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5

Warriors in the Capital

The Ashikaga and the Classical Ideal

THE KAMAKURA SHOGUNATE, which had been economically and politically weakened by the Mongol invasions of the late thirteenth century, was toppled in 1333 by a coalition of warriors fighting at the behest of Emperor Godaigo. Flushed with victory and determined to rule in the manner of a classical, Chinese-style sovereign, Godaigo sought to become the sole arbiter of formal rewards and commendations.¹ Provincial warriors seeking recognition and recompense for services rendered in the recent conflict were compelled to make the journey to Kyoto personally. Large-scale migration forced the greater capital basin to accommodate a sudden and dramatic influx of fighting men, and by no means were the newcomers kept outside the capital's traditional boundaries. On land adjacent to his own palace, Godaigo granted prime real estate to prominent generals such as Kusunoki Masashige (d. 1336) and Nawa Nagatoshi (d. 1336).² Former proscriptions on warriors in the capital appear to have had no meaning in the new order. Indeed, had Godaigo's regime prevailed, such circumstances might not have constituted a threat to imperial authority. In fact, it should have signified the advent of an even stronger centralized state, one able to accommodate and dominate political interests irrespective of their locations, inside or outside the capital. But alas, within three years of its proclamation, the restoration came crashing down. By the summer of 1335, Godaigo had been hounded out of Kyoto by the Ashikaga and their supporters, who quickly moved to replace him through the enthronement of Kōmyō (1321–1380), a prince from a rival branch of the imperial family. Meanwhile, the exiled Godaigo established

a “Southern court” in the mountains of Yoshino from which he and his successors challenged the primacy of Kyoto’s “Northern Court” for more than half a century.³ The war of attrition that ensued helped justify the establishment of a robust warrior regime in Kyoto. The general state of unrest that characterized the 1330s in fact transformed Kyoto into a cityscape infused with warriors and other “outsiders,” a circumstance that substantially eroded notions of capital exclusivity. Surprisingly, it was the Ashikaga who attempted to restore them.

This chapter begins by exploring the ways warriors interacted with Kyoto’s urban landscape following the establishment of the Ashikaga shogunate in 1336.⁴ Some of the regime’s earliest policies reveal a remarkable level of deference toward traditional spatial paradigms. Whereas the trend toward a greater level of inclusion had become inexorable by this period, warrior residence remained largely limited to the city’s margins. This tendency remained true even during the transformative reign of Ashikaga Yoshimitsu, the third and most powerful Ashikaga shogun. Yoshimitsu’s several large-scale building projects had a dramatic impact on Kyoto’s medieval urban landscape. Notably, however, not one was located within the classical city’s original boundaries. The shogun, it seems, remained reticent about violating the foundational taboo barring warriors and temples from the city. He even went so far as to defer to the court on questions of capital land distribution. The findings of this first section force a re-evaluation of the extent of Ashikaga assertiveness in medieval Kyoto, even at the zenith of the regime’s power. The standard narrative depicts the shogunate as a growing and eventually ineluctable force of political, economic, and physical change, one that ruled by fiat and according to supposedly unique “warrior” sensibilities. We discover here, however, evidence of a marked reluctance to violate age-old customs and a powerfully conservative impulse vis-à-vis capital spatial norms. This stance, it is argued, helped the Ashikaga gain legitimacy by enabling them to play the part of dutiful servants of the state.

The impulse to become fully endowed members of the state bureaucracy helps explain the findings of the second section, which show that successive Ashikaga leaders consistently built residential headquarters in the *shinden* style. Doing so endowed them with the architectural infrastructure necessary to conduct rituals of state that helped authenticate their membership in the imperial hierarchy. The findings reinforce the suggestion that the Ashikaga sought to

influence traditional spheres of influence through infiltration rather than coercion. This section also calls into question a widely accepted impression that the Ashikaga shoguns were pioneers of *shoin*-style architecture, the precursor of traditional Japanese residential architecture. As we shall see, to the extent that the Ashikaga shoguns built structures in that emerging style at all, they were more likely responding to pre-existing trends instead of forging new ones.

The same section concludes with a brief reflection on yet another way warriors used architecture to “build” legitimacy in medieval Kyoto. Following the establishment of the shogunate, the Ashikaga sought to transform the Tsuchimikado Palace in Kamigyō from a luxurious yet temporary imperial abode—a *sato-dairi*—into the official and permanent Imperial Palace, the *kōkyo*. The campaign was significant because it signaled the Ashikaga’s public acceptance of responsibility for the reigning emperor’s material well-being, a duty indicative of political primacy carried out with equal relish by the Fujiwara, Taira, and Minamoto before them. Just as important, any plan that contributed to a sense of imperial stability underscored the legitimacy of the Kyoto court (and its military protectors) vis-à-vis its “Southern” rivals.

The third section of this chapter looks more closely at the urban legacy of Ashikaga Yoshimitsu, this time to consider the possibility that the shogun had a master plan for medieval Kyoto that entailed a fundamental reorganization of capital space. A synthesis of textual and archeological evidence reveals that all the major building projects commissioned by Yoshimitsu—including several major temples, the Imperial Palace, and his own shogunal headquarters—lined up along a series of axes that together constituted a complex and highly contrived urban matrix. The evidence suggests the shogun was constructing a cityscape in which each of the powerful bodies of interest had a clearly defined place within the greater order, an order that he himself was defining and constructing in the process. While the calculated incorporation of *kenmon* into the capital’s urban landscape was novel, there was something deeply conservative about Yoshimitsu’s vision. By reorganizing Kyoto into a more unified political and material entity, he was restoring the classical ideal of monocentrism and turning back the clock on the nodal development that had for centuries made the city a fractured and pluralistic medieval landscape.

In the conclusion, we consider how the success of Ashikaga rule affected the discourse of capital exclusion. As the shogunate expanded its

power to eventually control all key matters of policy and the economy, the differentiation between *Rakuchū* and *Rakugai* became less emphatic, and from about the fourteenth century, those two words began appearing with the greatest frequency as part of a single, compound term signifying the entire capital basin: “*Rakuchū-Rakugai*.” No longer, it appears, was it necessary to sharply define spheres of autonomy and jurisdiction in an environment where there existed a strong centralized governing authority.

Restoring the Spatial Status Quo

The establishment of the Ashikaga shogunate in Kyoto can be interpreted as an extreme measure justified by the state of civil war that ensued following Godaigo's 1335 exile. Early shogunal authority was predicated upon the regime's role as protector of the Kyoto-based “Northern Court,” a duty that carried with it the obligation of safeguarding the traditional capital order. Accordingly, several of the shogunate's earliest policies impart a determination to redress matters related to court and aristocratic entitlement. Among these, one of the most urgent was the issue of land rights, which had been disrupted not only by Godaigo's failed experiment with direct imperial rule, but also by the preceding Kamakura shogunate.

Article 5 of the regime's founding legal document, the *Kenmu Formulary* (*Kenmu shikimoku*), addressed the issue of land in Kamigyō that had been confiscated from members of the aristocracy implicated in the 1221 plot to overthrow the Kamakura shogunate, the Jōkyū Disturbance.⁵ Acknowledging the “need to return vacant lots within the capital to their former owners,” the article can be interpreted as a gesture of conciliation to those elite families who had been disenfranchised by the former warrior polity. It sent a clear message to the emperor that the current regime was different from its predecessor because it was sympathetic to the interests of traditional capital elites.

The influx of warriors that occurred in the wake of Godaigo's restoration caused the displacement of thousands of commoners. The scale of the problem is captured in the following account of mass migration recorded in *Taiheiki*:

Once the eastern and western provinces were calm, the
[warrior] houses of Shōni, Ōtomo, Kikuchi, and Matsuura came

to the capital aboard more than seven hundred large boats. Nitta Sama'nosuke and his younger brother, Hyōgo'nosuke, arrived [leading] more than 7,000 cavalry. From all the other provinces too, it was as if not one [soldier] had been left behind. Kyoto and Shirakawa had become utterly inundated by warriors.⁶

Most of the newcomers found accommodations in Shimogyō through a sanctioned quartering system called *shitaku tenjō*, which permitted the temporary commandeering of commoner homes. Despite codes meant to ensure the right of return for the displaced, the practice resulted in the sudden and indefinite eviction of thousands.⁷ *Shitaku tenjō* is often cited as one of many ill-conceived policies of the Godaigo regime that led to widespread dissatisfaction. As a first step toward addressing the problem, Article 4 of the Kenmu Formulary specifically prohibited the commandeering of private homes by warriors. The article's concern for the former residents of houses "built by the diligent application of slender means" was as much a gesture of good will to Shimogyō's commoners as it was a sign of passivity toward the Kamigyō elite, many of whom continued to have vested economic interests in the area.⁸

For the shogunate, restoring and protecting capital land privileges meant, at times, giving precedence to the interests of traditional landowners even at the expense of the regime's own vassals. A dispute that unfolded between a shogunal deputy named Kogushi and the aristocratic house of Nakahara in 1367 indicates the kinds of problems the Ashikaga faced. In the autumn of that year, Kogushi began building a house in Shimogyō, claiming he had been ordered to do so by the shogun, Yoshiakira (1330–1367). The project, however, was put on hold and eventually canceled when Nakahara Moroshige (1312–1378), the head of the Nakahara family, lodged a complaint with Yoshiakira's office stating that the block in question had been under the proprietorship of the Nakahara for generations. "So vital is this particular plot to our family," Moroshige explained in a letter to the shogun, "the Nakahara are sometimes referred to as the 'Record Keepers of Sanjō,'" a toponym derived from the site's location along Sanjō Road. "We are talking about land with a name attached to it," Moroshige pleaded.⁹ The contest ended in victory for the Nakahara, whose traditional proprietary rites apparently trumped warrior priorities.¹⁰


Scholars who have considered warrior movement into the capital

after 1336 are quick to point out how the first functioning headquarters of the shogunate, the Sanjō-bōmon Palace, and most vassal residences were located in the district of Shimogyō. Not until Yoshimitsu moved to Kamigyō in 1378 do we find any significant or sustained warrior presence in that elite district. The prevailing argument holds that land in Shimogyō was relatively easy for warriors to acquire because it was populated predominantly by commoners.¹¹ There is an assumption that Kamigyō, with its high concentration of aristocrats, would have been much more difficult to break into. It should be remembered, however, that urban commoners in the fourteenth century did not generally own the land they occupied. Rather, in most cases they were tenants who leased plots from aristocratic or temple proprietors, the former of which usually lived in Kamigyō.¹² As we can see in the above case of Kogushi versus Nakahara, these aristocratic landowners were not only intent upon preserving their hold over Shimogyō real estate, in many cases they were exceedingly good at it. With this in mind, it becomes necessary to reconsider early Ashikaga gravitation toward Shimogyō. After all, having just noticed that one of the earliest policy objectives of the new regime was to roll back previous warrior advances in Kyoto, how then do we explain large-scale Ashikaga settlement there?

Answering this question requires careful consideration of precisely where warriors settled.¹³ Figure 5.1 shows the locations of known residences built by top Ashikaga generals during the 1350s.¹⁴ While it is clear that they—in addition to the regime’s headquarters at Sanjō-bōmon—were predominantly clustered south of Nijō in Shimogyō, it is notable that none stood within the most developed part of that district along Muromachi Road between Sanjō in the north and Gojō in the south (see Figure 3.7).¹⁵

5.1. Map of Kyoto in the 1350s, showing the residences of Ashikaga leadership. Shaded areas correspond to urbanized portions of the city during the Age of Warring States (1467–1580s).

The extent of early warrior peripherality comes into even sharper focus through an examination of Shimogyō’s size during the succeeding Age of Warring States (1467–1580s). During this long phase of protracted violence, the urbanized portions of Kyoto shrank and retreated into fortified islands surrounded by walls and moats. Within these makeshift urban fortresses, townspeople organized into grassroots self-governing bodies called “neighborhood federations” (*chō-gumi*), which provided for a degree of self-government amidst a largely un-governed urban landscape. If we make the safe assumption that the shrunken sections of wartime Shimogyō corresponded with the most highly developed core of the prewar district, we discover just how



marginalized Ashikaga leaders were during the 1350s (see Figure 5.1). Only one of the sixteen known residences was located within that central part of Shimogyō that, presumably because of its density and commercial importance, would retain its viability in the succeeding era. The rest were on the outside.

The shogunate's early policy objective of restoring and protecting land rights within the city meant, in certain cases, putting the claims of traditional landowners ahead of their own interests. The property dispute between Kogushi and Nakahara reminds us that much of the land in Shimogyō was actually under the proprietorship of members of the Kamigyō aristocracy. Their ability to successfully limit warrior residence in Shimogyō helped guarantee the district's continued commercial viability, a situation that benefited them and commoners alike. The above spatial analysis shows that whereas warriors did indeed settle in Shimogyō more than any other place in the capital basin, they did not penetrate the district's central area.

It is generally accepted that Yoshimitsu's decision to move to Kamigyō in 1378 was guided by an impulse to physically infiltrate the realm of high capital politics.¹⁶ In a well-cited essay, Kurokawa Naonori wrote that the building of the Muromachi Palace (Muromachi-dono) put Yoshimitsu in a position to conveniently "host, house, and keep watch over the emperor."¹⁷ While this assessment might be correct, it is critical not to assume proximity was of key political or even symbolic significance within the contemporaneous context. Indeed, if geography and location are to be read for their historical significance at all, the subtle spatial rules of the day must be considered with the utmost care. Kamigyō, for example, was the "elite district" to be sure, yet its status as such was purely informal. In fact, as a discrete entity, the enclave was little more than a cluster of dense development that from about the ninth century had been superimposed over the older and more formal northern boundary of the classical city's eastern half. In light of the evidence introduced in the previous chapter showing Heian-kyō's boundary still mattered at the time of the 1371 enthronement, it is notable that the Muromachi Palace, as well as each and every one of Yoshimitsu's other original projects in Kamigyō, were located north of Ichijō (see Figure 5.2). Having moved to the elite district, the shogun was indeed closer to the emperor and civil aristocracy. And yet, despite gaining the logistical and potentially symbolic advantages of proximity, he was unmistakably outside the formal boundaries of the capital.

5.2. Map of Kamigyō in the late fourteenth century. Asterisks indicate palaces of the civil aristocracy.



Whether or not Yoshimitsu would have been able to build his Muromachi headquarters within the old city is a hypothetical question that cannot be answered with known textual and archeological evidence. The shogun might have preferred land north of Ichijō for the same reasons civil aristocrats did when they began living in the area from as early as the late ninth century: land on the outside was exempt from the strict codes and customs of the capital proper. There, people could build whatever they wanted, irrespective of status-based prescriptions that dictated architectural styles and property sizes.¹⁸ The Muromachi Palace—covering nearly two whole city blocks in Kamigyō and possessing two complete and independent residential complexes (including a north and south *shinden*)—was massive by any standard. One wonders if a palace of this size and ostentation would not have been deemed unseemly, the loftiness of Yoshimitsu's formal status notwithstanding. Note too that while there were several other palaces in Kamigyō that were larger than a single block, not one was located south of Ichijō (see Figure 5.2). In this light, Yoshimitsu's move to Kamigyō begins to look more like an escape from the old capital than a move to be near the emperor.

Let us consider Yoshimitsu's two other major building projects in Kamigyō: the Zen monastery of Shōkokuji (completed 1382) and the seven-storied Shōkokuji Pagoda (completed 1399). The building of the former was a deeply disruptive affair for the residents of Kamigyō.¹⁹ In his journal, nobleman Ichijō Tsunetsugu (1358–1418) lamented the seizure of more than twelve city blocks for the temple's construction: "There has been no greater case of a relocation of both the high and low of this scale since the capital was transferred to Fukuhara [in 1168]."²⁰ People were apparently not the only ones to suffer. The project placed a significant burden on the environment as well.²¹ A contemporary diarist fumed in verse:

In the capital
Cypress and cedar exhausted
Lamenting the building of Shōkokuji.²²

We have no records of hardship caused by the building of the pagoda, but there can be little doubt that it too, occupying a whole block of prime Kamigyō real estate, was not a welcome newcomer. For as much strife as these two projects likely caused, it is important to note that

both, like the Muromachi Palace, were located north of Ichijō. We can safely assume the Heian-era principle of temple exclusion remained in force well into the fourteenth century.²³ Yoshimitsu was either unable or unwilling to change it.

A sequence of events recorded in the journal of Sanjō Kintada provides further evidence of Yoshimitsu's deferent posture vis-à-vis the emperor and court when it came to capital land. In the summer of 1381, Kintada was trying desperately to acquire a taxable plot in Shimogyō to provide income for his financially strapped family. Written with stirring poignancy, the narrative requires no commentary; it illustrates with unusual clarity Yoshimitsu's reticence about impinging upon what he saw as the prerogative of the emperor. The entries likewise highlight the complexity of the relationships between the emperor, members of the aristocracy, and the shogunate:

12th day [1381/8]: There has been much impropriety on our provincial lands. . . . Because of this, we are up to our necks in poverty. I sent a messenger to the Lord of Muromachi [Yoshimitsu] with an appeal requesting that a block of land in Shimogyō at Shijō-bōmon be deeded to our family and that the surrounding roads be made into thoroughfares. The reply [from Yoshimitsu] was as such: "Capital land is the concern of the emperor.²⁴ I, therefore, cannot grant your request. Shall I convey your desires to court?"

I sent another messenger to deliver a response. I wrote: "I am frightfully grateful to have received your reply. With this letter, I hereby request that you convey my desires to court."

Some time passed before word was sent [from Yoshimitsu to the court]. Then, Lord Madenokōji, the court's shogunal liaison, delivered to me an imperial document that read: "So that there shall be no ambiguity, you must lodge your petition with the court personally."

I sent my servant along with Lord Madenokōji accordingly. He is to go to court now and convey my desire for the block of land in Shimogyō.²⁵

20th day: About the land: Because no reply had yet arrived from the court, I inquired again with the shogunate yesterday. I submitted a letter conveying my hope that Yoshimitsu press the court for a decision. My letter was forwarded to Lord

Madenokōji who took it to the [imperial] palace in the early evening. I expressed my hope that my concerns be conveyed quickly.²⁶

22nd day: About the land: I have yet to receive the imperial reply via Lord Madenokōji. The emperor's will, however, has reached me discreetly through my daughter who is currently serving as an attendant in the Imperial Palace. I understand that the answer boils down to this: "In the end, the land within the capital is the business of the emperor (*kōke*). This goes without saying. Lodging your initial appeal with the shogunate was profoundly improper. Because there is someone [else] who has shown interest in this land before you, we must handle that request first. It has become necessary to explain this complication to the shogunate."

Appalling! The emperor is upset. Whatever can be done?²⁷

24th day: About the land. Again, the emperor's will has been conveyed through my daughter: "In the end, because your appeal was initially made to the shogunate, it is now necessary to issue an imperial decree to address the matter. A scribe was commanded to write the letter on behalf of the emperor. The reason no action has yet been taken [i.e., the reason we have not simply rejected your appeal out of hand] is because it seems to go against the wishes of the shogun. Regarding the imperial attendant [your daughter], from now on, she shall no longer function as a go-between and shall no longer come face-to-face with the emperor."

How unfortunate this is! It was naturally absurd of me to have prevailed upon the shogun in a matter that is entirely the concern of the court. Nevertheless, it is not as if there is no precedent. But now, the entire situation is blown out of proportion. It is not as if I have turned my back on the emperor. And why should a child be blamed for a father's faults? The emperor's thoughts on this issue are beyond reason. Our family is dreadfully poor. I just wanted some good fortune via the shogun [i.e. by using a shogunal route to present the petition].²⁸

11th month, 17th day: I requested that my petition for the property at Shijō be retracted. At any rate, I hear that the emperor will order that all land within the capital be returned to its original proprietors (*honshu*) in the coming days.


All concerned officials have been notified. . . . Because of Yoshimitsu's intervention, the land of Nijō Yoshimoto and myself will be spared. Nevertheless, it is the emperor's wish that I give up the land anyway. If I do not retract my request, it will create a situation of bad timing for my daughter. She was the one who first urged me to submit a retraction. The Shimogyō plot is poor land anyway, inappropriate to someone of my status. Still, words cannot capture the sentiments of the emperor.²⁹

"Building" Warrior Legitimacy

Cultural historians have long pointed to a dramatic transformation in the dominant style of elite residential architecture that took place during the period of Ashikaga rule. The standard narrative traces the displacement of *shinden* style by the newer *shoin* style (*shoin-zukuri*) in about the middle of the fifteenth century. Ashikaga shoguns are thought to have catalyzed this shift through their promotion of material culture and architecture inspired by a mixture of provincial rusticity and new continental influences.³⁰ Today, *shoin*-style architecture is so closely associated with medieval warriors that it is sometimes referred to as "warrior-style" (*buke-zukuri*) and its promotion in particular by the powerful and capital-dwelling Ashikaga is thought to have contributed to the undermining of classical building models.

The findings of this section show that the Ashikaga, rather than rejecting traditional building styles, actually embraced and celebrated them.³¹ To be sure, up until the outbreak of the Ōnin War in 1467, each of the shoguns carefully maintained a core contingent of *shinden*-style structures at their official Kyoto residences. Doing so enabled them to fulfill their ritual duties as members of the Ritsuryō hierarchy. At the same time, however, they were also willing adopters of new architectural forms. Like their aristocratic counterparts whose building practices were touched on in previous chapters, Ashikaga shoguns created residential venues well suited to a variety of social and political intercourse entirely outside the grammar of Ritsuryō comportment. Therefore, while the Ashikaga may be accurately credited with having contributed to the proliferation of *shoin* style, they were by no means its early pioneers nor its sole promoters.

Ashikaga Takauji did not settle permanently in Kyoto until 1344. When he finally did, it appears that the residence he built adhered to



5.3. Central *shinden* at Ashikaga Takauji's Kamigyō residence, ca. 1346, in *Mon'yōki, zuzō* (vol. 11, 605). Top of image is east.


exceptionally traditional models.³² A diagram of the central *shinden*'s plan drawn in 1346 shows that the building was a standard five bays (*ken*) wide and four bays deep (Figure 5.3).³³ Reticulating wooden shutters (*shitomido*) opened outward on the southern (front) and western sides, and an entrance corridor (*chūmon-rō*) extended to the south from the western side. All pillars were round and interior space was partitioned by a series of curtains alone. No permanent interior walls are apparent in the diagram and the accompanying text makes no mention of a *tsune-gosho*. In fact, the only known

non-*shinden*-style structure on the property was a small Buddhist reliquary (*shari-den*), which was the centerpiece of a private oratory.³⁴

The Sanjō-bōmon Palace, which was built by Ashikaga Tadayoshi (1306–1352) in about 1336 and served as the first functioning shogunal headquarters, likewise exhibited strong *shinden*-style traits.³⁵ Among them were a south-facing *shinden*, an opposing hall (*tainoya*), reticulating shutters, a cusped-gable roof (*kara-hafu*), and a hurdle veranda (*sunoko-en*) that opened onto a carriage port (*kuruma-dome*). A color illustration from the period confirms that the attached Ashikaga mortuary temple of Tōjiji possessed similar traits (Figure 5.4).³⁶ Its Buddha Hall (*Butsuden*) exhibited twin entrance corridors. While such a symmetry would have been typical of a temple or elite residence built in the eighth or ninth centuries, its implementation in the mid-fourteenth century was conspicuously reminiscent of a bygone era.³⁷

Soon after Ashikaga Yoshimitsu completed construction of the Muromachi Palace in the early spring of 1381, he used the compound to formally receive and entertain his first cousin, the emperor Goen'yū. A detailed account of the imperial visit refers to a central *shinden*, an inner gate, eastern and northern opposing halls, a circular corridor (*sukiwata-dono kairō*), and a fishing pavilion. Peripheral chambers (*hisashi*) were surrounded by a hurdle veranda (*hashinosunoko*), and reticulating shutters opened wide to a front garden.³⁸ The diarist gives special attention to the central *shinden* and garden, where several formal rituals were performed:

The palace, with its elevated connecting corridors (*sukiwata-dono*) and a fishing pavilion (*tsuri-dono*), is



5.4. Tōjiji-ezu, depicting the Sanjō-bōmon temple-palace complex (including Tōji Temple). Inscriptions around the margins are the signatures (*kaō*) of successive Ashikaga shoguns. Courtesy of Tōjiin Temple, Kyoto

surprising to the eyes. Water drawn from the Kamo River tumbles over rocks and babbles as it flows under the corridors. The sound, which blends with the wind in the pines, is most elegant. The ridgepoles of the central *shinden*, with their three and four-leaf decorations, are rumored to be newly crafted of cypress. This is all so very felicitous; the future indeed looks bright.

This account in *Sakayuku-hana* stands as a testament to Muromachi's adherence to *shinden*-style protocols. Indeed, the existence of a central *shinden* itself, augmented by opposing halls, a circular corridor, and

an inner gate, demonstrates that careful attention was paid to the classical building model. Yoshimitsu's apparent preference for *shinden* style has been widely interpreted as having been related to the shogun's intent to cast himself as a man of status and refinement on par with his aristocratic counterparts.³⁹ The underlying assumption is that a warrior such as Yoshimitsu would have been expected to build in the "warrior style" of *shoin-zukuri*. This logic, however, is flawed in several ways. First, it is problematic to strictly categorize Yoshimitsu as a "warrior." By the time Muromachi was completed, he had attained the rank of chief councillor of state (*gon-dainagon*) and as such was a fully vested member of the imperial court.⁴⁰ Second, as pointed out, members of the Ashikaga leadership had been building in the *shinden* style since at least the founding of the shogunate. Finally, and most important, *shoin* style did not emerge as a discrete architectural genre until about the second decade of the fifteenth century.⁴¹ Any assumption that Yoshimitsu should have built primarily in that style is therefore anachronistic.

But there is a more fundamental problem. The scholarship that treats Yoshimitsu's implementation of *shinden* style exhibits a misunderstanding about the genre's fundamental meaning. Its significance derived not from its conformity to subjective notions of opulence or fine living. Rather, it was its role as the prescribed venue of Ritsuryō ritual and performative statecraft that made it special and important.⁴² Yoshimitsu's use of *shinden* style, therefore, should be read more as the result of a compulsion to fulfill the ritual demands of his official station than merely an attempt to impress his peers.

The distinction being made is of profound interpretive significance. The creation of the Muromachi Palace coincided with Yoshimitsu's court promotion to chief councillor and his assertion of political independence from the regent Hosokawa Yoriyuki (1329–1392). The *shinden*-style complex functioned as a stage—physical, not metaphorical—upon which the rising star could publicly comport himself in the manner of a ranking court official. It was in these structures that he held, for example, a grand ceremony (*haiga*) in the seventh month of 1379 by which he formally conveyed his gratitude to the emperor for a recent promotion. Other events that required a *shinden*-style setting include the formal hosting of Emperor Goen'yū in 1381 and another *haiga* marking his promotion to grand chancellor of state in 1395.⁴³ In each of these cases, great care was taken to ensure that both the necessary architectural infrastructure and décor (*shitsurai*)

were in place to adhere to the strictest formalities of Ritsuryō pageantry and precedent. Muromachi's suitability as a venue of imperial functions is underscored by a decision made in 1401 that the palace should be used to house Emperor Gokomatsu (1377–1433) for an extended period while repairs were underway on the Imperial Palace.⁴⁴ Making the emperor comfortable was only part of the equation. Ensuring that he had the accoutrements necessary to fulfill his ceremonial duties as the sacerdotal head of state was paramount.

The several structures within the Muromachi complex that did not fit the *shinden*-style model have, to date, received more scholarly scrutiny than those that did. In particular, research has focused on the *kaisho* or “meeting place” that reportedly stood at the site.⁴⁵ While far too little information is available on this structure to examine its significance in full, there is one critical aspect that should not be overlooked: It was probably not built by Yoshimitsu. The structure first appears in documents from 1401, several years after Yoshimitsu moved to his retirement villa at Kitayama, thereby transferring both Muromachi and the post of shogun to his son, Yoshimochi (1386–1428).⁴⁶ The *kaisho* was Yoshimochi's preferred venue for social and political activity throughout the period. Indeed we have no evidence that he used the *shinden* at all prior to Yoshimitsu's death in 1408. Yoshimochi's avoidance of the Muromachi *shinden* might have been related to a perception that he should conduct business in a discreet, unofficial manner to avoid upstaging his father, who continued to wield ultimate power from retirement. For Yoshimochi, the *kaisho* constituted an ideal venue for low-profile social and political engagements, and it was his avid use of the structure that might help explain its later proliferation. Whatever the case, the observation that Yoshimitsu probably did not build the Muromachi *kaisho* throws into doubt the notion that the third shogun was a zealous proponent of new architectural styles.⁴⁷ We have no evidence, in fact, that he built any structures at Muromachi that departed from the *shinden*-style norm.

Yoshimitsu is well known for heavily patronizing the arts at his retirement villa in the northern hills of Kitayama during the opening years of the fifteenth century. The Golden Pavilion (Kinkaku shari-den), which remained standing at the site until its destruction by arson in 1950, was an emblem of “Kitayama culture,” a term used to describe forms of painting, performance, poetry, and tea connoisseurship that emanated from that period and place.⁴⁸ The Golden Pavilion's


implementation of both *shinden* and *shoin* architectural styles (in addition to a Zen-inspired third floor) is often read as indicative of the way Yoshimitsu deftly straddled the courtly and warrior worlds while facilitating a transition in architectural aesthetics from the former to the latter (pictured in Figure 4.4).⁴⁹ And the Kitayama *kaisho*, within which Yoshimitsu so famously entertained the emperor in 1408, is regularly pointed to as the inspiration for the proliferation of that type of building in later shogunal palaces. But for all of Kitayama's contributions to the most celebrated features of the period's culture, there were deeply conservative elements to the site that should not be overlooked.

First, the move to Kitayama must not be read as a rejection of Kyoto politics. The villa was by no means a place where Yoshimitsu lost himself entirely in the cultural and religious pursuits for which the site is so well known. On the contrary, Kitayama was first and foremost a *betsugyō* designed to empower its owner to comport himself in the manner of a retired court official with sustained political influence.⁵⁰ Within the grounds of the greater Kitayama Villa, there stood not one but three independent *shinden*-style complexes. These were the "Northern Palace" (Kita no dai), the "Southern Palace" (Minami no dai), and an additional complex farther south within which lived Fujiwara no Nakako (1339–1427), who was the grandmother of Emperor Gokomatsu and Yoshimitsu's maternal aunt.⁵¹ Most texts make only fleeting mention of the latter two complexes, and none include specific details about their appearances.⁵²

Far more is known of Kitayama's Northern Palace. Textual accounts consistently indicate the compound's importance as a venue for public ceremony and Ritsuryō-style rituals. "Annual observances" (*nenjūgyōji*) and Shingon rituals for the protection of the state (*gokoku butsuji*) took place regularly, and it was there where in 1407 Yoshimitsu's wife began the prescribed set of court formalities (*judai girei*) related to her being made surrogate mother of Emperor Gokomatsu.⁵³ In 1408, when the emperor visited Kitayama, the Northern Palace's central *shinden* was used to hold a series of events in which Yoshimitsu ceremonially received the emperor and accepted his tacit agreement to swiftly promote his favored second son, Yoshitsugu (1394–1418). The structure was also used to lodge the emperor throughout the nineteen-day stay.⁵⁴

Finally, and perhaps most dramatically, the Northern Palace was used to conduct international diplomacy. It was there where Yoshimitsu received envoys from both the Ming and Chosŏn courts on at least six

occasions between 1402 and 1407.⁵⁵ Sources are explicit about the lengths to which he went to ensure strict adherence to Ritsuryō precedent in each case. In preparation for the most important visit by Ming ambassadors in 1402, for example, the head abbot of Daigoji Temple was retained as a protocol adviser for the planning of everything from the approach and seating arrangements to décor and clothing. Every detail was meticulously choreographed to follow precedent set out by “former sovereigns” (*senkō*).⁵⁶ Matters of precedent were critical to members of the imperial hierarchy, for whom familiarity with and attention to the grammar of official pageantry were markers of status. Maintaining the proper architectural setting was one of several performative necessities. Texts confirm that the Northern Palace exhibited all the fundamental elements of a *shinden*-style complex, including a central *shinden*, an opposing hall, an entrance corridor, a central gate, and a “four-legged gate” (*yotsu-ashi-mon*).⁵⁷ Detailed descriptions of the central *shinden* refer to a hurdle veranda, a south-facing staircase, and the use of curtains, folding screens, and bamboo blinds to partition interior space.⁵⁸ Each of these traits is characteristic of early *shinden* style. Archeological data collected over the course of seven excavations conducted between 1988 and 1993 make it possible to reconstruct the layout of the central *shinden*.⁵⁹ Most striking about the plan, as recreated in Figure 5.5, is its traditionalism in an era of architectural evolution.



5.5. Central *shinden* at Kitayama Villa's Northern Palace (Kitayama Villa), ca. 1408.

Following Yoshimitsu's sudden and suspicious death in 1408, his son, Yoshimochi, moved from Muromachi to Kitayama. Almost immediately, however, he set into motion a plan to rebuild and reoccupy Sanjō-bōmon.⁶⁰ Completed in 1409, the reconstructed headquarters was used by successive shoguns Yoshimochi, Yoshikazu, and Yoshinori until 1431, when the latter rebuilt the Muromachi Palace and moved back to Kamigyō. The twenty-two years during which this Sanjō-bōmon Palace functioned without interruption as the shogunal headquarters was the single longest period of geographical stability for the regime during the entire era of Ashikaga rule.⁶¹

The latter Sanjō-bōmon Palace resembled Muromachi and Kitayama in the way it comprised two separate compounds, one consisting of a cluster of traditional *shinden*-style structures and the other several non-*shinden*-style structures. The former features prominently in documents that chronicle a succession of public events held between 1410 and 1430.⁶² Accounts consistently describe a central *shinden* flanked to the west by a nobles' hall and a vassals' hall (*zuishin-sho*). An entrance corridor extending to the south opened onto a carriage port. East of the *shinden* was a large, nine-bay opposing hall. High aristocracy entered the property from the west through a four-legged gate. All the elements of a typical *shinden*-style complex were present.

Descriptions of the two *kaisho* and two *tsune-gosho* on the property feature prominently in studies tracing the emergence of *shoin* style.⁶³ These three freestanding structures functioned as dedicated residential facilities. They were private, personal spaces used for eating, sleeping, and bathing. Occasionally, they functioned as waiting rooms for guests attending formal events.⁶⁴ The new Sanjō-bōmon complex is the earliest confirmed case where a dedicated, freestanding residential structure stood within an Ashikaga shogunal palace. As far as can be discerned from extant sources, all previous shoguns had lived within their respective central *shinden*, most probably within internal "regular palaces" (*tsune-gosho*) fashioned on the northern sides of those structures. The creation of dedicated living space was a development of critical significance because it extricated private space from the *shinden* entirely.

The building changes described here should be understood as part of a broader trend leading to the creation of increasingly function-specific space within elite residences. As we have seen, in about the tenth century, members of the Kyoto aristocracy began building oratories at their residential compounds to accommodate


private religious observances. Later, fountain pavilions (*izumidono*) and *kaisho* were introduced for entertainment and other informal functions. The necessities of private and daily affairs were accommodated through the creation of *tsune-gosho*, which again in their earliest forms were little more than rooms fashioned on the back sides of central *shinden*. Finally, as we see in the case of the latter Sanjō-bōmon Palace, living space eventually seceded from the *shinden* altogether with the creation of the freestanding *tsune-gosho* or perhaps a *shō-gosho* (minor palace).

This emergence of increasingly function-specific space should not be read as an abandonment of *shinden* style. On the contrary, it was a validation of its original significance. The creation of *kaisho*, *tsune-gosho*, and *shō-gosho* at Sanjō-bōmon, for example, restored that site's core *shinden*-style compound to its classical-era functional ideal as the exclusive and wholly dedicated venue for Ritsuryō rituals. Indeed, the documentary record confirms that the structures were used for those purposes exclusively.


In 1431, Ashikaga Yoshinori (1394–1441) abandoned Sanjō-bōmon in favor of a vastly upgraded Muromachi Palace. Although possessing a much larger and more opulent suite of *shoin*-style structures than its predecessors—including three *kaisho*, a *tsune-gosho*, and a *shō-gosho*—the new complex had at its core a cluster of *shinden*-style structures closely resembling those built by Yoshimitsu decades earlier (see Figure 5.6). It was within these that Yoshinori held, for example, the several formal celebrations (*taikyō*) that marked his successive promotions, first to the post of minister of the center and later to minister of the left.⁶⁵ Documents are explicit about how, on each of these occasions, ritual spaces were decorated in strict accordance with “noble precedent” (*kugyō girei ni shitagaubeku*).⁶⁶ In the case of the first *taikyō*, orders were given to intentionally imitate a similar investiture ceremony held in 1288 at a palace owned by the Konoe family of high aristocracy.⁶⁷

In 1458, just prior to his promotion


5.6 Grounds plan of Ashikaga Yoshinori's Muromachi Palace, ca. 1437. Karasuma Road was generally called “Imadegawa” north of Ichijō. After Nakamura, *Machiya no chashitsu*, 25



to minister of the center, Ashikaga Yoshimasa commissioned the production of a diagram of the Muromachi Palace as it appeared on the occasion of Yoshinori's 1432 *taikyō* (Figure 5.7). A full contingent of *shinden*-style structures is clearly visible, yet the illustration's most notable trait is how similar it is to a diagram of the Konoe residence dating from 1288 (Figure 5.8). Apparently, Yoshimasa sought to make his Muromachi Palace closely resemble that of his predecessor, Yoshinori (completed in 1431), which itself was a replica of a Konoe palace. The significance of this kind of architectural genealogy is in the identification of a conscious and sustained effort on the part of Ashikaga shoguns to adhere to traditional *shinden*-style models, irrespective of the contemporary proliferation of non-*shinden*-style structures.



5.7. *Muromachi-dono gotei taikyō sashizu*, diagram depicting the Muromachi Palace on the occasion of Ashikaga Yoshinori's promotion to great minister of the center in 1432. National Diet Library, Tokyo



5.8. Grounds plan of the Konoe Palace in 1288. From Ōta Seiroku, *Shinden-zukuri no kenkyū*, 710

The ineluctable decline of the imperial state's efficacy (and the rituals it perpetuated) had not deterred Yoshimasa from perpetuating *shinden* style at Muromachi. Why he did so, however, is unclear. Whereas previous shoguns had used their palaces to engage in traditional rituals with some regularity, Yoshimasa did not. In fact, there is no documentary evidence he conducted any such functions at Muromachi until as late as 1464. In that year, the newly retired Emperor Gohanazono (1419–1470) paid an official visit and was ceremoniously received at the central *shinden*.⁶⁸ The next time that structure appears in texts is three years later when the outbreak of the Ōnin War caused both Gohanazono and Emperor Gotsuchimikado (1442–1500) to flee their homes and take refuge there.⁶⁹

Despite his responsibility for the tensions that led to the outbreak of the war, Yoshimasa remained largely aloof of the conflict. In 1472, he took the tonsure and passed the post of shogun on to his son, Yoshihisa (1405–1489). The Muromachi Palace burned down four years later. Never again was an Ashikaga shogunal palace to possess a proper *shinden* or any of the standard ancillary structures. Yoshimasa retired to the Higashiyama Villa in 1483, where not a single *shinden*-style building was constructed. The Ashikaga, as a family and shogunate, never regained their former political influence.

As the frequency and perceived importance of Ritsuryō-style ritual waned during the medieval era, most *shinden*-style complexes were pared down while some were completely eliminated. In the Ashikaga shoguns, however, traditional elite architecture found a formidable ally. Not only did successive shoguns maintain the fundamental elements of *shinden* style, they went to great lengths to adhere to exceptionally retrospective models of form and function. By maintaining the style and using it to faithfully observe Ritsuryō customs, the Ashikaga continuously reaffirmed and authenticated their status as vested members of the imperial system.

In closing this section, it should be added that the use of architecture by Ashikaga leaders to “build” their legitimacy was not limited to the construction of their own palaces. To be sure, warrior patronage was instrumental in the commissioning of countless sites of imperial and religious importance both inside and outside the capital.⁷⁰ Within a decade of coming to power, for example, Takauji began advocating for the complete reconstruction of the Tsuchimikado Palace and the site’s formal elevation to the status of permanent imperial palace.⁷¹ To this end, blueprints were drawn up, a foreman appointed, and the site surveyed.⁷² Construction was to be funded by taxes collected from rice-producing lands designated specifically for the purpose.⁷³ Although progress was delayed until 1401, when a fire made reconstruction inevitable, the clamor that preceded it bespeaks a powerful and sustained impulse on the part of successive Ashikaga leaders to provide for the material well-being of the emperor.⁷⁴ Providing a degree of amenity and perhaps luxury to a reigning sovereign had symbolic and sentimental ramifications. Creating an official imperial palace, however, meant much more. It guaranteed that the infrastructure of ritualized imperial statecraft was in place and reliably stable. Like the Fujiwara before them, who had provided so many emperors with *sato-dairi*, the Ashikaga recognized the central importance of imperial pageantry to the maintenance of the Ritsuryō hierarchy. Constructing the venues within which that hierarchy could be validated and perpetually reiterated was critical to Ashikaga success in infiltrating and eventually dominating the highest realms of authority.

Yoshimitsu’s Urban Plan


The several monumental building projects commissioned by Ashikaga Yoshimitsu served to elevate the shogun’s status and facilitate the

long-term political success of his administration. As discussed, the reconstruction of the Imperial Palace made the shogun the primary guarantor not only of the emperor's living space but also of the most critical venues of imperial statecraft. The two temple projects of Shōkokuji and the Shōkokuji Pagoda constituted massive patronage of the Buddhist establishment. And finally, the Muromachi Palace, built in a grand, traditional style in the elite district of Kamigyō, undoubtedly elevated the profile of the warrior administration while providing the shogun himself with the formal and informal venues necessary to behave in the manner expected of a high-ranking member of the court.

A large body of scholarship has explored the styles and functions of these several sites individually. The significance of their locations, however, has only recently been examined.⁷⁵ That the historical relevance of location has been overlooked is a grave mistake in a city like premodern Kyoto, where notions of space, place, and orientation were deeply tied to pageantry as a function of status.⁷⁶ But there is an additional problem. It is assumed that because Yoshimitsu possessed the political and economic capacity to build what he wanted, anywhere he wanted, his decisions about what and where to build were arbitrary. Again, in a city such as this and with a man as political savvy as Yoshimitsu, we should assume quite the contrary. It would be more likely that the shogun carefully considered how certain structures and locations would be perceived as indicators of his status and role. A recent mapping exercise, made possible by new textual and archeological discoveries, showed precisely this, revealing that Yoshimitsu's several Kamigyō projects were not only strategically located, they were arranged according to a highly contrived matrix indicative of sweeping political objectives (Figure 5.9).⁷⁷

It was first noticed that Shōkokuji's great Mountain Gate (*sanmon*) and the seven-storied pagoda were aligned perfectly along an east-west axis. This same axis, when extended to the west, bisected the northern half of the Muromachi property, the portion generally thought to have been used as Yoshimitsu's official residence.⁷⁸

Drawing a north-south meridian on the map through the center of the Mountain Gate reveals yet another equally extraordinary configuration, one far too well constructed to be coincidental: Shōkokuji's Dharma Hall, Buddha Hall, and Mountain Gate were aligned along an axis that, when extended to the south, perfectly intersected the Imperial Palace's *shi-shinden*, the emperor's most important ritual structure



and site of the official throne room. Incidentally, this clean alignment of Shōkokuji and the Imperial Palace remains unchanged to this day, only slightly corrupted by several reconstructions.

Attention to the distance between the three east-west-aligned sites first mentioned leads to the discovery of a second north-south axis. Note how the Muromachi Palace's northern *shinden*, the Mountain Gate, and the seven-storied pagoda did not stand at an equal distance from each other. Rather, the Mountain Gate is offset slightly to the west of the point of equidistance. That point does, however, line up with another structure of significance: the monastery's functional outer gate, the *sōmon*, or "Main Gate." By drawing an additional north-south line through the Main Gate leading south, past the Imperial Palace, down into Shimogyō, an astonishing intersection emerges: Shōkokuji's Main Gate, the monastery's "front door," was aligned with the Ashikaga mortuary temple of Tōjiji and the original Sanjō-bōmon Palace, the first Ashikaga headquarters in Kyoto.

Textual sources frequently refer to what might best be characterized as buffer zones associated with each of Yoshimitsu's several projects.⁷⁹ The Imperial Palace, for example, was surrounded by a semiprotected area referred to as "Jinchū," meaning "within the encampment."⁸⁰ Guards were stationed at outer gates, and fires or crimes that occurred within were lamented for the danger or disrespect they posed to the palace. A similar though asymmetrical buffer was likewise attached to the Shōkokuji monastery. Bounded in the north by the monastery's Main Gate and in the south by another gate called Hokkai-mon (lit. "Dharma World Gate"), this so-called "Realm of Mystical Adornment" (Myōshōgon-iki), covered an area equivalent to a generous nine city blocks (more than thirty-two acres). Referred to in sources as an integral but not a core part of Shōkokuji, this "Realm" might be compared to the common medieval phenomena of *monzen-machi*, or "town in front of the gates," discussed in chapter 3. Similar associated spaces appear to have extended southward from both the Muromachi Palace and the seven-storied pagoda. Texts confirm that the former possessed a detached and wholly symbolic outer gate located on Ichijō Road near the intersection of Muromachi. Like the Hokkai-mon, also located along Ichijō, it too marked entry into a liminal space through which visitors would pass on their way to the respective primary structure three blocks to the north.

5.9. Map of Yoshimitsu's urban matrix, ca. 1400.

Although a similar detached gate for the pagoda has not yet been discovered, the robust symmetry of the overall plan strongly suggests one stood near the intersection of Ichijō and Higashikyōgoku. Had there actually been such a gate, the lining up of the three symbolic and detached egresses along Ichijō, Heian-kyō's northern boundary, stands as further evidence of Yoshimitsu's sensitivity toward the old city's spatial customs. While he relegated his warrior headquarters and major temple projects to the capital's outskirts, symbolic gateways leading to each provided perfect continuity connecting the latter to the former. Not only were Yoshimitsu's projects carefully arranged vis-à-vis each other, their locations took into account the classical city at a time when we might otherwise have expected such considerations to be long gone.

Interpreting Yoshimitsu's urban plan is difficult because many integral elements of the plan itself are likely buried under the modern cityscape. Indeed, much of the picture is yet to be revealed. Nevertheless, the evidence already uncovered makes it possible to propose that Yoshimitsu saw himself as a political unifier intent upon reversing the trend toward ever greater degrees of fragmentation that characterized the medieval status quo. Until his time, power in the capital was largely a matter of contest between the imperial court, various private interests (aristocratic and warrior alike), and each of the several powerful Buddhist sects. Throughout much of his career, even the imperial institution itself had remained divided. The urban plan introduced here suggests that Yoshimitsu sought to reimagine Kyoto as an integrated whole within which each of the powerful bodies of interest had a clearly defined place. The physical alignment of buildings reflected a more political, even philosophical, alignment of institutions that the hegemon was engineering through his strategic engagement in the workings of each. Yoshimitsu was, after all, not just shogun, the supreme leader of the military regime, he also became grand chancellor of state, the highest-ranking member of the imperial court. Not merely did he house, patronize, and protect the emperor, he negotiated the reunification of the imperial lineages in 1392, thus ending the civil war that had divided the institution for more than half a century. Besides being the pre-eminent patron of the Shōkokuji Pagoda when that structure was ceremoniously dedicated in 1399, he served as chief witness in the formal ritual, a role customarily filled by a cloistered prince acting in the guise of a Shingon priest. And finally, upon retirement, Yoshimitsu

took the tonsure and became (at least ostensibly) a Zen priest affiliated most closely with the monastic community based at Shōkokuji.

Although profoundly different from its classical counterpart, medieval Kyoto under Yoshimitsu resembled Heian-kyō in one critical way: The city was once again a unified, largely symmetrical urban matrix, centered on the imperial palace. This urban plan can be easily read as a homology for the way this remarkable historical figure succeeded in unifying the capital's several bodies of authority. Yoshimitsu not only defined the interrelationships between these bodies—physically and politically—he effected a degree of unification among them. Besides the city itself, he was, after all, the one thing they all had in common.

Conclusion

The eventual success of Yoshimitsu and his immediate successors in dominating both the military and imperial realms of politics resulted in the creation of a stronger and more effective central governing apparatus. Even the challenges presented by religious establishments decreased leading up to the early fifteenth century, due in part to growing Ashikaga control over sectarian hierarchies through the strategic placement of shogunal offspring into positions of temple leadership.⁸¹ Before becoming the eighth shogun in 1428, for example, Ashikaga Yoshinori himself had attained the lofty post of supreme abbot (*zasu*) of the Tendai sect on Mount Hiei. While the Ashikaga are well known for delegating authority over the provinces to their appointed deputies (*shugo*), the kind of full-spectrum dominance they came to enjoy in and around Kyoto resulted in a political and urban landscape more unified and centralized than it had been since perhaps the eighth-century reign of Emperor Kanmu.

Within this context, there was a further evolution in the discourse of capital space. Two centuries earlier, the distinction between Rakuchū and Rakugai had served to insulate a core portion of the city and assert the continued viability of capital institutions. In the late fourteenth century, however, as power became increasingly consolidated, the issue of exclusion became less relevant. No longer was it necessary to clearly define spheres of autonomy and jurisdiction in an environment in which the shogunate—now firmly based in Kyoto and functioning in unison with the imperial and religious establishments—had become the undisputed hegemon both within the capital and beyond. Such a

circumstance helps explain why, from about the last decade of the fourteenth century, a wide variety of official documents began referring to the areas of Rakuchū and Rakugai as if in the same breath. Combined into a single compound word, “Rakuchū-Rakugai” became the most commonly used signifier for the capital basin, a broad area where taxes, policies, and central governance applied (more or less) uniformly.⁸²

The rise of shogunal power had been made possible, in part, by the Ashikaga’s demonstrated respect for traditional capital norms. After all, protecting the capital and its institutions was, ostensibly, the military regime’s *raison d’être*. Early on, such protection meant upholding the principles of capital exclusion by defending Rakuchū from the many and various invaders it faced, including rioting sectarians, rebellious warriors, and even rival claimants to the throne. Ashikaga shoguns went so far as to limit their own presence and prerogatives within Kyoto. Once the various threats were eliminated, however, capital institutions could return to an earlier status whereby they exercised direct control over an area that, although not the entire country, was much broader than the narrow confines of Rakuchū. The composition of capital institutions, however, had changed profoundly in the interim. Endowed with imperial ranks and posts as well as with the infrastructure necessary to engage in ritualized pageantry, the leaders of the warrior regime had infiltrated and co-opted the statutory state. In sum, Ashikaga shoguns had come to engender “capital authority” and in that capacity had greatly consolidated and expanded “Kyoto’s” political reach.