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**The Participatory Turn: Participatory Budgeting Comes to America**

A dissertation presented

by

Hollie Russon Gilman

to

The Department of Government

in partial fulfillment of the requirements  
for the degree of  
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in the subject of  
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## **The Participatory Turn: Participatory Budgeting Comes to America**

### **Abstract**

Participatory Budgeting (PB) has expanded to over 1,500 municipalities worldwide since its inception in Porto Alegre, Brazil in 1989 by the leftist Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers' Party). While PB has been adopted throughout the world, it has yet to take hold in the United States. This dissertation examines the introduction of PB to the United States with the first project in Chicago in 2009, and proceeds with an in-depth case study of the largest implementation of PB in the United States: Participatory Budgeting in New York City. I assess the outputs of PB in the United States including deliberations, governance, and participation.

I argue that PB produces better outcomes than the *status quo* budget process in New York City, while also transforming how those who participate understand themselves as citizens, constituents, Council members, civil society leaders and community stakeholders. However, there are serious challenges to participation, including high costs of engagement, process exhaustion, and perils of scalability. I devise a framework for assessment called "citizenly politics," focusing on: 1) designing participation 2) deliberation 3) participation and 4) potential for institutionalization. I argue that while the material results PB produces are relatively modest, including more innovative projects, PB delivers more substantial non-material or existential results. Existential citizenly rewards include: greater civic knowledge, strengthened relationships with elected officials, and greater community inclusion. Overall, PB provides a viable and informative democratic innovation for strengthening civic engagement within the United States that can be streamlined and adopted to scale.

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It was raining on an end-of-summer night. I contemplated taking the longest subway ride I had ever taken to attend an “information session for Participatory Budgeting in New York.” The rain almost dissuaded me. By the time I began the long train ride home, I left so inspired I knew I had to write my dissertation on this new pilot project: the largest Participatory Budgeting process to ever be conducted in the United States. This was all happening in my city. Mere blocks from where I grew up democratic innovation was being born.

From that late summer evening through the research and writing of this dissertation, I have been extremely blessed by the kindness and generosity of those involved in Participatory Budgeting in New York (PBNYC) as well as a trusted collection of intellectual and emotional advisors and support networks. I acknowledge them because this project depended upon their counsel, around the clock support, patience and talent. This project would not have come into being without the intellectual curiosity and kindness of Archon Fung, whose work as both scholar and citizen has inspired me to pursue research that positively impacts the world. His Kantian categorical imperative inspired work ethic; integrity, support and encouragement pushed me to “write one sentence after the next, and the one after that.” His belief in the right to democracy, faith in human dignity, and trust in his students were fundamental to my staying the course in graduate school and completing my PhD.

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make our cities the safe and beautiful communities they are. These are the people who know that only through coming together and taking responsibility for our lives, our bodies, and the spaces we inhabit will we bring about the incremental change we seek. The people who participated in this process will for the rest of my life remind me of the ability of ordinary citizens to come together and the bravery required for all political acts, big and small. It is the people who participated in this process who gave me the strength to work on this project and affirm my belief in the power of human ingenuity. We are more than the sum of our parts, and we are always stronger collectively than we are individually.

Without the love, back rubs, large screen desktop, graciousness, Tea Empire, and enduring support of my dear partner, Daniel Benaim, this project would have fallen into the all-too-common waste bin of ideas.

Above all, this project is dedicated to all the great teachers I have been fortunate enough to have in my life, including my first and most profound teachers Gail M. Russon and Stephen Gilman.

**Abbreviations and Acronyms**

Albert, PBNYC implementing Council member (CM) from District A (D-A)  
Beatrice, PBNYC implementing Council member (CM) from District B (D-B)  
BC, Budget Committee  
BD, Budget Delegate  
CB, Community Board  
CBO, community-based organization  
Charlie, PBNYC implementing Council member (CM) from District C (D-C)

CM, Council member (New York City)  
CPB, Chicago Participatory Budgeting  
CVH, Community Voices Heard  
CR, Community Representative (Chicago)  
CSO, Civil Society Organization  
CUNY, City University of New York City  
Devon, PBNYC implementing Council member (CM) from District D (D-D)

DC, District Steering Committee  
FY, Fiscal Year

HRBI, Harlem RBI  
NYCHA, New York City Housing Authority  
NYSC, New York City Steering Committee  
NGO, Nongovernmental Organization  
PTA, Parent Teacher's Association  
PB, Participatory Budgeting  
PBP, Participatory Budget Project  
PBNYC, Participatory Budgeting New York City (pilot year 2011-2012)  
PT, Partido dos Trabalhadores (Worker's Party)  
P.S., Public School  
Sid, Alderman to institute PB in Chicago  
SC, Steering Committee  
WBI, World Bank Institute  
UJC, Urban Justice Coalition

## Chapter 1: Introduction

*[T]he empirical evidence, both from 40 years ago and today, shows that making substantive steps towards creating a participatory democracy is quite possible. The question I want to leave you with is whether, in the rich countries, there is any longer either the political culture or the political will to pursue genuine democratization. I do not have an easy response to this question – and I am happy to hand over the task of determining an answer to new generations of scholars (Pateman 2012, 15).<sup>1</sup>*

(Pateman 2012, 15)

### Overview:

This study looks at the perils and promise of participatory democracy in the “rich countries” by investigating the largest implementation of Participatory Budgeting (henceforth PB) in the United States - a pilot project in New York City for Fiscal Year (FY) 2012-2013.

PB serves as an edifying lens through which to study participatory democracy because it is one of the most pervasive democratic innovations in recent decades. PB involves directly empowering ordinary citizens by inviting them to make budget proposals upon which they then vote into enactment. PB differs from other participatory democratic models in that elected officials pledge to implement projects voted upon by citizens. As such, citizens are not merely advising or consulting on decision-making but instead actively crafting budget policy through binding input. Citizens are involved in every critical juncture of the process from designing their participation to voting upon which projects to enact.

Although PB has been successfully instituted in over 1,500 locations throughout the globe, it has yet to take hold in the United States.<sup>2</sup> This dissertation examines the

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<sup>1</sup> 2011, American Political Science Association (APSA) presidential address.

<sup>2</sup> For more information on worldwide PB implementation see <http://www.participatorybudgeting.org/about-participatory-budgeting/where-has-it-worked/>.

introduction of PB to the United States with research from the first project in Chicago in 2009, and proceeds with an in-depth case study of the largest implementation of PB in the United States: Participatory Budgeting in New York City (henceforth PBNYC). Unlike previous scholarship of PB that primarily focuses on civil society, I also research political and institutional conditions that are critical for PB's adoption within the United States. This dissertation examines the material and immaterial, or existential, outputs of PB in the United States through a theoretical framework I devise called "citizenly politics." I argue that PB produced modest material results than the *status quo* city budget process, such as a selection of more innovative investment projects, and substantial immaterial or existential results for participants of the process. Existential rewards for citizens include: greater civic knowledge, strengthened relationships with elected officials and greater community inclusion. PB participants often cite the significant number of opportunities for knowledge transfer and direct contact with Council members (CM) as their favorite aspect of the PB process.

The neighborhood investment projects selected through Participatory Budgeting New York City (PBNYC) suggest that, when offered tools for empowerment, citizens use these tools pragmatically so as to more effectively isolate hyper-local needs than does the *status quo* budget process. Through the PB process, projects were oftentimes more fair and accurate in assessing district needs than they were as a result of traditional non-transparent budget processes.

Overall, PB provides a viable and informative democratic innovation for strengthening civic engagement within the United States that – if streamlined – can be adapted to scale. This dissertation concludes with concrete policy recommendations for the

implementation of future PB processes in the United States that could contribute to reducing barriers to entry, process exhaustion and the potential for process co-optation by politicians.

### **1.1 What is PB?**

PB has expanded to over 1,500 municipalities worldwide since its inception in Porto Alegre, Brazil in 1989 by the leftist Partido dos Trabalhadores or Worker's Party (henceforth, "PT"). PB expanded from Latin America to Europe beginning in 2001 with Italy, France and Spain becoming its core initial countries of adoption (Sintomer et al 2010). The World Bank and United Nations Development Fund have dubbed PB a "best practice" in democratic innovation and have spent millions of dollars in aid to institute PB in places as diverse as the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Dominican Republic (Shah 2007; Weber 2012). Through this process, clientelism and corruption are reduced (Wampler 2004), while service delivery and citizen engagement are improved (Goldfrank 2007).

In its original campaign for Participatory Budgeting the PT outlined four basic principles guiding PB: 1) direct citizen participation in government decision-making processes and oversight 2) administrative and fiscal transparency as a deterrent for corruption 3) improvements in urban infrastructure and services especially in aiding the indigent, and 4) altering political culture so that citizens can serve as democratic agents (Goldfrank 2002).

Emerging out of a 19-year military dictatorship, PB offered a way to reimagine the state: "Participatory Budgeting would help re-legitimate the state by showing that it could be effective, redistributive, and transparent" (Goldfrank 2007). PB gives citizens the

opportunity to learn about government practices and come together to deliberate, discuss and make substantive impacts on budget allocations (Shah 2007). PB programs are implemented at the behest of citizens, governments, non-government organizations (NGOs) and civil society organizations (CSOs) to give citizens a direct voice in budget allocations (Wampler 2007). Scholars have suggested that when people partake in participatory deliberative engagements, they are better equipped to assess the performance of elected officials on both the local and national levels (Pateman 1970; De Sousa Santos 2004).

PB can take on many different manifestations and implementations depending on the unique geopolitical context in which it is implemented. There exist forms of participatory democracy in the United States, such as mechanisms for citizen feedback with school boards, neighborhood policing (Fung 2004) and urban planning (Berry et al 2006) to name a few. In order to mark a departure between other forms of citizen engagement and PB, however, I offer a bounded definition of PB involving three aspects that make PB a unique process over other forms of democratic participation:

*Participatory Budgeting is a 1) replicable decision-making process whereby citizens 2) deliberate publically over the distribution of 3) limited public resources that are instituted.*<sup>3</sup>

This definition requires the process be more than one ad hoc event, such as a citizen jury (Fishkin 1991) or a deliberation day (Ackerman and Fishkin 2005), such as those sponsored by AmericaSpeaks. The deliberations must be done in public and not in the private space Rousseau outlined in order for the general will to be decided. Finally, PB

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<sup>3</sup> The definitional addition of bounded resources differentiates PB in the US from Brazil where PB often does not have a clear amount of resources.



requires that monies be clearly delineated so that a set amount of funds must and will be allocated.

## **1.2 Why Participate?**

Why do citizens decide to participate in PB deliberations in the first place? Some citizens enter because they want to propose a specific project (material); while others enter because they want to feel a part of their community (existential) and there are varying levels of intermediate ideology at play in between (Inglehardt 1999, 1991). Inglehart (1999, 1991) notes that as human survival becomes increasingly secure, the “materialist” emphasis on psychological and economic security diminishes with an enlarged emphasis on “post-materialist” goals such as quality of life, freedom, and self-expression. As citizens’ basic material needs are met there is a deeper emphasis on existential self-actualization (Maslovian 1943).<sup>4</sup>

PB throughout Latin America typically brings legitimacy to weak or non-existent political regimes. In contrast, PB in the U.S. supports existing political institutions. This is partly what differentiates PB in the U.S. from other implementations aimed for democratization, such as in Brazil. Thus, PB in the United States is more closely tied to existential self-actualization.

## **1.3 What is PBNYC?**

PBNYC is a pilot project to bring PB to four New York City Council districts during 2012 – 2013 for FY 2013: District A Council member Albert, District B Council member

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<sup>4</sup> Tom Tyler (2006) argues that people’s feelings of a process what not just specific on the material outcome but related to feelings such as civic duty. Similarly, Henrik Bang (2009) observes that people who enjoy being involved are more excited by the experience itself than the material outputs.

Beatrice, District C Council member Charlie and District D Council member Devon.<sup>5</sup>

These members each pledged at least \$1.4 million of their discretionary funds toward neighborhood investment projects chosen by community residents in a vote. These projects were proposed by local stakeholders of at least 16 years of age in four respective districts.<sup>6</sup>

PBNYC had a citywide level Steering Committee composed of civil society leaders chosen through the existing networks of Council members, the PB technical lead, Participatory Budget Project (PBP), and the PB organizing lead, Community Voices Heard (CVH). Contrary to initial plans, ordinary citizens ended up participating in Steering Committee decisions. Additionally, each of the four districts assembled District Committees (DC); comprised of citizens personally asked by the Council member to serve a leadership role in the process. The District Committees worked with Council members and the technical and organizing leaders to plan neighborhood assemblies. The formation of these committees began in Spring 2011.

Through a process beginning with information sessions in late summer 2011, community members met in neighborhood assemblies (NA) (approximately four NAs in each district) to discuss, deliberate, and identify project needs in their areas; 2,138<sup>7</sup> stakeholders came to neighborhood assemblies throughout the city. At these neighborhood assemblies, people volunteered to be budget delegates, dividing themselves into thematic committees based upon various project ideas. 395 people signed up to be

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<sup>5</sup> Unless otherwise indicated, the proper names of Council members, district names and all participants are pseudonyms.

<sup>6</sup> Both residents and those who are “stakeholders,” such as those who work or send children to school in the district, were enabled to participate as budget delegates throughout the process.

<sup>7</sup> Data from Urban Justice Coalition, who led the research and evaluation team for PBNYC.

budget delegates, 250 participated in process orientations and many dropped off throughout the process.

Budget delegates met roughly every other week with at least daily correspondence via email or phone, and worked with relevant city agencies and Council member offices to craft budget proposals. Once the relevant city agencies and Council members' staffs approved these proposals, a second round of neighborhood assemblies reconvened to showcase proposals and receive neighborhood feedback.<sup>8</sup> This feedback was incorporated whenever possible and the projects were submitted for a popular vote in March 2012. In total, 5,431 residents came out to vote.

#### **1.4 Why PBNYC?**

Why study a project with a budget of \$6 million in a city with an annual budget of \$65.9 billion?<sup>9</sup> At its best, the project can be said to be impacting “Toilets and Trees”<sup>10</sup> – perhaps the lowest hanging fruit in a municipal budget. At its worst, the process is the latest sign of political manipulation by Council members already perceived as corrupt. Council members opened up only a small portion of their discretionary funds, determined solely by the Speaker of the Majority Party through personal preference in a range from \$3.3 to \$11 million. Out of these discretionary funds that were divided between capital funds for infrastructure and expense funds for programming, only a small portion of capital funds was allocated through PBNYC. Only 5,431 residents came out to vote of the

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<sup>8</sup> All three of the districts except one, District A, held formal second round of neighborhood assemblies. District A held an “Expo” that was a science-fair style event that was less about deliberation and more about showcasing the projects. This was controversial as all four Council members had signed upon specific rules for the pilot year, as will be discussed more in Chapter 4.

<sup>9</sup> New York City Council. Operating Budget 2010. URL: [http://council.nyc.gov/html/budget/PDFs/fy\\_2010\\_operating\\_budget.pdf](http://council.nyc.gov/html/budget/PDFs/fy_2010_operating_budget.pdf).

<sup>10</sup> Thank you to Dennis Thompson for phrase, April 18, 2012, Cambridge, MA.

roughly 180,000 constituents in the four districts, of which an estimated one-third to one-fourth are registered voters.<sup>11</sup>

Nevertheless, some people chose to devote nearly seven months of their lives to an intensively active mode of civic participation. The process made the cover of the *New York Times*' Metro section where it was referred to as "revolutionary civics in action"<sup>12</sup> A group of international Participatory Budgeting scholars convened in New York City for the first ever International Participatory Budgeting Conference.<sup>13</sup> Conference discussants cited PBNYC as the hotspot of democratic innovation in the West. Moreover, in the over 150 interviews conducted for this study, many traditional community activists, such as those who sit on Community Boards (CB), block associations and Parent Teacher Associations (PTA) – to name just a few of their commitments – repeatedly noted that PBNYC was the most meaningful civic engagement that they had ever experienced.<sup>14</sup> Why would residents who are already involved in the civic life of their community view PB as an innovative channel for engagement? New York City already has formalized mechanisms for citizen engagement and greater representation. In 1989, Charter 38 expanded the City Council from 35 to 51 members and included more mechanisms for citizen engagement with City Council members through the Community Boards (CB). In addition to these outlets for engagement, New York benefits from the stability of

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<sup>11</sup> New York City Elections. URL:

[http://www.elections.ny.gov/NYSBOE/enrollment/county/county\\_nov11.pdf](http://www.elections.ny.gov/NYSBOE/enrollment/county/county_nov11.pdf).  
[You do not need to be a registered voter to vote in PB, as outlined in Section 5.4, you do need proof of residency.](#)

<sup>12</sup> Sonia Sangha, "Putting in Their 2 Cents," March 30, 2012. " *New York Times*, Available at: [http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/01/nyregion/for-some-new-yorkers-a-grand-experiment-in-participatory-budgeting.html?\\_r=4&pagewanted=1&ref=nyregion](http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/01/nyregion/for-some-new-yorkers-a-grand-experiment-in-participatory-budgeting.html?_r=4&pagewanted=1&ref=nyregion). Soni Sangha, "The Voter Speak: Yes to Bathrooms," April 6, 2012. *New York Times*, Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/08/nyregion/voters-speak-in-budget-experiment-saying-yes-to-bathrooms.html>. The *New York Times* was recalcitrant to run this piece; Soni Sangha is a freelance writer who took it upon herself to write the piece.

<sup>13</sup> March 26, 2012. New York, NY.

<sup>14</sup> For more information on methods see Appendix 1.1.

institutional structures we in the “rich countries” (Pateman 2012) take for granted such as fair, free and universally accepted elections. In Brazil, PB was established to reduce clientelism, corruption, and increase a new government’s legitimacy after a 19-year military dictatorship. In contrast, elected leaders in the U.S. have both legitimacy and authority, even if sometimes lacking in popularity. Why are the Council members, Community Boards and numerous other outlets for public collaboration insufficient for New York City citizens? And does PBNYC offer something new?

New York’s current budget process grants the Speaker of the Majority Party – who is voted into the position through closed elections in a coalition building process – sole power to determine the amount of discretionary funds each Council member receives ranging anywhere from \$3.3 to \$11 million dollars. A report by Citizens Union, a citizen watchdog group in New York City, released a report on discretionary funding that analyzed whether or not the allocation process reflected the socioeconomic status of communities. It found “that the process is largely political, with no correlation between funding and the relative status of districts as determined by certain commonly-used indicators” (Citizens Union 2012, 2). One of the report’s recommendations called for “greater innovation” in the discretionary funding process and supported the use of the Participatory Budgeting pilot project for FY 2012-13 (Citizens Union 2012, 2).

This non-need based, non-transparent system is coupled with corruption scandals in New York City government. Even the current Speaker of the Majority Party Christine Quinn, who ran on a campaign promise of transparency, was found to be giving out \$17.4 million in funds hidden away from the public eye.<sup>15</sup> Such corruption and opacity have

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<sup>15</sup> Editorial, “*Ms. Quinn and the Potemkin Accounts*,” April 5, 2008, *New York Times*, Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/05/opinion/05sat2.html>.

contributed to New Yorkers' growing disillusionment with political institutions, as has been evidenced by the extremely low turnout rates for city elections. In Gov. Cuomo's State of the State Address he noted that New York currently ranks 48<sup>th</sup> in voter turnout nationwide.<sup>16</sup> In November 2009 when Council members Albert and Charlie were elected to City Council, New York City reported its lowest voting numbers in a mayoral race since 1969. Only 26% of New York City's 4.1 million registered voters cast a ballot for mayor in 2009, down from 33% in 2005.<sup>17</sup> Instances in which City Council elections coincide with mayoral elections typically result in higher voter turnout. In contrast, Council member Devon was elected in a special election in February 2009 in which 7,315 residents of District D voted. Devon received 3,316 votes, just 814 votes more than the runner-up.

When contrasting the number of people who voted Devon in office (3,316) with the residents of the same district who voted in PBNYC (1,085), the voting turnouts for PBNYC take on new significance, especially as PB was contained to just a small portion of Devon's district. This pilot process, which lacked considerable resources, was able to bring out nearly half as many voters as would an official city election. As one person whose CSO was involved in PB noted, "there is something about PB." She described that after attending one meeting she was "hooked" and continued her involvement, despite her limited availability. In essence, PBNYC is a departure from *status quo* politics in New York City and enables all those involved in its ecosystem, from elected officials to citizens to city agencies, to create new relationships.

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<sup>16</sup> Governor Andrew Cuomo "New York State of State Address" 1/04/2012 Albany, New York.

<sup>17</sup> Ray Katz, "As Voter Turnout Dwindles, Some Looks to a Tiny Agency for Help," July 2010. *Gotham Magazine*, Available at: <http://old.gothamgazette.com/article/governing/20100709/17/3309>

## 1.5 Citizenly Politics

In this dissertation I theorize that citizens enter PB for two reasons: to gain material and existential rewards. Some citizens enter because they want to propose a specific project (material), while others enter because they want to feel a part of their community (existential) and there are varying levels of intermediate ideology at play in between (Inglehardt 1999, 1991). Citizenly politics is the theoretical and analytical framework for assessment, filling in gaps in current PB literature often imbued with an ideological commitment to PB without an independent reporting mechanism. Citizenly politics aims to place PB in the U.S. within an analytic framework that harkens back to Aristotle's theory of politics centered around four basic tenets: 1) citizens design their own participation 2) deliberative discourse takes place (Gutmann and Thompson 1996) 3) participation is substantive, not merely performative (Moynihan 2003; 2007) and 4) has the ability to become institutionalized to scale.

Citizenly politics is a theory that differs from traditional literature surrounding deliberation and participation with a focus beyond engagement itself to how citizens can *design* their very engagement. For example, it is not enough that PBNYC creates new spaces for participation, but that citizens themselves are architects of their engagement. Similarly, some scholars posit that deliberation and participation are at odds with one another (Mutz 2005). Citizenly politics asserts that participation must have a deliberative element. Lastly, citizenly politics requires participation to be more than consultative or performative – it must be binding. Thus, it must extend participation beyond traditional deliberative dialogues such as citizen juries (Fishkin 1998) or deliberative forums (Fishkin 1991; Ackerman 2002).

## 1.6 The Approach

This dissertation analyzes to what degree PBNYC fulfills the four tenets of citizenly politics. I outline three salient conditions of the four districts implementing the treatment of PBNYC along the dimensions of 1) demographics 2) social capital and civil society capacity and 3) political economy. I assess these conditions of success within the criteria for success outlined by citizenly politics.

The empirical results, both quantitative and qualitative, show that PB districts produced results no worse than non-PB districts, and in some ways better. I employ a mixed methods approach that includes surveys, data analysis, in-depth interviews and secondary resources. I match districts not implementing PB to those implementing the treatment of PB with similar demographics.

*PBNYC with Respective Matched Pairs Districts*<sup>18</sup>:

<b><u>PBNYC District</u></b>	<b><u>Non-PBNYC Matched District</u></b>
District A, Council member Albert	District W, Council member Wasa
District B, Council member Beatrice	District X, Council member Xaviera
District C, Council member Charlie	District Y, Council member Yash
District D, Council member Devon	District Z, Council member Zeus

Figure 1.1: PBNYC and Non-PB Matched Districts

The matched-pair methods isolates the impact of PB on the type of projects Council members put forth.<sup>19</sup> Additionally, I employ a difference-in-difference method to compare projects implemented in PB districts before and after the introduction of the PB

<sup>18</sup> See Section 5.7 for comprehensive matched pair district demographic information. Throughout this dissertation this color schema is used to clearly delineate PB and non-PB implementing districts.

<sup>19</sup> For more information on methods see Appendix 1.1.



treatment. By process-tracing the Parks and Recreation budget committee in particular, I forge a framework for assessing deliberation and decision-making in the PB process. An analysis of deliberation and decision-making in PB shows that two norms— efficiency and inclusiveness – produce dual models of process and results oriented deliberation. I argue that PB produces better outcomes than the *status quo* budget process in New York City, while simultaneously transforming how those who participate understand themselves as citizens, constituents, Council members, Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and community stakeholders. Yet there are serious challenges to participation, including the high costs to engagement, opportunities for frustration and disillusionment, as well as the perils of scalability. This methodological framework challenges participatory democracy toward institutionalization and implementation at a higher scale, and is especially challenging for PBNYC with its high barriers to entry and costs of engagement. PB is resource and time intensive for participants. For Participatory Budgeting to become institutionalized in the U.S., it needs to move beyond ideological, personal or intra-political reasons for enactment.

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## **1.7 The Implications**

Even accounting for barriers to entry, how can genuine participation be ordered by decree? Saul Alinsky (1971) argues that the first year of any participatory process will always have forms of power co-option. It takes at least one cycle, at best, for participatory mechanisms to establish grassroots foundations and empower individuals from the bottom up. Critics argue that not only do citizens not want to engage in politics (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002), but also they are ill equipped to make rational policy decisions (Waltzer 1999). The impossibility theorem of social choice theory posits that

there is no rationally acceptable way to construct social preferences from individual preferences (Arrow 1988). The “discursive dilemma” states that individuals in deliberative settings are so alienated from policy concerns that they can potentially support policies that are inconsistent with their own beliefs (Pettit 2001; Richardson 2010).<sup>20</sup>

The data from PB tells a different story. I devise a typology of “conventional” and “innovative” projects. Conventional projects are similar to Council member-implemented projects and do not substantially deviate from projects in non-PB years, with the large exception that citizens are now able to specify where or how to implement the project. Innovative projects address community needs more creatively than *status quo* budgeting in non-PB years. According to my own typology, in Chicago, 50% of the projects were conventional and 50% were innovative.<sup>21</sup> In New York City, 62% of the projects were conventional and 38% innovative. Those projects that residents voted upon show that, when given the tools to make informed decisions, citizens are able to be rational and effectively assess their community’s needs. Furthermore, participation in PBNYC, even if costly and at times frustrating, also fulfills a rational desire for greater civic knowledge, strengthened relationships with elected officials and greater community inclusion. In this way, PBNYC provides a new conduit for U.S. citizens to fulfill Aristotle’s classification of man as a *Zôion politikòn*, or “a political animal.”<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> PB is a unique deliberate setting as citizens are given an up front role in policy making.

<sup>21</sup> For sake of comparison, these numbers are from the first year of the pilot project in Chicago.

<sup>22</sup> Aristotle *Politics* (I.1253a2).

## 1.8 Lay of the Land

This dissertation begins by taking a step back from PB to posit a more fundamental condition of the human experience: why do people choose to act political and enter into a political sphere, or *polis*? Chapter 2 engages with normative and empirical theories to position citizenly politics within a conception of citizens and politics beginning with Aristotle and Arendt through Gutmann and Thompson and Wright and Fung. In this conception, citizens return to political action on the local level (Dahl 1957) to reinvigorate a 21<sup>st</sup> century *polis*. Chapter 2 argues that political activity fulfills a fundamental and unique human condition.

After outlining normative reasons for political engagement, Chapter 3 places PB in a global context by reviewing current literature on lessons from prior PB experiences. Chapter 3 highlights the gaps in the current PB literature surrounding *political* and *structural* conditions as enabling forces in the PB process that this dissertation fills. This dissertation emphasizes the political enabling conditions for PB often overlooked in existing literature. Chapter 3 outlines the fundamental differences between PB in Brazil and its implementation in the United States, namely the lack of a specific political party and the size of the implementation. By focusing on the initial ideological reasons for PB implementation, this chapter provides the necessary historical and scholarly context in which to assess the adoption of Participatory Budgeting in the United States. Out of this context, I argue PB in the U.S. emerges as a less ideological and less partisan process. Chapter 4 focuses in on the transformation of PB from its application in the Global South to the United States with the first implementation of PB in the U.S. in Chicago. Chapter 4 illustrates that the process of Chicago PB was implemented by one politician and was

connected to his own personalities and networks of patronage. After the initial pilot year, the politician lost energy and momentum and those actively involved were dissuaded from participation, thus severely curtailing the process. Chapter 4 illustrates why one-man PB does not work and challenges sustained that compromised substantive participation, including process exhaustion and frustrations. In order for Chicago PB to serve as an effective model, it must become more institutionalized and less tied to any one specific politician.

Chapter 5 moves from Chicago PB to the largest instance of PB in the U.S.: Participatory Budgeting in New York City (PBNYC). Chapter 5 outlines a relevant history of the New York City Council and Community Boards and explains the current budget process in New York City, especially how Council members receive discretionary funds in a non-transparent process at the discretion of the Speaker of the Majority Party. Empirical evidence contrasting district needs with fund allocation details that Council member discretionary funds allotment does not correlate with district needs. In this climate, PBNYC involves citizens in the New York City budget process in an unprecedented way. Chapter 5 articulates the political ecosystem in which PB emerged and the ways in which PBNYC marks a departure from *status quo* budget decisions in the New York City Council.

From there, the dissertation details empirical findings of PBNYC with a focus on deliberation, participation and governance. Chapter 6 discusses the outcomes of deliberation and decision-making in PBNYC, while discussing the impact of moderator effects. The micro-deliberations within budget delegate committees illustrated two models of deliberative norms: 1) result and 2) process oriented deliberation. Result

oriented deliberation is technocratic in form and favors efficiency. Process oriented deliberation prizes inclusiveness of all voices. Chapter 6 shows that two norms of deliberation, efficiency and inclusiveness, produce dual models of process and results oriented deliberation. Deliberative discourse is not a static model, but rather elucidates that conflicting norms, such as inclusiveness and efficiency, can be in tension with one another while still producing deliberative ends. Chapter 6 illustrates that fulfilling the second tenet of citizenly politics -- deliberative discourse -- results in multifaceted deliberation, at times prioritizing results while at other times emphasizing process. Chapter 7 describes the challenges and frustrations of the role of participation in fulfilling the third tenet of citizenly politics: substantive participation. Participation serves as the most potentially fulfilling and transformative aspect of PBNYC. Many citizens were frustrated by obstacles to participation but stayed engaged in the process due to the existential rewards. Empirical results from PBNYC show that the less demanding forms of participation, such as the vote, were the most inclusive in terms of demographic diversity. Some districts, such as D-B and D-C, were able to mobilize a higher percentage of minorities and low-income residents to vote in PB than in the 2009 elections. Chapter 8 outlines the politics behind PBNYC with attention to decision making on the governance level. Chapter 8 illustrates that, despite the intention of the initiators of PB, citizens ended up participating in the design of the participatory institutions. They participated so as to make participation possible, even through perhaps undemocratic means. The unexpected opportunities for citizens to be architects of their own participation fulfill the first tenet of citizenly politics --citizens design their engagement-- while compromising democratic norms.

Chapter 9 analyzes the winning projects from the vote and argues that PB produces better material outputs over the *status quo* budget process. Chapter 9 contains a typology of votes for both innovative and conventional neighborhood projects, and shows that 62% of all projects voted upon were conventional while 38% qualified as innovative. In contrast, matched pairs not implementing PB had innovative projects 15% of the time. PB districts produced results no worse than non-PB districts, and in some ways projects that more creatively and effectively address community needs. Even the *most* innovative PB projects, disprove critics who contend that ordinary citizens are not able to effectively understand the intricacies of city budgets or put forth rational proposals. Thus, when citizens are empowered with the tools to make concrete policy recommendations, they use their hyper-localized knowledge to effectively identify needs through a creative and pragmatic approach.

The final chapter concludes by assessing broader normative implications of PB for citizenship and democracy in the U.S. and other advanced democracies. The conclusion addresses the fourth criteria of citizenly politics regarding questions of institutionalization to scale by arguing for greater institutionalization of PBNYC while also engaging with critics who may argue PB is potentially perilous as a model of “excessive democracy” (Huntington 1976). These ending remarks discuss tradeoffs between more transparent, participatory governance and efficient technocracy. I respond to critics with detailed policy recommendations to make U.S. PB a more effective, less resource intensive process. My policy recommendations acknowledge PB’s challenges to scalability, potential political pitfalls, and normative implications. Questions of PB’s scalability and institutionalization are fundamental for scholars and practitioners wishing to re-

conceptualize the relationship of the citizen to the state and push for greater democratization.

It is only through a rigorous normative and empirical analytical assessment of PBNYC that participatory democracy can move from the realm of the imagination to the realm of the possible within the United States. This dissertation uses PBNYC and the framework of citizenly politics as a set of tools with which to begin this inquiry. As a civil society leader from the PBNYC Steering Committee, noted upon completion of the process:

I've been working on the budget for 15 years in New York City where the budget dance is so entrenched. I've seen a radical change in the last few months, people are talking about this and imagining a budget process that is modified and doesn't involve highest paid lobbyists. Opening up the imagination of what is possible is the biggest achievement of PBNYC and shame on me for not thinking it was possible.

## Appendix 1.1

### Methods:

Throughout this dissertation a multi-method approach is used in the form of quantitative surveys of participants at neighborhood assemblies, budget delegate meetings and the vote. In addition, I conducted over 150 qualitative interviews with individuals participating at varying levels of the process. I did a process tracing approach with a group of roughly 30 participants, employing participant observation throughout the various stages of the process. I also did a process tracing in-depth analysis of the budget delegate Parks and Recreation Committee (PRC).

To capture activity at the level of process governance, mainly CM and the leading CSOs, I attended all meetings of the Steering Committee. I conducted in-depth interviews with CM, their staff, CSOs, and other key leaders, activists, and scholars of civic engagement and democracy in New York City. I also conducted numerous interviews over a period of a year-and-a-half with the Alderman from Chicago PB, his staff, active members in the process and researchers.

Additionally, I conducted a difference-in-difference analysis whereby I compared capital gains projects in the four districts implementing PBNYC before and after the treatment of PB. I employed matched pair analysis whereby I compared the capital gains projects in those districts that are similar to districts that implemented PB, but did not implement PB, with the projects emanating from those districts that did implement PB.

In order to implement these research methods, I relied on a variety of technologies. I was a part of email list serves and exchanged phone calls, and text messages relating to PBNYC with informants. In addition to my field research and academic training in



participatory governance, I have been working with the World Bank Institute to assess PB in other parts of the world, mainly in the DR and DRC, and specifically looking at the impact of mobile technology on PB.

Throughout this dissertation I directly transcribed all quotes from firsthand encounters and conversations with relevant participants. Some are consolidated. All names have been changed for anonymity. Disparate characteristics of participants are highlighted in various chapters as pertinent to in-group dynamics.

## Chapter 2: Norms

The commanding beliefs of the American people – that everything is possible, that vast problems can be solved if broken up into pieces and answered one by one, and that ordinary men and women contain within themselves, individually and collectively, the constructive genius with which to craft such solutions – now find themselves without adequate political expression (Unger 2009, 6). Through the theoretical framework of citizenly politics, this chapter outlines a normative appeal for Participatory Budgeting (PB) as a democratic innovation enabling political participation and expression. The current literature stages a debate between a populist wing, urging greater participation by citizens in the processes of government, and an elite-oriented wing that is skeptical about the public's capacity for and commitment to direct democracy. My sympathies are with those arguing for an expanded role for ordinary citizens in the everyday practice of self-government. But my project departs from the current literature in centering itself on budgeting and fiscal policy, an arena that has been neglected by theorists like J.S. Mill, Barber, and Pateman. In this chapter I present Participatory Budgeting (PB) as the local level whereby citizens can be experts within local budgetary contexts. Through deeper engagement at the local level (Dahl 1957), citizens in 2012 can realize some of the virtues of the *polis* as outlined by Aristotle and Arendt, and fulfill at least some of the tenets of citizenly politics.

The four tenets of citizenly politics involve both material and non-material forms of engagement: 1) citizens design their own participation 2) deliberative discourse takes place (Gutmann and Thompson 1996) 3) participation is substantive and not merely performative (Moynihan 2003; 2007) and 4) the process has potential to become institutionalized and scaled. The very real results that citizenly politics achieve move it out of the realm of the intellectual exercise and the social science experiment, and into the space of “real” politics. While many theories focus on norms of participation and

deliberation, citizenly politics incorporates citizen-informed mechanisms for engagement coupled with prospects for institutionalization.

Citizenly politics offers a stand-alone theory that seeks to surmount the challenge of “normative endogeneity” (Thompson 2008) crippling some scholarship on deliberative democracy while also extending the current literature on participation and deliberation.

Citizenly politics posits that neither participation nor deliberation is enough for deepening democracy within North America. Rather citizens must also be architects of their involvement. Furthermore, the innovation of Participatory Budgeting must move beyond the incubator of innovation to become institutionalized and scalable.

This chapter engages with normative and empirical theories to position citizenly politics within a tradition of participatory theories of democracy that begins with Aristotle and continues into the present day. By addressing more shallow conceptions of citizen engagement and critiques of participatory deliberations, I offer citizenly politics as a way to re-imagine the citizen.

## **2.1 Status quo citizens and politics**

Mainstream political science contends that rational citizens will seek to minimize the time and effort they expend on democratic participation and deliberation. Schumpeter (1942) challenges what he calls the “classical doctrine”<sup>23</sup> in arguing that citizens are largely ignorant of politics and easily manipulated by political elites. Therefore, average citizens ought not to be involved in policy decisions. Following a tradition initiated by Weber, Schumpeter presents democracy as an affair for elites, with channels for popular participation kept to a minimum. Downs (1957) expounds what he calls “the rationality of electoral ignorance” whereby the costs of citizens educating themselves about politics

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<sup>23</sup> See Schumpeter. 1976. *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*. London: Allen and Unwin.

outweigh potential benefits. Citizens rationally rely on heuristics and party cues for determining their preferences (Fiorini 1975). Any participation above the minimum threshold of voting is viewed as an inefficiency.

Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002) modify the Downsian argument in updating it for the twenty-first century; in their narrative it is not so much that people are uninterested in politics, but rather that they are quite content to elect what they see as competent, technocratic management. When citizens do engage in politics it is almost always through elections; however, even acquiring information for these elections is rendered irrational.

Party identification is a primary heuristic citizens use for making political decisions (Green, Palmquist and Schickler 2002). Oftentimes citizens follow partisanship before policy (Goren 2009) with party cues determining preferences (Fiorini 1975). Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) argue that elites in turn target those that are most likely to be influential, such as those with high SES.

In part as a reaction against the cynicism of modern political science, an alternative perspective advocating strong participation has emerged in political theory. Pateman (1976) contrasts Schumpeter's elite-centered conception of democracy with a more participatory alternative. Pateman (1976) buttresses her claims for a multi-dimensional participatory democracy with citations of Mill and Rousseau, theorists who appreciated what Schumpeter misses. She advocates the workplace as the site of future democratic innovation.

Barber (1984) calls for a strong democracy that enables individuals to achieve an existential "human freedom" (Barber 1984, 311) only found in the political sphere.

“Strong democracy” underpins more participatory, democratic, and collective channels for citizens to communicate with their government. Some call for deliberative opinion polls (Fishkin 1991) or more substantive citizen juries (Fishkin 2005). Most creatively, Ackerman and Fishkin (2005) call for an annual Deliberation Day, in which citizens would be encouraged to participate in small, diverse group discussions about the nation's political future. Deliberation Day is inspired by social science experiments, titled Deliberative Polls, aimed to more robustly engage citizens to participate in electoral decisions

While these theorists articulate norms for participation, few articulate the budget as the locus of reform. Erik Olin Wright and Archon Fung (2001) suggest participatory budgeting as an example of *Empowered Deliberative Democracy (EDD)* to re-invigorate robust citizen engagement.

Fung and Wright outline four examples of EDD: 1) neighborhood governance councils in Chicago that have served to check urban bureaucratic power over public schools and policing 2) the Wisconsin Regional Training Partnership (WRTP), which enables organized labor, firms, and government to assist workers in employment transitions 3) Habitat Conservation Planning that organizes stakeholders under the Endangered Species Act with outlets for engagement 4) Participatory Budgeting in Porto Alegre, the first instance of Participatory Budgeting enabling ordinary citizens to determine the placement of public monies and 5) Panchayat reforms in West Bengal and Kerala, India that have created both representative and direct channels to empower local villages (Fung and Wright 2001, 7).

## 2.2 Existential Participation Norms

Fung and Wright (2001) articulate PB as one potential way to empower citizens.

Participatory Budgeting is an attempt to rescue politics from elitism and the need to be highly organized. I argue that PB enables new channels for understanding citizen roles. In citizenly politics, the public sphere (*polis*) is able to produce better material and immaterial, or existential, outputs for citizens over the *status quo* modes of engagement.

Some better democratic conditions relate to material outputs, such as the PB process producing better projects to address community needs than traditional budget process.

Other better democratic conditions may be a renewed civic spirit in a community or renewed faith in elected officials.

I categorize positive externalities not addressing a material need as existential. Inglehart (1999, 1991) notes that as human survival becomes increasingly secure, the “materialist” emphasis on psychological and economic security diminishes with an enlarged emphasis on “post-materialist” goals such as quality of life, freedom, and self-expression. As citizens’ basic material needs are met there is a deeper emphasis on existential self-actualization (Maslovian 1943).<sup>24</sup>

I argue that PB is able to produce modest material outputs and substantial existential outputs. PB is an example of EDD *par excellence* because government takes the input of citizens seriously, inducing the “full participation” (Pateman 1989) of citizens. The existential outputs include new opportunities for citizens--as architects of their collective life--to use speech and reason to combat traditional power dynamics. On the local level

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<sup>24</sup> Tom Tyler 2006 argues that people’s feelings of a process what not just specific on the material outcome but related to feelings such as civic duty. Similarly, Henrik Bang (2009) that people who enjoy being involved are more excited by the experience itself than the material outputs.

PB creates micro-spaces where citizens use speech and reason to create new forms of engagement and participation.

PB can reshape politics in order to maximize freedom and achieve existential norms.

When successful, politics has a transformative, emancipative, and horizon-fusing (Gadamer 1960) potential.<sup>25</sup> Political theory beginning with Aristotle articulates how through engaging in a *polis* man can fulfill a uniquely human calling to be social in the political sphere. PB is a highly promising new outlet for achieving these "existential" outcomes.

Aristotle famously defined man as uniquely capable of speech. *Zoon Logon Ekhom* is understood as a "living being capable of speech"<sup>26</sup>(Arendt 1954, 27). It is this capacity for speech that sets man apart from other animals and enables mankind to operate within the *polis*. Hannah Arendt, who saw herself as advancing on Aristotle's major themes, describes such a *polis*: "To be political, to live in a *polis*, meant that everything was decided through words and persuasion and not through force and violence" (Arendt 1954, 27).

Integral to Aristotle's conception of the *polis* is freedom (Arendt 1954, 30)<sup>27</sup>. Arendt further explains:

[T]he organized polis is the highest form of human communal life and thus something specifically human, at equal remove from the gods, who can exist in and of themselves in full freedom and independence, and animals, whose communal life, if they have such a thing, is a matter of necessity (Arendt 2005, 116).

The *polis* is the "highest form of human communal life" because man has the option to attend a *polis* and not be subjected to another human being. The option to engage in

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<sup>25</sup> The transcendent effects of politics participation are also cited by Arendt (1954) and Unger (1998).

<sup>26</sup> See Aristotle's *Nichomachean Ethics* 1142a25

<sup>27</sup> I am building upon Arendt's stylized Aristotle - many classicists think Arendt gets Aristotle wrong in some important ways.

political life is an expression of freedom. The *polis* enables individuals to escape the confines of daily life. Within the *polis* an individual's actions can become timeless and transcend temporality and mortality. The *raison d'être* of the *polis* was to enable humans to achieve "immortal fame" (Arendt 2005, 197).

Arendt outlines a form of politics whereby humans' unique ability for speech enables the condition for humans to be free. Freedom is part of being human as is our humanness that the *polis* is able to provide. For Arendt, the *polis* is a space for freedom of speech, thought, and action. If man is the social and political animal Aristotle outlines, and our capacity for speech is what makes us uniquely human, then politics is a uniquely human expression.<sup>28</sup> Yet, why would man enter into the *polis* in the first place?

Arendt offers an interpretation of political action that seeks to surmount this challenge. For Arendt, politics is how we create and actualize ourselves as human beings. "Politics is based on the fact of human plurality. God created *man*, but *men* are a human, earthly product (Arendt 2005, 93)." Humans are unique among the creatures that roam the Earth in possessing the ability to create or do something new. Political action is how this novelty is expressed:

"Speech and action reveal this unique distinctness. Through them, men distinguish themselves instead of being merely distinct, they are the modes in which human beings appear to each other, not indeed as physical objects, but *qua* men (Arendt 2005, 176)."

Arendt is not referring to speech and action in general, but rather the specific interaction of action and speech in a political space. Arendt focuses on the creation of the space between two concepts, be it action and speech or men amongst men, as the space of possibility: "politics arises in what lies *between men* (Arendt 2005, 96)."

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<sup>28</sup> See Arendt (Arendt 1954, 27) for a discussion about the confusion between translations of man as a social animal vs. man as a political animal.



Contemporary theorist Roberto Unger expands on this vision in terms more appropriate for the twenty-first century: “In a deepened democracy people must be able to see themselves and one another as individuals capable of escaping their confined roles” (Unger 1998, 256). The escape from our “confined roles” is an expression of freedom. Unger outlines the “bigness” of the political sphere, or *polis*, as the place where humans can be free. For Unger, the political is deeply personal. Humans engage in politics because it enables an otherwise unrealized expression of our humanity.

Unger’s conceptualization buttresses Arendt’s ideal of the political sphere, or *polis*, as a place that outlines “the language of transformative politics” which “must hold up the image of a reordered world in which people acquire different identities and interests and they seek to satisfy more fully the interests, and live out more fully their identities, they now recognize as theirs” (Unger 1998, 260). Politics is not simply about day-to-day governance but rather about connecting humans to a part of their humanness or identity. Through politics, people are able to diversify their interests and develop and establish more rich and full identities.

For Unger it is only through a rich politics of personal empowerment that people are able to transcend the ordinary.<sup>29</sup> The ordinary encompasses the mundane tasks of private life, as well as the instrumental or material use of politics in order to divide the social product. Extraordinary politics, on the other hand, concerns the seeming banality involved with day-to-day governance and politics actually enables individuals to achieve immortality akin to Arendt’s conceptualization of the *polis*. It is not that politics bogs down the

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<sup>29</sup> In contrast to Arendt whose politics mostly come across in founding/revolutionary moments -- she debates throughout *On Revolution* whether an authentic/legitimate political life is even possible in the absence of a revolutionary moment.

individual with concerns of governance, but rather that politics frees the individual to have a richer and more diverse identity.

Politics is able to do this by allowing individuals an ability to appear before one another and meet “*qua men*” (Arendt 2005, 176). Through meeting one another on these uniquely human terms, the political sphere becomes the realm in which individuals “most radically accept one another as the original, context-transcending beings we really are, rather than as placeholders in a social scheme, acting out a script we never devised and barely understand” (Unger 1998, 9). Both Unger and Arendt outline a political sphere, or *polis*, that enables an individual to achieve a deeper kind of freedom through political expression. And PB is one of a small number of extant structures in which these kinds of interactions become possible.

### **2.3 Deliberative Democracy**

The Arendt-Unger ideal of civic engagement has the potential to be fully realized in Participatory Budgeting. But it remains to be seen whether or not PB can fulfill these norms. In order to achieve the existential outputs from political activity within the *polis*, people must use speech as their tool. Arendt’s discussion of man’s ability to exert reason and rhetoric inform modern-day scholarship on deliberative democracy. Deliberative democracy as a school of political theory first and foremost believes in the ability of reason and speech to be used by citizens to arrive at decisions.

Starting from Aristotle’s definition of what distinguishes man from other species, *Zoon Logon Ekhon*, our capacity for speech makes us uniquely human. In our mythical Athenian *polis*,<sup>30</sup> it is equality of speaking in front of one’s peers that enables political

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<sup>30</sup> I use the term mythical because scholars have tended to glorify this space yet as discussed earlier it was deeply limited in terms of who could actually participate. It is not at all clear this is what Aristotle believed,

freedom. Part of this freedom is the ability to enter into the public realm regardless of one's wealth or influence. Integral to this freedom is agency on behalf of the individual: I choose to engage in political speech. This stands in stark contrast to other forms of life that are a result of necessity.

Speech is a powerful tool because it is an equalizer among differently situated individuals. Speech can be the realm in which *a priori* advantages, such as physical strength or material wealth, can be mitigated. Speech can also be the medium whereby inherent differences in reason and intellect are used to overpower other individuals. The *polis* can quickly degenerate into a sphere where speech is usurped and existing class conflict and disadvantages are only further highlighted.<sup>31</sup> One reason speech in the classical *polis* was less problematic, as mentioned earlier, was that the *polis* contained a small sub-section of ancient Greek society. By limiting the *polis* to the wealthy and educated, speech was less likely to be used as an unfair manipulative tool – though that is not to say that it was never used to that effect.

Speech is a unique tool in so far as it can create benefits for both the individual and the collective. Understood in the Habermasian (1996) sense, speech can confer democratic legitimacy on a process while enabling a more deliberative, participatory culture. People, who enter PB for material concerns, i.e. with a specific project in a specific location, can use speech. For those who enter PB for more communitarian (or existential) reasons, speech is an end as well as a means; they participate not only to advance their policy goals, but because they hope that through the back and forth of public debate they will

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or what the Athenian assembly actually looked like. However, for the tenets of this broader point about speech, the *polis* still serves as useful, albeit flawed, heuristic.

<sup>31</sup> See Russon Gilman 2008 for a discussion of how the Iowa Caucus, as a mini *polis*, creates opportunities for rhetorical manipulation.

feel connected to their communities in new ways. Speech is malleable in this capacity and can be used for all these goals through enabling greater communication and compromise. It is a powerful medium for citizen participation and communication that accommodates a wide variety of goals.

One of the challenges of bringing about an authentically Arendtian political community is how to forge spaces for political discourse. For scholars looking to re-engage citizens through the practice of speech and discourse, deliberative democracy offers one of the most promising theoretical frameworks.

Deliberative democracy affirms the ability of speech to serve as an enabler of citizen engagement. One core tenet of deliberative democracy is the need to justify decisions made by citizens and their representatives with the expectation of mutual reciprocity. A tacit social contract is enacted, in which citizens agree to respect the reasons of others in return for having their own taken seriously. Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson note that while deliberative democracy makes room for other modes of decision making, such as group bargaining or secret operations if they can be justified through a deliberative process, “its first and most important characteristic then, is its *reason-giving* requirement” (Gutmann and Thompson 2004, 3).

Gutmann and Thompson outline four dynamics that enable Aristotle’s ideal of speech in the *polis* to be understood through the modern context of deliberative democracy: 1) reason giving 2) reasons must be accessible to all citizens 3) those reasons are binding for some duration and 4) the process of collective reasoning is dynamic and iterative (Gutmann and Thompson 2004). These four points culminate in a definition:

Deliberative democracy as a form of government in which free and equal citizens (and their representatives), justify decisions in a process in which they give one

another reasons that are mutually acceptable and generally accessible, with the aim of reaching conclusions that are binding in the present on all citizens but open to challenge in the future (Gutmann and Thompson 2004, 7).

## **2.4 The locality**

Even if Gutmann and Thompson's (2004) deliberative ideals can be realized there are obstacles for achieving Arendt and Unger's concept of existential political fulfillment. Contemporary democracies face the interlinked challenges of highly bureaucratized government and expansive populations, resulting in citizens feeling disconnected from governance (Zajac and Bruhn 1999). PB's strength as a democratic innovation lies in municipal budgets as the scale at which citizens can be experts. Other democratic innovations aiming for greater participation face the challenges of integrating the small-scale of the ancient *polis* in antiquity with contemporary U.S. democracy. Athens, the largest city-state in ancient Greece had quorum for assembly fixed for some purposes at 6,000 with 18,000 seats in the Pnyx where the Assembly met with an estimate of 40,000 adult male citizens.<sup>32</sup> For Plato, 5,040 was the maximum number of people for a unit of government. The *polis*, with its strengths and weaknesses, was inescapably local.<sup>33</sup> The locality is integral to empowered participation because citizens are experts in their locality. On the local level, people do not necessarily need to bring outside expertise or experience to be able to accurately assess community needs. The local level is the best hope in the U.S. to re-invent a *polis* for modern citizens. The local level is the focal point for integrating participatory mechanisms back into politics (Peters 1996). As Robert Dahl notes in his 1967 Presidential address to the American Political Science Association:

In this vision, the city-state must be small in area and in population. Its dimensions are to be human, not colossal, the dimensions not of an empire but of

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<sup>32</sup> Robert Dahl 1967. This article is his presidential address to the American Political Science Association, delivered on September 7, 1967, in Chicago. Cited in Fung 2011.

<sup>33</sup> Some other issues of the *polis* relate to representation and its limits to white property holding males.

a town, so that when the youth becomes the man he knows his town, its inhabitants, its countryside as well as he knows his own college or university.<sup>34</sup> PB is conceptually powerful because it suggests that through institutional design and structure there can be a modern solution to the ancient concept of citizenship. For example, the PB process is able to divide residents in small enough units that they can be local area experts on issues in their own neighborhoods. By breaking up complex budgetary needs into local neighborhood-level needs assessments, PB recasts politics on a more human scale. Through PB, as outlined in Chapter 7 and 8, citizens are able to know their neighborhoods, neighbors, and elected representatives. PB may not solve the problem of citizen engagement in a large, highly bureaucratized world, but it may foster better democratic conditions.

## **2.5 Citizenly Politics**

Literature on participatory deliberations focused on the local level offer an alternative to the narrow forms of citizenship outlined by political scientists, such as Downs (1967) and Fiorini (1975), outlined in section 2.1. However, even accounting for information and material costs to participation is another line of criticism on participatory deliberation surrounding both process and evaluation.

Some PB critics contend that the process is mostly about positioning different factions for electoral gain, or for building internal coalitions and support (Spada 2012). Some scholars posit that participation undermines representative government (Lynn 2002) while other scholars note the deleterious impacts of transparency when it comes to government functions such as budgeting.<sup>35</sup> Critiques range from the inability for citizens to make informed decisions (Richardson 2010; Walzer 1999) to concerns that

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<sup>34</sup> Robert Dahl 1967. This article is his presidential address to the American Political Science Association, delivered on September 7, 1967, in Chicago. Cited in Fung 2011.

<sup>35</sup> Francis Fukuyama, April 10<sup>th</sup>, Kennedy School of Government, Cambridge MA.

deliberative democracy is a way for elites to further consolidate their control (Posner 2003; Sanders 1997). Theorists of a more radical bent sometimes posit that hegemonic norms of race, class, and gender are magnified through the deliberative process (Young 1999; Mouffe 1999).

Other scholars point to methodological concerns. Since Joseph Bessette first coined the term “deliberative democracy” in 1980 (Bessette 1980, Cohen 1989), anxieties about efforts to meld theory with empirical study have loomed over the literature on deliberative democracy. One reason for this disconnect is the difficulty research projects have in capturing the holistic deliberative systems in place on an experimental basis (Thompson 2008). Research aiming at bridging this divide often faces the challenge of “normative endogeneity” whereby the design of the project and its evaluation both stem from the same narrow set of assumptions (Thompson 2008). This dissertation aims to bridge the divide within deliberative democracy by outlining all the relationships formed through deliberative democracy. In contrast to other scholarship on PB, the assessment framework of this project, citizenly politics, outlines criteria for success that are separate from districts level conditions for success.<sup>36</sup>

In order to return to a society that takes more responsibility for its collective identity, citizenly politics begins with Arendt’s assumption that flexing one’s civic muscles fulfills an existential human proclivity. In contrast to rational choice theories of resource-efficient citizenship (Downs 1967) centered around representational democracy, citizenly politics integrates citizens into processes that may be highly inefficient from the

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<sup>36</sup> Salient conditions of the four districts implementing the treatment of PBNYC along the dimensions of: 1) demographics 2) social capital (Putnam 1993) and civil society capacity and 3) political economy. These conditions are fully presented in Chapter 5.

standpoint of Constantian liberalism,<sup>37</sup> which prizes freedom *from* politics. However, the framework of citizenly politics suggests that if engagement can be substantive and lead to material (Fung and Wright 2001) ends it will be that much more able to fulfill an existential desire for engagement (that is, the norms of the Aristotlian-Arendtian *polis*). One of the many positive externalities of citizenly politics may be the “courage to repeatedly assert civic norms in daily life” (Rae 1993, 425). As Douglas Rae notes, “we have grown used to very low standards of civility on the streets, and we have substituted avoidance for citizenship” (Rae 1993, 425).

Citizenly politics centers around three basic tenets: 1) citizens design their participation 2) deliberative discourse takes place (Gutmann and Thompson 1996) and 3) participation is substantive and not merely performative (Moynihan 2003; 2007). One aspect of these new mechanisms is a re-imagining of traditional power dynamics in society. Finally, in order for citizenly politics to be useful it must become institutionalized and implemented on a national scale. At its best, citizenly politics enable greater involvement, representation, and equality in the process of governance. At its worst, citizenly politics serves as a waste of taxpayer dollars, a burden on the time of citizens and elected officials, and a process too limited in scope to be impactful or effective.

This dissertation posits that PB falls somewhere on this spectrum while enabling new mechanisms that engage elected officials, agencies, and citizens in transformative, substantive, and meaningful ways. At the same time, the costs of the process, both in term of material resources, political resources, and capital are burdensome and may

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<sup>37</sup> Constant, Benjamin. “Liberty of the Ancients Compared with that of the Moderns” 1816. Constant argues that one of the conditions of “modern liberty” is the freedom from politics.



suggest that the specific version of PB seen in PBNYC is not a sustainable democratic innovation for widespread implementation.

Citizenly politics offers a theoretical contribution to the literature on both participatory deliberation and democratic innovation. Few participatory and deliberative theorists recognize budgets as the space for citizen engagement. Little assessment on the self-determination of democratic innovation exists precisely because so few democratic innovations have been successfully implemented in North America.<sup>38</sup> Therefore questions remain as to how to engage citizens as architects of their political involvement. The first tenet of citizenly politics addresses this question of whether or not citizens really want to engage in Participatory Budgeting by requiring citizens to inform new modes of engagement in addition to substantive binding participation and deliberative discourse. Citizenly politics posits that individual deliberative and participatory elements are not sufficient for deepening democracy within North America. Citizens must also be engaged in the very process of determining their engagement. Citizenly politics goes even further to stress that democratic innovation will not truly enhance citizens' political efficacy unless it can move beyond its novel innovation period and become institutionalized.

## **2.6 Conclusion**

In this chapter I articulated a counter-argument to mainstream political science's portrayal of citizens and politics. In contrast to a view of politics whereby citizens are disinterested and not demanding (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002), I posit a citizen body

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<sup>38</sup> Two of the most promising recent democratic innovations in the United States have been "Imagine Philadelphia" involving citizens in planning the new city plan. See <http://participedia.net/cases/imagine-philadelphia-laying-foundation-philadelphia-pennsylvania>. As well as "Strong Starts for Children" that involved Dialogue Circles in New Mexico, USA on improving education including the successful implemented of Early Childhood Care and Education Act. See <http://participedia.net/cases/strong-starts-children-albuquerque-new-mexico-usa>.

that engages in political deliberation and discussion as an end in itself. Current literature often overlooks the import of the uniquely human freedom found in the political sphere, as articulated by Aristotle and buttressed by Arendt and Unger. One reason may be the hyper-burecratization of daily life (Barber 1986). Even most scholars of participation and deliberation work within a framework whereby complex bureaucracy leaves citizens feeling disconnected from governance (Zajac and Bruhn 1999). However, few of these scholars, with the notable exception of Wright and Fung's (2001) concept of *Empowered Deliberative Democracy (EDD)*, isolate the local budget as the scene for deepening citizen engagement and democracy.

PB is designed with unique characteristics to foster the deepening of democratic engagement. Through offering the local budget as its locus, politics are returned to human dimensions (Dahl 1957). Within these human dimensions citizens can be experts in their locality.<sup>39</sup> PB's new pathways for citizen engagement enable citizens to fulfill a deep-seated and quintessentially human yearning for genuine political action as outlined by Aristotle, and to improve their local governance in the process. Yet, PB moves from the realm of Aristotle and Arendt's theory to substantive participation as outlined by Pateman and Unger. PB offers opportunities for citizens to directly engage with their elected representative, through offering binding policy recommendations. Elected official entering PB pledge to enact policies citizens both create and vote upon, thereby fostering substantive participation. Organizers and volunteers promise that trained facilitators will adhere to reason-based arguments in making collective decisions.

The challenges to deliberative discourse and meaningful participation are numerous. Yet even if PB can offer meaningful participation, reasoned discourse, and opportunities for

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political freedom, the costs of engagement are burdensome and the self-determination of citizens unclear. Critics could argue that citizens provided no mandate for PB and costs to participation are so high as to render the process unsustainable. To address these concerns citizenly politics requires citizens informing new mechanisms for engagement and the process become institutionalization and implemented at a higher scale.

A standalone theory, citizenly politics, to assess Participatory Budgeting is especially informative because of the data available from New York's recent experiment. Within the context of Western industrial democracies is an innovation such as PB viewed as a sign of decay of representational democracy? Citizenly politics is a framework that can shed light on how democracies implementing PB, such as the United States, surmount the challenges of civic apathy and elite domination that plague advanced democracies. The next chapter outlines PB's modern history starting in Porte Alegre, Brazil in 1989 and its spread throughout the developing world, in order to inform the normative challenges for

### Chapter 3: Participatory Budgeting Worldwide

In the realm of political imagination, participatory democracy has plenty of romance. Perhaps for that reason alone, we wizened North Americans seldom discuss it. But perhaps we should. As we consider the polarization, deadlock, cynicism, and outright corruption that infects the eighteenth-century machinery through which we try feebly to govern ourselves in the twenty-first, we would all do well to look beyond Alexandria<sup>40</sup>

(Fung 2011, 867).

Archon Fung outlines a normative appeal for why Participatory Budgeting may be a useful democratic innovation for North Americans. Perhaps our politics could learn a few lessons from our neighbors in the Global South. In fact, Participatory Budgeting (henceforth referred to as “PB”) is not just limited to the Global South, but rather has served as an effective governance model throughout the world from Latin America to Europe and Asia to the Middle East and North Africa. This chapter outlines exactly what is meant by the term “Participatory Budgeting,” current literature surrounding PB, and the gaps my dissertation fills. This chapter outlines 1) what is PB 2) the first examples of PB in Brazil 3) the current literature on PB in Brazil 4) holes in the literature 5) PB beyond Brazil and 6) differences between PB in the United States and other PB implementations. This chapter contextualizes PB as a broader phenomenon outside the United States, placing this dissertation within an intellectual tradition of scholarship assessing the impact of PB throughout the world.

While U.S. PB differs from earlier adaptations, assessment of earlier PB implementations provides a critical foundation to determine challenges and rewards for bringing PB to the United States. PB within Latin America, and especially Brazil, offers lessons: pitfalls to avoid, such as emphasizing ideology as well as transferable innovations in the form of deepening democracy.

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<sup>40</sup> Alexandria here refers to the ideal of the Greek city-state founded by Alexander the Great in 332 B.C., which served as the epicenter of culture and politics in Greek antiquity.

PB in Brazil, the birthplace of modern PB, differs from PBNYC in three critical ways: 1) came about as the result of a military dictatorship 2) influenced by Marxist ideology and a specific political party and 3) pertained to one city budget. PB in the United States has been implemented on the municipal level with a portion of discretionary funds distributed by an Alderman in Chicago (Chapter 4) and four Councilors in New York City (Chapter 5) in the context of the comparative stability of United States democracy when contrasted to Brazil. PB in New York City resulted from four Council members coming together across partisan and ideological lines.

I argue that the first implementations of PB in Brazil were part of a leftist ideological agenda and, as PB became institutionalized, it becomes less partisan. As PB spreads beyond Brazil it becomes a model of development often implemented with the help of an external organization, such as the World Bank or United Nations Development Fund. As such, PB can be understood as part of an ideological agenda to bring about development within a country through democratization. PB that is imposed by an external organization raises questions about the grassroots nature of the process.

The first generation of PB scholarship is a byproduct of first wave implementation focused on a specific ideological agenda.<sup>41</sup> In this chapter I show that current gaps in the literature include a lack of focus on factors beyond ideology, such as institutionalized political structures and political networks. By framing PB outside of the United States, I argue that PBNYC illustrates an alternative model where PB does not have to be ideological or partisan as earlier cases suggest.

While successful PB is often tied to strength of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), I argue that within the United States political conditions are the enabling factor for CSOs

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<sup>41</sup> See Archon Fung 2011 for a discussion of first generation and second-generation scholarship on PB.

to produce successful PB. Outside the U.S., PB is typically implemented to bring stability within weak or non-existent political institutional structures. In contrast, U.S. PB buttresses existing political institutions. One of the reasons I focus on existential, or immaterial, politics is that as citizens' basic material needs are met there is a deeper emphasis on existential self-actualization (Maslovian 1943).<sup>42</sup> Therefore, gaps excluding political conditions in PB localities do not provide sustainable models, including existential outputs, for impact assessment as PB continues to be implemented in more developed democracies.<sup>43</sup>

Through assessing these gaps in research and design of PB, I aim to offer a more sustainable model of analyzing PB and its material and immaterial outputs. Unlike scholarship of PB that begins with the assumption that PB is a normative good, citizenly politics<sup>44</sup> holds PB up to rigorous independent assessment. Citizenly politics requires a multi-faceted research method addressing often over looked questions of institutionalization and economies of politics and governance.

### **3.1 What is Participatory Budgeting?**

Participatory Budgeting (PB) is a direct democracy approach to budgeting. PB enables citizens the opportunities to learn about government practices and come together to deliberate, discuss, and make substantive impacts on budget allocations (Shah 2007). Through this process citizens become educated about budget processes and engaged in politics. Ideally, PB leads to greater accountability and transparency as citizens leave the process with more knowledge and work toward holding officials more accountable. The

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<sup>42</sup> Tom Tyler 2006 argues that people's feelings of a process what not just specific on the material outcome but related to feelings such as civic duty. Similarly, Henrik Bang (2009) that people who enjoy being involved are more excited by the experience itself than the material outputs.

<sup>43</sup> Variations of PB are gaining popularity in Europe and the United Kingdom.

<sup>44</sup> 1) Citizen design their own participation 2) deliberative discourse takes place (Gutmann and Thompson 1996) 3) participation is substantive and not merely performative (Moynihan 2003; 2007) and 4) the process has potential to become institutionalized to scale.

World Bank has argued that PB, especially in the developing world, has the potential to limit government inefficiency and curb clientelism, patronage, and corruption (Shah 2007).

PB programs are implemented at the behest of citizens, governments, non-government organizations (NGOs) and civil society organizations (CSOs) to give citizens a direct voice in budget allocations (Wampler 2007). In many parts of the developing world, international NGOs implement PB within specific countries.

The impacts of PB on local government are due in part to the ability of PB to empower typically marginalized members of society with the ability to take part in politics. At its best, PB makes government more responsive to the needs of these typically excluded groups of society and accountable in terms of resource allocation and delivery. In this end, PB typically provides poor and historically excluded citizens with a critical venue for decision-making and involvement.

For those who partake in PB, the participatory and deliberative aspects of the process itself serve as citizenship training, or school, whereby citizens leave more knowledgeable, with increased self efficacy and a diminished scope of non-democratic attitudes (Almond and Verba 1965). Scholars have suggested that when people partake in participatory deliberative engagements they are better able to assess performance of elected official on both the local and national level (Pateman 1970; De Sousa Santos 2004).

While there are countless participatory and deliberative engagements, even those involving budgeting, discussions of “Participatory Budgeting” in its current manifestations harken back to a specific PB that first originated in Porto Alegre, Brazil in

1990 in 12 Brazilian cities. By 2005 it had expanded to more than 1200 municipalities worldwide (Wampler 2004; Wampler and Avritzer 2005).

PB can take on many different manifestations and implementations given the unique geopolitical context in which it is implemented. For example, the scale at which PB is implemented can differ from national to local to municipal. The enabling organization of PB can vary as well, such as a political party like the Partido dos Trabalhadores or Worker's Party (henceforth PT) who brought PB to Brazil or an International NGO such as the World Bank Institute. Therefore local, social, political and economic environments condition the effects of Participatory Budgeting on empowerment, decentralization of decision-making authority and accountability (Wampler 2007).

For the tenets of this project, I synthesize disparate definitions of PB: *Participatory Budgeting is a 1) replicable, decision-making process whereby citizens 2) deliberate publically over the distribution of 3) limited public resources that are instituted*<sup>45</sup>.

This definition requires the process be more than one ad hoc event, such as a citizen jury or a deliberation day (Ackerman 2005) such as those sponsored by AmericaSpeaks. The deliberations must be done in public, not in the private space Rousseau (1762) outlined for the general will to be decided. Finally, monies must be delineated so that a set amount of funds must and will be allocated. PB requires a specific amount of money is available and be spent.

PB proves to be an insightful and theoretically rich model for democratic engagement because it both improves service delivery between the state and the citizens, as well as

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<sup>45</sup> The definitional addition of bounded resources differentiates PB in the U.S. from Brazil where PB often does not have a clear amount of resources.



enhances the quality of democracy by creating new outlets and mechanisms whereby citizens can engage in their politics.

### **3.2 Why PB?**

Assessing factors involved in PB requires unpacking potential motivations for different parties involved in the PB process. Local government may want to implement PB in order to 1) promote government transparency 2) encourage civic education 3) create new channels for feedback with the potential for greater resource distribution equity and 4) electoral success. Citizens may want to participate in PB in order to 1) gain information 2) gain access to political leaders and policy 3) gain control over service delivery and 4) form new social capital and networks in their neighborhoods. Civil society organizations may want to engage in PB in order to: 1) strengthen their impact 2) expand their networks 3) influence political leadership/policies and 4) expand their programmatic agenda and priorities.

In some manifestations of PB, such as those in Brazil and other parts of the developing world, international NGOs often have an incentive to help support PB ranging in some instances to more consultative to more directly embed in the process. These NGOs view PB as part of a larger programmatic strategy to reduce corruption and clientelism and promote better service delivery as part of a larger reform of government transparency and accountability. However, NGOs implementing PB run the risk of imposing a top-down structure on what needs to be a bottom-up process. Likewise, in some communities adopting PB, the business community engages in order to further its interests such as increased market efficiency that requires stable and non-corrupt government structures.

Sometimes local commerce associations come together to have members work on a specific topic in the PB process.

Any discussion of PB must acknowledge ideological components to PB's origins. This ideology is identified with the post-authoritarian Marxist left in Latin America that grew out of failures of socialism and 19 years of a military dictatorship. The experience of life under authoritarian rule left people with doubts about socialism as an ideology. The new thinking revolved around the concept of "radical democracy," also known as "deepening democracy" and "democratizing democracy" (Goldfrank 2007). In the original campaign for Participatory Budgeting the PT, Radical Cause Party, and the Broad Front Party outlined four basic principles for PB: 1) direct citizen participation in government decision-making processes and oversight 2) administrative/fiscal transparency as a deterrent for corruption 3) improvements in urban infrastructure and services, especially in aiding the indigent and 4) altering political culture so that citizens can be democratic agents (Goldfrank 2002).

Participatory Budgeting was birthed in an ideological tradition struck between a Soviet-style centralized powerful state on one hand and a minimal state on the other (Dutra 2002). Emerging out of these extreme, PB offered a way to re-imagine the state: "Participatory Budgeting would help re-legitimate the state by showing that it could be effective, redistributive, and transparent" (Goldfrank 2007).

### **3.3 Participatory Budgeting in Brazil**

While the typical literature credits the rise of "Brazilian style Participatory Budgeting" or, for our purposes "PB," with the PT in 1989, some scholars note the origins are more contestable (Goldfrank and Schneider 2006; Goldfrank 2007). According to these

accounts, municipal governments in Lages (Lesbaupin 2000), Boa Esperance (Baiocchi 2001) and Pelotas (Goldfrank and Sneither 2006) started experiments to submit their budgets for public discussion in the late 1970's. After winning control of 36 municipalities in the 1988 election, the PT experimented with citizen budget council in places beyond Porto Alegre including Ipatinga, Jaoa Monlevarde, Piraciaba, Santo Andre, and Santos (Abers 1996).

The actual design of PB was formed by the civil society and PT's municipal administration using earlier citizen budget engagements by the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party as a launch pad (Baierle 1998; Baiocchi 2002; Goldfrank 2007). Before formal implementation of PB, Porto Alegre's Union of Neighborhood Associations drafted a report that demanded some form of citizen engagement and participation in budget creation. Two other leftist parties, the Radical Cause in Ciudad Guayana, Venezuela and the Broad Front in Montevideo Venezuela also implemented similar citizen budget engagement programs at the same time (Goldfrank 2007). It was not until 1990 that the process of citizen engagement in Porto Alegre was titled "Participatory Budgeting" (Goldfrank 2005). Participatory Budgeting gained International fame after the 1996 United Nations Habitat II Conference in Istanbul cited Porto Alegre's Participatory Budgeting as one of the 42 best practices in urban governance throughout the world.

The leftist PT seized upon the confluence of three factors that made Brazil ripe for PB at this moment in time: 1) history of participation in civil society 2) decentralization and 3) democratization. Brazil is a unique country insofar as it was an authoritarian country that allowed opposition parties to exist and devolved power to the municipal level with

relatively transparent mayoral elections when contrasted with its neighboring authoritarian regimes.

The 1988 Brazilian Constitution mandated many forms of participatory engagement, but did not include a specific provision for PB. Part of these new Constitutional elements added resources and authority to municipal governments. The devolution of power to the local level is a paramount structural condition for implementing PB. Arguably the combination of 1) lack of public trust combined with a defunded government and 2) devolution of power to the local level enabled the conditions that birthed PB. In the first years of implementation in 1989 and 1990 less than 1,000 citizens participated in PB. Starting in 1992, participation increased to 8,000 participants – by the time of the PT's re-election in 1992 there were more than 20,000 citizens participating in PB. PB often has an exponential growth rate as it gains momentum and legitimacy by citizens.

The basic structure and design of PB in Brazil takes the following form:




Figure 3.1: Brazilian PB Structure *source: Wampler 2007.*

The structure of PB in Porto Alegre serves as a paradigm to understand the structure of PB not only throughout Latin America, but also in the rest of the world. In Porto Alegre, the first portion of the process involves a series of neighborhood assemblies in 16 regions of the city. There are two assemblies: public works and thematic. In the public works forum, citizens come together, discuss, debate, deliberate and vote on budget priorities and elected representatives to move on the next levels of the process. In the thematic assemblies, citizens discuss thematic policies that impact broader politics beyond the

municipality. Examples of themes include transportation, health and education to name but a few.

Following this first level of engagement is a second level called Regional Budget Forums. The elected representatives participate in these forums by consolidating the list of priorities from the Neighborhood Assemblies and mapping out priorities for their regions. The elected representatives in Thematic Budget Forums mirror this process. All citizens are invited to attend as observers.

The third level of engagement is the Municipal Budget Council (COP) in which each regional forum elects two councilors. The COP is where decisions about the distributions of funds throughout the city are made and it is open to all citizens to observe the process. Within the COP is a process of deliberation and debate to determine distributive rules to govern the following year's PB. In addition to deciding on the distribution of funds, the COP is also tasked with monitoring implementation of projects. The COP serves the dual role of a mechanism of both transparency and accountability entirely in the citizens' control. The next step after the COP involves voting on public works projects and submitting the budget over to the mayor office and then the city legislature.

The relation of the mayor to city governance, including the power dynamics between the mayor and the city legislature, are critical for PB. As discussed in further detail below, Wampler (2004) outlines the impact of institutional factors on PB including the willingness of the mayor to devolve power to the PB process. PB can work to both strengthen and weaken the power of the mayor.

Assessing the two forums underpins PB's dual goals of: 1) high quality service delivery of goods to citizens and 2) deepening democratic engagement. The public works forum

enables citizens to see a direct link between their involvement and concrete improvements in their areas. Citizens can observe their impact and feel efficacious in the process. The city of Porto Alegre has established a successful track record of implementing projects within two to three years. The result is increased accountability. In addition to enabling greater accountability, the public works forums engender self-determination in citizens. Citizens are able to craft the agenda and determine the priorities for their region. Because the process is broken down by locality, citizens are able to effectively use their hyper-localized area specific knowledge. Through this process they learn the workings of authority and responsibility. By enabling the process of public works to enter into the public domain there is greater transparency of the process and cycles of patronage are weakened.

While the public works forum allows citizens to see the tangible results of their efforts in actualized projects in the city, the broader thematic councils offer opportunities for citizens to deepen their democratic engagement. First, the government provides citizens with detailed information about current spending priorities and policies. Second, participants debate the current set of government policies. Citizens are not presenting new proposals, but rather deliberating on merits of current policies. Citizens discuss where spending priorities should be without independently proposing new policies. Civic education for participants is a component of thematic councils.

While scholars disagree on the causal mechanism and sufficient conditions that led to PB in Brazil, there is consensus that PB in Porto Alegre was the genesis of a specific form of PB that serves as the pivot and dividing point for understanding PB. The high level of focus on Brazilian innovation of PB suggests that innovation in the United States will

serve as another quilting point for PB's history. PB in Porto Alegre is an instructive paradigm for structuring PB elsewhere, including the U.S.

Scholars looking at the origins of PB in Porto Alegre within the PT discuss reasons for implementation including the confluence of "ingenuity and self-interest of leftist political entrepreneurs" (Fung 2011, 859). Baiocchi (2003a, 2003b) extends the analysis of PT's role as self-interested instigator of PB while noting their relationship with civil society was an important factor. Other scholars place the locus of analysis on the relationship between existent civil society and its relationship to elected officials (Abers 1998; 2000). A thread of this scholarship contends that throughout the 1980's civil society become more robust with new formations and more diffuse and strategic tactics for citizen engagement (Wampler and Avritzer 2004). Civil society pushed for more participatory engagement to foster citizen deliberation that led to the natural inclusion of CSOs with elected officials (Bairle 1998; Wampler and Avritzer 2004).

Accepting PB in Porto Alegre as the quilting point for contemporary understandings of PB raises the question of impact assessment. Some potential indicators of success include 1) greater citizen education 2) more redistribution to lower income citizens 3) greater transparency and accountability in the budget process and 4) deepening of citizen engagement and furthering of democratic opportunities for citizens.

### **3.4 What is Success?**

In order to effectively assess the institutional, political, and social conditions that give rise to PB it is helpful to outline potential indicators of success in existing PB literature. Success is often implied with varying meanings. Because PB has now been implemented in many institutional, political and social contexts, one standard framework is not



sufficient. Success is complicated because there is often variation in PB down to the micro level. For example, a city may implement “successful” PB in one portion of its city, but not in another. One pocket of a city may prioritize community organization and engagement as a prominent indicator of success, while another section of a city may prioritize mobilization as a key indicator of success. Within the current literature, I outline the characterization of success, with the richest case studies in Brazil and Latin American.

For many scholars of PB, the process fulfills an ideological commitment to citizen participation and democratic innovation. For some scholars of PB, *ceteris paribus*, PB is a normative good (Fung 2011). More PB is always better than less PB. Embedded is the concept that more often than not, PB will be successful. Part of the reason for these “soft indicators of success” is an endogeneity bias: those who decide to study PB already have a proclivity for PB. Partially because PB requires intensive investigation – even using tools of economics and quantitative analysis, a scholar must be committed to studying the process.<sup>46</sup> One scholar of PB, Giovanni Allegretti, calls this method “intensive engagement” for studying processes such as PB.<sup>47</sup> As we move further into generations of scholarship on PB (Fung 2011), we need measures from less ideological scholars to critically assess PB’s impact.

Wampler (2007) understands success through 1) citizen empowerment and 2) equitable resource distribution and allocation, through PB. Wampler’s surveys assess the degree to which citizens are efficacious through the PB process – both through feelings of efficacy

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<sup>46</sup> Unlike other democratic innovations, PB is not confined to one specific day, but rather is a process of many different components over a year. Process tracing requires a high level of commitment and dedication.

<sup>47</sup> International Participatory Budget Conference, New York City, March 30 2012.

and by trying to isolate the concrete casual mechanism of action. For example: a citizen's ability to have authority over a specific project.

Wampler (2007, 2007a) contends that the degree to which political leadership is able to overturn authority to PB explains success. Variation in leadership accounts for both political calculations, including electoral ambition, as well as ideology and party affiliation. Within the context of Brazil, mayors commit political capital, material and non-material resources to PB in order to garner support against their political challengers. If mayors perceive their constituencies as being amenable to PB, their political survival becomes intertwined with PB's success. Wampler (2007) gives the examples of Ipatinga, Porto Alegre, and to a lesser degree Recife and Belo Horizonte, as cities where mayors viewed the implementation of PB as beneficial for their political survival.

Wampler's definition of success requires strong networks of CSOs that move forward and exert political pressure to implement PB. Wampler suggests social movements in Brazil viewed participatory mechanisms as useful tools for organization. Other scholars buttress this idea by highlighting Brazil's 21 years under military dictatorship as producing conditions for civil society to work cooperatively together and through participatory mechanisms (Cabbenes 2012, Ceasar).

Scholarship on the impact of civil society on the PB process identifies the *a priori* embedded networks necessary for PB to flourish. Wampler (2007) notes, "Participatory Budgeting programs have been most successful in municipalities with deep civil society roots" (Wampler 2007, 24). Pre-existing community organizations, social movement networks and other voluntary/civic associations play critical roles in the successful rollout of PB. Avritzer (2002) notes that not only is a robust civil society presence

critical for PB, but also these civil society organizations and members must infuse the PB process with practice and skills embedded in the pre-existing organizational structure. In addition, there needs to be an incentivization structure for political leaders to delineate authority towards civil society organizations. Rather than looking at a one-size-fits-all approach to implementing PB, Avritzer (2009) suggests implementing PB that will flourish under given social and political constraints. While Avritzer contends that civil society must be the first mover in PB implementation, Abers (2000) notes that the state must induce civil society to be an active participant in PB. The state was the critical actor in bringing in typically marginalized people –those people who are not typically engaged in civil society.

In contrast to Avritzer, Baiocchi (2002) finds a decline in participation in organizations that are not linked to PB during the process. These organizations not directly linked to PB are focused on a broader strategy and are not directly involved in service delivery on the local level. While Baiocchi finds a mutually reinforcing relationship between civil society and PB, he also illustrates potential distortions in engagement.

Trying to control for economic, political and social context, Baiocchi et al (2011) look at the introduction of PB as the treatment. Their dependent variable is the relationship between civil society and the State. First, is civil society dependent or autonomous from the state defined as “self-organization?” Second, in what capacity does civil society in the form of CSO make demands onto the state? They outline disparate levels of demand onto the state, those in which CSO achieve desired outcomes through a clientelist arrangement such as with patrons. This prototype is contrasted with institutionalized structures that are contained with transparency and bounded rules. Their results show that

all of the cases that received the treatment of PB saw shifts in the relationship of state and civil society relationships that were lacking in the control groups.

However, even as Baoicchi et al (2011) exhibit the improvement of democratic governance as a result of PB, their indicators of success are further complicated as civil society becomes less autonomous, such as in Maua, in the shift from discretionary to institutionalized. One result of the treatment of PB may be increased hierarchical control and shifts in CSOs as they work to strengthen their relationship with the State.

Within the strand of PB scholarship looking at the relationship of civil society to PB, Avritzer (2009) looks at the extant relationship between civil society and the state as a precursor for enabling participatory mechanisms, including not only Participatory Budgeting, but also other participatory forms like health councils and urban planning. Avritzer (2009) outlines three participatory designs: bottom-up, power sharing, and ratification.

Rather than viewing PB as teleological innovation – a given area is always better off with PB than without it, Avritzer (2009) posits a more nuanced understanding of PB, positing that some participation will be more successful than others given *a priori* political and social conditions.

Assessing the unique circumstances, such as the relationship and strength of civil society vis-à-vis political actors enables participatory mechanisms to be specifically tailored. In places where both political leadership and CSOs support public participation all three forms of participatory design are possible e.g. Porto Alegre and Belo Horizonte. However, in places where political actors are less enthused about public participation and CSO is weaker, there can be more successful power-sharing designs with less resource-

demanding bottom up schemes. For example, Sao Paulo's health councils, with a less demanding participatory mechanism, were able to be more successfully implemented than Participatory Budgeting. In places such as Salvador with weak CSOs and hostile political leadership, only minimal implementations of participatory innovations would be successful.

While Wampler and Avritzer (2009) study how strong civil society can enable the engines of PB, Baiocchi et al (2011) examine successful PB whereby civil society is strengthened as a result of PB. A successful indicator of PB is a stronger civil society after the implementation of PB than before. Interwoven with these metrics of success are normative assumptions about PB's merit. Baiocchi et al (2011) examine the positive outcomes on the relationship between civil society and states in five cities that introduced the treatment of PB when compared to control cities that did not receive the PB treatment.

### **3.5 Current Literature**

The current literature on PB broadly outlines two different instances of PB: those in which the state is legally mandated, through Constitutional arrangement, to implement a direct form of citizenship engagement, and those in which citizens in the form of domestic or international organizations put external pressure for participatory mechanisms (Folscher 2007).

The relationship between different branches of government is important within this schema. In many places the mayor implements PB. If, for example, the legislative branch is weak to a mayoral administration, legislators may try to act as "spoilers" – attempting to undermine a process they feel is at odds with their interests. The allocation of discretionary funds is another critical institutional design element for implementing PB.

Having discretionary funds available increases the likelihood that citizens can make choices about specific policy outcomes. However, if a government is financially strapped, there may be legitimacy concerns that decisions made through PB will not be funded. Additionally, in unstable political regimes there is a fear that citizens' efforts in PB will not be fruitful or legitimate. Therefore, government stability and legitimacy is essential for citizens to feel like PB is an efficacious mechanism for engagement.

Wampler (2004) outlines three different types of accountability PB can induce: 1) vertical (citizens control public officials) 2) horizontal (distribution of power through different branches of government) and 3) societal (pressure on the State from civil society). Within this plan, PB can act as another form of "checks and balances" on State power by serving as an external pressure on the State. PB can be understood as a semi-autonomous policymaking institution that competes with other State agencies over the distribution of resources, authority and power. One potential outcome is increased power of the mayor and diminished horizontal accountability. For Wampler (2007a) the ability for citizens to exert authority and have agency is the determinate factors for determining whether or not PB is successful.

Viewing PB as semi-autonomous decision making body, involved in *real-politicking* with other institutional forms of governances illustrate the normative implications of PB as an arm of direct democracy. Santos (1998) identifies PB as distributive democracy insofar as PB can create more equitable power conditions within a society. For example, if a PB process is able to bring in few wealthy and more educated members of society, PB can have an equalizing and redistributive impact on democracy.

Abers (2000) views PB as a modern interpretation of local democracy, harkening to Dahl's concept *polis* as outlined in Chapter 2. Abers outlines how PB in Porto Alegre led to a strengthening of civil society and an increase in the ability of citizens to hold government accountable. In this way, politics becomes manageable on the local level and citizens are able to hold government accountable for projects in their locality.

Related to this concept of PB as enabling a new form of democratic engagement for citizens, Baiocchi (2001) argues for PB to defend deliberative democracy,<sup>48</sup> - through the process citizens learn to express their preferences and expand their skill set. Baiocchi et al (2011) use a matched-pair analysis to compare success in those cities that adopt PB and others that do not. The results show that in all but one pair, the outcomes of PB were superior to those of non-PB cities.

Marquetti (2002) claims PB has a redistributive effect to lower income neighborhoods as the majority of Porto Alegre's investment resources were spent in middle-class neighborhoods in the 1970s and 1980s. In contrast, under PB, spending in Porto Alegre has been concentrated within the poorer pockets within the municipality. Poorer regions receive more spending per capita than wealthier regions. However, Marquetti's analysis of redistribution only becomes visible after many years of PB's implementation.

Marquetti's analysis looks at data from 10 years of PB with census data.

Within the paradigm of enabling new forms of democratic engagement is a wide literature discussing how PB can be operationalized. PB serves as a distinct form of deliberative democracy because it enables genuine deliberation through a semi-structured process.

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<sup>48</sup> For a definition of deliberative democracy see Section 2.5.

Wampler (2007) outlines basic guiding principles for adoption of PB: 1) municipality is divided into regions 2) government-sponsored meetings are held throughout the year 3) “Quality of Life Index” is created to serve as a baseline for allocation of equitable resources 4) public deliberation takes place both amongst participants as well as between participants and government agencies/officials 5) elected representatives visit all pre-approved projects 6) elected representatives vote on projects 7) municipality-wide council is elected, including two representatives from each region 8) final approval of annual budget by delegates, followed by the mayor sending it to legislative counsel for approval 9) year-end report is published detailing implementation of public works and 10) regional or neighborhood committees are established to monitor design and implementation of projects.

Within Brazil, Avritzer and Wampler (2005) identify five determinate factors for PB’s implementation: 1) mayor affiliated to the PT 2) size of the municipality 3) location 4) level of development measured through the Human Development Index (HDI)<sup>49</sup> and 5) relationship between civil and political society relationships.

For Wampler, PB’s tenets underpin the fundamental goals of PB for desired outcomes such as “engaged deliberation, social justice, and active citizens” (Wampler 2007, 26). Inherent in Wampler’s description is a normative assumption that these qualities of PB are both worthy goals as well as realistically feasible. Embedded in this understanding is that PB will succeed more often than it fails. Otherwise, the project is theoretically unsustainable.

Other scholars take a less sanguine view of PB. Goldfrank and Schneider (2006) articulate that a goal of PB is to create a contesting partisan area that deteriorates

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<sup>49</sup> A statistical comparison of countries based on various quality of life indicators.



traditional democratic institutions. Their claim is hard to verify and hard to understand in disparate contexts of PB beyond the specific example of the PT in Brazil. In Brazil, the PT was able to use PB as a way to both legitimate its party as well as expand support with Brazil's poorest demographics. However, this strategy was not sustainable with the economic crisis of the late 1990s. The result was constricted ability for the PT to redistribute funds down. In the analysis of PB, Goldfrank and Schneider (2006) posit factors such as economic resources and party control as determinate. This strand of analysis looks upon PB as a manipulative process.

### **3.6 PB Critiques**

It is easy to romanticize PB. Many scholars of PB are more ideologically committed to the process than to objective scholarship. For too many scholars of PB, the process *ceteris paribus*, is a good within itself (Fung 2011). The introduction of PB becomes the intervention to be praised while the success or validity of the engagement becomes secondary. Likewise, critics of PB also come from an ideology that does not support participatory deliberation and begins with the assumption that participation and deliberation stand at odds, such as Diana Mutz (2005).

For a process as labor and resource intensive as PB this is problematic, especially for those of us who want to understand the value of PB implementation. The recommendation of Avritzer (2009) is particularly insightful because it implies that PB is a democratic innovation that requires specific conditions and thoughtful implementation. A realistic assessment of PB ought to start *ceteris paribus* with the assumption that not all political, social, and institutional conditions favor PB. Given PB's high costs of implementation, an accurate assessment of varying degrees of success is critical.

There are two broad camps of PB critiques: critiquing existing scholarship and literature on PB and critiquing the process itself. Critiques of PB scholarship focuses on a few broad themes: 1) ability to generalize research 2) concerns over methods and 3) scalability of decision-making. Critiques of the PB process itself focus on 1) tension between short and long term planning 2) projects are too small in scope 3) the process can lead to disillusionment 4) focus on specific goods eludes citizenship 5) not authentically grassroots and 6) opportunities for capture.

There is widespread concern amongst both researchers and practitioners of deliberative participatory innovation that current scholarship on PB is too focused on Brazil often in the form of qualitative case method research. The combination of homogenous methods and location limit generalizability.

The scholarship of PB in Brazil inhibits broader frameworks for accurately assessing the conditions that give rise to PB, its success and sustainability. The focus on civil society creates a non-replicable set of indicators given the uniqueness of civil society in Brazil as a forum for participatory mechanisms during the military dictatorship of 1964-1988. The emphasis in the literature on civil society overlooks economic, political, and institutional conditions that impact PB.

A focus on civil society often eludes the broader questions of top-down control of established CSOs and the degree to which these organizations are empowering and enabling grassroots participation. What is the degree of autonomy of actors within a PB process? For example, what is the ideal relationship between political leadership and CSOs? Can civil society actors maintain independent despite close relations with political

actors? These are questions that are not properly accounted for in the extant literature that often views civil society as the prime mover of PB without a space for a broader narrative. It is the implementation of specific short-term projects that enables PB to be *Empowered Deliberative Democracy* (EDD).<sup>50</sup> EDD outlines three basic tenets: 1) participation 2) deliberation and 3) empowerment. The tension for PB is to ensure that all three tenets of EDD are met and sustained. In order to ensure continued participation, PB encourages empowerment: e.g. ensuring that when citizens come together to work on a project it becomes enacted. In order to ensure that citizens' projects are in fact implemented they need to be small in scope.

Within PB lies a tension between service delivery of goods on a short basis and long term strategic planning. PB connects citizens to immediate delivery of goods. Citizens take part in PB and are able to see the fruits of their labor through the implementation of specific goods in their areas. The close relationship between citizen participation and implementation of projects is powerful—citizens realize their involvement is substantive and meaningful. However, in order to be fully participatory, the process must extend behind small scale.

The moments, in which PB extends beyond the small scale, such as with the thematic council in Brazil that focuses on long planning, the process opens up more avenues for citizen dissatisfaction and disillusionment with the process of politics. Politics is long, hard, arduous and slow moving (Weber 1917). The more channels in which citizens may realize government inefficiencies and the perils of bureaucracy, the larger the risk for longer term citizen disengagement. Therefore, the scale of projects in PB and the risks of opening up the process to citizen disillusionment are interwoven.

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<sup>50</sup> For an expanded of EDD see Section 2.3.

How can PB best balance the needs of short-term projects with a broader programmatic strategy of working toward transformative institutions? PB wants to both enable citizens to have agency over concrete projects and specific goods while also fostering greater citizen knowledge and citizenship engagement. PB throughout the world is viewed as a way to bring about redistributive justice especially to lower income and typically disenfranchised members of society. Unfortunately, short-term projects such as service delivery and small-scale infrastructural projects will not bring about broader changes to society.

Some organizing members from typically disenfranchised groups may require organization and skill for mobilization. The result may be initial top-down control of the PB. The critique that top-down actors are imposing the process may be necessary in the first few years.<sup>51</sup>

Top-down control may in fact enable genuine participation while running the risk of cooption. In the case of Brazil, there is the concern that the mayor will use the process to advance his own agenda such as weakening the citizen oversight committees, not disclosing information, or implementing programs.

The concern for process cooption is equally pressing for civil society organizations involved in PB, especially international NGOs externally imposing PB. The following section will outline experiences of PB beyond Latin America where NGOs are oftentimes an integral part of the implementation process of PB.

Another line of critique focuses on the degree to which the *process* itself enables genuine 1) representation 2) engagement and 3) deliberation. One concern relates to the diversity

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<sup>51</sup> Saul Alinsky (1971) notes that the first year of any process cannot be genuinely grassroots because it takes top down structure to impose the process.

of participants involved. Even if PB brings in diverse and new participants will they be equipped with the prior knowledge to engage in genuine deliberation and empowerment participation? A challenge for PB is to find ways to engage new citizens without allowing them to be manipulated through others in the course of deliberation and decision-making. It is incumbent upon facilitators to equalize pre-existing power dynamics and enable new participants in civic engagement to feel comfortable.

Critiques of PB focus on the *structure*, *implementation* and *substance* of PB with a focus on the normative implications of the process for broader implications for citizenship. A gap in the existing literature is that critiques often do not take a holistic account of the PB process when examining its potential flaws. For example, a series of critiques focuses on whether or not the process is genuinely deliberative or empowering while assuming that the institutional and structural conditions are *a priori* in place and transparent. Likewise, other critiques focus on the process being too strictly controlled by government or open to capture without assessing whether or not these more tightly controlled processes are in fact enabling a richer deliberation. The structural and procedural critiques are too often divorced from one another. Scholars are either focused too broadly on the macro level questions of institutional design or too embedded in the micro questions of deliberation and language. My research aims to fill in these gaps.

Lastly, even the most astute critiques of PB too often elude normative questions. For example, even if we can ensure a transparent and non-corrupt process that enables both genuine participation and deliberation, fulfilling the three tenets of EDD; 1) participation 2) deliberation and 3) empowerment, to what ends? PB is a resource-draining process for both organizers and participants. To what extent is PB the result of a failed system of

representative government? Should PB even be practiced or is it a sign of a broken system that is such dire need of repair that a few small opportunities for citizen engagement will hardly suffice? My research systematically addresses these questions through an analytic framework for assessment.

I approach PB as a holistic process that must be viewed through the multifaceted lens of 1) institutional design 2) implementation and 3) politics and 4) deliberative discourse and identity politics captured within a theoretical framework of citizenly politics. I assess key political components of the process often overlooked by scholars who primarily focus on civil society components. While successful PB is often tied to strength of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), I argue that political conditions are the enabling factor for CSOs to produce successful PB. In contrast to assumptions about the government, Chapter 5 addresses the political economy in which elected officials operate. The current literature on PB does not typically examine political economies of power. I focus on institutional design and the innovation phase of PB in New York City as key to addressing current gaps in the literature.

### **3.7 Beyond Brazil**

Scholars are continually trying to identify other “successful” implementations of PB outside the classic Porto Alegre example to move beyond Brazil. This section outlines other examples of Participatory Budgeting throughout the world. There are literatures for both researchers and practitioners of PB. Scholarly, academic work is just now starting to think systematically through the enabling conditions of PB. Is the successful implementation of PB in Porto Alegre a unique phenomenon whereby a specific confluence of circumstances may never be possible again? Recent scholars looking at PB

posit that the attention of civil society in Brazil to participatory mechanisms may be one critical factor for understanding the success of PB in Brazil. In this section I showcase the places where PB has been implemented beyond Brazil in order to expand both the horizon for implementing PB as well indicators of success.

Wampler (2003; 2007) identifies four factors that make a landscape more amenable to adopting Participatory Budgeting: 1) strong mayoral support 2) civil society willing and capable of contributing to public debates 3) supportive political environment and 4) discretionary funds available for citizens to vote upon.

Any discussion of PB beyond Brazil raises the question: how does PB get started in a given location? Does PB require an endogenous actor such as the end of a military dictatorship in Brazil in 1988 or the World Bank Institute for origins in a specific locality? To assess this question, I examine PB in Latin America beyond Brazil and then the diffusion of PB throughout the developing world with three case studies: Albania, Bangladesh, and South Africa.

After the genesis moment of the PT implementing PB, not all political groups implementing PB were leftist. For example, Bolivia's President Gonzala Sanchez de Lozada sponsored the 1994 Popular Participation Law, Nicaragua's President Arnoldo Aleman put forth municipal reforms in the late 1990's, and Guatemala's President Alvaro Arzu outlined decentralizing reforms in the 1996 Peace Accords (Goldfrank 2007).

These three Presidents align with the center or center right. Another change was national, rather than local, politicians subsequently implemented PB.

PB throughout Latin America has seen a mixed rate of success suggesting there are specific socio-political factors that make Brazil particularly amenable to PB. Goldfrank

(2007) outlines factors that have led to better adoption of PB in Brazil than its neighboring counterparts in Latin America focusing on Bolivia, Guatemala, Nicaragua and Peru.

Brazil is wealthier and more fiscally decentralized than other Latin American countries. As discussed earlier, Brazil has stronger civil society organizations that are more amenable toward working with municipalities than in Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Peru. However, other countries in Latin America have laws mandating participation, with Peru having the strongest laws for participation. Guatemala has paradoxical laws regarding participation: Development Councils Law requires the community development councils to put forth budget proposals while the Municipal code does not. Because there are no laws requiring Participatory Budgeting in Brazil, mayors who implement PB tend to be focused on citizen participation and have an ideological bent. From 1997-2000, 73 of the 140 Brazilian cities using Participatory Budgeting had PT mayors and 33 had mayors from other parties on the left (Goldfrank 2007). In other countries within Latin America, where PB is legally mandated, there is the potential to de-politicize the process. PB tends to be more deliberative in nature, smaller in scope, and less formally structured in other parts of Latin American over Brazil. In Brazil, individuals, as opposed to representatives of civil society organizations are more likely to participate with the process if it is more internally regulated rather than mandated by decrees, laws or constitutions (Cabannes 2004). As such, the form of the process can be more discursive and deliberative in nature. The laws in Bolivia, Guatemala, and Nicaragua delineate more tightly bound roles for participation. In Peru, the PB laws require that 60 percent of



budget coordination take place between Council members and government officials (Altman 2003).

PB in Brazil is uniquely focused on short term planning and service delivery while PB in other parts of Latin America tends to be more focused on longer term planning.

Guatemala has been critiqued as the least successful implementation of PB in the region, where PB seems to be more perfunctory than functioning according to the World Bank Institute (2004). The process of PB seems to be less inspired by the genuine commitment of national leadership and more a result of pressure from international organizations that led to the formation of participatory mechanisms. Mayors in Guatemala seem unwilling to give up power to citizens (Goldfrank 2007).

PB in Nicaragua seems to suffer from many of the problems of limited desire for power sharing, as does PB in Guatemala. Part of the reason leaders may be recalcitrant to share their power is that municipal government in Nicaragua is typically underfunded. While Nicaragua has laws for robust participation, in reality open town hall meetings are often not attended and the proceedings are unproductive (Ortega Hegg 2004).

Peru seems to have a more successful implementation of PB than some of its Latin American counterparts. One possible explanation is that some members of the ruling party, Peru Posible, came from the United Left with a large history of participatory programs (Goldfrank 2007). Additionally, while PB in Peru is also the result of international NGO pressure, they consulted on the ground civil society when thinking through implementation. While PB in Peru may have the underlying institutional structures that make it a more successful model than for example, Nicaragua and Guatemala, the first two years of implementation are not viewed as a success along lines

of outreach, participation or project monitoring (Chirinos Segura 2004; Diaza Palacdios 2005; Monge 2004, Goldfrank 2007).

Looking at these three instances of PB in Latin America beyond Brazil, the most successful instances within these three countries involved partnerships with existing organizations on the ground when implementing PB. For example, Ilo and Villa El Salvador are cited as successful implementations of PB and had the criteria of locally initiated, supported by the United Left and involving organized civil society with participatory elements already well established (Goldfrank 2007). Some scholars suggest that PB is most successful when initiatives are more bottom-up, more deliberative and less formalized in structure – the model of PB in the United States. Goldfrank identifies four factors that seem to be helpful for successful PB implementation: 1) strong NGO presence 2) mayor from a leftist, indigenous or union background 3) weak opposition and 4) high level of social capital.

Within the institutional structure of the United States, I argue that political calculations are critical for success. PB throughout Latin America is implemented to fill a political leadership vacuum. In contrast, PB in the United States is supplementing existing stable political structures. Therefore, PB's success in the U.S. must be less closely tied to ideology and more closely aligned with existing political economies of power.

### **3.8 PB Beyond Latin America**

PB has the ability to serve as an impactful model for citizen engagement throughout the developing world where successful models have been implemented in political structures as diverse as Bangladesh and South Africa. In the post-Cold War era, some newly formed democracies added participatory mechanisms into these countries' constitutional

orders. For example, Bulgaria is a signatory to the European Charter of Local Self-Government and also created robust mechanisms for direct citizen engagement in decision-making including community meetings, regulated contact with mayors, and referendums (Novkirishka-Stoyanova 2001).

Three broad trends in these newly formed democracies lend themselves to PB: 1) increased forms of participation for legitimately (Moynihan 2003; Olivo 1998) 2) trend toward transparency (Moynihan 2007) and 3) trend toward fiscal decentralization (Robinson 2004). PB serves as a way to legitimate and implement these ideals into practice. International organizations often partner with local NGOs on the ground to implement a variety of PB. The implementation, mobilization, and degree to which the process is binding differs across geopolitical contexts. Thus, as discussed in 3.4, one generalizable metric for success is untenable.

One such example is Bangladesh, a democracy since 1971, where the constitution includes both a bill of rights and “pledges ownership of the republic to the people;” with few constitutional mechanisms for citizen engagement. In 2000 in Sraj Ganj, Bangladesh, a form of PB was implemented by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) with the United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF) in conjunction with the local government (Rahman et al 2004). The budgeting project revolved around the local government, the *parishads*. The first part of the project involved \$6,000 in block grants for each union to allocate for project on the ward level. The second part of the project creates an institutionalized mechanism for citizens to engage with the local budget (Fölscher 2007).

Another example is South Africa in the wake of apartheid where there are constitutionally mandated mechanisms for citizen engagement. Chapter IV of the Municipal Systems Act of 2000 specifically mandates municipalities to interact with communities around service delivery, performance management, integrated development planning, and the budget process (Shall 2007). The constitution contains a provision that at least 10 months before the start of the financial year the mayor must put out a public timetable for budget deadlines, including a public record of all deadlines for consultative and participatory mechanisms in the process. The municipality is legally bound to make annual budgets public with any supporting documentations and invite public submissions on the budget from community stakeholders (Shall 2007).

In newly formed democracies PB aims to institute mechanisms of transparency and bottom up democracy in countries that have a history of corruption (Edstrom 2002). The aim is more effective service delivery and greater responsiveness to citizen needs on the local level (McGee 2003). Citizen participation improves vertical or social accountability by altering the incentive structure for officeholders. Through deepening citizen engagement, public officials have a new sense of accountability and eyes watching them. Development organizations seeking to implement PB in fragile institutional political systems that lack autonomy, such as in Bangladesh and Indonesia, highlight the ability for PB to lead to greater government transparency and accountability (Fölscher 2007). In addition to the material concerns of greater accountability, transparency and service delivery less rife with corruption, there is also the immaterial, or existential, argument for greater democratic quality. In contrast to other innovations aimed to ameliorate corruption PB uniquely deepens democracy. While there are many different democratic

innovations, PB is unique because it combines both material concerns with existential concerns of what makes someone a citizen. As discussed in the previous chapter, in its Platonic ideal, PB has the ability to both provide improvements over *status quo* service delivery, politics, and civic engagement. Implementing PB in emerging democracies can provide material benefits as well as existential benefits such as expanding the role of the citizen. Through the process of being involved in PB, participants leave with tools to be more engaged citizens in the future. PB ideals to create new mechanisms for engagement between citizens and public officials are paramount in developing country contexts where there is no existing foundation for such a relationship (McGee 2003).

Within developing countries PB offers promise and peril. In many implementing countries, there are new constitutional orders calling for increased participatory mechanisms. Within these spaces lies promise for more participatory mechanisms.

However, many of these countries are united by a shared history of a centrally controlled bureaucratic structure. Therefore, enabling officials on the local level with the money and power to implement Participatory Budgeting mechanisms may be difficult. Case studies looking at PB throughout the developing world consistently cite the lack of capacity of officials on the local level as the single greatest impediment to PB (Shall 2007).

Even if power and a form of discretionary funds can be devolved to the local level, some developing societies lack a historical culture of engagement. Therefore, citizens are not inculcated in a culture of participating in governance decisions or taking responsibility for their respective localities. Low levels of education and literacy may only add to feelings of disenfranchisement. Additionally, some councilors, especially those from

rural areas lack the adequate training to convey information between their constituents and higher-level officials.

It is critical to note the bias when studying these less researched implementations of PB beyond Latin America. First, for too many cases, the same group funding the implementation, such as the World Bank, is also the author of the case.<sup>52</sup> Second, only the successes are recorded. Therefore, we have little to no information of instances behind Latin American where PB was tried and failed (Fölscher 2007).

When foreign NGOs and governmental organizations work to implement PB there is the risk that when these external bodies leave, the internal civil society will be unable to successfully monitor the process. Additionally, when external organizations are responsible for the implementation of PB questions arise about the legitimacy of the process as a bottom up grassroots endeavors. Is PB being implemented as a response to a citizen need? If so through what channels was that need communicated?

### **3.9 PB in the United States**

Having outlined PB in its birthplace of Brazil and travels throughout the globe one truth is self-evident: PB takes on a different flavor in each locality. Structural factors such as whether or not an NGO or a political party is instituting PB shape the process. From the most common structure of PB in Brazil to manifestations of PB in the U.S. six differences emerge: 1) relationship with city council 2) non-partisan frame 3) deliberative vs. representative 4) district customization 5) resource bounded and 6) mobilization vs. need.<sup>53</sup>

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<sup>52</sup> Since these cases are small not only is the same funding body the case study author but there also does not exist any other written case studies as reference.

<sup>53</sup> Spada and Russon Gilman Presentation, International Participatory Budget Conference March 31, 2011. New York City.

In Brazil, PB often bypasses the city Council. In Chicago and New York City, Councilors, or Aldermen institute PB, themselves. In Chicago one Alderman instituted the process with neither a strong partisan nor ideological frame for the process. The New York City process is bi-partisan as contrasted with the partisan frame of PB in Brazil. Both Chicago and New York City focus on small group deliberation throughout the process. In contrast, Brazil often has a structured representative system (COP) and employs large groups assemblies. No one is elected to represent their community in the United States process of PB whereas there is an elected assembly in Brazil.<sup>54</sup>

The process in New York City devolves power to local districts and enables District Committees agency to shape the process within their district. In contrast, the process in Brazil is often hierarchical (COP plus District Assemblies) with more centralized control of process implementation.

Decentralization in PBNYC is coupled with a set amount of Councilors' discretionary funds whereas PB in Brazil often has no clear set amount of resources. Within the unbounded nature of PB in Brazil is a mechanism to weigh popular decisions to consider needs. Currently PB in Chicago and New York, lack such a mechanism.

The process so far in United States has been more focused on participation, deliberation, and mobilization than PB in Brazil. However, PB in the U.S. has also dealt with a small discretionary budget of a district whereas Brazilian PB involves a large portion of an entire city Budget. In future years, the process of PB in the United States may or may not conform to the Brazilian process. The distinct political, structural, and institutional factors in the places PB is executed in the U.S. will shape its implementation.

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<sup>54</sup> Chicago began its pilot year with a theory of elected representatives they quickly abandoned as the realities of the process unfolded. See Section 4.2 for more information.

### 3.10 Conclusion

The traditional elites know perfectly well that this practice gives real content to democracy, ending privileges, clientelism, and ultimately the power of capital over society. Besides deepening and radicalizing democracy, Participatory Budgeting also is constituted by a vigorous socialist impulse, if we conceive socialism as a process in which direct, participatory democracy is an essential element, because it facilitates critical consciousness and ties of solidarity among the exploited and oppressed, opening the way for the public appropriation of the State and the construction of a new society (Dutra 2002). According to Olivio Dutra (2002), the mayor who first implemented PB in Porto Alegre and then to Rio Grande de Sul as governor of the state.

The role of ideology is hard to deny for the first wave of practitioners of PB: for both the early implementers as well as the first generation of scholarship on PB. The study of modern “Brazilian style PB” and its impact throughout the world requires understanding the Marxist element of ideology and partisanship in the PT’s decision to first institute PB. Through acknowledging the role of ideology and partisan frame, PB can be de-contextualized from Porto Alegre to be implemented in other geopolitical contexts. PB in the United States comes from a different framework. The lack of political ideology or partisan politics coupled with strong democratic institutions in the U.S. makes the implementation of PB in the U.S. unique. The local unit of analysis, disparate civil society traditions, and Council member implementation further differentiate PB in the United States. PB in the United States shows that PB does not have to be ideological or partisan as the earlier cases might suggest.

In the following chapters on PB in Chicago and New York City, I illustrate why these respective cities face conflicts of transparent and legitimate governance. Nonetheless, cities in the U.S. do not have the old patrimonialist-clientelist system that characterized Brazil during the military regime. Brazilian PB was implemented in the 1) wake of a



military dictatorship 2) by a political party with a Marxist bent and 3) in only one city.

However, despite the political, structural, institutional differences between implementing PB in NYC and its predecessors, many of the questions surrounding participation, engagement, and mobilization remain for assessing PB in the United States.

In order to answer these questions, I conceptually extend beyond literature on PB that too narrowly focus on civil society conditions infused with the author's own ideology. Civil society is an important but not sufficient criterion. PB requires specific political conditions for implementation. I outline existing literature to illustrate the lack of focus on institutionalization and economies of political power in PB scholarship. In contrast, I offer a more holistic model of PB taking into greater account political, structural, and institutional factors.

In contrast to scholarship that ideologically begins with the belief that PB is a normative good, I present an independent analytic framework to rigorously assess PB: citizenly politics.<sup>55</sup> Citizenly politics places this inquiry into United States' PB as part of a larger tradition of citizens and politics harkening back to Aristotle. By outlining the history and theory behind PB, I present citizenly politics as an alternative for assessing PB within a more abstract, and less ideological, framework.

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<sup>55</sup> 1) Citizen design their participation 2) deliberative discourse takes place (Gutmann and Thompson 1996) 3) participation is substantive and not merely performative (Moynihan 2003; 2007) and 4) the process has potential to become institutionalized to scale.

## **Chapter 4: Participatory Budgeting in Chicago**

Participatory Budgeting (PB) in the United States began in Chicago, when an Alderman instituted this as a pilot project in 2009-2010. At the time of writing this dissertation the process has gone through three cycles, all of which involved the same Alderman.<sup>56</sup> Part of the reason no other Aldermen signed on to the process was because it was viewed as idiosyncratic and revolving around one politician and his networks. Citizens involved in the process became disillusioned with what they perceived as patronage and non-transparency in the process of civil society mobilization. As a result the third tenet of citizenly politics, substantive ongoing participation, was compromised.

Citizens viewed the Alderman as being politically entrepreneurial with his support of PB. As a result the second year faced process exhaustion; many volunteers leading the process quit and the Alderman lost interest. The process exhaustion resulted from factors such as the perception of ideological and political forces. The material project outputs from the first year in Chicago were modest, with 50% of projects, which I categorize as “innovative” and 50% “conventional.”<sup>57</sup> Despite Chicago PB’s challenges to substantive participation and institutionalization, the process continued beyond its pilot year. I argue that citizens remain involved for PB’s significant existential benefits that compensate for its lesser material benefits.

In this chapter I outline 1) origins of PB in Chicago 2) structure and basic properties of the process 3) lessons learned from Chicago and 4) similarities and differences between

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<sup>56</sup> Fiscal Year 2014 marks the first time that three other Alderman will be joining to implement PB in their respective wards.

<sup>57</sup> As further expounded upon in Chapter 9, this is a typology I devise relating to the degree to which projects produced through PB compare to pre-PB projects.

PB in Chicago and New York. Assessment of the origins of U.S. PB in Chicago outlines how existing political ecosystems and values are difficult to overcome through the intervention of PB. Chicago PB exemplifies why one-man PB does not work. Existing ecosystems prohibited Chicago PB from fulfilling the third and fourth tenet of citizenly politics: substantive participation and institutionalization to scale.

#### 4.1 Background

“I wish I were mayor, I could institute this<sup>58</sup>”

Noted Alderman Sid,<sup>59</sup> the first politician to bring PB to the United States after learning about it at the World Social Forum in Brazil in 2007. Instead, Alderman Sid, as effective mayor of Ward S, ceded his discretionary funds for infrastructure to the PB process.

Alderman Sid had first encountered PB at the World Social Forum in Brazil in 2007 and was intrigued at the power of PB in Brazil. Since 1994, Aldermen in Chicago annually receive “Menu Money” of roughly \$1.4 million for infrastructure projects. Menu Money is allocated equally to all 50 wards in Chicago need-blind.

Corruption has been a recurring problem in Chicago—known as the “windy city” for the pervasive corruption of politicians.<sup>60</sup> Chicago’s Democratic machine retained a stronghold from 1931 until the late 1980’s<sup>61</sup> with the Daley family holding the mayoral post for a combined twelve terms.<sup>62</sup>

In addition to mayoral politics, ward-level politics have also been rife with political scandals.

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<sup>58</sup> Stated the first Alderman to implement PB in Chicago at a Conference on Participatory Budgeting, March 2012.

<sup>59</sup> Names have been changed for anonymity, the ward is coded as Ward S.

<sup>60</sup> Nathan Bierma, “Windy City: Where did it come from?”, *Chicago Tribune*, Dec. 7 2004

<sup>61</sup> Chicago. Windy City History: URL: <http://www.encyclopedia.chicagohistory.org/pages/774.html>.

<sup>62</sup> Richard J. Daley (1955-1976) and Richard M. Daley (1989-2011).

From 1972 to 2009, thirty Chicago Aldermen were indicted and convicted of federal crimes ranging from income tax evasion to extortion, embezzlement, and conspiracy (Gradel et al 2009). Ergo, bringing a democratic innovation focused on transparency and accountability to Chicago seemed an unlikely pairing. The publicity of being the “first person to implement PB in the United States, in Chicago of all places<sup>63</sup>” was a large reason for the Alderman’s adoption.

Alderman Sid has been serving Ward S since 1991. He was in a hotly contested re-election in 2011 and after implementing PB won by 72% of the vote. Based on the demographics of his ward, Sid took a calculated risk that PB would be favorably received. The demographics of the Ward S:<sup>64</sup>

Population	White	Black	Hispanic	Asian	Other	Median Income <sup>65</sup>
54,991	39.31%	26.3%	24.43%	6.41%	3.56%	\$40,577;\$57,169

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Figure 4.1: U.S. Census Data Ward S

The area that comprises Ward S is recognized as affluent and liberal with high Internet penetration, ranked one of the “bloggiest neighborhoods” by the website *Outside.in*. It is also nearby two research universities.<sup>66</sup> The area has a higher rate of residents with advanced degrees than the state average and residents working in non-for-profit

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<sup>64</sup> The ward is too small an area for accurate Census information. There is a section in Chicago that encompasses ward S and T with the majority of this area in ward S. Alderman’s Sid office does not have any more specific information as it pertains to ward demographics than the rough approximation from the Census that include a small part of Ward T.

<sup>65</sup> There are two zip codes within this area each with a corresponding income. The higher income is primarily in Ward S.

<sup>66</sup> “[Inside America's Top 10 Bloggiest Neighborhoods](http://outside.in/)”. Outside.in. URL: <http://outside.in/>. Accessed August 4, 2011.

institutions exceed twice the state average.<sup>67</sup> Inglehart (1999, 1991) notes that as human survival becomes increasingly secure, the “materialist” emphasis on psychological and economic security diminishes with an enlarged emphasis on “post-materialist” goals such as quality of life, freedom, and self-expression. As citizens’ basic material needs are met there is a deeper emphasis on existential self-actualization (Maslovian 1943) creating enabling conditions ideal for PB interest and implementation.<sup>68</sup>

Sid was hopeful that gambling on PB would result in electoral success. He was right.

## 4.2 From Theory to Implementation

“We know Chicago is a very warm place [laughter] if people come out to Chicago they should be able to come out and visit democracy at work,<sup>69</sup>” joked Alderman Sid when outlining why PB should be implemented in Chicago. In April 2009, forty leaders were invited from diverse local service organizations, schools, religious institutions, block clubs, and other civic groups to form the Participatory Budgeting Steering Committee (SC) for the ward. All invited were connected in existing networks of supporters and friends of the Alderman. Given the demographics of Ward S it is not surprising that the SC was comprised largely of white and affluent residents.<sup>70</sup> Alderman Sid appointed a chair of the SC from this circle. Community critics would later contend that the SC was unrepresentative of the diversity of the district and reflected Sid’s network of campaign donors and supporters.<sup>71</sup>

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<sup>67</sup> Chicago City Data. URL: City-data.com.

<sup>68</sup> Tom Tyler 2006 argues that people’s feelings of a process are not just specific on the material outcome but related to feelings such as civic duty. Similarly, Henrik Bang (2009) argues that people who enjoy being involved are more excited by the experience itself than the material outputs.

<sup>69</sup> Chicago has notoriously cold winters, partially due to the chill from the North Shore, its mythically due to the “windy” politicians.

<sup>70</sup> See Summers 2009.

<sup>71</sup> Interviews with SC members and other active citizens who critiqued the process.

The SC worked in conjunction with the non-profit organization, Participatory Budget Project (PBP<sup>72</sup>) that taught about previous implementations of PB throughout the world in order to draft guidelines for Chicago.

The SC outlined its own rules and responsibilities for each phase of the process:

October 14, 2009- Planning meeting for neighborhood assemblies  
October 28, 2009- Planning meeting for neighborhood assemblies, focus on facilitation  
November 3, 2009- Meeting for SC members facilitating small group discussions at neighborhood assemblies  
November 4, 2009- Debrief meeting after first neighborhood assembly  
November 12, 2009- Designing representative phase of the process  
December 7, 2009- Planning meeting for first community representative meeting  
February 4, 2010- Planning meeting for second round of neighborhood assemblies, final voting assembly  
March 10, 2010 – Planning meeting for outreach, publicity, and structure of voting day  
March 18, 2010 – Open discussion/reflection on this year’s PB process; finalizing of some minor details for voting day  
April 7, 2010 – Finalizing details for structure of voting day, organization and sign-up for volunteer tasks<sup>73</sup>

Each meeting lasted from one and a half to two hours. The SC began with about forty members with around ten to fifteen staying active throughout the process. The original “Rulebook” crafted by the SC, in conjunction with the Alderman’s Office and PBP, outlined four stages of the process: 1) neighborhood assemblies (October-November) 2) community representative meetings (November –March) 3) voting assembly (March) and 4) implementation and monitoring (April – December). Alderman Sid, extremely galvanized about the process, attended nearly every meeting in the first year ranging from neighborhood assemblies to many of the individual budget committee meetings.

The original Rulebook stated that community representatives would be voted upon at the neighborhood assemblies:

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<sup>72</sup> PBP is also technical lead for PBNYC.

<sup>73</sup> See Nicole Summers 2009 for more information.

Each neighborhood assembly will elect 5 community representatives, plus 1 community representative per 20 residents present. For example, if 140 residents attend an assembly, participants will elect 12 representatives (5 +7).

At each assembly, 2 community representative spots will be reserved for youth, between 16 and 19 years old.

Each resident can vote for up to 3 community representative candidates.<sup>74</sup>

In order to participate in PB, the Rulebook states you must be a resident of the ward.<sup>75</sup>

Additionally there could be no more than fifteen projects per committee. The original themes of the committees were:

**Budget Committees:**

- 1) Parks & Environment
- 2) Safety & Health
- 3) Streets & Transportation
- 4) Youth
- 5) Seniors & People with Disabilities
- 6) Education, Art, and Other Projects.

The original Rulebook outlined a “bus tour” led by the Alderman’s office for a needs assessment within the ward, similar to the caravans in Brazil whereby citizens go into the field to see greatest need for specific projects.

As the process progressed, the SC, in conjunction with the Alderman’s Office and PBP, amended some of the rules. The biggest changes involved abandoning the election of community representatives. Instead, participants were able to self-select to serve as community representatives without setting a specific maximum number of representatives. Another amendment was the addition of a second round of neighborhood assemblies in March that pushed the voting back from March to April. The bus tour was abandoned as part of the process, so too was the fifteen-project proposal limit per

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<sup>74</sup> Taken from the Chicago PB 2009-10 Rulebook.

<sup>75</sup> It is not clear how strictly this was enforced. For voting people were asked to give IDs. However, for general process participation it appears as though residency was never enforced and not found to be a salient issue or point of contention.

committee. The original six themes of the committees were changed to more aptly reflect the projects put forth at the neighborhood assemblies to: Streets, Transportation, Public Safety, Traffic Safety, Parks & Environment, and Art & Other Projects.

All of the changes amended to the Rulebook made the process more responsive to the needs and realities of citizen participation. Many of the original structures of the process imposed top down decisions, such as the themes of the budget committees, without anticipating participant needs and opinions on how to best run the process.

The members of the SC played an integral role in every phase of the PB process. The SC members facilitated the neighborhood assemblies and the budget committees. At the first and second round of neighborhood assemblies the SC publicized the event to their respective organizations, helped set-up and cleanup, and one SC served as a Meeting Chair at each neighborhood assembly. One SC member served as a mentor to the budget committee (BC) assisted in researching projects, explaining rules and procedures, and served as a liaison between the individual committees and the SC. For the vote, SC members worked at voting stations doing set-up, cleanup, welcome, voter registration, and leading the oral project presentations.

#### **4.3 The Process**

Understanding the mechanics of PB in Chicago is integral for assessing how PB was distilled specially within the United States. While PB in Brazil involved the mayoral level, two thematic committees, and elected representatives, PBP worked to re-format the process for ward level. Without having a template of PB in the U.S., the theoretical design of the process was altered throughout the process to reflect the realities of the community. For example, in the original theory of implementation community



representatives were set at a specific number and were elected. In reality, community representatives were not voted upon and there was not set number. Similarly, a second round of neighborhood assemblies was added to the process that was not in the theoretical design. As will be explored in Chapter 5, PBNYC benefited from Chicago already have adapted PB to the ward/council level for consumption in the U.S. Both of these adaptations created during the Chicago PB process were integrated into the original framework of PBNYC.

*Neighborhood Assemblies:*

From November to December 2009, nine neighborhood assemblies convened throughout the ward, eight in English and one in Spanish, in areas accessible to residents such as field houses, churches, and schools. Alderman Sid's office sent email flyers as well as paid canvassers to post fliers, stating: "you have a date with democracy."<sup>76</sup> At the meetings participants were given an agenda, a map of the ward, a brochure on the process and roles for community representatives, a list of previous Menu Money expenditures, and a survey to complete at the end of the meeting.

SC members facilitated the meeting as well as serving as the "MC." Four or five SC members led discussions at each neighborhood assembly with break out groups of seven to twelve participants. There were fifteen to forty-five attendants at each meeting, with the median number of about thirty. In these break out sessions, people participated in small group deliberation and decision-making. Deliberation followed the Rulebook's "Small Group Discussion Guidelines" that outlined how to engage people and have everyone share their ideas (See Appendix 3.3). These small groups outlined projects in

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<sup>76</sup> See Appendix 4.1

the area they would like to see implemented in their districts. People could also sign up to be community representatives.

*Community Representative/Budget Committees:*

Following the neighborhood assemblies (NA), those who signed up to be community representatives (CR) were contacted to attend budget committee meetings. Sixty out of the eighty who signed up showed up to this meeting. PBP gave a presentation outlining the roles and responsibilities of the CRs and residents broke out into groups.

At this first meeting, the SC mentors who would be leading each budget committee by theme announced which time of the week they would be convening for bi-monthly meetings.<sup>77</sup> The two hundred ideas from the NA were compiled, sorted into committees, and designated “Eligible,” “Maybe Eligible,” and “Ineligible or Unnecessary.” The criteria was largely based on which projects would be eligible for Menu Money restricted to infrastructure projects only. Each of the six committees had five pre-planned meetings already scheduled: Streets, Transportation, Public Safety, Traffic Safety, Parks & Environment, and Art & Other Projects. All groups except for Streets had additional meetings, and all meetings took place at the ward office at 7pm on different nights.

The SC had decided before the first CR meeting that each budget committee should have a SC “mentor,” a committee chair, and a vice-chair. At the first meeting of each budget committee, they were instructed to vote on a chair and a vice-chair, though the specific

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<sup>77</sup> Arguably, this structure encourages people to put their scheduling needs above their thematic interests. However, the second year of PB Chicago did not structure it like this. Instead, each thematic group come together and decide upon a schedule together. The result was a much less organized, less productive schedule. For the third year PB Chicago returned to having the SC mentors outline their scheduling plan before people choose which thematic group to be a part of.

roles and responsibilities of these chairs were not outlined.<sup>78</sup> The SC mentor for each budget committee group also asked for a “communications chair” to be voted upon who would be in charge of emailing participants about meetings reminders, facilitating discussion online, and emailing directly with the ward office.

After the initial meeting of all the CRs, committees were given near full discretion on to how to make decisions, organize their process, and facilitate discussions. The committees were told to provide rationale for ideas suggested at the neighborhood assemblies. As a result, each committee had a different relationship with the process and the specific agencies they interacted with while drafting proposals.

For example, some committees, such as Transportation, broke up into subcommittees such as “Sidewalk Repairs,” “Bike Transportation,” and “Public Transportation.” Some agencies proved more cumbersome to work with; Education had a high level of bureaucracy within the agencies, and some committees conducted more surveys of the areas than others. For example, the Streets Committee divided up the ward into sections and went to inspect streets in need of repair.<sup>79</sup>

The committees were able to keep abreast of projects through the blog maintained by the ward where committees would post updates. Residents of the ward could post ideas for projects on the blog and the Arts and Other Project posted a survey on the blog that 350 filed out. In the weeks before the vote a sample ballot was posted on the blog.

#### *Second Round of Neighborhood Assemblies:*

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<sup>78</sup> Four of the six committees decided to have co-chairs rather than a chair and vice chair. The roles and responsibilities of the chairs varied in the committees as well did the roles and responsibilities of the SCs in the committees. In some committees the mentor position was quite robust, while in others less strong. Sometimes the SC would aim to represent the views of the entire SC while at other moments they were acting more autonomously.

<sup>79</sup> Each member of the committee had their own evaluation schema, some used a one to five scale while others bad/medium/okay for example.

Though not part of the original Rulebook, a second round of neighborhood assemblies (NA) was added a month before the final vote. The Alderman felt that a second round of neighborhood assemblies would enable more citizen feedback in the process – this was a frequent request from citizens who wanted to find ways to be involved in the process outside of being a community representative or simply voting. The second round of assemblies was publicized through ward emails and flyers with a particular focus on the Hispanic community, achieved primarily through outreach in existing church networks.<sup>80</sup> By the second round of neighborhood assemblies each committee was instructed to label their projects either “recommended,” probably being put on the ballot, and “other suggested” projects that would probably not make the ballot. Three second rounds of neighborhood assemblies were held – including one for Spanish speaking residents. There were roughly two hundred people who attended the second round of NA. These two-hour meetings first involved committee presentations with a structured Q and A with community representatives in a “science fair format.” Committees laid out tables with presentations and people could walk around each table and ask questions about projects. They were not given specific guidelines about presenting their work. As a result, some committees such as Art and Other projects used PowerPoint for their presentations while Streets Committee made a color-coded map to show their recommendations. After the presentations, people were able to walk around and visit the different committee “stations” and ask questions about the projects.

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<sup>80</sup> The Alderman made a conscious choice to not do a publicity push around the second NA fearing that it would be too difficult to effectively advertise and explain.

After the second round of neighborhood assemblies, scheduled a month before the vote, committees were able to discuss and try to incorporate the suggestions from the assemblies.

While residents provided feedback for projects, much of it could not be implemented because with only a month before the vote many changes could not be incorporated in time. The second round of assemblies provided residents with information about the PB process and the upcoming vote. The second round of neighborhood assemblies successfully educated residents, while less successfully implemented feedback into the project proposals. Residents were unaware of the bureaucratic requirements for project formation, and therefore not much of the feedback could be incorporated into projects.

#### *Elections:*

In order to vote, residents had to meet several criteria. All residents had to be sixteen years old or older, members of Ward S, and had to show proof of residency and photo identification at the vote. Residents appointed by Sid onto the Steering Committee decided upon this criterion. Sample ballots were produced and distributed before the vote with the official ballot (see Appendix 4.1) as a two page folded booklet with ballot options and project title, cost estimate, and a one or two line description. Projects were in alphabetical order grouped by committee. People could vote for up to six projects with no weighting of votes allowed.

There was a “Get Out the Vote” (GOTV) campaign for about three weeks before the elections. The GOTV strategy meeting involved all SC and CR representatives to brainstorm creative ideas, for example to spray paint voting signs, reaching out to local CSOs, standing in front of trains during rush hours giving out flyers, and putting up

window signs in local businesses. The ward office created flyers, posters, yard signs, window signs, palm cards, and paid for a canvasser. Committee members also made their own flyers and signs to promote their individual projects. The CR and the ward office made a Facebook page. The Alderman posted an op-ed piece about the process in the *Chicago Tribune*, on the Huffington Post, and reached out to major news organizations such as CBS, WTTW, Fox News, Univision, and several local university newspapers.

There was the option for early voting at the ward office, Monday through Friday, to precede the Saturday election held at a local school from 9am-3pm. Voters could vote anywhere in a school cafeteria, including in a private voting booth, and would place their ballots in a homemade “voting box” once complete. The SC and ward volunteers staffed the voting location. Each committee was given a poster board they could fill out with their projects to present at the vote site. In addition, a PowerPoint Presentation with all the projects ran continuously throughout the voting assembly. Each committee was given five minutes to give oral presentations on their projects at 10am, 12pm, and 2pm.

Roughly four hundred people voted early at the ward Office with roughly twelve hundred voting on the official voting day.” A total of 1,652 voted in the first PB Chicago election.

#### **4.4 The Projects**

In the PowerPoint presenting PB to community residents, Alderman Sid outlined how Menu Money is typically spent in the ward: Roads, Street lighting, Sidewalks, and Parks. This section outlines where Menu Money was spent in the year before and after the treatment of PB was introduced in Chicago:<sup>81</sup>

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<sup>81</sup> Specific geographic information has been removed to maintain anonymity.

I have created this typology to distinguish the nature of projects:<sup>82</sup>

1) “Conventional” (**C**) projects maintain the form of typical Menu Money funding. PB has enabled a more equitable process to determine project need in the community.

2) “Innovative” (**I**) denote projects that are more creative than typical projects funded through menu money allocations.

*Pre PB:* (2009)

Street Resurfacing \$937,278

Street Lighting \$325,000

Sidewalk Repairs \$92,889

Avenue Design \$65,000

Alley Resurfacing \$48,596

Alley Speed Humps \$8,225

Street Speed Humps \$3,500

*PB:* (2010)

Sidewalk repairs, \$188,292

Bike lanes, \$100,000

Dog Friendly Area at Park, \$110,000

Community Gardens in two parks \$33,000

Underpass Murals, \$84,000

Traffic/Pedestrian Signal \$230,000

Artistic Multifunctional Bike Racks, \$105,000

Additional Benches and Shelters on Chicago Transit Authority “El” Platforms, \$84,000

Street Resurfacing Solar-Powered Garbage Containers on Rd., \$41,000

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<sup>82</sup> This typology is based on my qualitative data.

Convenience Showers at Park Beach, \$50,000

Completion of Path in Park, \$25,000

Park Historical Signs, \$42,000

Residential Street Lighting\$130,000

Out of the fourteen projects, I categorize seven as innovative and seven as conventional.

As will be discussed in Chapter 9, 38% of projects in PBNYC were innovative with 62% as conventional. Therefore, PB in Chicago produced more innovative projects in its pilot year than PBNYC.

The even split of innovative and conventional projects suggests that PB in Chicago was effective both at bringing about new ideas and creative project proposals as well as showing that citizens can make rational proposals.

Conventional projects within the context of PB are particularly informative because they take projects that would already be implemented through capital funds, such as sidewalk repair, and focus them to a specific street that has been determined by citizens. Thus, conventional projects suggest that citizens based in their own local community are the ones best able to assess need.

The innovative projects were effective at bringing the community together in new ways. These projects were not only able to effectively address community needs but reimagine those needs. Without PB these projects would not have happened. As one chair of the transportation committee noted, “there was a tension for people living a car based lifestyle with focus on a bike lifestyle. Ultimately, the bike people were able to convince many people to join their cause.” The creation of bike lanes, dog parks, and underpass



murals are not only projects that would not have happened without PB but also exemplify people forming new understandings through the PB process itself. Projects such as solar powered garbage cans, community gardens, and historical signs represent a commitment to a specific set of ideals and values. All of these projects favor alternative policy solutions, including community involvement in spaces typically not opened to the community.

#### **4.5 Lessons Learned**

PB in Chicago offers a model for assessing challenges and opportunities for PB implementation in the United States and a paradigm to inform PBNYC. There are many structural, institutional, and political differences between Chicago and New York that inform unique PB adoption and implementation. PB in Chicago differs from PBNYC because only one Alderman instituted it, not four as in New York. Having only one Alderman institute PB opened the process up to critiques surrounding personality, ideology, and personal patronage in a way that the structure of PBNYC, where four council members came together, was more diversified. SC members were concerned that Sid was co-opting the process for his own political gain. The SC interviewed did not like the relationships they formed with Sid and as a result roughly half of the SC quit for the second year of PB (henceforth Y2). Disillusionment of participants curtailed substantive participation, the second tenet of citizenly politics. PBNYC was able to avoid this because, despite the intention of the initiators, citizens actually participated in the design of the participatory institutions as explored in Chapter 8.

With the interest of only one Alderman, PB in Chicago experienced process exhaustion with decreased energy, turnout, and less Aldermanic support in its second year. The

process exhaustion experienced in Chicago prevented completion of the fourth tenet of citizenly politics. In order to become institutionalized to scale, the process must become less political and move beyond a single politician. Yet despite Chicago PB's material challenges to participation and institutionalization, the continuation of the process underscores the importance of existential benefits for participants.

"The Alderman lost steam after the first year, especially when only 20 people from the original Steering Committee wanted to return because they felt like the process had been co-opted and was more about re-election than community engagement," described a committee chair and member of the SC from Chicago PB year one (henceforth Y1).

The Alderman often cites re-election campaigning as a central reason for implementing PB. After implementing PBY1, he won a hotly contested by 77% in an election he was not slated to win. Several of the SC who left the process felt that the Alderman's office had too strictly imposed top down control of the process without allowing for genuine grassroots engagement.

Another reason of the decline in popularity revolved around differences in personality: those who felt that the Alderman's style of leadership was caustic and too driven by personal patronage. There were also accusations of favoritism. Community representative's who sat on committees could not understand why only *certain* people were picked to be on the SC. These people seemed to just be the friends, supporters, and donors to the Alderman's campaign. "At many times during the process I wondered: am I here to support Sid or to engage our community residents? If this process is really about community engagement why was there no transparency about who formed the Steering Committee?" described one active community representative from PBY1.

The leadership of PBY1 appeared to be more about creating a support network and structure for the Alderman than about community participation. Questions arose about whether or not the entire structure of PB was just a GOTV apparatus for re-election aimed to spotlight Alderman Sid as the “first elected official to bring PB to the U.S.”

One SC who retained involvement after the first year mentioned, “If Sid had not been in a hotly contested election for the first time in years, would he have implemented PB? He was totally absent from the second year of the process.”

The fourth tenet of citizenly politics addresses the tension that occurs when the novelty aspect of a democratic innovation wears off and the banality of governing sets in. In PBY2, Alderman Sid was neither facing re-election nor implementing a democratic innovation for the first time in the United States. PBY2 was about taking something unique and making it mainstream. There were only 20 people who sat on the SC and participation rates throughout every stage of the process were lower than before. Was participation lower because the Alderman chose to devote less staff resources to the process or did the Alderman chose to devote less staff resources because the process was less exciting and engaging in its second year? Both are probably true.

PB is a resource intensive process for both citizens and a politician. The full time intern who ran PBY1 was not replaced for PBY2. However, the process exhaustion in PBY2 was also due to the alienation felt by the SC who had devoted time and resources to PBY1. In PBY2, the SC was smaller, more fractured, and less amenable to devoting the considerable resources required toward the project. The combined reduction in efforts of both the SC and the Alderman led to lower participation numbers in the process.

Lower participation rates throughout the process resulted in a smaller amount of potential projects to be put on the ballot. In PBY1 36 projects were put on the ballot, in PBY2 only 21 projects were put on the ballot.

In order to accommodate the lower participation rates throughout the process, the Alderman's office set aside \$300,000 of Menu Money to be used at Sid's discretion. Additionally, there was a question of which percentage of the remaining funds should be allocated to street resurfacing.

In PBY1 the Alderman may have set unrealistic expectations for the process, both in terms of his own involvement as well as the speed in which Menu Money funds would be operationalized. In PBY1 Sid was excited about the process in addition to running for re-election. He would attend nearly every meeting from neighborhood assembly to budget committee meetings. This was not a realistic time commitment for an Alderman and his absence in PBY2 may have been viewed as a lack of involvement when in reality it was a more realistic time commitment to the process. Similarly, after devoting time and resources to PBY1, SC and community representatives were unable to see immediate physical manifestations of their work, as projects often took at least one year, and often three years to implement. Without seeing physical results, many citizens were not inclined to devote more energy to the process.

Another reason for the process exhaustion was that no other Alderman signed up for PBY2. PB expansion is integral to its broader adoption in the U.S. Part of the responsibilities for expansion fell with Alderman Sid and PBP who were actively trying to expand PB in the United States. The re-election focus of PBY1 may be responsible for lack of outreach to additional Alderman. Dealing with the daunting task of bringing PB

to the U.S. may have taken up all the resources of PBP without enabling outreach to other Alderman. Factors germane to the specific urban environment of Chicago may also be to blame. Chicago is a sprawling city, much more so than New York City, with a system that does not encourage political cooperation. The set funding structure of Menu Money in Chicago, as opposed to the range of discretionary funds in New York City, may create fewer political opportunities for Aldermen to interact with one another than the New York City Council.

“Seeing PB in the city of New York has re-inspired me to believe in the dream of PB for the United States,” noted Alderman Sid at the first ever International Participatory Budget Conference in New York City. One member of the SC who remained involved through the third year of PB (henceforth Y3) recounted:

Sid does not want to be upstaged by New York City. The focus on New York City has once again given him a podium to bring attention to his own efforts at bringing PB to the United States. He also wants to show that Chicago is the birthplace of PB in the U.S. and the place where it is being run the best.

While there may be instrumental reasons for Alderman Sid’s renewed interest in PBY3, the third year of a process also marks the beginning of institutionalization. I argue that Y1 is innovation, Y2 growth, and Y3 is institutionalization. In Y3, Sid has reinvigorated efforts with an expanded outreach and mobilization plan to target youth. Further galvanized by the media attention in New York City, other Aldermen in Chicago had taken notice and had been in serious dialogue to support PB in year four. Even with the combined efforts of greater outreach, mobilization, and engagement from the Alderman there remained tensions between the Alderman’s office and the SC. According to a member of the SC for all three years:

Sid wants to take credit for when things go well, even if the SC is responsible, and distance himself from the process when things don’t go as well as planned. There

have also been internal tensions on SC. In Spring 2012, towards the vote one of the chairs of the SC resigned over email citing sexual harassment. The SC faced external tensions with the Alderman's office as well as internal tensions. The result was false autonomy whereby the SC did not feel empowered compromising substantive participation. Part of the frustration came from lack of clear authority combined with resource intensive participation. As PB becomes institutionalized in Chicago, participants face the challenge of wanting substantive participation (third tenet of citizenly politics) through deliberative discourse (second tenet of citizenly politics) but feel as though Sid's office limits the opportunities for citizens to design their own participation (first tenet of citizenly politics). Until PB in Chicago expands beyond the tutelage of one Alderman, it will not fulfill the first tenet of citizenly politics and enable citizens the opportunities to be architects of their involvement.

Another person involved in the process since PBY1 noted:

"I am hopeful that when we expand to more wards we will be able to get away from this power grab – it is worst and heightened because it's one ward, wards are like little villages and everyone knows one another. If we had more wards it would be less about the individual personality of the Alderman and there would be more oversight."

#### **4.6 PB: Chicago vs. New York City**

PB in Chicago differs from PB in New York City in three structural ways: 1) the number of politicians participating 2) the size of representative districts and 3) the budget process in each respective city. Each of these three factors helps explain the different material and existential outputs of the process in each city. Chicago and New York City represent instructive paradigms for implementing PB in other U.S. cities.

"Maybe I'm just skeptical of politicians; our Alderman's ego is so big maybe there just needs to be enough opportunities for ego inflation for the Alderman to feel good about the process."

The above sentiment, by a long-standing member of the Chicago SC, reflects the reality that PB in Chicago has been perceived by those involved to be interwoven with the

personality, ego, and ambitions of the one elected official who had been the first pioneer to bring PB to the United States. The first major difference between PB in Chicago and New York City is the number of politicians involved. The Chicago process began with one Alderman and at the time of writing this dissertation remains the project of one elected official alone.<sup>83</sup> In contrast, the process in New York City began with four Council members. As will be outlined in the following chapter, the process of deliberation and agreement of shared norms for the New York City process represents a political achievement unto itself. In contrast, the process in Chicago remains insular and structured around individual loyalties to one Alderman.

The role of individual personality and electoral ambitions in Chicago PB may reflect the participation of only one politician, but may also be the result of geography. The wards in Chicago are much smaller than districts in New York City. There are fifty Aldermen for Chicago's 2,851,268 residents.<sup>84</sup> In contrast, New York City has fifty-one Council members for New York City's 8,391,881 residents.<sup>85</sup> The feeling that Aldermen are mini "mayors over their own ward," as Sid notes, may be the result of this structure of city governance. The structure of wards in Chicago may on the one hand encourage a closer relationship between citizens and their Alderman while on the other hand enable more opportunities for patronage – or at least the perception of patronage. In contrast, New York City's districts are so large it is difficult for personal relationships between

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<sup>83</sup> Fiscal Year 2014 marks the first time that three other Alderman will be joining to implement PB in their respective wards. While other Alderman may have been interesting in PB earlier, the PB cycle is not concurrent with the Fiscal Year. Therefore, some interested officials must wait for entire new Fiscal Year to implement PB.

<sup>84</sup> U.S. Census Bureau July 2009

<sup>85</sup> Ibid.

constituents and elected officials to develop; this may also prevent the perception of personal patronage that is conducive to smaller localities.

In addition to having smaller wards in Chicago, the structure of Menu Money dispersal makes implementing PB less politically costly for an individual Chicago Alderman.

Aldermen in Chicago have been receiving a set amount of Alderman funds or Menu Money for capital projects since 1994. In contrast, the range of a New York City Council member's discretionary funds is anywhere from \$3-11 Million at the discretion of the Speaker of the Majority Party. As outlined in Section 5.7, there is little correlation between a New York City district needs and their discretionary funds. Political relationships impact New York City Council discretionary funds,<sup>86</sup> whereas political relationships between Aldermen do not impact Menu Money allocation. I argue that PBNYC represents a departure from the *status quo* of budgeting in New York City with the potential to challenge traditional roles and responsibilities surrounding budgets. City Council members in New York may be taking a risk to implement PB in a way that is much less costly for Chicago Aldermen.

Given this non-transparent aspect of discretionary funding in New York City, community residents in New York City may view PB as a greater departure from traditional budget processes than Chicago residents. However, between 1972 and 1999, twenty-six former or current Aldermen were officially convicted of corruption.<sup>87</sup> From 1972 to 2009, thirty Chicago Aldermen were indicted and convicted of federal crimes ranging from income

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<sup>86</sup> For more information on the political patronage involved in discretionary funding in New York City Council see "Creating a More Equitable and Objective Discretionary Funding Process in New York City," Citizens Union of the City of New York, May 2012, Available at: [http://www.citizensunion.org/www/cu/site/hosting/Reports/CU\\_Report\\_NYC\\_Discretionary\\_FundingFY2009-2012\\_May2012.pdf](http://www.citizensunion.org/www/cu/site/hosting/Reports/CU_Report_NYC_Discretionary_FundingFY2009-2012_May2012.pdf)

<sup>87</sup> Reardon, Patrick T., "Aldermen Rogues' Gallery Opens '99 Wing; Jones Is 25th City Council Member Convicted Since 1972," January 31, 1999, *Chicago Tribune*.



tax evasion to extortion, embezzlement, and conspiracy to name but a few (Gradel et al 2009). These figures suggest that Aldermen are viewed as corrupt and non-transparent in an analogous way to New York City Council,<sup>88</sup> members even if the budget process itself in Chicago is structurally more transparent than the process in New York City.

Given that adoption of PB is less politically costly in Chicago than in New York City, due to discretionary funding structure, one would hypothesize that this would make Aldermen amenable to signing on to PB. In practice, PB in Chicago has yet to expand beyond one Alderman. The failure of adaptation by other Aldermen suggest that structural differences alone cannot explain outputs in these two cities. Chicago had a greater percentage of innovative projects in its first year than New York City. Despite seemingly successful projects after PBY1, many involved with the process in Chicago were disillusioned and did not participate again in PBY2. In contrast, while some people in PBNYC were frustrated by engagement they have already signed on to be active participants in the second year of PBNYC. The different experiences of participation in Chicago and New York City illustrate the import of existential outputs from the PB process.

#### **4.7 Conclusion**

Chicago PB highlights why one-man PB is less successful than a more diverse process, as exemplified in New York City. Existing ecosystems prohibited Chicago PB from fulfilling the third and fourth tenet of citizenly politics: substantive participation and institutionalization to scale. Despite Chicago PB's challenges to substantive participation and institutionalization, the process continued beyond its pilot year. PB Chicago's

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<sup>88</sup> See Chapter 5 for information relating to perceptions surround New York City Council members.

continuation illustrates that the existential benefits of PB are so significant that they can compensate for lesser material benefits.

In this chapter I have shown that PB in Chicago serves as an instructive paragon with many similarities and pivotal structural differences to PBNYC. The process of evolution in Chicago, from the original Rulebook to changes during implementation, directly influenced design and implementation of PBNYC. For example, not having community representatives elected, holding second rounds of neighborhood assemblies, and flexible committee themes were directly incorporated into PBNYC's structure.<sup>89</sup>

The structural differences of PB in Chicago vs. New York; 1) number of politicians participating 2) the size of representative districts and 3) the budget process, suggest institutional design is critical for evaluation. Yet, these structural differences do not fully account for the different existential outputs and experiences for those who participated in PB in Chicago vs. New York. There are idiosyncratic factors relating to individual personalities and politics that influence the perceptions of the process. For instance, many of the SC in Chicago viewed PBY1 as self-serving to Alderman Sid even though the process produced innovative projects. Chicago PB produced more innovative projects, proportionally than PBNYC, yet faced greater participant disillusionment. Perceptions of influence and personality contributed towards process exhaustion in Y2.

After the pilot year, SC members raised concerns that citizens were not genuinely empowered to inform mechanisms for engagement.<sup>90</sup> When this first tenet of citizenly

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<sup>89</sup> PBP, implementing PB in both Chicago and New York City, has yet to come to a definite decision about the degree to which scheduling should serve as an initial reason for how community representatives/budget delegates choose a committee as this switched from Y1 to Y2 and back to the original format in Y3. In PBNYC set schedules were not presented as a factor for joining a budget committee. As the process continues to evolve, more changes can be expected such as the dual ballot voting in Y3.

<sup>90</sup> Reactions against the pilot year buttress the import of studying the pilot year of democratic innovations, such as PBNYC, for gleaning insight into the prospects of the process.

politics seemed compromised, the barriers to entry for achieving the third and fourth tenets, participation and institutionalization, became even greater. The challenges for expansion and implementation of PB beyond Y1 serve as an educative example for the perils for scaling up PB and institutionalization. Until the challenges to wider political support, participation maintenance, and ease of process exhaustion are addressed; Chicago PB faces serious obstacles to fulfilling the fourth tenet of citizenly politics and becoming institutionalized and apolitical.

## Appendix 4.1

### **Small Group Discussion Guidelines**

#### **(For first round neighborhood assemblies)**

##### Discussion Guidelines

Thank you for being a small group discussion leader!

Announce to group: The purpose of this discussion is to identify infrastructure needs in the ward and start brainstorming ideas for projects to address these needs.

Representatives from all of the neighborhoods will use these ideas to develop full project proposals that the entire ward will vote on in March or April. The more specific the ideas the group comes up with the better, but the ideas needn't be specific, either. Thus you can say that the 1500 block of Greenleaf needs to be resurfaced, or you can just say that streets need to be resurfaced in general. Either suggestion is useful!

To start out the discussion, go around the group and have everyone introduce him or herself by saying their name, where they live, and where they work.

Below is a list of guiding questions to facilitate the discussion. You don't have to stick exactly to these questions, but these may be helpful to get the discussion going.

Everyone should have the handout of examples of infrastructure projects eligible for funding (the "Yes" and "No" sheet), and a packet with a list of past projects should be circulating around the group.

The note taker should write down the ideas mentioned by the group on the large post-it for everyone to see. People can also write their ideas on small post-its and attach them to the large post-it.

1. What are some infrastructure needs (streets, roads, sidewalks, parks, etc.) in our neighborhood and ward?
2. Which of these needs are most pressing and important? Why?
3. What types of projects can address these needs? (Again, the more specific the better, but ideas do not have to be specific. Refer to the list of eligible project (Yes's and No's) to get ideas, though we encourage you to think beyond this list! You can also get an idea of what menu money has been spent for in the past by looking at the List of Past Projects, and you can get a sense of how much projects cost by referring to the Menu Cost Comparison sheet.
4. Do we have project ideas for all of the needs we identified?

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5. Which project ideas sound best? Which would you consider your priorities?
6. Announce to group: We need one person from the group to give a very short presentation (about 1 minute) to the large group. The presentation will be a summary of what our group talked about-- the infrastructure needs and ideas our group discussed. Do we have a volunteer to give this presentation? By volunteering you are NOT nominating yourself to become a representative—this role is only for the presentations. Let's review what this person will talk about. What are the main infrastructure needs and projects we discussed and felt were most important?
7. Announce to group: The participatory budgeting process requires the active engagement of community residents! As part of this process, we encourage all motivated residents to seek participatory budgeting leadership roles as community representatives. This is a great opportunity to learn about city budgeting, get involved in local government, and advocate for your community.

As a community representative you will attend a series of five meetings through which you'll develop concrete project proposals that will respond to the needs and priorities discussed at today's meeting. See the handout on roles and responsibilities (on the back of the list of eligible projects) for more details.

#### Appendix 4.2

### **First Community Representative Meeting**

#### **Handouts**

#### **Outline for Community Representative Meetings**

Meeting 1- December 9, 2009

Goal 1: Orientation to community representative phase of participatory budgeting, representatives learn about city budget process, menu budget, and infrastructure spending issues

Goal 2: Break into budgeting committees

Goal 3: Select one community representative from each neighborhood area assembly to be a "communications chair"

Meeting 2- Weeks of January 4th and 11th, 2010

Goal 1: Meet with technical experts to learn about how they prioritize and develop related project proposals

Goal 2: Develop criteria for prioritization of projects and/or plan for working out technical aspects of projects

Goal 3: Review the list of projects suggested at the neighborhood assemblies and divide up projects for representatives to survey sites before meeting 3

Meeting 3- Weeks of January 18th and 25th, 2010

Goal 1: Representatives report back on project site/areas surveyed

Goal 2: Begin to prioritize projects using criteria developed in meeting 2

Goal 3: Work with experts on technical details

Meeting 4- Weeks of February 8th and 15th, 2010

Goal 1: Finalize project prioritization process- determine list of projects that will be proposed

Goal 2: Discuss and determine need and impact of proposed projects

Goal 3: Finalize technical details of projects, including cost estimate

Meeting 5- Weeks of February 23rd and March 1st, 2010

Goal 1: Finalize all project details

Goal 2: Prepare project proposals and presentations

#### Appendix 4.3

### **Committee Frequently Asked Question**

#### **Handouts**

#### **FAQs- Transportation Committee**

1. Do we have to prepare proposals for all of the projects on the list of eligible projects?

No, but we do have to consider all of the projects. From this list we will develop a list of "recommended projects" that we believe are needed and worthwhile projects for the Ward. We will present this list, as well as the list of all projects suggested, to the residents of the Ward at the second round of neighborhood assemblies in March. At these meetings we will explain why we chose to recommend certain projects and not

others, and then residents will have the opportunity to amend the list of recommended projects. After these meetings we will have a final list of recommended projects and propose only these projects at the final voting assembly.

2. Will we only be developing proposals for projects that are on this list?

We will use this list as a solid jumping off point for developing proposals. The projects on this list were all of the transportation projects suggested at the nine neighborhood assemblies held throughout the Ward. However, it is also our job as a committee to be creative and come up with new ideas for projects that meet the Ward's transportation needs and reflect the Ward's priorities. Residents can also write, call, or email in project suggestions until March 1<sup>st</sup>.

3. How do we decide which projects to propose?

This is really up to us to figure out, but it should be based on our assessment of the Ward's need and desire for each project suggested. We can get a sense of the Ward's priorities from the project list—we can see that certain projects were suggested at multiple assemblies and/or determined by a group to be their priority—but we should also talk to our friends, neighbors, and co-workers about what their priorities are and what sort of transportation improvement projects they feel would most benefit the Ward as a whole. It's also very important to do our own assessments of the need for suggested projects by going out and surveying the proposed sites.

4. How do we divide up the projects amongst us or decide who does what?

This is up to us to decide. We can each work on separate projects or we can work in subcommittees on groups of projects.

5. Do we need to coordinate with other city departments/agencies for these projects?

How do we do this?

For most of these projects we will coordinate with the Department of Transportation, the Office of Emergency Management, or the CTA. The Alderman's Office will facilitate all necessary coordination.

6. How do we go about proposing a project for a bike path?

We have to coordinate with the Park District to put a bike path in a park or on the lakefront. If we decide to work on a proposal for a bike path, the Alderman's Office will set up a meeting for us with the Park District.

7. How do we go about proposing a project for bike lanes?

For bike lanes we have to coordinate with the Department of Transportation (CDOT). They will have to come out and survey the streets where we want to add bike lanes to make sure that they are wide enough. The Alderman's Office will coordinate this for us if we decide we want to propose bike lanes.

8. How will we know how much projects cost?

Several of the projects we will be working on are already on the menu cost comparison sheet. Knowing from past experience, we can look to the 2009 menu costs to get a close estimate of the 2010 costs. We will work with the Alderman's Office to get cost estimates for projects that are not on the menu.

9. How can we be sure that another agency/level of funding isn't simultaneously planning for one of the projects we're working on?

The Alderman's Office will advise us if any other agency or level of funding is planning for any of the same projects.

## Chapter 5: Participatory Budgeting in New York City

In his 1949 work, *Here is New York*, E.B. White wrote:

By rights New York should have destroyed itself long ago, from panic or fire or rioting or failure of some vital supply line in its circulatory system or from some deep labyrinthine short circuit.<sup>91</sup>

Thankfully, E.B. White's predictions have yet to come true. New York has not destroyed itself—far from it. New York is the birthplace of a new kind of democratic experiment, the most large-scale Participatory Budgeting project in U.S. history, implemented as a pilot from 2011 to 2012. What accounts for New York City adopting this democratic innovation? This chapter outlines existing budget politics in the New York City council and presents PBNYC as an alternative model rising out of current conditions, covering topics such as: 1) history of relevant City Council existing or *status quo* budget politics in New York 2) the trajectory of bringing PB to New York City 3) a description of conditions of the four PBNYC implementing districts and 4) conditions of four matched pair districts with similar conditions but not implementing PBNYC. Through assessing *status quo* budget politics, PB emerges as an alternative to traditional City Council discretionary funds in both process and outputs. In Chapter 9, I extend the matched pair analysis to compare capital projects in PB implementing districts contrasted to projects in matched pair districts not implementing PB.

A comparison of the four districts implementing the treatment of PBNYC, and four matched pair districts not implementing the PB treatment, shows that the amount of discretionary funds a given Council member receives does not correlate with relative district need. Even though the four districts implementing PBNYC have the ordinary

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<sup>91</sup> E.B. White *Here is New York* p 24 as quoted in “A Phoenix in the Ashes” p 12

characteristics of many New York City districts, by instituting PBNYC they are choosing to do something extraordinary.

The individual motivating factors for the four Council members are ideological and idiosyncratic. Albert, Beatrice, and Charlie all sit on the City Council's Progressive Caucus and brought their progressive vision of deepening citizen engagement *within* government as motivations for implementing PB. Devon, in contrast, brought libertarian motivations to PB: "people ought to determine where their money goes – *not* government."<sup>92</sup> While these two views offer competing paradigms mapping the relationship between citizens and government, PB is expansive enough to accommodate variance of ideological motivations.

The role of ideology serves as a critical starting point for understanding PBNYC as further explored in Chapter 6. Here, I outline three salient conditions of the four districts implementing the treatment of PBNYC along the dimensions of: 1) demographics 2) social capital (Putnam 1993) and civil society capacity and 3) political economy. In subsequent chapters, I assess these conditions of success within the criteria for success outlined by the theory of citizenly politics, as discussed in Chapter 2 : 1) citizens design their own participation 2) deliberative discourse takes place 3) participation is substantive and 4) the ability for institutionalization to scale. Through detailing empirical findings of PBNYC, with a focus on deliberation, governance, and participation, I assess the full outputs of this pilot project as an alternative to the *status quo ante*.

By outlining salient district conditions, including the ideology of the four Council members implementing the treatment of PBNYC in their districts, I argue that micro-

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<sup>92</sup> Council member Devon cited as reasons for implementing PB.



level political<sup>93</sup> factors such as a Council members' perception amongst peers, are critical components for understanding motivating factors and potential outputs of PBNYC.

Citizenly politics requires establishing relative conditions that led to adoption of PBNYC.

The immaterial, or existential, factors such as the political economies in which each

Council member exists are critical engines driving the adoption of PBNYC.

### **5.1 “Ford to City: Drop Dead!”<sup>94</sup>**

New York City politics is fascinating not only because it binds many interests together in intimate conflict but because the stakes are so high. New York has long had the nation's largest, broadest, costliest, and most intrusive local public sector (Mollenkopf 1992, 13)

According to John Mollenkopf, - the enormity of the public sector in New York City

elevates the stakes of New York City politics. In Fiscal Year (FY) 2011- 2012, New York

City's population of 8,244,910 made it the most populous city in the United States.<sup>95</sup> In

2012, New York City's budget was \$65.9 billion. FY 2012 is best understood in the

context of fiscal constraints imposed upon the city after the 1975 fiscal crisis.

Between 1975 and 1983, the city budget shrank by 22 percent. Leading up to the 1975

crisis were a series of government spending projects including 130,000 units of public-

sector housing, three hundred schools, five public hospitals, new libraries and thousands

of new acres of park (Sanjek 1998, 84).<sup>96</sup> Under Mayor Robert Wagner, followed by

Mayor John Lindsay, City University of New York (CUNY) campuses doubled from

nine to nineteen and the city's Medicaid and public assistance safety net expanded to

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<sup>93</sup> These types of political economies are lacking in the current literature as described in Chapter 3.

<sup>94</sup> Headline on the *Daily News* from President Ford on October 29, 1975. Though some speculate he never said these words: Sam Roberts, “*Infamous ‘Drop Dead’ Was Never Said by Ford*,” December 28, 2006, *New York Times*, Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/28/nyregion/28veto.html>.

<sup>95</sup> Census 2010. Population numbers in New York are probably higher because of undocumented residents, “over all immigration is acknowledged at *the* contributing factor in the city's population growth” (Adrian et al 1991, 5).

<sup>96</sup> There was a confluence of geo-political and local factors including the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) quadrupling the price of oil, the resignation of Governor Nelson Rockefeller, and the collapse of Manhattan's West Side highway (Sanjek 1998, 89).

nearly \$1 billion by 1975. By 1975, New York City's deficit was \$2 billion, with \$13 billion in accumulated debt; just the prior year the city had borrowed \$8 billion to meet short-term note obligations. The rise of government expenditures was one confounding factor that led to the city's financial crisis, combined with New York City's unemployment rate, which had grown from 3 percent in 1968 to 11 percent in 1974.<sup>97</sup> Government policies that diminished the city's tax base were amplified by declining tax revenue due to the recession and job loss, rising municipal employee costs, and the near-defeat of the commuter tax (Sanjek 1998, 85).

There are two reasons the financial crisis of 1975 is important for understanding New York City budget politics—namely, mistrust of public spending, and the power of the financial sector in New York City's budget. In the early months of 1975, Mayor Beame borrowed unprecedented amounts – with the City's operating budget at a whopping \$450 million.<sup>98</sup> The Financial Community Liaison Group (FCLG) was formed including David Rockefeller of Chase and top officers from Salomon Brothers, Citibank, Merrill Lynch, Chemical Bank, and Manufacturers Hanover. The FCLG became an integral player with city government forever altering the relationship between the public and private sector (Sanjek 1998, 92). The FCLG helped form the Municipal Assistance Committee (MAC) that consisted of eight bankers and one academic – not a single Council member, municipal worker, or resident of New York was represented on the MAC. In September 1975, the Emergency Financial Control Board (EFCB) was created and influenced the city's finances for the next thirty years. As a result, everyone learned

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<sup>97</sup> For a plethora of reasons New York City felt the recession more deeply than other parts of the country and city lost 440,000 residents (Sanjek 1998, 86).

<sup>98</sup> "A good loan is better than a bad tax" was the phrase of the day in New York City politics.

to accept the eminence of the banks, including the unions who saw severe job cuts.<sup>99</sup>

Upon the FCLG's request, the federal government helped bail out New York, with Washington pledging \$2.3 billion in annual loan guarantees.

The resultant cuts in the city impacted the quality of life for residents of New York, disproportionately affecting the poorest and traditionally least represented members of the city who are more dependent on city services and public goods such as schools and hospitals. For example, the year 1976 saw the end of 129 years of free college education in New York through the city's esteemed CUNY program. Not surprisingly, by 1980, the number of CUNY students dropped by 30 percent (Sanjek 1998, 93). Public schools saw a 25 percent increase in class size and layoffs of over 15,000 teachers. By 1984, the New York Police Department (NYPD) had only three-quarters of the staff that it employed in 1974. As Community Board (CB4) comptroller Harrison Goldin described the impact of the city's four-year capital budget freeze in 1979:

The collapse of the city is physically overwhelming and is the result of failure to invest limited amounts of money on highways, sewers, parks, subways, all of which now require huge amounts of money to bring them back to acceptable standards (Sanjek 1998, 94).

According to Sanjek, the erosion of quality of life in New York after 1975 led to the expansion of local "parapolitical" activity with the city's 3,500 civic, block, tenant, ethnic, and other associations in 1977, growing to 8,000 by 1995 (Sanjek 1998, 375). Sanjek's "parapolitical" activity refers to citizen activity beyond electoral voting aimed to strengthen local democracy. He notes the trend toward government decentralization, with voters affirming the power of the community board in citywide charters in both 1975 and 1989.

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<sup>99</sup> Between September and November 1975 there were forty-five union demonstrations over service and job cuts.

A large part of this “parapolitical” activity takes place inside New York’s 59 Community Boards where 50 members, who must reside or be stakeholders in the community, are appointed by Borough Presidents or City Council members for two year terms without term limits. In 1989, the roles and responsibilities of the community board were expanded under Charter 38 to include a provision for the Community Board to hold an annual open meeting on the budget. However, there are no mechanisms for accountability within any provisions for the Community Board, including Charter 38, and as a result the Community Board budget meetings have become “nothing but pro forma.” According to multiple Community Board members I interviewed,<sup>100</sup> several community boards have stopped holding them without any consequences.

While the reforms aimed to increase the representativeness of the Community Boards, by the mid-1990’s, community boards were less inclusive than they both could or should have been (Sanjek 1998).<sup>101</sup> The lack of diverse representation on community boards was due in large part to the structure where community board members are appointed by either Borough Presidents or City Council members and not elected, “particularly in racially and ethnically diverse community districts they did not fully ‘look like New York City’” (Sanjek 1998, 375).<sup>102</sup>

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<sup>100</sup> Interview with Community Board Member in a CB that overlaps with D-A.

<sup>101</sup> There is both a descriptive and normative argument to be made. The former relates to the demographics of New York City and whether or not the Community Boards were reflective, the latter relates to the normative imperative for having greater inclusion and diverse representation on the Community Boards. According to scholarship, the Community Boards were unable to accomplish neither the descriptive nor normative goals.

<sup>102</sup> In his in-depth study of CB4, Roger Sanjek (1998) shows that transition to making Community Boards appointments led to greater inclusion but did not lead to full representation or a board that “looks like Elmhurst-Corona” (Sanjek 1998, 376). Elmhurst-Corona, at least one-third Latin American, had only six Latin Americans, out of thirty-nine CB4 members.

## 5.2 The City Council and their Capital Funds

The City Council has not usually used its institutional potential offensively and extensively to represent the diversity of New York City residents, and has not served as an arena of consequential public discussion, and controversy, even less as an instrument of control of the executive (Windhoff-Heritier 1992, 54). New York City displays a strong mayor-weak council leadership system as described by James Svara (Svara 1990). Historically, the City Council's role was limited in nature with the Mayor wielding nearly complete power over the budgeting process. However, under the reforms of Charter 38 in 1989, the City Council was expanded from 35 to 51 members.<sup>103</sup> The Charter abolished the Board of Estimate that was in charge of budget and land use decisions. In 1989, the Supreme Court deemed the body unconstitutional in the case *Board of Estimate of City of New York v. Morris*. Under Charter 38 most of the Board of Estimate's powers were given to the City Council, specifically giving power to the Council over land use decisions such as zoning changes, housing and urban renewal plans, and community development.<sup>104</sup> The reforms expanded the number of Councilors, enhanced their roles by adding to their powers, and making Councilors seemingly more representative of their constituencies.

For a long time, the City Council was “ignored and by-passed by the non-government groups, by bureaucrats, and by governmental leaders of the City and other jurisdictions” (Sayre and Kaufman 1960, 622). The charter aimed to increase the power of the City Council while retaining the Speaker of the majority party in making budgetary decisions. According to a May 1985 edition of the *New York Times*: “The City Council is not the most politically powerful institution in city government, but whatever power it has is concentrated in the office of the majority leader” (5/25/1985). The Speaker of the

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<sup>103</sup> As mentioned in Chapter 4, by way of contrast, Chicago a city with roughly a third of the population of New York has 50 Alderman (the rough equivalent of New York City Council members).

<sup>104</sup> New York City Council. URL: <http://council.nyc.gov/html/about/about.shtml> Accessed 5/5/2012.

majority party is voted upon in a closed election that involves internal coalition building.

The Democratic Party has been the strong hold in New York politics, especially in the City Council, with the infamous Tammany Hall<sup>105</sup> as its emblem of corruption.

Windhoff-Heritier argues that one of the principal reasons the City Council has not reflected the diversity of New York City is its historic dominance by the non-diverse Democratic Party (Windhoff-Heritier 1992, 55).

The little power the City Council has is evidenced through its discretionary funds that are determined by the Speaker of the majority party – this process has created a meaningful role for the City Council even though these funds combined amount to less than one percent of the city’s annual budget. The City Council has two types of funds, capital and expense funds. Capital funds totaled \$428 Million in FY2012 and can be used for infrastructure projects such as building parks, renovating schools, etc. The money can be spent over several years for projects of at least \$35,000. Expense Funds totaled \$150 million in FY 2012 and must be used within one fiscal year. Further complicating the budget process is the dual state and city level jurisdiction over many projects, for example, a project aimed to fix a sidewalk may fall under both state and city level laws leaving a wide amount of discretion to individual agencies for project timeline implementation. Straightforward capital projects only involving one agency are typically able to get projects implemented in one year versus capital projects involving multiple agencies that may take years to implement. As the policy director for one of the Council members implementing PBNYC noted, “If Capital Funds had to be used within a year, there would be no projects.”

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<sup>105</sup> Democratic county organization of Manhattan, with the exception of a reform period, that dominated City politics until the mid sixties.

The Speaker of the Majority Party, who is always a Democrat, has sole discretion over the amount of discretionary funding a Council member receives. There has been widespread criticism about the lack of transparency and corruption of the process.<sup>106</sup> To address this criticism the Speaker enacted a series of reforms starting in 2006 aimed to render the process more transparent and credible.<sup>107</sup> In 2006, the City Council put the list of all programs or organizations receiving funding, also known as “Schedule C” online for expense funding, but not capital. In 2007, the Council began using “transparency resolutions,” public documents available on the Council’s website to outline changes to discretionary funds outside of the traditional budget process.<sup>108</sup> However, these reforms did not go far enough—in 2008, a citywide scandal erupted that showed City Councilors had used fictional names of organizations to serve as erroneous placeholders for \$17.4 million of taxpayer dollars since 2001.<sup>109</sup> The result was a series of reforms aimed to increase transparency and accountability including pre-clearance requirements for organizations, creating an online database of discretionary funds, limiting City Council

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<sup>106</sup> “Creating a More Equitable and Objective Discretionary Funding Process in New York City,” *Citizens Union of the City of New York*, May 2012, Available at: [http://www.citizensunion.org/www/cu/site/hosting/Reports/CU\\_Report\\_NYC\\_Discretionary\\_FundingFY2009-2012\\_May2012.pdf](http://www.citizensunion.org/www/cu/site/hosting/Reports/CU_Report_NYC_Discretionary_FundingFY2009-2012_May2012.pdf).

<sup>107</sup> Mark Berkey- Gerard, “Reforming - and Not Reforming - the Budget Process,” July 10, 2006, *Gotham Gazette*, Available at: <http://www.gothamgazette.com/article/iotw/20060710/200/1904>.

<sup>108</sup> “Creating a More Equitable and Objective Discretionary Funding Process in New York City,” *Citizens Union of the City of New York*, May 2012, Available at: [http://www.citizensunion.org/www/cu/site/hosting/Reports/CU\\_Report\\_NYC\\_Discretionary\\_FundingFY2009-2012\\_May2012.pdf](http://www.citizensunion.org/www/cu/site/hosting/Reports/CU_Report_NYC_Discretionary_FundingFY2009-2012_May2012.pdf).

<sup>109</sup> Sara Kugler, “NYC Pol Caught in Slush Fund Probe,” *Associated Press*, April 5, 2008, Available at: <http://www.foxnews.com/wires/2008Apr05/0,4670,CouncilSlushFunds,00.html>. City Council member Martinez Resigning in Deal with Feds.” *Manhattan Times*. July 13, 2009. Available at: [http://www.manhattantimesnews.com/index.php?option=com\\_myblog&show=City-Council-Member-Martinez-is-resigning-in-deal-with-feds.html&Itemid=57&lang=en](http://www.manhattantimesnews.com/index.php?option=com_myblog&show=City-Council-Member-Martinez-is-resigning-in-deal-with-feds.html&Itemid=57&lang=en).

“Speaker Quinn, Council Budget Team Present Best Practices for Budget Allocation Process,” Office of Communications, New York City Council, May 7, 2008, Available at: [http://council.nyc.gov/html/releases/039\\_050708\\_BudgetBestPractices.shtml](http://council.nyc.gov/html/releases/039_050708_BudgetBestPractices.shtml).

members' ability to sublet office space, and limiting outside consultants hired.<sup>110</sup>

However, a 2012 report by Citizens Union contends, "the current discretionary funding process, while improved from a decade ago, remains flawed and needs additional reform" (Citizens Union of the City of New York 2012; 4).

The Citizens Union report maintains that, first, the process of funding remains arbitrary, and secondly, information is still not easily accessible. The report suggests that if we could further empower the City Council, and take some control away from the mayor, perhaps the City Council would no longer need discretionary monies. Douglas Mae (1993) aptly notes the distinction between powers of government and powers of governance: only if city government is a strong power player do questions of who controls the policy decisions in government matter.

Currently there is no online database for City Capital funds, just unwieldy PDFs that prevent citizens from understanding and assessing Capital funds allocations. A 2012 report by Citizens Union outlined why recent reforms are a step in the right direction but have not done enough to make the system more transparent. There is wide variance in the amount of discretionary funds a Council member receives: the smallest amount of discretionary funds received by a City Council member was \$2,490,321 and the highest was \$14,532,564 for FY2012.<sup>111</sup> If funds were distributed equally, each Council member

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<sup>110</sup> City Council Fiscal Year 2010 Adopted Expense Budget: Adjustments Summary/Schedule C. Available at: [http://council.nyc.gov/downloads/pdf/fy\\_2010\\_sched\\_c\\_final.pdf](http://council.nyc.gov/downloads/pdf/fy_2010_sched_c_final.pdf).

*"Further Protecting The Integrity Of The Use Of Public Funds, Speaker Quinn Announces Budget Reforms," Office of Communications, New York City Council, April 30, 2010, Available at:* [http://council.nyc.gov/html/releases/discretionary\\_04\\_30\\_10.shtml](http://council.nyc.gov/html/releases/discretionary_04_30_10.shtml).

<sup>111</sup> *"Creating a More Equitable and Objective Discretionary Funding Process in New York City," Citizens Union of the City of New York, May 2012, Available at:* [http://www.citizensunion.org/www/cu/site/hosting/Reports/CU\\_Report\\_NYC\\_Discretionary\\_FundingFY2009-2012\\_May2012.pdf](http://www.citizensunion.org/www/cu/site/hosting/Reports/CU_Report_NYC_Discretionary_FundingFY2009-2012_May2012.pdf).



would receive \$8.3 million in FY2012.<sup>112</sup> While that would not be equitable, it would be equal, akin to the equality of fund allocation for Chicago's Aldermanic wards as outlined in Chapter 4.

The Citizen Union report charges that discretionary funds do not correlate with the needs of a neighborhood such as median household income, unemployment, needy populations (youth and elderly), recipients of food stamps, or persons under poverty, but rather the relationships between Council members and the Speaker, pointing to the fact that three of the ten districts with the highest median income received the most discretionary funds while two of the three districts with lowest median income received the least amount of discretionary funds. The report ends with a mandate for greater innovation in the budget process including "the use of pilot programs to improve the current system such as Participatory Budgeting project taking place in four council districts during the current FY 2012 budget cycle" (Citizens Union for New York City 2012, 10). The report adds the caveat that Citizens Union "withholds judgment on the expansion of this particular pilot program citywide until greater data is available regarding its effectiveness" (Citizens Union for New York City 2012, 10). The rest of this chapter presents the origins of PBNYC in order to begin an assessment of its effectiveness.

### **5.3 From Brazil to the Big Apple**

"Once you start PB there is no turning back" – Chief of Staff in a PBNYC implementing district.

Upon hearing the first Alderman to institute PB in Chicago speak at the Pratt Institute in Brooklyn, New York, Council member Albert became enthralled with PB. Albert has a history of community engagement, both as a teacher and practitioner. Elected to the city

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<sup>112</sup> Ibid.

Council in November 2009, Albert,<sup>113</sup> a Jew representing District A, became a PB enthusiast and held a briefing at the New York City council to inform his colleagues about PBNYC. According to other Council members, Albert had robust political ambitions since he was elected and upon election immediately tried to run for Speaker of the Majority Party, which alienated him from many of his colleagues.<sup>114</sup> Some in the City Council contend that Albert's actions, and behavior of academic superiority, have left him unpopular with the Speaker of the Majority party and resulted in District A receiving the low end of discretionary funds.

Fellow Council members, Beatrice,<sup>115</sup> representing district B, and Charlie,<sup>116</sup> representing district C, co-chair the Progressive Caucus and got excited about PB. Beatrice, prior to joining the City Council in 2006 as the first Latina and Puerto Rican Woman to represent District B, was a community organizer. Beatrice is allegedly close to the Speaker of the Majority Party and had, at one point, ambitions to run for Speaker of the Majority Party.<sup>117</sup> Some in the City Council contend that Beatrice's favorable relationship with the Speaker of the Majority Party is why District B has received the high end of discretionary funds.

Charlie, elected in November 2009 and the first generation of his West Indian family to be raised in New York City, was a community organizer and activist. During one of the

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<sup>113</sup> This Council member will be hereby called Albert and represent District A.

<sup>114</sup> It is concerned bad practice to become elected and then immediately run for Speak of the Majority Party. Council members typically wait years and build coalition support before running for this position. All information is through conversations with City Council members, staff, and those involved in New York City politics.

<sup>115</sup> This Council member will be hereby called Beatrice and represent District B.

<sup>116</sup> This Council member will be hereby called Charlie and represent District C.

<sup>117</sup> Some City Council members contend that the Speaker of the Majority Party has a "crush" on Beatrice. Freedlander, David *Uptown Smacktown: Inez Dickens and Melissa Mark-Viverito Vie to Become Next City Council Speaker*. *Politicker* January 03, 2012, Available at: <http://www.politicker.com/2012/01/uptown-smackdown-inez-dickens-and-melissa-mark-viverito-vie-to-become-next-city-council-speaker/>.

neighborhood assemblies in the fall of 2011, Charlie was at Occupy Wall Street protests in Zuccotti Park where he nearly got arrested. He missed the neighborhood assembly because he had to bail out a colleague and friend who was arrested. Charlie has a reputation with the City Council as a radical, though some have noted his record is socially conservative especially on the issues of abortion and gay marriage. Some in the City Council contend that Charlie's perception of radicalism may be the reason he does not have a close relationship with the Speaker of the Majority Party and receives the low end of discretionary funds.

These three Council members, all Democrats, signed up to lead PBNYC and then a fourth, more unlikely Council member, Republican Council member Devon of District D, signed up for PBNYC.<sup>118</sup> Albert, Beatrice, and Charlie all sit on the Progressive Caucus and brought their progressive vision of deepening citizen engagement within government as motivations for implementing PB. In contrast, Devon brought libertarian motivations to PB, believing that citizens, not government, ought to be in charge of money. While approaching PB from different angles, these two visions of the relationship between citizens and government were accommodated within the PB paradigm.

Devon, elected in a special election in February 2009, was the youngest member of the City Council in 2011 and had almost become a Catholic Priest prior to joining the City Council. Devon is slated to have electoral ambitions. He did not attend the final meeting to thank budget delegates and Steering Committee members after the PB process because he was too busy having declared his candidacy for State Senate in the spring of 2012. Some contend that Devon is a skilled politician who has risen in the ranks of the Council,

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<sup>118</sup> This Council member will be hereby called Devon and represent District C.

and receives the high end of discretionary funds, despite being in the Council's minority party, due to political savvy.

These four Council members disagree on issues of both substance and style. Albert and Beatrice have a more polished and professional approach to governance than Charlie, who comes across as the most earnest and genuine of the Council members. Devon produces the impression of a bright, and sometimes calculating, young man. Despite these differences, Participatory Budgeting allows them all to come into agreement at least on the modes of citizen involvement, if not ideal outcomes.

The four Council members decided that they would each put a portion of their discretionary funds, only capital funds, into the hands of the people to decide how to allocate them for FY 2012-2013. The Council members opted to each put at least \$1 million of their capital discretionary funds into the process, with the option to add additional monies to fund other projects. Each project could not exceed \$500,000. There were three main reasons Council members decided on capital funds: 1) there are stricter and clearer guidelines for capital funds 2) capital funds are less likely to be co-opted by special interests or lobbying and 3) capital funds pertain to local infrastructure projects that people can be experts about on the local level.

New York City has strict guidelines for who can receive capital funding. For example, for projects that are not on city-owned property, the recipients must be a legally recognized nonprofits and the project must directly benefit the city. In order to receive funding, the nonprofit must enter into a "City Purpose Contract," which is a legal agreement stating that the capital funds will only be used in a way that enhances the city. Furthermore, the nonprofit must have a separate pre-existing contract with the city for

expense (operating) funds. Some institutions, such as private schools, are excluded from receiving capital funding.<sup>119</sup>

Given the strict and somewhat onerous requirements for capital funds, there is a perception that the process is more about actual needs and less easily co-opted by individual groups lobbying. Related to this is the scale and scope of capital projects, since they involve physical infrastructure (i.e. things citizens can see versus the programs of expense funding that are less physical, citizens by design are more readily equipped to access needs). Residents already possess the knowledge to decide which parks in their neighborhood need repair. In contrast, it is more difficult for residents to visibly ascertain information about specific programs as they relate to expense funds.

Once the decision was made about which funds, and how much, to put forth to the process, the Council members worked in conjunction with the Steering Committee on a host of other issues surrounding the basic structure of the nine month process.

Throughout the process, Albert was leading the team in conjunction with the Participatory Budgeting Project (PBP) and Community Voices Heard (CVH), outlining how PB works and also offering his office as support for the process. Already gearing up for the process, Albert had hired a full time staff member who would be doing PB in his office. Albert was realistic about the time commitment PB required and noted at an early meeting to the four Council members and their staffs: “PB requires either a nearly full time person or a few staff members each willing to devote a portion of their time to PB and my office is here to help and be a resource.” All of these discussions and meetings took place in early 2011, well before the fall of 2011 when the PB process would begin.

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<sup>119</sup> See the FY 2011 “Capital Funding Guidelines issued by the City Council.” URL: [http://council.nyc.gov/html/budget/PDFs/fy11\\_guidelines.pdf](http://council.nyc.gov/html/budget/PDFs/fy11_guidelines.pdf).

However, for other Council members, PB was still a nascent idea and they were not able to plan staff for the process in the prior fiscal year. Thus, as the three others, Beatrice, Charlie, and Devon joined Albert, they were scrambling to find ways to integrate PB into their already overworked schedules.

#### **5.4 The Steering Committee**

Albert, Beatrice, Charlie, and Devon, in conjunction with Community Voices Heard (CVH), located in District B, and the Participatory Budget Project (PBP) formed the executive members of the Steering Committee (SC) for PBNYC. The SC was officially co-chaired by CVH, PBP, and the Chief of Staff of D-A. CVH had first heard about PB in same way the Alderman from Chicago had: at the World Social Forum. CVH, as an organization involved with organizing low income minorities, especially women, around housing issues, viewed PB as a way to work toward more participatory mechanism in housing. CVH served as the community lead and PBP as the technical lead. PBP specifically works to implement PB around the United States and was an integral part of the process formation in Chicago. PBP took the experience of Chicago to directly inform the structure of the process in New York City. In addition to CVH and PBP, there were roughly forty CSO organizations participating on the Steering Committee.

The majority of the Steering Committee was comprised of civic organizations in New York that work to locally empower citizens and build coalitions. Seven community boards were on the Steering Committee in the overlapping portions of districts A, B, C, and D, as Community Board districts and City Councils districts differ.<sup>120</sup> There were

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<sup>120</sup> Some Community Board leaders were hostile to PBNYC believing the process was thwarting their own power and “adding just another layer to the already dysfunctional budgeting system without changing the systematic nature of the process” as one Community Board manager noted. Community Board critics are further explored in Chapter 6.

also local academic institutions such as City University of New York (CUNY), Pratt Institute, and Marymount Manhattan College that served on the Steering Committee. The Urban Justice Coalition (UJC) led the research and evaluation of the process and worked to organize graduate students, professors, and practitioners in the field of Participatory Budgeting to draft surveys to be administered at different phases of the process: neighborhood assemblies, budget delegate committees, and the vote. The Center for Urban Pedagogy (CUP) received a small grant for the design of the logo, pamphlets, interactive maps, and ballots for the process. The Project for Public Spaces (PPS) created the online interface for project submission and wanted more online submission and involvement. The Steering Committee vetoed online voting for the pilot year of the project.<sup>121</sup>

While there were originally approximately forty organizations that signed up to be on the Steering Committee,<sup>122</sup> it is hard to accurately determine how many organizations stayed involved and to what extent. Organizations given specific tasks, such as CUP, made more obvious contributions to the process than some other organizations. There were Steering Committee meetings roughly every other month throughout the process, typically held at the New York Immigration Coalition or at the City Council. Present at these meetings were usually 15-20 recurring individuals. Some members of the process became active and stayed involved while other organizations simply stopped their involvement early on in the process. At these Steering Committee meetings at least one representative from each district attended (typically a staff person, the Chief of Staff, and/or active members

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<sup>121</sup> The Steering Committee agreed upon three basic principles to guide the project: 1) Transparency 2) Equality and 3) Inclusion. Citizenly politics accounts for these principles but also extends behind them to first principles of civic engagement.

<sup>122</sup> PBNYC. About New York City Process. URL: <http://pbnyc.org/content/about-new-york-city-process#partners>. Accessed last May 7, 2012.

from the District level steering committees). Each district had District Committees (DC) of active citizens and CSOs that were invited to serve by the Council members. Citizens were not part of the theoretical structure of the Steering Committee but some active District Committee members, particularly from D-C, ended up at Steering Committee meeting as Chapter 6 further explores.

Each district office pledged expense funds towards the PBNYC process granted to CVH, as PBP is not a New York-based organization and therefore cannot accept New York City expense funding.<sup>123</sup> Charlie's district pledged less in expense funds with the idea that it would hire a local community based organization for outreach and mobilization; however, this never happened. CVH and PBP applied for external grants from foundations to receive addition support. The budget for FY July 2011-June 2012 shows a large gap between the expected costs of \$392,792 for the process and the actual received monies, which while hard to determine, fell under \$100,000. The result was that the majority of people leading this process, especially those from CVH, PBP, and UJC were volunteering their time to run the Steering Committee. For example, UJC did not receive any funding to conduct research.

The process of these four Council members coming together to deliberate and decide upon the rules to govern the PBNYC process goes against precedent, given the history of the City Council where members are striving for individual power and trying to maintain a strong relationship with the Speaker of the majority party. The Council members agreed upon rules to govern the process and formed guidelines to uphold for the pilot year with

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<sup>123</sup> The exact amount of money pledged is difficult to ascertain; the original PBNYC FY July2011-June 2012 has each district giving \$15,000 with District D giving \$2,500. In reality, each district seems to have given \$5,000 for the process with District C giving \$7,500. However, each district contributed a large and unquantifiable amount in in kind donations such as printing flyers, pamphlets, organizing food donations etc. Additionally, CVH receives its own expense funds through District B where it is located there.



the option to revisit the process in year two. For the pilot year of the project, each Council member agreed to put forth at least one million dollars with the option to add more money to fund specific projects.

The most pertinent debates and guidelines centered on participation eligibility requirements. Albert, Beatrice, and Charlie all wanted the voting age to be 16, in contrast to Devon who wanted the voting age to be 18. Likewise, Beatrice and Charlie pushed for non-citizens to be able to vote as their districts had large populations of immigrants, many of who were potentially un-documented residents. The resultant compromise was made that you had to be a stakeholder in the community, e.g. work or live in the community, but did not necessarily have to hold residency or be 18 to be a budget delegate. In order to vote you had to be a resident and be at least 18 years of age. Beatrice and Charlie both had separate “youth committees” where youth expressed their preferences and concerns.

The Steering Committee decided upon the structure of the process. The Steering Committee was able to determine some basic principles such as equality, transparency, and inclusiveness to guide the process. Heavily guided by PBP, the structure is widely adapted from the process in Chicago and adopting lessons from changes made in the Chicago process. As discussed in the previous Chapter, Chicago originally outlined for community representatives to be voted upon and planned on having one round of neighborhood assemblies. However, in reality, community representatives, or the PBNYC equivalent of budget delegates, were not voted upon and there was a second round of neighborhood assemblies. Thus, in the original tenets of the PBNYC Steering Committee, budget delegates were not selected through a vote and second rounds of

neighborhood assemblies were planned.<sup>124</sup> In Chicago, you have to be a resident to participate as a community representative, whereas in NYC you need only be a “stakeholder” in the community to be a budget delegate and a resident to vote.<sup>125</sup>

### **Planning (May-September 2011)**

A City-Wide Steering Committee designs the PB process. Project leads develop materials, raise support funding, and build relationships with local partners.

### **Information Sessions (August-September 2011)**

Stakeholders in each district learn about the process of Participatory Budgeting, what it is, and how they can get involved.

### **Neighborhood Assemblies (October-November 2011)**

Stakeholders in each district learn about the available budget funds, brainstorm initial spending ideas, and select volunteer budget delegates.

### **Budget Delegate Meetings (November 2011 – March 2012)**

Delegates meet in issue committees to review project ideas, consult with technical experts, develop full project proposals, and prepare project posters and presentations.

### **Voting (March 2012)**

Residents vote for which projects to fund in their districts.

### **Evaluation, Implementation, and Monitoring (April 2012 on)**

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<sup>124</sup> The four Council members kept their word about maintaining conformity throughout much of the process with the exception of Albert’s district who at a few critical junctures opted to do their own format. For example, for the second round of neighborhood assemblies they did a “science fair Expo” instead.

<sup>125</sup> Never defined in the process. Could be someone whose child goes to school in the district or works in a given district.

The Council members work with the City to implement the projects that receive the most votes. Budget delegates, staff, and Steering Committee members evaluate the process and monitor the implementation of projects.




Figure 5.1: PBNYC process pilot year (FY) 2011-2012. Source: PBNYC.org

While determining the basic framework for the process, the actual implementation of various stages of the process varied dramatically in specific districts. The Steering Committee agreed upon the basic structure of the process whereby each district would have their own District Committee (DC) that would have ownership over the various stages of the process such as determining where to hold neighborhood assemblies, outreach, and mobilization. The relationship between the New York Steering Committee and the District Committee can be analogized by federalism. The New York Steering

Committee is the federal government broadly setting rules and mandates and the District Committees are state level governments that enact these rules on their own terms.

In Chicago, with only one ward participating in PB, the Steering Committee set broad guidelines, such as having members of the Steering Committee serve as “mentors” for thematic committee. In contrast, in New York City the Steering Committee did not set broad guidelines and instead devolved power to the local level District Committees.

## **5.6 PB Districts**

Districts in New York are densely populated with resultant diversity across populations. Districts in New York City are all roughly the same size with roughly 180,000 people in each district. In this section, I further outline some important characteristics of the four districts participating in PBNYC. I then compare demographics of these four areas to four matched paired districts that are *not* implementing PB.

The three salient characteristics of districts that impact PBNYC implementation are: 1) geography 2) social capital (Putnam 1993) and civil society capacity and 3) the political economy of the individual Council members.

Geography refers to how the district is laid out with specific population distributions throughout the district. Social capital (Putnam 1993) refers to ties between citizens in these communities as well as the existence of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and civil society networks in a given space. The political economy refers to the political relationships and capacity of the Council members.<sup>126</sup>

*District A (D-A):*

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<sup>126</sup> Population information per district was obtained from the 2010 Census. The other information was obtained through interviews with Council members, their staffs, as well as directly with CSOs and civil society networks and leaders in each district and throughout New York City.

“PB is part of deepening civic engagement and enhancing democracy in our community” – Council member Albert on why he supports PB.

District A is divided between three different areas. One area consists of middle to upper class, mainly white people of higher education. A second area consists of an insular area of Orthodox Jews, with varying levels of education and income. A third area consists of recent Bangladeshi immigrants and constitutes the portion of the district with the lowest income and education. Recent residents of the community have less strong social networks and ties.

Council member Albert has an academic background and this is reflected in his staff. The staff is comprised of Ivy League and other elite university graduates and has the largest number of interns from elite city high schools and universities of the four members. D-A is the only district participating in PBNYC with a full time staff member dedicated solely to PBNYC. District A exerted top down control over the process and deviated from the agreed upon guidelines of the SC. D-A was the only district to call the second round of neighborhood assemblies an “Expo,” with no opportunities to incorporate citizen feedback into the projects, and had their own ordering system for the vote.

Council member Albert receives the least amount of discretionary funds of the four districts implementing the treatment of PBNYC. He is alleged to have alienated members in the City Council.<sup>127</sup> Council member Albert received nearly \$2 million less in discretionary funds than Council member Devon, the only Republican implementing PBNYC. In FY2012, Council member Albert received \$3,195,00 in capital funds, ranking 43<sup>rd</sup> in the Council and \$460,464 for expense funds, ranking 40<sup>th</sup> in expense out

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<sup>127</sup> Information obtained through interviews with Council members.

of 51 members. This trend has continued since Council member Albert took office, as he continually has been in this ranking in the period from 2009-2012.<sup>128</sup> Of the four Council members participating, D-A has the highest median income \$57,914 with the lowest amount of unemployed, 4,958, yet the second highest number of people under the poverty level of 29,184 – second only to District B.

D-A, especially in its more affluent parts, has many educated, white activists. This part of the district consists of strong social ties with traditionally active citizens with high levels of social capital. The district committee consists of traditionally civic-minded residents citizens who are already highly engaged. The majority of the DC was comprised of individuals engaged in civic life, such as school boards or park associations, as opposed to representatives from well-established community-based organizations.

*District B (D-B):*

“Our diverse district needs resources, especially in the low income portion. PB is a step toward a more equitable distribution of city funds” – Council member Beatrice on why she supports PB. District B is one of New York City’s most diverse and seemingly arbitrarily cut districts.<sup>129</sup> D-B is the only district out of the four that spans two different boroughs of New York City and houses the most extreme disparity between affluence and poverty. The majority of the district is low income, African-American and Hispanic populations with low education levels. There is a large pocket of the district with some of the most affluent homes in New York of primarily white and well-educated people. There is also a

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<sup>128</sup> For more information regarding data analysis see: “*Creating a More Equitable and Objective Discretionary Funding Process in New York City*,” *Citizens Union of the City of New York*, May 2012, Available at: [http://www.citizensunion.org/www/cu/site/hosting/Reports/CU\\_Report\\_NYC\\_Discretionary\\_FundingFY2009-2012\\_May2012.pdf](http://www.citizensunion.org/www/cu/site/hosting/Reports/CU_Report_NYC_Discretionary_FundingFY2009-2012_May2012.pdf)

<sup>129</sup> According to Beatrice herself and her staff. Borough divides make relative proportions for this district easier to obtain and more accurate than for the three other districts.

small pocket of the district that consists primarily of New York City public Housing Authority (NYCHA).

Council member Beatrice's district office is located in an area rife with nonprofit and community organizations – the heart of New York's philanthropic center as well as near major CUNY centers and the CVH headquarters. As a result, D-B has graduate level interns and staff that represent the diversity of the community. While D-B has an organized and capable staff, because of the strong force of CSOs in the community, including but not limited to CVH, the District aimed to not overly regiment or structure the process and instead tried to empower the DC.

Council member Beatrice receives the most amount of discretionary funding of any the four Council members involved in PBNYC. Council member Beatrice is a self-described progressive with an organizing background. She is known to be in favor with the Speaker and set to be running herself for Speaker. In FY 2012, Council member Beatrice received \$5,139,000 in capital funds ranking 17<sup>th</sup> and \$613,714 in expense funding, ranking 22<sup>nd</sup> in the Council. D-B has the lowest median income of four districts; \$33,794; with 8,236 people unemployed, 13,699 people receiving food stamps, and 50,975 people under the poverty level. District B has the greatest need of the four districts participating and also receives the most discretionary funds out of the four participating districts.

Of the four districts, D-B has the greatest disparity in demographics. There is a large presence of CSOs in the area creating a rich tapestry of civil society. However, social capital between individuals is less strong than the CSO presence. The DC reflected representatives from various sections of the district. The majority of members of the DC

were representatives from CSOs based within the district. There were a few members of the DC from the more affluent section of the district as well as individuals living in New York City housing authority projects (NYCHA). The result was a sometimes discordant DC with variation in skill set, background, and resources.

*District C (D-C):*

“I have worked as an organizer in the community, PB is a way to bring our community together” – Council member Charlie on why he supports PB. District C consists of a large area of Caribbean and Creole speaking immigrants with a small pocket of Orthodox Jews. The majority of the district is a Caribbean community focused around church networks where everyone seems to know one another. Council member Charlie is of Haitian background and knows most active members of the community by first name.

Council member Charlie’s staff reflects his personality and personal approach to governance. The D-C budget director is an old friend of Charlie’s with whom he used to run a Vegan restaurant. The DC is comprised of mainly Caribbean immigrants with a noticeable lack of representation from the Creole speaking and Orthodox Jewish community. The church networks create a robust system of social capital with a physical congregating space. The Chair of the DC is a well-known pastor in the community with strong ties and networks in the Caribbean community.

Council member Charlie co-chairs the Progressive Caucus with Council member Beatrice. In FY 2012, Council member Charlie received \$3,970,00 in capital funds ranking 32<sup>nd</sup> and \$471,464 in expense funding, ranking 38<sup>th</sup>. District C has a median household income of \$49,624, with 6,317 unemployed and 5,610 households receiving food stamps and 19,418 persons under the poverty level. Given the relative need, District C does not



receive proportionate discretionary funds. For example, District D has a median household income of \$56,289 in contrast to District's C's \$49,624 yet in FY2012 District D received \$4,305,00 in capital funds, ranking 27<sup>th</sup>, and \$603,321 in expense funding, ranking 23<sup>rd</sup>. This trend is evidenced throughout FY2009-FY2012.

The community outreach staffer assigned to PBNYC quit during the early fall of 2011. As a result, staff members each tried to commit time to PBNYC with the assistance of two interns on a fellowship from England. The overburdened staff was ill-equipped to face the time demands of PBNYC and put a lot of responsibilities' into the hands of the DC. The DC viewed the interns as illegitimate and quickly became frustrated with the lack of support from the Council member's office. Charlie tried to mitigate these tensions through meetings with the DC and by working to hire a new community outreach staffer who was not hired until a few weeks before the end of PBNYC. Due to the lack of staffing in the CM, the DC had to exert a strong role in shaping and running the PB process.

*District D (D-D):*

“Citizens should be in charge of their money: not big government” - Council member Devon on why he supports PB.  
District D only involved one portion of the district in PBNYC, a portion that has a natural separation by a toll bridge and body of water. This segment of the district involved in PBNYC, hereby D-D, comprises a large white-middle class Irish Catholic community, a group of “Snow Birds,” who live in a vacation complex half the year when they are not living somewhere warmer,<sup>130</sup> and a section of more minority populations in public housing (NYCHA).

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<sup>130</sup> This section of the district has a complex that has the highest consumptions of beer per capita in the US as well as the most densely populated area of public housing (NYCHA) in New York City.

Council member Devon's office reflects the tenor of Constituents – Council member Devon almost became a Catholic Priest before running for office and before the end of PBNYC announced his run for State Senate. The office has a charismatic and well-seasoned NYC political veteran for Chief of Staff. While the budget staff member was originally hired for the process his “personality did not lend him to the PBNYC process,” noted the Chief of Staff who is extroverted and personable. As a result, the Chief of Staff headed the process and often sat in as Council member Devon in meetings. He ran the process, attended nearly every meeting, and acted like the executive of the process. Perhaps due to the political skill and expertise of the Chief of Staff, despite being a Republican in a Democratic controlled Council, Devon continues to rank high on discretionary funds recipients. In FY2012 Council member Devon received \$4,305,000 in capital funds ranking 27<sup>th</sup> and \$603,321 in expense funds ranking 23<sup>rd</sup>. District D has a median income of \$56,289; 5,741 unemployed. 4,144 people receive food stamps with 19,418 people under the poverty level. In FY2012, District D was just behind District B in terms of expense allocations even though the median income in District B was \$33,794 in comparison to \$56,289 in District D.

The DC was primarily white and notably lacked representation from the more racially diverse portion of the district living in public housing (NYCHA). D-D contained high levels of social capital where most of the heterogeneous population had known one another for generations.

### **5.7 Non-PB Districts**

In this section four districts not implementing the treatment of PB, comparable in demographics, are compared to four districts that are implementing PB. Comparing

demographic, need, and relative discretionary funding for the four districts implementing the treatment of PBNYC to the four not implementing PBNYC shows: 1) implementing districts are comparable to non-implementing districts along demographics and 2) non implementing matched districts all receive more discretionary funds than the implementing districts. Need is defined by 1) median household income 2) unemployed 3) food stamp recipients and 4) income under poverty level.

*District W:*

Council member Wasa represents a district similar to District A in terms of demographic composition. Council member Wasa is a Latina woman, whereas Council member Albert is a Jewish man, and she has a less academic background with experience in grassroots engagement. As is the case with Council member Albert, Council member Wasa identifies as progressive.

*District X:*

Council member Xaviera represents a district similar to District B in terms of demographic composition. Council member Xaviera is a prominent female African-American who, like Council member Beatrice, has risen in the ranks to be known as a leader in the activist community. However, Council member Xavier has more experience, being older, and comes from a well established political family in contrast to Council member Beatrice.

*District Y:*

Council member Yash represents a district similar to District C in terms of demographic composition. Council member Yash has a more traditional background within the established Democratic Party in contrast to the perception of Council member Charlie's

more radical organizer background and progressive agenda. Both Council members are relatively young; Council member Yash is a Jewish male with a family where as Council member Dave is a single African-American.

*District Z:*

Council member Zeus represents a district that is similar to District D in terms of demographic composition. Council member Zeus, an African-American male Democrat, has been in the City Council for so long he is being termed out, whereas Council member Devon, a Catholic male Republican, is the youngest member of the City Council. While Council member Devon is concerned about a quality of life agenda, Council member Zeus has a strong progressive agenda including being a long-term advocate for public initiatives.

## **5.9 Discretionary Funding Comparison**

The differences between districts and individual Council members implementing PB and non-PB matched districts are informative. Demographic data of the four non-PB matched districts in comparison to the four districts implementing PB illustrates the lack of correlation between discretionary funds allocations and relative district need.

I have chosen to highlight specific demographic data in assessing need. In Belo Horizonte, Brazil, resources to be allocated through PB for each specific district are determined through a formula of resources in direct proportion to population and inverse proportion to average income:  $PVR = \text{popR}/[e (1/y)]^{131}$  (Avritzer 2005, 390). Therefore median income is one way to assess needs in a given district. Chapter 8 further examines

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<sup>131</sup> PVR being the virtual population, popR as the regional population, Y regional average revenue, and e is a constant of 2,7182818.

the relationship between population and participation in specific PB implementing districts.

FY 2012 Funding and need for four districts implementing PB and four matched paired districts. Each PB implementing district (gray) is followed by its corresponding (neutral) matched pair district not implementing PB.

District	Capital	Rank	Expense	Rank	Median Household Income	Unemployed	Food Stamps	Income under poverty level
A	\$3,195,000	43	\$460,464	40	\$57,914	4,958	6,317	29,184
W	\$4,900,000	20	\$628,464	31	\$38,117	6,047	9,392	40,813
B	\$5,139,000	17	\$613,714	22	\$33,794	8,326	13,699	50,975
X	\$9,365,000	4	\$942,114	6	\$38,031	8,206	10,800	39,345
C	\$3,970,000	32	\$471,464	38	\$49,624	6,317	5,610	19,418
Y	\$5,956,000	14	\$555,464	31	\$38,234	4,394	9,959	37,868
D	\$4,305,000	27	\$603,321	23	\$56,289	5,741	4,144	16,398
Z	\$4,555,000	25	\$588,321	24	\$54,012	6,411	8,153	23,657

Figure 5.2: FY2012 PBNYC and Matched Pair Districts (*Data Source: Citizens Union 2012 Report*)

Key: Unemployed refers to those between 18-64 years old. Household receiving food stamps. Households with Income Below the Poverty Level. Non-PB implementing matched pair districts are highlighted.

Every matched pair district receives more discretionary funds than its corresponding PB district. The matched District W has greater need than District A with a lower median income, and more unemployed persons receiving food stamps and with income under the poverty level.

Matched District Y has 4,349 more residents receiving food stamps and 27,899 more households under the poverty line than District C. Yet, District Y does not receive proportionally more - \$198,600 more in capital and \$84,000 in expense funds.

Matched District X has less need than District B with a higher median income of \$4,237; 2,899 fewer recipients of food stamps, and 11,030 fewer residents with income under the poverty level. In contrast, District X receives \$422,600 more in capital and \$329,013 in expense funds.

Matched District Z has nearly double the food stamp recipients of District D: 4,009 more, with 7,259 more residents living under the poverty line and a median income of 2,271.

District D, however, receives \$15,000 in discretionary funds.

Can we extrapolate from the fact that all the matched non-PB districts receive more funding than PB districts that the reason that districts implement PB is that they are already receiving less discretionary funds? There exist too many confounding variables to make verifiable statements regarding the relationship between initial fund allocation and PB implementation. The data suggest that correlation between district need and discretionary funds allocation is not linear. We can accurately say that there is no formulaic model of relative need and discretionary allocation.

Given the lack of formula for determining discretionary funds, political calculations may have been the determinant variable for whether or not a district adopts PB. The data shows that non-PB implementing matched districts all receive more discretionary funds than the implementing districts. Were Council members dissuaded to implement PB because they feared jeopardizing their relatively high levels of discretionary funding? Lawrence Lessig (2012) outlines the insidious influence of money in politics: direct causality is difficult to prove but the very existence of these networks undermines trust and legitimacy. Without a more transparent funding model based more closely to need, Council members individual motivations for not choosing PB are obscured. Council

members may not have been concerned about their political capital when choosing to not implement PB. However, the non-needs based discretionary funding structure implicates political motivations perhaps unfairly. Even if Council members had idiosyncratic, non-systemized, motivations for choosing to not implement PB, structural, institutional, and political motivations will remain suspect.

## **5.9 Conclusion**

This chapter presents the *status quo* budget process in New York City and the introduction of the treatment of PB as a departure from the traditional budget process. By comparing district discretionary funding and need allocation, this chapter buttresses recent scholarship (Citizens Union 2012) describing the current City Council allocation process as not tied to need. Given the lack of need based discretionary funding, political calculation relating to relationships with the Speaker and economies of power may have been determinant variables for a Councilor choosing whether or not to implement the treatment of PB.<sup>132</sup>

The characteristics of each of the districts implementing PB when compared to matched pair districts now implementing PB show that 1) the PB districts are similar in demographics and 2) non-PB districts receive more discretionary funds. The relatively high funds allotment in the non-PB matched pair districts may have impacted these Councilors decisions to not implement PB.

Motivations for Councilors who did and did not implement PB are imprecise. The motivations of the four Councilors who implemented PB are idiosyncratic and not easily theorized. Given the Speaker's unchecked power to determine discretionary funding, implementing PBNYC was a political risk for the Councilors involved. The non-needs

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<sup>132</sup> As Section 5.7 outlines, this data is non-casual.

based system of discretionary funding lends itself to partisan loyalties and power wielding. Nonetheless, the four Council members instituting PB choose to devolve some of their elected power back to their constituents. The Speaker does not support PB.<sup>133</sup> It appears that the four Council members' decision to impose the treatment of PB in their given districts was based on immaterial, or existential reasons such as values and ideology. For Albert, Beatrice, and Charlie these values were progressive, and based on norms of community engagement. Devon brought a libertarian stance that citizens, not big government, should be in charge of their money.

Instituting a pilot project into the New York City council, especially given the non-transparent nature of discretionary funding allocations is a risk. The Council members were relinquishing some of their control over the funding process over to community stakeholders. Yet the very conditions of non-transparency, history of Democratic Party patronage, and power wielding contributed to inspiring the four Council members to implement PB.

Unique district conditions may have also contributed to PB adoption. The conditions of the four districts implementing PB— again, 1) demographics 2) social capital and CSO capacity and 3) political economy in the four PBNYC participating districts— impacts the criteria of citizenly politics.<sup>134</sup>

The following four chapters use the criteria of citizenly politics to assess whether or not PB implementing district have better process and outcomes over the *status quo*.<sup>135</sup>

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<sup>133</sup> The speaker did not support PB and left threatening messages for Council member Devon to stop publicizing, see Section 8.3 for more information.

<sup>134</sup> 1) Citizens design their own participation 2) deliberative discourse takes place 3) participation is substantive and 4) ability to be institutionalized to scale.

<sup>135</sup> *Status quo* process and outputs within New York City Council capital fund allocations.



Chapter 9 directly compares capital projects in PB implementing districts contrasted with those in non-PB implementing districts.

## Chapter 6: Deliberations and Decision Making

“My least favorite part about PB was disagreeing with my neighbors. The conversations would easily turn ugly and unproductive because people were so busy disagreeing with one another.”

- Budget Delegate from the Parks and Recreation Subcommittee

This chapter develops two conceptual models, based on empirical data, for assessing deliberation and decision making within PBNYC to assess how successfully deliberative norms were implemented to fulfill the second tenet of citizenly politics. The first model is results oriented whereas the second model is process oriented. The two models evince the tension between inclusiveness and efficiency that emerge as U.S. PB tries accommodating the dual goals of improved short-term service delivery and democratic deepening. Results driven PB is aimed at improving the short-term delivery of government services, while process driven PB targets greater long-term civic engagement and a strengthening of democratic norms. Improvement of service delivery requires concrete, practical proposals; the strengthening of democratic norms requires robust participation by a wide and diverse range of ordinary citizens. It is not hard to see why these goals sometimes come into conflict.

Variation suggests that decision-making in PBNYC exceeds citizens' ability to make collective decisions with rational discourse. Rather, the structural conditions of district constitution, bureaucratic constraints, and facilitator skill impacted decision-making. These conditions impacted the degree to which a specific committee had more results or process oriented deliberation.

In order to assess these conditions I traced the budget delegate process of the Parks and Recreation Committee (PRC) within each of the four districts. I choose PRC because it allows for natural variation and is uniquely suited to the small capital projects that

PBNYC seeks to create. I immersed myself in four different committees, attending every meeting of these groups, observing site visits, and reading each group's email discussions. In addition, I conducted separate interviews with delegates in both the PRC and other thematic committees before, during, and after serving as budget delegates.<sup>136</sup> Unlike accounts of deliberation that are either empirical or normative, I offer empirical evidence to inform normative claims.

## 6.1 Norms of Deliberation

“When properly conducted, then, democratic politics involves *public deliberation focused on the common good*, requires some form of *manifest equality* among citizens, and *shapes the identity and interests* of citizens in ways that contribute to the formation of the public conception of the common good” (Cohen 1989, 19). These principles, outlined by Joshua Cohen, underpin a modern conception of deliberative democracy. As outlined in Chapter 2, deliberative democracy is one modern implementation of the Aristotelian human capacity for *logos* or speech. Assessing the nuances of deliberation and decision-making requires a normative understanding of current deliberative democracy literature, which fulfills the second tenet of citizenly politics. I contribute to deliberative democracy literature with empirical data illustrating that two norms of deliberation, efficiency and inclusiveness, produce dual models of process and results oriented deliberation.

Deliberative democracy begins with political assumptions that we live in pluralist democratic societies (Gutmann and Thompson 2004; Weinstock and Kahane 2010). Such societies are characterized by conflicts of interests, driven by their politics and their morals; deliberative democracy aims to find new ways to understand and address such conflicts without sacrificing pluralism. Theoretically, deliberation rests on the possibility that rational discussion and exchange of ideas enables a wider array of considerations to

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<sup>136</sup> For more information about methodology see Appendix 1.1.

be taken into account, resulting in the ascendancy of the better argument (Gutmann and Thompson 2004, Cohen 1989). In the process of deliberation citizens must be civic-minded, which allows for the potential to be swayed, and evince reciprocity in their conversations (Gutmann and Thompson 1996; Weinstock and Kahane 2010).

Critics contend that if citizens are not empowered to make such decisions, deliberation might amount to little more than uninformed chatter (Richardson 2010). Within this line of critique it follows that most citizens, unlike informed jurors on a jury or members of a selection committee, lack the knowledge or understanding to make binding and authoritative decisions (Waltzer 1999). Some go as far to suggest that deliberate democrats actually do not believe that mass citizens should be empowered, but rather use deliberative democracy to consolidate forms of elite control (Posner 2003). Modeling democracy on a “faculty workshop” stifles the range of available options and implies that political influence will go to the most learned and skilled rhetoricians (Sanders 1997). Some critics fear that the process of deliberation leads to problematic outcomes. Some posit that within deliberation itself, the reification of hegemonic norms such as white male patriarchy is magnified through the deliberative process (Young 1999; Mouffe 1999). Beliefs can be manipulated and induced through the process of deliberation, rendering the project utterly undemocratic (Stokes 1998). In the end, citizens are further balkanized and alienated from one another, as participants become more entrenched to their viewpoints and divisions widen (Sunstein 2007).

Within the tenets of PBNYC I focus on two norms of deliberation in tension with one another: inclusiveness and efficiency. This definition takes into consideration concepts of dynamic and iterative process (Gutmann and Thompson 2004), rational discourse

(Habermas 1996), and emphasis on the publicity of discourse to promote public spirit (Chambers 2005).

## **6.2 Facilitation and Legitimacy**

According to Thompson, “legitimacy prescribes the process by which, under these circumstances, collective decisions can be morally justified to those who are bound by them” (Thompson 2008, p502). Many deliberative democracy theorists posit that a decision is legitimate if it responds to reasons identified to justify a decision (Cohen 1989, 2007; Guttman and Thompson 2004; Mendelberg 2002). In contrast, PBNYC mandates that deliberations result in viable project proposals.

While it was pre-determined that viable projects were the desired end of deliberations, there was wide variance about *how* to decide upon projects. Were the goals of deliberations to craft the most innovative proposals or those that accurately assess tactical district needs? How should district needs be adequately determined? Should committees put forward the proposals that are most likely to be voted upon? These are some of the many questions that emerged in the course of deliberations.

The structure of PB devolved power down to individual budget committees to come up with their own answers. Some micro-level facilitators and deliberators privileged putting forth “winning” projects that they thought were likely to be selected by residents at the final vote. Some other groups were less concerned about putting forth projects likely to win. The result was that for some groups process trumped results and vice versa. Having the pre-determined end of coming up with viable projects, while leaving the

means open, resulted in variance across deliberative approaches throughout subcommittees.<sup>137</sup>

While deliberations were intended to forge budget proposals, the very reason citizens (as opposed to traditional elites) drove the process marks a sharp departure from traditional budgeting. Citizens participated not only to forge proposals in their area but also to engage in the basic activity of politics. Ergo, individual facilitators and in-group deliberation dynamics influenced the realization of these competing norms.

The behavior of facilitators in PBNYC suggests that facilitator impacts are subtler than some literature would suggest and that there are tradeoffs between efficiency and enabling all voices to be heard. Moreover, the lack of quality control across facilitation methods raises question about the balance between allowing autonomy in individual committees and the need for greater process quality control.

### **6.3 The Nature of Deliberation**

Chapter 8 outlines deliberations and decision-making amongst Council Members (CM) and other members of the Steering Committee (SC) at the governance level of PBNYC. While there were district residents from District Committees (DC) that participated in these decisions, the majority of governance decisions within PBNYC took place between CM, their staffs, and other members of the SC. In contrast, the majority of deliberations for ordinary residents occurred when people signed up to be budget delegates. Within these delegate meetings small group deliberation took place with a facilitator appointed

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<sup>137</sup> Should more attention be paid to the specific implementation of these ends? For instance, should there have been more top down imposed uniformity on deliberations? PBNYC resulted in wide variance of implementations of deliberative norms. Yet, the converse would have been non-deliberate imposition of values.

by the DC. For some districts where there was a shortage of participants, such as in District C (D-C), facilitators for thematic budget delegate groups were from the DC. Residents who signed up to be budget delegates at the first round of neighborhood assemblies (NA) broke up into various thematic groups based around topics discussed at the assemblies. Examples of thematic groups included transportation, education, and arts. District B (D-B) had a youth and senior committee focused specifically on these issues comprised of people from these respective demographics. D-C had a youth committee, which faced a challenge: the rules limited participation to those 16 years or older and voting to those 18 or older.<sup>138</sup> This resulted in youth spending months participating as budget delegates, but not being allowed to vote for projects they had worked on. As analyzed in the previous chapter, level of control by the CM differed across budget delegate committees. In all districts except District A (D-A), the CM office set specific dates and a centralized location for budget delegate meetings. D-A had 100 budget delegates sign up, whereas every other district had roughly 50 budget delegates, and each thematic group determined their own meeting times and locations. With so many budget delegates D-A subdivided thematic groups. For example, a committee titled Streets and Transportation had dedicated sub-committees focusing on sidewalks, subways, buses, etc. There was significant reduction of budget delegate participation across the district from those who initially signed up. In D-C, partially due to lack of the coordination from the CM and a DC unequipped to handle the burden of planning and running these events, much of the information pertaining to who signed up to be budget delegates was lost. Without this level of organization it was difficult to properly coordinate and maintain the

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<sup>138</sup> The age requirements to be a budget delegate were not enforced while the age requirement was enforced for voting.

interest of those who initially signed up to be budget delegates. D-C thus saw the biggest reduction in budget delegates from those who initially signed up to participate.

The goals of the committees were to 1) sift through the ideas presented at the neighborhood assemblies 2) assess needs in the district through site visits 3) deliberate on new projects 4) work directly with agencies and 5) create new projects for the vote on March 26<sup>th</sup> 2012. The district composition, bureaucratic actors, and facilitator leadership and organization of each committee influenced the degree to which site visits were conducted and the way in which community needs were assessed. Council district offices compiled the ideas generated at the neighborhood assemblies to determine necessary budget committee themes based around topics raised at the assemblies. The compiled ideas were examined for feasibility at the initial meeting of budget delegates.

#### **6.4 District Composition and Deliberation Typology**

Facilitation resulted in two models of deliberation: result oriented and process oriented. The result oriented model emphasized efficiency whereas process orientation prized free and inclusive discussion. The following examples model implementation of these two facilitation methods through the process of project deliberation, decision-making, and forming projects for the ballot. Similar projects within two different deliberation paradigms were treated very differently. D-A cut from the ballot a similar project that D-C included on the ballot. The role of the facilitator emerges as a critical difference in these two districts.

The structure and organization of individual Council Members (CM) and District Committees (DC) influenced facilitator training, organization, and resources. CM and DC determined the level of training the facilitators received. In D-C many facilitators



dropped out of the process and were replaced by members of the DC itself and received no training. Facilitation training in D-B and D-D was less robust than D-A and more robust than D-C.

Bureaucratic constraints impacted needs assessment and fulfillment of deliberative norms within all four Parks and Recreation Committees. Individual bureaucrats working in respective city agencies were direct information sources for budget delegates. The differences amongst bureaucrats in the four districts impacted how respective subcommittees were able to acquire information to form projects. Additionally, homogeneous or heterogeneous district composition affected needs assessment and project formation within the subcommittees.<sup>139</sup> Participation of individual bureaucrats and district composition were non-controllable PBNYC variables:




Figure 6.1: District Composition

This chart illustrates the spectrum from most homogenous district (D-D) to the least (D-C).<sup>140</sup>

Levels of homogeneity and organization impacted how focused committees were on process versus result oriented deliberations. In homogeneous D-D, budget delegates

<sup>139</sup> In more homogenous districts, where people were more familiar with one another and area needs, deliberative discourse was more accommodating. In contrast, more heterogeneous districts residents were less familiar with one another and deliberation was sometimes contentious. The district composition impacted the nature of facilitation within deliberations. Both of these factors were unavoidable but could be ameliorated through skilled facilitation.

<sup>140</sup> Homogeneity is defined by the variance of district composition as well as who participated in the PRC.

confidently felt they knew district needs.<sup>141</sup> In more heterogeneous D-A and D-C, budget delegates wanted to get more accurate information about varied district needs throughout districts. D-A,<sup>142</sup> with an organized CM and DC, was able to arrange site visits to assess park needs. D-C, with a disorganized CM and overburdened DC, was not able to arrange site visits.

While D-A and D-C are both heterogeneous districts they differed in deliberative implementation. The focus on result oriented deliberation, imposed top down by Albert's office, enabled D-A to be more effective in needs assessment and project formation. The emphasis on result oriented deliberation in D-C, influenced by the lack of capacity in Charlie's office, led to hardly any needs assessment and few viable projects.

District factors such as composition and bureaucratic capacity relate to a facilitator's ability to influence decision-making. While influenced by these factors, individual facilitators still had agency in shaping the deliberation. Within this confluence of factors, two deliberate models emerged. On a scale ranging from 'all voices heard' (process oriented) on one end to 'efficiency' (result oriented) on the other, is a typology of the PRC across four districts implementing the PBNYC treatment:

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<sup>141</sup> PB was implemented in a small portion of the district. As one budget delegate recounted: "very good meeting, everyone was very very involved we had a lot of detail and a lot of feedback from everyone who did their research. We have a unique district with unique land needs." D-D residents took on responsibility for acquiring necessary information and contacting Parks and Recreation bureaucrats directly, resulting in an agency bureaucrat emailing CM Devon: "I do not have capacity to deal with every individual complaint, my office is overwhelmed by PB." The Chief of Staff for D-D replied, "you do not have to respond directly to every resident, fwd them to me and I will handle it."

<sup>142</sup> The Education Committee had representatives from Parent Teacher Associations (PTA) show up at one of the initial meetings and were concerned that they were receiving a biased sample of information – only affluent and well-resourced schools would know about the PB process and be able to send PTA representatives. As a result, the Education Committee decided to do their own independent needs assessment by going directly to different schools in order to determine where need was the greatest. Similarly, the Parks and Recreation in D-A conducted site visits; through deliberation during these on-the-ground visits, they built up their own criteria for parks, such as "round tables where people can congregate," "recycling and dog runs," and "recreational courts etc." Site visits enabled informed deliberation and greater understanding of needs beyond the knowledge people had first entered in with.

### Typology of deliberation<sup>143</sup>

*D-A*: Result oriented. Less about all voices being heard and more about effective projects.

*D-B*: Mix of results with deliberative process, more result oriented.

*D-C*: Process oriented, less focus on results, more on deliberative process and all voices heard.

*D-D*: Mix of results with process, more process oriented.




Figure 6.2: Typology of Deliberation

At initial PRC meetings, at either the first or second meeting of the group, delegates sifted through project proposals from the first round of neighborhood assemblies. An agency official from the Parks and Recreation department came to outline which existing projects were already in the pipeline. Different representatives met with the four districts, as each district lies in a different part of New York City. Some representatives were generous with their time, such as the Parks and Recreation representative who came out for a two-hour meeting in D-C. Others were only able to stay for a portion of

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<sup>143</sup> As witnessed through the Parks and Recreation Committee.

the meeting – only thirty minutes in D-B. In all cases, agency officials were volunteering their time with little to no prior information about PB. The agency representatives provided realistic policy details for delegates about bureaucratic constraints, feasibility, and costs of projects. One of the only uniform experiences throughout the four districts was delegate surprise at project costs coupled with frustration at how long projects take to be implemented.

In D-A, the DC and CM were focused on results, with the goal of forming the maximum number of viable projects. In D-B, self-interested CSOs threatened to co-opt the process that strong facilitation was able to mitigate. D-C, partially due to lack of CM organization, prized having all voices heard - not efficient project formation. In D-D, a strong Chief of Staff managed participants who assumed they knew best. Within each district, an ecosystem of bureaucracy and CM organization impacted facilitation skills. For example, the well-organized CM office in D-A more effectively trained facilitators than the disorganized CM office in D-C.<sup>144</sup>

D-A's combination of a highly controlling CM with highly empowered DC resulted in hosted weekly conference calls for facilitators. Conference calls outlined specific problems facilitators may face and problem solved for difficult deliberative situations. In these calls, information was conveyed top-down directly from CM staff so that every

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<sup>144</sup> Assessing deliberative ecosystems requires understanding the CM office's impact on district level deliberative norms. For example, D-D's Chief of Staff was a technocratic presence on deliberations, sitting in on all meetings. This is contrasted with D-B, where the CMs reserved a block of rooms for delegates, and where a staff member glanced at different deliberations but did not sit in on one specifically. In D-C, deliberations were influenced by lack of structure emanating from the CM office. The following examples illustrate how micro-level deliberation and decision-making resulted from process level decisions. Macro-level structural design, organization, and implementation of PB in the four districts had direct outcomes on micro-level deliberation and decision-making.

facilitator knew upcoming deadlines as well as important information regarding agency requirements or news pertaining to the PBNYC process.

In contrast was D-C, with a low staffed CM and overworked DC, where many initial facilitators dropped out during the process. As a result the frustrated and overcommitted DC, already heavily involved in the community and oftentimes unable to attend meetings they were set to facilitate, filled the vacancies. In the PRC for D-C, the facilitator missed as many meetings as she led due to health ailments or other commitments. Even occasional facilitator absences resulted in a lack of clear information conveyed to committee members along with a dearth of direction and leadership.<sup>145</sup> The PRC for D-C had few recurring members who would participate with a resultant lack of cohesion throughout the process. The few people who came regularly had to do the majority of the work.

## **6.5 Result Oriented Model of Facilitation**

### *District A (D-A):*

As outlined in the typology of deliberation, both D-A and D-B had more result oriented deliberations, with D-B having slightly more inclusive process than D-A.

D-A has a rich network of activism with high social capital and affluent, educated budget delegates. The facilitators faced a challenge of keeping budget delegates on task. In D-A the initial moderator of the PRC was given a more experienced co-chair who brought strong bureaucratic organization to the committee. He was a white, well-educated professional overseeing a primarily white, professional, well-educated committee with one Asian woman, one black woman, and one Orthodox Jewish male. He ensured that

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<sup>145</sup> The PRC in D-A and D-B had co-facilitators so that if one person missed a meeting there was still continuity and leadership.

projects were timely and done in a constructive and fair manner, and that people did not fall behind schedule. In one meeting before the Expo,<sup>146</sup> he had people email around their projects prior to the meeting. He came to the meeting with extensive notes that systemically covered each project. At this meeting, people were not given the option to deliberate or discuss their proposals as the Expo was scheduled for the week after. All the participants of this meeting were middle-aged or older, white, relatively affluent, educated residents. Rather than focused on deliberation, this meeting was highly efficient and people left with a concrete understanding of what they needed to get done.

There were some people who were disappointed, “I’ve been working on this project for the last five months and now it is dead,” noted one budget delegate. Yet the majority of people were glad the meeting was brief and efficient, “everyone came prepared, did their homework, and our facilitator made tough calls based on agencies rules – we have to do what we have to do.”

The facilitator was technocratic. While he was stern he did not put forth his own preferences but rather conveyed agency information and rules for projects per instructions from the D-A Council member office. The majority of budget delegates at this final meeting before the Expo responded favorably to the facilitator’s result oriented approach. Yet these were budget delegates who, for the most part, had projects that were already approved to go on the ballot. Absent from the meeting was a middle-aged, white, middle-class woman whose project had recently been disapproved by city agencies. She did not attend this final budget delegate meeting and had written an email to the committee prior to this meeting outlining her frustration at the process.

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<sup>146</sup> As previously mentioned, D-A was the only district to implement an Expo instead of a second round of neighborhood assemblies.

At the Expo<sup>147</sup> the following week, this same woman made her project and frustration known to all; “I’ve made a board of projects for next year I am hopeful that it will get chosen next year, I was sad it didn’t get chosen because I am skeptical of politicians in general – was this process really up to the people?” Next to her board of projects for the following year, she made a board for people to write criticisms and complaints of the process. These two boards were entirely filled by the end of the meeting.<sup>148</sup>

At the Expo, CM Albert thanked all the participants for their hard work: “it sounds cliché at this point but we really are reinvigorating our democracy to make decisions together about how to invest in the public realm how to make this a stronger better community both by bringing people together and making investments that will last in the years to come.” He also personally thanked the woman whose project had been rejected.

Her project’s inability to make the ballot highlights the challenges of the result oriented model for decision making. Her project was highly innovative and creative containing both artistic and cultural elements involving many different agencies. It therefore faced additional bureaucratic obstacles, with each overseeing agency having their own specific and often obtuse guidelines.

Yet, part of this woman’s frustration extended beyond the bureaucratic limitations of the government, and focused on facilitation channeled by D-A’s moderators, DC, and CM office. Through instructions that emanated from the CM and DC, facilitators were given clear protocol for feasible projects. Therefore, facilitators did not foster freeform deliberation that was not going to result in feasible projects to put on the ballot to be

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<sup>147</sup> As mentioned earlier, D-A was the only district to have an “Expo” instead of a second round of neighborhood assemblies.

<sup>148</sup> Examples included “more outlets for citizen engagement” and “finding ways to push a progressive agenda beyond PB.”

voted upon. Part of her frustration was simply that “no one gave my project a chance because it wasn’t a cookie-cutter project.”

Other budget delegates were interested in her project. Many budget delegates expressed outrage at only being able to work on “sidewalk repairs.” “I am here to do big projects to strengthen our troubled democracy,” noted one D-A budget delegate. As outlined earlier, opinions were so strong in the first meeting of the PRC that the entire conversation was derailed and a stronger co-facilitator was brought in who was more adept at structuring debate toward viable projects. This suggests that without having strong facilitation, budget delegate meetings could have strayed from the task at hand.

The results oriented model mitigated the strong opinions of D-A budget delegates. One consequence of heavy-handed facilitation was fewer opportunities for heated disagreement between participants; instilling the economy of moral disagreement, in which citizens seek the rationale that minimizes the rejection of the position they oppose and try to find common ground in related politics (Gutmann and Thompson 1996, pp84-94).<sup>149</sup>

Another consequence of heavy-handed facilitation was that innovative and unfeasible ideas were not given an opportunity. The approach stifled the range of creative projects while also producing more feasible projects in D-A than any other district.

#### *District B (D-B):*

Similarly to D-A, D-B had residents with strong opinions who wanted to share their input. Their opinions and potential for disagreement was effectively channeled by a strong co-facilitation team of two active members of the DC; one a graduate student in social work,

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<sup>149</sup> For some, learning to navigate the economy of moral disagreement is a critical educational component of deliberation.



another running for City Council. These two white, relatively affluent, well-educated facilitators presided over a middle-class, educated, predominantly Latino and African-American group, with one outspoken, older, educated, white woman who was a community activist and longstanding Community Board member. The co-facilitators were dedicated to ensuring participants put forward pragmatic proposals.

While D-B started with a PRC of roughly twelve, there were only four active participants toward the end: a young black male, a young black woman, a middle-aged Latina woman, and an older white woman. These four participants were already heavily involved in civic-focused civil society organizations (CSOs) in the district. Due to their CSO experience, they brought pragmatism to their projects buttressed by their facilitators. One of the representatives, a young black woman, was a representative of a local CSO that had a project for a community center and hospital on the ballot. This organization was on D-B's District Committee and Council member staff and PBNYC organizers were internally concerned that they were co-opting the process.

A staffer from D-B noted:

They are not using this process in the way it was intended. They sent dozens of people to the neighborhood assemblies to advocate for their projects. They have assigned representatives to each of the budget delegate committees in order to promote their projects. This is not how PB is supposed to run – they are not allowing fair and unbiased deliberation in these budget delegate committees.

The PRC in D-B faced a deliberation challenge: the older white woman with years of Community Board experience would dominate every meeting and not allow other people to speak. After the first meeting she brought another woman to tears. The challenges this raised for deliberation were indicative of the demographic divide in the heterogeneous D-B: a relatively affluent white portion, a predominately Latino and African-American portion with lots of need and several CSOs, and a smaller portion of low-income public

housing occupied predominately by minorities. Initial meetings of the PRC faced a challenge with one woman who wanted to control the conversation and another woman who was sent as a representative of a specific organization trying to set forth a specific agenda.

Through the course of deliberations in the PRC two dynamics emerged: 1) the strong facilitation team was able to effectively guide and steer the conversation; 2) by getting to know one another, the members of the committee formed bonds that enabled them to transcend their own agendas.

At around the third meeting of the PRC there was a visible shift – people were learning to laugh and get along with the older white woman and not take her so seriously. She and a young black male had the follow exchange:

J<sup>150</sup> : “We need Parks and Recs tattoos”

K<sup>151</sup> : “Absolutely! I have a spit tattoo – a temporary tattoo”

J: “You’re a badass, let’s see”

*Shows tattoo, everyone laughs, and they high five.*

In addition to this formation of bonds, the young black woman who was the

representative of the CSO started to become increasingly invested in the needs of the community, beyond her organization’s project. She started to represent herself, not just her employer. As projects were getting put on the ballot before the vote she decided to pull the project from the ballot.

L<sup>152</sup>: “If we get \$100,000 for this project from PB out of the 3 million we need it is not going to make as big an impact as that \$100,000 can make for the other projects people in this committee have been putting forth.”

M<sup>153</sup>: “I think it's amazing how transparent you've been and that you're putting PB before your organization.”

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<sup>150</sup> Young Black Male.

<sup>151</sup> Older White Female.

<sup>152</sup> Young Black Female, representing the CSO.

<sup>153</sup> Older Latina Female.

L: “It’s becoming very evident that people need to do what is best for the community and what the community needs. Those are going to be the projects, which get funded. It’s not just about me.”

The co-facilitators were happy with the decision to take this project off the ballot and applauded the efforts of the young woman who, though appointed through the CSO that employs her, became personally invested in the process. “She has been to every meeting. Her heart is really in it. So many meetings so much time, yet people keep on coming. Not clear this is worth the amount of time, yet people are getting something out of it,” described one of the co-facilitators, a young white male, for the PRC in D-B.

The CSO had decided to pull projects from all the different committees except for the Youth Committee.<sup>154</sup> What appeared to be an earnest decision was in fact a strategic choice made on behalf of her CSO.<sup>155</sup> However, even if the decision to pull the projects from the committees was top-down, through the process of deliberation the woman herself had changed her own opinions about the priorities and needs of the community. The presence of two facilitators who were able to effectively convey information and keep deliberations on track contributed to these decisions.

The result oriented approach enabled participants to effectively assess community needs and move beyond their parochial interests. Given the level of heterogeneity present in the district prior to PBNYC, the result oriented model was instructive. The organic relationships formed during the process of deliberation effectively supported the decision making.

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<sup>154</sup> As noted in Chapter 5, D-B had a special youth and senior committee (D-C was the only other district to have a youth committee).

<sup>155</sup> A strategy had been determined top down within the CSO that their proposal would seem most credible if put forth by the youth committee. Therefore, the proposal was taken away from other committees. The proposal had multi-dimensions to it and fit for multiple committees.

## 6.6 Process Oriented Model of Facilitation

While D-A and D-B were more results oriented models of deliberation, D-C and D-D privileged process without a necessary clear end. Thus, D-C and D-D had project deliberations that never made the ballot. Opinions were expressed but sometimes to unproductive ends. In D-D, the potential for people to deliberate without a focus on pragmatic proposals was mitigated by the presence of the Chief of Staff who attended every meeting and provided accurate information as it pertained to deadlines and agencies restrictions. In D-C, the lack of coordination from the CM and the overburdened DC only furthered the opportunity for deliberation without decision making. Individual facilitators within committees also had large impacts.

### *District C (D-C):*

D-C Council staff lacked organizational capacity after the staffer assigned to PB quit early on the process. Lack of CM capacity led to a disorganized process for transmitting necessary ideas from the neighborhood assemblies to budget delegates.<sup>156</sup> The leadership vacuum put pressure on an overburdened DC, leading to tensions and disorganization. The district was the most heterogeneous as reflected by the most diverse PRC across the four districts. D-C was the only district with organized donations of food to meetings.<sup>157</sup> D-C was also the only Parks and Recreation Committee to include the word “environment” in its title, heavily influenced by the facilitator who was a self-described environmentalist. Participants included one Caribbean young professional woman, one Caribbean professional man, one Caribbean community activist, one white professional

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<sup>156</sup> Council district offices compiled the ideas generations at the neighborhood assembly to determine necessary budget committees based upon the topics raised at the assemblies.

<sup>157</sup> The food donations were organized by tapping into the network of churches. While the food contributed to the communal and familial atmosphere, it also provided another delegate distraction.

and activist, one Caribbean high school student,<sup>158</sup> and a white British man living in a homeless shelter. The facilitator was a middle-aged Caribbean activist on the DC appointed without any training due to a drop off in initially trained facilitators. D-C had the widest diversity of people across age, race, and socio-economic background of any PRC across the four districts.

The facilitator was already burdened with community commitments and missed as many meetings as she facilitated due to other obligations or health ailments. As a result, the facilitator's roles and responsibilities became distributed between two other members of the group. One older white woman was passionate about her creative proposal and tried to solicit information from agencies and the CM office. Another younger Caribbean woman attempted to encourage the group to be pragmatic and strategic about what would be doable, as outlined earlier in the needs assessment section. When the facilitator was present, either in person or via email, she was not able to offer constructive information or suggestions. Instead, she would offer her own ideologically infused opinion. A PRC meeting intended to solidify concrete proposals started 45 minutes late. The discussion was peripatetic and circuitous:

N<sup>159</sup>: "When you reach out to the agencies you realize they have thought of these things but they don't have the resources, funding or otherwise"

O<sup>160</sup>: "When parks guy came everything is so expensive, and overhead costs are ridiculous."

Facilitator: "want to disband politics and start over?"

*Laughter*

Discussion continued with people outlining opinions and ideas for proposals covering an expansive range of proposals and projects. The facilitator ensured that everyone's

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<sup>158</sup> D-C had a separate youth committee, in addition to D-B, but this youth choose to come to the parks and recreation committee instead of the youth committee.

<sup>159</sup> Young Caribbean Female.

<sup>160</sup> Older White Female.

opinion and voice was heard. She made people feel comfortable with one another and created an environment of ease where everyone's opinion felt valued, frequently adding her own opinion.

At the end of the meeting, consensus was not reached and there were no clear next steps to turn these ideas into action. A vague creative project with community gardening had been discussed. At this stage in the process every other PRC already had several concrete and detailed proposals. The number of active participants on the PRC in D-C was comparable to those in D-B, which suggests that the role of the facilitator was essential in helping participants turn their discussions into concrete proposals. Two women, one younger and Caribbean and one older and white, tried to fill in the role of a facilitator in the leadership vacuum. They each organized email chains with next steps and proposal information, contacted CM staff, and tried to keep people on task both during the actual meetings as well virtually over emails.

In the final PRC before the second neighborhood assembly, the facilitator was not able to attend the meeting. There was notable frustration amongst the three other active participants of the committee, as they still did not have a concrete proposal. The atmosphere was extremely tense as they faced difficult decisions: propose a small project that would be more feasible or continue trying to implement the same creative project on community gardens they have been deliberating since the first meeting. They had not received agency information or conducted site visits. The proposal was still in a nascent form lacking concrete details. To further compound the confusion, some people showed up to the last meeting who had not been attending regularly, providing another obstacle for decision-making.

O: "I didn't get involved in this to just fix things, I want to do creative proposals that will positively impact our community."

P<sup>161</sup>: "I didn't come here to fix pot holes, I came here to do something innovative. I would have gone to transportation if I wanted for something simple. I really like our proposals that we made."

Q<sup>162</sup>: "Yes, but we need to ensure that our proposal meets the necessary agency criteria otherwise Charlie's office will not let us put it on the ballot."

R<sup>163</sup>: "We have a limited amount of time, if we talk about what we want to do instead of what doesn't work. We all agree potholes are controversial let's talk about other proposals that may not be pothole like."

Without the facilitator present, the two women who had been working on various administrative components of the process tried to mitigate the conflicting ideals of supporting an innovative proposal and trying to come up with even one feasible proposal. At this late stage in the budget delegate process, Charlie's office had finally hired a staff person to work on PB, who was trying to understand PB. She sat down with the PRC at this meeting and explained that they were going to have to try to make a realistic proposal within the next week before the second round of neighborhood assemblies. She also tried to assuage their frustrations with the process by reminding them that this was the first year of the process. To which the older white woman noted, "I lost sight of this being the first year, you reminded me." Part of her intensity around making an innovative project was interwoven in a fear that she would never have another opportunity to make an impact in this way. Once the new staff member reminded her that this was simply a pilot year, she was able to relax and feel less ideologically committed to her proposal.

At this same meeting after the conversation with the new staff hired from D-C, the PRC had other conversations with those involved at the governance level of the process, such as those from the technical (Participatory Budgeting Project) and organizing (Community Voices Heard) lead, and CM staff, who all encouraged the participants in the PRC to opt

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<sup>161</sup> Caribbean Female High School Student.

<sup>162</sup> Young Caribbean Female.

<sup>163</sup> Caribbean Male.

for a more realistic and feasible project. These stakeholders had their own vested interest in the PRC putting forth a viable project, seeking to positively reflect on both D-C and PBNYC generally. It was only at the final budget delegates meeting that the PRC understood that they had to think not only creatively, but also strategically and pragmatically, about how to make a budget proposal. Their facilitator had encouraged and enabled deliberation and the free flow of ideas without structure or guidance. She had not conveyed basic information such as how to interact with the agencies (through the CM office) or the pros and cons of strategic proposals that can make the ballot and ultimately be voted upon by residents.

The participants in the PRC were acutely aware of the campaign being waged against them to abandon their creative project for the broader sake of the community and PBNYC as a whole. They were also aware that if they opted to continue with a proposal around their creative parks project, it would probably not receive any traction because it was not likely to be vetted by the agencies or make the ballot, and not be voted for even if it made the ballot. Yet having finally realized that the creative proposal they had been discussing and deliberating for months would probably not succeed, they decided to continue with the proposal anyway. The idea of abandoning this proposal, which lacked concrete details, was less appealing than trying to piece together a smaller but realistic proposal.

Even when told in the starkest terms that their creative project would probably not be turned into a realistic project, the PRC in D-C did not make a results oriented decision. Rather, the four participants who showed up to the last meeting self-facilitated a process-oriented deliberation culminating in a decision to continue with their creative project.



When given the option to make a results oriented decision, they decided to prize deliberation above all. Ultimately, their project was put on the ballot and was acknowledged as not having a chance by the CM and other members of the DC of being selected. Their project received a low number of votes and was not chosen by the residents.

### **6.7 Lessons and Online Options**

A creative proposal in D-C, similarly innovative to the proposal in D-A that resulted in great frustration for its advocate, was treated in an entirely different manner in D-C. The facilitator of the PRC in D-C was a self-described “environmental activist” who would often make her opinions known, ranging from her mistrust of city government (such as the prices cited by the agencies), to her desire for an innovative “green” project. She was heavily involved in the community, overburdened by her responsibilities, and missed roughly half of the PRC meetings.

In contrast, a creative proposal in D-A that had many more specific details researched and agencies contacted, was vetoed through strong facilitation. Results oriented, heavy-handed facilitation in D-A, resulted in a lot of viable budget proposals while stifling creativity. The result-oriented model too tightly enforced boundaries whereas the process oriented model was too expansive without explaining the necessity of feasible proposals. D-B used a result-oriented structure to enable productive deliberation. Especially in more heterogeneous districts, result oriented deliberation opened up spaces to genuine deliberation and discussion. The result oriented model runs the risk of dissuading innovative proposals and leading to greater disillusionment, as in D-A.

The ideal approach seems to be structured around results while allowing for diversity of opinions and potentially less realistic proposals through process. The result oriented model leaves less room for the idiosyncratic nature of deliberators or ideologies.

However, a strict commitment to end results is within itself an ideology. Ideology can also be present in the process oriented model. One of the weaknesses of the facilitator in D-C is that she let her ideology infuse deliberations. Had the budget delegates been discussing a proposal she did not personally support she may have imposed more control over the group.

How can facilitation be structured while not ideological? Online tools and mediums provide a plausible alternative to the idiosyncratic personalities of facilitation. These were used for deliberation and decision-making in all the districts – most heavily in D-A, and least in D-D.




Figure 6.3: District Online Tool Usage

One committee facilitator in D-D was a younger women working at a CSO who created a listserv for the committee and sent out emails regularly. The median age of PRC budget delegates in D-D was older than the participants in the PRC in the other three districts. Thus, there was a larger “digital divide” to overcome with the majority of members of the PRC who were not comfortable with Internet Communication Technologies (ICT).

The PRC in D-D minimally used email to only communicate meeting times and locations. The committee meetings always took place at the same time at the same location, in the district office that the Chief of Staff would open himself, so there was less dependence on the emails as the conduit of meeting times, locations, and dates. CM Devon is the only one of the four CM's who does not keep a blog or use any form of social media. His older, white, Irish Catholic, constituency has not put any pressure on the office for more online tools because most of the PB participants would not be able to access these tools. Therefore, when online tools were used in D-D it was purely for communication not participation.<sup>164</sup>

At the opposite end of spectrum was D-A, where various online tools were used throughout the process including an online interface for idea submission.

Online tools create new opportunities for engagement, while also changing the underlying legitimating principles of deliberation and decisions.<sup>165</sup> Do people behave differently over a listserv than when deliberating face-to-face? The immediacy of email correspondence coupled with the veil of the Internet creates unique dynamics of deliberation and decision-making.

As an example of this effect, the facilitator of the PRC in D-A sent an email before the Expo asking people to vote online about whether or not to put a proposal for a dog run on the ballot.<sup>166</sup> Each of the CMs agreed upon an individual project maximum of \$500,000. D-A Parks and Recreation had a vocal pro-dog run delegation that put forth a proposal for a dog run; although approved by the Parks and Recreations Department, this was not

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<sup>164</sup> Communication is one-way whereas participation is a two-way engagement.

<sup>165</sup> For example, is the reason-based argument required lessened by not being physically face to face with someone?

<sup>166</sup> The facilitator set up a Google survey that she sent to the Google Group she had created for the PRC.

supported by the local dog owners associations and was slated at a costly \$500,000. As a result the facilitator sent an email out asking people to electronically vote for whether or not the project should go on the ballot:

“Ah, democracy! In that spirit, please cast your vote by midnight tonight - we have to know by tomorrow so that ballots can be designed and printed in time. Please use this form to vote. Please feel free to reply and discuss, but definitely vote whether or not to keep the Dog Run proposal on the ballot.”

This email prompted fourteen heated emails between budget delegates. Delegates were trying to balance competing interests; they were sympathetic to the work put into the proposal and wanted to be supportive, but also recognized that less expensive projects would be more likely to be voted for. Below is a snapshot of these fourteen emails:

Woman who led the dog proposal who self-described as a “dog evangelist” at the first introductory meeting of the PR: “Our group worked extremely hard on this, especially Cynthia!<sup>167</sup> To see no proposal for our cause is disappointing. Tell Albert give his people a chance to vote...wasn't this the premise of creating this program in the first place?”

Another male member of the PRC: “I was a dog owner until my 15 year old black lab passed recently, but I support Albert’s decision not to put so much of our limited funds on one single project. It’s a big district with many needs. His decision to allow as much as half the funds on a single project seems very reasonable to me. 2/3s is too much.”

*(The “Dog Evangelist” asked to put forth the original dog run proposal, which differs from the dog run proposal now being voted upon.)*

Facilitator: “Parks approved that idea, but unfortunately it’s too expensive - \$650k. Albert’s office has set the maximum at \$500k per project.”<sup>168</sup>

“At this point, it’s not Albert’s decision - it’s yours (all of yours). The decision to limit the maximum amount per project was done out of fairness to be sure that multiple projects would be funded, and at this point it can’t be changed. So given what we’ve got, it’s up to the committee to decide whether or not to put Dog Run on the ballot, and if it does go on the ballot, it’s then up to the community to decide whether or not to fund it.”

*(After people had filled out the survey and more emails opposing the Dog Run were sent)*

Facilitator: “Thank you for your quick response on the dog run issue. The committee voted 6-3 to take the proposal off the ballot. I know this is a disappointment to everyone - Cynthia and Stephanie worked really hard on the proposal, and obviously lots of folks in the community want dog run

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<sup>167</sup> All names are changed for anonymity.

<sup>168</sup> CM name changed from original email in order to protect anonymity

improvements. However, given the cost and complications with the local Dog Owners Association, I think this is probably the right decision. But still, what a bummer!”

The facilitator in D-A employed a result oriented model through online mediums, asking targeted questions with deadlines and an online poll. However, the lack of face-to-face interaction prevented the type of relationship formation that occurred in D-B to soften the structure of the results model. Without the intervening variable of face-to-face interaction, the results model online can easily dissolve to nothing more than filling out an online survey or voicing a quickly formed opinion.

These fourteen emails were all sent within a few minutes of one another, and enabled an opportunity for less costly disagreement than face-to-face discussion. Emails provide a short timeframe for decision-making at odds with a process of deliberation aimed to maximize discourse and dialogue. The technology enabled a dynamic that transcends the traditional economy of moral disagreement: rapid-fire emails conveying brief commentary not providing opportunities for deliberation.

The introduction of these non-face-to-face components in the PBNYC process points to the implications of technology and its role in deliberation and decision-making. The nature of these emails alters the substance and style of deliberation. Are people able to hide behind the masks of technology? Are people able to speak in a way they would not if they were looking in the eyes of the other person? Perhaps the anonymity is a virtue - Rousseau for one prized decision-making done through secret ballot.

The creation of a digital poll anonymizes the process of deliberation and reduces the costs of public disagreement by creating a form of a secret ballot. People’s names are attached to their emails but the in-person relationships that mitigate the rigidity of the results oriented model are less present in online deliberation. Introducing online deliberation as

a more pervasive part of PBNYC in the second cycle requires unique online norms and facilitation guidelines for understanding how to compensate for the social barriers that the Internet reduces.

## **6.8 Conclusion**

“There is wide variation along every single dimension of the PBNYC process. But that is ok. If the purpose is civic engagement and encouraging participation we do not need perfect uniformity across every committee” - Facilitator for the PRC in D-B.

Empirical examples of deliberation of the PRC place deliberations on a spectrum of process to result oriented deliberation. Results oriented deliberation prized project feasibility. In contrast, process oriented deliberative models prized participant expression. As a result, similar projects within two different deliberation paradigms were treated very differently. D-A cut from their ballot a project similar to one that D-C included on theirs. Variation suggests that decision making in PBNYC is nuanced beyond citizens’ ability to make collective decisions with rational discourse. Rather, the structural conditions of district composition, bureaucratic constraints, and facilitator skill impacted decision-making. These conditions impacted the degree to which a specific committee had more results or process oriented deliberation.

Each district contained variation pertaining to implementation of deliberative norms on specific committees. By structurally creating room for on-the-ground variation and creativity, budget delegates were able to utilize their unique backgrounds. Greater process level control would have created more uniformity throughout budget delegate committees. More process level structure would have evinced the tension between quality control and creativity down to the subcommittee. The lacuna between structure

and efficiency created facilitator dependency. Facilitators had wide variance in background, organization, and time commitment to PBNYC.

The freedom for individual committees to determine their own deliberative norms is contrasted with the limited forms of participant freedom before entering in the PBNYC process. Legitimacy is pre-determined for participants: feasible project outcomes. The ability for district-level factors to impact micro-level decision making, enabled an outlet of creativity at the expense of quality control. Yet, it is unclear whether or not counterfactual deliberative models would have worked in districts.

Within heterogeneous districts such as D-C, perhaps the result oriented model would have stifled discussion and been ineffective. The process oriented model in D-B could have led to more tears and disagreement. The result oriented model, buttressed with opportunities for engagement in D-B, suggests that structured deliberation and participation can be mutually reinforcing. Without face-to-face opportunities for relationship formation, as evidenced through online deliberation, the result oriented model will prevent genuine discourse. Without the presence of the Chief of Staff of D-D driving results, participants may not have formed viable proposals under the process model. Likewise, less emphasis on results in D-A may have resulted in discursive conversation without end.<sup>169</sup>

Inclusiveness and efficiency emerge as deliberative norms in tension. This tension manifested in two deliberative models: process and result oriented. These are indicative of the dual aims of PBNYC. The process on the one hand is aimed at better short-term service delivery of goods, while also aiming for greater long-term civic engagement and deepening of democracy. Improvement of service delivery requires results in the form of

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<sup>169</sup> The questions emerge as to whether or not discursive conversation is a legitimate goal and to what ends?

concrete proposals, whereas deepening of democracy relies on all participants voicing their opinions.

The evidence from this chapter shows that deliberation fulfilling the second tenet of citizenly politics can take different forms, some more focused on process while others more on results. While the result and process oriented models prized different ends, both enabled a type of deliberation fulfilling the second tenet of citizenly politics. The chapter's data shows that the conflicting goals of PB—short-term service delivery and long-term civic engagement—require 1) structured deliberation 2) conveying specific information while 3) providing opportunities for genuine relationship formation.



## Chapter 7: Participation

Therefore one can argue that participation in PB varies according to two factors: the existence of an associative tradition and the perceived effectiveness of the process (Avritzer 2005, 394). Avritzer argues, in contrast with Arendt (1958) and Schumpeter (1942) who posit that democratic theory can become a particularistic process, participation in PB corresponds to the establishment of rules for public goods delivery. Therefore PB combines “integrating forms of broadening popular sovereignty with forms of dealing with issues of justice” (Avritzer 2005, 395). Avritzer’s theory posits that participation in PB follows a rational trajectory; people are more likely to participate after they see the material success of the first year. In contrast, I argue that in PBNYC, many citizens sustained participation not necessarily because of material benefits, such as improved service delivery or putting forth a specific proposal, but because of PB’s existential rewards. Participants routinely cite number of opportunities for knowledge transfer and direct contact with government officials and agencies as the primary reasons PBNYC is a uniquely engaging civic activity.

Empirical results from PBNYC show that the less demanding forms of participation, such as the vote, were the most diverse. Some districts, such as District B (D-B) and District C (D-C), were able to mobilize a higher percentage of minorities and low-income residents to vote in PB than in the 2009 elections.

This chapter assesses modes of participation and engagement in PBNYC by classifying citizens into three groups: “usual suspects,” “active citizens,” and “new citizens.” I assess how PBNYC offered more or less opportunities for engagement for different types of citizens within districts. PB offered innovative participation opportunities for all these

types of citizens. Citizens experienced frustration but continued to participate nonetheless in order to gain the meaningful existential rewards from participating. Challenges to participation can be both substantive and fulfill the third tenet of citizenly politics while also imposing large resource costs and creating disillusionment and frustration amongst participants. Some of the tensions and potential threats to meaningful and substantive participation in PBNYC were linked to structural conditions, such as district composition and New York City bureaucracy, which ended up influencing the new process of PBNYC. Challenges to participation were varied, though consistently high.

In this chapter, I show that citizens were frustrated by obstacles to participation but stayed engaged in the process due to the existential rewards. While existential rewards may not conform to typical behavioral accounts of participation motivations, there are rational examples for existential rewards including greater civic knowledge, strengthened relationships with elected officials, and greater community inclusion.<sup>170</sup>

### **7.1 Norms around Participation**

Participation is the necessary condition of PBNYC: the process is only as strong as the participants' participation. Sustained and substantive participation is required for PBNYC. Assessing multifaceted participation requires understanding participatory forms, both in theory and practice.

From a normative perspective, individual citizen participation serves the dual purpose of both educating citizens (Wampler 2000) and empowering citizens to serve as a check on traditional representational bureaucracy (Barber 1986). The act of participation allows

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<sup>170</sup> Thank you to Marshall Ganz for pointing out that these reasons for engagement are in fact rational. Cambridge, MA September 12, 2012.

residents the opportunity to establish self worth in their identity *qua* citizens (Kweit and Kweit 1981; King and Stiver 1998). Putnam (1993) illustrated how citizens who became skilled in democracy build social capital. The process of participation via public deliberation increased both democratic legitimacy and a deliberative political culture (Habermas 1996).

Zajac and Bruhn (1999) argue that the Weberian hierarchical-bureaucratic model has been unable to foster inclusive and robust relationships for citizens with their elected officials. Participation serves as a way for citizens to exert influence and control within this highly structured framework. This is why some scholars posit that participation can undermine institutions of representative government (Lynn 2002).

There are varying degrees of participation, some that are more and less robust and therefore more or less disruptive. The third tenet of citizenly politics involves a substantive definition of participation: 1) those affected by the decision must be included (Habermas 1989) 2) participation is authentic with a genuine impact on public decisions (Fox and Miller 1996) and 3) officials take the input of citizens seriously (Pateman 1989). This chapter outlines modes of participation in practice. The challenges to participation include time commitment and representativeness. Voter inclusion and mobilization serve as the mechanism by which public officials substantiate participation in the process.

## **7.2 Actual Modes of Participation**

In practice, the modes for participation in PBNYC differed from those originally drafted in the rulebook. The previous chapter outlined the ways in which deliberation and decision-making took root in the PBNYC process. There were opportunities for citizen engagement that extended beyond those originally conceived of, such as having citizens

involved with governance level decision making as explored in Chapter 8. These modes of citizen engagement supplemented opportunities for participation.

The District Committee (DC) expected to be organizing district level initiatives such as neighborhood assemblies, budget delegate committees, and the process of vote mobilization and outreach. Chapter 8 outlined how in some districts, such as District-C, the DC also became integral participants in the citywide Steering Committee (SC). Even within less expansive DC roles, their roles and participation levels were still higher than originally outlined, including coordinating logistics with both the agencies and the CM office.

For non-DC members there were two other types of participation. One was a less substantive form of participation for residents who came to neighborhood assemblies (NA) or out to a vote. Another was a more substantive role of participation serving as a budget delegate. In summary, there were four ways to participate in PBNYC in descending order of time commitment: 1) member of the DC 2) serve as a budget delegate<sup>171</sup> 3) attend a neighborhood assembly or 4) come out to vote. At least half of all participants participated in all four levels of involvement.<sup>172</sup>

### **7.3 Citizen Typologies**

Participation modes correspond to different segments of the process; outlining the dual nature of PBNYC aimed for both short term service delivery and long term civic

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<sup>171</sup> Arguably the time commitment for DC and budget delegates were comparable over different time periods. The DC had meetings roughly every month but starting in the spring and summer before PBNYC. Whereas budget delegates met every week starting in the winter. The majority of DC were also budget delegates.

<sup>172</sup> Unlike the thematic councils in Brazilian PB that are focused on long term engagement, as opposed to the short term service delivery of the budget delegates, PBNYC lacks long term engagement components. Rather, in the pilot project, PBNYC offers modes of engagement that are aimed both at shorter term service delivery, such as budget committees, as well as longer term engagement through community inclusion and mobilization.

engagement. Within four opportunities for participation were varieties of citizen typologies. PBNYC differs from PB implementation in societies with less robust democratic institutions and civil society organizations. When PB is implemented in emerging democracies it offers new institutional pathways for engagement. However, in New York City, PB is grafted<sup>173</sup> on top of existing infrastructures that citizens view as efficacious.<sup>174</sup> Accounting for the citizen typology; “usual suspects,” “active citizens,” and “new citizens” I offer a snap shot of **10** average PBNYC participants:<sup>175</sup>

Typology of Citizen Engagement<sup>176</sup>:

**5 “Usual suspects”** i.e. people already engaged in society either through established outlets such as community boards, block associations, or tenant associations.

**3 “Active citizens”** i.e. people who are some what engaged but looking for more outlets for engagement.

**2 “New citizens”** i.e. people who are not previously engaged and whose engagement in PBNYC is a marked new step for them.

Within these **10** people emerge dynamics informing the PBNYC process. The role of deliberation and decision-making amongst these **10** people was outlined in Chapter 6. Council member’s (CM) and Civil Society Organizations’ (CSO) existing capacity was an intermediate variable bringing together these **10** people. District level CM and CSO outreach was critical to all three types of citizens: usual suspects, active citizens, as well as new citizens. Once these citizens are effectively mobilized to participate CM, CSOs,

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<sup>173</sup> Questions surrounding the “mandate for PB” in New York City will be explored in the Conclusion.

<sup>174</sup> I use Mark Warren’s definition: “Efficacy is the feeling that one *could* have on impact on collective actions if one so chose to do so” (Warren 2001, 71 italics in original).

<sup>175</sup> The snap shot is based on meetings I have intended. This is meant as a rough approximation across four districts of the distribution of typologies of individuals. More detailed district snap shots are explored in this chapter.

<sup>176</sup> All estimations are based on my qualitative research.

and DC capacity sustains relationships amongst the **10** people for the duration of the PB process, and ideally after the vote, for project implementation and monitoring. Pre-existing urban demographics and district constitution shape interaction within new PBNYC relationships.

New and dynamic relationships amongst these **10** individuals to their physical urban district, with its unique demographics along the lines of SES, race, and education, rupture traditional modes of engagement in New York City.<sup>177</sup>

Who were these citizens and how did they get involved with PBNYC? Many of the usual suspects were already familiar with one another and came into the PB process with their own conception of where problems lay in the community. Some of them were long standing members of community boards and entered into the process with established viewpoints and relationships with the CM. The majority were personally called by their CM and invited to participate on the DC. Others opted not to be on the DC because they were “skeptical of this pilot process and...already over committed,<sup>178</sup>” and remained skeptics on the sidelines attending neighborhood assemblies and the vote. Yet large numbers of usual suspects contend, “PBNYC is the most fulfilling mode of civic engagement I have ever been part of.”<sup>179</sup> The usual suspects cite the number of opportunities for knowledge transfer and direct contact with CM and city agencies as the primary reasons that PBNYC differs from other forms of civic engagement, namely Community Boards (CB), Parent Teachers Association (PTA) associations, and block associations.

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<sup>177</sup> See Section 5.6 for more information about district demographics.

<sup>178</sup> As one long-standing community board member in D-C noted.

<sup>179</sup> As described by one long-standing community board member in D-C, though many usual suspects in each of the four districts echoed this sentiment.

The majority of active citizens who participated in PBNYC were looking for new outlets for civic engagement and seized upon those provided by PBNYC. These people were already somewhat involved in their community, such as sitting on a PTA or a neighborhood block association. However, the level of engagement of an active citizen is less than a usual suspect in a given week or month. Usual suspects define their identity through civic engagement - active citizens do not. In contrast, active citizens view engagement as a smaller component of their identity. The involvement of active citizens in PBNYC transforms their civic engagement hours and enlarges their civic identity. Lastly, for new citizens who participated in PBNYC, their involvement is a marked departure from typical life. These are citizens who have not previously been engaged in civic life in any meaningful way. In social capital rich districts, such as D-A, many new citizens were inspired by the civic activism of their neighbors to get involved. All new citizens who engage with PBNYC hear about the process through a citizen who is more active than they are. Some are brought in through an email on a CM newsletter or through a flyer. Some active citizens and usual suspects personally brought new citizens to neighborhood assemblies or to vote through established networks such as churches or schools. For these new citizens, PBNYC has the potential to be the most transformative civic activity they take part in due to its unique opportunities for civic involvement and knowledge transfer.

PBNYC faces the challenge reconciling these disparate types of citizens within a cohesive process. Each phase of the process contained different proportions of the three types of citizens. The level of engagement and required time commitment differs

throughout the process. Below is an outline of different forms of participation throughout the process with an estimation of citizen typology proportions.

**Budget Delegate: meetings roughly every other week including at least weekly correspondence over email (December-March)** 70% usual suspects, 20% active citizens, 10% new citizens

**District Committee: meetings roughly every month including at least weekly correspondence over email (Aug-March)**<sup>180</sup> 80% usual suspects, 20% active citizens

**Neighborhood Assemblies: one two hour meeting (Fall and Spring)** 55% usual suspects, 25% active citizens, 20% new citizens

**Vote: one voting event (Spring)** 45% usual suspects, 30% active citizens, 25% new citizens

Empirical data shows that inclusivity is inversely proportional to time commitment. The vote had the most diverse representation along race and socio-economics. The District Committee and budget delegates were the least representative yet they were able to mobilize more diverse community residents to vote. Within this capacity emerged tensions for District Committee members: they are district residents participating and organizing participation. Many District Committee members felt an obligation to serve as public trustees and mobilize a diverse range of participants. Yet, some District Committee members disagreed and were disdainful of mobilizing already well-resourced pockets of their district.

District Committee members and budget delegates spent the most hours involved in PBNYC, becoming personally invested in the process while exerting ownership and power over the process.<sup>181</sup>

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<sup>180</sup> Some DC met much more frequently, such as in D-C, where meetings were held almost every week.



## 7.4 Who Participated?

PBNYC contained four different outlets for participation throughout the process.<sup>182</sup> I have pulled data from surveys given out at neighborhood assemblies, to budget delegates, and voters illustrating the representation levels of PBNYC.<sup>183</sup> The number of voters reflected in the following charts reflects voters who filled out surveys – not the amount of voters within the districts.<sup>184</sup> For each district, participation rates from surveys are compared with 2010 Census data. The surveys were formed using Census categorizations to ensure continuity along race and ethnicity categories. The voting data for each district reflects targeted outreach and mobilization that varied by district. A portion of the monies that each CM funneled to Community Voices Heard for the PBNYC process were set aside for mobilization and outreach within the different communities around the vote. Within each district specifically low-income and typically disenfranchised populations were to be targeted for the vote.<sup>185</sup> Some districts, such as D-B were able to mobilize a higher percentage of minorities and low-income residents to vote in PB than in the 2009 elections.

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<sup>181</sup> As outlined in Chapter 8, much of the power wielded by participants was dependent simply on who “showed up” and not on theoretical mandates of engagement. As a result, active budget delegates controlled networks of power within the process in a way that a community member showing up at only to vote could not (Hayward 2011). By the time of the vote, all the projects had been pre-determined.

<sup>182</sup> Not including DC who participated in the Steering Committee deviating from the original structures of participation.

<sup>183</sup> See Appendix 7.1 for comprehensive participation tables by ethnicity and SES from survey data.

<sup>184</sup> For sake of anonymity of vote, filling out the survey was optional. A large debate ensued within the SC with all the CM staff except for those in D-D wanting to make surveys more closely tied to the ballot. D-D staff worried about protecting voters right and safeguarding vote legitimacy.

<sup>185</sup> The decisions about which sections of the district to conduct outreach for vote mobilization were partially based on a needs assessment. CVH conducted research about which portions of the district to target based on greatest need. Decision-making was ultimately up to the CM and DC and often fraught. CM eager to reach as many voting constituencies as possible encouraged wide mobilization of diverse pockets yet individual DC brought their own biases toward mobilization around the vote. As outlined in Chapter 8, the DC wielded control over the process and decided where to do outreach – especially since the DC carried out the responsibilities associated with outreach.

	<u>D-A</u>		<u>D-B</u>		<u>D-C</u>		<u>D-D</u>	
	Voters 2009	Voters PB	Voters 2009	Voters PB	Voters 2009	Voters PB	Voters 2009	Voters PB
Black or African American	8%	3%	31%	34%	79%	87%	6%	3%
Hispanic or Latino	11%	6%	39%	50%	4%	6%	18%	4%
White	55%	87%	22%	17%	11%	7%	61%	89%

Figure 7.1: 2009 local election voters vs. PB voters by race.<sup>186</sup>

	<u>D-A</u>		<u>D-B</u>		<u>D-C</u>		<u>D-D</u>	
	Voters 2009	Voters PB	Voters 2009	Voters PB	Voters 2009	Voters PB	Voters 2009	Voters PB
Less than \$10,000	0%	1%	4%	22%	0%	8%	0%	2%
\$25,000-\$34,999	18%	4%	25%	12%	19%	14%	11%	8%
\$50,000-\$74,999	37%	14%	20%	10%	28%	20%	40%	18%
\$150,000 or more	0%	3%	0%	3%	0%	7%	0	16%

Figure 7.2: 2009 local election voters vs. PB voters by income bracket.<sup>187</sup>

D-B and D-C were able to effectively mobilize a greater percentage of low-income residents to vote for PB than in local elections. D-A and D-D were able to mobilize a larger percentage of higher income residents of PB than local elections. The following sections outline not only the empirical participation numbers in each districts, but also individual district-level decisions that resulted in targeting specific demographics.

Existing district structure, group relations, and politics influenced decisions by the District Committee (DC) and Council members (CM) in mobilization and outreach.

#### *District A (D-A):*

Population 2010: 162,743.

40 Projects submitted online. 1,048 voters.

6 projects funded at \$1.54 Million.

<sup>186</sup> See Appendix 7.1 for full survey information including a broader spectrum of demographic questions and number of surveys completed.

<sup>187</sup> Ibid.

District A (D-A) had diversity among citizen typologies with less racial and socio-economic diversity. D-A residents who self-identified as white is 32% higher in PBNYC than for the district population. 3% of voters in PBNYC self-identified as black compared with 8% of voters for local elections. In PBNYC, white people and wealthier residents were overrepresented . 87% of PB voters self-identified as white compared with 55% of 2009 voters. Lower percentage of blacks (3%) and Latinos (6%) voted in PB than in the 2009 local elections, 8%, 11% respectively.

The largest percentage of neighborhood assemblies attendees, budget delegates, and voters were from the \$100,000-\$149,000 income bracket. Yet, only 15% of the district's voters are from that demographic. 13% of 2009 voters were from the \$15,000-\$24,999 income bracket, while this income bracket comprised 2% of voters.

D-A choose to mobilize the Bangladeshi community instead of the Orthodox Jewish community that has similar low-income and low-education levels yet is much more integrated into the district. There was a less fraught relationship for members of the DC with the Bangladeshi community than with the Orthodox Jewish community. As one active citizen and reform Jew noted, the Orthodox Jewish community was “already encroaching upon our area – I don’t want them coming out to vote for only their own projects.” Albert personally reached out to Orthodox Jewish community leaders and organized a voting day on Sunday (to reflect that Orthodox Jews would not attend a Saturday voting day on the holy Sabbath). Yet, the DC was recalcitrant to do outreach in this community and made shallow mobilization efforts in comparison to the comprehensive door knocking campaign in the Bangladeshi community.

D-A galvanized active and new citizens to participate in the process, many as budget delegates. One new citizen described his reasons for engagement, “I met my community through walking my dog. I wanted to give back to this community that has meant so much to me.” Yet, these active and new citizens were themselves primarily white, affluent, well-educated members of the district.

*District B (D-B):*

Population 2010: 162,743.

40 Projects submitted online. 1,048 voters.

6 projects funded at \$1.54 Million.

District B (D-B) had diversity along both citizen typologies as well as racial and socio-economic indicators. In D-B, participants who self-identified as black or African American and Hispanic or Latino made up the biggest share of participants, respectively: neighborhood assembly participants (41%,46%), budget delegates (50%,33%), and PB voters (34%,50%). The largest discrepancy is between Hispanic or Latino voters in PB (50%) compared with in 2009 local elections (39%). The data suggests D-A was effective in mobilizing Hispanic residents.

The largest percentage of budget delegates (19%) came from the \$50,000-\$74,999 bracket yet only make up 13% of the district. The largest percentage of PB voters (22%) was from the less than \$10,000 income bracket though they only made up 4% of all voters in the 2009 election. The majority of neighborhood assemblies attendees (14%) were from the \$10,000-\$14,999 income bracket although they only make up 9% of the district’s population.

D-B effectively mobilized those from lower incomes, especially \$10,000 - \$14,999 to participate as budget delegates, attend neighborhood assemblies, and vote. The DC chose to mobilize the largest area of low-income residents as opposed to a smaller pocket of the district (10%) in a New York City public housing authority (NYCHA) complex. Beatrice and the DC did not mobilize the portion of the district containing wealthier and more-educated participants for the vote

The majority of new and active citizens in D-B were from typically marginalized groups representing the lower-income, less white portion of the district. A new citizen woman living in New York City public housing (NYCHA) who had never before been involved in a civic process noted, “I thought all the affluent white people would look down upon me because I live in public housing – in reality they were all understanding and wanted to help.” This woman ended up serving as a budget delegate.

*District C (D-C):*

Population 2010: 139,731.

17 Projects submitted online. 1,085 voters.

5 projects funded at \$1.35 Million.

District C (D-C) had diversity among citizen typologies with less racial and socio-economic diversity. D-C participants who self-identified as black or African American were overrepresented in PBNYC. Those who self-identified as white were underrepresented in the PB process, making up 11% of voters in the 2009 and 7% of voters in PB.

The largest percentage of neighborhood assembly attendees (21%) budget delegates (26%) and PB voters (20%) came from the \$50,000-\$74,999 bracket and made up 19% of

the district. The data suggests that people from the same income demographic were consistently mobilized throughout PB while not necessarily engaging others in the process. Lower-income people making less than \$24,999 were more likely to vote in PB than in the 2009 elections.

D-C effectively mobilized those in the low-middle income bracket, \$25,000-\$49,999.

Many new and active citizens participated throughout the process as budget delegates.

The majority was brought into the process through the church networks within the Caribbean immigrant community.<sup>188</sup> 56% of PB voters reported they were born outside the U.S.

Active citizens and usual suspects from the Caribbean community made up the majority of participants in D-C, especially on the DC. Charlie asked the DC to mobilize the other portions of the district, particularly the Orthodox Jewish community. There was fear and resentment that those from the Orthodox Jewish community would mobilize for the vote and try to capture the process. As one usual suspect on the DC and a budget delegate noted, “I want police officers on our streets. I go to their [Orthodox Jewish] area and they have tons of police - why don't we have any of those?” Her concern about this community coopting the vote was rooted in the existing structural conditions she viewed as benefiting one portion of the district at the expense of her section of the district.

*District D (D-D):*

Population 2010: 38,309.<sup>189</sup>

8 Projects submitted online. 1,639 voters.

5 projects funded at \$1.35 Million.

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<sup>188</sup> The census, and therefore survey data, captures “Black or African American” not “Caribbean” etc.

<sup>189</sup> In the portion of the district where PB was implemented.

District D had less diversity along citizen typologies with greater socio-economic and racial diversity pertaining to the vote. D-D participants who self-identified as white were overrepresented in PBNYC; 68% of residents, 89% of neighborhood assembly attendees, and 89% of PB voters compared to 61% of voters in the 2009 elections. Those who self-identified as Hispanic or Latino comprised 14% of residents yet only 5% of neighborhood assembly attendees, 3% of budget delegates, and 4% of PB voters compared to 18% of voters in the 2009 elections. The majority of budget delegates (29%) were in the middle income \$35,000-\$49,999 bracket.

Residents from lower incomes were less represented in the neighborhood assemblies and budget delegate portion (less than \$10,000 - \$34,999) and became more involved in the PB vote. Voters in the \$15,000-\$24,999 income bracket made up 0% of voters in local election yet 4% of PB voters.

D-D mobilized the low-income portion of the district that lived in a New York City public housing authority complex (NYCHA). A white woman, self-identified as conservative, usual suspect chaired the DC and wanted to ensure that people from the housing complex were targeted for the vote; “I know our district is divided and I want to reach out to people who haven’t yet participated in PB to vote.”

Usual suspects made up the majority of participants with minimal racial diversity. Yet, these usual suspects were effective at mobilizing low-income, new citizens, who voted at higher rates for PB than for the 2009 general election. D-D brought in these new citizens in order to vote. D-D was less effective at bringing new and active citizens into the PB process as budget delegates or before the vote.

## 7.5 Comparing District Participation

The data shows that some districts, such as D-B, were more effective at mobilizing typically marginalized residents than other districts such as D-A. The data also shows that participation by demographics was not static. Across the four districts two conditions held constant: 1) budget delegates were middle-upper class and well educated with at least a High School Diploma or GED 2) diversity, racial and socio-economic, increased with the PB vote. The data showed that new citizens were more likely to participate in the least resource-demanding portions of PBNYC: neighborhood assemblies and voting.<sup>190</sup>

Districts contained variance on indicators of diversity: better at certain aspects of diverse participation and worst at others. D-A and D-C effectively brought in new and active citizens to be active participants in PBNYC in the form of neighborhood assembly attendees and budget delegates. Yet, the majority of these new and active citizens came from overrepresented demographics in the PB process such as the white and black/African American community respectively. D-B was the only district able to bring in new and active citizens throughout the entire PB process, including serving as budget delegates. The presence of Community Voices Heard in D-B is a possible explanatory variable. D-D was the least successful at mobilizing new and active citizens from a diverse background to participate in the process.

While D-D was the least successful at mobilizing new and active citizens to participate throughout the process, they were one of the most successful districts at mobilizing new

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<sup>190</sup> Quantitative and qualitative data show that participation in PBNYC is multifaceted not only along lines of civic experience (usual suspects/new and active citizens) but also along indicators such as race, SMS, and education. The criteria for diversity along civic engagement and demographic dimensions are not mutually exclusive. The data cannot capture the texture of which types of citizens participated at various points of the process. Thusly, illustrating some of the limits of quantitative research methods within civic engagements such as PBNYC.



and active citizens to vote. D-B also effectively mobilized new and active citizens to vote.<sup>191</sup> D-A and D-C were less successful at mobilizing new and active citizens to vote. The data shows that decisions about which pockets of a district to target for mobilization were idiosyncratic and did not follow a needs-based model. Rather, existing political structures, individual ideology, and local politics influenced mobilization decisions.

## **7.6 Challenges to Participation**

Even for participants able to navigate the existing bureaucratic structures and politics within districts in New York City, the demands of participation were still high.

Organizers of PBNYC were cognizant of the high costs of participation: "Really appreciate you taking the time to sacrifice your time as budget delegates," Pastor in D-C would note at the beginning of every meeting.<sup>192</sup> In this section I outline the multifaceted challenges to participation. The next section reaffirms existential rewards as sustaining consistent participation throughout the demanding process.

"PB will die on its own weight based on the sheer amount of meetings," described one DC and budget delegate. While she had served on a Community Board for decades, PB was a uniquely cumbersome form of engagement. The amount of meetings required to serve as a budget delegate or District Committee member were the greatest barriers to entry. Serving on a District Committee is a full yearlong commitment, requiring attendance roughly once a month. Budget delegates communicate weekly or daily and meet every other week for roughly four months. Large portions of budget delegates were also District Committee members. Attending a neighborhood assembly or budget

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<sup>191</sup> Is there a normative obligation to equally mobilize all portions of the districts for equitable representation? For example, did D-B face an obligation to mobilize for the vote typically franchised white, wealthier residents who were not proportionately represented in PBNYC?

<sup>192</sup> Someone in every district, either the Council member herself or a fellow staff or organizer, would thank participants at every meeting.

delegate meeting takes hours during the week when many people may have to work late afternoon/night shifts or take care of children. These meetings prized those who could afford childcare. Likewise, almost all District Committee meetings took place during the day, requiring flexible work schedules.

Further dissuading participation, resource barriers to involvement were coupled with feelings of government disillusionment. “Black people want to know why white people get government money in their communities; it’s because white people participate,” a Caribbean woman in D-C told me as she drove me to a subway at 11pm after a Budget Delegate meeting. She elaborated: “I try to tell people in my church to stop complaining about government and get involved. This is why I participate in PBNYC. We especially need to be here to look out for those who cannot in our community such as the youth and elderly.”

She viscerally understood reasons why members of her church community feel politically ineffectual. Yet she viewed their behavior, coupled with feelings of discontent in their resource allotment, as self-defeating. She struggled to encourage new citizens to participate in PBNYC, “I brought a few friends to an initial neighborhood assembly. They signed up to be budget delegates but stopped coming after the first meeting. They wanted to participate but had to take care of their children.” While able to encourage her congregants to take a leap of faith to attend a PB meeting, resource constraints proved too burdensome to sustain their involvement. Even overcoming the disbelief of civic engagements cannot account for the resource constraints of participation.

In contrast to other forms of civic engagement, participation in PB leads to binding results.<sup>193</sup> Therefore, citizens have a heightened level of responsibility with both positive and negative impacts for participation. For some who become galvanized by PB, the process presents seemingly endless opportunities for participation: attending Steering Committee sessions, District Committee, and budget delegate meetings as well as neighborhood assemblies and the vote. Some usual suspects or active citizens wanted to participate as much as possible while also feeling overwhelmed.

Feeling overwhelmed relates to the DC's dual rules: serving on a governance level of the process as well as serving as active participants.<sup>194</sup> The white woman in D-B, a paradigmatic usual suspect with years of community board experience, would often run in late to the budget delegate meetings vocally expressing her exhaustion from just having attended another civic meeting. "I can't believe I have to come to yet another meeting" she would sigh as she entered the budget delegate meeting. Yet, during the process of vote mobilization she wrote an extremely angry email to the entire DC and CM office expressing her outrage and dismay at how little power the budget delegates were given. On the one hand she wanted less involvement with the process and on the other hand wanted greater autonomy.

Therefore, even for participants able to overcome the barriers to entry, including disillusionment with politics and substantive resource costs, PBNYC participation has inherent tensions. For those who entered the process with a specific proposal, more than

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<sup>193</sup> In contrast to other forms of civic engagement where citizens serve a consultative or advisory role.

<sup>194</sup> In the original theory of the design members of the DC would not also serve as budget delegates or committees facilitators. Yet, in each of the four districts DC members subsumed active roles as budget delegates, many times as facilitators.

half of these proposals were not deemed viable and never made the ballot. Given all these obstacles the question emerges: *why* participate at all?

## 7.6 Why Participate?

Mother<sup>195</sup>: “We have an obligation to put forth projects to help our portion of the district – we are the people who have put in the time.”

Daughter<sup>196</sup>: “I disagree. We are public trustees and we have an obligation to put forth projects that will benefit as much of the entire district as possible.”

Mother: “But we are the neediest portion of the district.”

Daughter: “That is not necessarily true, we have a skewed vantage point.”

This conversation was overheard in a car ride between a mother and daughter in D-C.

The mother was a typical usual suspect who was engaged in many aspects of civic and church life and had personally brought many of the participants to PBNYC. She brought her daughter, a new citizen, familiar with civic life through her mother. The discussion also underpins the dual nature of PBNYC participation - serving as representatives or putting forth your own opinions/projects?<sup>197</sup>

If people are representatives of their districts what power are budget delegates endowed with for the process? In contrast to Brazilian PB where representatives were elected, the community did not elect budget delegates for PBNYC.<sup>198</sup> If people are representatives then are they “representative of the district” as a whole?<sup>199</sup> The data shows budget delegates were disproportionately from higher incomes than the district while the

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<sup>195</sup> Caribbean woman, usual suspect.

<sup>196</sup> Caribbean woman, new citizen.

<sup>197</sup> The difference of opinion may be due to the generational gap: the daughter was less versed in the community’s history of racial and socio-economic tensions.

<sup>198</sup> As discussed in Section 4.2, in Chicago PB representatives in theory were to be elected but in practice were self-selected. Learning from this, PBNYC started with a paradigm of non-elected representatives.

<sup>199</sup> Those who most actively participate in PBNYC are able to delineate boundaries for process engagement. These individual actors have the agency to determine whether or not they will think myopically about projects that will benefit them directly or whether or not they have an obligation as public trustees to their community. The value of projects addressing “greatest need” was discussed at initial information sessions before neighborhood assemblies by CVH and PBP but neither enforced nor brought up again during the process.

demographics of voters in some districts were more representative of low-income district populations. The process of PBNYC was not aiming for representative participation.<sup>200</sup>

Rather, self-appointed budget delegates raise the question: what are the incentives for participation beyond achieving success in the form of a material proposal? Without being elected, those who participate choose to sacrifice their own resources of time and oftentimes money, in the form of donations of food, printing flyers, and transportation costs to meetings. Are these people empowered to make their own decisions about the nature of the projects they should propose?

Assessing tensions between paradigms, individual interests and a public trustee, builds upon Chapter 2 norms of material and existential conditions for political participation. Throughout PBNYC, some people enter with specific projects or are employees of specific organizations proposing projects, while others enter for more existential and immaterial reasons. Some felt an obligation to be part of their community and be more engaged with their neighborhoods. Their engagement can be more easily characterized as existential, as opposed to material, because it relates to an existential longing for community and to feel connected to others.

For some, participation was predicated on an ideological commitment to a constraining democratic ideal. As one budget delegate in D-A noted, “PB should not be the place of basic things like bathrooms. PB should be the place we do progressive democracy.” This form of ideology falls on a spectrum in between material and immaterial motivations.

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<sup>200</sup> Many PBNYC organizers believe any participation is preferable to no participation prior to PBNYC. For those governing the PBNYC process, the *telos* of PBNYC is good within itself and therefore all form of participation are relatedly good.

Mapping engagement motivations onto citizens' pre PBNYC identity is tenuous. Some usual suspects came into the process with a specific project in mind and had the background of understanding the system to successfully implement it. Other usual suspects came in as ideologues or looking for more fulfilling forms of civic engagement that correlate to existential motivations. Many usual suspects were interested in the unprecedented opportunities for knowledge transfer about the New York City budget process through PBNYC.

Some active citizens came to deepen their community involvement or purpose a specific project. Rarely did new citizens come in with a specific material project; rather the majority of new citizens came into the process looking for some form of existential engagement. As new citizens lacked preexisting information about how the system worked, they were the least likely to have the information necessary to come into the process with a premeditated project.

It is difficult to categorize motivations for participation through typologies of engagement. Residents often have a confluence of motivations for engagement, some more conscious than others. Through the process of PB, residents may be transformed and their motivations for engagement may alter.

For example, as described in Chapter 6, the new citizen woman in D-B originally went into PBNYC to put forth a proposal of her employee. By the end of the process, she had formed new bonds with her neighbors and felt connected to deeper needs of her community beyond her material project. The existential desires for community engagement and connecting with her community trumped her original material reasons for engagement.

An active citizen in D-A, outlined in Chapter 6, whose creative proposal was ultimately dismissed, entered the process simply looking for more ways to be involved. Her initial involvement in PBNYC was propelled through an existential longing to seize a new opportunity to make a creative contribution to her community. She did not enter with a specific project proposal, but through the course of the process became impassioned about her project. While she entered for existential concerns it was her material project that led to her process disillusionment and disappointment when the hurdles to implementation far exceeded her expectations.

Many of the usual suspects in D-D experienced a similar trajectory of involvement. They became involved in PBNYC because they are the people who *always* get involved. They entered out of an existential longing to “be a good citizen”<sup>201</sup> in their tightknit community and hold up their bargain of the social contract to take responsibility for their locality.

Many of the usual suspects did not come into the process with a set project but rather collected ideas through the neighborhood assemblies that they then became advocates of. As the process progressed, the line was increasingly blurred between material and existential motivations for engagement.

Given that usual suspects typically entered with more information and experience, these information asymmetries had the potential to lead to process domination. Some usual suspects, as in D-D, assumed a pragmatic role and brought their civic expertise to expedite realistic project formation. Other usual suspects, such as in D-C, were impassioned about ideals and expressed their ideology for a specific democratic vision. Usual suspects provided a challenge for facilitation. Results oriented models of

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<sup>201</sup> Many usual suspects I spoke with expressed a feeling of obligation to their communities and expressed rhetoric about how being a “good citizen” means putting in the time in one’s own community.

facilitation were better suited to prevent usual suspects from dominating deliberation and decision-making. Process oriented models of facilitation allowed room for usual suspects to co-opt and manipulate discourse.<sup>202</sup>

As frustrations mounted, especially surrounding bureaucratic limitations, budget delegates continued to put time into the process because of connections formed with fellow citizens. The networks of engagement re-defined power dynamics, moreover – people enjoyed spending time with one another. For those who entered the process for a specific proposal, more than half of these proposals were not viable and never made the ballot. For these people, if they choose to maintain their involvement, as some but not all did, they did so for reasons beyond the material.

I classify these reasons for sustained continued involvement as existential and relating to a deeper desire to 1) gain insight into how city government works 2) forge connections with Council members and 3) forge connections with fellow residents. The same information leading to frustration, such as cumbersome bureaucratic rules, was part of the reasons citizens stayed involved. People involved in PBNYC would rather know information, albeit frustrating, than not know. For those who opt into PBNYC, being part of something, however flawed, is paramount.

I classify these three reasons as existential, while having material components, because the *telos* or end is not concrete. For example, in this classification citizens who want to forge connections with Council members are not doing it for a specific instrumentalist reason, such as to acquire funding for their organization. Rather, these three types of engagements stems from an existential desire to participate in one's community and make connections with another human being. Specifically, appearing before other human

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<sup>202</sup> See Section 6.4 for more information outlining these two facilitation typologies.



beings *qua* citizen, not in another capacity such as employer, employee, or caregiver (Arendt 1954). A large reason people participate in PBNYC is to act citizenly in this unique arena enabling them to appear and interact as a citizen.

## **7.7 Conclusion**

Avritzer (2005) argued material motivations for involvement; in contrast I argue participation was maintained because of transformative existential rewards. Despite considerable barriers to entry and obstacles to participation, citizens remained active participants in PBNYC. Existential citizenly rewards include: greater civic knowledge, strengthened relationships with elected officials, and greater community inclusion. Empirical results from PBNYC show that the less demanding forms of participation, such as the vote, were the most diverse. Some districts, such as D-B and D-C, mobilized a larger percentage of minorities than in the 2009 elections. D-A and D-D mobilized a larger percentage of higher income residents and whites to vote in PB than in local elections.

The motivations for why those with fewer resources, such as education and income, would be less likely to participate are interwoven with feelings of citizen efficacy (Warren 2001). In addition to perceptions of efficacy, the PBNYC process itself is resource intensive and frustrating. The demands placed on participants due to existing structural demographics within districts and bureaucratic design in New York City added to frustrations amongst participations.

The skillset required for intensive participation, such as serving a budget delegate, require both education and socialization typically associated with higher socio-economic status.

For example, every budget delegate committee used email as a communicative tool,<sup>203</sup> creating another barrier to entry. There is a broader process of socialization that involves being inquisitive about bureaucratic regulation, feeling comfortable speaking in groups, and feeling efficacious enough to devote this much time to a civic act. The ability to use speech as a communicative tool through reasoned arguments (Habermas 1989) is a learned behavior. The vote is the only portion of the PB process that does not require citizens to speak and appear before one another (Arendt 1954) – the process is private and not conducted in public.<sup>204</sup> Therefore, even though ostensibly all forms of participation were aimed to reflect the diversity of districts, there were many obstacles to diverse and broad participation throughout the phases of the process.<sup>205</sup>

For citizens able to bypass the considerable barriers to entry, participation itself resulted in frustrations and disillusionment. However, people retained their involvement due to the transformative citizenly effects of participation. Through the act of participating, people formed new relationship with their elected officials, neighbors, and community space. The high demands of participation also resulted in high levels of knowledge transfer whereby citizens leave with a unique civic education in politics. The summation of existential rewards resulted in citizens forging a communal identity, albeit frustrating, but collective identity sustained their involvement. The collective identity is the by-product of authentic and binding substantive participation fulfilling citizenly politics.

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<sup>203</sup> See 6.7 for more information about the utilization of technology in PBNYC.

<sup>204</sup> Furthermore, the vote is the only aspect of the PBNYC process that involves a single time commitment. 1) The private nature 2) lack of required public deliberation and 3) limited time commitment make the vote uniquely suited to attract the most amounts of participants. The vote requires the least prior socialized skills, such as using reasoned arguments or assessing complex bureaucratic codes. These aspects of the vote may make it more appealing for people who are typically disenfranchised as an entry point for civic engagement.

<sup>205</sup> Four phases of participation include: 1) member of the DC 2) serve as a budget delegate<sup>205</sup> 3) attend a neighborhood assembly 4) come out to vote.

Participation in PBNYC shows that despite the varying motivations of citizen types who enter into the process, the immaterial, or existential rewards, sustain their involvement.

PBNYC participation suggests the existent literature needs to expansively re-define rational intent for involvement beyond material motivations.

## Appendix 7.1 Participation broken down by district along ethnicity and SES.

The following data was self-reported by participants at disparate stages PBNYC. The categories match 2010 Census data including numbers for voters in 2009 elections. The respective numbers of people who filled out surveys for each part is reported.

### *District A:*

Population 2010: 154,341. 180 Projects submitted online. 2,213 voters. 7 projects at \$1.2 Million funded.

	Census Data	Neighborhood Assembly Attendees Surveyed (277 <sup>206</sup> )	Budget delegates Surveyed (102)	PB Voters Surveyed (1106)	Voters in 2009 local elections	Difference PB and NYC Voters
<b>American Indian or Alaska Native</b>	0%	7%	1%	1%	0%	+1%
<b>Asian</b>	13%	7%	6%	5%	4%	+1%
<b>Black or African American</b>	4%	4%	4%	3%	8%	-5%
<b>Hispanic or Latino</b>	14%	6%	10%	6%	11%	-5%
<b>Native Hawaiian/Other Pacific Islander</b>	0%	1%	1%	0%	N/A	N/A
<b>White</b>	66%	81%	89%	87%	55%	+32%
<b>Other<sup>207</sup></b>	3%	6%	6%	5%	0%	+5%

Figure 7.1A: Participation Demographics by Race. Census

data vs. PBNYC data in D-A *source: UJC*

<sup>206</sup> The “N” is in parentheses for each respective portion.

<sup>207</sup> Other including Asian American Indian, or Alaska Native or Other.

	<b>Census</b>	<b>Neighborhood assemblies Surveyed (277)</b>	<b>Budget delegates Surveyed (102)</b>	<b>PB Voters Surveyed (1106)</b>	<b>Voters in 2009 Elections</b>	<b>Difference PB and NYC voters</b>
<b>Less than \$10,000</b>	8%	2%	1%	1%	0%	+1%
<b>\$10,000- \$14,999</b>	6%	2%	3%	1%	1%	+1%
<b>\$15,000- \$24,999</b>	10%	4%	1%	2%	13%	-11%
<b>\$25,000- \$34,999</b>	8%	5%	7%	4%	18%	-14%
<b>\$35,000- \$49,999</b>	12%	10%	9%	6%	23%	-17%
<b>\$50,000- \$74,999</b>	15%	21%	17%	14%	37%	-23%
<b>\$75,000- \$99,999</b>	12%	14%	13%	16%	8%	+8%
<b>\$100,000- \$149,000</b>	15%	26%	30%	28%	0%	+28%
<b>\$150,000 or more</b>	9%	3%	0%	3%	0%	+3%

Figure 7.2A: Participation Demographics by Income. Census  
data vs. PBNYC data in D-A *source: UJC*

*District B:*

Population 2010: 162,743. 40 Projects submitted online. 1,048 voters. 6 projects at \$1.54

Million funded

	Census Data	Neighborhood Assembly Attendees Surveyed (272)	Budget delegates Surveyed (61)	PB Voters Surveyed (746)	Voters in 2009 local elections	Difference PB and NYC Voters
<b>American Indian or Alaska Native</b>	0%	3%	5%	2%	0%	+2%
<b>Asian</b>	6%	3%	2%	2%	2%	0%
<b>Black or African American</b>	23%	41%	50%	34%	31%	+3%
<b>Hispanic or Latino</b>	50%	46%	33%	50%	39%	+11%
<b>Native Hawaiian/Other Pacific Islander</b>	0%	0%	0%	1%	N/A	N/A
<b>White</b>	19%	14%	20%	17%	22%	-5%
<b>Other</b>	2%	5%	3%	2%	0%	+2%

Figure 7.3A: Participation Demographics by Race. Census

data vs. PB NYC in D-B source: *UJC*

	<b>Census</b>	<b>Neighborhood assemblies Surveyed (272)</b>	<b>Budget delegates Surveyed (61)</b>	<b>PB Voters Surveyed (746)</b>	<b>Voters in 2009 Elections</b>	<b>Difference PB and NYC voters</b>
<b>Less than \$10,000</b>	18%	22%	19%	22%	4%	+18%
<b>\$10,000- \$14,999</b>	9%	14%	19%	15%	24%	-9%
<b>\$15,000- \$24,999</b>	13%	13%	8%	12%	14%	-2%
<b>\$25,000- \$34,999</b>	9%	13%	6%	12%	25%	-13%
<b>\$35,000- \$49,999</b>	12%	13%	14%	15%	11%	+4%
<b>\$50,000 - \$74,999</b>	13%	12%	19%	10%	20%	-10%
<b>\$75,000- \$99,999</b>	8%	7%	8%	6%	1%	+5%
<b>\$100,000- \$149,000</b>	8%	3%	8%	5%	1%	+4%
<b>\$150,000 or more</b>	9%	3%	0%	3%	0%	+3%

Figure 7.4A: Participation Demographics by Income. Census data vs. PBNYC data in D-B *source: UJC*

*District C:*

Population 2010: 139,731. 17 Projects submitted online. 1,085 voters. 5 projects at \$1.35

Million funded.

	<b>Census Data</b>	<b>Neighborhood Assembly Attendees Surveyed (295)</b>	<b>Budget delegates Surveyed (52)</b>	<b>PB Voters Surveyed (479)</b>	<b>Voters in 2009 local elections</b>	<b>Difference PB and NYC Voters</b>
<b>American Indian or Alaska Native</b>	0%	0%	0%	2%	0%	+2%
<b>Asian</b>	3%	1%	0%	1%	1%	0%
<b>Black or African American</b>	76%	83%	84%	87%	79%	+8%
<b>Hispanic or Latino</b>	8%	4%	6%	6%	4%	+2%
<b>Native Hawaiian/Other Pacific Islander</b>	0%	0%	0%	0%	N/A	N/A
<b>White</b>	11%	7%	8%	7%	11%	-4%
<b>Other</b>	2%	6%	12%	6%	0%	+6%

Figure 7.5A: Participation Demographics by Race.

Census data vs. PB NYC in D-C *source: UJC*



	Census	Neighborhood assemblies Surveyed (295)	Budget delegates Surveyed (52)	PB Voters Surveyed (479)	Voters in 2009 Elections	Difference PB and NYC voters
<b>Less than \$10,000</b>	9%	11%	2%	8%	0%	+8%
<b>\$10,000- \$14,999</b>	5%	4%	7%	5%	2%	+3%
<b>\$15,000- \$24,999</b>	11%	5%	9%	8%	4%	+4%
<b>\$25,000- \$34,999</b>	11%	12%	9%	14%	19%	-5%
<b>\$35,000- \$49,999</b>	14%	16%	14%	15%	11%	+4%
<b>\$50,000 - \$74,999</b>	19%	21%	26%	20%	28%	-8%
<b>\$75,000- \$99,999</b>	12%	12%	14%	14%	1%	+13%
<b>\$100,000- \$149,000</b>	13%	14%	12%	6%	0%	+6%
<b>\$150,000 or more</b>	7%	6%	9%	7%	0%	+7%

Figure 7.6A: Participation Demographics by Income. Census  
data vs. PBNYC data in D-C *source: UJC*

*District D:*

Population 2010: 38,309<sup>208</sup>. 8 Projects submitted online. 1,639 voters. 5 projects at \$1.35

Million funded.

	<b>Census Data</b>	<b>Neighborhood Assembly Attendees Surveyed (117)</b>	<b>Budget delegates Surveyed (36)</b>	<b>PB Voters Surveyed (1379)</b>	<b>Voters in 2009 local elections</b>	<b>Difference PB and NYC Voters</b>
<b>American Indian or Alaska Native</b>	0%	1%	0%	1%	0%	+1%
<b>Asian</b>	3%	0%	0%	0%	6%	-6%
<b>Black or African American</b>	14%	5%	3%	3%	6%	-3%
<b>Hispanic or Latino</b>	14%	5%	3%	4%	18%	-14%
<b>Native Hawaiian/Other Pacific Islander</b>	0%	0%	0%	0%	N/A	N/A
<b>White</b>	68%	89%	94%	89%	61%	+28%
<b>Other</b>	2%	1%	0%	4%	0%	+4%

Figure 7.7A: Census data vs. PB NYC in D-B *source: UJC*

<sup>208</sup> In the portion of the district where PB was implemented.

	<b>Census</b>	<b>Neighborhood assemblies Surveyed (177)</b>	<b>Budget delegates Surveyed (36)</b>	<b>PB Voters Surveyed (1379)</b>	<b>Voters in 2009 Elections</b>	<b>Difference PB and NYC voters</b>
<b>Less than \$10,000</b>	8%	0%	0%	2%	0%	+2%
<b>\$10,000- \$14,999</b>	5%	0%	4%	3%	0%	+3%
<b>\$15,000- \$24,999</b>	8%	13%	0%	4%	0%	+4%
<b>\$25,000- \$34,999</b>	10%	2%	0%	8%	11%	-3%
<b>\$35,000- \$49,999</b>	13%	11%	29%	10%	42%	-32%
<b>\$50,000 - \$74,999</b>	17%	20%	17%	18%	40%	-22%
<b>\$75,000- \$99,999</b>	15%	14%	13%	19%	6%	+13%
<b>\$100,000- \$149,000</b>	16%	23%	21%	20%	1%	+19%
<b>\$150,000 or more</b>	10%	17%	17%	16%	0%	+16%

Figure 7.8A: Participation Demographics by Income. Census  
data vs. PBNYC data in D-D *source: UJC*

## Chapter 8: Participatory Budgeting Governance

How should the designers choose their approach? The natural answer is: deliberatively, through a process that might be called meta-deliberation (Thompson 2008, 515).

PB NYC created the opportunities for ordinary citizens to directly participate in process governance.<sup>209</sup> Despite the intention of the initiators, citizens participated in the design of participatory institutions. Some participated to enable opportunities for many. Yet, the process through which citizens participated in order to make participation possible did not conform to the ideals of deliberative democracy. Non-democratic approaches produced unprecedented opportunities for citizens to fulfill the first tenet of citizenly politics: design their own participation. This differs from traditional participatory innovation, whereby citizens simply show up to participate without shaping the structure of their participation.

In this chapter, I lay out 1) social actors 2) their interests and 3) values conflicts that created non deliberative power dynamics of governance while also providing innovative opportunities for citizens to shape the structure of their involvement. Within Chapter 7's citizen typology, PB NYC enabled new citizens, active citizens, and usual suspects groundbreaking ways to engage in politics. Multifaceted ecosystems<sup>210</sup> of participants shaped opportunities for citizens. I outline relationships between actors involved in governance because internal relationships amongst Council members relate to opportunities for ordinary citizens to be involved in process level decisions. I illustrate how process enactment differed from process theories. Civil society interest was largely

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<sup>209</sup> Ordinary denotes citizens who are not necessarily tied to an organizational structure.

<sup>210</sup> In contrast to previous literature on PB (see Chapter 3), I argue that understanding civil society within PB NYC requires understanding an entire ecosystem of power. Therefore, opportunities for ordinary citizens to participate in shaping the mechanisms of their engagement is related to power networks and dynamics between citizens and elected officials as well as intra-political factors between Council members. I call this an ecosystem, as they are all interconnected with related nodes. Movement within any one node impacts the entire ecosystem.

absent in governance, and in its place, were ordinary citizens. Throughout the discussions of process, actors infused their own ideology and tried to assert power in order to impose values. The dominance of ideology underscores the eminence of immaterial, or existential, factors in shaping the PBNYC process.

### **8.1 The Actors and Non-Actors**

The Citywide Steering Committee (SC) was created to design and oversee the PBNYC process, chaired by Community Voices Heard (CVH), Participatory Budget Project (PBP), and the Chief of Staff from Albert's office. There were three major stakeholders in the Citywide Steering Committee: (1) Council member offices (2) Community Voices heard (CVH), Community Engagement Lead and (3) The Participatory Budget Project (PBP), Technical Assistance Lead.

Roughly forty civil society organizations (CSOs) signed up to be on the Citywide Steering Committee.<sup>211</sup> The SC met roughly every other month to delineate basic governing questions surrounding PBNYC, such as voting requirements, rules surrounding participation, and structures for mobilization. In addition to these infrequent meetings was an email listserve rarely used for discussion. As a result, the majority of CSOs were only engaged in the process during bi-monthly meetings.

The theoretical framework for how the SC would operate did not take into consideration ordinary citizen participation. Citizens were not outlined to participate as members of the SC. The only form of citizen representation was CSOs that theoretically represent civil society. In reality, citizens from the District Committee (DC), from D-C and D-B, were involved in the governance of the process.

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<sup>211</sup> The exact number is difficult to determine because some groups tacitly agreed to be involved while others who made public pledges to be involved discontinued their involvement.




Figure 8.1: Theoretical structure of the SC




Figure 8.2: Actual structure of the SC

In the original theory of change, CSOs were an embedded part of governance serving on the SC. These CSOs represented organizations working on topics only tangentially related to civic engagement, such as immigration reform, education, and workers rights, to name but a few. These organizations faced the challenge of finding ways to tie PB into

their programmatic mission. As one CSO's leader working on women's rights told me, "I love PB. But I cannot find a way to justify to my board our involvement, and the involvement is significant." The time commitment on behalf of PBP and CVH was significant, and most staff hours spent working for PBNYC counted only as uncompensated volunteer work.

Several CSO leaders who sat on the SC wanted to be more active in the process but were unable to connect PB to their own organization's mission. Additionally, there were CSOs and community residents who opted to not participate in PBNYC because they either felt ideologically opposed to it or could not understand how the process connected to their organization's strategy.

The CSO Urban Justice Coalition (UJC) agreed to lead the Research and Evaluation team. UJC unsuccessfully requested grants to fund research, thus the UJC was volunteering its staff time to conduct the research and evaluation. As UJC continued to invest more volunteer hours in PBNYC, similar to CVH and PBP, expectations increased that PBNYC would produce positive outcomes. The desire to produce research that supported PBNYC was in tension with the desire to produce objective research to evaluate PBNYC impacts. Gianpaolo Baiocchi, amongst other experts on Participatory Budgeting, expressed dismay at the lack of objective rigor in the research and evaluation.<sup>212</sup> The lack of rigorous research was due in part to the low retention rate of scholars who signed up to assist in survey collection and analysis at the onset of the process.<sup>213</sup>

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<sup>212</sup> International Participatory Budget Conference, March 30, 2012.

<sup>213</sup> Some researchers were personally excited about PB and had small projects such as term papers they ostensibly wanted to do research for. The high costs of research involvement coupled with bounded nature

There are seven Community Board (CB) districts that overlap with the four council districts implementing PBNYC. These districts ostensibly were on the SC but, in reality, within each of the seven Community Boards were dissenting leaders. One reasons for dissent amongst CB leaders is the tenuous nature of CB power in New York City. In theory, CBs serve as advisory boards to review land use decisions and give opinions and feedback for the city to use. However, in reality, these non-binding recommendations are not enforced. According to a long-standing member from D-C, “the CB is all about relationships with folks. We have no legitimate authority but through relationship formation are sometimes able to influence decisions on an agency by agency basis.” Because CB powers are not enforced with legal accountability mechanisms, mayoral administrations have been able to delineate scope and influence of the CB. A chairman of a CB that intersects with Albert’s district explained that, “Under [Mayors] Koch and Dinkins we [the CB] could meet freely with city agencies and they would be honest about their shortcomings. Least transparent mayor I have ever seen is Giuliani—Bloomberg has been a bit better but not as transparent as it was under Koch.” CB members were concerned that PB would infringe upon their already precarious influence in city politics. In every individual district, CB members were invited to join the SC. One CB member in D-C said, “I was personally called by Charlie to get involved, I simply do not have any more time to spend on community engagement. The CB takes up a lot of time. I like Charlie, I think he is a good guy and trying to make the system better.”

Some members of the CB choose to not participate ostensibly due to limited time resources, others because of ideological opposition to PBNYC. The Chairman of a CB

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of projects resulted in a winnowed research and evaluation team where I was often the only researcher present at budget delegate, steering committee, or district committee meetings.



that overlaps with D-A notes:

I am skeptical of PB because it is only creating a Band-Aid solution. It is creating yet another apparatus which does not address the fundamental problems of our non-transparent budget process. The people involved in PB are not representative of the community. They do not know the needs of the community. The CB reps are continually, systemically thinking and breathing these problems.

CB members who choose not to support PB are dedicated to positive existential and material outputs that move beyond the current *status quo* budget in New York City. They agree with the material objectives of PBNYC, yet for reasons concerning power values and ideology they choose to not support the process. On the one hand, CB members worry that the process will not be effective enough to bring positive change over the traditional budget process. On the other hand, CB members worry that if the process is too effective it may diminish their already tenuous power.

The misperceptions of PB by civil society, such as those leading research and evaluation, as well as Community Board members, highlight inadequacies in the original theory of governance. Ordinary citizens filled in participation gaps left by civil society. One of the most pressing challenging for civil society involvement in PBNYC were conflicts of ideals and values.

## **8.2 Power Networks**

“This process is like sticking sharp needles in my eyes and then you realize why you do it - because people are coming up to the streets and hugging you,” noted a Chief of Staff for one of the Council members (CM) in a meeting of the Steering Committee (SC) in the City Council.

Why is a metaphor of pain followed by joy appropriate for PBNYC? I argue that the process of governance involved conflicting interests, ideologues, and power values that

were difficult and non-deliberative, yet this structure enabled affirmation and positive transformative participation over the *status quo* for all actors involved.<sup>214</sup>

One reason for the pain of governance relates to internal workings of the City Council as well as power dynamics and politics within each individual CM office. Power can be understood as a network with various actors connected as nodes, such as CMs, CSOs, and citizens.<sup>215</sup> The ability for disparate actors, such as citizens, to exert power is intricately related to other actor's power relations.

The existing networks of power for each Council member influenced the way they interacted with the process, especially at the governance level. Compounding impacts of power, each interested party came into the process with *a priori* value hierarchy and ideology. The ecosystem of values, power and ideals played out in many different relationships at the governance level. The next sections assess dynamics internally amongst Council members, which is connected to how Council members interacted with their District Committees. Relationships between Council members and District Committees enabled opportunities for ordinary citizens to participate in SC decision-making that deviated from the PBNYC theoretical process model.

### **8.3 Intra Council Members**

“We've always felt like the red-haired child of PBNYC.” - Chief of Staff for District-D.

The above quotation is in reference to Devon's status as the only Republican and District-D's geographic isolation from the rest of New York City. Council members Albert, Bernice and Charlie shared a comfort and closeness with one another they did not share

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<sup>214</sup> *Status quo* budget process and modes of participation.

<sup>215</sup> Informed by Hayward's definition of power: “A network of social boundaries that constrain and enable action for all actors” (Hayward 2000, 11). Gaventa's “powercube” visually depicts the networks of power, including its visible, hidden, and invisible forms (Gaventa 2007).<sup>215</sup> The powercube outlines the spatial and multi-level dimensions of power that existed within the ecosystem of PBNYC politics.

with Council member Devon. This was partially due to the Progressive Caucus the three sit on and similar causes they espouse. Another reason relates to pressure to appease the majority Democratic Party and the Speaker. As Democrats, Albert, Beatrice, and Charlie were beholden to the Speaker and encouraged to support her position, while Devon as a Republican had freedom to deviate from the Speaker. Council member Albert told me “the Speaker supports PB” though he receives a small amount of discretionary funds given his district need<sup>216</sup>. Council member Devon told me that the Speaker of the Majority Party had sent him messages threatening political ramifications if he continued to publicize the process. Devon mentioned that the Speaker unequivocally does not support PBNYC and views it “as a direct threat to her power.”

The following chart outlines the number of news articles mentioning a given CM and their respective involvement in PBNYC:

<b>Albert</b>	<b>Beatrice</b>	<b>Charlie</b>	<b>Devon</b>
80	19	23	17

Figure 8.3: Number of articles that mentioned CM and

PB.*source: UJC*

Albert had 300% more articles mentioning his involvement in PBNYC than Devon. Beatrice, Charlie, and Devon all receive a higher proportion of discretionary funds than Albert. They may have been distancing themselves publically from PBNYC in order to maintain a high level of discretionary funding. If the Speaker was not supporting PBNYC, she may express her dismay through the discretionary funding process solely controlled by her. Devon speculates, “The Speaker doesn’t like PB and its potential to undermine her political power through the discretionary funding process.”

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<sup>216</sup> See Section 5. 9 for more information regarding individual district capital fund allocation.

An internal meeting within the City Council, held during the budget delegate portion of the process, advertised PBNYC to other Council members to join for the second year.

While CMs would often publicly cite reasons for supporting PB to their constituency—such as community empowerment and engagement—they spoke differently about the process in front of other CMs.

The meeting began with PBP outlining process “pros and cons,” notable because after dozens of information sessions to the public, no cons had ever been discussed.

*Pros:*

community engagement and involvement  
support  
new volunteers

*Cons:*

staff time  
potential disengagement of citizens who get frustrated or community boards  
ideological reasons: CMs are elected and may not want to devolve power to residents

They presented a time break down required for staff. Either one full time person from October through March or obligations split 50% for a community liaison, 25% for a budget director, and 25% for a logistics chief of staff.

CM Beatrice: “The community board has been supportive and not hostile.<sup>217</sup> Given the diversity of my district it has been a huge learning experience for residents of my community who thought the need was greatest in some pockets only to learn other portions of the district had bigger need.”

CM Charlie: “Without a doubt the time commitment and staff resources are considerable. We lost our community liaison that had been tasked with PBNYC and we have been

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<sup>217</sup> As aforementioned, reality was much more complex with marked hostility from community board leaders who did not support PBNYC.

scrambling ever since. It is a huge undertaking from your district and you have to sacrifice other projects and priorities. The costs are worth it, but there are costs.”

When speaking to the Council, the three Democrats involved in PBNYC were less ideological and more realistic about staff time commitments required and framed the process in more opportunistic ways. While the CMs noted that PBNYC led to greater community engagement, they also stressed how this community engagement could be used to further a political campaign or strategy. In front of their constituents, CMs would neither cite these reasons for supporting PBNYC, nor would they articulate the extent of difficulties and strains of PBNYC on their staff. The intra-council discussion was the only place where they vocalized that PBNYC could pose a potential threat to traditional understandings of representational leadership. While the CMs did not present an answer to why a CM would devolve power to her constituents, they all pledged to support the process in the second year.

CM Albert explained:

Let me be clear, doing PBNYC requires not doing other things in your district, but in my estimation it is worth it. Out of all the community engagement projects I have done in my district none have resulted with as much positive feedback from citizens, who literally come up to me in the streets, to tell me how meaningful they find this process.

#### **8.4 CM and DC**

One level of power networks took place internally amongst Council members. Another level of power exists between individual Council members (CM) and the District Committees (DC) in charge of governance in each district. The dynamics of CM offices shaped the relationship with DC, which in turn impacted opportunities for ordinary citizens from the DC to inform Steering Committee (SC) decisions. Through these relationships, another network of power was formed with its own tensions. The varying

relations between the DC and CM differed in each of the four districts. While the variance created opportunities for engagement contrasted with deliberative democracy's equality norms, ordinary citizens had robust and unprecedented opportunities to participate.

The tensions can be understood through the level of control CM offices aimed to exert over the process (X axis) with the level of empowerment of the DC (Y axis).




Figure 8.4: CM Control vs. DC Empowerment

*District A (D-A):*

District A was unique amongst the four districts with both a highly controlling CM office as well as a highly empowered DC. D-A also was the only district with a full-time staff person assigned to PBNYC. D-A's approach was technocratic and the CM office scheduled budget delegate meetings to take place in specific locations. D-A made their own adaptations to the process including calling their second round of neighborhood assemblies an "Expo" as well as changing the ordering system for voting. The CM office

told the SC that these reforms reflected the desires of the CM. However, the CM office introduced these ideas for variation to the process—the DC did not organically envision them.<sup>218</sup>

Though the DC was empowered, they did not feel like they were empowered enough. Relative to the other districts, the DC was empowered and able to exert their own opinions and ideas into the process. However, the combination of the high levels of existing civil society networks coupled with a controlling CM left the DC frustrated by their seeming lack of influence. The DC were especially frustrated by bureaucratic regulations presented by agencies. Members of the DC who sat on budget delegate committees, sharing in the technocratic tendencies of their CM, wanted to correspond directly with the agencies. However, the CM wanted all communication to go through their office before it was funneled to the agencies for fear of overwhelming the agencies with individual requests. Members of the DC wanted to have more information and faulted their CM office for not giving them more specific information. DC members felt frustrated that they were not able to have greater agency over the nature of projects eligible for funding. Even though these requirements were mandated by city agencies, they still wanted more control and autonomy for implementing visionary projects in the city.

*District B (D-B):*

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<sup>218</sup> I attended a meeting where the DC questioned the Council member on the Expo and expressed dismay at not having an opportunity to incorporate citizen feedback, such as in a neighborhood assembly.

District B was unique amongst the four districts for striking a balance between CM control and DC empowerment. For example, the CM office scheduled a block of rooms at the City University of New York (CUNY) Graduate Center for budget delegate committees to meet, but there was wide variation in the types of neighborhood assemblies. Some took place in affluent community centers while others where in New York City housing authority projects (NYCHA). The DC was able to exert influence on the process trajectory as it pertained to different portions of the district. Thus, even though the DC exerted power, they did not dominate in shaping the process.<sup>219</sup>

In District B, Community Voices Heard, the lead organizing group running PB, was an intermediate variable wielding power and influence in the relationship between the DC and the CM. Community Voices Heard is based in a low-income portion of D-B, comprising the majority of the district, where it offered resources in the form of several interns who became de facto full time PBNYC workers on behalf of D-B. However, this put a lot of pressure on members of the DC from the two other portions of the district, the affluent predominantly white portion and the portion of the district living in New York City housing authority (NYCHA) public housing.<sup>220</sup> The two other portions of the district, without Community Voices Heard, were unable to match organizational resources.

District geographic stratification may have enabled representatives from each neighborhood of the district to feel empowered. The geographic diversity prevented the CM office from imposing top down norms pertaining to the entire district.

#### *District C (D-C):*

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<sup>219</sup> There was an intern in charge of the process who may account for the CM office organization without seeming controlling. Interns may be viewed as less power grabbing than government officials.

<sup>220</sup> Accounting for roughly 10% of district.



District C was unique amongst the four districts, as it had the least controlling CM office, largely due to lack of a staff member, and an empowered DC.<sup>221</sup> After the staff hired for PB quit early in the process the CM had limited resources available to devote to PB. Due to the dearth of leadership from the CM office, the DC became the main organizing presence, doing everything from securing venue space for all meetings to acquiring donations and doing publicity. After the first round of neighborhood assemblies, the DC called a meeting with Charlie and his staff to directly express their anger and frustration at the amount of work expected from them and lack of resources from Charlie's office.

At the meeting, attended by lead organizing groups; Participatory Budget Project and Community Voices Heard, the DC expressed their dissent. At this point, two foreign interns had been appointed to the PB process. The DC viewed these interns as illegitimate and disrespectful to the DC. As one member of the DC described, "I joined this process because Charlie called me and asked me to get involved. I thought I would be working directly with Charlie, not a 20 year old from Europe who doesn't know anything about our district or PB."

A prominent community leader, who personally invited a large portion of those on the DC, said, "We had no idea the amount of work that would be required of us. There were not clearly defined roles or responsibilities. It is extremely frustrating." The chair of the DC is a pastor, reflecting the tenor of civic life in D-C centered on the tightly knit network of Caribbean churches. The DC was mostly homogenous members from the Caribbean community. The majority of DC members knew each other before PB, some were family, and reached out to their personal networks to form the DC. The majority of

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<sup>221</sup> To what extent did the lack of a staff member become a way for Charlie's office to avoid responsibility for not having a more tightly organized approach?

the DC felt personally spurned by what they perceived as lack of respect and support from CM.

Charlie's office acknowledged the large commitment of time and resources from the DC, thanked them for their hard work, and promised to do more outreach to other community leaders and offer more office support. Partially due to dissent and partially because D-C was trying to find another staff member to replace the person who quit, they expedited the process of hiring a replacement and tasked this person with PBNYC. A new woman was hired toward the end of the budget delegate portion of the process and faced a steep learning curve as the vote was approaching. She had worked with the community, specifically youth, and brought youth into the process, but was also unfamiliar with PB. The relationship between the new staff hire from the CM office and the DC was fraught. On the one hand, DC members were glad to have someone to ease their work burden, while; on the other hand, this woman came in lacking legitimacy and tried to exert control and influence on the process. As one member of the DC noted, "We are glad she is hired, but wish she would let us handle this—we know this process better."

*District D (D-D):*

District D was unique amongst the districts for having the combination of a controlling CM with a moderately empowered DC. Part of the reason for this combination is the geographic isolation of the D-D, especially the portion participating in PBNYC. The Chief of Staff exerted an aggressive protectiveness over the process. He would have to personally open the district office in an isolated part of the district.<sup>222</sup> The DC was a closely-knit homogenous group of mostly middle class white Irish people who knew each

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<sup>222</sup> The distance from the City Council Legislative Office at 250 Broadway in Manhattan to this district office is a two-hour commute.

other for generations, including some family members. As one DC member told me, “I grew up with a lot of the people involved here, and all our parents grew up together too, we know the area’s needs well.” This closed environment produced dynamics where everyone knew one another and was already familiar with the issues and needs of the area before the process formally began.

After opening the office for meetings, the Chief of Staff would personally sit in on the various meetings and move from room to room during these meetings offering direct feedback. While originally skeptical about the process, through being so deeply enmeshed in the process he became a supporter. He said, “There is so much to take on, I am the Council member’s chief of staff and this consumed a lot of my time. I went from being a complete non-believer to a disciple.” He may have become a supporter of the process because of the large amount of time he personally invested into the process. D-D was the only district where all the work from the CM office came from one person without any other support staff or interns. Compared with the three other Council members, Devon was the least present Council member in the process. The threatening messages he received from the Speaker may be partially responsible for his curbed involvement.

The impact of CM-DC interaction resulted in each district having a unique flavor of PB. The micro-district ecosystems of power show how different CM ideologies and values influence process execution. The DC process did not conform to the values of deliberation in so far as every DC presented equal opportunities for engagement. Instead,

there was wide variance of participation.<sup>223</sup> Though not equally empowering all DC members city wide, in some districts the DC led to innovative opportunities for ordinary citizens to inform mechanisms of involvement, interact with elected officials, and exert influence over the process.

### **8.5 Steering Committee (SC)**

The dynamics of power, values, and ideology influenced each individual portion of governance, ranging from intra-council relations to those between Council members, their staffs, and District Committees. Each ecosystem of influence forms the tapestry for how ordinary citizens were able to exert extraordinary influence on the Steering Committee (SC). The practice of involving ordinary citizens in the SC differed from the norms of the SC.

The leads of the project, Participatory Budget Project and Community Voices Heard, tried to set up a SC structure conforming to deliberative democracy ideals. The rules of the SC aimed to impose a structure to enable equal voices are heard in a democratic way.

An initial meeting of the SC devised governance rules:

**One vote per organization.**

**Each group can have up to two reps.**

**Less up and down voting, more deliberative models and breaking up into small groups.**

**The CM has final veto power.**

Rule formation was paradigmatic of the SC paradox. The only people in attendance at the SC meeting to determine rules were the Chief of Staff from District-D, two representatives from Participatory Budget Project, a researcher from the Pratt Institute, and myself. A group not decided upon by deliberative democratic methods determined

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<sup>223</sup> The variance raises a question as to what degree aspects of the process should be centralized through the SC without allowing for district-level variation. Should quality control come at the expense of district autonomy?

rules aimed to enforce deliberative democratic ideals. While theoretically democratic, in reality, those who showed up wielded the majority of the power.<sup>224</sup>

The structure of the SC was based around morning bi-monthly meetings. In reality, many decisions regarding the process were made on the ground within districts at evening neighborhood assemblies and budget delegate meetings. In these meetings ordinary citizens exerted more influence over the process than organizations ostensibly “running” the process.

The CSOs’ part of the original theory of SC engagement (see Figure 1) were replaced by ordinary citizens (see Figure 2) who put in the time that the CSOs did not.

As ordinary citizens became more involved in the process than CSOs, they were able to weigh in on high-level SC process decisions such as those surrounding voting requirements. Citizens participating in these SC deliberations were given unfettered access to elected officials and the inner workings of government. Citizens also witnessed how heated debates ostensibly about material conditions, such as voting requirements, were actually tied into non-material, or existential, values, ideals, and prerogatives.

One such ideological dispute took place at the SC meeting held at the City Council to determine voter eligibility. Tensions over ideals emerged between maximum inclusion and maximum verification advocates. Interwoven into this discussion were actors exerting their prerogatives and concerns about reputation and legitimating PBNYC. A discussion emerged between how strict voter requirements should be at the voting

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<sup>224</sup> The issue of quorum and having a certain percentage of the SC present to change the structure of PBNYC was discussed at this small meeting. The percentage was neither finalized nor would have been enforceable given the drop-off rate of SC attendance at meetings.

sites.<sup>225</sup> An earlier manifestation of this argument had been previously decided when the four Council members agreed to limit voting to all residents of the community who were over 18 years of age but were not necessarily formal citizens.

Staff distribution was typical of SC meetings, with CM Albert's staff dominating in terms of both numbers of staff, interns, and expertise.<sup>226</sup> DC members from D-B and D-C were in attendance. This meeting of the SC took place in the middle of the period of frustration and dissent within D-C, as previously outlined.

The district offices had the following representation:

D-A: Three staff members and one intern: Chief of Staff, budget director, one member of the DC, one full time PB staffer.

D-B: One staff member and two interns: Budget director deeply involved in the PB process and one full time intern in charge of PB. One member of the DC.

D-C: One staff member, two interns, three members of the DC: Budget director not engaged in the PB process and two full time interns recently assigned to the process.

D-D: One staff member: Chief of Staff and CM showed up toward end.<sup>227</sup>

PBP: "Simple version someone with a current driver's license current D.O.B., more complicated in which people have two of those things on any document, proof of residency versus proof of I.D.?"<sup>228</sup>

UJC: "Do you think it would be cumbersome for two forms of I.D.?"

DC Member (D-C): "Two is cumbersome, we need to make this process not intimidating to people, especially to non-citizens."

CVH: "Only two if you don't have driver's license or with gov issued I.D."

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<sup>225</sup> An original debate about voting eligibility was decided early on in the process, before the SC was formed and without input from other actors. Participants in the process could be 16 years old and need only be stakeholders in the community. This debate was an example of the legitimacy of the process in tension with the goal of maximum inclusion. Devon and his office, taking a libertarian stance, were concerned with process legitimacy. Albert, Beatrice and Charlie exhibited their ideology as former community activists and organizers and wanted greater civic mobilization. The resultant rules were viewed as a compromise, as Beatrice publically said, "I wanted the voting age to be 16 and potentially open to stakeholders, not just residents."

<sup>226</sup> At most meetings, CM Albert was present in addition to three members of his staff.

<sup>227</sup> The organizers were visibly shocked with Devon came and in and expressed their shock to me after the meeting.

<sup>228</sup> Date of Birth (D.O.B.) and Identification (I.D.).

CM Staff (D-C): "This is on the money, this will be okay if you are homeless, we got bases covered—how did process go in Chicago?"

PBP: "Anyone who came was basically not turned away. Everyone was able to demonstrate residency, checked voter list, if someone isn't on that they checked out. Checked list first."

Intern: "If there is someone in a shelter they are registered, if they are sleeping in the district

PBP: "In practice people have an ID."

CM Staff (D-A): "Last ID is two people swearing an affidavit that we have people swear they live in the district."

*Everyone agrees.*

CM Staff (D-C): "Nice work brother."

The operationalization of voter eligibility veered into a conversation about merits of such requirements and how strictly they ought to be enforced at each individual voting site. A debate between two members of the SC took the following form:

DC member (D-B): "This process is about empowerment and deep participation, we should aim to have voting requirements as lenient as possible."

CSO representative: "While I want to encourage participation we need to protect the process and make sure it is legitimate, just the potential that there is double voting will undermine our credibility. My biggest fear is that this is viewed as out of control—we need to inoculate ourselves in advance to any criticism."

The CSO representative works for an organization specifically focused on greater civic engagement and voter inclusion. Her commitment to values of legitimacy was to safeguard the process so that it could potentially be scaled up for greater civic ends. She was not against voter mobilization, but rather had worked in this space long enough to understand the types of criticism the vote could receive. The DC member was a long-time Community Board member whose background informed his ideals: empowerment above all. Their debate illustrates power values aimed for similar material ends, such as

civic engagement taking multi-faceted immaterial manifestations.<sup>229</sup> Illustrating that citizen input,<sup>230</sup> even for similar ends, can be discursive.

Citizen input offered unique insights into a series of difficult questions that emerged on potential vote scenarios. What happens if there is a run-off between two projects? What if the CM does not have enough discretionary funds, which are only determined in late June, to fund the projects voted upon?

CM Staffer (D-A): “We won't know what we are funded until June, we want to do what will benefit the most members of the community. I don't want to make commitments that we can't keep because we do have other things in the pipeline.”

CSO representative: “We should finance whatever is next, not realistic that's how real budget decisions are made, want to teach people about the budget proposal. If there is a tie doing the one that is fully funded.”

DC Member (D-C): “We have to be very clear to publicize how this process will shake out in the end otherwise you will disillusion everyone and they won't want to participate in the future.”

The discussion underscores tensions and manifestations of power that run contrary to the original design and conception of the SC.<sup>231</sup> Direct citizen input was not in the original design of the SC. Yet, citizens became active participants able to exert power over conflicts of ideology and interests. Citizen feedback was effective at ensuring the SC did not make decisions out of CM prerogative. Citizens also provided an invaluable understanding of how the process may be perceived by their fellow neighbors.

Citizens articulated their interests at the level of structuring how the PB process ran. The involvement of citizens in the SC shows both the strengths and weaknesses of the SC structure. Citizens can mitigate the presence of ideology but cannot answer the question

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<sup>229</sup> Ideological or normative.

<sup>230</sup> In the form of both DC members and CSOs representing civic interests.

<sup>231</sup> Accepting Hayward's definition of power as the “network of social boundaries that delimits, for all, fields of possible action,” the SC creates a network that delimits the sphere of power for those who show up (Hayward 2000, 27).



of *why* the SC is empowered to make high-level governance decisions in the first place.<sup>232</sup>

The unexpected participation of ordinary citizens on the SC suggests that the most authentic way to have a participatory democratic innovation is to allow opportunities for citizens themselves to construct the rules of engagement. Due to the power networks formed by prerogative, interests, and ideals, the governance of PBNYC will neither be fully deliberate nor transparent. However, the presence of ordinary citizens in the SC are a step toward making the governance level of the process more aligned with the theoretical goals and values of the process.<sup>233</sup>

Citizens who participated on the SC spanned the citizen typology outlined in Chapter 7: usual suspects, active citizens, and new citizens. The majority of those who ended up participating in SC were usual suspects. Yet, there were notable exceptions of active and new citizens whose first experience with civic engagement was crafting the mechanisms for their engagement through the SC. PB produced unprecedented opportunities for civic engagement for all citizens who participated on the SC. For active and new citizens, SC engagement will forever be paradigmatic of how citizens can inform and *design* their own modes of political participation.

## 8.6 Conclusion

Diana Mutz (2008) posits that deliberation is in tension with participation because people are risk averse.<sup>234</sup> Yet, the governance of PBNYC suggests that deliberation and

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<sup>232</sup> How participatory and democratic can PBNYC be when the people did not ordain the process? Rather the process was imposed top-down onto the citizens by a group of organizers and Council members.

<sup>233</sup> For the second year of PBNYC, two citizens per district, who had been on the DC, were asked to serve as representatives to the SC. There was a 100% turnout rate of citizens appointed to the SC as representatives for the second year.

<sup>234</sup> Chapter 6 effectively changes the terms of Mutz's debate by presenting process and results orientated deliberation.

participation face a different tension: participation may come at the expense of the process' deliberative norms. PBNYC produced opportunities for deliberation and *more* opportunities for substantive participation than initially envisioned. These models differed from the normative paradigm of PBNYC that aimed for deliberative, democratic design. However, in practice, richer deliberation and participation stemmed from a less deliberative governance model.

Through multifaceted ecosystems of power, new opportunities for engagement occurred that deviated from the original theory of governance. Some citizens from District Committees were able to exert influence over how the process was structured and executed. The ability for citizens to be involved at the structural level of their participation charted a new opportunity for citizen engagement, fulfilling the first tenet of citizenly politics. Through these new mechanisms, citizens can be the architects of their participation delineating new paradigms for participatory democracy.<sup>235</sup>

Yet, the process through which citizens influenced the Steering Committee was undemocratic. The reasons certain citizens attended SC meetings over others was idiosyncratic and based on micro-level factors in each district. Many more citizens would have participated in the SC had they been offered the opportunity.<sup>236</sup> Therefore, even through these substantive new opportunities for participation, PBNYC illustrates: “The internal conflicts problem, which necessitates recognizing that the conditions that promote some values of deliberative democracy may undermine other values, including

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<sup>235</sup> As outlined earlier, while there are many opportunities for citizens to participate in politics, none offer as robust elements for citizens to participate as designers of their involvement. Informing mechanisms for their engagements offers an unprecedented degree of self-determination within participatory democratic innovations.

<sup>236</sup> As evidenced by the 100% turnout rate of citizens appointed to the SC as representatives for the second year.

some that deliberative democrats favor” (Thompson 2008, 500). However given the robust opportunities for participation, PBNYC challenges even the most fervent proponents of process values matching implementation norms.

## Chapter 9: The Vote

The whole reason deliberative democracy is normatively desirable is because it is thought to produce tangible benefits for democratic citizens and societies (Mutz 2008, 523).

What type of tangible benefits does PBNYC produce for citizens? I have argued that there are existential and material reasons for engagement. Many of the existential reasons for engagement are tied to relationships formed throughout participation and deliberation. Yet, for both critics and evangelists of PB, the tangible material outcomes from PBNYC will impact future scholarship and implementation of PB as well as other empowered deliberative democratic innovations.<sup>237</sup>

This chapter describes projects voted upon by residents in districts implementing the treatment of PBNYC for FY 2012-2013. I apply the typology of “innovative” and “conventional ” projects, used to evaluate Chicago PB projects in Chapter 4. Innovative projects are those that are more creative than typical capital funded projects.

Conventional projects are in line with typical capital funds projects but are more specific in both implementation and spatial need. 62% of the projects voted upon fall under the conventional category. Conventional projects directly challenge critics who contend that citizens cannot make rational, pragmatic, and informed public policy decisions. Through the PB process, projects were oftentimes more fair and accurate in assessing district needs than they were as a result of traditional non-transparent budget processes.

In contrast, matched pairs not implementing PB had innovative projects 15% of the time. I employ a difference-in-difference approach whereby capital projects selected in non-PB implementing districts for FY 2012-2013 are directly compared to projects selected by PB implementing districts.

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<sup>237</sup> See Section 2.1 for more information on Erik Olin Wright and Archon Fung’s (2001) *Empowered Deliberative Democracy (EDD)*.

The projects selected through PBNYC suggest that when citizens are offered tools for empowerment they use them pragmatically, and are able to isolate hyper-local needs more effectively than the *status quo*, or traditional budget process. Even the *most* innovative PB projects disprove critics who contend that ordinary citizens are not able to effectively understand the intricacies of city budgets or put forth rational proposals. PB districts produced results no worse than non-PB districts, and in many ways chose projects that assess community needs more creatively and effectively. The PB process enables people to legitimate new projects. In turn, the resultant viable projects confer legitimacy onto the PB process itself.

### **9.1 The Voting Sites**

For the process of voting each District Committee (DC) picked various locations, many of them where neighborhood assemblies were held, to conduct voting over the course of a week. Each of the local Council member district offices also had voting throughout the week. Districts instituted special voting days and times to accommodate distinct populations; D-A and D-D added Sunday voting for Orthodox Jews while D-B added early morning voting for the elderly. Each of the voting sites differed in layout with all containing posters throughout the wall of different projects. Some voting spaces were larger than others, enabling larger colored posters. Other smaller sites had smaller 8" x 11" black and white posters.

Each voting site consistently had volunteers, mainly DC members and budget delegates, checking people in and handing them both a ballot and a survey compiled by the research and evaluation team. The volunteers asked for proof of residency or a sworn affidavit, as decided at a contentious meeting of the SC recounted in Chapter 8. Some sites had a

computer with a “Google Document”<sup>238</sup> where people would enter in voter information so as to prevent people from voting twice at multiple locations throughout the district. However, these rules were not strictly enforced and people were not turned away from voting. On the contrary, people were encouraged to vote – even residents who were at the voting site for another meeting unaware of PBNYC.

The ballots were designed by the Center for Urban Pedagogy (CUP) and featured interactive images depicting various projects. The ballots each folded open and residents were given a number of projects to choose from, pending how many projects were on the ballot in each district. There was no weighing of votes. Residents were then given an opportunity to walk around the voting site, look at posters, and sit at tables to fill out their ballots and surveys.<sup>239</sup> The SC had made rules prohibiting speaking on behalf of a specific project at the voting sites. The only time organizers spoke was when there was a question about translation.<sup>240</sup>

Some voting sites also had a number of spectators. One of the main voting days took place during the first ever International Participatory Budget Conference organized to coincide with the vote. Researchers and practitioners of democratic innovation worldwide came to view the vote and asked voters questions about the process.

## **9.2 The Winning Projects**

This section outlines where capital funds were spent in the four districts that implemented the treatment of PB. Within each district is a direct comparison between those projects

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<sup>238</sup> Documents run on a Google site that can be updated in real time. Therefore, data entered throughout various voting locations can be simultaneously updated.

<sup>239</sup> Voters theoretically had the option of completing their ballots in private, although this option was neither publicized nor utilized.

<sup>240</sup> While in theory they were supposed to be translators available at each location, in reality many voting sites lacked translators.

implemented before and after PB. In order to isolate the effects of PB on a district, I organize capital projects in both PB and non-PB districts in the year before and after the treatment of PB is introduced. In the first instance I categorize projects with the five most salient categories: education, arts/culture/libraries, parks and recreation/housing and other. However, simply analyzing the number of projects does not account for textured variation about the nature of projects PB can induce. Therefore, in the second instance I implement the typology of projects used in Chapter 4 to assess PB Chicago. My typology includes a coded index to distinguish between “Conventional” (C) and “Innovative” (I) projects. Conventional projects do not substantially deviate from *status quo* projects in non-PB years, with the exception that citizens now specify where or how to implement the project. “Innovative” (I) projects address community needs more creatively than *status quo* budgeting in non-PB years.

The functionality of these two categories differs; for example, conventional projects are typically more pragmatic and foundational for a community. Examples include technology for a school. In contrast, innovative projects are more creative and add to the quality of life to an area but without which an area would still be able to function, such as a community arts center.

Conventional projects within the context of PB are informative because they take projects that would already be implemented through capital funds, such as sidewalk repair, and contextualize them to a specific street that has been determined by citizens. Thus, conventional projects suggest that citizens, based in their own local community, are the ones best able to assess district need.

The selected projects are a lens to understand the entire PB process, including budget delegates project formation, as well as the process of being a voter. Throughout the budget delegate process, as recounted in previous chapters, there was institutional pressure from both city agencies as well as from Council members offices to create viable proposals. Throughout the process was internal pressure from PBNYC organizers, Council members, and fellow residents to propose projects that would be practical for the community and had a likelihood of getting selected, with D-C as the notable exception. Many budget delegate groups made strategy a critical component of project selection. For example, in D-D, the Council member's Chief of Staff encouraged three schools to bundle together for a technology package. The idea was that by putting together schools strategically, some with high need and other with less, education would have a better chance of winning.

*PB and Non PB Districts:*

	PB Districts								Non PB Districts							
	Before (FY 2012)				After (FY 2013)				Before (FY 2012)				After (FY 2013)			
	A	B	C	D	A	B	C	D	W	X	Y	Z	W	X	Y	Z
Education	24	12	24	7	24	6	27	23	0	3	5	27	13	4	21	25
Arts/Culture/Libraries	2	5	1	3	2	5	1	3	0	24	0	2	0	17	4	1
Parks and Rec	6	0	2	2	6	0	2	2	4	0	3	1	1	3	3	4
Housing	1	2	1	0	1	13	1	0	0	3	0	5	0	1	0	0
Other	3	0	0	0	6	2	0	8	2	0	1	0	4	1	0	0

Figure 9.1: PB and Non-PB Districts in FY 2012 and 2013.

The data from PB and Non-PB districts in years before PB (FY 2012) and after PB (FY 2013) illustrates that PB does not significantly alter the categorical distribution of capital projects in aggregate. For PB implementing districts, projects before and after PB have a similar distribution on average, yet individual PB districts experience category variation. D-B implemented 50% fewer education projects and over six times as many housing projects. D-D implemented more than three times as many education projects. Notably,



the distribution of arts/culture/libraries and parks and recreation projects remain identical within PB implementing districts in years before PB (FY 2012) and after PB (FY 2013). Likewise, non-PB districts show consistent distribution over two fiscal years with little variation on aggregate. Yet, a few districts experienced notable changes in allocation. D-W implemented no education projects in FY 2012, but implemented 13 in FY 2013. D-Y had more than four times the number of education projects in FY 2013 than FY 2012. D-Z had 5 housing projects in FY 2012 while none in FY 2013.

Capital projects broken down in the aforementioned categories show little impact from the treatment of PB, in either PB implementing districts or non-PB matched pairs.

However, when looking at the specific nature of projects chosen through PB, the innovative aspects of PB projects shine. The following section outlines a difference-in-difference approach within districts implementing PB to analyze the nature of PB produced projects.

#### *PB Districts:*

The following present an in-depth textured comparison of projects in D-A, D-B, D-C, and D-D before and after the treatment of PB. The specific natures of projects are outlined to articulate how introducing PB alters specific capital projects in a district.

<b><i>District A (pre PB)<sup>241</sup> FY 2012</i></b>	<b><i>District A (PB) FY 2013</i></b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• PS<sup>242</sup> Bathrooms Repairs (\$225,000)</li> <li>• Green infrastructure installation on street (\$50,000)</li> <li>• Playground renovation (\$250,000)</li> <li>• MS library technology upgrade (\$100,000)</li> <li>• Construction of historically-compatible Pedestrian Islands (\$200,000)</li> <li>• Grant for technology purchases for 22 public school (\$35,000 total cost \$770,00)</li> <li>• Affordable Housing Energy Retrofits &amp; Rehabilitation (\$200,000)</li> <li>• Initial Outfitting of Arts Media House (\$35,000)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Innovative community composting system near Canal to turn 1 ton/day of food waste into soil (\$165,000) (I)</li> <li>• Planting 100 new trees on blocks throughout the district with few or no trees (\$100,000) (I)</li> <li>• New technology for two PS (\$140,000) (C)</li> <li>• Repairing Park pedestrian paths to prevent flooding, and adding trash cans in the park (\$205,000) (C)</li> <li>• Repairs and safety improvements at the dangerous intersection - Expressway pedestrian crossing (\$200,000) (C)</li> <li>• New books and equipment for public library to enhance the branch's use for meetings, storytelling, rehearsals, and small performances promoting area's cultural diversity (\$80,000) (I)</li> <li>• Renovation of two dysfunctional bathrooms at PS (\$150,000, 958 votes) (C)</li> </ul>
<b><i>District B (pre PB) FY 2012</i></b>	<b><i>District B (PB) FY 2013</i></b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• School technology (laptops, smart boards) (\$660,000)</li> <li>• Rooftop garden at PS (\$500,000)</li> <li>• Security systems at NYCHA projects (\$975,000)</li> <li>• Branch Library (\$700,000)</li> <li>• Two senior centers (\$150,000)</li> <li>• Skate Park (\$350,000)</li> <li>• Latino Cultural Center (\$450,000)</li> <li>• Museum of African Art (\$200,000)</li> <li>• Housing/school project (\$500,000)</li> <li>• ArtSpace project/PS (\$250,000)</li> <li>• Community Health Center (\$81,890)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Transportation for Seniors and Meals-on-Wheels Delivery Van (\$100,000). The transportation and Meals-on-Wheels vans will be operated by Union Settlement Association. (I)</li> <li>• Security Cameras in Several New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA) Developments (\$525,000) (C)</li> <li>• Playground Improvements (\$500,000) (C)</li> <li>• A Home for Community Center/ Charter School (\$250,000) (I)</li> <li>• Ultrasound System for Hospital (\$105,000) (I)</li> <li>• New Technology for New York Public Libraries (\$60,000) (C)</li> </ul>

<sup>241</sup> Council member Albert posted on his blog that in addition to the projects voted upon; “I am committed to push forward on several other projects on the ballot that did not receive enough votes to qualify for a share of the \$1 million, but around which community residents have coalesced.” Five projects were listed including “bus countdown clocks,” specific street repairs, and community access to wireless internet (WiFi).

<sup>242</sup> Public School.

<i><b>District C (pre PB) FY 2012</b></i>	<i><b>District C (PB) FY 2013</b></i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Security lights in Park (\$250,000)</li> <li>• Converting multipurpose field in Park (\$500,000)</li> <li>• Phase 2 reconstruction asphalt multipurpose play area at Park (\$800,000)</li> <li>• Furniture and equipment at Library (\$400,000)</li> <li>• Library collection and technology at Grad Center for Worker Education (\$100,000)</li> <li>• Affordable housing project in conjunction with Borough President (\$250,000)</li> <li>• Technology upgrades at 21 schools (\$735,000)</li> <li>• Technology and Field locker renovation at High School (\$235,000)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The installation of two security cameras at several locations district-wide (400,000) (C)</li> <li>• Funding towards the purchase or renovation of a space for a proposed community resource center (35,000) (I)</li> <li>• The installation of flood lights in each park in the district (350,000) (C)</li> <li>• The purchase of desktops, laptops, a security cart and a smartboard for students at P.S. (245,00) (S/I<sup>243</sup>)</li> </ul>
<i><b>District D (pre PB) FY 2012</b></i>	<i><b>District D (PB) FY 2013</b></i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• \$200,000 Technology Upgrades in 2 schools.</li> <li>• \$300,000 HS for Environ. Sustainability Tech Upgrades &amp; Carpentry Room</li> <li>• \$200,000 Scholars' Academy Tech Upgrades</li> <li>• \$400,000 Outdoor Showers and Drinking Fountains on Beach Boardwalk (Parks to provide matching funds)</li> <li>• \$300,000 Street Roller Rink Repairs</li> <li>• \$600,000 Removal of Beach Pylons</li> <li>• \$605,000 Construction of YMCA Community Center (partial funding)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Technology Upgrades at 4 schools (400,000) (C)</li> <li>• Cascade (Oxygen Refill) System for Volunteer Fire Departments (I)<sup>244</sup></li> <li>• Water Pump for Volunteer Fire Departments to Alleviate Flooding (C)<sup>245</sup></li> <li>• Pagers for Four Volunteer Fire Departments (C)<sup>246</sup></li> <li>• Handicapped Bathroom Upgrade (C)</li> <li>• Gazebo-Bandstand/Outdoor Performance Space on Shorefront Parkway (150,000) (I)</li> <li>• Library Vending Machine (200,000) (I)</li> <li>• Six Security Cameras (3 locations) (100,000) (C)</li> <li>• Library Renovation/Upgrade at Library Branch (500,000) (C)</li> </ul>

### 9.3 Innovative vs. Conventional Projects

<sup>243</sup> Desktops and laptops are conventional, but the addition of the security cart and smartboard are innovative.

<sup>244</sup> Allocation amounts not yet available.

<sup>245</sup> Ibid.

<sup>246</sup> Ibid.

The combination of needs and strategy resulted in budget delegates forming projects where practicality often triumphed. Of 31 total projects, 62% were those that I categorize as conventional and 38% innovative. The higher percentage of conventional projects suggests that PB encourages people to think pragmatically about where to place projects for maximum impact in their area.

There were several reasons for putting forth pragmatic proposals, including pressure from city agencies and CM offices about making strategic choices to maximize votes.<sup>247</sup>

The high number of conventional projects--62%--in line with typical capital funding in non-PB years shows that PB districts produced no worse results than non-PB districts.

The innovative projects, uniquely reflecting community needs, suggest that PB districts in fact produced better projects. PB enables district need to be assessed more fairly, and oftentimes more accurately, than the traditional non-transparent funding process as reflected in both conventional and innovative projects.

What does the nature of projects inform about citizen involvement in PB? For some participants, the PB process was too heavily structured and prevented them from putting forward the innovative and inventive proposals they desired. The proposals I categorize as innovative were those that deviated from the norm of capital funds. While these projects differed from those typically assigned during the capital funds process, they were still projects centered on pragmatic community needs. Take, for example, the following innovative projects from each district:

D-A: Planting 100 new trees on blocks throughout the district with few or no trees  
(I)

D-B: Ultrasound System for Hospital (I)

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<sup>247</sup> See 6.6 for more information.

D-C: Funding towards the purchase or renovation of a space for a proposed community resource center **(I)**

D-D: Gazebo-Bandstand/Outdoor Performance Space on Shorefront Parkway **(I)**

Each one of these projects is vital to community interests, though would not have been implemented without PBNYC. None of them radically depart from capital projects in previous years. They do however offer a unique vision of self-identified community needs. They represent projects that differ only slightly from standard projects that would be implemented. Because they are the by-products of a citizen led initiative they are granted legitimacy.

In contrast, in a non-PB year, if Council members were to institute these projects in their respective districts there may be questions surrounding their legitimacy. For example, if Council member Beatrice were to put forth a project for a Hospital's Ultrasound System, some may contend that she was being co-opted by special interests or lobbyists from that specific hospital. However, since this project was selected through the PB process it was imbued with legitimacy: this is a project the people choose at every critical juncture of the process.

PB opened up space for projects that are more innovative than projects in prior, non-PB years. The process enables people to legitimate new projects. In turn, the resultant viable projects confer legitimacy onto the PB process itself.

The innovative projects were creative, but not so inventive and particularized as to be out of sync with the needs of the community. That an increased number of innovative projects were chosen with PB suggests that the people were able to critically and accurately assess community needs.

The relatively standard nature of even these innovative projects concretizes the idea that citizens are able to make sound choices about their community needs. Even the most innovative PB projects disprove critics who contend that ordinary citizens are not able to effectively understand the intricacies of city budgets or put forth rational proposals. Both innovative and conventional projects highlight disparate aspects of the PBNYC process. The conventional projects show that citizens are able to effectively assess needs, perhaps more effectively than Council members:

D-A: New technology for two public schools (C)

D-B: Playground Improvements at both two public housing complexes (C)

D-C: The installation of floodlights in each park in the district (C)

D-D: Pagers for Four Volunteer Fire Departments (C)

I categorize these projects as conventional because they designate a specific implementation of traditional capital projects. Conventional projects take a traditional capital project and give it a specific dimension, typically a geographic specificity sometimes combined with a tool or usage such as “pages for volunteer fire departments.” Conventional projects confer legitimacy on the entire PB process, illustrating that when citizens are given the tools and influence to make budgetary decisions they, more often than not, stay in line and buttress the *status quo ante* while adding a critical local perspective. Conventional projects, like innovative projects, directly challenge critics who contend that citizens cannot make rational, pragmatic, and informed public policy decisions.

#### **9.4 Non-PB Matched Pair Districts**

While the four districts implementing PB created mechanisms for citizenly politics in the budget process, the four matched pairs not implementing PB decided their capital

projects through the traditional budget process. All decisions regarding capital funds, including specific site locations, were determined solely by the CM. The traditional budget process lacks a transparency mechanism for citizens to assess why specific projects are funded. Furthermore, the data pertaining to which projects are funded is not readily accessible. In order to put together the information about capital funds in non-PB districts, I navigated a complex database. The data is not organized by district, rather by topic area. Therefore, a citizen needs to comb through hundreds of pages to synthesize disparate budget categories in order to assess where their Council member allocate discretionary funds. Individual council offices do not release information by district. When called to disclose this information, they contend they have already made the information public through this cumbersome database. I apply the same typology of conventional and innovative to the capital projects decided upon by matched-pair districts not implementing PB in FY 2013. The projects are listed below in order to illustrate the textured nature of capital projects applied in non-PB implementing districts. Out of 95 capital projects in these four districts, I classify 14 as innovative or 15%. Non-PB matched pairs had a smaller percentage of innovative projects than decided through PBNYC, where I classify 38% of projects as innovative. Capital fund allocation in non-PB districts enables a deepened understanding of New York City *status quo* budget process and PB's marked disruption from traditional budget processes.

*District W:*

Council member Wasa represents a district similar to District A in terms of demographic composition. Council member Wasa is a Latina woman, whereby Council member Albert is a Jewish man, and she has a less academic background with experience in

grassroots engagement. Similar to Council member Albert, Council member Wasa identifies as progressive.

District W had 18 total capital projects for FY 2013. Out of 18 projects, I classify one as innovative:

- Compost Project (\$68,000)

**18** projects: **17** conventional projects, **1** innovative

*District X:*

Council member Xaviera represents a district similar to District B in terms of demographic composition. Council member Xaviera is a prominent female African-American who, like Council member Beatrice, has risen in the ranks to be known as a leader in the activist community. However, Council member Xavier has more experience, being older, and comes from a well-established political family in contrast to Council member Beatrice.

District X had a total of 27 capital projects for FY 2013. Out of 26 projects, I classify 6 as innovative<sup>248</sup>:

- Museum for African Art
- Studio Museum (\$280,000)
- Manhattan School of Music (\$250,000)
- United Community Aids Center
- Dance Theatre

Museum for African Art

**26** projects: **21** conventional, **6** innovative

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<sup>248</sup> Not all projects publically listed with respective allocation amounts.



*District Y:*

Council member Yash represents a district similar to District C in terms of demographic composition. Council member Yash has a more traditional background with the established Democratic Party in contrast to the perception of Council member Charlie's more radical organizer background and progressive agenda. Both Council members are relatively young; Council member Yash is a Jewish male with a family where as Council member Dave is a single African-American.

District Y has 28 total capital projects in FY 2013. Out of 28 projects, I classify 1 as innovative:

- Federation of Italian American Organization

**28** projects: **27** conventional projects, **1** innovative.

*District Z:*

Council member Zeus represents a district that is similar to District D in terms of demographic composition. Council member Zeus, an African-American male Democrat, has been in the City Council for so long he is being termed out, whereas Council member Devon, a Catholic male Republican, is the youngest member of the City Council. While Council member Devon is concerned about a quality-of-life agenda, Council member Zeus has a strong progressive agenda including being a long-term advocate for public initiatives.

District Z has a total of 30 capital projects in FY2013. Out of 30 projects, I classify 6 as innovative:

- HS Pathway to Writers (\$50,000)
- Anti-Mosquito Network (\$50,000)

- Playground Bandshell (\$1,683,000)
- Crew Cab Pick-Up Truck (\$45,000)
- Beach Wagon (\$115,000)
- Center for Arts and learning (\$200,000)

The capital funds spent by matched pair districts illustrate the nature of projects decided upon without the treatment of PB. Non-PB implementing matched pair districts both instituted fewer innovative projects than PB, but also lack information for why these specific conventional projects are decided upon. There is no information available pertaining to why a specific school, street, or park receives capital funding. There is no citizen feedback or vote. Would District X residents have chosen a different P.S. to fund if it were up to them? There is no way to know. The traditional budget process offers no mechanisms for assessment.

The traditional budget process does not empower citizens in district needs assessment. Furthermore, the traditional budget process also lack mechanisms for citizens to critically assess capital project funds and hold their elected officials accountable through funding decisions. For example, citizens do not know the existing relationship between Council member Zeus and a given Arts and Learning Center receiving funding in FY2013.

Furthermore, citizens are not able to effectively track and monitor the implementation of capital funds. Residents of District Y have no way to monitor the money a park receives.

In contrast, PB enables citizens to have a voice in district needs assessment, such as which specific recipients ought to receive funds, and monitor the implementation of projects. Through citizens' input, questions about existing relationships between Council members and fund recipients are ameliorated. In addition to rendering the budget process

more transparent and reflective of citizens needs, PB also provides clearer information as to the details of projects.

Within the PB process, citizens learned more details of the project than they would through the *status quo* capital funding process. For example, through PB, D-A residents know their composting project converts one ton per day of food waste into soil. In contrast, non-PB, D-W, does not provide residents details of the composting project. Similarly, D-A goes into detail about where PB money for the public library is going: new books and equipment for public library to enhance the branch's use for meetings, storytelling, rehearsals, and small performances promoting the area's cultural diversity. In contrast, when non-PB capital funds go to a library there is limited information available to constituents. All citizens know is the amount of money a specific library receives. They do not know what the money is specifically doing in that given library. Therefore, in addition to not knowing why a specific library was chosen, citizens also lack information as to what capital funding aims to achieve in the library.

Both forms of information are unique to local citizens living in a particular district: how can elected officials know which are the playgrounds needing the most improvements? In the traditional budget process, prior to PB, those playgrounds that were organized or had some special relationship to Council members would be the ones to receive capital funds. However, through the PB process, parks are chosen that citizens identify as having the greatest amount of need. The specific implementation of these projects is the result of a process that enabled citizens the ability to put their hyper-localized knowledge to use.

## **9.5 Why Vote?**

“We are beating D-B, we are currently in the lead!” - Chief of Staff for D-D.

This sentiment was echoed in each and every single PB district where Council members eagerly awaited the each day's voting turnout numbers:

<u>District</u>	<u>PB Voters</u>
A	2,213
B	1,048
C	1,085
D	1,639

Figure 9.2: PB Voters by District

Voter turnout numbers became a competition for Council members, staff, and each District Committee (DC). D-A was proud to have the most voters – a fact that Albert emphasized at their district's post-vote celebration. D-C, viewed as the dark horse of the process, was ecstatic that they had more voters than D-B. For D-C, the relatively large amount of voters helped legitimate the Council member office's relative disorder and lack of resources.

On the one hand, competition encouraged districts to pursue mobilization and outreach surrounding the vote. On the other hand, the process ought to be about engagement and not simply voting statistics. Unlike an election for an office, votes in one district do not take away from votes in another district. Therefore, maximization of voter turnout across the four districts is strategically in everyone's best interest.

While friendly competition can be viewed as a positive catalyst to encourage participation, Chapter 8 outlines how deeply political decisions can be in the New York City Council. It is difficult to separate friendly competition between elected officials from less-friendly competition that can seek to undermine the PBNYC process. If PBNYC centers around competition amongst Council members, the process will not be

able to build the broad based coalition support it needs to grow and become institutionalized and sustainable. Only by coming together and compromising on issues, such as the basic governance of PBNYC, will the process succeed past its first year. The traditional budget process in New York City is rife with disincentives for cooperation along with a history of non-transparency and corruption. Given the general reality of *status quo* competition between New York City Council members, the competitive element of PBNYC in FY2013 has a potential to perpetuate harmful norms, something that should be considered when arguments for friendly voter turnout competition are made.

#### **9.6 Voting and Mobilization District Strategies**

Emphasis on horse racing (Norranders 1996) aspects of voting, such as a focus on turnout numbers, illustrates one of the tensions inherent within PBNYC: short-term vote mobilization vs. long-term community engagement. Each district's voter turnout shows how districts balanced these competing goals in varying ways.

D-A put an emphasis on high voting numbers—not necessarily community feedback and engagement. As outlined earlier, D-A was the only district to host an “Expo” instead of a second round of neighborhood assemblies. The goal of the neighborhood assemblies was to showcase the work of the budget delegates to the broader community and receive neighborhood feedback to incorporate into the projects before they were voted upon. By having an Expo, where citizens could not give feedback to the proposals, D-A emphasized attendance over input. The relatively low voting numbers in D-B, especially when contrasted to D-A, evidenced placing a premium on citizen engagement.

In contrast, D-C genuinely empowered residents sometimes at the expense of greater process efficiency or voters. Similarly, D-B, outlined as having a more balanced power relationship between DC and CM in Chapter 8, had relatively low voter turnout numbers. Community Voices Heard (CVH), tasked with running outreach and vote mobilization, is not only based in D-B but also had special interns and staff members who specifically served D-B. Given the extra capacity coupled with district expertise one would hypothesize that D-B would have seen the largest turnout. In reality, Community Voices Heard (CVH) is more skilled at building lasting coalitions than at turning out voters. The vote occurred at the end of a nearly yearlong engagement; challenges to mobilizing citizens for voting were coupled with process exhaustion experienced by citizens. In addition to process exhaustion were a wide arrange of critiques surrounding vote mobilization.

Critiques of the vote range from those wanting more opportunities to publicize projects to those condemning “strategic voting.” Many participants disapproved the use of instrumentalist strategizing to determine which projects to put forth on the ballot. Some participants experienced a tension between a desire to put forth creative proposals that may have only reached a small portion of the district, and putting forth more general, and less creative, projects. If the process is open to a vote, should projects be geared to simply maximize votes? This illustrates one of the many tensions in trying to put forth a process that has a voting element to it. The structure of voting processes encourage a winner and a loser which is at odds with a democratic innovation aimed to maximize citizen involvement in budgetary decisions. Yet at the same time, without a vote the process would be rendered undemocratic. Many citizens expressed a desire to vote for

pragmatic projects. Having attended a vote in every district, when asking people which projects they voted for and why, preferences were always the same: 1) children 2) elderly and 3) safety.<sup>249</sup> Not a single voter I interviewed identified creativity as a voting preference. These preferences suggest a normative challenge: a self-selecting group of citizens should not be able to impose creative projects onto a larger sampling of citizens who simply want programs that support needy communities such as youth and elderly. Some critics contend that such a small amount of people came out to vote that the process was coopted by those who petitioned their colleagues, neighbors, and friends to support their projects. At the voting site itself, organizers of PBNYC placed restrictions on how closely people could stand near their projects. Project supporters were not allowed to stand physically near voting sites for fear that supporters may try to cajole people into voting for a specific project.<sup>250</sup>

Even if PB voters represent a limited sampling of citizens, this amounts to more citizen involvement in budgetary decisions than without PB. While this dissertation has identified ways in which disparate parts of the process are more or less representative of given districts, even accounting for varying levels of representation outlined in Chapter 7, all PB projects contain more direct citizen input than the traditional budget process.

Throughout the process, citizens have been cognizant of the limits of representation and worked as much as possible to obtain thorough district information. Budget delegates

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<sup>249</sup> This is contrasted with many budget delegates who wanted to form “projects aimed to foster democracy” as discussed in Chapter 6.

<sup>250</sup> PBNYC process did set limits for how much groups could spend lobbying under the premise that groups would not lobby at all. Yet, in the post-event debriefs many residents expressed a desire for more robust lobbying. Their rationale was that they wanted to be able to explain and get people excited about the projects beyond what was simply displayed. However, without an enforcement mechanism it is difficult to enable limited forms of lobbying. Lobbying has the potential to give some groups power to unfairly influence the process.

identified that they were not necessarily receiving the most accurate information about the district and sought out more accurate needs assessment information.<sup>251</sup>

Many of the questions arising from the vote, such as should a small group of citizens or elites determine the nature of projects to impact a wider portion of citizenry, manifest tensions inherent in democracy. Many voting critiques of PBNYC can also be applied to voting in City Council and other elections in the United States. Electoral reform is a critical component of deepening civic engagement. PB critics should distinguish between critiques geared specially toward PB and those aimed at the institutional design of representational democracy. While accounting for some of the inherent tensions within democratic elections, I contend that PB voting was able to engage citizens in a profound capacity deepening democracy.

## **9.7 Conclusion**

Projects voted upon within districts implementing PBNYC show that PB enables more creative proposals than in matched pair districts not implementing PB. Within PB-implementing districts, 38% of the projects were innovative compared with 15% of projects in non-PB districts. Yet, even the most innovative PB projects disprove critics who contend that ordinary citizens are not able to effectively understand the intricacies of city budgets or put forth rational proposals. Conventional projects directly disprove critics contending that ordinary citizens cannot make rational, pragmatic, and informed public policy decisions. Through PB, determining where to implement projects often more accurately and fairly assessed district needs than through traditional non-transparent budget processes.

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<sup>251</sup> Such as the education committee in D-B that sought out information from schools for fear that only well resourced schools would utilize the PB process.



The process enables people to legitimate new projects. In turn, the resultant viable projects confer legitimacy onto the PB process itself. PB illustrates that when citizens are given the tools and influence to make budgetary decisions they, more often than not, stay in line with the spirit of the *status quo* while adding a vital new local perspective. The hyper-local nature of these projects suggests that Dahl (1957) was correct to implore the local unit as the place for citizen efficacy in the 21st Century. PBNYC offers unique opportunities for citizens to exert their local expertise, while elected officials focus on creating new opportunities for citizen engagement.

The PB process enables more transparency regarding why specific projects receive funding and how capital funds are used. Furthermore, the process creates mechanisms for citizens to monitor the implementation of capital funds. PB also offers a civic education. Through learning about funding, citizens leave with different priorities, such as bundling a school technology package in D-D. Citizens pooled resources to maximize efficiency whereas Council members are beholden to other political goals such as appeasing competing constituent factions. PB has the potential to long-term change how capital funds are allocated. Citizens may put pressure on elected officials to implement more innovative projects that favor cooperation.

However, in order for PB to effectively mount political pressure it must be able to reconcile competing norms of deepening of civic engagement with short-term vote mobilization. Furthermore, PB must be able to find ways to encourage vote cooperation, not competition, in order to maximize vote mobilization and diverse representation.

## Conclusion: To where do we go?

Participation does make better citizens. I believe it, but I can't prove it. And neither can anyone else. The kinds of subtle changes in character that come about, slowly, from active, powerful participation in democratic decisions cannot easily be measured with the blunt instruments of social science. Those who have actively participated in democratic governance, however, often feel that the experience has changed them. And those who observe the active participation of others often believe that they see its long run effects on the citizens' character.<sup>252</sup> Jane Mansbridge spoke these words in 1995 at the PEGS conference in Washington, D.C.

In the intervening 17 years, we have yet to see dramatic participatory initiatives take hold in the U.S. Since 1995, Participatory Budgeting (PB) has spread across the world in places as diverse as Ireland, Canada, India, Uganda, Brazil, and South Africa. Yet, PB only came to America in 2009. The World Bank and United Nations Development Fund declared PB a “best practice” and have devoted multi-millions for implementation. There have been a variety of participatory elements added to zoning, housing, and other aspects of both civil society and the private sector.<sup>253</sup> The United States of the 21<sup>st</sup> century has seen the rise of private solutions to public problems (Crenson and Ginsberg 2007) without democratic innovation included in the tool kit for public problems. In the U.S. we have yet to see robust participatory mechanisms to involve citizens in governance, politics, or service delivery.

There have been numerous attempts to increase participatory governance, typically concentrated in urban areas. However, none is as binding in nature as participatory

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<sup>252</sup> Jane Mansbridge “Does Participation Make Better Citizens?” paper delivered at the PEGS Conference, February 11-12, 1995.

<sup>253</sup> Two of the most promising recent democratic innovations in the United States have been “Imagine Philadelphia” involving citizens in planning the new city plan. See <http://participedia.net/cases/imagine-philadelphia-laying-foundation-philadelphia-pennsylvania>. As well as “Strong Starts for Children” that involved Dialogue Circles in New Mexico, USA on improving education including the successful implemented of Early Childhood Care and Education Act. See <http://participedia.net/cases/strong-starts-children-albuquerque-new-mexico-usa>.

budgeting.<sup>254</sup> These include participatory deliberative innovations in energy choices in Texas, revitalization in downtown Minneapolis (Fagotto and Fung 2006), and the Philadelphia Waterfront (Sokoloff and Steinberg 2005), to name but a few. Often citizens are invited to give input and feedback, or take part in deliberate exercises such as those put on by AmericaSpeaks, which is one of the most evolved participatory processes.<sup>255</sup> While these types of engagement are essential at enabling fruitful deliberation they are not binding in the same way as PB.

My dissertation has aimed to add PB into the greater tool kit for U.S. civic revitalization in the context of local and urban governance. The concentration of democratic innovations in urban areas should come as no surprise given the accelerated rates of urbanization, “both as centers of economic activity but also as complex sociopolitical units that pose particularly acute challenges of governance” (Baiocchi et al 2011, p. 5).<sup>256</sup> In a world of increased globalization, local politics is viewed as more malleable and penetrable for local citizens than national politics (Keil 1998). Heller and Evans (2010) note that local governments are assuming an ever-increasing role as the focal point for public authority and socially transformative projects.

Given these trends, the practice of Participatory Budgeting, which has been implemented in over 1,500 cities globally,<sup>257</sup> is particularly well suited for galvanizing both civil

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<sup>254</sup> Binding in so far as citizen input translates into direct policy implementation. In contrast, other forms of citizen engagement have citizens in a consultative or advisory role.

<sup>255</sup> See report from June 26, 2010 deliberations: [http://usabudgetdiscussion.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/OBOEResearcherReport\\_Final.pdf](http://usabudgetdiscussion.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/OBOEResearcherReport_Final.pdf)

<sup>256</sup> As of the 2010 Census, three-quarters of America’s largest 100 cities gained population, while high energy prices combined with smart urban planning will create more incentives for people to live in more densely packed areas (Berube *et al*, 2006, Voith and Crawford 2004). Some of these cities, such as Washington D.C. are growing for the first time since the 1960s.

<sup>257</sup> As outlined defining PB can be a moving target and estimates of PB vary widely. For more information see: <http://www.participatorybudgeting.org/about-participatory-budgeting/where-has-it-worked/>.

society and citizens on the local scale.<sup>258</sup> The impetus to study the politics of locality seems more pressing than ever with participation viewed as a “redemptive” element for a community.<sup>259</sup> Berry *et al* posit that participatory democracy is redemptive for local politics in so far as:

Participation nourishes the democratic spirit of individuals . . . builds community, which in turn nurtures shared values such as compassion, tolerance, and equality. [P]articipation transforms institutions so that they become effective instruments of democracy (Berry *et al* 1992, p 5).

### **10.1 PBNYC Results**

In this dissertation, I have argued that the institutional design of PB produces individual democratic spirit through collective action. I argue that the transformative effects of participation sustain citizen involvement and make PB a successful democratic innovation for the United States. I have shown that, at times, PB was able to mobilize more diverse residents to participate and vote than traditional elections. Some PBNYC districts, such as District B (D-B) and District C (D-C), were able to mobilize a higher percentage of minorities and low-income residents to vote in PB than in the 2009 elections. In all districts, PB produced significant mobilizing power as participants formed new genuine relationships with their neighbors, elected officials, and government. The PB process itself enabled unprecedented transparency and legitimacy into the budget process.

Empirical results show that PB produced modest material results, such as more innovative projects, and substantial immaterial or existential results. PB districts

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<sup>258</sup> As Berry writes in *Power and Interest Groups in City Politics*, “in an era when government seems ever more remote and difficult to approach, the neighborhood associations [...] have brought government closer to the people” (Berry *et al* 1993, p. 1).

<sup>259</sup> Trounstein, like Dahl (1957) before her, outlines the methodological strengths of studying local areas, and the fertility of studying local level politics to witness a large portion of the ways in which most Americans interact with their government (Trounstein 2009).

produced results no worse than non-PB districts, and in many ways chose projects that more creatively and effectively assess community needs. Within PBNYC implementing districts, 38% of the projects were innovative compared with 15% of projects in non-PB districts. Through PB, determining where to implement projects often more accurately and fairly assessed district needs than through traditional non-transparent budget processes.

PB produced significant existential rewards including greater civic knowledge, strengthened relationships with elected officials, and greater community inclusion. Overall, PBNYC produces a viable and successful model for citizen engagement and improved outcomes over *status quo* budget processes. PB is an informative democratic innovation for strengthening civic engagement within the United States that can be streamlined and adopted to scale.

PB's existential benefits can lead to the deepening of democracy. Numerous scholars ranging from Putnam (1992) to Sandel (1996) note the importance of being involved in associational relationship for civic virtue. Rosenblum (1998) discusses the multifaceted ways in which these associations benefit an individual's character. PB connects people with one another on the local level and builds social capital while also bridging these individual relationships to the larger project of civic engagement within a democracy. Warren has an enthusiastic list of civic virtues associated with democracy, they include but are not limited to attentiveness to the common good and concerns for justice; tolerance of the views of others; trustworthiness; willingness to participate, deliberate, and listen, respect for the rule of law and respect for the rights of others (Warren 2001 73).

While these existential benefits extend beyond the temporality of the PB process, there are also many material benefits to PB, including projects that more innovatively address community needs than non-PB implementing districts. PBNYC in its pilot year fulfilled the first three tenets of citizenly politics:

- 1) Citizens design their participation
- 2) Deliberative discourse takes place (Gutmann and Thompson 1996)
- 3) Participation is substantive, not merely performative (Moynihan 2003; 2007).

Empirical results show that PBNYC produces successful outputs pertaining to governance, deliberation, and participation.

This dissertation has shown that fulfilling these norms is complex. Citizens ended up participating in the design of the participatory institutions, despite initiators' intent.

Deliberative discourse took place while evincing the tension between two norms of deliberation, efficiency and inclusiveness, which emerge as U.S. PB tries accommodating the dual goals of improving short-term service delivery and deepening the democratic process. As a result, two models emerged: results and process oriented deliberations. Results oriented deliberation is more effective at producing viable projects, whereas process oriented is better at ensuring that all participants' voices are heard. Finally, while participation in PBNYC was substantive, some parts were more effective at inclusive and diverse representation such as the vote. The budget delegate process was less diverse and inclusive.

However, there are serious challenges to participation, including the high costs to engagement, opportunities for frustration and disillusionment as well as the perils of scalability. In order for PB to be transplanted to the U.S, significant changes must be

made. The process must become more streamlined, less time and resource intensive, and find ways to mitigate political competition. Through reforms, PB in the U.S. can reduce barriers to entry, process exhaustion, and potential for process co-option by politics. Even if PB can make these necessary changes there are still formidable challenges, such as quality uniformity and scalable institutionalization. The high level of variance within PBNYC, presumably a process self-contained within four districts, provides challenges for institutionalization to scale.

The empirics from governance, deliberation, and participation illustrate variance down to the budget subcommittee. Even within districts, there was great variation in how individual moderators and in-group dynamics shaped their discourse, decision-making, and mobilization. District demographics, political economies, and civil society capacity shaped the experience of PB down to the subcommittee level.

While I have tried to provide a thorough multi-method approach within a rich theoretical framework, there are limitations to my approach. The pilot innovation year of PB is the most often studied aspect. The origins of the process are insightful as to how to create this process from nothing. Yet, a single year cannot account for longitude change over time. Even within the second year, eight council members have implemented PB. In only one year, the process has doubled and dramatically increased the percentage of New York City Councilors choosing PB from 7% to 15%. In Chicago, only one Alderman adopted PB for its first three years. In its fourth year, four Aldermen are implementing PB for FY 2014.<sup>260</sup>

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<sup>260</sup> Part of the reason for the adoption lag is that Fiscal Year cycles typically begin in the spring while PB begins in the fall. Therefore, even if an elected official wants to sign onto join PB they may need to wait for an entire year in order to begin the process.

However, the process may continue to dramatically increase in adaptors, and then experience a dwindling of support.<sup>261</sup> Moreover, the fact that more elected officials are implementing PB for FY 2014 does not necessarily mean the process will successfully fulfill the tenets of citizenly politics. There may be negative externalities, such as further backlash from the Speaker or Mayor. It is difficult to account for the individual Councilors adopting PB, and how their own political ecosystems will shape the process. Citizens may be disillusioned with the process and end up reducing their civic energies. Community Boards may revolt and petition for the eradication of PB all together in New York City. We cannot anticipate all of the unknowns.

Within my own time bound project, there are critics who could contend that my survey sampling was non-representative. While I tried to avoid many of the endogeneity biases typically associated with PB scholarship, I invariably became close to my subjects over the course of intensively studying the process for nearly a year. I tried to account for potential biases with a mixed method approach and an objective theoretical framework. I buttressed my typology with an objective classification of projects based on issue areas to resolve questions around my matched pair choice and subjective typology of innovative versus conventional projects. Finally, my own theory of citizen politics hinges in ways upon the ability for PBNYC to be institutionalization to scale. This is a question that may take decades, at least, to fully answer. I argue that the process must reduce barriers to entry, process exhaustion, and potential for process co-option by politics. In the next section I offer policy recommendations for how to achieve this. My recommendations are contingent upon the scope of the process. Thus, I have created an argument with circuitous logic: in order for PB to be successful it must become institutionalized to scale,

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<sup>261</sup> Similar to the trajectory of PB adaption in Brazil.



yet recommendations for institutionalization require understanding its continued size and context. To account for this paradox, I offer a range of policy recommendations for how PB, more generally, can work to achieve the fourth tenet of citizenly politics.

PB policy recommendations must be guided by three principles. First, any top down policy recommendation seeks to impose a hierarchal model to what should ideally be a grassroots process. Therefore, all institutional design must have enough room to be adapted to unique political contexts.<sup>262</sup> Second, policy recommendations assume *a priori* that proper institutional design can lead to better citizenry.<sup>263</sup> This is, at best, a controversial claim.<sup>264</sup> Finally, the model of PB in the U.S. requires municipal funds. Not every city or municipality in the U.S. has devolution of funds to the regional, local, or state level. With these three caveats, I provide a set of policy recommendations to enable PB within the U.S. to achieve the fourth tenet of citizenly politics. A few of the specific recommendations focus on PBNYC, but the majority is applicable to any major U.S. city where local leaders have discretionary funds.<sup>265</sup> Realistic policy recommendations ought to be an integral part of any pragmatic democratic theory:

What we need are hard-nosed proposals for pragmatically improving our institutions. Instead of indulging in utopian dreams we must accommodate to practical realities (Erik Olin Wright, 2009).

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<sup>262</sup> PB is *not* a one size fits all model. PB *must* be adapted, changed, and reformed for individual contexts.

<sup>263</sup> “Institutional bootstrapping,” (Sabel 2004) whereby a seemingly closed process such as a New York budget can be transformed into a participatory deliberate activity.

<sup>264</sup> Some may contend that institutional design cannot lead to citizen engagement. Rather, citizens must be externally mobilized to put pressure on institutions without actually becoming institutionalized.

<sup>265</sup> Perhaps PB will be scaled up to the city/national level. Valejo, CA is the first city to implement PB in the U.S. for FY 2014. However, given that the majority of PB implementations up to this point have been on the municipal level I confine my recommendations to the local level. All of these recommendations can be scaled up.

## 10.2 PB Policy Recommendations

- 1) Reduce number of participant meetings:
  - Streamline the process so that budget delegates can meet fewer times to craft proposals.
  - Host training sessions on using Internet Communication Technologies (ICT) for in-between meeting follow up.
  - Coordinate more closely with city agencies providing agency specific information sessions and briefing material.<sup>266</sup>
- 2) Limit competition between City Councilors:
  - Steering Committee should more centrally control participant inclusion, mobilization, and “Get Out the Vote” (GOTV) strategy.
  - Reduce opportunities for City Councilors to be in direct competition, such as on voter turnout, by enforcing uniform protocol determined by the Steering Committee.
  - Work more closely with the Speaker of the Majority party and the Mayor to gain more broad based PB support. Have these supportive parties provide their own independent, external information about PB to increase legitimacy and awareness.
- 3) Provide incentives to deepen Civil Society involvement:
  - More clearly delineate expected Steering Committee roles and responsibilities. Map out clear and enforceable expectations and timetables.
  - Change Steering Committee meeting times as to accommodate those working in CSOs and full-time working citizens.
  - Make citizens permanent, as opposed to adhoc, members of the Steering Committee.<sup>267</sup>
- 4) Increase civic awareness about *status quo* budget models:
  - Short-term service delivery must be coupled with discussions surrounding thematic issues: two open forums during the process connecting PB with other opportunities for deepening civic engagement.
  - An open town hall, which citizens are invited to attend, during the process to discuss the *status quo* budget process.<sup>268</sup>
  - PB(NYC) must be coupled with a civic awareness campaign to shed light on the non-transparent, non-equitable, non-equal nature of City Council discretionary funds.<sup>269</sup>

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<sup>266</sup> That way they can better understand PB and in turn provide more accurate information to participants.

<sup>267</sup> This change has already been enacted for the second year of PBNYC for FY 2014.

<sup>268</sup> There was an internal town hall within the City Council to inform one another about PBNYC. This was not publicized and outside attendance was not allowed. After the process there was a press conference outside of the City Council to present the findings of the process that was open to the public.

<sup>269</sup> As outlined in Section 5.9, the process is non-transparent in so far as the Speaker solely decides funding decisions. Non-equitable refers to funds not tied to needs allotment. Non-equal refers to variance of allocation amounts across districts.

These policy recommendations can reduce the high barriers to entry, opportunities for process exhaustion, and limit deleterious political competition. Integrated in these recommendations are more opportunities to widen the support base of PB to include a wider sampling of citizens, Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), and political leaders/agencies. The sustained involvement of these three groups of stakeholders will be essential for institutionalizing the PB process.<sup>270</sup> The Steering Committee must work more closely with a broader sampling of CSOs to tie PB more closely into their programmatic value. Furthermore, tying in PB more closely with broader policy issues surrounding discretionary funds and others avenues for civic engagement will deepen the democracy-enhancing aspects of the process.

These changes will make PB a more sustainable model for future implementation, and would have alleviated some of the frustrations experienced by PBNYC participants. Many participants experienced frustrations at the limits of their ability to affect change. The limited window to make innovative proposals, in accordance with structural and bureaucratic regulations frustrated residents. Many participants worked on projects that never made it to the ballot. Some worked on projects for over seven months that made it to the ballot but were not voted upon. More opportunities to tie in the small act of PBNYC to a broader platform of deepening democracy will result in fewer participant frustrations. If citizens can understand the *telos* of their engagement as revolving around their civic activity, instead of projects, their frustrations may decrease. A broader

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<sup>270</sup> Many of my recommendations call for greater centralized process control by the Steering Committee, while mandating citizen representatives. In a debrief meeting of the process, all the CM staffs noted the highest barriers to entry for CM were the high time commitment and any opportunities to concentrate the process in the Steering Committee would ameliorate this. I believe further Steering Committee control will lead to more diversity and inclusivity; however, at the expense of district diversity.

narrative around deepening democracy will more effectively sustain long-term participation as well as the longevity of PB.<sup>271</sup>

### **10.3 Looking Forward**

Let us imagine that all my recommendations are adopted. Furthermore, in the next few years the United States undertakes a massive adaption of PB in diverse municipalities; even some mayors want to experiment with PB on their entire city budgets. The fulfillment of the fourth tenet of citizenly politics moves from this dissertation to the way citizens do politics in the United States. Can we unequivocally say this is a normative good?

For many, PB is the ultimate sign of decaying representative democracy. If the system worked, we would not need PB. Even noted PB scholar Gianpaolo Baiocchi laments the situation as such.<sup>272</sup> Furthermore, the participatory democracy of PB privileges inclusivity over efficiency. Having citizens participate over the course of several months to form budget proposals that are voted upon and then enacted by Councilors is not the most efficient route to policy outcomes. PB does not acknowledge the tensions between efficiency and liberty.

There are potentially grave dangers to involving citizens in decision-making, including the perils of excessive democracy (Huntington 1976). Given the perpetual campaign of American electoral politics (Gutmann and Thompson 2012), perhaps heightened transparency aimed for greater civic participation will only undermine effective governance. R. Douglas Arnold (1990) describes how negotiations done in private were more effective at closing military bases than public negotiations would have been.

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<sup>271</sup> May also appease Left critics who contend PB has moved too far away from its early ideology, aimed to deepen democracy, and is now too focused on service delivery.

<sup>272</sup> First ever International PB Conference, New York City, March 26, 2011.

Similarly, Fukuyama cites the failure of the super committee, formed to ameliorate America's growing deficit through transparent participation.<sup>273</sup> In contrast, he argues, a more closed technocratic group of elites would have had a better chance of success. Fukuyama argues that as democracy in the United States became more transparent and participatory, it became less representative of the needs of the entire country. Indeed, increased open governance and technological tools for transparency and accountability have not led to policies more reflective of the interests of the majority of Americans.<sup>274</sup> In fact, the opposite has been true. Hacker and Pierson (2011) argue that political structures enabled the top 1% of Americans, by income, to exert political pressure for policies that serve their interests and not those of the majority of Americans.<sup>275</sup> There is an abundance of fears surrounding participation. These fears include the ideas that participation will lead to sub-optimal outcomes, and that ordinary citizens are not the most equipped to make policy decisions. Yet there is another often over looked fear: what if participation actually undermines representative democracy? None of our founding fathers thought direct democratic deliberation by the people was a good idea. There was more (Hamilton, Madison) or less (Wilson, Jefferson) skepticism about the people's involvement, but direct democracy through deliberation was anathema to the democracy that the United States' founding fathers envisioned. Federalist 10 famously warns against the dangers of direct democracy and factions:

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<sup>273</sup> Francis Fukuyama "Democratic Development and Democratic Decay," Harvard University, April 10, 2012.

<sup>274</sup> Democratizing campaign donations is the notable exception. For example, when massive amounts of small buy-in donations online fueled Barack Obama's ability to claim the Democratic nominee. The prevalence of money related power politics is only furthered with participatory budgeting presuming budgets as the locus of political power.

<sup>275</sup> Hacker and Pierson show that since 1978 the richest 1% gained 256% after inflation while the income of the lower earning 80% grew only 20%.

It may be concluded that a pure democracy, by which I mean a society consisting of a small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the government in person, can admit no cure for the mischiefs of faction.

Thomas Jefferson, as portrayed by Hannah Arendt, comes closest to an ideal of participatory democracy, but it is neither as robust nor binding as participatory budgeting.<sup>276</sup> In addition to the founding fathers' fear of factionalism, it is possible that citizens want a type of modern liberty outlined by Constant where they are freed from politics.<sup>277</sup> What if people do not *want* to participate in their democracy<sup>278</sup>?

In response to all the challenges, I contend that the current political atmosphere does not give citizens the background knowledge to assess value propositions between citizens and politics accurately. Citizens do not even know the realm of possibilities for engaging with politics. PB is one attempt to provide more opportunities for citizens to begin a discussion. A counter argument may suggest that PB does not go far enough. PB focuses the locus of power too narrowly on budgets, only furthering a neo-liberalism paradigm.<sup>279</sup> What if budgets should not be the locus of political involvement? Rather citizens should be focusing on mobilization and organization to engage with broader political issues as scholars such as Marshall Ganz argue.<sup>280</sup> Ideally, PB ought to be combined with a campaign for greater civic reform and expanding citizens' political

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<sup>276</sup> Raising the question as to the accuracy of Jefferson in Arendt's reading. Moreover, perhaps just as Arendt may re-appropriate more democratic inclinations in Jefferson, perhaps I do the same with Arendt.

<sup>277</sup> Constant, Benjamin. "Liberty of the Ancients Compared with that of the Moderns" 1816, provides a version of modern liberty where people are freed from the burden of politics. Modern political institutions enable individuals to pursue their own desires; "respecting their [citizens] individual rights, securing their independence, refraining from troubling their work.

<sup>278</sup> As suggest by Theiss-Morse and Hibbing's (2002).

<sup>279</sup> Related to the concept of "voting with our dollars" or money being the effective model of political participation and expression.

<sup>280</sup> See Marshall Ganz, "*We Can Be Actors, Just not Spectators*" July 11, 2012. *New Statesman* available at: <http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/politics/2012/07/we-can-be-actors-not-just-spectators>.

power beyond budgets.<sup>281</sup> Perhaps PB is not enough, but it is one tool we have for deepening democracy in both developing and developed democracies.

#### **10.4 PB for the (Near) Future**

It shouldn't come as any surprise, then, that only 1 out of 5 Americans trusts government to do what is right most of the time. Citizens don't believe their government listens to them and they don't believe they have any power to affect public policy<sup>282</sup> – Chicago Alderman Sid on why he brought PB to the U.S. Perhaps if 5 out of 5 Americans trusted government there would be no need for PB.

Contemporary America lacks that counterfactual. What we do know is that trust in government is at an all time low.<sup>283</sup>

Further research ought to focus on the longitudinal impacts of PB in the United States as well as more organic, less formalized structures of participation in local governance.

With increased access to open data, Americans in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century may be able to use Internet Communication Technologies (ICT) to have more two-way communication and empowered participation in politics. Democratic innovation must include networked systems that can use data to deepen civic engagement. Large databases, even on the federal level, can be used to galvanize citizenry on the local scale. ICT tools can invert traditional relationships between size and power: large top down systems have the potential to harness local citizen involvement.<sup>284</sup>

In this dissertation I have argued that PB, for all its shortcomings, is transformative and provides citizens with much desired existential benefits. I isolate PB to the local level

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<sup>281</sup> Especially beyond small discretionary budgets.

<sup>282</sup> “Spending Out in the Open for 49th Ward” *Chicago Tribune*, March 31, 2010: <http://www.ward49.com/participatory-budgeting/#Alderman>

<sup>283</sup> See “Distrust, Discontent, Anger and Partisan Rancor: The People and Their Government” Pew Center for the People and the Press, April 18, 2010: <http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1569/trust-in-government-distrust-discontent-anger-partisan-rancor>.

<sup>284</sup> There are many caveats, especially to viewing technology as a panacea. See Fung, Russon Gilman, Shkabatur “Six Models for Internet & Politics” (2012).

(Dahl 1957). The local level is where citizens have the most direct knowledge to maximize equitable need distribution. On the local level, citizens can easily acquire information to become experts. Through returning politics to the locality, individuals can once again be efficacious as “big” citizens: “the secret message is that politics should become little so that individuals can become big” (Unger 2005 17).

PB, understood through the lens of citizenly politics, responds to the decline in citizen engagement in the U.S. One of the culprits for the lack of citizen engagement in the U.S. is the shortcoming of the Weberian hierarchical-bureaucratic model that made politics too “big” and complex for ordinary citizens to be efficacious. The Weberian model lacks necessary mechanisms for responsiveness between elected officials and citizens (Moynihan 2007). Bureaucratic organizations have alienated citizens and are not able to create inclusive relationships with the citizenry (Zajac and Bruhn 1999). The popular unease with the perception of government growth has created new spaces and tools for citizen engagement and participatory mechanisms (Peters 1996). A participatory model underpins more participatory, democratic, and collective channels for citizens to communicate with their government.

Within the framework of citizenly politics, PB extends norms about participation to provide a real world applicable framework for citizens to be involved in politics. PB is more than optimistic ideals of humanity. Rather, PB provides a blueprint for directly engaging citizens in the process of governance. Citizens may find they would rather not be involved in the process of governance. But if the U.S. is committed to the “pursuit of



happiness” as a right,<sup>285</sup> we owe it to our citizens to have the option to see if citizenly politics are able to fulfill an existential desire for engagement (that is, the norms of the Aristotlian-Arendtian *polis*). Ultimately, PB may transform both the citizens who partake in the process as well as the broader structure of representational democracy. PB may lead to more accountable governance and elected representation that more aptly reflects the American populace.

If United States democracy were living up to its ideal, PB would be unnecessary.

Perhaps PB can re-invigorate the public sphere and revitalize democracy. If PB can successfully build Barber’s “strong democracy,” then PB can become a vestigial process.

A process we use only for a limited time and place to revitalize citizens and politics:

Thus it is that democracy, if it is to survive the shrinking of the world and the assaults of a hostile modernity, will have to re-discover its multiple voices and give citizens once again the power to speak, to decide, and to act; for in the end human freedom will not be found in the caverns of private solitude but in the noisy assemblies where women and men meet daily as citizens and discover in each other’s talk the consolidation of a common humanity” (Barber 1984, 311).

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<sup>285</sup> Second section of the United States’ Declaration of Independence reads; “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.”

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