


# Adversarial Examples

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# Are you sure of your model's predictions?



**Figure:** Humans can hide from surveillance cameras with 2D prints<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup><https://www.zdnet.com/article/academics-hide-humans-from-surveillance-cameras-with-2d-prints/>

# Objectives

1. To show the effect and effectiveness of adversarial examples in deceiving machine learning models
2. To understand its use and varying applications, and determine how to combat it.
3. To enlighten the audience on machine learning security.

# Outlines

Objectives

Introduction

Properties of Counterfactual Instance

Examples

- Techniques

- Black Box Attacks vs White Box Attacks

- Gradient based optimization approach

- Fast gradient sign method

- 1-pixel attack

- Adversarial Patch

- Robust adversarial examples

- Adversarial Examples in NLP

Coding Session


More Interesting Ideas

Combating adversarial examples

Conclusion

# Introduction

- An **adversarial example** is an instance with small, intentional feature perturbations that cause a machine learning model to make a false prediction.<sup>3</sup>
- A type of **counterfactual example**



**Figure:** Causal relationships between inputs of a machine learning model and the predictions

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<sup>3</sup><https://christophm.github.io/interpretable-ml-book/adversarial.html>

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- have feature values that are **likely**.
- produce the predefined prediction as **closely** as possible.

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4. Self-driving cars can be deceived by images to misclassify stop-signs.

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Our focus will be on how adversarial examples affect image classifiers with deep neural networks.

# Black Box Attacks vs White Box Attacks

## Black Box Attacks

- No internal model information required and no access to the training data.

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<sup>4</sup>Papernot, Nicolas, et al. "Practical black-box attacks against machine learning." (2017)

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# Gradient based optimization approach

$$\min \text{loss}(f(x + p), y_{adv}) + c \cdot |p|$$

where  $x$  is an image,  $p$  is the changes to the pixels to create an adversarial image,  $y_{adv}$  is the desired outcome class, and the parameter  $c$  is a balancing factor.




Figure: Examples generated on Alexnet using GB<sup>5</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Szegedy, Christian, et al. "Intriguing properties of neural networks." (2013)



# Fast gradient sign method

$$x_{adv} = x + \epsilon \text{Sign}(\nabla_x J(\theta, x, y))$$

where  $x$  is the gradient of the models loss function with respect to the original input pixel vector  $x$ ,  $y$  is the true label vector for  $x$  and  $\theta$  is the model parameter vector.




Figure: NN predicts Gibbon for a perturbed panda image<sup>6</sup>

<sup>6</sup> Goodfellow et al. "Explaining and harnessing adversarial examples." (2014)

# Changing a single pixel

Uses **differential evolution** to find out which pixel is to be changed and how.



Cup(16.48%)  
Soup Bowl(16.74%)



Bassinet(16.59%)  
Paper Towel(16.21%)



Teapot(24.99%)  
Joystick(37.39%)



Hamster(35.79%)  
Nipple(42.36%)


**Figure:** Changing a single pixel (marked with circles) to deceive a NN to predict the wrong class instead of the original class.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>8</sup>Su et al. "One pixel attack for fooling deep neural networks."(2019).

# Adversarial Patch

Replaces a part of the image with a patch that can take on any shape.



**Figure:** Changing a single pixel (marked with circles) to deceive an NN to predict the wrong class instead of the original class.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>10</sup> Brown, Tom B., et al. "Adversarial patch.(2017)

# Robust adversarial examples

- Adversarial over transformations (rotation, zoom in) unlike other methods such as FGM.
- Expectation Over Transformation (EOT) algorithm.



■ classified as turtle      ■ classified as rifle  
■ classified as other

**Figure:** 3D-printed turtle that was designed to look like a rifle to a deep NN<sup>12</sup>

<sup>12</sup> Athalye, Anish, and Ilya Sutskever. "Synthesizing robust adversarial examples." (2017)

# Adversarial Examples in NLP

Adversarial example used to fool Google's Perspective Toxic comment detection system.<sup>13</sup> All phrases are examples provided by the Perspective website<sup>14</sup>.

| Original Phrase (Toxicity Score)  | Modified Phrase (Toxicity Score)  |
|---|---|
| Climate change is happening and it's not changing in our favor. If you think differently you're an <b>idiot</b> . (84%) | Climate change is happening and it's not changing in our favor. If you think differently you're an <b>idiot</b> . (20%)     |
| They're <b>stupid</b> , it's getting warmer, we should enjoy it while it lasts (86%)                                    | They're <b>st.upid</b> , it's getting warmer, we should enjoy it while it lasts (2%)  |
| They are liberal <b>idiots</b> who are <b>uneducated</b> (90%)  | They are liberal <b>i.diots</b> who are <b>un.educated</b> (15%)  |
| <b>idiots</b> . backward thinking people. <b>nationalists</b> . not accepting facts. susceptible to <b>lies</b> . (80%) | <b>id.iots</b> . backward thinking people. <b>nationa.alists</b> . not accepting facts. susceptible to <b>L.ies</b> . (17%) |
| They are <b>stupid</b> and <b>ignorant</b> with no class (91%)  | They are <b>st.upid</b> and <b>ig.norant</b> with no class (11%)  |
| It's <b>stupid</b> and wrong (89%)  | It's <b>stui.pd</b> and wrong (17%)   |
| If they voted for Hilary they are <b>idiots</b> (90%)   | If they voted for Hilary they are <b>id.iots</b> (12%)  |
| Anyone who voted for Trump is a <b>moron</b> (80%)  | Anyone who voted for Trump is a <b>mo.ron</b> (13%)   |
| <b>Screw</b> you trump supporters (79%)   | <b>S c r e w</b> you trump supporters (17%)   |

Figure: Attack examples generated for the Perspective Toxic Detection System

<sup>11</sup> Hossein Hosseini et al. "Deceiving Google's Perspective API Built for Detecting Toxic Comments." (2017)

<sup>14</sup> <https://www.perspectiveapi.com>



//just let me code



# Combating adversarial examples

AEs can be Model-agnostic.

Methods used to combat adversarial examples include<sup>15</sup>;

- 1 Adversarial training - iterative retraining of the classifier with adversarial examples

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- 3 Use of multiple classifiers instead of just one and have them vote the prediction (ensemble)
- 4 Use of noise reduction methods such as scalar quantization and spatial smoothing filter <sup>16</sup>

Lot's of research ongoing in this field of Adversarial and ML security.

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# Conclusion

- The threats of adversarial examples are real and potent.
- These attacks are not limited to computer-vision but span other areas of ML such as NLP, Reinforcement Learning, Speech Recognition e.t.c.
- Increasing development in this field (but with equivalent sophistication in attack methods).

Think of the many different types of spam emails that are constantly evolving (image spam, header masking etc).

**tHANK yOU**



for staying awake