Pages on SecuRity by Ruxandra F. Olimid

Unconditional (Information-theoretic)

Conditional (Computational)

... security

An adversary with no restrictions (unbounded computational resources - time, memory) cannot break the scheme.

An adversary with computational restrictions (bounded time, memory) can break the scheme with some (negligible) probability.

Stands against brute force



Good in theory, poor in practice





Suitable for practice



Weaker than unconditional security

cryptographic construction satisfies *computational security* if any adversary \mathcal{A} that runs the attack in a time t(n) succeeds the attack with probability at most $\varepsilon(n)$; t and ε are functions of a computational security parameter n.

Statistical Security

A cryptographic construction satisfies $\varepsilon(\lambda)$ statistical **security** if any unbounded adversary \mathcal{A} succeeds the attack with probability at most $\varepsilon(\lambda)$; ε is function of a statistical security parameter λ .

- Introduces a *small* advantage $\varepsilon(\lambda)$ wrt the *a-priory* probability of winning



Statistical and computational security are both *relaxations* of information-theoretical security.

PPT (Probabilistic Polynomial in Time) Adversary

- t(n) is **polynomial** in n
- $\varepsilon(n)$ is **negligible** in n

Negligibility:

 $\forall p(n)$, $\exists n_d$ such that $\forall n \geqslant n_d$ it holds $\varepsilon(n) < 1/p(n)$ $p(n) = n^d$ and d constant

Examples:



1/2 , 1/n¹⁰⁰



 $1/2^{n}$, $p(n)/2^{n}$