

**Milan Mossé**  
[milan\\_mosse@berkeley.edu](mailto:milan_mosse@berkeley.edu)  
[mmosse19.github.io](https://mmosse19.github.io)  
+1 (626) 710-2177

## Education

- |                 |   |
|-----------------|---|
| 2026 (expected) | <b>Ph.D.</b> , Philosophy, UC Berkeley<br>Committee: Johann Frick (co-chair), R. Jay Wallace (co-chair), Anna Stilz |
| 2024            | <b>M.S.</b> , Computer Science, Stanford<br>Research supervisors: Thomas Icard, Omer Reingold, Li-Yang Tan          |
| 2020            | <b>B.A.</b> Philosophy (Honors), <b>B.S.</b> Math, Stanford<br>Thesis advisors: Michael Bratman, Barry Maguire      |

## Areas

**Specialization:** Ethics (Practical Ethics; Normative Ethics; Metaethics) and Political Philosophy

**Competence:** Action, Language, Logic, Race, Science

## Dissertation: Reasons by Request

Requesters seem to have what is, on reflection, a remarkable power: to create reasons at will. My dissertation explores this central but overlooked dimension of our normative lives. How can requesters give us reasons to do what they want, even when they stand in no relation of authority over us? And what would be lost if we saw requests as devices for communicating the existence of pre-existing reasons, rather than creating new ones? I explain how requests create reasons and how the values served by the power to request constrain its permissible use. In characterizing the valuable relationships sustained by requests, my dissertation develops a view of reciprocity that sheds new light on a wide range of further issues, including the morality of markets, duties of fairness, distributive justice, and our reasons to care about future generations.

## Peer-reviewed publications

 [Google Scholar](#)  [PhilPapers](#)

- forth. Stable Voting and the Splitting of Cycles  
*Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence* // Wesley H. Holliday, Chase Norman, Milan Mossé, Eric Pacuit, Cynthia Wang
- 2025 How to Count Sore Throats  
*Analysis* // Léa Bourguignon, Milan Mossé
- 2024 On Probabilistic and Causal Reasoning with Summation Operators  
*Journal of Logic and Computation* // Duligur Ibeling, Thomas Icard, Milan Mossé

- 2024 Social Choice for AI Alignment: Dealing with Diverse Human Feedback  
*International Conference on Machine Learning* // Vincent Conitzer, Rachel Freedman, Jobst Heitzig, Wesley Holliday, Bob Jacobs, Nathan Lambert, Milan Mossé, Eric Pacuit, Stuart Russell, Hailey Schoelkopf, Emanuel Tewelde, William Zwicker
- 2023 Probing the Quantitative-Qualitative Divide in Probabilistic Reasoning  
*Annals of Pure and Applied Logic* // Duligur Ibeling, Thomas Icard, Krzysztof Mierzewski, Milan Mossé
- 2023 Multiplicative Metric Fairness Under Composition  
*Foundations of Responsible Computing* // Milan Mossé
- 2022 Is Causal Reasoning Harder than Probabilistic Reasoning?  
*Review of Symbolic Logic* // Milan Mossé, Duligur Ibeling, Thomas Icard
- 2022 A Generalization of the Satisfiability Coding Lemma and Its Applications  
*International Conference on Theory and Applications of Satisfiability Testing* // Milan Mossé, Harry Sha, Li-Yang Tan ([Best Theory Paper Award](#))
- 2021 Conditional Negative Sampling for Contrastive Learning of Visual Representations  
*International Conference on Machine Learning* // Mike Wu, Milan Mossé, Chengxu Zhuang, Daniel Yamins, Noah Goodman
- 2019 Zero Shot Learning for Code Education: Rubric Sampling with Deep Learning Inference  
*Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence* // Mike Wu, Milan Mossé, Noah Goodman, Chris Piech ([Outstanding Student Paper Award](#))

## Revise and Resubmit

- ④ Why not Ask? (former title: “The Requesting-Offering Asymmetry”)  
*Ethics*

## Under review

- ④ How Requests Create Reasons
- ④ Two Kinds of Reciprocity
- ④ Modeling Discrimination with Causal Abstraction  
 Milan Mossé, Kara Schechtman, Frederick Eberhardt, Thomas Icard

## Awards & fellowships

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|---------|---|
| 2024-25 | Fellowship from the Kavli Center for Ethics, Science, and the Public, UC Berkeley |
| 2025    | Dissertation Completion Fellowship, UC Berkeley                                   |
| 2023    | Outstanding GSI Award (awarded to fewer than 10% of TAs), UC Berkeley             |
| 2020    | Cota Robles Fellowship, UC Berkeley   |
| 2019    | Major Grant, Stanford   |

2017-19      Mellon Mays Undergraduate Fellow, Stanford  
2017          Chappell-Lougee Scholarship, Stanford

## **Selected presentations**

*Teleological Explanations* (with Seth Yalcin)

2026      Eastern APA

*How Requests Create Reasons*

2026      Eastern APA Symposium

*Individualism and Its Limits*

2025      MANCEPT (University of Manchester) Workshop on Moral Aggregation

*Equality and Alienation*

2025      Berkeley Political Philosophy Workshop

*Treating Others Merely as Ends*

2025      Rocky Mountain Philosophy Conference, University of Colorado Boulder

*Reasoning about Confirmation*

2025      Probability Logic Workshop, Carnegie Mellon University

*Why not Ask? (formerly “The Requesting-Offering Asymmetry”)*

2025      Central APA Symposium

2024      Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress, University of Colorado Boulder

*Modeling Discrimination with Causal Abstraction*

2025      Departmental Talk, Emory\*

2024      CEPDISC, Aarhus University

2024      Stanford Logic Seminar\*

*Care as Respecting a Sensibility*

2024      Harvard Workshop on Care and Love

*Conditional Intention Ascriptions*

2024      Agency and Intentions in Language, Harvey Mudd College

*Modeling Structural Injustice*

2023      Stanford Logic Seminar\*

*How to Count Sore Throats*

2023      LSE Choice Group\*

\*invited; all others refereed

## **Graduate coursework**

### **University of California, Berkeley**

Fall 2025      Philosophy of Language, with Seth Yalcin

Spr 2025      Ethics and Time,\* with Johann Frick

Fall 2024      Disagreement,\* with Joshua Cohen & Véronique Munoz-Dardé

2022-23      **Qualifying Exams**

	Hume's Sentimentalism, with Olivia Bailey
	Contractualism, with R. Jay Wallace
	Question-Sensitivity, with Seth Yalcin
Spr 2022	Individual, Social, and Ethical Choice, with Wesley Holliday
Spr 2022	Thought, Character, and Action in Aristotle, with Tim Clarke
Fall 2021	Ethical Theories, with R. Jay Wallace
Fall 2021	The Common Ground, with John MacFarlane & Seth Yalcin
Spr 2021	Hume, with Olivia Bailey
Spr 2021	Pragmatism, with Shamik Dasgupta
Fall 2020	Feminist Epistemology, with Andreja Novakovic
Fall 2020	Evolutionary & Developmental Perspectives on Morality, with Jan Engelmann & R. Jay Wallace
Fall 2020	Property, with Joshua Cohen & Desmond Jagmohan
Fall 2020	Proseminar, with John Campbell & Hannah Ginsborg

## Stanford University

Spr 2024	Artificial Intelligence: Principles and Techniques, with Nima Anari, Moses Charikar, and Sanmi Koyejo
Spr 2024	The Ethical Analyst, with Dale Nesbitt
Spr 2023	Decision Theory and Planning Agency,* with Thomas Icard & Michael Bratman
Fall 2020	Research Seminar in Complexity Theory, with Li-Yang Tan
Spr 2020	Complexity Theory II, with Li-Yang Tan
Win 2020	Complexity Theory, with Li-Yang Tan
Win 2020	Optimization and Algorithmic Paradigms, with Moses Charikar
Win 2020	Theory of Probability II (Statistics PhD Sequence), with Amir Dembo
Fall 2019	Theory of Probability I (Statistics PhD Sequence), with Andrea Montanari
Fall 2019	Research Seminar on Logic and Formal Philosophy, with Thomas Icard
Spr 2019	Topics in Logic, Information, and Agency, with Johan van Benthem & Thomas Icard
Spr 2019	Topics in Aesthetics, with Kendall Walton
Spr 2019	Topics in Combinatorics, with Jacob Fox
Win 2019	Algebraic Error Correcting Codes, with Mary Wootters
Spr 2018	Planning, Time, and Rationality, with Michael Bratman

\*audited; all others for credit

## Teaching

### University of California, Berkeley

Fall 2025	TA, Philosophy of Science, with Ezra Rubenstein
Fall 2024	TA, Political Philosophy: Equality and Identity, with Véronique Munoz-Dardé
Sum 2024	Co-Instructor, Individual Morality and Social Justice, with Russell McIntosh
Fall 2023	TA, Political Philosophy, with Véronique Munoz-Dardé
Sum 2023	TA, Contemporary Ethical Issues, with Tim Crockett
Fall 2022	TA, Bioethics, with Johann Frick

Sum 2022	TA, Philosophy of Race, Ethnicity, and Citizenship, with Tim Crockett
Spr 2022	TA, Individual Morality and Social Justice, with Johann Frick
Fall 2021	TA, Nature of Mind, with John Campbell

## Stanford University

Spr 2024	TA, Incentives in Computer Science, with Aviad Rubenstein
Sum 2020	TA, Design and Analysis of Algorithms, with Karey Shi
Win 2020	TA, Design and Analysis of Algorithms, with Mary Wootters
Win 2018	TA, Programming Abstractions, with Marty Stepp
Fall 2018	TA, Programming Methodology, with Mehran Sahami

## Service

### Diversity, equity, and inclusion

AY 2021-22, 2024-25	Graduate Representative, Equity Task Force; Focus on <a href="#">Trans Inclusion</a>
AY 2021-22, 2023-24	Co-Organizer, Minorities and Philosophy
Fall 2022	Co-Organizer, COMPASS Workshop
Spr 2021	<a href="#">Un-Naming Proposal</a> Co-Author, Moses Hall Name Review Committee

### Other organizing, chairing, and refereeing

Fall 2025	Co-Organizer, MANCEPT Limited Aggregation Workshop
Spr 2022, 2023, 2025	Founder, Co-Organizer, & Mentor, Directed Reading Program
AY 2020-21, 2023-2024	Organizer, Graduate Work-in-Progress Talks
Spr 2023	Grad Organizer, Social Choice for AI Ethics & Safety Workshop
AY 2022-23	Grad Organizer, Department Colloquia
Spr 2021/2023, AY 2023-24	Organizer, Faculty Work-in-Progress Talks
Spr 2022	Organizer, Latin American Philosophy Reading Group
AY 2021-22	Organizer, Feminism and Masculinity Reading Group
Chair (selected)	Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress (2024); Central APA (2025); Arizona Workshop in Normative Ethics (invitation by submitted abstract)
Referee	Computational Complexity Conference (CCC); Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems (NeurIPS; ×5); International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML; ×5), International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming (ICALP); International Symposium on Algorithms and Computation (ISAAC); Journal of Moral Philosophy (×4); Logic Journal of the IGPL (×3); Philosophical Studies (×2); Utilitas

## Skills

Languages: Spanish (professional proficiency) and German (reading)

Coding: C, C++, Python

## References

### **Thomas F. Icard**

C. I. Lewis Professor of Philosophy and (by courtesy) Professor of Computer Science  
*Stanford University*  
icard@stanford.edu

### **Johann Frick**

Associate Professor of Philosophy  
*University of California, Berkeley*  
jfrick@berkeley.edu

### **Véronique Munoz-Dardé** (teaching reference)

Professor of Philosophy  
*University College London*  
Mills Adjunct Professor of Philosophy  
*University of California, Berkeley*  
munoz\_darde@berkeley.edu

### **R. Jay Wallace**

William and Trudy Ausfahl Chair in Philosophy  
*University of California, Berkeley*  
rjw@berkeley.edu

### **Seth Yalcin**

Professor of Philosophy  
*University of California, Berkeley*  
yalcin@berkeley.edu

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## Reasons by Request

### Dissertation Summary

You are not required to stop and aid every stranger lost in the subway. Upon seeing one, you might cite your discretion to defer assistance for another occasion, thinking to yourself, “I will help the next time I see someone in their shoes.” But this thought rings hollow when the lost stranger *requests* your guidance. Your normative situation has changed, and you must now give a reason for not helping in this particular case, or else provide assistance. Requesters have what is, on reflection, a remarkable power: to create reasons at will. The central puzzle of requests is to explain how this is possible. What accounts for the ability of requesters to create reasons for others in this way, even in cases in which they do not stand in any special relation of authority over the requestee?

My dissertation begins by answering this question. At the center of my account is the idea that we have reasons to grant requests because doing so improves our compliance with *imperfect duties*—duties that grant us significant discretion to decide how to comply. Anytime you can help a stranger, you can also think to yourself that you will help next time, and we are correspondingly liable to fall short of our imperfect duties to help others. As a result, it is valuable for you to accept that the lost stranger’s request prevents you from just citing your generic interest in discretion, by providing a reason for compliance in this particular case. Just as religious traditions improve compliance with imperfect duties to give to charities by establishing regular times and recipients for donations, requests improve compliance with imperfect duties more generally.

My account does not appeal to *pre-existing, intimate* relationships between the requester and the requestee. How do the values served by the power to request constrain its permissible use, given that we wield this power at will over perfect strangers? What do we owe to the recipients of our requests? I approach these questions by way of an asymmetry between requests and offers: it is often not okay to request an act, but perfectly fine to accept an offer for it. What might explain this? After all, the request and offer result in the same duty upon their acceptance, and they concern the same act. My second chapter argues that some requests are wrongful *precisely because they create reasons*. Creating a reason often generates a double-bind for the requestee: if they act as requested, they pay the practical cost of doing so; if they do not, they pay a moral cost, in the form of a reason for regret. While this double-bind does not always make requests wrongful, I show how it can be intrusive, exploitative, and coercive. Offers do not create the same double-bind, I argue, because offers do not as such create reasons.

Even if requests do not generally invoke antecedent relationships, they create reasons which incentivize us to develop them. Prior work models these relationships in terms of *material* reciprocity: the mutual exchange of benefits. I argue that requests are not just efficient vehicles for exchanging benefits, but can function to develop intrinsically valuable relationships. They thereby sustain *relational* reciprocity, which is realized when we share responsibility for deepening the value of a relationship. My third chapter defends the distinction between material and relational reciprocity and argues that it sheds new light on a wide range of further issues, including the morality of markets, duties of fairness, distributive justice, and our reasons to care about future generations.