combined model overall has a pseudo- R^2 of .0719. This means that the model explain very little of the variation in amicus brief filings. The pseudo- R^2 increases, however, when agency type is isolated. For the civil rights model, the pseudo- R^2 increases to .114, and in the economic model, it becomes .0737. This falls in line with expectations. The theory and empirical tests focus on ideology due to data, time, and ability constraints. Ideology can only play so much of a role in these decisions to file, though. Case facts, agency constituencies and resources, the salience issues, case importance, and political context all should impact agency decisions, as well. Ideology plays a part, and

this particular paper can potentially help in determining the large decision to interact with the courts made by agencies. In the end, ideology explains part of the filing decision but only a part, and the pseudo- R^2 reflect this.

For civil rights agencies, the model has more impact, primarily due to ideological distance measures. In the robustness checks included in the appendix, the model run only with additional control and without the age/case interaction returns a similar pseudo- R^2 . For economic agencies, the pseudo- R^2 is actually decreased without the interaction of age and cases filed. The overall model does not experience drastic change when age/filings are dropped. While the models do not explain even a large amount of variance within the dependent variable (as expected) civil rights agencies and economic agencies fall in line with logic. Civil rights, as a more ideological area of the law, is more impacted by the ideological distance between the court and the agency.



Table 14: Models

	(1) Civil Rights	(2) Economic	(3) Both
Was a amicus brief filed?			
Agency Age	-0.310 (-0.88)	0.106 (1.70)	0.133* (2.14)
Distance: Court-Agency	42.18* (2.28)	5.219 (1.34)	6.604* (1.98)
Agency Age \times Distance: Court-Agency	-0.900* (-2.26)	-0.186** (-3.13)	-0.182*** (-3.64)
Distance: Court-Agency Sq.	-63.48** (-2.67)	-6.057 (-1.09)	-6.737 (-1.52)
Agency Age \times Distance: Court-Agency Sq.	1.337* (2.57)	0.215** (2.60)	0.193** (2.88)
Filed Cases (logged)	-0.860 (-0.45)	1.135* (2.48)	1.325** (2.94)
Agency Age \times Filed Cases (logged)	0.0435 (1.06)	-0.0112 (-1.52)	-0.0145* (-1.97)
Constant	5.250 (0.32)	-10.94** (-2.87)	-12.18** (-3.22)
Observations	312	804	1272
Pseudo-R2	0.114	0.0737	0.0719


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* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$


3.2 Marginal Effects



All Agencies



All Agencies



4 Robustness Tests

4.1 Simple Robust Standard Errors

In order to verify that my standard errors are corrected through clustering, I ran the main, combined model with simple robust standard errors. This is the equivalent of running the model without standard errors in OLS for a logit, since robust standard errors are necessary with logit and probit models. The standard errors from the clustered model are more accurate as well as theoretically more valid.

Table 15: Models for Std. Errors

	(1) Clustered	(2) Simple Robust
Was a amicus brief filed?		
Agency Age	0.133* (2.14)	0.133** (3.08)
Distance: Court-Agency	6.604* (1.98)	6.604** (2.62)
Agency Age \times Distance: Court-Agency	-0.182*** (-3.64)	-0.182*** (-4.18)
Distance: Court-Agency Sq.	-6.737 (-1.52)	-6.737 (-1.87)
Agency Age \times Distance: Court-Agency Sq.	0.193** (2.88)	0.193** (3.09)
Filed Cases (logged)	1.325** (2.94)	1.325*** (4.81)
Agency Age \times Filed Cases (logged)	-0.0145* (-1.97)	-0.0145** (-2.92)
Constant	-12.18** (-3.22)	-12.18*** (-5.12)
Observations	1272	1272
Pseudo-R2	0.0719	0.0719

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

4.2 Main Hypothesis

I simplified my model down further in order to test the most interesting of my hypotheses, H2:

Hypothesis 2, Part 1: When the ideological distance between an agency and a circuit is small, an agency will be less likely to file amicus briefs in that circuit. Similarly, when ideological distance is large, filing will also be less likely.

Hypothesis 2, Part 2: When ideological distance between an agency and circuit is moderate, the agency will be more likely to file amicus briefs in the circuit.

I add in controls for agency independent, the volume of cases in a circuit, and agency age. The control for cabinet agencies fell out of the model due to multicollinearity (it is completely collinear with independence, since the only non-independent agencies are also within cabinet departments). Again, there are three models run, one for each type of agency and one for all agencies combined.

Table 16: Model for H2

	(1) Civil Rights	(2) Economic	(3) Both
Was a amicus brief filed?			
Distance: Court-Agency	3.701 (1.51)	-3.239 (-1.63)	-1.287 (-0.81)
Distance: Court-Agency Sq.	-7.970** (-2.60)	3.854 (1.35)	0.638 (0.29)
Independence	1.327*** (4.11)	0.220 (0.25)	0.999** (2.93)
Filed Cases (logged)	1.003*** (4.17)	0.694** (2.85)	0.627** (3.21)
Agency Age	0.0302 (1.02)	-0.0173 (-1.32)	-0.0285*** (-4.64)
Constant	-9.981*** (-3.86)	-5.974** (-2.90)	-4.767** (-2.88)
Observations	312	804	1272
Pseudo-R2	0.127	0.0566	0.0787

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

H2 Model Results The implication of this model is that the civil rights agencies are less likely to file an amicus brief in a circuit once that circuit increases in distance past the critical value for persuasion. Before it reaches that critical value, however, a civil rights agency has an increased probability of filing. Only the squared result is significant, however, most likely due to a lack of variation in my sample.

The control for the number of filed cases is statistically significant in all model, and of higher significant in the civil rights model. This is likely due to the higher number of criminal and civil rights type cases that comprise the circuit caseload. There is just a higher opportunity for civil rights agencies to file amicus briefs when compared to economic agencies. The independence control is unsurprisingly significant in the civil rights model: the EEOC is an independent agency and one of the two agencies typed civil rights. It also filed the most of any agency in the sample. The number of economic agencies filing briefs is lower, and it is harder to get any leverage on those agencies.

The key finding from running this model alone is that civil rights agencies are affected most significantly by ideology, at least when ideological distance is past the critical point for persuasion. However, results cannot be taken as too concrete: the small number of agencies and the outlier filings could be heavily affecting the results.

4.3 Outlier Agencies

As stated previously, there are certain agencies that are heavy with amici filings. The EEOC, the Employee Benefits Security Administration, and the Civil Rights Division all have triple-digit number of filings. Isolating these three agencies should determine to what extent those agencies are driving my results. I run two logits, both all agency types combined but with a control for agency type.

Results of the Outlier-Separated Model The significant results disappear but in the opposite model as expected. The three outlier agencies have a combined total of 251 non-zero observations, while the other seven agencies total 119 non-zero observations. However, the more positive observations present in the regression, the less of a significant effect of my independent variables. It leads me to question whether the factors impacting an agency's decision is something that can be generalized across agencies. It could be that considerations for the EEOC and Civil Rights Division have little to do with ideology, but the FTC and SEC factor ideological distance in heavily.

Table 17: Model Separated by Outliers

	(1) EEOC, EBSA, & Civil Rights	(2) All Others
Was a amicus brief filed?		
Agency Age	-0.105 (-0.54)	0.0905 (1.32)
Distance: Court-Agency	10.40 (1.10)	8.335* (2.09)
Agency Age \times Distance: Court-Agency	-0.243 (-1.10)	-0.214** (-3.19)
Distance: Court-Agency Sq.	-11.82 (-0.87)	-11.04 (-1.90)
Agency Age \times Distance: Court-Agency Sq.	0.256 (0.81)	0.263** (2.71)
Filed Cases (logged)	0.352 (0.37)	1.203** (2.74)
Agency Age \times Filed Cases (logged)	0.0182 (0.78)	-0.00920 (-1.16)
Civil Rights Agency	0.620 (1.29)	1.843*** (8.57)
Constant	-5.025 (-0.65)	-11.78** (-3.17)
Observations	468	1116
Pseudo-R2	0.104	0.175


t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

5 Circuit Information

5.1 Circuit Workload

Figure 3: Circuit Caseload Changes over Time



As mentioned before, there are no dramatic increases or decreases over time. The Ninth Circuit is the busiest and receives the second highest number of briefs. The Second Circuit, despite having an average workload, receives the highest number of briefs. The D.C. and First Circuits have the lowest caseload, and the D.C. does receive the lowest number of amicus briefs (and this is despite the location of the D.C. Circuit and agency headquarters overlapping). The First Circuit, however, receives more briefs than the Tenth Circuit. This does not mean much, since the Tenth Circuit also has a relatively low number of new filed cases. However, the amici filings in the First Circuit are similar in number to the Eleventh and the Eighth. Both Circuit, especially the Eleventh, have a substantially higher number of new filed cases a year. This adds evidence to my belief that it is not simply the size of a Circuit and volume of cases resulting in amicus brief filing discrepancy.

Figure 4: Number of Amici in a Circuit, Ranked Most to Fewest

Circuit	Total	Mean Filed Cases	Terminated Cases
2	173	5,770	5,688
9	141	12,313	11,983
5	134	8,232	8,279
4	117	4,960	4,971
6	115	4,880	4,879
7	110	3,361	3,395
3	104	3,903	3,901
11	70	7,100	7,247
8	67	3,134	3,163
1	62	1,644	1,652
10	36	2,523	2,564
D.C.	19	1,289	1,272

5.2 Circuit Map




Figure 5: Map taken from the United States Courts website.