Data integrity protection for data spaces

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https://mm.aueb.gr/projects/snds










What is a data space?



- A way to liberate data from silos
 - Data supplier shares data with data consumers
 - An intermediary facilitates the exchange
 - Standardized storage & retrieval API at intermediary
 - Example: ETSI's NGSI-LD API









NGSI-LD Objects

```
"id": "urn:ngsi-ld:Car:001".

"type": "Car",

"colour": "Black,

"speed": 30,
 "brand": {
    "company": "BMW",
    "model": "i5"
},

"@context": [
    "https://example.com/data-models.context-ngsild.jsonld"
]
```

- Each entity is a uniquely identified JSON-LD encoded object
- Each entity has a "type"
- Each entity consists of name-value "attributes"
 - Which may be JSON-LD objects themselves
- The attributes of a type are defined in a "context"









NGSI-LD Queries - Retrieve Item

GET https://broker.com/ngsi-ld/v1/entities/urn:ngsi-ld:Car:001

```
{
    "id": "urn:ngsi-ld:Car:001",
    "type": "Car",
    "colour": "Black,
    "speed": 30,
    "brand": {
        "company": "BMW",
        "model": "i5"
    },
    "@context": [
        "https://example.com/data-models.context-ngsild.jsonld"
    ]
}
```









NGSI-LD Queries - Retrieve Attributes

GET https://broker.com/ngsi-ld/v1/entities/urn:ngsi-ld:Car:001?attrs=brand%speed

Colour is hidden!









Challenge

- Given that:
 - The data space stores complete items
 - Attribute hiding is implemented by the intermediary
 - Consumer may not be authorized to access hidden attributes
 - Consumers trust suppliers
- → How can consumers verify the integrity of partially retrieved items?
- ✓ We propose two signing solutions that support selective disclosure









Approach









A "disclosures" construction mechanism

- A common construction shared by both solutions
- Step 1: Decompose an item into a list of "disclosures"
- Step 2: Reconstruct a "partial" item by selecting which "disclosures" to reveal









Step 1: Decomposition

- Turn each attribute into a "disclosure"
 - The disclosure name is the attribute's "JSON Pointer"
 - The disclosure value is the attribute's value
- For each composite attribute repeat the process for all inner objects

```
"id":"urn:ngsi-ld:Car:001",
"type":"car",
"colour":"black",
"speed": 30,
"brand":{
    "company":"bmw",
    "model": "i5"
```

/id	urn:ngsi-ld:Car:001
/type	car
/colour	black
/speed	30
/brand	{'company': 'bmw', 'model': 'i5'}
/brand/company	bmw
/brand/model	i5









Step 2: Reconstruction

- Select the disclosures to reveal
- Perform the reverse process
 - E.g., reveal 1st, 4th and 6th disclosures

/id	urn:ngsi-ld:Car:001
/type	car
/colour	black
/speed	30
/brand	{'company': 'bmw', 'model': 'i5'}
/brand/company	bmw
/brand/model	i5









Two non-solutions

- Sign the entire item
 - Cannot split it at the intermediary
 - Need to sign each and every possible attribute combination
- Sign each attribute separately
 - Does not preserve objects
 - No way to know if attributes belong to the same object









Hash signature-based approach - Sign

Performed by the supplier

- 1. Generate a random salt value for each disclosure
- 2. Hash each disclosure + salt value
- 3. Digitally sign concatenation of all hashes
- 4. Store signature, hashes, disclosures and salt values at intermediary

H(/id	urn:ngsi-ld:Car:001	<salt></salt>)	
Н(/type	car	<salt></salt>)	
H(/colour	black	<salt></salt>)	
H(/speed	30	<salt></salt>)	Sign()
H(/brand	{'company': 'bmw', 'model': 'i5'}	<salt></salt>)	
H(/brand/company	bmw	<salt></salt>)	
H(/brand/model	i5	<salt></salt>)	









Hash signature-based approach - Reveal

Performed by the intermediary

- 1. For each revealed attribute also reveal the salt
- 2. For the hidden attributes only return the hash
- 3. Reveal the signature
 - E.g., reveal 1st, 4th and 6th disclosures

	/id	urn:ngsi-ld:Car:001	<salt></salt>
H(/type	car	< Calt>
H(/ eeleur	black	<salt></salt>
	/speed	30	<salt></salt>
H(/brand	{'company': 'bmw', 'model': 'i5'}	< Salt>
	/brand/company	bmw	<salt></salt>
H(/brand/model	15	<salt></salt>









Hash signature-based approach - Verify

Performed by the consumer

- 1. For each revealed attribute calculate the hash
- 2. Concatenate the hashes
- 3. Verify the signature

H(/id	urn:ngsi-ld:Car:001	<salt></salt>)	
H(/type	car	<salt></salt>)	
Н(/ eeleur	black	<salt></salt>)	
H(/speed	30	<salt></salt>)	Verify()
Н(/brand	('company': 'bmw', 'model': 'i5')	<salt></salt>)	
H(/brand/company	bmw	<salt></salt>)	
H(/brand/model	i5	<salt></salt>) _	









BBS+ signature-based approach

- BBS+ signatures allow:
 - A signer to sign a "group" of messages
 - A third party to select a subset of the messages and calculate a ZKP to prove that "this subset of the messages is part of the set that matches the provided signature"
 - Size of the ZKP linear on hidden disclosures
- Straightforward application to the list of disclosures → Treat each disclosure as a separate message









Implementation*

- Part of Secure Named Data Sharing (SNDS) project
 - Data supplier stores disclosures & signatures at intermediary
 - Intermediary accessed via NGSI-LD API gateway
 - Gateway trusted (and operated) by consumer
- Gateway operation
 - Receives NGSI-LD API request from consumer
 - Retrieves disclosures from intermediary
 - Validates signatures and proofs
 - Responds with reconstructed partial item

*https://github.com/mmlab-aueb/selective-disclosure









Evaluation

- Baseline scenario
 - Intermediary is fully trusted
 - Constructs partial content item
 - Signed with ECDSA with the P-256 curve
- Hash-based scenario
 - 128-bit random salts
 - Hashes calculated using SHA-256
 - Signed with ECDSA with the P-256 curve
- BBS+-based scenario
 - MATTR's BBS+ implementation
 - Group signatures using the BLS12-381 pairing-friendly elliptic curve
 - Must also create/send ZKP based on revealed disclosures










Communication overhead



- Size of responses returned
 - Against disclosures revealed









Computing overhead

	Supplier (sign original items)	Intermediary (sign disclosed items)	Consumer (verify signatures)
Baseline	None	<0.1ms	<0.1ms
Hash	<0.1ms	None	<0.1ms
BBS+	22ms	70ms	60ms









Security properties

	Hash-based	BBS+
Integrity protection		<u> </u>
Indistinguishability of hidden disclosures (Let D1 and D2 be the same attribute for two items, if D1 and/or D2 is hidden, the gateway should not be able to say if D1==D2)		
Untraceability of disclosures (Let D1 be a hidden attribute of an item and D1' the same attribute after some time, the gateway should not be able to say if D1==D1')	×	
Hide the total number of disclosures	×	×









Summary

- Selective revelation in data spaces
 - Data integrity protection
 - Content only signed by supplier
 - Content selectively revealed by intermediary
 - Hash based solution: higher communication overhead
 - BBS+ based solution: higher computing overhead
- Future work
 - Disallow hiding of some attributes (e.g. object ID)
 - Integrate with FIWARE Orion context broker
 - Integrate proofs directly into NGSI-LD objects









Thank you

https://mm.aueb.gr/projects/snds







