



KubeCon



CloudNativeCon

North America 2019

Security Beyond Buzzwords: How to secure Kubernetes with empathy?

Pushkar Joglekar, Security Engineer, Visa Inc.




Who is Visa?



A global payments **technology company** that connects consumers, businesses, financial institutions and governments in more than 200 countries and territories, enabling them to use electronic **payments** instead of cash and checks.

What we are not:

- Credit card issuers
- A Bank or lender
- Exposed to consumer credit risk



>whoami

- Architecting “secure by design” container deployments @ Visa
- Individual Open Source contributor for Visa
- Co-Author (Security): “The Kubernetes Book” with Nigel Poulton
- Certified Kubernetes Application Developer and Docker Certified Associate
- Concluded that Chai > Boba



Twitter: [@pudijoglekar](https://twitter.com/pudijoglekar)

Disclaimers

- “Point of view” of security team, engineer or architect
- We/Us == Security teams
- They/Them == Operations, Product teams, Developers
- Assumes there is a dedicated person, team, organization who is “accountable” for security
- Everyone else is “responsible” for security

Day 0

BRACE YOURSELVES



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Ref: <https://imgflip.com/memegenerator/Brace-Yourselfes-X-is-Coming>

Hopefully, not Day 0, but...

- Ensure visibility, clearly documenting unknowns
- Do some basic checks
- Ask them what they are doing about security
- Clarify that we will come back with more recommendations
- Request to start small with business non-critical apps

< Day 0 - Threat model

S: Spoofing

T: Tampering


R: Repudiation

I: Information Disclosure

D: Denial of Service

E: Elevation of Privilege

< Day 0 – Data Flows




< Day 0 - TM- Spoofing

- Kubernetes components communicate via mTLS and encryption via self-managed CAs
- Ensure this CA is trusted only within the cluster
- Pod to Pod communication:
 - Un-authenticated by default
 - Enable mTLS
 - Educate developers about this
- Do pods “really” need service account tokens?
- MFA for Admins and host access

```
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
  name: service-account-example-pod
spec:
  serviceAccountName: some-service-account
  automountServiceAccountToken: false
<snip>
```


Ref: Poulton, Nigel. The Kubernetes Book: March 2019. leanpub.com. Kindle Edition.

< Day 0 – TM - Tampering



At-rest

Auditing, Sign
and Verify



In-transit

TLS



In-memory

Restricted access

```
readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
allowedHostPaths:
  pathPrefix: "/foo"
    readOnly: true # only allow read-only mounts
<snip>
```

Ref: Poulton, Nigel. The Kubernetes Book: March 2019. leanpub.com. Kindle Edition.

< Day 0 – TM – (Non-) Repudiation

- Who, Where, When, What, How, Why?
- API auditing
- Log forwarding
- Linux audit
- Audit other K8s components
 - e.g. kubelet, etcd, container runtime

```
{  
  "kind": "Event",  
  "apiVersion": "audit.k8s.io/v1",  
  "metadata": { "creationTimestamp": "2019-03-03T10:10:00Z" },  
  "level": "Metadata",  
  "timestamp": "2019-03-03T10:10:00Z",  
  "auditID": "7e0cbccf-8d8a-4f5f-aefb-60b8af2d2ad5",  
  "stage": "RequestReceived",  
  
  "requestURI": "/api/v1/namespaces/default/persistentvolumeclaims",  
  "verb": "list",  
  "user": {  
    "username": "fname.lname@example.com",  
    "groups": [ "system:authenticated" ]  
  },  
  "sourceIPs": [ "123.45.67.123" ],  
  "objectRef": {  
    "resource": "persistentvolumeclaims",  
    "namespace": "default",  
    "apiVersion": "v1"  
  },  
  "requestReceivedTimestamp": "2010-03-03T10:10:00.123456Z",  
  "stageTimestamp": "2019-03-03T10:10:00.123456Z"  
}  
<snip>
```

Ref: Poulton, Nigel. The Kubernetes Book: March 2019. leanpub.com. Kindle Edition.

< Day 0 – TM - Information Disclosure

- Exposure of sensitive data, files, strings a.k.a. secrets
- Restrict host access
- Kubernetes secrets:
 - Encoding is *not* encryption
 - Use KMS plugins
 - Key and data in the same node is *never* a good idea
- Images, ConfigMaps, yaml files are not a good place to store secrets


< Day 0 – TM - Denial of Service

- Cluster level:

- More than one manager node
- More than one worker node
- Network segregation of manager and worker nodes
- Resource quotas

- Pod level:

- Requests and limits
- Mutual AuthN
- AuthZ policies



Ref: Poulton, Nigel. *The Kubernetes Book*: March 2019. leanpub.com. Kindle Edition.

< Day 0 – TM - Elevation of Privilege

- Cluster level:
 - Node: Kubelet
 - Role Based Access Control: for everything else
 - Roles mapped to user groups
- Pod level:
 - Not running as root
 - Seccomp (Syscall filtering)
 - Linux capabilities
 - Mandatory access controls e.g. SELinux, AppArmor
 - allowPrivilegeEscalation: false*

< Day 0 - Controls gap analysis

Controls Gap = Total Threats - Control(threats)

Where,


Control(threats) = Mitigated Threats

This is where security products are “born”

< Day 0 - Open discussion

- Share the results with Dev and Ops teams
- Request for feedback and adjust what makes sense
- Dev and Ops teams will appreciate if you share a security issue
 - Even better, if security team fixes it
- Share why something is a security issue
- Have external references that support the threat identified

Day 1



Ref: <https://imgflip.com/memetemplate/One-Does-Not-Simply>

Day 1 - Don't be a checklist bot!

- Ensure the security controls are applied and *work* as expected.
- Few examples:
 - Auditing – Alerting = useless
 - Permissive(SELinux) = useless
 - mTLS + Compromised(CA) = useless
 - Default((Privileged)PSP) = useless

Day 1- Be practical

- Every rule has an exception
- Sometimes rules cannot be applied for valid reasons
- Understand the use-cases
- Consider compensating controls:
Q: Need to run an app as privileged or mount the docker socket?
A: Run on a dedicated cluster

Day 1 - Automate

Problem	Solution
Vulnerable container images	Scanner in CI/CD pipeline
Lack of isolation of pods	PSPs that follow 80/20 rule
Unrestricted network access	Label based network security policies
Lack of awareness of user actions	Audit and Centralize API server auditing

Day 2



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Ref: <https://imgflip.com/memegenerator/13026863/TOYSTORY-EVERYWHERE>

Day 2

- Securing Kubernetes does not end after the cluster is built or the first pod is deployed
- It ends only when there are no more Kubernetes clusters in your cloud
- Like all software (and hardware), there will always be vulnerabilities

Day 2 – Not all vulnerabilities are equal

Risk != Severity

Day 2 – Not all vulnerabilities are equal

Risk = likelihood x Severity

Day 2 - CVE-2019-5736

SEVERITY: **HIGH**

Allows attackers to overwrite the host runc binary (and consequently obtain host root access) by leveraging the ability to **execute a command as root** within one of these types of containers:

- (1) a new container with an attacker-controlled image, or
- (2) an existing container:
 - Which the attacker previously had write access to
 - Can be attached with docker exec

Ref: <https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-5736>

Day 2 - CVE-2019-5736

- Determining the likelihood of a vulnerability being exploited is hard
- Assume attacks will be attempted
- Can existing security controls make an attack unlikely to be successful?
- How many such security controls exist?
- How confident are we on the controls doing what's expected?

Pro Tip: Understand the pre-requisites of the threat

Day 2 - CVE-2019-5736

Controls that make the attack difficult to be successful or go undetected:

- Vulnerability scanning of images
- Gated release process for production images
- Host level controls: SELinux
- Not running containers as root
- Auditing of container runtimes

Day 2 – K8s security audit

No.	Severity/ Difficulty	Low	Medium	High	Undetermined
High Risk					
1	High				
2	Medium	1 (TM 07)	5 (TM 1, 2, 3, 4, 14)		
3	Low			8 (TM 5, 6, 8, 11, 13, 15, 16, 17)	
4	Very low			2 (TM 9, 10)	
5	Informational				1 (TM 12)  Low Risk

Aggregated data from: <https://www.cncf.io/blog/2019/08/06/open-sourcing-the-kubernetes-security-audit/>


Day 2 – K8s security audit

No.	Severity/ Difficulty	Low	Medium	High	Undetermined	N/A
1	High Risk	1 (TOB-K8s-038)	2 (TOB-K8S-028, TOB-K8S-034)	2 (TOB-K8S-022, ATR-K8S-001)		
2	Medium	4 (TOB-K8S-015, TOB-K8S-020, TOB-K8S-021, TOB-K8S-026)	4 (TOB-K8s-001, TOB-K8S-002, ATR-K8S-002, TOB-K8S-024)	9 (TOB-K8S-004, TOB-K8S-005, TOB-K8S-012, TOB-K8S-013, TOB-K8S-014, TOB-K8S-019, TOB-K8S-029, TOB-K8S-031, ATR-K8S-003)		
3	Low	1 (TOB-K8S-006)	2 (TOB-K8S-036, TOB-K8S-032)	5 (TOB-K8S-007, TOB-K8S-008, TOB-K8S-016, TOB-K8S-023, TOB-K8S-033)		
4	Informational	1 (TOB-K8S-009)		3 (TOB-K8S-017, TOB-K8S-010, TOB-K8S-003)	2 (TOB-K8S-027, TOB-K8S-037)	1 Low Risk

Day 2 - Revisit threat model

- With newer versions of Kubernetes, things will change
- Revisit the threat model and assumptions
- Expect multi-tenancy support and secure defaults to get better
- More layers and defense in depth is key


Empathetic security is a reality!



imgflip.com

Ref: <https://imgflip.com/memegenerator/97426768/you-can't-if-you-don't>


Empathetic security is a reality!



Find the plastic
door

Empathetic security is a reality!

BE A



NOT A



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Questions?



Thank you

