

Digital Signature Schemes

- Schnorr
- ECDSA (Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm)
- Boneh-Lynn-Shacham (BLS)

Goal: Description of generating • Public & Private keys
 • Signing Messages
 • Validating Signatures

One-Way Functions

$f()$ easy to compute but hard to calculate $f^{-1}()$

Assumption 1

- $f(x)$ given, no polynomial time function to compute x

Signatures use the additive property of $f()$

$$f(xy) = f(x) \oplus f(y)$$

$$f(x-y) = f(x) \ominus f(y)$$

$$f(x) = f(\underbrace{x+\dots+x}_c) = f(x) \oplus \dots \oplus f(x) = c \times f(x)$$

Why do the points using modulo q ? isn't that implied by the fact inputs are in the range $[1, q-1]$

What does it mean for an operator to be defined along an elliptic curve?

One-way function implementations on elliptic curves

Finite Set which satisfies equation on elliptic curve

$$y^2 \equiv x^3 + ax + b \pmod{p} \quad \text{w} \quad 0 \leq y < p \text{ and } 0 \leq x < p \text{ are x,y}$$

Digital Signatures

- public & private keys are paired to create "irreversibility" of signatures

- each public key has secret key, one can generate a signature (Primitive Sign)
 and corresponding key (Primitive Verify Sign)

VerifySig \rightarrow 1 if valid sig
 \rightarrow 0 otherwise

Elliptic Curve Cryptography

$f(x) \rightarrow$ to a point on elliptic curve over finite field F_p
 $[x, y-1]$

q, p are large prime numbers

- Points on elliptic curve are denoted in Capital letter
- Integers in the range $[1, q-1]$ with lowercase letters

relates to continuing to properties of EC

- Means operator maintains EC properties

- Consistency w EC
- Closure \rightarrow result is also on the curve
- Defined algebraically or geometrically

Schnorr Signatures

- takes adv of fact $ax+b$, $a \neq 0$ has a single sol
- only one single x such that $ax+b=0$ for $a \neq 0$

$s \equiv r+h \cdot x \pmod{q}$, congruence modulo prime q
only satisfied by ints s, r, h, x from $1, \dots, q-1$

also satisfy

$$f(s) = f(r) \oplus h \times f(x)$$

- $f(s), f(r), f(x)$ points on elliptic curve

Schnorr Primitive $\text{Sign}(m, x) = \sigma$

- Public key $X = f(x)$

- pick random number r , called the nonce

$$R = f(r)$$

↖ point on EC

$$H(m \| R \| X)$$

↖ concatenate the message with the point and hash

$$\text{Compute } s \equiv r + h \cdot x \pmod{q}$$

$$\text{Return } \sigma := (R, s)$$

So is s the signature value for schnorr's?

yes

do all signature generations go through that equation?

yes

- see operator definition Regs above

input to another value so bit placement irrelevant

So there are certain bits for each m, R, X ?

✓ what is the function of them to give the amount?

each are represented in 256 bits

Schnorr Primitive $\text{VerifySig}(\sigma, m, X) = \{0, 1\}$

Signature is $(R, s) = \sigma$

Compute $S = f(s)$ from s

Concatenate the message m w R and X & compute its hash $h = H(m \| R \| X)$

$$\text{Return } S \stackrel{?}{=} R \oplus h \times X$$

Schnorr Signature

- Composed of 2 parts

$R = f(r)$ and s

- s does not reveal the secret key as long as r is not presented

Instead of

Verifying $s \equiv r + h \cdot x \pmod{q}$

Also verifies whether the equality $f(s) = f(r) \oplus h \times f(x)$ holds

ECDSA Signature

- In DSA calculates the nonce & public key in a finite field
- Signature is calc in a cyclic subgroup using suitable operator
- Converts curve point R to int r
- public key : 256 bits
- Secret key: $[1, q-1]$, $q \lesssim 2^{256} \rightarrow 256$ bits
- Operator $|e| \rightarrow [1, q-1]$

ECDSA $\text{Sign}(m, x) = \sigma$

$r \equiv h \cdots + R \cdot s \cdot x \pmod{q}$
 $f(r) = f(h \cdot s) \oplus (R \cdot s) \times f(x)$
 $R = |f(r)|$
 Hash message $h = H(m)$
 pick random r , $R = |f(r)|$ ← why r^{-1} ?
 compute $s \equiv (h + R \cdot x) r^{-1} \pmod{q}$
 Return $\sigma := (R, s)$

ECDSA $\text{VerifySig}(\sigma, m, x) = \{0, 1\}$

Extract $sg (R, s) = \sigma$, $h = H(m)$, $R = |R|$
 Return $s \times R \stackrel{?}{=} f(h) \oplus R \times H$

BLS Signatures

- In Schnorr and ECDSA, use of nonce can create vulnerability
- Often favored for signature aggregation capabilities
- two homomorphic one-way functions
 $f_1(), f_2()$ map to separate elliptic curves

$$\begin{aligned}
 f_1(): \oplus & & f_2(): \oplus \\
 G_1 = f_1(1) & & G_2 = f_2(1)
 \end{aligned}$$

BLS Sign → Hash msg → hash
 $h = H(m)$, $H = \text{SWH}(h)$, $S = x \cdot H \rightarrow$ sign hash w private key
 equation must hold
 $e(H, X) = e(H, x G_1) = e(x H, G_2) = e(s, G_2)$

BLS Primitive VerifySig

$(s) = \sigma$, $h = H(m)$, $H = \text{SWH}(h)$
 Return $e(S, G_2) \stackrel{?}{=} e(H, X)$