

# Complexity of the Gale String Problem for Equilibrium Computation in Games

Marta Maria Casetti

Thesis submitted to the Department of Mathematics of the London School of  
Economics and Political Science for the degree of Master of Philosophy

London, April 2015

## **Declaration**

I certify that chapter 2 of this thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is based on joint work with Julian Merschen and Bernhard von Stengel, published in [2]. The appendix was the result of previous study for the Master of Science degree I undertook at the London School of Economics and Political Science in 2008, see [3].

The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without my prior written consent.

I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party.

## Abstract

This thesis presents a report on original research, published as joint work with Merschen and von Stengel in *Electronic Notes in Discrete Mathematics* [2]. Our result shows a polynomial time algorithm to solve two problems related to labeled Gale strings, a combinatorial structure consisting a string of labels and a bitstring satisfying certain conditions introduced by Gale in [7].

Gale strings can be used in the representation of a particular class of games that Savani and von Stengel [15] used as an example of exponential running time for the classical Lemke-Howson algorithm to find a Nash equilibrium of a bimatrix game [9]. It was conjectured that solving these games via the Lemke-Howson algorithm was complete in the class **PPAD** (Proof by Parity Argument, Directed version). A major motivation for the definition of this class by Papadimitriou [14] was, in turn, to capture the pivoting technique of many results related to the Nash equilibrium, including the Lemke-Howson algorithm.

Our result, on the contrary, sets apart this class of games as a case for which there is a polynomial-time algorithm to find a Nash equilibrium. Since Daskalakis, Goldberg and Papadimitriou [5] and Chen and Deng [4] proved the **PPAD**-completeness of finding a Nash equilibrium in general normal-form games, we have a special class of games, unless **PPAD** = **P**.

Our proof exploits two results. The first one is the representation of the Nash equilibria of these games as Gale strings, as seen in Savani and von Stengel [15]. The second one is the polynomial-time solvability of the problem of finding a perfect matching in a graph, proven by Edmonds [6].

Merschen [12] and Végh and von Stengel [18] expanded our technique to prove further interesting results.

An appendix relates an amendment to the proof of the **PPAD**-completeness result by Daskalakis, Goldberg and Papadimitriou [5].

# Contents

<b>1 Complexity, Games, Labels and Gale Strings</b>	<b>6</b>
1.1 Some Complexity Classes . . . . .	6
1.2 Normal Form Games and Nash Equilibria . . . . .	9
1.3 Bimatrix Games and Labels . . . . .	10
1.4 Cyclic Polytopes and Gale Strings . . . . .	18
<b>2 Algorithmic and Complexity Results</b>	<b>23</b>
2.1 Lemke Paths and the Lemke-Howson for Gale Algorithm . . . . .	23
2.2 The Complexity of GALE and ANOTHER GALE . . . . .	30
<b>3 Further results</b>	<b>36</b>
<b>Appendix: A Note on the PPAD Completeness of NASH</b>	<b>37</b>
<b>Polytopes</b>	<b>38</b>
3.0.1 Bimatrix Games, Labels and Polytopes . . . . .	40
<b>Acknowledgements</b>	<b>48</b>
<b>Index of Symbols</b>	<b>49</b>
<b>Bibliography</b>	<b>51</b>

# Introduction

# Chapter 1

## Complexity, Games, Labels and Gale Strings

### 1.1 Some Complexity Classes

references - cite Papadimitriou (book) for general

A *computational problem* is given by the combination of an *input* and a related *output*. A specific input gives an *instance* of the problem.

Computational problems can be classified according to the form of their output. A *function problem*  $P$  returns for an instance  $x$  an output  $y$  that satisfies a given binary relation  $R(x, y)$ . In the case of a *decision problems*,  $y$  is either “YES” or “NO”. The *complement* of a decision problem  $P$  is the problem  $\bar{P}$  that returns “NO” for each instance of  $P$  that returns “YES”, and vice versa.

*Search problems* are function problems that return either an output  $y$  such that  $R(x, y)$ , or “NO”, if it’s not possible to find any such  $y$ . If  $y$  is guaranteed to exist, the problem is called a *total function problem*. *Counting problems* return the *number* of  $y$ ’s that satisfy  $R(x, y)$ ; given a problem  $R$  we denote the associated counting problem  $\#R$ .

An example of decision problem is: “(input) given a graph, (question) is it

possible to find an Euler tour of the graph?” Its complement is “(input) given a graph, (question) is it possible that there isn’t any Euler of the graph?” A search problem is: “(input) given a graph, (output) return one Euler tour of the graph, or “NO” if no such tour exists.” A total function problem is: “(input) given an Euler graph, (output) return one of its Euler tours.” Finally, a counting problem is “(input) given a graph, (output) return the number of its Euler tours.”

Computational problems are also classified according to their *computational complexity*, given by the *reducibility* from each other.

Turing machines: here - not that in the following deterministic TM

Let  $P_1$  be a computational problem. For an instance  $x$  of  $P_1$ , let  $|x|$  be the the number of bits needed to encode  $x$ .  $P_1$  reduces to the problem  $P_2$  in polynomial time, denoted  $P_1 \leq_P P_2$ , if there exists a polynomial-time reduction, that is, a function  $f : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^*$  and a Turing machine  $\mathcal{M}$  such that for all  $x \in \{0, 1\}^*$

1.  $x \in P_1 \iff f(x) \in P_2;$
2.  $\mathcal{M}$  computes  $f(x)$ ;
3.  $\mathcal{M}$  stops after  $p(|x|)$  steps, where  $p$  is a polynomial.

Intuitively, if  $P_1$  is polynomial-time reducible to  $P_2$ , it takes polynomial time to “translate”  $P_1$  to  $P_2$ , and then to “translate back” a solution of  $P_2$  as a solution of  $P_1$ .

For any class  $C$  of decision problems, the class of all complements of the problems in  $C$  is the *complement class*  $\text{co} - C$ . A problem  $P$  is *hard* for a class  $C$  if for every problem  $P_C$  in  $C$  there is a polynomial-time reduction to  $P$ ; that is, if  $P$  is hard to solve at least as every problem in  $C$ . A  $C - \text{hard}$  problem in  $C$  is *complete* for  $C$ .

The complexity class  $\mathbf{P}$  contains all the *polynomially decidable problems*, that is, all problems  $P$  such that there exists a Turing machine  $\mathcal{M}$  that outputs

either “YES” or “NO” for all inputs  $x \in \{0, 1\}^*$  of  $P$  after  $p(|x|)$  steps, where  $p$  is a polynomial. Intuitively, a decision problem is in **P** if the answer to its question can be found in a number of steps that is polynomial in the input of the problem.

A problem  $P$  belongs to the class **NP**, *non-deterministic polynomial-time problems*, if there exists a Turing machine  $\mathcal{M}$  and polynomials  $p_1, p_2$  such that

1. for all  $x \in P$  there exists a *certificate*  $y \in \{0, 1\}^*$  which satisfies  $|y| \leq p_1(|x|)$ ;
2.  $\mathcal{M}$  accepts the combined input  $xy$ , stopping after at most  $p_2(|x| + |y|)$  steps;
3. for all  $x \notin P$  there does not exist  $y \in \{0, 1\}^*$  such that  $\mathcal{M}$  accepts the combined input  $xy$ .

This means that a decision problem is in **NP** if it takes polynomial time to verify whether the “certificate solution”  $y$  is, indeed, a correct answer to the question posed by the problem. The class **#P** is the class of all problems that output the number of possible certificates for a problem in **NP**.

check formal def of # P (?)

In [11], Megiddo and Papadimitriou introduce the classes **FNP**, *function non-deterministic polynomial*, and **TFNP**, *total function non-deterministic polynomial*. The former is defined as the class of binary relations  $R(x, y)$  such that there is a polynomial-time algorithm that decides whether  $R(x, y)$  holds for given  $x, y$  satisfying  $|y| \leq p(|x|)$ , where  $p$  is a polynomial. The latter is the class of all such problems for which  $y$  is guaranteed to exist. Intuitively, **FNP** and **TFNP** are similar to **NP**, but they allow for problems of (respectively) function and total function form.

In [11], Megiddo and Papadimitriou also prove that, unless **NP** = **co** – **NP**, **TFNP** is a *semantic* class, that is, a class without complete problems. To

circumvent this limitation of **TFNP**, Papadimitriou ([14]) focused on the problems for which the existence of a solution is proved by a “parity argument”, introducing the classes **PPA** (*Proof by Parity Argument*) and **PPAD** (*Proof by Parity Argument, Directed version*).

The formal definition of **PPA** and **PPAD**,

definition of PPA(D): one in Papadimitriou 1994 and one in DGP the second w END OF THE LINE, use that one.

as an example, SPERNER (look at Papadimitriou 1994); will reconnect to NASH in next subsection - BROUWER mention, maybe

## 1.2 Normal Form Games and Nash Equilibria

A *finite normal-form game*  $\Gamma = (P, S, u)$ , where  $S = \times_{p \in P} S_p$  and  $u = \times_{p \in P} u^p$ , and both  $P$  and  $S$  are finite, is a model of a strategic interaction. Each *player*  $p \in P$  chooses a probability distribution  $x^p = (x_1, \dots, x_{|S_p|})$  over a set of *strategies*  $s^p \in S_p$ . Since  $x^p$  is a probability distribution, we have  $x_s^p \geq 0$  and  $\sum_s x_s^p = 1$  for every  $p \in P$  and  $s \in S_p$ . If  $x_s^p = 0$  for every strategy  $s^p$  but  $\bar{s}^p$ , the strategy  $x^p$  is the *pure strategy*  $\bar{s}^p$ ; otherwise,  $x^p$  is a *mixed strategy*. The *strategy profile*  $(x^1, \dots, x^{|P|})$  influences the *payoff*  $u^p : S \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$  of each player  $p$ . For each player  $p$  we denote the set of strategy profiles of all his opponents as  $S_{-p} = \times_{q \neq p} S_q$ , and for  $s \in S_{-p}$  we denote

(what exactly is this?!) as  $x_s = \prod_{q \neq p} x_{s_q}^q$

A *Nash equilibrium* of a game is a strategy profile in which each player cannot improve his expected payoff by unilaterally changing his strategy. Formally, a Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile  $x$  such that for every  $p \in P$  and every  $s_i^p, s_j^p \in S_p$

$$\sum_{s \in S_{-p}} u^p(s_i^p, s) x_s > \sum_{s \in S_{-p}} u^p(s_j^p, s) x_s \Rightarrow x_j^p = 0$$

The existence of a Nash equilibrium is guaranteed by the following theorem by Nash ([13]).

**Theorem 1.** (Nash, [13]) Every finite game in normal form has a Nash equilibrium.

sketch of pf, brouwer

note: dominated strategies - needed for br polytope

as example, (generalised) matching pennies, used in DGP, incl appendix here

n-NASH in TFNP and typical problem pushing the def of PPAD ([14]); in fact, PPAD-complete ([5] for  $n \geq 3$ , [4] for  $n = 2$ ).

### 1.3 Bimatrix Games and Labels

In the rest of this thesis we will focus on two-player normal-form games. For sake of readability, we will use feminine pronouns when referring to player 1 and masculine pronouns when referring to player 2.

Two-player normal-form games are also called *bimatrix games*, since they can be characterized by the  $m \times n$  payoff matrices  $A$  and  $B$ , where  $a_{ij}$  and  $b_{ij}$  are the payoffs of player 1 and 2 when she plays her  $i$ th pure strategy and he plays his  $j$ th pure strategy. We will assume that  $(A, B)$  are non-negative, and that  $A$  and  $B^\top$  have no zero column. This can be easily obtained without loss of generality via an affine transformation that will not affect the equilibria of the game.

The Nash equilibria of bimatrix games can be analysed from a combinatorial point of view using *labels*. This method is due to Shapley [17], in a study building on ideas introduced in a paper by Lemke and Howson [9].

Let  $(A, B)$  be bimatrix game. The mixed-strategy simplices of player 1 and 2 are, respectively

$$X = \{x \in \mathbb{R}^m | x \geq \mathbf{0}, \mathbf{1}^\top x = 1\}, \quad Y = \{y \in \mathbb{R}^n | y \geq \mathbf{0}, \mathbf{1}^\top y = 1\} \quad (1.1)$$

A *labeling* of the game is then given as follows:

1. the  $m$  pure strategies of player 1 are identified by  $1, \dots, m$ ;
2. the  $n$  pure strategies of player 2 are identified by  $m + 1, \dots, m + n$ ;
3. each mixed strategy  $x \in X$  of player 1 has
  - label  $i$  for each  $i \in [m]$  such that  $x_i = 0$ , that is if in  $x$  player 1 does not play her  $i$ th pure strategy;
  - label  $m + j$  for each  $j \in [n]$  such that the  $j$ th pure strategy of player 2 is a best response to  $x$ ;
4. each mixed strategy  $y \in Y$  of player 2 has
  - label  $m + j$  for each  $j \in [n]$  such that  $y_j = 0$ , that is if in  $y$  player 2 does not play his  $j$ th pure strategy;
  - label  $i$  for each  $i \in [m]$  such that the  $i$ th pure strategy of player 1 is a best response to  $y$ ;

A strategy profile  $(x, y) \in X \times Y$  is *completely labeled* if every label  $1, \dots, m+n$  is a label of either  $x$  or  $y$ . We have the following theorem (Theorem 1 in [17]):

**Theorem 2.** *Let  $(x, y) \in X \times Y$ ; then  $(x, y)$  is a Nash equilibrium of the bimatrix game  $(A, B)$  if and only if  $(x, y)$  is completely labeled.*

*Proof.* The mixed strategy  $x \in X$  has label  $m + j$  for some  $j \in [n]$  if and only if the  $j$ th pure strategy of player 2 is a best response to  $x$ ; this, in turn, is a necessary and sufficient condition for player 2 to play his  $j$ th strategy at an equilibrium against  $x$ . Therefore, at an equilibrium  $(x, y)$  all labels  $m + 1, \dots, m + n$  will appear either as labels of  $x$  or of  $y$ . The analogous holds for the labels  $i \in [n]$ .  $\square$

An useful geometrical representation of labels can be given on the mixed strategies simplices  $X$  and  $Y$ . The outside of each simplex is labeled according

to the player's own pure strategies that are *not* played; so, for instance, the outside of  $X$  will have labels  $1, \dots, n$ . The interior of each simplex is subdivided in closed polyhedral sets, called *best-response regions*. These are labeled according to the other player's pure strategy that is a best response in that set; so, for instance, the inside of  $X$  will have labels  $m + 1, \dots, m + n$ .

We give an example of this construction.

page 3–4 of Savani, von Stengel, Unit Vector Games.

*Example 1.3.1.* With graphics.

We will now give a description of labeling on polytopes equivalent to the construction based on best-response regions.

We begin by noticing that the best-response regions can be obtained as projections on  $X$  and  $Y$  of the *best-response facets* of the polyhedra

$$\bar{P} = \{(x, v) \in X \times \mathbb{R} | B^\top x \leq \mathbf{1}v\}, \quad \bar{Q} = \{(y, u) \in Y \times \mathbb{R} | Ay \leq \mathbf{1}u\}. \quad (1.2)$$

These facets in  $\bar{P}$  are defined as the points  $(x, v) \in X \times \mathbb{R}$  such that  $(B^\top x)_j = v$ . These points represent the strategies  $x \in X$  of player 1 that give exactly payoff  $v$  to player 2 when he plays strategy  $j$ . The projection of the facet defined by  $(B^\top x)_j = v$  to  $X$  will have label  $j$ . Analogously, in  $\bar{Q}$ , the facets are the points  $(y, u) \in Y \times \mathbb{R}$  such that  $a_i y = u$ , and their projection to  $Y$  will be the best-response region with label  $i$ .

*Example 1.3.2.* cont of ex above, page 4–5, image on page 5 left

Given the assumptions on non-negativity of  $A$  and  $B^\top$ , we can give a change coordinates to  $x_i/v$  and  $y_j/u$  and replace  $\bar{P}$  and  $\bar{Q}$  with the *best-response polytopes*

$$P = \{x \in \mathbb{R}^m | x \geq \mathbf{0}, B^\top x \leq \mathbf{1}\}, \quad Q = \{y \in \mathbb{R}^n | y \geq \mathbf{0}, Ay \leq \mathbf{1}\}, \quad (1.3)$$

Each one of these polytope is defined by half spaces corresponding to either the player's own strategy that is not being played or the other player's best

response; each one of the facets of the polytope is labeled by the strategy corresponding to the relative half-space.

This means that a point in  $P$  has label  $k$  if and only if either  $x_k = 0$  for  $k \in \{1, \dots, m\}$  or  $(B^\top x)_{k-m} = 0$  for  $k \in \{m+1, \dots, m+n\}$ ; analogously, a point in  $Q$  has label  $k$  if and only if either  $y_{k-m} = 0$  for  $k \in \{m+1, \dots, m+n\}$  or  $(Ay)_k = 0$  for  $k \in \{m+1, \dots, m+n\}$ . A point  $(x, y) \in P \times Q$  is *completely labeled* if every  $k \in [m+n]$  is a label of  $x$  or  $y$ . Note that the point  $(\mathbf{0}, \mathbf{0})$  is completely labeled. Rescaling back to  $\bar{P}$  and  $\bar{Q}$ , all the non-zero completely labeled points give exactly all the equilibria of  $(A, B)$ . In this construction, we will call  $(\mathbf{0}, \mathbf{0})$  *artificial equilibrium*.

*Example 1.3.3.* ex in Savani, von Stengel, image on page 5 right

A characterization of the completely labeled pairs in  $P \times Q$  can be given as follows.

**Proposition 1.** *The pair  $(x, y) \in P \times Q$  is completely labeled if and only if one of the following condition holds:*

- (Complementarity condition)

$$x_i = 0 \text{ or } (Ay)_i = 1 \text{ for all } i \in [m], \quad y_j = 0 \text{ or } (B^\top x)_j = 1 \text{ for all } j \in [n] \quad (1.4)$$

- (Orthogonality condition)

$$x^\top (\mathbf{1} - Ay) = 0, \quad y^\top (\mathbf{1} - B^\top x) = 0 \quad (1.5)$$

Proposition 5 can be used to prove a useful property: *symmetric games*, that is, games that have payoff matrix of the form  $(C, C^\top)$  for some matrix  $C$ , can be used to study generic bimatrix games without loss of generality. The result is due to Gale, Kuhn and Tucker [8] for zero-sum games; its extension to non-zero-sum games is a folklore result.

**Proposition 2.** Let  $(A, B)$  be a bimatrix game and  $(x, y)$  be one of its Nash equilibria. Then  $(z, z)$ , where  $z = (x, y)$ , is a Nash equilibrium of the symmetric game  $(C, C^\top)$ , where

$$C = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & A \\ B^\top & 0 \end{pmatrix}.$$

The converse has been proved by McLennan and Tourky [10] in their study of *imitation games*, that is, bimatrix games of the form  $(I, B)$ .

**Proposition 3.** The pair  $(x, x)$  is a symmetric Nash equilibrium of the symmetric bimatrix game  $(C, C^\top)$  if and only if there is some  $y$  such that  $(x, y)$  is a Nash equilibrium of the imitation game  $(I, C^\top)$ .

*Example 1.3.4.* Consider the symmetric game  $(C, C^\top)$ , where  $C^\top = B$  in the previous examples.

ex Savani, von Stengel, pg 8

Savani and von Stengel [16] extended the study of imitation games to *unit vector games*  $(U, B)$ , where the columns of the matrix  $U$  are unit vectors. For these games, the use of labeling in polytopes to characterize Nash equilibria of the game is given by the following theorem, first proved in dual form by Balthasar [1].

**Theorem 3.** [16] Let  $l : [n] \rightarrow [m]$ , and let  $(U, B)$  be the unit vector game where  $U = (e_{l(1)} \ \cdots \ e_{l(n)})$ . Consider the polytopes  $P^l$  and  $Q^l$  where

$$P^l = \{x \in \mathbb{R}^m | x \geq \mathbf{0}, \ B^\top x \leq \mathbf{1}\} \quad (1.6)$$

$$Q^l = \{y \in \mathbb{R}^n | y \geq \mathbf{0}, \ \sum_{\substack{j \in N_i \\ i \in [m]}} y_j \leq 1\} \quad (1.7)$$

where  $N_i = \{j \in [n] | l(j) = i\}$  for  $i \in [m]$ .

Give a labeling  $l_f$  of the facets of  $P^l$  according to the inequality defining it, as follows:

$$x_i \geq 0 \text{ has label } i \text{ for } i \in [m] \quad (1.8)$$

$$(B^\top x)_j \leq 1 \text{ has label } l(j) \text{ for } j \in [n] \quad (1.9)$$

Then  $x \in P^l$  is a completely labeled point of  $P^l \setminus \{\mathbf{0}\}$  if and only if there is some  $y \in Q^l$  such that, after scaling, the pair  $(x, y)$  is a Nash equilibrium of  $(U, B)$

*Proof.* Let  $P, Q$  be the polytopes associated to the game  $(U, B)$  as before.

Let  $(x, y) \in P \times Q \setminus \{\mathbf{0}, \mathbf{0}\}$  be a Nash equilibrium of  $(U, B)$ , therefore completely labeled in  $[m+n]$ . Then, if  $x_i = 0$ , then  $x$  has label  $i \in m$ . If  $x_i > 0$  instead, then  $y$  has label  $i$ , therefore  $(Uy)_i = 1$ , therefore for some  $j \in [n]$  we have  $y_j > 0$  and  $U_j = e_i$ , so  $l(j) = i$ . Since  $y_j > 0$  and  $(x, y)$  is completely labeled,  $x \in P$  has label  $m+j$ , that is,  $(B^\top x)_j = 1$ , therefore  $x \in P^l$  has label  $l(j) = i$ . Hence,  $x$  is a completely labeled point of  $P^l$ .

Conversely, let  $x \in P^l \setminus \{\mathbf{0}\}$  be completely labeled. If  $x_i > 0$ , then there is  $j \in [m]$  such that  $(B^\top x)_j = j$  and  $l(j) = i$ , that is,  $j \in N_i$ . For all  $i$  such that  $x_i > 0$ , define  $y$  as follows:  $y_h = 0$  for all  $h \in N_i \setminus \{j\}$ ,  $y_j = 1$ . Then  $(x, y) \in P \times Q$  is completely labeled.  $\square$

Theorem 15 gives a correspondence between the completely labeled vertices of the polytope  $P^l$  and the equilibria of the unit vector game  $(U, B)$ , with an “artificial” equilibrium corresponding to the vertex  $\mathbf{0}$ .

The dual version of theorem 15, given in [1], is constructed as follows. We translate the polytope  $P^l$  in theorem 15 to  $P = \{x - \mathbf{1} \mid x \in P^l\}$ . Multiplying all payoffs in  $B$  by a constant if necessary (an operation that does not change the game), we can have  $\mathbf{1}$  is in the interior of  $P^l$  and  $\mathbf{0}$  in the interior of  $P$ . We have  $x \in P$  if and only if  $x + \mathbf{1} \geq \mathbf{0}$  and  $B^\top(x + \mathbf{1}) = (x + \mathbf{1})^\top B \leq \mathbf{1}$ ; that

is, if and only if  $-x_i \leq 1$  for  $i \in [m]$  and  $x^\top \frac{b_j}{1 - \mathbf{1}^\top b_j} \leq 1$  for  $j \in [n]$ . The polar of  $P$  is then

$$P^\Delta = \text{conv}(\{e_i \mid i \in [m]\} \cup \{\frac{b_j}{1 - \mathbf{1}^\top b_j}\}) \quad (1.10)$$

$P$  is simple (why? because game nondegenerate! show it before), so  $P^\Delta$  is simplicial

Since  $\mathbf{0}$  is in the interior of  $P$ , we have that  $P^{\Delta\Delta} = P$ , and the facets of  $P^\Delta$  correspond to the vertices of  $P$  and vice versa. We can then label the vertices of  $P^\Delta$  with the labels of the corresponding facets in  $P^l$ , so the completely labeled facets of  $P^\Delta$  will correspond to the completely labeled vertices of  $P^l$ . In particular, the facet corresponding to  $\mathbf{0}$  is

$$F_0 = \{x \in P^\Delta \mid -\mathbf{1}^\top x = 1\} = \text{conv}\{e_i \mid i \in [m]\}. \quad (1.11)$$

Theorem 15 then translates as follows.

**Theorem 4.** [1] Let  $Q$  be a labeled  $m$ -dimensional simplicial polytope with  $\mathbf{0}$  in its interior, with vertices  $e_1, \dots, e_m, c_1, \dots, c_n$ , so that  $F_0 = \text{conv}\{e_i \mid i \in [m]\}$  is a facet of  $Q$ .

Let  $l : [n] \rightarrow [m]$ , and let  $(U, B)$  be the unit vector game with  $U = (e_{l(1)} \cdots e_{l(n)})$  and  $B = (b_1 \cdots b_n)$ , where  $b_j = \frac{c_j}{1 + \mathbf{1}^\top c_j}$  for  $j \in [n]$ .

Label the vertices of  $Q$  as follows:

$$l_v(-e_i) = i \text{ for } i \in [m] \quad (1.12)$$

$$l_v(c_j) = l(j) \text{ for } j \in [n] \quad (1.13)$$

Then a facet  $F \neq F_0$  of  $Q$  with normal vector  $v$  is completely labeled if and only if  $(x, y)$  is a Nash equilibrium of  $(U, B)$ , where  $x = \frac{v + \mathbf{1}}{\mathbf{1}^\top (v + \mathbf{1})}$ , and  $x_i = 0$  if and only if  $e_i \in F$  for  $i \in [m]$ . Any  $j$  so that  $c_j$  is a vertex of  $F$  represents a pure best reply to  $x$ ; the mixed strategy  $y$  is the uniform distribution on the set of the pure best replies to  $x$ .

In theorem 16 we have a correspondence between the completely labeled facets of the polytope  $Q$  (the completely labeled vertices of  $P^l$  in theorem 15) and the equilibria of the unit vector game  $(U, B)$ , with the “artificial” equilibrium corresponding to the facet  $F_0$  (the vertex  $\mathbf{0}$  in theorem 15). This proves the following proposition.

**Proposition 4.** *The problem 2-NASH for unit vector games is polynomial-time reducible to the problems ANOTHER COMPLETELY LABELED VERTEX and its dual ANOTHER COMPLETELY LABELED FACET, where*

---

ANOTHER COMPLETELY LABELED VERTEX

---

**input :** A simple  $m$ -dimensional polytope  $S$  with  $m + n$  facets; a labeling  $l : [m + n] \rightarrow [n]$ ; a facet  $F_0$  of  $S$ , completely labeled by  $l$ .

**output :** A facet  $F \neq F_0$  of  $S$ , completely labeled by  $l$ .

---

do we  
have to  
prove  
“polyno-  
mial”?

---

ANOTHER COMPLETELY LABELED VERTEX

---

**input :** A simplicial  $m$ -dimensional polytope  $S$  with  $m + n$  vertices; a labeling  $l : [m + n] \rightarrow [n]$ ; a vertex  $v_0$  of  $S$ , completely labeled by  $l$ .

**output :** A vertex  $v \neq v_0$  of  $S$ , completely labeled by  $l$ .

---

nondegeneracy; made nondegenerate by “lexicographic” perturbation

(what does it mean?);

nondegeneracy - $\mathcal{L}$  br polytope  $P$  is simple - $\mathcal{L}$   $P^\Delta$  is simplicial

so: this goes before!

ex pg 9; odd no eq, mention homotopy method (find ref) (tie with Nash,  
again?)

## 1.4 Cyclic Polytopes and Gale Strings

In the last section we have built a correspondence between labeling of best response polytopes and bimatrix games. We now focus on a special case of games, where the polytope in theorem 16 is a *cyclic polytope*, a particular kind of polytope that can be represented as a combinatorial structure called *Gale string*. We give first the definition of cyclic polytope, then the definition of Gale string, and we show their relation as proven by Gale in [7].

A *cyclic polytope*  $P$  in dimension  $d$  with  $n$  vertices is the convex hull of  $n$  distinct points  $\mu_d(t_j)$  on the *moment curve*  $\mu_d : t \mapsto (t, t^2, \dots, t^d)^\top$  for  $j \in [n]$  such that  $t_1 < t_2 < \dots < t_n$ .

example(s) with graphics! There's one in Ziegler

A *bitstring* is a string of labels that are either 0's or 1's. Formally: given an integer  $k$  and a set  $S$ , we can represent the function  $f_s : [k] \rightarrow S$  as the string  $s = s(1)s(2)\dots s(k)$ ; we have a bitstring in the case where  $S = \{0, 1\}$ . A maximal substring of consecutive 1's in a bitstring is called a *run*. We denote a run of length  $k$  as  $1^k$ ; and, analogously, a string of 0's of length  $k$  as  $0^k$ .

A *Gale string of length  $n$  and dimension  $d$*  is a bitstring of length  $n$ , denoted as  $s \in G(d, n)$ , such that

1. exactly  $d$  bits in  $s$  are 1 and
2. (*Gale evenness condition*)

$$01^k0 \text{ is a substring of } s \implies k \text{ is even.} \quad (1.14)$$

The Gale evenness condition characterises Gale strings in  $G(d, n)$  as the bitstrings of length  $n$  with exactly  $d$  elements equal to 1, such that *interior* runs (that is, runs bounded on both sides by 0s) must be of even length. In general, this condition allows Gale strings to start or end with an odd-length run; but when  $d$  is even this means that  $s$  starts with an odd run if and only if it ends with an odd run. We can then consider the Gale strings in  $G(d, n)$  with

even  $d$  as a “loop” obtained by “glueing together” the extremes of the string to form an even run. Formally, we can see the indices of a Gale string  $s \in G(d, n)$  with  $d$  even as equivalence classes modulo  $n$ , identifying  $s(i+n) = s(i)$ . This also shows that the set of Gale strings of even dimension is invariant under a cyclic shift of the strings.

*Example 1.4.1.* As an example of  $d$  even, we have

$$G(4, 6) = \{\mathbf{111100}, \mathbf{111001}, \mathbf{110011}, \mathbf{100111}, \mathbf{001111}, \\ \mathbf{011110}, \mathbf{110110}, \mathbf{101101}, \mathbf{011011}\}$$

The strings  $\mathbf{111100}$ ,  $\mathbf{111001}$ ,  $\mathbf{110011}$ ,  $\mathbf{100111}$ ,  $\mathbf{001111}$  and  $\mathbf{011110}$  are equivalent under a cyclic shift (if considering the strings as “loops”, the **1**’s are all consecutive), as are the strings  $\mathbf{110110}$ ,  $\mathbf{101101}$  and  $\mathbf{011011}$  (if considering the strings as “loops”, the even runs of **1**’s are two couples separated by a single 0).

As an example for  $d$  odd, we have

$$G(3, 5) = \{\mathbf{11100}, \mathbf{10110}, \mathbf{10011}, \mathbf{11001}, \mathbf{01101}, \mathbf{00111}\}$$

Note how  $\mathbf{01011}$  is a cyclic shift of  $\mathbf{10110}$ , but it is not a Gale string.

The relation between cyclic polytopes and Gale strings is given by the following theorem by Gale [7].

**Theorem 5** ([7]). *For any positive integers  $d, n$  let  $P$  be the cyclic polytope in dimension  $d$  with  $n$  vertices. Then the facets of  $P$  are encoded by  $G(d, n)$ ; that is,*

$F$  is a facet of  $P$

$\iff$

$$F = \text{conv}\{\mu(t_j) \mid s(j) = 1 \text{ for some } j \in [n] \text{ and } s \in G(d, n)\}$$

pf - see Ziegler

Essentially, this holds because any set  $S \subset [n]$  the moment curve defines a unique hyperplane which is crossed (and not just touched) by the moment curve; if the bitstring  $s$  that encodes  $F$  as  $1(s)$  has a substring  $01^k0$  example of cyclic polytope + equivalent gale string - pg 35 JM has nice one

We now give define a *labeling* for Gale strings, corresponding to the labeling of best-response polytopes.

A string  $s$  is *completely labeled* for some labeling function  $l : [n] \rightarrow [d]$  if  $\{\bar{l} \in [d] | s(i) = 1 \text{ and } l(i) = \bar{l} \text{ for some } i \in [n]\} = [d]$ . If  $s \in G(d, n)$ , this implies that for every  $\bar{l} \in [d]$  there is exactly one  $s(i)$  such that  $s(i) = 1$  and  $l(i) = \bar{l}$ , since there are exactly  $d$  positions such that  $s(i) = 1$ .

*Example 1.4.2.* Given the string of labels  $l = 123432$ , there are four associated completely labeled Gale strings: **111100**, **110110**, **100111** and **101101**.

$$\begin{array}{cccccc} \mathbf{1} & \mathbf{2} & \mathbf{3} & \mathbf{4} & \mathbf{3} & \mathbf{2} \\ \hline \mathbf{1} & \mathbf{1} & \mathbf{1} & \mathbf{1} & \cdot & \cdot \\ \mathbf{1} & \mathbf{1} & \cdot & \mathbf{1} & \mathbf{1} & \cdot \\ \mathbf{1} & \cdot & \cdot & \mathbf{1} & \mathbf{1} & \mathbf{1} \\ \mathbf{1} & \cdot & \mathbf{1} & \mathbf{1} & \cdot & \mathbf{1} \end{array}$$

Sometimes it is not possible to find a completely labeled Gale string.

*Example 1.4.3.* For  $l = 121314$ , there are no completely labeled Gale strings.

The labels  $l(i) = 2, 3, 4$  appear only once in  $l$ , as  $l(2), l(4), l(6)$  respectively; therefore we must have  $s(2) = s(4) = s(6) = 1$ . For every other  $i \in [n]$  we have  $l(i) = 1$ , so we have  $l(i) = 1$  for exactly one  $i = 1, 3, 5$ . The candidate strings are then **110101**, **011101**, **010111**; but none of these satisfies the Gale evenness condition.

From this point forward, we will assume that  $d$  is even. We will also assume that the labeling  $l : [n] \rightarrow [d]$  is such that  $l(i) \neq l(i+1)$ ; this can be done without loss of generality, given the following consideration. Suppose that

$l(i) = l(i + 1)$  for some index  $i$ , and let  $s$  be a completely labeled Gale string for  $l$ . Then only one of  $s(i)$  and  $s(i + 1)$  can be equal to  $\mathbf{1}$  (note that it's possible that both are 0s). So  $s(i)s(i + 1)$  will never be a run of even length that "interferes" with the Gale Evenness Condition, so we can "simplify" by identifying the indices  $i$  and  $i + 1$ .

We will now focus on the problem of finding the Nash equilibria of a unit vector game  $(U, B)$  where  $U = (e_{l(1)} \cdots e_{l(d)})$  for some labeling  $l : [n] \rightarrow [d]$  and the best-response polytope  $Q$  is cyclic, exploiting theorems 16 and 5. To do so, we must find a labeling  $l$  such that the Gale strings  $s \in G(d, d + n)$  encoding the completely labeled facets of the corresponding cyclic  $d$ -polytope  $Q$  with  $d + n$  vertices are exactly the Gale strings of dimension  $d$  and length  $d + n$  that are completely labeled for  $l$ .

Theorem 16 relies on a labeling of the vertices  $l_v : [d + n] \rightarrow [d]$  defined in 3.12 such that  $l_v(-e_i) = i$  for  $i \in [d]$ , and  $l_v(c_j) = l(j)$  for the vertices  $c_j \neq -e_i$ , where  $j \in [n]$ . We define the labeling  $l_s : [d + n] \rightarrow [d]$  as follows:

$$l_s(i) = i \text{ for } i \in [d] \quad (1.15)$$

$$l_s(d + j) = l(j) \text{ for } j \in [n]. \quad (1.16)$$

The Gale strings  $s \in G(d, d + n)$  that are completely labeled for  $l_s$  correspond exactly to the completely labeled facets of  $Q$ , with the facet  $F_0$  corresponding to the "trivial" completely labeled string  $\mathbf{1}^d 0$ .

Then, by proposition 8, we have the following theorem.

**Theorem 6.** *The problem of finding a Nash equilibrium for a unit vector game for which the best response polytope is the dual of a cyclic polytope in dimension  $d$ , where  $d$  is even, is polynomial-time reducible to the problem ANOTHER GALE, where*

do we  
have to  
prove  
"polyno-  
mial"?

---

ANOTHER GALE

---

**input :** A labeling  $l : [n] \rightarrow [d]$ , where  $d$  is even and  $d < n$ . A Gale string  $s \in G(d, n)$ , completely labeled by  $l$ .

**output:** A Gale string  $s' \in G(d, n)$ , completely labeled by  $l$ , such that  $s' \neq s$ .

---

## Chapter 2

# Algorithmic and Complexity Results

### 2.1 Lemke Paths and the Lemke-Howson for Gale Algorithm

We have NEs  $\Leftrightarrow$  completely labeled things (facets, vertices, GS) We give now different versions of fundam algorithm to deal with labeling looking for compl.label. - in particular in these cases first in version on simple polytopes with labeled facets, (name: Lemke-Howson; Lemke-Howson 1964, Shapley 1974 beautiful exposition) then dual case with labeled vertices (name???? exchange? cite from???) then in special case Gale strings (name: Lemke-Howson for Gale, cite from???).  
Mention general version - or leave it further results? (maybe better)  
(name: exchange algorithm, Edmonds - Sanità). (This case: index more problematic - see )

Consider a labeling  $l : [n] \rightarrow [m]$ , for a set  $X$  with  $|X| = n$ . Then  $x = (x_1, \dots, x_m) \in X^m$  is *almost completely labeled* if  $|\{j \in [n] \mid x_i = j\}| \geq 1$  for some  $i \in [m]$ .

$[m]\} = [m] \setminus \{k\}$  for exactly one  $k \in [m]$ . This mean that all labels appear once in  $x$ , except for the *missing label*  $k$ , and a *duplicate label*  $\bar{k} \in [m]$  that appears twice.

now we see in poly with labeled facets, cl vertices

Let  $P$  be a simple polytope in dimension  $m$  with  $n$  facets. We define the operation of *pivoting on vertices* as moving from a vertex  $x$  of  $P$  to another vertex  $y$  such that there is an edge between  $x$  and  $y$ . Note that, since  $P$  is simple, there are exactly  $m$  possible choices for  $y$ .

Now let  $l_f : [n] \rightarrow [m]$  be a labeling of the facets of  $P$  such that there is at least one completely labeled vertex  $x_0$  of  $P$ . Note that if we pivot from vertex  $v$  we “leave behind” a facet  $F$ , that has label  $k$ ; we call this *dropping label*  $k$ . We will then reach a vertex  $w$  that shares with  $v$  all facets except  $F$  (that contains  $v$  but not  $w$ ) and another facet  $G$  (that contains  $w$  but not  $v$ ) that has label  $j$ ; we will call this *picking up label*  $j$ . We give the *Lemke-Howson algorithm* as in 1.

reference

---

**Algorithm 1:** Lemke-Howson algorithm

---

**input :** A simple  $m$ -polytope  $P$  with  $n$  facets. A labeling

$l_f : [n] \rightarrow [m]$  of the facets of  $P$ . A vertex  $x_0$  of  $P$ , completely labeled for  $l$ .

**output:** A completely labeled vertex  $x \neq x_0$  of  $P$ .

- 1 choose a label  $k \in [n]$
  - 2 pivot from  $x_0$  to  $x$  dropping label  $k$
  - 3 **while**  $x$  is not completely labeled **do**
  - 4     pivot from  $x$  to  $x' \neq x_0$  dropping the duplicate label  $j$
  - 5     rename  $x_0 = x$ ,  $x = x'$
  - 6 **return**  $x$
- 

The steps of the Lemke-Howson algorithm result in a *Lemke path* that connects two completely labeled vertices through  $k$ -almost complementary vertices

and edges, that is, almost completely labeled vertices and edges where the only missing label is  $k$ . It remains to show that  $y \neq x_0$ . This comes from the fact that the Lemke paths are *simple paths*, that is, there are no “loops” where a vertex is visited more than once. This is not possible because at each vertex there are only two edges corresponding to the missing label  $k$ , since  $P$  is not degenerate; one is the edge that is traversed to get to the vertex, one is the one that is traversed to leave it in the next step.

**Theorem 7.** *The Lemke-Howson algorithm 1 returns a solution to the problem ANOTHER COMPLETELY LABELED VERTEX.*

*Furthermore, the number of completely labeled vertices in a simple polytope with labeled facets is even.*

*Proof.* pf parity via Lemke paths

□

In the context of finding the Nash equilibrium of a bimatrix game  $(A, B)$ , there are two equivalent implementations of the Lemke-Howson algorithm.

We can consider the game  $C$  as in proposition 6, and the associated polytope  $S = \{z \in \mathbb{R}^{m+n} \mid z \geq \mathbf{0}, Cz \leq \mathbf{1}\}$ , labeling the  $2(m + n)$  inequalities defining the facets of  $S$  as  $1, \dots, m + n, 1, \dots, m + n$ . Then applying the Lemke-Howson algorithm starting from vertex  $\mathbf{0}$  returns a Nash equilibrium  $(z, z)$  of  $C$  and a corresponding  $(x, y) = z$  a Nash equilibrium of  $(A, B)$ .

We can also follow the “traditional” version of the Lemke-Howson algorithm; a very clear exposition of this can be found in Shapley [17]. Let  $P$  and  $Q$  be the best response polytopes of  $(A, B)$  as in 3.3. We then move alternately on  $P$  and  $Q$ , starting from the couple of vertices  $(\mathbf{0}, \mathbf{0})$ . Since we move in  $\mathbb{R}^m$  and  $\mathbb{R}^n$  instead of  $\mathbb{R}^{m+n}$ , this version is more practical to visualize, as shown in the following example.

Example 2.1.1. ex Savani - von Stengel, pag. 11; fig 8 are Schegel diagrams of BR polytopes.

Theorem 2.1 has a straightforward dual version. Let  $Q$  be a simplicial polytope in dimension  $m$  with  $n$  vertices. We *pivot on facets* by moving from facet  $F$  to facet  $G$  that shares an edge with  $F$ . Since  $P$  is simplicial, there are exactly  $m$  possible choices for  $G$ . Let  $l_v : [n] \rightarrow [m]$  be a labeling of the vertices of  $P$  such that there is at least one completely labeled facet  $F_0$ . We *drop label  $k$*  and *pick up label  $j$*  when pivoting from a facet  $F$  to a facet  $G$  that shares with  $F$  all vertices except a vertex  $v$  with label  $k$  that belongs to  $F$  but not  $G$ , and another vertex  $w$  with label  $j$  that belongs to  $G$  but not  $F$ . The Lemke-Howson algorithm then becomes the theorem in 2. reference

---

**Algorithm 2:** Lemke-Howson algorithm on facets

---

**input :** A simplicial  $m$ -polytope  $Q$  with  $n$  vertices. A labeling

$l_v : [n] \rightarrow [m]$  of the vertices of  $P$ . A vertex  $F_0$  of  $Q$ ,  
completely labeled for  $l$ .

**output:** A completely labeled facet  $F \neq F_0$  of  $Q$ .

- 1 choose a label  $k \in [n]$
  - 2 pivot from  $F_0$  to  $F$  dropping label  $k$
  - 3 **while**  $F$  is not completely labeled **do**
  - 4     pivot from  $F$  to  $F' \neq F_0$  dropping the duplicate label  $j$
  - 5     rename  $F_0 = F$ ,  $F = F'$
  - 6 **return**  $F$
- 

Considering the dual of Lemke paths on (almost) completely labeled facets, we get the dual result to theorem 2.1.

**Theorem 8.** *The algorithm 2 returns a solution to the problem ANOTHER COMPLETELY LABELED FACET.*

*Furthermore, the number of completely labeled facets in a simplicial polytope with labeled vertices is even.*

*Example 2.1.2.* example! octahedron? so we're ready for index?

To find a Nash equilibrium of a unit vector game  $(U, B)$ , where  $U = (e_{l(1)} \cdots e_{l(n)})$  for a labeling  $l : [n] \rightarrow [m]$ , we can apply theorem 15 and algorithm 1, or we can apply the dual theorem 16 and algorithm 2. The first case relies on the polytope  $P^l = \{x \in \mathbb{R}^m \mid x \geq \mathbf{0}, B^\top x \leq \mathbf{1}\}$  defined in 3.6; theorem 15 shows that  $P^l$  encodes all the Nash equilibria of  $(U, B)$  as completely labeled vertices, with an “artificial” equilibrium corresponding to the vertex  $\mathbf{0}$ . The second case relies on the polytope  $Q$ , defined as the convex hull of vertices  $-e_i$  for  $i \in [m]$  and  $c_j = \frac{b_j}{1 - \mathbf{1}^\top b_j}$  for  $j \in [n]$ ; analogously, theorem 16 shows that  $Q$  encodes all the Nash equilibria of  $(U, B)$  as completely labeled facets, with the “artificial” equilibrium corresponding to the facet  $F_0 = \text{conv}(-e_1, \dots, -e_m)$ .

On the other hand, we can consider  $(U, B)$  as any bimatrix game, and apply algorithm 1 to the product of the best response polytopes  $P$  and  $Q$ . The projection of a Lemke path for a missing label  $i \in [m]$  on  $P \times Q$  to  $P$  defines a Lemke path in  $P^l$ . However,  $P \times Q$  has  $m + n$  labels, therefore there could be Lemke paths for a missing label  $m + j$  with  $j \in [n]$  on  $P \times Q$  that get lost in the projection on  $P^l$ . The following theorem, proved by Savani and von Stengel in [16], shows that there is no loss of generality in studying Lemke paths on  $P^l$ ; an analogous result holds for the dual case.

**Theorem 9.** *Let  $(U, B)$  be a unit vector game, with  $U = (e_{l(1)} \cdots e_{l(n)})$  for a labeling  $l : [n] \rightarrow [m]$ ; let  $P = \{x \in \mathbb{R}^m \mid x \geq \mathbf{0}, B^\top x \leq \mathbf{1}\}$  and  $Q = \{y \in \mathbb{R}^n \mid y \geq \mathbf{0}, A y \leq \mathbf{1}\}$ , as in 3.3; and let  $P^l = \{x \in \mathbb{R}^m \mid x \geq \mathbf{0}, B^\top x \leq \mathbf{1}\}$  as in 3.6. Then the Lemke path on  $P \times Q$  for the missing label  $k$  projects to a path on  $P$  that is the Lemke path on  $P^l$  for missing label  $k$  if  $k \in [m]$ , and for missing label  $l(j)$  if  $k = m + j$  with  $j \in [n]$ .*

As before, we now focus on the case of unit vector games where the simplicial polytope  $Q$  is cyclic; that is, the case that we can study from the point of view of Gale strings.

Consider a Gale string  $s \in G(m, n)$  with  $d$  even, identifying the indices

modulo  $n$  (that is, considering the string as a “loop”); let  $s(k) = 1$  for an index  $k \in [n]$ . Then, by Gale evenness condition, there is an odd run of **1**’s in  $s$  either on the left or on the right of position  $k$ ; let  $j$  be the first index after this run. A *pivoting on  $s$*  is then defined as setting  $s(k) = 0$  and  $s(j) = 1$ . Given a labeling  $l_s : [n] \rightarrow [m]$ , pivoting as above becomes *dropping label  $k$*  and *picking up label  $j$* . The *Lemke-Howson for Gale algorithm* is defined as in 3.

---

**Algorithm 3:** Lemke-Howson for Gale algorithm

---

**input :** A labeling  $l_s : [n] \rightarrow [d]$  such that there is a completely labeled Gale string  $s_0 \in G(d, n)$ .

**output:** A completely labeled Gale string  $s \in G(d, n)$  such that  $s \neq s_0$ .

```

1 choose a label  $k \in [d]$ 
2 pivot on  $s_0$  dropping  $k$ , obtaining  $s$ 
3 while  $s$  is not completely labeled do
    4   pivot from  $s$  to  $s' \neq s_0$  dropping the duplicate label  $j$ 
    5   rename  $s_0 = s, s = s'$ 
6 return  $s$ 

```

---

Considering the Lemke paths defined by algorithm 3 we can prove that the Lemke-Howson for Gale algorithm works and a parity result, analogously to theorems and .

**Theorem 10.** *The Lemke-Howson for Gale algorithm 3 returns a solution to the problem ANOTHER GALE.*

*Furthermore, the number of completely labeled Gale strings  $s \in G(d, n)$ , where  $d$  is even, is even.*

*Example 2.1.3.* example

In 1.15 we have given a labeling  $l_s : [n + d] \rightarrow [d]$  to study the Nash equilibria (including the “artificial” equilibrium) of the unit vector game  $(U, B)$ ,

where  $U = (e_{l(1)} \cdots e_{l(n)})$  and  $l : [n] \rightarrow [d]$ , as Gale strings  $s \in G(n+d, d)$  that are completely labeled by  $l_s$ , with the “artificial” equilibrium corresponding to the string  $1^d 0^n$ .

check!

thanks to dual of theorem SvS-15 9, when doing labeling we can take the str of labels  $l(n+j) \cdots l(n+m)$  instead of  $l(1) \cdots l(n+m)$ , that is, we could cut the “artificial” first labels  $12\dots n$ .

After all, in main we’re studying ANOTHER GALE in general, not nec starting from  $12\dots n$ ; and we’re interested in finding *one* eq that’s not the one we started from (and is at other end of LPath, since index and so on), *not all equilibria*; but the eq we started from is not nec the artificial one - actually, if we go with this we can take any NE to start looking for another, and we’re sure to find a “non-artificial” one. Note: if we were looking for all NE, LH doesn’t work anyway - see ex by Wilson in Shapley, where “disconnected” paths between equilibria.

complexity considerations: PPAD complexity of GALE (also of ANOTHER CL VERTEX/FACET, analogous pf; for 2-NASH we have completeness by DGP+CD)

Now: it's PPAD; but is it complete? (Also, PPAD is relatively new, results welcome...)

Interesting case: Morris paths (Morris 1994), translates in terms of games by SvS 2006. Exp running time!

Could it be used to show a completeness result? Next section: we show that on the other hand it takes polynomial (!) time to find a result, so a completeness result would mean that P=PPAD - very unlikely! (One can dream, though...)

---

Advantage of two dual cyclic polytopes as in SvS 06 over only one (and without "prefix" in labels for gale string) as seen in SvS 15 is: good example of exp on supports - see SvS 15

## 2.2 The Complexity of GALE and ANOTHER GALE

We will now give our main result: ANOTHER GALE can be solved in polynomial time. Therefore, it takes polynomial time to find a Nash Equilibrium of a bimatrix game for which the best response polytope is cyclic.

Our proof will be based on a simple graph construction, based on the idea of *perfect matching* and a theorem by Edmonds ([6]).

A perfect matching for a graph  $G = (V, E)$  is a set  $M \subseteq E$  of pairwise non-adjacent edges so that every vertex  $v \in V$  is incident to exactly one edge in  $M$ .

**Theorem 11** ([6]). *The problem PERFECT MATCHING, defined as*

---

**PERFECT MATCHING**

---

**input :** A graph  $G = (V, E)$ .

**question :** Is there a perfect matching for  $G$ ?

---

is solvable in polynomial time.

We will first consider the accessory problem GALE, and we will show that it is solvable in polynomial time by using theorem 11.

---

**GALE**

---

**input :** A labeling  $l : [n] \rightarrow [d]$ , where  $d$  is even and  $d < n$ .

**question :** Does there exist a completely labeled Gale string  $s$  in  $G(d, n)$  associated with  $l$ ?

---

**Theorem 12.** *The problem GALE is solvable in polynomial time.*

*Proof.* We give a reduction of GALE to PERFECT MATCHING.

In the following, we will consider every Gale string as a “loop,” as seen in section ??, so  $n + 1 = 1$ .

Given the labeling  $l : [n] \rightarrow [d]$ , let  $V = [d]$ , let  $E = \{(l(i), l(i+1)) \text{ for } i \in [n] \text{ for every } i \text{ such that } l(j) \neq l(i+1)\}$ , and consider the multigraph  $G = (V, E)$ .

Let  $s \in G(d, n)$  be a completely labeled Gale string. Then every run of  $s$  splits uniquely into  $d/2$  pairs  $(i, i+1)$  such that the labels  $l(i)$  satisfy the condition  $l(i) \neq l(i+1)$ , and all the labels  $l(i) \in [d]$  occur. Then the labels will correspond to all the vertices of  $G$ , and the pairs will correspond to the edges of a perfect matching for  $G$ .


Conversely, let  $l : [n] \rightarrow [d]$  be a labeling, and let  $M$  be a perfect matching for  $G$  as above. We can construct a string  $s$  such that  $s(i) = s(i+1)$  for every  $(l(i), l(i+1)) \in M$  and  $s(i) = 0$  otherwise. Since  $M$  is a matching, all the

$(l(i), l(i+1)) \in M$  are disjoint, so, considering  $s$  as a “loop,” every run is of even length. Furthermore, since  $M$  is a perfect matching, every vertex  $v \in [d]$  is the endpoint of an edge  $(l(i), l(i+1))$ , so  $s$  is completely labeled.


We have a reduction from GALE to the problem PERFECT MATCHING, which is polynomial-time solvable by theorem 11. Finding a Gale string for a given labeling, or deciding that there isn’t one, can therefore be done in polynomial time.  $\square$

We give two examples of the construction used in theorem 12.


*Example 2.2.1.* Let  $l = 12343122$  be a string of labels. Then the edges  $e_i$  of the graph  $G$  obtained from the construction in the proof of theorem 12 will be as follow:




Given the vertices  $v \in [4]$ , the graph  $G$  will be:



A perfect matching for  $G$  is given by  $M = \{e_1, e_4\}$ .




In turn, this corresponds to the completely labeled Gale string 11011000.



A perfect matching for a graph, and therefore a Gale string for a labeling, is not always possible, as shown in the next example.

*Example 2.2.2.* Let us consider the labeling  $l = 121314$ . The associated graph  $G$  will be



Since there aren't any disjoint edges, it's not possible to find a perfect matching for  $G$ . Analogously, we have seen in example ?? that there isn't any possible completely labeled Gale string for the labeling  $l$ .

We finally extend the proof of theorem 12 to show that ANOTHER GALE is polynomial-time solvable.

**Theorem 13.** *The problem ANOTHER GALE is solvable in polynomial time.*

*Proof.* Let  $l : [n] \rightarrow [d]$  be a labeling, and let  $s \in G(d, n)$  be a completely labeled Gale string for  $l$ . Let  $G = (V, E)$  be the graph constructed from  $l$  as in the proof of theorem 12, and let  $M$  be its perfect matching for  $G$  corresponding to  $s$ .

If there is an edge  $e = (l(i), l(i + 1)) \in M$  and there is an edge  $e' \neq e$  in  $G$  such that  $e' = (l(i), l(i + 1))$  (recall that  $G$  can be a multigraph), we simply consider the matching  $M' = M \setminus \{e\} \cup \{e'\}$ . Let  $s'$  be the completely labeled Gale string corresponding to  $M'$ ; the 1's corresponding to the labels


$l(i), l(i+1)$ , that in  $s$  were in the position given by the edge  $e$ , for  $s'$  are in the position given by  $e' \neq e$ . Therefore, we have a completely labeled Gale string that is different from the one in the input of the problem.

We now assume that all the edges in every perfect matching  $M$  for  $G$  don't have a parallel edge. Note that this condition is only on the edges in the matching;  $G$  can still be a multigraph.

Theorem ?? guarantees the existence of a completely labeled Gale string  $s' \neq s$ ; since the two strings are different, the perfect matching  $M' \neq M$  corresponding to one of these  $s'$  does not use at least one edge  $e \in M$ . There are  $d/2$  possible graphs  $G'_i = (V, E'_i)$ , where  $E'_i = E \setminus \{e_i\}$  for each  $e_i \in M$ ; since  $V(G) = V(G')$  and  $E(G) \subset E(G')$ , every perfect matching for  $G'$  is a perfect matching for  $G$  as well. The existence of  $s'$  implies that there is at least one graph  $G'$  with a perfect matching  $M' \neq M$ . With a brute force approach, the time to find this  $G'$  and the corresponding  $M'$  will be given by the time to find a perfect matching multiplied by a factor  $O(d)$ . Therefore, searching for a completely labeled Gale string  $s' \neq s$  takes again polynomial time.  $\square$

We give two examples of the construction of theorem 13.


*Example 2.2.3.* We consider the labeling the string of labels  $l = 1234312$ . We have found in example 2.2.1 the completely labeled Gale string 1101100, corresponding to the perfect matching  $M = \{e_1, e_4\}$  in the graph  $G$ .



If instead of  $e_1$  we take the parallel edge  $e_6$ , the resulting matching is still perfect.

A case in which all the edges in every perfect matching don't have a parallel edge is the following; note that  $G$  is a multigraph.

*Example 2.2.4.* We consider the labeling  $l = 123142$ . There are only two possible perfect matchings for the corresponding graph:  $M = \{e_2, e_4\}$ , that corresponds to the completely labeled Gale string  $s = 011110$ , and  $M' = \{e_3, e_5\}$ , that corresponds to  $s' = 001111$ .



## **Chapter 3**

### **Further results**

# A Note on the PPAD Completeness of NASH

appendix/ppad-msc

# Polytopes

change the title

alt. title: Polyhedra, Simplexes and Polytopes; the next subsection becomes Bimatrix Games and Labels

so results in labels section - after this - don't get lost in boredom, and each section in background is about 150-200 lines (see: getting lost).

Maybe turn this into an appendix?

We denote the transpose of a matrix  $A$  as  $A^\top$ . We consider vectors  $u, v \in \mathbb{R}^d$  as column vectors, so  $u^\top v$  is their scalar product. A vector in  $\mathbb{R}^d$  for which all components are 0's will be denoted as  $\mathbf{0}$ ; similarly, a vectors for which all components are 1's will be denoted as  $\mathbf{1}$ . The *unit vector*  $e_i$  is the vector that has  $i$ -th component  $e_{ii} = 1$  and  $e_{ij} = 0$  for all other components. When writing an inequality of the form  $u \geq v$  (and analogous), we mean that it holds for every component; that is,  $u_i \geq v_i$  for all  $i \in [d]$ .

An *affine combination* of points in an Euclidean space  $z_1, \dots, z_n$  is

$$\sum_{i=1}^n \lambda_i z_i \quad \text{where } \lambda_i \in \mathbb{R} \text{ such that } \sum_{i=1}^n \lambda_i = 1$$

The points  $z_1, \dots, z_n$  are *affinely independent* if none of them is an affine combination of the others.

A *convex combination* of points  $z_1, \dots, z_n$  is an affine combination where  $\lambda_i \geq 0$  for all  $i \in [n]$ . Note that such  $\lambda_i$ 's can be seen as a probability distribution over the  $z_i$ 's.

A set of point  $Z$  is *convex* if it is closed under forming convex combinations,

that is, if  $\bar{z} = \sum_{i=1}^n \lambda_i z_i$ , where  $z_i \in Z$ ,  $\lambda_i \geq 0$  and  $\sum_{i=1}^n \lambda_i = 1$ , then  $\bar{z} \in Z$ . A convex set has *dimension d* if it has exactly  $d + 1$  affinely independent points.

convex hull (needed for def cyclic poly);

pow hyperplanes;

polyhedra, polytopes

simplex

simple and simplicial polytopes

polar:  $Q = \{x \in \mathbb{R}^d \mid x^\top c_i \leq 1, i \in [k]\}$

with  $c_i \in \mathbb{R}^d$ . Then the polar (Ziegler, 1995) of  $Q$  is given by

$Q^\Delta = \text{conv}\{c_i, i \in [k]\}$

from here: notes - copy-paste

A ( $d$ -dimensional) *simplicial polytope*  $P$  is the convex hull of a set of at least  $d + 1$  points  $v$  in  $\mathbb{R}^d$  in general position, that is, no  $d + 1$  of them are on a common hyperplane.

If a point  $v$  cannot be omitted from these points without changing  $P$  then  $v$  is called a *vertex* of  $P$ . A *facet* of  $P$  is the convex hull  $\text{conv } F$  of a set  $F$  of  $d$  vertices of  $P$  that lie on a hyperplane  $\{x \in \mathbb{R}^d \mid a^\top x = a_0\}$  so that  $a^\top u < a_0$  for all other vertices  $u$  of  $P$ ; the vector  $a$  (unique up to a scalar multiple) is called the *normal vector* of the facet. We often identify the facet with its set of vertices  $F$ .

### 3.0.1 Bimatrix Games, Labels and Polytopes

In the rest of this thesis we will focus on two-player normal-form games. For sake of readability, we will use feminine pronouns when referring to player 1 and masculine pronouns when referring to player 2.

Two-player normal-form games are also called *bimatrix games*, since they can be characterized by the  $m \times n$  payoff matrices  $A$  and  $B$ , where  $a_{ij}$  and  $b_{ij}$  are the payoffs of player 1 and 2 when she plays her  $i$ th pure strategy and he plays his  $j$ th pure strategy. We will assume that  $(A, B)$  are non-negative, and that  $A$  and  $B^\top$  have no zero column. This can be easily obtained without loss of generality via an affine transformation that will not affect the equilibria of the game.

The Nash equilibria of bimatrix games can be analysed from a combinatorial point of view using *labels*. This method is due to Shapley [17], in a study building on ideas introduced in a paper by Lemke and Howson [9].

Let  $(A, B)$  be bimatrix game. The mixed-strategy simplices of player 1 and 2 are, respectively

$$X = \{x \in \mathbb{R}^m | x \geq \mathbf{0}, \mathbf{1}^\top x = 1\}, \quad Y = \{y \in \mathbb{R}^n | y \geq \mathbf{0}, \mathbf{1}^\top y = 1\} \quad (3.1)$$

A *labeling* of the game is then given as follows:

1. the  $m$  pure strategies of player 1 are identified by  $1, \dots, m$ ;
2. the  $n$  pure strategies of player 2 are identified by  $m + 1, \dots, m + n$ ;
3. each mixed strategy  $x \in X$  of player 1 has
  - label  $i$  for each  $i \in [m]$  such that  $x_i = 0$ , that is if in  $x$  player 1 does not play her  $i$ th pure strategy;
  - label  $m+j$  for each  $j \in [n]$  such that the  $j$ th pure strategy of player 2 is a best response to  $x$ ;

4. each mixed strategy  $y \in Y$  of player 2 has

- label  $m + j$  for each  $j \in [n]$  such that  $y_j = 0$ , that is if in  $y$  player 2 does not play his  $j$ th pure strategy;
- label  $i$  for each  $i \in [m]$  such that the  $i$ th pure strategy of player 1 is a best response to  $y$ ;

A strategy profile  $(x, y) \in X \times Y$  is *completely labeled* if every label  $1, \dots, m+n$  is a label of either  $x$  or  $y$ . We have the following theorem (Theorem 1 in [17]):

**Theorem 14.** *Let  $(x, y) \in X \times Y$ ; then  $(x, y)$  is a Nash equilibrium of the bimatrix game  $(A, B)$  if and only if  $(x, y)$  is completely labeled.*

*Proof.* The mixed strategy  $x \in X$  has label  $m + j$  for some  $j \in [n]$  if and only if the  $j$ th pure strategy of player 2 is a best response to  $x$ ; this, in turn, is a necessary and sufficient condition for player 2 to play his  $j$ th strategy at an equilibrium against  $x$ . Therefore, at an equilibrium  $(x, y)$  all labels  $m + 1, \dots, m + n$  will appear either as labels of  $x$  or of  $y$ . The analogous holds for the labels  $i \in [n]$ .  $\square$

An useful geometrical representation of labels can be given on the mixed strategies simplices  $X$  and  $Y$ . The outside of each simplex is labeled according to the player's own pure strategies that are *not* played; so, for instance, the outside of  $X$  will have labels  $1, \dots, n$ . The interior of each simplex is subdivided in closed polyhedral sets, called *best-response regions*. These are labeled according to the other player's pure strategy that is a best response in that set; so, for instance, the inside of  $X$  will have labels  $m + 1, \dots, m + n$ .

We give an example of this construction.

page 3–4 of Savani, von Stengel, Unit Vector Games.

*Example 3.0.5.*

With graphics.

We will now give a description of labeling on polytopes equivalent to the construction based on best-response regions.

We begin by noticing that the best-response regions can be obtained as projections on  $X$  and  $Y$  of the *best-response facets* of the polyhedra

$$\bar{P} = \{(x, v) \in X \times \mathbb{R} | B^\top x \leq \mathbf{1}v\}, \quad \bar{Q} = \{(y, u) \in Y \times \mathbb{R} | Ay \leq \mathbf{1}u\}. \quad (3.2)$$

These facets in  $\bar{P}$  are defined as the points  $(x, v) \in X \times \mathbb{R}$  such that  $(B^\top x)_j = v$ . These points represent the strategies  $x \in X$  of player 1 that give exactly payoff  $v$  to player 2 when he plays strategy  $j$ . The projection of the facet defined by  $(B^\top x)_j = v$  to  $X$  will have label  $j$ . Analogously, in  $\bar{Q}$ , the facets are the points  $(y, u) \in Y \times \mathbb{R}$  such that  $a_i y = u$ , and their projection to  $Y$  will be the best-response region with label  $i$ .

*Example 3.0.6.* cont of ex above, page 4–5, image on page 5 left

Given the assumptions on non-negativity of  $A$  and  $B^\top$ , we can give a change coordinates to  $x_i/v$  and  $y_j/u$  and replace  $\bar{P}$  and  $\bar{Q}$  with the *best-response polytopes*

$$P = \{x \in \mathbb{R}^m | x \geq \mathbf{0}, B^\top x \leq \mathbf{1}\}, \quad Q = \{y \in \mathbb{R}^n | y \geq \mathbf{0}, Ay \leq \mathbf{1}\}, \quad (3.3)$$

Each one of these polytope is defined by half spaces corresponding to either the player's own strategy that is not being played or the other player's best response; each one of the facets of the polytope is labeled by the strategy corresponding to the relative half-space.

This means that a point in  $P$  has label  $k$  if and only if either  $x_k = 0$  for  $k \in \{1, \dots, m\}$  or  $(B^\top x)_{k-m} = 0$  for  $k \in \{m+1, \dots, m+n\}$ ; analogously, a point in  $Q$  has label  $k$  if and only if either  $y_{k-m} = 0$  for  $k \in \{m+1, \dots, m+n\}$  or  $(Ay)_k = 0$  for  $k \in \{m+1, \dots, m+n\}$ . A point  $(x, y) \in P \times Q$  is *completely labeled* if every  $k \in [m+n]$  is a label of  $x$  or  $y$ . Note that the point  $(\mathbf{0}, \mathbf{0})$  is

completely labeled. Rescaling back to  $\bar{P}$  and  $\bar{Q}$ , all the non-zero completely labeled points give exactly all the equilibria of  $(A, B)$ . In this construction, we will call  $(\mathbf{0}, \mathbf{0})$  *artificial equilibrium*.

*Example 3.0.7.* ex in Savani, von Stengel, image on page 5 right

A characterization of the completely labeled pairs in  $P \times Q$  can be given as follows.

**Proposition 5.** *The pair  $(x, y) \in P \times Q$  is completely labeled if and only if one of the following condition holds:*

- (Complementarity condition)

$$x_i = 0 \text{ or } (Ay)_i = 1 \text{ for all } i \in [m], \quad y_j = 0 \text{ or } (B^\top x)_j = 1 \text{ for all } j \in [n] \quad (3.4)$$

- (Orthogonality condition)

$$x^\top (\mathbf{1} - Ay) = 0, \quad y^\top (\mathbf{1} - B^\top x) = 0 \quad (3.5)$$

Proposition 5 can be used to prove a useful property: *symmetric games*, that is, games that have payoff matrix of the form  $(C, C^\top)$  for some matrix  $C$ , can be used to study generic bimatrix games without loss of generality. The result is due to Gale, Kuhn and Tucker [8] for zero-sum games; its extension to non-zero-sum games is a folklore result.

**Proposition 6.** *Let  $(A, B)$  be a bimatrix game and  $(x, y)$  be one of its Nash equilibria. Then  $(z, z)$ , where  $z = (x, y)$ , is a Nash equilibrium of the symmetric game  $(C, C^\top)$ , where*

$$C = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & A \\ B^\top & 0 \end{pmatrix}.$$

The converse has been proved by McLennan and Tourky [10] in their study of *imitation games*, that is, bimatrix games of the form  $(I, B)$ .

**Proposition 7.** *The pair  $(x, x)$  is a symmetric Nash equilibrium of the symmetric bimatrix game  $(C, C^\top)$  if and only if there is some  $y$  such that  $(x, y)$  is a Nash equilibrium of the imitation game  $(I, C^\top)$ .*

*Example 3.0.8.* Consider the symmetric game  $(C, C^\top)$ , where  $C^\top = B$  in the previous examples.

ex Savani, von Stengel, pg 8

Savani and von Stengel [16] extended the study of imitation games to *unit vector games*  $(U, B)$ , where the columns of the matrix  $U$  are unit vectors. For these games, the use of labeling in polytopes to characterize Nash equilibria of the game is given by the following theorem, first proved in dual form by Balthasar [1].

**Theorem 15.** [16] *Let  $l : [n] \rightarrow [m]$ , and let  $(U, B)$  be the unit vector game where  $U = (e_{l(1)} \ \cdots \ e_{l(n)})$ . Consider the polytopes  $P^l$  and  $Q^l$  where*

$$P^l = \{x \in \mathbb{R}^m | x \geq \mathbf{0}, \ B^\top x \leq \mathbf{1}\} \quad (3.6)$$

$$Q^l = \{y \in \mathbb{R}^n | y \geq \mathbf{0}, \ \sum_{\substack{j \in N_i \\ i \in [m]}} y_j \leq 1\} \quad (3.7)$$

where  $N_i = \{j \in [n] | l(j) = i\}$  for  $i \in [m]$ .

Give a labeling  $l_f$  of the facets of  $P^l$  according to the inequality defining it, as follows:

$$x_i \geq 0 \text{ has label } i \text{ for } i \in [m] \quad (3.8)$$

$$(B^\top x)_j \leq 1 \text{ has label } l(j) \text{ for } j \in [n] \quad (3.9)$$

Then  $x \in P^l$  is a completely labeled point of  $P^l \setminus \{\mathbf{0}\}$  if and only if there is some  $y \in Q^l$  such that, after scaling, the pair  $(x, y)$  is a Nash equilibrium of  $(U, B)$

*Proof.* Let  $P, Q$  be the polytopes associated to the game  $(U, B)$  as before.

Let  $(x, y) \in P \times Q \setminus \{\mathbf{0}, \mathbf{0}\}$  be a Nash equilibrium of  $(U, B)$ , therefore completely labeled in  $[m+n]$ . Then, if  $x_i = 0$ , then  $x$  has label  $i \in m$ . If  $x_i > 0$  instead, then  $y$  has label  $i$ , therefore  $(Uy)_i = 1$ , therefore for some  $j \in [n]$  we have  $y_j > 0$  and  $U_j = e_i$ , so  $l(j) = i$ . Since  $y_j > 0$  and  $(x, y)$  is completely labeled,  $x \in P$  has label  $m+j$ , that is,  $(B^\top x)_j = 1$ , therefore  $x \in P^l$  has label  $l(j) = i$ . Hence,  $x$  is a completely labeled point of  $P^l$ .

Conversely, let  $x \in P^l \setminus \{\mathbf{0}\}$  be completely labeled. If  $x_i > 0$ , then there is  $j \in [m]$  such that  $(B^\top x)_j = j$  and  $l(j) = i$ , that is,  $j \in N_i$ . For all  $i$  such that  $x_i > 0$ , define  $y$  as follows:  $y_h = 0$  for all  $h \in N_i \setminus \{j\}$ ,  $y_j = 1$ . Then  $(x, y) \in P \times Q$  is completely labeled.  $\square$

Theorem 15 gives a correspondence between the completely labeled vertices of the polytope  $P^l$  and the equilibria of the unit vector game  $(U, B)$ , with an “artificial” equilibrium corresponding to the vertex  $\mathbf{0}$ .

The dual version of theorem 15, given in [1], is constructed as follows. We translate the polytope  $P^l$  in theorem 15 to  $P = \{x - \mathbf{1} \mid x \in P^l\}$ . Multiplying all payoffs in  $B$  by a constant if necessary (an operation that does not change the game), we can have  $\mathbf{1}$  is in the interior of  $P^l$  and  $\mathbf{0}$  in the interior of  $P$ . We have  $x \in P$  if and only if  $x + \mathbf{1} \geq \mathbf{0}$  and  $B^\top(x + \mathbf{1}) = (x + \mathbf{1})^\top B \leq \mathbf{1}$ ; that is, if and only if  $-x_i \leq 1$  for  $i \in [m]$  and  $x^\top \frac{b_j}{1 - \mathbf{1}^\top b_j} \leq 1$  for  $j \in [n]$ . The polar of  $P$  is then

$$P^\Delta = \text{conv}(\{e_i \mid i \in [m]\} \cup \{\frac{b_j}{1 - \mathbf{1}^\top b_j}\}) \quad (3.10)$$

$P$  is simple (why? because game nondegenerate! show it before), so  $P^\Delta$  is simplicial

Since  $\mathbf{0}$  is in the interior of  $P$ , we have that  $P^{\Delta\Delta} = P$ , and the facets of  $P^\Delta$  correspond to the vertices of  $P$  and vice versa. We can then label the vertices of  $P^\Delta$  with the labels of the corresponding facets in  $P^l$ , so the completely labeled facets of  $P^\Delta$  will correspond to the completely labeled vertices of  $P^l$ . In particular, the facet corresponding to  $\mathbf{0}$  is

$$F_0 = \{x \in P^\Delta \mid -\mathbf{1}^\top x = 1\} = \text{conv}\{e_i \mid i \in [m]\}. \quad (3.11)$$

Theorem 15 then translates as follows.

**Theorem 16.** [1] Let  $Q$  be a labeled  $m$ -dimensional simplicial polytope with  $\mathbf{0}$  in its interior, with vertices  $e_1, \dots, e_m, c_1, \dots, c_n$ , so that  $F_0 = \text{conv}\{e_i \mid i \in [m]\}$  is a facet of  $Q$ .

Let  $l : [n] \rightarrow [m]$ , and let  $(U, B)$  be the unit vector game with  $U = (e_{l(1)} \dots e_{l(n)})$  and  $B = (b_1 \dots b_n)$ , where  $b_j = \frac{c_j}{1 + \mathbf{1}^\top c_j}$  for  $j \in [n]$ .

Label the vertices of  $Q$  as follows:

$$l_v(-e_i) = i \text{ for } i \in [m] \quad (3.12)$$

$$l_v(c_j) = l(j) \text{ for } j \in [n] \quad (3.13)$$

Then a facet  $F \neq F_0$  of  $Q$  with normal vector  $v$  is completely labeled if and only if  $(x, y)$  is a Nash equilibrium of  $(U, B)$ , where  $x = \frac{v + \mathbf{1}}{\mathbf{1}^\top (v + \mathbf{1})}$ , and  $x_i = 0$  if and only if  $e_i \in F$  for  $i \in [m]$ . Any  $j$  so that  $c_j$  is a vertex of  $F$  represents a pure best reply to  $x$ ; the mixed strategy  $y$  is the uniform distribution on the set of the pure best replies to  $x$ .

In theorem 16 we have a correspondence between the completely labeled facets of the polytope  $Q$  (the completely labeled vertices of  $P^l$  in theorem 15) and the equilibria of the unit vector game  $(U, B)$ , with the “artificial” equilibrium corresponding to the facet  $F_0$  (the vertex  $\mathbf{0}$  in theorem 15). This proves the following proposition.

**Proposition 8.** The problem 2-NASH for unit vector games is polynomial-time reducible to the problems ANOTHER COMPLETELY LABELED VERTEX

do we  
have to  
prove  
“polyno-  
mial”?

and its dual ANOTHER COMPLETELY LABELED FACET, where

---

ANOTHER COMPLETELY LABELED VERTEX

---

**input** : A simple  $m$ -dimensional polytope  $S$  with  $m + n$  facets; a labeling

$l : [m + n] \rightarrow [n]$ ; a facet  $F_0$  of  $S$ , completely labeled by  $l$ .

**output**: A facet  $F \neq F_0$  of  $S$ , completely labeled by  $l$ .

---

ANOTHER COMPLETELY LABELED VERTEX

---

**input** : A simplicial  $m$ -dimensional polytope  $S$  with  $m + n$  vertices; a labeling

$l : [m + n] \rightarrow [n]$ ; a vertex  $v_0$  of  $S$ , completely labeled by

$l$ .

**output**: A vertex  $v \neq v_0$  of  $S$ , completely labeled by  $l$ .

---

nondegeneracy; made nondegenerate by “lexicographic” perurbation

(what does it mean?);

nondegeneracy - $\downarrow$  br polytope  $P$  is simple - $\downarrow$   $P^\Delta$  is simplicial

so: this goes before!

ex pg 9; odd no eq, mention homotopy method (find ref) (tie with Nash,  
again?)

# Acknowledgements

appendix/acknowledgments

# Index of Symbols

appendix/symbols

# Bibliography

- [1] A. V. Balthasar (2009). “Geometry and equilibria in bimatrix games.” PhD Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science.
- [2] M. M. Casetti, J. Merschen, B. von Stengel (2010). “Finding Gale Strings.” *Electronic Notes in Discrete Mathematics* 36, pp. 1065–1082.
- [3] M. M. Casetti (2008). “PPAD Completeness of Equilibrium Computation.” MSc Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science.
- [4] X. Chen, X. Deng (2006). “Settling the Complexity of 2-Player Nash Equilibrium.” *Proc. 47th FOCS*, pp. 261–272.
- [5] C. Daskalakis, P. W. Goldberg, C. H. Papadimitriou (2006). “The Complexity of Computing a Nash Equilibrium.” *SIAM Journal on Computing*, 39(1), pp. 195–259.
- [6] J. Edmonds (1965). “Paths, Trees, and Flowers.” *Canad. J. Math.* 17, pp. 449–467.
- [7] D. Gale (1963). “Neighborly and Cyclic Polytopes.” *Convexity, Proc. Symposia in Pure Math.*, Vol. 7, ed. V. Klee, American Math. Soc., Providence, Rhode Island, pp. 225–232.
- [8] D. Gale, H. W. Kuhn, A. W. Tucker (1950). “On Symmetric Games.” *Contributions to the Theory of Games* I, eds. H. W. Kuhn and A. W. Tucker, *Annals of Mathematics Studies* 24, Princeton University Press, Princeton, pp. 81–87.
- [9] C. E. Lemke, J. T. Howson, Jr. (1964). “Equilibrium Points of Bimatrix Games.” *J. Soc. Indust. Appl. Mathematics* 12, pp. 413–423.
- [10] A. McLennan, R. Tourky (2010). “Imitation Games and Computation.” *Games and Economic Behavior* 70, pp. 4–11.

- [11] N. Megiddo, C. H. Papadimitriou (1991). “On Total Functions, Existence Theorems and Computational Complexity.” *Theoretical Computer Science* 81, pp. 317–324.
- [12] J. Merschen (2012). “Nash Equilibria, Gale Strings, and Perfect Matchings.” PhD Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science.
- [13] J. F. Nash (1951). “Noncooperative games.” *Annals of Mathematics*, 54, pp. 289–295.
- [14] C. H. Papadimitriou (1994). “On the Complexity of the Parity Argument and Other Inefficient Proofs of Existence.” *J. Comput. System Sci.* 48, pp. 498–532.
- [15] R. Savani, B. von Stengel (2006). “Hard-to-solve Bimatrix Games.” *Econometrica* 74, pp. 397–420  
better other article, “Exponentially many steps for finding a NE in a bimatrix game.” In the 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS 2004.?
- [16] R. Savani, B. von Stengel (2015). “Unit Vector Games.” arXiv:1501.02243v1 [cs.GT]
- [17] L. S. Shapley (1974). “A Note on the Lemke-Howson Algorithm.” *Mathematical Programming Study 1: Pivoting and Extensions*, pp. 175–189
- [18] L. Végh, B. von Stengel “Oriented Euler Complexes and Signed Perfect Matchings” arXiv:1210.4694v2 [cs.DM]  
textbooks - papad, ziegler, sth gth