Details on the Payment Rule -- Skip if you are not interested to know!

You will not be quizzed on this information. We only provide this information in case you are interested in knowing how to construct what economists call "incentive compatible elicitation mechanisms"! You can also print this page.

The payment rule for this part is as follows:

- Suppose the computer has chosen a question to count for payment and in answering this question, you say it is X% likely that the selected box was Box A.
- Then the computer randomly generates a number Y between 0 and 100. The value of Y is not related to any of your answers.
- We then compare X and Y.
 - If X is larger than Y, then you receive the extra bonus of \$4.50 if the selected box was indeed Box A and no extra bonus if it was Box B.
 - If Y is larger than X, then you receive the extra bonus of \$4.50 with Y% chance and no bonus with (100-Y)% chance. This is done by letting the computer generate a second random number Z between 0 and 100, and you get paid the extra bonus if and only if Z is smaller than Y.
- In short, you will receive the extra bonus either when the selected box was indeed Box A or when you win a Y%-chance lottery, whichever you think is more likely to happen.

Why does this (complicated!) rule ensure that you should tell us your true assessment? Imagine you believed that it was 60% likely that the selected box was Box A. But instead of typing in 60%, you say it's 80%. What happens next?

- Imagine the number Y generated by the computer is 70.
- Then, since 70 is smaller than 80, the computer will pay you if and only if the selected box was Box A.

This is, of course, a bad deal for you because you now only win with probability 60% according to your true assessment. Had you told us your true assessment and typed in 60%, the computer would have paid you according to the outcome of a 70%-chance lottery!

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Debug info

ID in group	1
Group	1
Round number	1
Participant	P1
Participant label	
Session code	jcxajne1