




Implementing Segmentation in Industrial Networks

Andrew McPhee - IIoT Security Solution Manager
BRKIOT-2882



Webex App

Questions?


Use the Webex app to chat with the speaker after the session


How

- 1 Find this session in the Cisco Events mobile app
- 2 Click “Join the Discussion”
- 3 Install the Webex app or go directly to the Webex space
- 4 Enter messages/questions in the Webex space

Webex spaces will be moderated by the speaker until February 28, 2025.

CISCO Live!





Agenda

- Introduction
- Identifying the Assets
 - Virtual Segmentation
- The role of Firewalls in OT
- Network as an Enforcer
- Segmenting the Users
- Q&A


Introduction

State of Industrial Networking 2024

Insights from over 1000 operational leaders, across 17 countries and 20 industries



Which types of industrial/OT infrastructure are receiving the most investment in your organization currently? Select up to three.



Attackers are taking advantage of poor connectivity

Clorox says sales and profit took a big hit from cyberattack

Johnson Controls Ransomware Attack: Data Theft Confirmed,

World's Critical Infrastructure Suffered 13 Cyber Attacks Every Second in 2023

Jan 29, 2024

Cyberattacks on CNI surge by 30% in 2024, study reveals

The report by KnowBe4 details the significant rise in attacks on essential sectors - with the US power grid providing especially vulnerable.

Suzuki Motorcycle India breach forces plant shutdown

Simpson Manufacturing Takes Systems Offline Following Cyberattack


Simpson Manufacturing is experiencing disruptions after taking IT systems offline following a cyberattack.

cisco Live!

BRKIOT-2882

Over 50% of incidents occurred in process and discrete manufacturing in 2023

OT Reported Incidents since 2010



Security guidelines can often make cybersecurity seem complex

NIS2

- 46 Articles
- 144 Recitals
- 3 Annexes
- 40000+ words

And yet, industry is still asking
what do I need to comply?

Can I follow IEC 62443?

IEC 62443

- 14 documents
- Product Compliance
- System Compliance
- Zones & Conduits or Zero Trust?

What about NIST?

NIST SP 800-82

- 300+ Pages
- 1 of 200+ special publications

Current OT security themes from our customers



Scalable Visibility

"High cost of SPAN networks, as there are an order of more assets in OT than in IT"



Adaptive Segmentation


"Avoiding downtime when enforcing segmentation policy for IEC-62443 zones & conduits"



Cross-Domain SOC


"Difficulty in tracking lateral movement of threats propagating between IT and OT"

Cisco Industrial Threat Defense




Network as a fabric to secure OT at scale

What Industry says about Segmentation



The Purdue Model




- No direct communication between IT (level 4 & 5) & OT (level 0 – 3)
- IDMZ services (level 3.5) are recommended to be segmented from each other
 - i.e. each service in its own VLAN and terminates at the firewall
- OT consists of site operations zone (level 3) and Cell/Area zone (level 0-2)

TSA definition of a Critical Cyber System

“Critical Cyber System means any Information or Operational Technology system or data that, if compromised or exploited, could result in operational disruption. Critical Cyber Systems include those business services that, if compromised or exploited, could result in operational disruption.”

- TSA Security Directive 1580/82-2022-01A


IEC 62443 Zones & Conduits



- **Zone:** Collection of entities that represent a partitioning of a System under Consideration (SUC) based on their **functional, logical and physical (including location)** relationship that share common security requirements
- **Conduit:** Physical or logical grouping of communication channels, intermittent or permanent, between **connecting a zone with another zone or with the outside that share common security requirements**
- The intent is to **identify those assets which share common security characteristics in order to establish a set of common security requirements that reduce cybersecurity risk**

NIST Zero Trust Guidance is practically the same

ISA/IEC 62443



NIST Zero Trust Guidance


3.1.2 ZTA Using Micro-Segmentation

An enterprise may choose to implement a ZTA based on placing individual or groups of resources on a unique network segment protected by a gateway security component. In this approach, the enterprise places infrastructure devices such as intelligent switches (or routers) or next generation firewalls (NGFWs) or special purpose gateway devices to act as PEPs protecting each resource or small group of related resources. Alternatively (or additionally), the enterprise may choose to implement host-based micro-segmentation using software agents (see Section 3.2.1) or firewalls on the endpoint asset(s). These gateway devices dynamically grant access to individual requests from a client, asset or service. Depending on the model, the gateway may be the sole PEP component or part of a multipart PEP consisting of the gateway and client-side agent (see Section 3.2.1).

This approach applies to a variety of use cases and deployment models as the protecting device acts as the PEP, with management of said devices acting as the PE/PA component. This approach requires an identity governance program (IGP) to fully function but relies on the gateway components to act as the PEP that shields resources from unauthorized access and/or discovery.


The key necessity to this approach is that the PEP components are managed and should be able to react and reconfigure as needed to respond to threats or change in the workflow. It is possible to implement some features of a micro-segmented enterprise by using less advanced gateway devices and even stateless firewalls, but the administration cost and difficulty to quickly adapt to changes make this a very poor choice.

Segmentation Phases



Virtual Segmentation

- Visualizing the zones and conduits model and reacting to data observed between zones



Macro Segmentation

- Pushing policy across “large” zones (production lines or cell/area zones)
- IDF is typically point of VLAN termination and is a conditioned space




Micro Segmentation

- Pushing policy across “small” zones
- Segmentation within Cell/Area Zone

Identifying the Assets


Leverage the network as a sensor to lower cost and complexity



Why is a network-sensor important?


Distributed edge active discovery gives you 100% visibility

Centralized active discovery cannot see behind firewalls and NAT boundaries



Other solutions

Active discovery by edge sensors can see more



Cisco Cyber Vision

Cyber Vision

Manage risks from OT assets with full visibility on your OT security posture

- Asset Inventory & Profiling
- Asset Communications
- Asset Vulnerabilities
- Asset Risk Scores
- Behavior Baselining
- Snort Threat Detection
- Talos Threat Intelligence


CISCO Live!

Cyber Vision Center



Deep Packet Inspection & Active Discovery
built into your network infrastructure

Easy to deploy in Brownfield and Greenfield environments



- Network-sensors embedded in Cisco networking for simple and highly scalable deployments
- Hardware or Virtual sensors capturing traffic on any switch with a single hop SPAN to support brownfield deployments
- On-Center sensor to leverage existing SPAN infrastructures, or collect traffic within the datacenter

Cyber Vision offers flexible deployment options

Cisco Cyber Vision portfolio

Center

Sensors

Hardware Appliance


UCS based servers with Hardware RAID



CV-CNTR-M6N
• 24 core CPU
• 128 GB RAM
• 3.2TB drives

Software Appliance

Virtual Machines



VMWare ESXi OVA



HyperV VHD



Amazon Web Services



Microsoft Azure

Minimum requirements
x386 server CPU, 10 cores
32GB RAM and 1TB SSD
1 or 2 network interfaces

Minimum requirements
x386 server CPU, 10 cores
32GB RAM and 1TB SSD
1 or 2 network interfaces



Catalyst IE3300 and IE3400 Switches



Catalyst IE3400HD IP67 Switch



Catalyst IR1101 Cellular Router




Catalyst IR8300 Multiservice Router



Catalyst IE9300 Rugged Switches



Catalyst 9300/9400 Aggregation Switches



x86 or ARM64 Compute



IC3000 Industrial Compute

Network-Sensors

DPI and active discovery built into network-elements eliminating the need for SPAN

Docker Sensor

DPI and active discovery via SPAN to support brownfield

Hardware-Sensor

Visibility into connected industrial assets

Asset Inventory

Automated inventory of all assets in your environment with detailed and up to date profile information

Communication Patterns

Dynamic map of all communication activities with detailed application flow level information

Asset Inventory

Component
Rockwell Automation
1769-L16ER/B LOGIX5316ER
Paint_Line_2 high
IP: 192.168.249.50
MAC: f4:54:33:91:cbee
[Edit](#) [Manage group](#)

First activity Apr 14, 2021 11:45:12 AM
Last activity Apr 16, 2021 11:00:01 AM

Tags
Controller, Rockwell Automation
Activity tags
Stop CPU, Diagnostics, Read Var, Write Var, Low Volume ...
14 Flows
9 Events
10 Vulnerabilities
Variable

Basics Security Activity Automation

Properties Tags Sensor

Properties

vendor-name: Rockwell Automation	enip-status-ra-minor: RUN
fw-version: 31.011	enip-cpuName: SecDemo_Li
model-ref: 1769-L16ER/B LOGIX5316ER	enip-serial: 60771949
serial-number: 60771949	enip-status-ra-major: REM
name: 1769-L16ER/B LOGIX5316ER	vendor: Rockwell Autom
ip: 192.168.249.50	name-vendorId: Rockwell I
public-ip: no	name-enip: 1769-L16ER/B
mac: f4:54:33:91:cbee	enip-name: 1769-L16ER/B
	enip-deviceType: Programma
	enip-productCode: 0x99
	enip-version: 31.011
	enip-vendor: Rockwell Aut

Communication Map

Drilling Machine

Siemens 192.168.105.150
PLC_3
Siemens 192.168.105.75
PLC_1
Dell 192.168.105.241
S7-400 station_1
Super 192.168.105.1

Identify & Track Vulnerabilities

Vulnerability Detection

Identify known asset vulnerabilities so you can patch or protect them before they are exploited

The screenshot shows the Cisco Vulnerability Manager interface. The left sidebar displays network and component tags, along with activity and group tags. The main dashboard shows a summary of 73 vulnerabilities, with a donut chart indicating their severity distribution: Critical (black), High (red), Medium (orange), Low (yellow), and None (green). A table below lists the top 10 most matched vulnerabilities, each with its CVE ID, title, CVSS score, and affected components. The total number of vulnerable components for the subnet is 9.


73 Vulnerabilities

10 most matched vulnerabilities

Vulnerability title	CVE	CVSS score	Affected components
Multiple Denial of Service Vulnerabilities on Siemens devices using the PROFINET Discovery and Configuration Protocol	CVE-2017-2680	6.5 (v3)	3 components
Siemens Products CVE-2017-12741 Denial of Service Vulnerability	CVE-2017-12741	7.5 (v3)	3 components
Denial-of-Service Vulnerability in Profinet Devices	CVE-2019-10936	7.5 (v3)	3 components
Yokogawa CENTUM 'BKHOdep.exe' Stack Based Buffer Overflow Vulnerability	CVE-2014-0783	9.0 (v2)	2 components
Yokogawa CENTUM BKFSim_vhfd.exe Buffer Overflow - Packet Storm	CVE-2014-3888	8.3 (v2)	2 components
Schneider Electric Modicon Modbus Protocol Multiple Authentication Bypass Vulnerabilities	CVE-2017-6032	5.3 (v3)	2 components
Yokogawa CENTUM 'BKEsimgr.exe' Stack Based Buffer Overflow Vulnerability	CVE-2014-0782	0.0 (v2)	2 components

Filtering and Grouping

Filters allow the user to customize how assets are displayed and grouped



The screenshot shows a filtering interface with the following criteria:


- Criteria**:
 - Select all | Reject all | Default
 - Search criteria
- RISK SCORE**:
 - ✓1
- NETWORKS**:
 - + Add network criterion
 - External communications
 - 10.17.10.0/24
- DEVICE TAGS**:
 - ✓3 X1
 - Devices without tags
 - Device - Level 0-1
 - Device - Level 2
 - Device - Level 3-4
 - Network analysis
 - Software
 - System

Filter Criteria

Filter Category	Function	Examples
1	Risk Score	Filters components by risk score range
2	Networks	Filters components by VLAN and/or subnet
3	Device Tags	Filter devices using device tags such as Purdue level, device type, system manufacturer
4	Activity Tags	Filter by tags assigned to observed flows such as control system behavior or industrial protocols
5	Groups	Filter by user created tags
6	Sensors	Filter by Cisco Cyber Vision sensor


Aggregated activities match IEC62443 conduits

Unaggregated



View all asset relationships

Aggregated



Easily browse through conduits


Visualize Zones & Conduits

Zones


View simplified maps of grouped assets as zones

Conduits

Identify communications across zones to ensure valid flows don't get blocked when implementing segmentation




The role of Firewalls in OT



Cisco Industrial Threat Defense

Asset Visibility & Security Posture

Cisco Cyber Vision




Network embedded CV Sensor

Zero Trust for OT

Zero Trust Network Access

Cisco Secure Equipment Access




Network embedded ZTNA Gateway

IEC 62443 Zones & Conduits

Cisco Secure Firewall




Zone-1



Cisco ISE



Zone-2



Network enforced segmentation

Cross-Domain Detection, Investigation & Response


splunk>
a CISCO company



Visibility across the entire attack chain


Network as a fabric to secure OT at scale

Re-visiting the Purdue Model




- Firewalls are usually the first point of contact between IT and OT domains
- Firewalls are used to segment DMZ applications from each other
- Deny by Default policy, only allow trusted communication through

Going beyond the IDMZ




- Most manufacturing networks have a distribution network (IDF) in a conditioned space
- VLANs terminate at the IDF to go east/west across Cell/Area Zones

Where to place a firewall?




- In front of the Industrial Data Center
 - Protects critical infrastructure from applications in the IDC
 - IDC servers are typically the candidates for cloud / IT access to subject to a wider attack surface
 - Limits the impact a vulnerability in the IDC can have on the critical infrastructure

Where to place a firewall?




- Terminate OT VLANs
 - All VLANs in the OT network will terminate at the firewall
 - Traffic that crosses VLAN boundaries will be subject to firewall rules
 - Great choice for well architected networks

Where to place a firewall?




- Transparent Firewall before distribution layer
- Catalyst switching continues to terminate VLANs
- Transparent firewalls will also capture inter-VLAN connection
- Great for existing environments to bolt security on

Dynamic Attributes in Cisco Secure Firewall



Cisco Secure Dynamic Attributes Connector (CSDAC)



Dynamic Objects in Action



Cisco Secure Dynamic
Attributes Connector

REST API
(Add 10.0.0.5 to Workload_A)




SFTunnel Update
(Without policy deployment)


#	Name	Source Networks	Dest Networks	Dest Ports	Source Dynamic Attributes	Destination Dynamic Attributes	Action	...
Mandatory - Secure Policy (1-1)								
1	Workload A	Any	Any	HTTPS	Any	Workload_A	Allow	...

Dynamic Object	Content:
Workload_A:	10.0.0.4 10.0.0.5

Dynamic Feed Update




Firewalls in Industrial Networks



Name	Action	Source	Destination	App
Cell1-Cell2	Deny	VLAN10	VLAN20	any
Cell2-Cell1	Deny	VLAN20	VLAN10	any

Dynamic Attribute Example: Interlocking PLC



Name	Action	Source	Destination	App
PLC-PLC	Allow	C1_PLC	C2_PLC	CIP
Cell1-Cell2	Deny	VLAN10	VLAN20	any
Cell2-Cell1	Deny	VLAN20	VLAN10	any

Supported Connectors

CSDAC 3.0.0 release adds Cyber Vision

Cloud Connectors



Azure



Azure Service
Tags



vCenter/
NSX-T




GCP



AWS

Cisco IIoT Connector



Cyber Vision

Public Feeds Connectors



O365



GitHub



Webex




Zoom




Generic
TXT


Cisco Secure Dynamic Attributes Connector Cyber Vision Integration



Network as an Enforcer

A series of overlapping, rounded blue shapes resembling waves or hills, positioned on the right side of the slide. They transition from a bright cyan at the base to a deep navy blue at the top, set against a dark navy background.


TrustSec Case Study: Car Manufacturer



Cisco Proposed Solution

- Network designed based on C9300 distribution layer and IE3400 switches on the plant floor
- Cyber Vision deployed on C9300 & IE3400 switches for visibility to the security posture of OT assets
- Cyber Vision visibility used to drive zone level segmentation on IE3400 switches in the OT network using Cisco ISE and TrustSec

9 Use Cases for Securing Industrial Networks




1. All devices within a zone can communicate freely
2. Deny by default across zone
3. Convenience Port within a zone
4. Engineering workstations to all devices within designated zones
5. Superusers - named employees to all devices
6. IT applications have restricted access to all zones
7. Vendor applications to specified machines
8. Communication of named devices between zones (e.g. Interlocking PLC)
9. Remote Access to single application temporarily

ISE Segmentation Technologies

VLANs


Dynamic VLAN Assignments



Per port / Per Domain / Per MAC


ACLs: DL, Named, DNS

Downloadable ACL (Wired) or
Named ACL (Wired + Wireless)



Scalable Group Tags


Cisco Group-Based Policy



16-bit SGT assignment and
SGT based Access Control


What are Security Group Tags (SGTs)?

Role Based Access Control embedded in the network



Zones & Conduits with SGTs

ISA/IEC 62443




TrustSec Matrix

	Enterprise	DMZ	IDC	Cell 1	SIS
Enterprise	✓	✗	✓	✗	✗
DMZ	✗	✓	✓	✗	✗
IDC	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗
Cell 1	✗	✗	✓	✓	✗
SIS	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓

Cisco TrustSec – Key Concepts Review


Classification, Propagation and Enforcement



Case Study Takeaway


Define TrustSec Domain based on requirements

Use case #1: All devices within a Zone should be able to communicate freely




- If my TrustSec domain resides within a Cell/Area Zone, I must create policy to allow communication through the switches
 - More on this later!

How do we classify an SGT?




- Static Classification options:
 - VLAN to SGT
 - Subnet to SGT
 - IP to SGT
 - Interface to SGT
- Static classification can be done directly on a switch, or centrally in ISE
- Dynamic Classification is done via Authentication to ISE

Cisco TrustSec – Hybrid Macro / Micro Segmentation



Use Case #8:

Communication of named devices between zones is allowed




- Zone 1 → Zone 2 is denied
- Zone 1 PLC → Zone 2 PLC is allowed

Dynamic Classification of SGTs in ISE




Least Privilege Access: Expectation vs. Reality


Expectation



Reality



Use Visibility to Influence Segmentation



CISCO Live!

Visualize Zones & Conduits



Group endpoints into zones to visualize aggregated flows as conduits to inform segmentation policy

Dynamic SGT Mapping




Cyber Vision grouping results in dynamic Group-based policy assignment to endpoints through ISE

Monitor Before Enforcement



Visualize Group-based network behavior in Catalyst Center and enable enforcement when confident after monitoring

Change of Authorization (CoA)



Case Study Takeaway

Reduce complexity by creating SGTs based on Privileges instead of device type

Device Type

Vision Cameras, Barcode
Scanners, Controllers,
Convenience port, Drive, HMI,
Industrial Printer, Laser Systems,
Inverters, Leak Tester, PLC
Interlock, IO, Private IO, Press
controllers, Process Servers, RFID
modules, Security Cameras,
Torque Tools, Robots, Andon,
Process PC, ...

SGT

Cell/Area Zone devices
Interlock
Workstation



Case Study Takeaway

Classification depends on asset capabilities and “role”

Static assignment based on location

OT device in body area




OT device in painting area



Use the network to answer: “Where are you?” (VLAN or Subnet)

Assignment for “named” devices

OT device in body area



This is an interlocking PLC

Use Cyber Vision to “promote”/change device tag

Dynamic assignment for users




I am an admin



I am a contractor



Dynamic assignment for OT devices




It is a Fanuc Robot



Use device attributes (ISE) and communication patters (Cyber Vision) to profile device

TrustSec Propagation


DATA PLANE PROPOGATION (INLINE TAGGING)



SGT carried inline in the data traffic. Methods include, SGT over:

- Ethernet
- MACSec
- LISP/VxLAN
- IPSec
- DMVPN
- GETVPN


CONTROL PLANE PROPOGATION (SXP)



IP-to-SGT data shared over control protocol. No SGT in the data plane. Methods include, IP-to-SGT exchange over:

- SXP
- pxGrid


SXP in Action



1. PLC connects to Cisco IE Switch and authenticates to ISE via MAB
2. Device is profiled as Interlocking PLC and ISE assigns the device with the SGT for interlocking PLCs
3. IE Switch receives the SGT assignment, and creates a binding for the PLC IP address and the newly assigned SGT
4. IE switch shares the IP to SGT mapping to the TrustSec domain

Case Study Takeaway

SXP propagation is required when enforcement is not at the access & dynamic authentication is used. Needed for enforcement device to learn about destination tag




- SXP can be from ISE to Distribution Switch (centralized) or from access switch to Distribution Switch (distributed)

SXP is configured via templates


Case Study Takeaway

What happens with MES to PLC traffic when we enforce twice on the packet path?



Case Study Takeaway

What happens when a device is replaced at midnight?



1. Controller in Zone 1 fails
2. Operator replaces PLC with new hardware
3. Evaluate worse case scenario and define workflow

Example:

PLC in zone 1 needs to talk PLC in zone 2

Default policy allows only port 2222 by default between zone 1 and zone 2

OT admin gets alert from CV about device and updates the tag to "promote" or "restrict" permissions

The TrustSec Matrix

	ASSEMBLY WORKSHOP	WELDING WORKSHOP	PAINTING WORKSHOP	INFRASTRUCTU RE SERVICES
ASSEMBLY WORKSHOP	✓	-	-	✓
WELDING WORKSHOP	-	✓	-	✓
PAINTING WORKSHOP	-	-	✓	✓
INFRASTRUCTU RE SERVICES	✓	✓	✓	✓

Defining Security Group Access Control Lists (SGACL)


	ASSEMBLY WORKSHOP	WELDING WORKSHOP	PAINTING WORKSHOP	INFRASTRUCTURE SERVICES
ASSEMBLY WORKSHOP				
WELDING WORKSHOP				
PAINTING WORKSHOP				
INFRASTRUCTURE SERVICES				

permit ip src dst eq 123
permit ip src dst eq 67
permit ip src dst eq 68
permit ip src dst eq 53
permit ip src dst eq 1812
permit ip src dst eq 1813
deny ip

Centralized Management, Distributed Enforcement

	ASSEMBLY WORKSHOP	WELDING WORKSHOP	PAINTING WORKSHOP	INFRASTRUCTURE SERVICES
ASSEMBLY WORKSHOP	✓			✓
WELDING WORKSHOP		✓		✓
PAINTING WORKSHOP			✓	✓
INFRASTRUCTURE SERVICES	✓	✓	✓	✓

Default - Deny



Push and deploy TrustSec policies consistently across switching, wireless and routing infrastructure

Making use of the default policy

	ASSEMBLY WORKSHOP	WELDING WORKSHOP	PAINTING WORKSHOP	INFRASTRUCTURE SERVICES
ASSEMBLY WORKSHOP	✓			✓
WELDING WORKSHOP		✓		✓
PAINTING WORKSHOP			✓	✓
INFRASTRUCTURE SERVICES	✓	✓	✓	✓

Default - Deny 


What Devices Support SGT Enforcement?

Enforcement Nodes: Can actively block traffic



Catalyst Switches


Typically used at the distribution & core



IE3400, IE9300

Typically used at access & aggregation

SXP Speakers: Can share IP to SGT information over SXP but cannot enforce traffic




- IE3300
- IE3200
- IE3100
- IE2000

How device support effects the TrustSec domain


If all switches are capable of enforcement, my TrustSec domain can be everywhere

- Segmentation within a cell is possible





Not all switches need to be enforcement nodes to do TrustSec


- Segmentation between cells still possible



How the TrustSec domain enables you to reduce the number of policies in your network




How the TrustSec domain enables you to reduce the number of policies in your network



- Every Cell/Area Zone has the same SGT
 - Deny by default
- We are only focused on the policy for traffic that leaves the zone


	Cell/Area Zones	Infrastructure Services
Cell/Area Zones		
Infrastructure Services		

How a ring topology effects your enforcement strategy



- In this case, aggregation of the SGT does NOT work
- TrustSec domain is part of the ring
- Each ring must have its own SGT so traffic can be permitted through


How L2NAT effects your enforcement strategy



- **Problem Statement:** IP to SGT mapping will be on private IP address. This address does not exist in the TrustSec domain
- **Solution:** L2NAT Gateway is added to TrustSec Domain
 - Static SGT on Post-NAT IP
 - Dynamic SGT is shared to L2NAT device via SXP
 - L2NAT device does inline tagging on Post-NAT IP for transporting through TrustSec Domain
 - L2NAT device understands private IP address for enforcement

Segmentation Design Principles

It is all about the use case



Classification

Group assets based on privileges

Classification may be based on endpoint location (i.e. zone), role (i.e. interlocking), dynamic authentication (i.e. user or profiling rule)



Enforcement


Segmentation needs should define enforcement points



Propagation

Remember: enforcement points needs to know source and destination tag, propagate if required

Recap: Use visibility to influence segmentation



CISCO Live!

Visualize Zones & Conduits



Group endpoints into zones to visualize aggregated flows as conduits to inform segmentation policy

Dynamic SGT Mapping



Cyber Vision grouping results in dynamic Group-based policy assignment to endpoints through ISE

Monitor Before Enforcement



Visualize Group-based network behavior in Catalyst Center and enable enforcement when confident after monitoring

Using Cyber Vision to Initiate a CoA

Using User Input -Groups

The screenshot displays the Cisco Cyber Vision interface, which integrates network monitoring, security analysis, and threat detection.

Left Panel: Mini Map

- Legend:**
 - Important (Red line)
 - Control system behavior (Green line)
 - IT Behavior (Teal line)
 - Security analysis (Dark purple line)
 - Network analysis (Dark blue line)
 - Others (Black line)
- Node type:**
 - Device (Yellow square)
 - Component (White square)

Central Panel: Network Topology

The network diagram shows two main zones: **Zone1** and **Zone2**. **Zone1** contains an **Interlock1** component. **Zone2** contains multiple **Rockwell Automation** devices and an **Interlock2** component. A yellow box highlights the **Interlock1** component in Zone1.

Right Panel: Device Details and Configuration

Device Details: CLX_P | 12
IP: 10.17.20.1
MAC: 00:00:BC:2D:21:70
Edit

Configuration (Attributes Tab):

MAC Address: 00:00:BC:2D:21:70
User Name: admin
Endpoint Profile: CVC_group_Interlock2
Current IP Address: 10.17.20.72
Location: Location → All Locations

Attributes Tab (Selected):

Endpoint Policy: CVC_group_Interlock2
Static Group Assignment: false
Identity Group Assignment: CVC_group_Interlock2

Custom Attributes:

assetGroup: Interlock2
assetCCVGrp: CCV
assetSource: Cisco

Using Cyber Vision to Initiate a CoA

Using Asset Attributes – ISE Profiling

The image shows two side-by-side screenshots from Cisco Cyber Vision.


Left Screenshot (Asset Details):

- Device Summary:** 1769-L36ERM/A LOGIX5336ERM, Cell20 (high risk), IP: 10.17.20.62, MAC: 00:00:bc:ce:1e:c9.
- Activity:** First activity on Apr 17, 2024, 8:26:52 AM; Last activity on Apr 18, 2024, 7:55:44 PM.
- Sensors:** IE3400-4, IE3400-5, IE3400-6, ... show more (1).
- Tags:** Controller, Rockwell Automation.
- Activity tags:** Broadcast, Low Volume, ARP, CIP-IO, EthernetIP.
- Risk score:** 84 (See details).
- Components:** 1769-L36ERM/A LOGIX5336ERM, Rockwell ce:1e:c9.
- Properties:** fw-version: 26.13, ip: 10.17.20.62, mac: 00:00:bc:ce:1e:c9, model-ref: 1769-L36ERM/A LOGIX5336ERM, name: 1769-L36ERM/A LOGIX5336ERM, Rockwell ce:1e:c9, ... show more.

Right Screenshot (ISE Profiling Configuration):


- Profiler Policy List:** LEVEL_1_CONTROLLER.
- Profiler Policy:**
 - Name: RA_CONTROLLER (checked)
 - Description: (Valid Range 1 to 65535)
 - Policy Enabled: checked
 - Minimum Certainty Factor: 50
 - Exception Action: NONE
 - Network Scan (NMAP) Action: NONE
 - Create an Identity Group for the policy:
 - Yes, create matching Identity Group (selected)
 - No, use existing Identity Group hierarchy
 - Parent Policy: NONE
 - Associated CoA Type: Global Settings
 - System Type: Administrator Created
- Rules:**
 - If Condition: IOTASSET.assetDeviceType_CONTAINS_...
 - If Condition: IOTASSET.assetVendor_CONTAINS_Rockwell
- Conditions Details:** IOTASSET.assetDeviceType CONTAINS Controller (highlighted with a yellow box).

What about SDA?




- SDA is not required to implement TrustSec
- SDA automates most TrustSec configurations
 - Enables enforcement
 - VLAN to SGT
 - Port authentication
- Design principles are the same!

Segmenting the Users


A series of overlapping, translucent blue bell-shaped curves of varying heights and widths, resembling waves or data distributions, positioned on the right side of the slide.

9 Use Cases for Securing Industrial Networks




802.1X Authentication is primarily used to enable use cases associated with human interaction to the OT network

Authentication and Authorization



Remote Users
are the biggest
attack vector to
your network



In a hybrid, multi-vendor, multi-vector universe

Risk from External Threats

83%
of breaches involved External actors

Social Engineering is on the rise

74%
of breaches include the human element


Credentials are still an issue

49%
of breaches involved credentials

The risk of Vulnerabilities

5%
of attacks exploit vulnerabilities to access an organization

Evolving from VPNs to ZTNA




- Always-on solutions with all-or-nothing access
 - Firewall rules need to be frequently updated
 - Manual session management using jump servers
- Trust broker manages policy based on identity and context, and grants access to specific resources at specific times
 - Gateway establishes an outbound connection to the trust broker eliminating complexity of firewall rules

Go to our Walk
In Lab and try it!

Pulling it all together


Let's put everything together



1. CyberVision discovers industrial assets and communications and groups it into Zones.
2. ISE implemented for visibility and CyberVision context is shared with ISE.
3. Components are dynamically classified in SGTs via group assignment directly from CyberVision
4. Visualize traffic activity between SGT in Catalyst Center policy analytics
5. Deploy segmentation with confidence once you are comfortable with the observed network behavior
6. CyberVision, Secure Network Analytics or other analytics tools raise alarms endpoint behavior anomalies and threat detection.
7. Investigate in Splunk and SOC tools
8. Users can trigger quarantine of offending asset.


Cisco Industrial Threat Defense

Asset Visibility & Security Posture




Zero Trust for OT

Zero Trust Network Access




IEC 62443 Zones & Conduits



Cross-Domain Detection, Investigation & Response

splunk>
a CISCO company



Network as a fabric to secure OT at scale

Webex App

Questions?


Use the Webex app to chat with the speaker after the session

How

- 1 Find this session in the Cisco Events mobile app
- 2 Click “Join the Discussion”
- 3 Install the Webex app or go directly to the Webex space
- 4 Enter messages/questions in the Webex space

Webex spaces will be moderated by the speaker until February 28, 2025.

CISCO Live!



Fill Out Your Session Surveys



Participants who fill out a minimum of 4 session surveys and the overall event survey will get a unique Cisco Live t-shirt.

(from 11:30 on Thursday, while supplies last)



All surveys can be taken in the Cisco Events mobile app or by logging in to the Session Catalog and clicking the 'Participant Dashboard'



Content Catalog



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- Contact me at:
- Contact Erika: www.linkedin.com/in/erikafranco
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