

# Stopgap Jobs: Search and Temporary Jobs

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# Temporary Jobs as Stopgap Jobs

- ▶  $\sim 2\%$  of workers have a temporary contract
- ▶  $\sim 10\%$  of  $U \rightarrow E$  and  $E \rightarrow U$  flows involve temporary jobs
- ▶ How does the availability of temporary jobs affect job search?
  - ▶ Temporary jobs are less costly for firms
  - ▶ If temporary jobs are easier to find, they can be used as a stopgap
    - ▶ “Stopgap:” a temporary, quick, dirty fix
  - ▶ However, temp jobs may not be good for upward mobility/skill accumulation

# Research Questions

- ▶ How does accounting for temporary jobs affect the cost of unemployment?
- ▶ What would be the effects of changing the rules of temporary jobs?
  - ▶ Outcomes of interest: welfare, optimal UI, dynamism, etc.

# What I Do

- ▶ Document temporary job facts in data (SIPP and CPS Contingent Worker Supplement)
- ▶ Write model with temporary jobs from worker's perspective
  - ▶ Search frictions
  - ▶ Incomplete markets
- ▶ Today's exercise
  - ▶ Turn off temporary jobs
  - ▶ Calibrate without taking temporary jobs into account

# Institutional Notes

- ▶ Firms do not need to offer retirement benefits to workers of  $< 1,000$  hours (26 weeks full time) (ERISA)
- ▶ Sufficiently large firms do not need to offer health insurance to workers of  $< 90$  days (ACA)
- ▶ Firms can fire without cause (unless there is union protection against it)
- ▶ I find that the same worker earns a smaller wage at temporary jobs than permanent jobs

Data

# Why Job Ends

- ▶ I use three SIPP panels: 2004, 2008, and 2014
- ▶ SIPP asks why jobs end
- ▶ This is how I classify temporary jobs

Why did job end?

Why job ended	Percentage of jobs
Terminated	16.5%
Job was temporary	11.7%
Quit	35.0%
Quit to take another job	26.0%
Layoff	10.2%
Retired	0.5%

# Frequency of Temporary Jobs

## Temporary job statistics

% of jobs	11.7%
Average % of workers at point in time, SIPP	1.8%
Average % of workers at point in time, CPS	3.7%
% of $U \rightarrow E$ flows	8.8%
% of $E \rightarrow U$ flows	9.4%



# Low-Wage Workers More Likely to Work Temporary Jobs



# “Desperation” is Top Reason for Working a Temporary Job

## Why Working a Temporary Job

Reason	% of temp workers
All I could find/hope it leads to permanent job	40.2%
In school	21.2%
Flexibility of schedule	10.9%
Personal	23.3%
Nature of work/seasonal	4.4%

Source: CPS Contingent Worker Supplement

► CPS contingent worker categories

► Wages

► Length

► Hours

► Industry

► Occupation

► Adjacent state

► Unemp length

# Temporary Job Wages Have a Wage Penalty

- ▶ Temporary wages are  $\approx 90\%$  of adjacent permanent job wage

Log wage difference between temporary job wage and...

Previous job, $E \rightarrow U \rightarrow T$	-0.025
Next job, $T \rightarrow U \rightarrow E$	-0.110
Next job, $T \rightarrow E$	-0.153

Model

# Model Intuition

- ▶ Search with incomplete markets and a borrowing constraint

Krusell et al. (2010)

- ▶ Three states:  $U$ ,  $E$ , and  $T$
- ▶ Unemployed workers find a permanent job with some probability (DMP)
- ▶ Unemployed workers can accept a temporary job if it is available (McCall)

⇒ If unable to find a permanent job, unemployed workers can smooth consumption by taking a temporary job.

⇒ Unemployed workers will take temporary job if assets are low enough (reservation asset strategy)

# Model Framework

- ▶ Agents are heterogeneous in...
  - ▶ Assets:  $a$
  - ▶ If employed, log wage:  $w$
  - ▶ If unemployed or temp worker, reference log wage (previous wage):  $\tilde{w}$ 
    - ▶ Determines unemployment benefits, temp wages, and wages of new jobs
- ▶ Temporary job is different from permanent job because it...
  - ▶ Is short: ends with probability  $\delta$ ,  $\delta > \lambda$
  - ▶ Pays differently: wage is  $\phi e^{\tilde{w}}$
- ▶ Agents choose...
  - ▶ Next period assets:  $a'$
  - ▶ If unemployed, whether to accept temporary job or remain unemployed
- ▶ Transition rates ( $UE$ ,  $EU$ ,  $UT$ ) depend on  $w$  and  $\tilde{w}$

# Problem of Employed Worker

$$V_E(a, w) = \max_{c, a'} u(c) + \frac{1}{1 + \rho} \left[ \lambda_w V_U(a', w) + (1 - \lambda_w) \sum_{w'} \mu(w'|w) V_E(a', w') \right]$$

s.t.  $c + a' \leq a(1 + r) + e^w$   
 $a' \geq \underline{a}$

- ▶  $\lambda_w$  = separation rate for permanent jobs
- ▶  $\mu$  = idiosyncratic wage risk, random walk with variance  $\sigma^2$
- ▶  $u$  is CRRA:

$$u(c) = \frac{c^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma}$$

# Problem of Unemployed Worker

$$\begin{aligned} V_U(a, \tilde{w}) = \max_{c, a'} & u(c) + \frac{1}{1 + \rho} \left[ \alpha_{\tilde{w}} V_E(a', \tilde{w}) \right. \\ & \left. + (1 - \alpha_{\tilde{w}}) \left( \eta_{\tilde{w}} \max \left\{ V_U(a', \tilde{w}), V_T(a', \tilde{w}) \right\} + (1 - \eta_{\tilde{w}}) V_U(a', \tilde{w}) \right) \right] \quad (1) \\ \text{s.t. } & c + a' \leq a(1 + r) + be^{\tilde{w}} \\ & a' \geq \underline{a} \end{aligned}$$

- ▶  $\alpha_{\tilde{w}}$  = job finding rate for *permanent* jobs
- ▶  $\eta_{\tilde{w}}$  = job offer arrival rate for *temporary* jobs
- ▶  $b$  = unemployment benefits (replacement rate)



# Problem of Temporary Worker

$$\begin{aligned} V_T(a, \tilde{w}) = \max_{c, a'} & u(c) + \frac{1}{1 + \rho} \left[ \psi V_E(a', \tilde{w}) \right. \\ & \left. + (1 - \psi) \left( \delta V_U(a', \tilde{w}) + (1 - \delta) V_T(a', \tilde{w}) \right) \right] \\ \text{s.t. } & c + a' \leq a(1 + r) + \phi e^{\tilde{w}} \\ & a' \geq \underline{a} \end{aligned}$$

- ▶  $\psi$  = job finding rate for permanent jobs *for temporary workers*
- ▶  $\delta$  = separation rate for temporary jobs
- ▶  $\phi$  = temporary wage relative to permanent wage

# Calibration

# Calibration Scheme



- Set some parameters externally using SIPP results:

Parameter	Meaning	Value
$\delta$	Separation rate of temporary jobs	0.195
$\psi$	Finding rate of permanent jobs from temp jobs	0.058
$\phi$	Relative temporary job wage	0.9


- For  $\alpha_w$  and  $\lambda_{\tilde{w}}$ :
  - Use job finding and job loss rates by wage decile from Karahan et al. (2022)
  - Use share of temp jobs by wage decile from SIPP
  - Solve for  $\alpha_w$ ,  $\lambda_{\tilde{w}}$ , and  $p_{\tilde{w}}$  using steady state equations for each  $w$
- For  $\eta_{\tilde{w}}$  (job offer arrival rate of temporary jobs), target  $p_{\tilde{w}}$  and calibrate using minimum distance

# Job Finding and Separation Moments from Karahan et al. (2022)

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# Calibrated Job Finding Rates

[▶  \$\eta\_{\tilde{w}}\$](#) [▶ Back](#)

# Counterfactual Analysis

# Counterfactual Labor Markets

Call the calibrated model the “baseline” labor market.

## 1. Turn temporary jobs off

- ▶ Set  $\eta_{\tilde{w}} = 0$ , keep rest the same
- ▶ Only flows left are between  $U$  and  $E$
- ▶ Unemployed workers lose option of temporary jobs for smoothing consumption

## 2. Re-calibrate model without temporary jobs

- ▶ Set  $\eta_{\tilde{w}} = 0$
- ▶ Let  $\alpha_{\tilde{w}}$  equal *total* job finding rate
- ▶ Let  $\lambda_w$  equal *total* job separation rate
- ▶ All jobs are permanent

# Consumption Equivalence

	Consumption equivalence relative to baseline	
	Entire labor market	Unemployed workers
Temp jobs are turned off	-0.2%	-1.0%
All flows are attributed to permanent jobs	1.0%	6.1%

- ▶ Workers value the existence of temporary jobs as a stopgap solution
- ▶ A model without temp jobs understates the cost of unemployment
  - ▶ A significant part of job finding is temporary jobs
  - ▶ Temp jobs are not as desirable as permanent jobs



# Conclusion

1. There is evidence for the stopgap job hypothesis
2. The existence of temporary jobs makes job searchers better off
3. A model that doesn't take temp jobs into account understates cost of unemployment

## Future work?

- ▶ Firms and general equilibrium
- ▶ Skill accumulation/job ladder → explain churn at bottom of ladder
- ▶ Instead of turning off temporary jobs, experiment with in-between policy change for US

# Contribution to Literature

- ▶ Alonso-Borrego et al. (2005)  $\Rightarrow$  very similar to me, does not consider skill accumulation and the setting is Spain
- ▶ Veracierto (2007)  $\Rightarrow$  setting is Argentina, focus is on firing taxes
- ▶ Gregory et al. (2021)  $\Rightarrow$  I help explain why  $\gamma$  workers have short job duration (instead of match learning)
- ▶ Jarosch (2021)  $\Rightarrow$  I help explain the “slippery bottom rungs” of job ladder

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# Data Sources

## **Survey of Income and Program Participation**

- ▶ 2004, 2008, and 2014 panels
- ▶ ~40,000 households per panel
- ▶ Why I use SIPP: longer panel, wage data, job ID's
- ▶ Households interviewed every four months for 2004 & 2008 panels, every year for 2014 panel
- ▶ Households recall weekly labor force states

## **CPS Contingent Worker Supplement**

- ▶ Asks about job duration and employment types
- ▶ Last administered in May 2017 (before that, 2005)

# Contingent Worker Categories


CPS Contingent Worker Categories

Contingent worker type	Percent of employed workers
Temp worker	3.7%
Company contractor	1.6%
Day laborer	1.7%
Temp agency	1.0%
Independent contractor	1.2%

Source: CPS Contingent Worker Supplement [▶ Back](#)

# Temporary Jobs are Shorter

- Mean = 21.1 weeks, median = 11 weeks



# Temporary Jobs More Likely to be Preceded and Followed by Unemployment

Adjacent States

	State before job		State after job	
	All jobs	Temp jobs	All jobs	Temp jobs
<i>E</i>	72.1%	53.9%	60.3%	31.1%
<i>U</i>	27.9%	46.1%	39.7%	68.9%

# Hours Worked

Percentage of jobs by hours worked per week

Hours worked per week	Percentage of jobs		
	All jobs	Temp jobs	Temp jobs - all jobs
0-10	12.3%	19.4%	7.1%
10-20	17.2%	21.4%	4.3%
20-30	12.2%	12.0%	-0.2%
30-40	50.1%	41.8%	-8.3%
40-50	8.3%	5.4%	-2.9%

# Industry

Industry	Percentage of jobs		
	All jobs	Temp jobs	Temp jobs - all jobs
Agriculture and mining	2.3%	6.5%	4.1%
Construction	8.8%	8.9%	0.1%
Manufacturing	8.6%	6.1%	-2.5%
Wholesale	2.3%	2.3%	0.0%
Retail	12.2%	9.2%	-3.0%
Transportation	3.7%	2.7%	-1.0%
Utilities	0.4%	0.5%	0.1%
Information	1.9%	2.0%	0.2%
FIRE	4.6%	2.1%	-2.4%
Professional	5.2%	7.3%	2.1%
Administrative	8.9%	15.6%	6.7%
Education	8.0%	11.8%	3.8%
Healthcare	12.5%	6.1%	-6.5%
Entertainment	2.5%	5.5%	3.0%
Accommodation and food service	10.3%	5.3%	-5.0%
Public administration	2.9%	3.9%	1.0%
Other	4.9%	4.3%	-0.6%



# Occupation

	All jobs	Temp jobs	Temp jobs - all jobs
Management	4.7%	2.6%	-2.1%
Business and finance	2.9%	3.9%	1.0%
Computer	1.8%	1.6%	-0.2%
Engineering	1.1%	0.7%	-0.4%
Science	0.7%	1.3%	0.6%
Social service	1.2%	0.9%	-0.4%
Legal	0.6%	0.6%	0.0%
Education	5.9%	9.1%	3.3%
Entertainment	2.0%	4.0%	2.1%
Healthcare practitioner	3.7%	1.6%	-2.1%
Healthcare support	3.3%	1.8%	-1.5%
Protective	1.9%	1.8%	-0.1%
Food	8.5%	4.0%	-4.5%
Building and grounds	5.4%	4.8%	-0.5%
Personal care	4.4%	4.2%	-0.2%
Sales	10.8%	7.8%	-3.0%
Administrative	13.1%	16.3%	3.2%
Farming	1.6%	5.6%	4.0%
Construction	8.2%	9.1%	0.9%
Mechanical	3.0%	1.3%	-1.6%
Production	6.8%	7.2%	0.4%
Transportation	8.3%	9.7%	1.4%

# Unemployment Length

Average unemployment length given adjacent job types

Sequence	Average unemployment length (weeks)
$E \rightarrow U \rightarrow E$	16.9
$E \rightarrow U \rightarrow T$	19.5
$T \rightarrow U \rightarrow E$	15.8
$T \rightarrow U \rightarrow T$	6.4

# Continuous Time Equations

$$\begin{aligned}\rho V_E(a, w) = \max_c & u(c) + \frac{\partial V_E(a, w)}{\partial a} (ar + e^w - c) + \frac{\partial^2 V_E(a, w)}{\partial w^2} \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \\ & + \lambda_w [V_U(a, w) - V_E(a, w)]\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}\rho V_U(a, \tilde{w}) = \max_c & u(c) + \frac{\partial V_U(a, \tilde{w})}{\partial a} (ar + be^{\tilde{w}} - c) + \alpha_{\tilde{w}} [V_E(a, \tilde{w}) - V_U(a, \tilde{w})] \\ & + \eta_{\tilde{w}} \max \left\{ V_T(a, \tilde{w}) - V_U(a, \tilde{w}), 0 \right\}\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}\rho V_T(a, \tilde{w}) = \max_c & u(c) + \frac{\partial V_T(a, \tilde{w})}{\partial a} (ar + \phi e^{\tilde{w}} - c) + \delta [V_U(a, \tilde{w}) - V_T(a, \tilde{w})] \\ & + \psi [V_E(a, \hat{w}) - V_T(a, \tilde{w})]\end{aligned}$$

# External Parameters

## Borrowed Parameters

Parameter	Meaning	Value	Source
$\gamma$	CRRA curvature	2	
$\rho$	Discount rate	0.008	$\beta = 0.9$ annual
$r$	Interest rate	0.0025	3% annual
$\underline{a}$	Borrowing constraint	-3	Nirei (2006)
$b$	Unemployment benefits	0.44	50% for 6 months
$\sigma$	St dev of idiosyncratic log wage risk	0.119	Guvenen et al. (2021)

# Calibrated Temporary Job Offer Arrival Rate $\eta_{\tilde{w}}$

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