

Decisive Action Training Environment



TRADOC G2
TRADOC Intelligence Support Activity
(TRISA)-Threats
Contemporary Operational Environment and
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TRADOC G-2

TRISA-THREATS

CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND THREAT INTEGRATION

DIRECTORATE (CTID)

SECTION 1: STRATEGIC SETTING

PURPOSE

An operational environment is the “composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of commanders.”(JP 3-0)

The purpose of this Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE) document—formerly known as the Full Spectrum Training Environment (FSTE)—is to provide the US Army training community with a detailed description of the conditions of five operational environments (OEs) in the Caucasus region; specifically the countries of **Ariana, Atropia, Gorgas, Minaria, and Donovia**. It presents trainers with a tool to assist in the construction of scenarios for specific training events but does not provide a complete scenario. The DATE offers discussions of OE conditions through the Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, Infrastructure, Physical Environment, and Time (PMESII-PT) variables. This DATE applies to all US Army units (Active Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve) that participate in an Army or joint training exercise.

This DATE will incorporate some real-world data and some artificial data in order to set the conditions for a wide range of training events, to include decisive operations. Section 2: Variables of the OE and Orders of Battle (OBs) provides the bulk of these details. The variable discussion explores the complex and ever-changing combination of conditions, circumstances, and influences that could affect military operations within a given OE. The PMESII-PT variables offer insight into each country's independent, dynamic, and multi-dimensional environment. By defining these variables' makeup and interoperability as they relate to a specific country, a picture emerges of the environment's nature and characteristics. The OBs, which follow each country's PMESII-PT variable discussions, contain the administrative force structure (AFS) OB.

HOW TO USE THE DATE

The DATE is a tool for the training community to use across training events ranging from rotations at the Combat Training Centers (CTCs) to individual home station training (HST) events. It is the baseline document for all the conditions and characteristics of the five OEs in the region. Exercise planners should use this document for all exercise and scenario design requirements. A map showing the location of each CTC component within the Caucasus region is located on page 1-I-16.

The DATE was developed and designed to allow for flexibility and creativity in its application. Not all conditions in the document need to be represented during each training event. Specific training requirements should drive the scenario development and conditions replicated. If additional description or detail is needed for a given condition, each exercise planner can add that narrative to the condition. The goal is to keep the baseline conditions stable, while allowing for any additional narrative to be added as required by the training tasks. For example, if a scenario story-line requires more detail on the insurgent group the Provisional Army of Lezgin (PAL), this detail can be added by the exercise planner as long as it follows the naming convention and associated group conditions used in the DATE and does not change the baseline story.

DATE SECTIONS

This DATE contains four sections.

- **Section 1: Strategic Setting** describes the strategic situation of each actor across the Caucasus region and provides an overview of some key strategic issues. This section sets the stage for the document and presents a starting point for discussing the strategic environment and developing a specific scenario. A particular exercise or training event

may need to add more discussion or specific strategic issues to this discussion to support the training requirements necessary for scenario construction and exercise execution.

- **Section 2: Variables of the OE and Orders of Battle** provides a comprehensive and complimentary look at the PMESII-PT variables as they apply to the region, specifically Ariana, Atropia, Gorgas, Minaria, and Donovia. This section enables the scenario writers and exercise designers to better understand the regional conditions. Detailed OBs, derived from the TC 7-100 series, are provided to adequately stress US Army units across the spectrum of operations.
- **Section 3: Events** provides a list of non-country specific events that can be used to test the mission essential task list (METL) of various friendly elements.
- **Section 4: Orders of Battle Appendices** is comprised of three parts. Organizational equipment tables of selected units are in an online version of Appendix A at <https://www.us.army.mil/suite/files/26501220>. Appendix B provides instructions on how to task organize opposing force (OPFOR) units for combat. Appendix C consists of the OPFOR equipment tier tables from the Worldwide Equipment Guide (WEG).



DISCUSSION OF THE OES IN THE DATE

Over 200,000 square miles comprise the Caucasus, a mountainous region located between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea. The Caucasus includes Atropia, Minaria, and Gorgas, as well as parts of Ariana, Donovia, and Kemalia. The Caucasus Mountains, consisting of the Greater and Lesser Caucasus ranges, traditionally form the separation between Europe and Asia. The Caucasus region contains two major parts—the North Caucasus and the South Caucasus—that are divided by the Greater Caucasus Mountains. The North Caucasus region is contained entirely within Donovia, while the South Caucasus contains Gorgas, Minaria, Atropia, and parts of Ariana and Kemalia. The Caspian Sea holds large oil and natural gas reserves, potentially as large as those in Saudi Arabia, which contribute to the region's geostrategic importance.

The region has a long history of warfare; ethnic and religious factionalism; and general political, military, and civilian unrest. In addition to these internal regional divisions, outside actors like the US, the European Union (EU), China, and Middle East nations have increasing strategic interests in the region. The Caucasus thus represents a flashpoint where highly localized conflict can spill over into widespread unrest or general war.

ARIANA

Ariana, the area's second-largest and second-strongest nation militarily, possesses massive oil and gas reserves in its southwest region along the Persian Gulf. This area and the Strait of Hormuz comprise key terrain assets for the country. Ariana's government is aggressive, capable, revolutionary, and intent on spreading its vision of Islamic governance and the establishment of a new Arianian hegemony throughout the region. Ariana mobilizes target populations through politicization of Islam to accomplish its long-term goals.

ATROPIA

Atropia is vulnerable because of its natural resources and as a result of conflicts over the Artzak region. Atropia possesses significant oil and gas reserves in both the northeast and the Caspian Sea. Further, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, one of the most critical infrastructure components in the region, originates near its capital city. These rich natural resources generate potential threats from external forces.

Minaria currently occupies Atropia's Artzak region, an area fought over by Atropia and Minaria for over a quarter of a century. At present, over 95% of the Artzak region population belongs to the Minarian ethnic group. Refugees displaced from the Artzak dispute amount to over one million people. An estimated 400,000 Atropian Minarians and 30,000 Artzak Minarians fled to Minaria or Donovia to avoid the conflict. An estimated 800,000 Atropians from Minaria or Artzak sought refuge in Atropia. Various other ethnic groups in Artzak also evacuated to refugee camps in Atropia or Ariana. All efforts to settle the dispute since 1997 have failed. Ariana contains a large internal Atropian ethnic minority and disagrees with Atropia over the delineation of Caspian Sea oil and gas fields. Atropia, a majority Shia nation, resists Arianian-sponsored attempts to politicize Islam within Atropia.

GORGAS

Gorgas, like Atropia, is a small yet fiercely independent state in a fragile and dangerous area, but without Atropia's hydrocarbon assets. The country's primary strength is geographical—its Black Sea ports and land border with Kemalia make it a logical pipeline route and regional outlet to the outside world. Gorgas remains among the smallest and least economically developed nations in the region. It currently exists in a state of "frozen conflict" with Donovia over Donovian attempts to block

Gorgas from NATO and EU membership, as well as Donovian support for Zabzimek and South Ostremek—two breakaway regions formerly part of Gorgas.

The breakaway territory Zabzimek is located in northwest Gorgas and borders Donovia. Currently, a ceasefire and line of separation exist between Gorgas and Zabzimek, but the Zabzimek militia poses a threat to the port of Poti and lines of communication from the Black Sea to the Gorgan capital city of Tbilisi. Zabzimek achieved *de facto* independence after the conflict with Gorgas in 1992, but only Donovia and Nicaragua recognize the country internationally. Strong criminal elements operate in Zabzimek.

South Ostremek, in north-central Gorgas, also wants independence from Gorgas. Like Zabzimek, South Ostremek achieved *de facto* independence after the 2008 Donovia-Gorgas War, but only Donovia and Nicaragua recognize the new country internationally. South Ostremek wants to reunite with North Ostremek, a Donovian province. Currently, a ceasefire remains in effect between Gorgas and South Ostremek, primarily monitored by Donovian peacekeepers.

MINARIA

Minaria, a small and poor country, neighbors Atropia, Ariana, Gorgas, and Kemalia and also occupies the Artzak region. Minaria currently enjoys a strong economic and military relationship with Donovia and a good economic relationship with Ariana. Tensions still exist with Atropia over the disputed Artzak region, an Atopian province that is currently occupied by ethnic Minarians. Additionally, Ariana's and Minaria's improved trade relations have created tension with the US. Minaria will attempt to maintain relations with all the Caucasus powers due to its precarious economic development and isolated geopolitical position.

DONOVARIA

Donovia is a resurgent nation that, prior to the early 1990s, was the region's dominant political, economic, military, and social player. Internal turmoil lessened Donovia's influence during the period from the 1990s to around 2000. Now, riding a wave of higher oil prices, a reinvigorated Donovia seeks to rebuild its prior levels of regional and international influence through a combination of assertive diplomacy and military power. However, the desire for independence among the other states in the region creates friction between them. Ultimately, Donovia's neighbors wish to accommodate Donovian power without jeopardizing their core equities.

REGIONAL PMESII-PT OVERVIEW

POLITICAL

Since the region's distancing from Donovian influence, political divisions within the Caucasus have hardened to create deep animosity between some of the countries. A long history of conflict has created borders that are often illogical, with contested boundaries that divide ethnic groups, rupture trade and communication routes, and split previous economic and political interdependencies. Internal and external forces destabilize the relatively weak Caucasus governmental structures and make the governments subject to potential breakdown. Ariana and Atropia put up the front of a democracy with elected officials—Ariana with its legislature and Atropia with attempts to follow the Kemalian secular-Muslim model; but in reality, power belongs to a small elite group. In Ariana, the clerical authority roots out serious dissent and liquidates any opposition. In Atropia, a ruling family dominates all political life. Gorgas wants to sever its former ties with Donovia as it courts membership in NATO and the EU. Minaria retains its ties with Donovia but would not hesitate to turn to other countries if such an alliance would ensure its survival.

Despite some advances in the creation of parliamentary and electoral mechanisms, enactment of limited liberal legislation, and the development of new leaders, the legitimacy of the region's governments remains limited. These governments often resort to authoritarian methods to retain control of the state: manipulating elections, stifling opposition, clamping down on dissidents, violating political freedoms, and abusing human rights. As a result, long-term political, economic, and social stability prospects remain uncertain. Oil and natural gas resources draw outside powers to the Caucasus, but the region's history of outside interference and ethnic conflict makes its nations wary and prone to vendettas and grudges, whether in the countries' best interests or not.

Contributing to the inter-regional strife are the various political ideals and goals espoused by each individual nation:

- Ariana is a true theocracy, with every significant political action affected by the clerical class. A brutally efficient military ensures the continuation of the current power structure, while a sham representative government appeases or distracts Western interests.
- Atropia is a classic dictatorship and uses a dynastic approach to governance. Every national success or failure reflects directly on the ruling family.
- Gorgas is a political oddity in the region as an emerging representative democracy. In a region driven by group politics and ethnic nationalism, Gorgas is trying to make a democracy work and stands to lose much if let down by Western interests.
- Minaria is an autocracy. Minaria's key political goal is the survival and advancement of the Minarian ethnicity. Any argument for action between Minarians can be won by the side offering better protection for the local and Diaspora population.
- Donovia is an authoritarian state led by a small, incestuous elite. This group uses state power and resources to enrich itself and secure both domestic and international political support. The Donovian elite wants to return Donovia to a co-equal place with the Great Powers of the world.

MILITARY

Because of ties to Donovia, most Caucasus countries use primarily Donovian-sourced military doctrine and equipment. Some of the countries, however, recently purchased Western hardware, and their interactions with NATO forces in operations around the world caused them to adopt more Western doctrine and technologies like unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and advanced anti-armor capabilities.

Several factors threaten security and stability throughout the Caucasus region. For the most part, the region has no functional border guard units, so the borders remain quite porous. Secessionist conflicts, limited political and economic reforms, and increased social problems provide a fertile ground for germination of radical groups, infiltration of foreign Islamic networks, and formation of militant organizations. Overall, unresolved territorial conflicts pose the most dangerous and immediate threat to the region's security.

Ariana maintains the second largest military of the five Caucasus countries—behind Donovia. Militarily, it is a dominant actor within the region, capable of conducting military action across the spectrum of operations. The Arianian military conducts overt, covert, and clandestine operations with ripple effects across the region. Reporting also suggests ties between elements of Ariana's military to criminal and terror groups within the region, which further extends the potential for a global threat. Ariana has generally antagonistic relations with Atropia and maintains good ties with Minaria. Ariana is focused on keeping Western influence out of the region and maintaining its

current status and self-perceived logical role as a regional strongman. Reports indicate that Ariana possesses nuclear weapons, with three nuclear sites identified at Qom, Isfahan, and Natanz.

Atropia's military forces consist of a small army, navy, and air force that have limited offensive capability, with doctrine and structure that reflect decades of Donovian influence. Due to the military's small size, Atropia restricts its scope to defending the country's borders and regional operations, mostly directed at Minaria. Atropian military forces emulate Minaria's in size and capability, and the two nations are currently engaged in an ongoing arms race. Enduring skirmishes with Minaria over disputed territory drive Atropia's deployment of forces. To counter Donovian support for Minaria, the Atropian military is attempting to gain Arianian military support to help reclaim lost territory. Atropia's hydrocarbon revenue is currently allowing its military to modernize its equipment. The Atropian military's current key mission is to defend its oil and gas infrastructure. Atropia hopes its oil and gas revenues—and the resulting prestige and power—will translate into a more robust military and overall regional power.

Like the rest of the Caucasus region, Gorgas has an extensive history of irregular and regular warfare. Of the five countries, Gorgas maintains the smallest military—consisting of a ground force, air force, and sea force (coast guard) capability for defensive operations, with limited offensive capabilities. Gorgas uses the military for defense and to maintain territorial sovereignty that includes regaining breakaway regions. Gorgas is currently attempting to join NATO and is the most accepting of Western influence.

Regular and irregular warfare also permeate Minaria's history. Minaria is heavily influenced by Donovia, which currently has advisors in the country. Minaria would most likely remain neutral if conflict began with Ariana. The Minarian military consists of only an army and an air force, and is roughly the size of the Atropian military. The Minarian military, heavily influenced by the territorial dispute with Atropia, cannot project forces outside of the region.

Donovia maintains a strong military, partially as an inheritance from its pre-1991 strength and partially through economic wealth being used to transform the pre-1991 military remnants into a modern military. Donovian doctrine and tactics are complex, supple, and competent, making Donovia a capable opponent. Donovia's military capability ranges from irregular forces to nuclear weapons and anti-space capability. This strong military, combined with its assertive political agenda, make Donovia a prime consideration for all nations in the region.

ECONOMIC

Oil and gas resources drive the region's economy. All international commerce centers around oil drilling and refining, and development of a transportation corridor. Significantly, the corridor serves as the main world market outlet for hydrocarbon resources from both the Caucasus region and the Central Asian countries. In addition, China and Japan continue to extend their influence into the region through financial involvement with Caspian energy projects. Ariana, Atropia, and Donovia possess the fossil fuels, while Gorgas provides the pipeline access required to ship oil and gas abroad. Minaria would like to participate in the transshipment of petroleum products, but its dispute with Atropia over the Artzak region precludes this possibility.

Regional conflicts compound local economic problems, generating hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and encouraging many others to leave their country, especially for Donovia. Donovia serves as the main market for regional goods, primarily hydrocarbon products and foodstuffs for several reasons, including international markets closed because of political instability, insufficient alternate transit routes, and stiff trade tariffs. With domestic markets contracted and trade opportunities constrained, all five Caucasus nations have limited potential for economic development outside the energy sector. The economic challenge is to identify ways to diversify the region's economies through restoration and development of critical water resources,

agriculture, and the ailing manufacturing sector. The region's relatively weak central governments focus more on control than on the fledgling market economies, so inefficiency and criminal elements freely flourish. Its minimal diversity places the region's economies in danger of stagnating, with daily commerce and utilities degrading and the general standard of living falling. Because of this threat, some of the region's inhabitants are returning to the countryside to survive from the land or seeking permission to migrate abroad.

The Arianian economy primarily centers on its petroleum industry, though it is highly diversified compared to other petroleum-dependent economies. The Arianians have attempted to create an industrial manufacturing sector, especially as international sanctions require them to increasingly in-source manufactured goods. Ariana also has a large agriculture sector.

Atropia's economy is also dependent on hydrocarbon extraction. Most industry other than oil and gas is engaged in subsistence-level agriculture or services. Atropia has attempted to diversify its economy with little success. It is likely that hydrocarbon dependence will be the hallmark of the Atropian economy indefinitely.

Gorgas is primarily a service economy, with many citizens also engaged in subsistence agriculture as a secondary sector. While the Gorgan economy is relatively free, development has been slow. The most likely growth opportunity will be as a petroleum transshipment point. Even this bright spot in the economy is overshadowed by the lingering, cooling effects of the Donovian-Gorgas War.

Minaria, like Gorgas, is a service and agriculture-based economy. While not as politically free as Gorgas, Minaria benefits from overseas investment from the Minarian Diaspora and Donovia. Due to a near blockade of goods and services from Kemalia and Atropia, Minaria is dependent on its relationships with Ariana and Gorgas for the movement of goods and services. However, international sanctions against Ariana and a limited Gorgan trade embargo against Minaria hamper the effectiveness of these partnerships.

Donovia is using its petrochemical wealth to climb out of economic stagnation. However, beneath the veneer of a market economy, former command elements have morphed into a crony capitalist economy. State-associated businesses dominate the economic landscape, and businesses not affiliated with the government face significant hurdles from a variety of government bureaucracies. The general response to massive corruption is more corruption, which affects nearly every element of Donovian economic life. Services are an important element of the Donovian economy, but export of non-military manufactured goods and services remain dwarfed by hydrocarbon-based exports.

SOCIAL

All countries in the region can trace their cultures back for centuries, and most ethnic groups retain rivalries against each other that date back just as far. The countries have long histories of internal and external volatility, usually over disputed territory. Each country possesses strong ethnic groups that do not tolerate others, and each is home to displaced persons who originated from the others' territory. Many of the IDPs are born into a refugee situation and harbor resentment and intolerance to other displaced groups. This violent history keeps the countries and their people wary of each other and of regional outsiders.

Literacy rates are high in the region, with only Ariana possessing a rate lower than 98%. Atropia, Gorgas, Minaria, and Donovia have all instituted educational reforms during the past two decades, with the aim of producing qualified, internationally competitive citizens who will reduce poverty, improve social welfare, and encourage economic growth.

The vast majority of Ariana's citizens are Shia Muslim and view themselves as either Persian or Arianian, depending on ethnicity. With a rich culture and heritage, Ariana's social issues stem not from its people but from its leaders, whose actions are considered corrupt and repressive. Protests

over government corruption, unequal wealth distribution, high inflation, and high unemployment rates occur often, despite the government's frequent use of force to put them down.

Atropia consists mainly of ethnic Atopian Shia Muslim, with small ethnic and religious minorities. Most Atropians choose to support the government, which may well be due to the continuing dispute with Minaria over the Artzak region. Those that do not usually fall into two categories: separatists who wish to create a new country from southern Atropia and northwest Ariana; and those upset over taxation, lack of utilities, substandard social services, and judicial favoritism.

Most Gorgan citizens are of the same ethnicity and practice Orthodox Christianity. Though attacks do occur against other ethnic groups and religions, the government is working to protect the rights of minorities, as well as freedom of speech and of the press. Most social unrest revolves around Gorgas' breakaway republics, which both the government and its citizens would like to see returned to Gorgan control.

Nearly all Minarians are ethnic Minarian Christians. Those that are not suffer some discrimination, but not at the levels experienced in neighboring countries. Major social issues that shape Minarian thinking are hatred of the Kemalians—a residue of attempted genocide—and support for the autonomous Artzak region in Atropia.

Donovia's population is predominately Arab Sunni, with significant social-related issues that retard economic and political development. In addition, certain Donovian social fabric elements, such as massive smoking, pervasive corruption, and endemic violence, have created significant social volatility that is manifested through gender imbalance, high crime rates, and systemic discrimination against ethnic minorities.

INFORMATION

The Caucasus region receives the majority of its news and information through television, but Internet and mobile phone usage are growing. The region continues to evolve slowly from state-controlled media and information delivery. While governments still attempt to control information, satellite and computer technology enable many of the region's people to bypass governmental controls. As more international companies move into the growing information market, technology and access continue to become more affordable to the average citizen. The mass use of television keeps perception management at the forefront of all political and military operations. Computer attacks have occurred in the region, and each country continues to expand both its Intelligence and Information Warfare (INFOWAR) capabilities.

Ariana is a highly-controlled information environment. The government controls all media outlets and attempts to limit its citizens' access to outside sources of information like the Internet and satellite TV broadcasts. Despite the government's actions, Arianian citizens—especially the educated urban elite—have aggressively attempted to circumvent the government-imposed information embargo.

The Atopian government attempts to regulate the information environment through ownership control of the main media outlets and occasional arrests of bloggers and reporters. No significant nongovernment-affiliated media outlets exist. The Atopian government also attempts to control the content of religious messages through the selection of religious authorities. If Atropians avoid messages with a strong religious or antigovernment tone, the content is generally allowed by the government.

Gorgas maintains a generally free press, though government ownership and connections with media owners make certain subjects off limits. Unlike other countries in the region, Gorgas does have some media outlets that are independent, so debate in Gorgas is the freest among Caucasian countries.

Minaria follows the pattern set by Gorgas and Atropia, falling between the two in overall control of the information environment. The Minarian government controls the media environment, but only to a degree that does not antagonize its neighbors or the West. In this fashion, the Minarian government maintains the most flexible information posture.

Donovia is a world leader in INFOWAR. While information is subject to government pressure and outright censorship, censorship is usually self-imposed. Opinions contrary to the standing government line are primarily found in social media, which is outside the government oversight imposed on other mass media communications.

INFRASTRUCTURE

The Caucasus countries face several hurdles to infrastructure development. Atropia, Gorgas, Minaria, and Donovia rely on infrastructure mainly built decades ago, while Ariana possesses a somewhat newer infrastructure. The region remains dependent on oil and natural gas reserves in Ariana, Atropia, and Donovia. While these countries possess the financial resources to improve their infrastructure, Western embargos against Ariana, ethno-political issues in Atropia, and lack of government priority in Donovia prevent most infrastructure improvement outside the hydrocarbon industries. This aging infrastructure is affected by natural disasters such as landslides, mudslides, and floods, which routinely cause evacuation of local populations, loss of life, infrastructural damage and heavy material losses. Development of the Caucasus as a transportation corridor will not only increase incomes and boost the Atropian and Gorgan economies, but will also expand air pollution and noise issues. Construction of roads, railways, and pipelines may cause the loss of valuable agriculture land. Waste dumping along the transportation routes will become a growing issue.

Ariana has the second most modern infrastructure in the Caucasus region because of wealth generated by hydrocarbon exports. Ariana contains 12 cities with a population of over one million residents, high building density, and developed power, water, and sewage utilities that can reach at least 75% of the urban residents. Ariana operates complex transportation architecture with abundant multi-lane hard-surface highway networks, railway lines, and many operational airports. Ariana also possesses nuclear power plants, nuclear research facilities, and civilian industrial plants with the capacity to produce military-grade nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.

Atropia's largest cities possess a high building density and over 75% of the residents in the 10 largest cities enjoy access to modern power, water, and sewage utilities. The country has only moderate transportation architecture due to limited railroad lines. Conversely, it possesses considerable hydrocarbon resource infrastructure to export crude oil and natural gas to the outside world. Atropia has no nuclear power plants and only limited industrial capacity outside the hydrocarbon industry.

The five largest Gorgan cities exhibit a high building density and in four of these, 75% of residents have access to modern power, water, and sewer utilities. Zugdidi and all smaller Gorgan cities have only a utility access rate of 25-50%. Due to limited railroad lines and a lack of secondary roads between major cities, Gorgas has moderate transportation architecture. The country contains no nuclear power plants and little major industrial capacity.

Of the five Caucasus countries, Minaria's infrastructure is the least modern. The five largest Minarian cities show a high building density, but modern power and water access rates are usually 25-50%. Yerevan is the only exception, with a utility access rate of over 75% for power and water. Limited railroad access and a lack of multi-lane hard surface roads limit Minaria to a moderate transportation architecture. The country operates no nuclear power plants and possesses little industrial capacity, as most Minarians work in agriculture or the service industry. Recent reports indicate Minaria may have gained possession of a small number of nuclear weapons.

Despite years of neglect, Donovia still possesses the most modern infrastructure in the region. Of Donovia's five largest cities, two have more than 1 million residents and lie outside its Northern Caucasus provinces. The remaining three are within the Caucasus region and have less than 1.1 million residents combined. All five provide more than 75% of their residents with access to modern utilities. The country has a complex transportation architecture with paved roads, railroads, and multiple airports. Dozens of nuclear power plants exist, as do nuclear research and industrial plants that can produce military-grade nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.

PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT

Terrain features across the Caucasus region are similar—dominated by mountains but with deserts and lowlands as well. Specifically, Ariana features a plateau of deserts in the east with mountains prevalent in other areas of the country. Its coast is bordered by the Caspian Sea on the north and the Persian Gulf on the south. Lowlands are present in Atropia, but the Greater and Lesser Caucasus Mountains are the primary terrain feature throughout the country. These same mountain ranges hem in Gorgas to the north and south, respectively, while the Likhi Range divides the country into eastern and western parts. Minaria is 70% mountains, primarily the Lesser Caucasus. Central Minaria consists of a plateau whose elevation gradually decreases as it meets the Aras River Valley. Southern Donovia is primarily mountainous, though its access to most of the major outside world means its geographic position assures its strategic importance.

TIME

The Caucasus countries, for the most part, do not believe in the sensitivity of time and do not view punctuality or the importance of time as most Western countries do. The people do not look at time in the short term, but look toward the long term. Time commitments are seen more as an objective to be achieved, if possible, rather than a requirement to be met. Promptness is based on relationships, with people being much more likely to be on time if the person who sets the time commitment is close to him, such as a friend or family member. The more a country interacts with Western nations, however, the more accepting the country becomes to Western ideas on time.

VARIABLE CONDITIONS PER OE

	Ariana	Atropia	Gorgas	Minaria	Donovia
Political	Theocracy <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Clerical authority over government structure - Token representative government - Strong influence of clerical class - Wary of "Western Influence" - Seeking regional dominance - Strong relationship with Minaria - Mutually beneficial unofficial relationship with Donovia - Generally antagonistic relationship with Atropia 	Dictatorship <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Power belongs to a small, elite group – one family - Looks to the West for support - Sees Ariana, Donovia, and Minaria as threats - US willing to support 	Emerging Democracy <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Representative republic - Values Western principles - Looks to distance itself from Donovia - Seeks NATO and EU membership 	Autocracy <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - A small, elite group controls Minarian politics - Values alliance with Donovia - Past genocide of Minarian civilians influences all decisions - Sees Atropia as a threat 	Authoritarian Republic <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Regionally dominant - Figurehead elected President - Power rests with small group of elites - Five main political parties; only one true opposition party - Weakening legitimacy of ruling political party - Typically neutral to US power and forces; will protect regional position of power - Adversarial toward Atropia - High levels of crime and corruption

	Ariana	Atropia	Gorgas	Minaria	Donovia
Military	<p>Large conventional force</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Three standing Armies at Tier 2 - Most capable military in the region after Donovia - Tier 1 niche capability - Faces small insurgencies in southeast - Capable of a wide range of operations - Successful nuclear weapons program 	<p>Small army, navy, and air force</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Tier 2 conventional forces - Limited offensive capabilities - Tensions continue with Minaria over Artzak region - Defense of hydrocarbon resources and infrastructure paramount - Two main and several small insurgent groups 	<p>Smallest military in region</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Tier 2 conventional forces - Defensive capabilities with limited offensive capabilities - Tensions continue with Zabzimek and South Ostremek (breakaway Gorgan republics) - Donovian-sponsored paramilitaries are current threat, along with the Donovian military 	<p>Small military with army and air forces only</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Tier 2 conventional forces - Tensions continue with Atropia over Artzak region - Focused on Atropian military and support for allied Artzak military forces - Terrorist groups present - Reports indicate possession of 2-5 nuclear weapons; government denies 	<p>Large conventional force</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Three standing armies with mainly Tier 1 capabilities - Most capable military in region - Capable of a wide range of operations - Successful nuclear weapons program - Anti-satellite capabilities - Strong INFOWAR capabilities - Potential ally of Ariana - Relations with Minaria
Economic	<p>Economy based on petroleum industry</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Owns large oil and natural gas reserves - International sanctions depress economy - Relies on Minaria for international trade - Large agricultural sector 	<p>Hydrocarbon extraction dependent economy</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Owns large oil and natural gas reserves - Political patronage depresses economic growth 	<p>Primarily service economy</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Large agricultural sector - Dependent on trans-national trade routes and pipelines - Growth limited due to attempt to cut ties with Donovia 	<p>Service and agricultural based economy</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - International trade window for Ariana 	<p>Dominant energy sector</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Owns large oil and natural gas reserves - Large hydrocarbon-related service sector - Major international military equipment exporter - Current economy resultant from an internal economic collapse of 1991
Social	<p>Persian Shia Muslim Culture</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 51% Persian - 24% Atropian - 77% literacy rate - 1 million IDPs, 70% there over 20 years - 68% of population is urban 	<p>Shia Muslim Culture</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 89% Shia Muslim - 91% Atropian - 99% literacy rate - 1/2 million IDPs - 52% of population is urban 	<p>Christian Culture</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 84% Gorgan - 100% literacy rate - 1/4 million IDPs - 53% of population is urban 	<p>Christian Culture</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 98% Minarian - 99% literacy rate - 300,000 IDPs - 64% of population is urban 	<p>Arab Sunni Hanafi Culture</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 70% Arabic - 98% literacy rate - 67% of population is urban
Information	<p>Tightly controlled information/media environment</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Good INFOWAR capabilities; superior in niche areas 	<p>Free but monitored information/media environment</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Growing INFOWAR capabilities; focus on Minaria and Ariana 	<p>Most free information/media environment in region</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Growing and integrated INFOWAR capabilities, mostly focused on Donovia - INFOWAR based on NATO standards 	<p>Fairly free information/media environment – soft censorship</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Looks to Donovia for support of INFOWAR capability 	<p>Controlled information/media environment</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Tier 1 INFOWAR capabilities - Most capable in region - Industry standard in some areas

	Ariana	Atropia	Gorgas	Minaria	Donovia
Infrastructure	Relatively modern infrastructure <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Has the resources to maintain and improve infrastructure but priority is on nuclear and oil/natural gas programs - International sanctions prevent substantial improvements - Possesses both nuclear power and nuclear weapons 	Unable to maintain infrastructure <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Focus is on oil/natural gas programs - Road system incapable of handling military traffic - Rural areas lack modern water, electricity, and sewage system - Baku International Sea Port on the Caspian Sea is key terrain 	Unable to maintain infrastructure <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Lacks raw materials for its factories - Pipelines top priority - Port of Poti on the Black Sea is key terrain for the region 	Unable to maintain infrastructure <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Atropia's recent blockade forced reduction of Minarian industrial output - Relies on food imports - Lacks modern running water, electricity, and sewage system for much of the population 	Modern infrastructure <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Western standards in terms of railroads and ports - Energy infrastructure is top priority - Possesses both nuclear power and nuclear weapons
Physical Environment	Located in key position on Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Faces Caspian Sea - Borders Atropia and Minaria - Rugged mountainous terrain 	Vital transportation corridor between east and west <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Access to Caspian Sea - Varied terrain 	Controls much of Caucasus Mountains and routes through them <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Access to Black Sea - Largely mountainous terrain 	Landlocked <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Contains Lake Sevan, the largest lake in the region - Mountainous terrain 	Greater Caucasus Mountains separate country from southern neighbors <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Access to Black and Caspian Seas - Varied terrain
Time	Value planning over deadlines <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Uses the Solar, Lunar, and Gregorian (Western) calendars - Harvest cycle is May to August - 4-year election cycle, 6 for president, 8 for Forum of Proficiency; no term limit 	Punctuality not important <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Uses Gregorian calendar - Harvest cycle is April to October, depending on climatic zone - 2-year election cycle for legislature, four consecutive-term limit; 6-year presidential cycle, no term limit 	No urgency to complete tasks <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Uses Gregorian calendar - Harvest cycle is April to October - 4-year election cycle for all offices; three-term limit 	Attempt to be punctual for Westerners <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Uses Gregorian calendar - Harvest cycle is year round - 5-year election cycle for all offices; no term limit 	Expect punctuality from Westerners but may not reciprocate <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Uses Gregorian calendar - Harvest cycle is year round - 6-year election cycle for president, two consecutive-term limit; 4-year cycle for parliament

STRATEGIC POSITIONS

ACTORS

The US gives increased geopolitical attention to the countries of the Caucasus region (Ariana, Atropia, Gorgas, Minaria, and Donovia) because of their strategic location that connects Europe to Asia, their hydrocarbon resources, and their key position along this main route for the westward export of Caspian Sea energy resources. Ethno-political conflict that has plagued the Caucasus region for thousands of years led to the death of thousands and material destruction, contributing significantly to political instability, economic hardship, and increased organized crime. Failure to resolve these long-term conflicts continues to keep the region from creating a durable peace and efficient, accountable national governments. Many regional issues will require inter-state cooperation for any significant progress to occur. Other issues besides basic security include natural resource development, water protection, conservation and management, trade and transit, disease

prevention, and drug trafficking. Many issues cannot simply be solved on a national basis—no matter how committed a government remains to reform and overall economic development.

SECURITY STRATEGIES

Each country in the region has different threat perceptions formed by its ethno-political situation and religious fervor. Minaria perceives threats from Atropia and looks to Donovia for security. Atropia perceives threats from Ariana, Minaria, and Donovia and looks to the West for support. Gorgas, which mainly sees threats from Donovia and its internal Donovian population, looks to the West for protection. Ariana sees “Western influence” as the threat to its culture and bases all decisions on that belief. Donovia is adversarial towards Atropia and continues to inject itself into Gorgas’ internal affairs. The Caucasus region countries all seek relationships with outside governments that often prove contradictory. Cooperation continues to deteriorate since the elimination of major Donovian influence impacted the region’s standard of living. This inability to cooperate with neighbors has stymied efforts to tackle regional issues such as drug trafficking. Restrictive tariffs, quantitative controls, and closed crossing points disrupt trade and transit for both goods and people within the Caucasus. While the countries all recognize the importance of regional cooperation on key issues, prospects for cooperation remain dim as ethno-political tensions lead to acute regional conflict.

POTENTIAL CONFLICT FLASHPOINTS

All major players within and bordering the Caucasus region maintain multiple significant strategic interests in conflict with those of their neighbors. Divided by religious and ethnic hatreds hundreds of years old, the Caucasus represents one of the major spots of “frozen conflict” in the world—a critical one that sits astride a major global source for oil and natural gas. The Caucasus countries of Ariana, Atropia, Gorgas, Minaria, and Donovia find themselves interconnected by ties of conflict unlikely to abate in the near future.

In the Caspian Sea, Ariana and Atropia maintain claims to offshore oil and gas fields that conflict with each other. Atropia also has a chilly relationship with Minaria over the Artzak region. Atropia attempts to sustain cordial relations with Donovia, though the country finds itself dependent on Gorgan pipelines to export oil and gas. Minaria generally remains isolated from its Atropian and Kemalian neighbors, but remains integrated with Donovia and pursues deeper ties with Ariana. Donovia and Ariana attempt to assert their traditional power in the region, while the other independent states seek to preserve their own political identities and economic viability.

Potential conflict flashpoints include:

- Atropian blockade of goods and electricity to Minaria: Minaria remains dependent on Gorgas (despite a limited embargo) and Ariana—an international pariah—for access to much of its imports and power.
- Artzak (current ceasefire): Localized violence routinely disrupts the ceasefire agreement.
- South Ostremek (current ceasefire): The ceasefire simply stabilized the conflict lines, as the Donovians want to politically pry Gorgas away from EU or NATO membership, or even close cooperation with the Western world. Gorgas definitely seeks a return to its pre-war territorial boundaries.
- Zabzimek (current ceasefire): Like South Ostremek, Gorgas prefers a return to the pre-war status quo and boundaries, while Donovia wants to further isolate Gorgas from its Atropian and Western allies.
- Archeological sites and religious shrines in Ariana: Ariana controls significant Shia religious sites where many Muslims conduct pilgrimages for religious purposes.

- Transnational pipeline operations: The export of crude oil and natural gas to the world remains a significant challenge for Ariana and Atropia. Oil producers possess several pipeline projects that diversify their export options, but pipelines remain vulnerable to interdiction.
- Caspian Sea oil and natural gas reserves: The demarcation of Caspian Sea deposits remains a source of contention. Oil and gas fields are the lifeblood of the countries that possess them, and their exact demarcation leads to contentious arguments over the boundaries.
- Arianian nuclear program: The Arianian government's desire to maintain a robust WMD program causes strife with nearly all its neighbors, as the relative power of a WMD-armed Ariana complicates the delicate balance of power that currently exists in the region.

The Caucasus remains an area with dynamic and continuous conflict. Any conflict, especially one that threatens oil and gas production or export, will likely involve outside powers, including the US. The Caucasus also is in a relatively inaccessible spot for US forces due to the geographic realities of airspace and sea lines of communications.

BASELINE TO WAR

INTRODUCTION

The DATE Road to War (RTW) is intended to serve as a common starting point for all Army CTCs and TRADOC Schools and Centers to draw upon in formulating their scenarios and other supporting documentation for training events and exercises. This RTW is not the only possible narrative to assist in the generation of scenarios. Each CTC has the flexibility and freedom to adapt, change, or modify this RTW to fit the specific needs of each training event.

ROAD TO WAR REGIONAL CONDITIONS

US operations in the Caucasus occur in an increasingly hostile area of operations (AO). The current situation involves a broad political alliance of Ariana and Donovia to redraw the geopolitical map of the Caucasus to the exclusion of Western powers, and the functional end of currently independent states such as Gorgas and Atropia. The continuing competition by both Ariana and Donovia with Atropia in the international oil and gas markets, the latent ethnic tensions within Atropia, and other regional flashpoints continue to defy permanent diplomatic solutions. Should deterrence fail, US-led coalition forces may need to defeat aggressor nations militarily to support critical national and regional security objectives.

Politically, Ariana and Donovia broadly support each other's specific Caucasian regional interests, despite differences in social and religious makeup. While the majority of both nations practice Islam, Ariana has a dominant Persian culture while Donovia is primarily Arabic. Both Ariana and Donovia view the existence of the hydrocarbon-rich Atropia as an outpost of the "colonialist West," and both covet control of Atropia's natural resources. Economically, Atropia serves as one of the largest oil and gas producers in the world, with much of its hydrocarbon products used by Western countries. Atropian independence in setting its own gas/oil prices and policies has angered Ariana, who is also upset by the political independence that such oil and gas production and its accompanying hard currency income gives Atropia. Atropia also has a largely secular government (though not, strictly speaking, a democratic one). All things considered, Atropia is generally a less repressive state than its Arianian neighbor, although Ariana likes to claim that Atropia is quite repressive.

Atropia's neighbor and historical enemy, Minaria, typically attempts to remain neutral in the growing regional tension. While broadly aligned with Donovia despite their religious differences,

Minaria continually maneuvers to stay clear of the fight between Atropia and its neighbors. Unlike Atropia, Minaria does not export hydrocarbons but desires to become involved in the hydrocarbon export business, primarily through new pipelines. Minaria enjoys an unspoken but enduring security and economic relationship with Donovia, and a frosty relationship—punctuated by violence and ethnic tension—with Atropia.

Atropia remains determined to maintain its independence and ensure the safe export of its hydrocarbon resources, primarily through the Black Sea pipelines of its neighbor, Gorgas. Both Atropia and Gorgas continue, with varying levels of success, to placate or balance the demands of Donovia and Ariana, while Atropia and Gorgas vigorously court European and US diplomatic support; possible inclusion in NATO; and, specifically, US security guarantees. The Atropians attempt to balance these diplomatic links to the West in a way that is less likely to inflame regional tensions, feed Arianian or Donovian perception management operations, or give either Ariana or Donovia a *causus belli* to attack Atropia.

The Gorgans, on the other hand, willingly welcome US Government involvement in their country, including diplomatic and military “advisory groups” to build Gorgan military capability and interoperability with NATO forces. Gorgas has a frosty relationship with Donovia, and cooperation built on mutual need with Atropia. Ultimately, Gorgas remains Atropia’s best outlet for its resources, and this relationship with Atropia gives Gorgas geopolitical value to the West.

In addition to an unstable diplomatic situation, a variety of terrorist groups and other non-state actors are operating within the AO, some with state backing, and others pursuing religious and ethnic goals. Criminality in the form of significant trafficking in illicit goods, along with other organized crime, is endemic to the region.

ROAD TO WAR EVENTS

Over the last 24 months, undeniable intelligence shows a slow but steady redeployment of Arianian ground combat power, both in conventional and unconventional forces, to the Caucasus, primarily along Ariana’s northern border shared with Atropia. Despite Arianian claims of a defensive build-up designed to protect Arianian interests from Western attack, other intelligence indicates Arianian hostile intent toward Atropia. Arianian military and government assets—including oil survey and coastal defense ships, civil and military aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles, and other military assets—continue to actively and aggressively reconnoiter Atropian hydrocarbon and defense interests. Ariana has also moved its air and missile strike assets into range of Atropia. Additionally, Arianian-based INFOWAR capabilities have been probing Atropian government networks (including those for oil/gas production) and using the Internet, including social media, to carry out an aggressive perception management operation against the Atropian population. Much of this content focuses on the repressive nature of the Atropian government and its close links to the US. The Arianian military has also made preparations for the mass expulsion of ethnic Atropians from the north of Ariana as well as preparations for advance northward.

Politically, the Arianians view Atropia’s Western orientation as part of an encirclement of Ariana by the West and nations viewed as Western proxies. The Arianians also fear secularized and independent Atropia’s growing power to encourage ethnic Atropians within Ariana to join their ethnic homeland. Over the last two years, Arianian political and religious figures have described the Atropian government in progressively more hostile terms. Combined with increasing military maneuvers and other display-of-force actions, the tone between Atropia and Ariana has chilled considerably. In perception management operations over the last 12 months, Arianians have portrayed the large Atropian minority population within Ariana as well-treated and integrated, as compared to the majority of Atropians within Atropia, whom the Arianian government claims are exploited by the Atropian ruling family. Additionally, the Arianians have claimed in revised textbooks and official maps that Atropia is an “historical part” of Ariana. The Atropian government

has attempted to diplomatically extinguish such rhetoric, while quietly beginning preparations for potential conflict with Ariana.

Within the last year, the US President issued a Presidential National Security Directive (PNSD) that identifies respect for current Caucasus international boundaries and continued unfettered export of Caucasus oil and gas supplies as vital US national security interests. The PNSD also directed the Department of Defense to create and deploy a Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) to the Caucasus to demonstrate US resolve and deter potential aggression. Should shaping and deterrence fail, the CJTF must be prepared to conduct decisive operations.

The US has publicly responded to growing Arianian propaganda by demanding respect for all Caucasus state boundaries. The US approached multilateral organizations, but few other countries seem willing to risk the backlash of an Arianian-sponsored oil embargo. In the last six months, border skirmishes between Arianian and Atropian border guards, overflight of Atropian terrain by Arianian air assets, and official Arianian naval vessel incursions into the Caspian Sea—home of the bulk of Atropian oil and gas fields—have increased. Six weeks ago, an Arianian military patrol “strayed” 10 kilometers into Atropian territory before being chased back into Ariana.

Last week, Atropia responded by mobilizing a portion of its Reserves to increase its border security. Citing an “imminent attack,” Ariana initiated artillery fire and air strikes on Atropian military structures, though clearly sparing oil fields and production facilities. Ariana then demanded that Atropia “demilitarize” its border with Ariana and stop all oil exports. Ariana also demanded a “free and fair election” in Atropia, to be administered by Arianian-affiliated organizations. Ariana threatened the world community, and specifically the US, against intervention. Ariana warned of dire consequences if the West—most clearly the US—threatened the “political development of Atropia with aggressive military action to prop up an anti-Islamic puppet state.” Atropia refused to accede to the Arianian demands. The day after Atropia’s refusal, Arianian forces commenced a conventional assault on Atropia, and the US announced deployment of combat forces within the CJTF to roll back Arianian aggression.



TRADOC G-2

TRISA-THREATS

CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND THREAT INTEGRATION

DIRECTORATE (CTID)

SECTION 2: VARIABLES OF THE OE AND ORDERS OF BATTLE

Introduction to Section 2: Variables of the OE and Orders of Battle

VARIABLES OF THE OE

The variables serve as the DATE's nucleus and concentrate on the conditions and characteristics of each variable that would significantly impact the military if deployed to that area of the world. Known by the acronym PMESII-PT, the variables center on the political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time components of an OE. In this case, the variables are operationalized to the countries of Ariana, Atropia, Gorgas, Minaria, and Donovia. In effect, this section helps to define the "composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of commanders." (JP 3-0, definition of an operational environment) Many conditions, activities, and events affect more than one variable and appear in more than one of the PMESII-PT sections.

Each PMESII-PT variable covers the minimum requirements necessary for scenario development and exercise design. This section provides a common baseline of conditions from which various training events may be developed. The political variable defines the government types, their loyalties, stability, and effectiveness. The military variable specifies the type of military organizations; their tactics, capabilities, and weaponry; as well as their level of activity or aggressiveness. The economic variable describes each country's economic emphasis, structure, financial institutions, and the presence of any shadow economy. The social variable outlines the region's demographic mix, social volatility, education levels, ethnicity, religious diversity, societal transience, criminal tolerance, and most prevalent languages. The information variable explains the area's information environment complexity, methods of information distribution, and level of sophistication. For each country, the infrastructure variable outlines the urban layout, building density, level of utilities and services available, and the transportation and information architecture present. The physical environment variable describes the area's landforms, natural hazards, vegetation, and climate. The time variable expresses the culture's conceptual view of time, describes important annual events, and explains how each group may use time to its advantage. The actual variables contain more details than the minimum requirements and provide comprehensive information to the reader unfamiliar with the operational area.

ORDERS OF BATTLE

All five countries have an administrative force structure (AFS) to manage their military forces in peacetime. This AFS is the aggregate of various military headquarters, facilities, and installations designed to man, train, equip, and sustain the forces. In peacetime, forces are commonly grouped into divisions, corps, or armies for administrative purposes. The AFS includes all components of the armed forces—not only regular, standing forces (active component), but also reserve and militia forces (reserve component). Normally, these administrative groupings differ from the country's order of battle (OB), which is its go-to-war (fighting) force structure that is task-organized to meet the combat situation. For information on how to use the AFS to obtain an OB, see Appendix B: OPFOR Task-Organizing for Combat on page 4-B-1.

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TRISA-THREATS

CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND THREAT INTEGRATION

DIRECTORATE (CTID)

OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

ASSESSMENT: ARIANA

TRADOC G-2

TRISA-THREATS

CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND THREAT INTEGRATION

DIRECTORATE (CTID)

POLITICAL: ARIANA

Political: Ariana

The political variable describes the distribution of responsibility and power at all levels of governance—formally constituted authorities, as well as informal or covert political powers.

KEY FACTS:

REGION

- Every country in the region has a center of political power wildly dissimilar from its neighbor.
- Ethnic nationalism and identity politics generate most conflicts in the region.

ARIANA

- Ariana's government is a hostile, national-level, stable theocracy.
- Clerical authority is the supreme political authority.
- The Arianian military plays a large role in Arianian society with its network of members and ex-members in prominent positions throughout the country.

OPERATIONAL IMPACTS OF THE POLITICAL VARIABLE IN THE OE:

REGION

- Despite Western influence, political maneuvering is frequently seen as a natural precursor to brutal purges.
- Any negotiations must include very intrusive methods of verification.

ARIANA

- Outsiders should not mistake Ariana's internal frustration for a Westernization movement. As a whole, the country remains suspicious of Western views and wary of Western agendas.
- Arianians treat foreign involvement with their internal affairs as a residue of colonization and will violently resist any attempts at such.
- The government is committed to the export of the Council of Guardians Revolution.

POLITICAL OVERVIEW:

At the heart of political power in Ariana is the Council of Guardians Revolution. The Revolution considers itself the vanguard of proper Islamic sentiment on the planet, and the heart of a global conversion to its version of Islam. The Revolution has successfully defended itself from both internal and external threats, and remains committed to the export of its vision of theocratic rule.

CENTERS OF POLITICAL POWER

Supreme Leader Ayatollah Mahmood Mekhenei and the Arianian military are the centers of political power in Ariana. The late Ayatollah Khodadad established an Islamic republic based on the

principles of Islamic law. A clerical body oversees the operation of each state institution and ensures the office does not deviate from Islamic law and the clerical community's direction. Such governmental structure directly links all political power to clerical authority in an ideology known as *Wilayat al Faqih*, or the Guardianship of the Islamist Jurist. Even though a liberal, representative government structure ostensibly serves as the voice of the populace, clerical authority supersedes it and drives political direction for the state. Additionally, Ayatollah Khodadad co-opted the Arianian military to guarantee that no popular movement would be able to overturn the Islamic Revolution. The military established its own identity and power structures and continues to adapt to the fluid political environment to ensure its continual power, wealth, and relevancy. After an August 2009 presidential election marred by voter irregularities, the military played a major role in the suppression of protestors who sought reforms.



MILITARY AUTHORITY

Ayatollah Khodadad co-opted the Arianian military shortly after the Council of Guardians Revolution. In addition to its role as ideological guardian of the Revolution's Islamic ethos, the military evolved into an expansive socio-political-economic conglomerate. All facets of Arianian political life and society reflect its influence. Highly characterized by a populist, authoritarian, and assertive vision of the Arianian state, the military believes it represents the most faithful representation of Council of Guardians Revolution ideals. Its presence plays a powerful role in Ariania's highly factionalized political system where the president, much of the cabinet, many parliament members, and a host of other provincial and local administrators hail from military ranks.

RELIGIOUS/CLERICAL AUTHORITY

In 1979, Ayatollah Khodadad dramatically transformed Arianian religious and political landscapes and made Shia Islam an inseparable element of the country's political structure. Velayat-e faqih (the rule of the Islamic jurist) became the highest principle. In his 1970 book, *Hokumat-e Islami: Velayat-e faqih*, Ayatollah Khodadad argued *sharia*, or Islamic law, should direct the government. For *sharia* law to take precedence, an Islamic jurist (*faqih*) must oversee a country's political structure. The constitutional changes that followed the Council of Guardians Revolution created an Arianian government based on the same three pillars of power as the US—the executive, judicial, and legislative branches. The three branches, however, possess less power than the Supreme Leader, then Ayatollah Khodadad, and the Supreme Leader retains religious control.

ATTITUDES TOWARD THE US

Current Supreme Leader Ayatollah Mahmood Mekhenei routinely denounces the United States for its arrogance, greed, and contempt for the Arianian nation. Mekhenei also sees the United States as the leader in a “cultural onslaught” designed to undermine the Islamic Republic. The US characterizes Ariana as a “profound threat to US national security interests,” a perception created by Ariana’s military support to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Palestinian group Martyr’s Army, the Lebanese Shia Internationalist Brigades, and especially by its nuclear ambitions in violation of UN Security Council Resolutions.

ATTITUDE TOWARD US TRADE

Ariana is under a variety of regime sanctions and, by US law, US companies face significant restriction on trade with Arianian entities. Arianians usually employ third countries to work around sanctions in an attempt to obtain technology for oil extraction or military operations. Most US companies had their Arianian holdings nationalized in the wake of the Council of Guardians Revolution.

TYPE OF GOVERNMENT

The theocratic Arianian government contains three branches like the US, but the executive branch wields the lion’s share of federal power. The unicameral legislative and the judicial branches possess only limited means to check the Arianian president, Ahmad Moudin. The cleric-controlled Guardian Leadership Council must approve all legislation passed by the legislative branch. All judicial branch appointees are clerics who must use sharia law as the basis for adjudicating cases. The clerical community—headed by the Supreme Leader—must approve all public office candidates and appoints judges to ensure that all officials support approved beliefs/positions.



Ariana consists of 30 provinces further subdivided into a total of 314 counties. Each county contains districts and each district has several rural districts. The average rural district encompasses several villages and generally covers about 620 square miles.

Much of the pre-Revolutionary federal administrative structure remains intact. The Minister of Interior (MoI) appoints a governor general for each province and a governor for each county. Since 1999, citizens elect their district chiefs, rural chiefs, and village chiefs as well as their councils. Although the pre-revolutionary structure remains the same, governor’s generals no longer possess the province level power they held before the Revolution. Local prayer leaders (*Imam Jomehs*) exercise considerable political authority because they head the local revolutionary committees.

BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT

Legislative Authority

The legislative branch consists of a 290-member unicameral body which represents all 30 Ariana provinces. Citizens elect members by “popular” vote to serve four-year terms. The Arianian constitution directs that the legislature draft legislation, ratify international treaties, and approve


the national budget. The Guardian Leadership Council must approve all candidates who run for the legislature. The constitution reserves a number of seats for religious minorities. These include two seats for Minarian Christians, one for Assyrian Christians, one for Jews, and one for Zoroastrians. The legislature also appoints six members to the Guardian Leadership Council.

Executive Authority

Second only in authority to the Supreme Leader, the president controls the Arianian national government's operations. He also wields power, through leadership and patronage of the ministries, to exercise control down to the provincial and county level. Ahmad Moudin became Ariana's president in 2003.

Judicial Authority

The Guardian Leadership Council consists of 12 members and serves as the Islamic Republic's overseer to ensure that the country operates under sharia law. The Supreme Leader appoints six theologians directly to the Guardian Leadership Council, and the legislature approves another six jurists from a list of candidates selected by the Supreme Judicial Council.



Since the Supreme Leader controls the Supreme Judicial Council, there is little chance that the Supreme Judicial Council nominees will share a different viewpoint than the six directly chosen by the Supreme Leader. The Arianian constitution establishes two primary responsibilities for the Guardian Leadership Council. As the government's legal experts, the Council reviews each piece of legislation passed by parliament to ensure compatibility with both the Arianian Constitution and Islamic Law. Under Ariana's legal system, judicial authority rests with the judge who both investigates and prosecutes crimes, with no trials by jury. When an accused person stands trial for something not expressly forbidden by the legal code, the judge issues a sentence based on his interpretation of Islamic law and custom.

GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESS AND LEGITIMACY

Internationally, most countries recognize the Islamic Republic of Ariana even though the country established a nuclear program in violation of international non-proliferation treaties. In recent years, "reformists" helped achieve a degree of regional stability by successfully tempering the government's previous militant message to pursue long-standing national interests. One popular reformist attempted to strengthen Ariana's relationships with Japan and Western European nations that oppose the Ariana-Libya Sanctions Act, a US law that essentially provides significant penalties to companies and governments which make significant investments in Ariana's energy sector. These

US sanctions successfully impact Ariana's petroleum-based economy as they prevent large-scale improvements and technological advancements.

DOMESTIC POLITICAL ISSUES

Elections

Arianian elections increasingly are popularity contests between candidates vetted and approved by religious authorities. Rising discontent with these sham elections has resulted in wide-scale demonstrations, but their effect to date on the stability of the Arianian regime has been negligible. The Revolution remains generally popular in more rural areas, and elections there are seen as reflective of the popular will, compared with discontent caused by elections in urban areas. Parliamentary elections occur every four years, with Presidential elections every six years. There are no term limits for any elected office.

Rule of Law

Rule of law is based on the Arianian government's significant power and utter ruthlessness in squashing threats to its rule or what it deems as anti-social behavior. The government uses law enforcement forces, military personnel, and private citizens to monitor the actions of all Arianians. Courts are generally functionaries of the executive, rather than independent.

Corruption

Corruption is becoming a serious problem, with most Arianians turning to corrupt practices, especially in urban areas, to get access to government services. The regime sanctions also create an atmosphere of corruption, as military officers import hard-to-obtain items and resell them at inflated prices. The military uses its power to either muscle its way into most lucrative business deals, take over directly, or inject itself as a silent partner.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS

REGIONAL ACTORS

Ariana desires not only to export the Council of Guardians Revolution to its neighbors, but to place itself in a position of regional dominance as well. The country has a mutually beneficial political and economic relationship with Minaria, in which Ariana uses its smaller neighbor as a way to import and export goods internationally and Minaria gains access to much-needed hydrocarbon resources. In addition, Ariana and Donovia enjoy positive, though unofficial, political and economic relations despite the fact that Donovia is Ariana's main competitor for the role of regional强man.

Ariana remains friendly to any neighboring countries—other than Atropia—that are willing to negotiate or trade in the Caucasus region. The large Atropian population in northern Ariana and the minority's predilection for a schism from the central government in Tehran makes Arianians suspicious of the Atropian government and people of Atropian ethnicity. Ariana also wants to gain control of the rich oil reserves in Atropian-controlled Caspian Sea areas since its own oil reserves continue to dwindle. Arianian relations with Atropia are generally antagonistic as a result, and Ariana also remains leery of Kemalia's regional ambitions and its close relationship with Atropia.

Additionally, Ariana's nuclear weapons program represents a massive destabilizing influence in regional and international dialogue. This capability is most threatening to Ariana's neighbors and remains yet another troublesome aspect to Ariana's foreign policy. Politically, the domestic popularity of the nuclear weapons program, along with the obvious power and prestige it brings to the Ariana government, outweighs the trade sanctions and other political and economic costs.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Ariana has attempted to create an anti-Western, and specifically anti-US, coalition in most international organizations of which it is a member. Additionally, Ariana has attempted to use oil exports as a weapon to coerce or bribe poor, small, or neutral nations to support its anti-US cause. Ariana is a member of most major international organizations. About 30 to 40 smaller non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and international organizations (IOs) operate within Ariana. The major IOs in terms of programs and budget are the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and International Red Crescent. NGO programs generally are non-political in nature and focus on culture, literacy, and medical programs, especially in rural locations.

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ASSOCIATIONS

Because of Ariana's oil wealth and its somewhat dodgy status on the global stage, the country's participation in international economic associations is limited to one exception, namely its non-US dollar denominated oil bourse. The oil bourse is an effort to break the US dollar monopoly on oil transactions. While not truly successful, as the majority of the world's oil transactions are dollar-denominated, the bourse demonstrates Ariana's continuing efforts to confront the US.

MILITARY ALLIANCES

Ariana maintains no official military alliances, instead relying on foreign manned proxies or political support from nations it supports economically. Ariana also actively denounces other military alliances, especially Atropia's alliances, which may introduce Western and specifically US forces into proximity with Ariana.

INFLUENTIAL POLITICAL GROUPS

OFFICIAL POLITICAL PARTIES

There are no political parties in the Western sense in Ariana. The Arianian Clergy determine who stands for election, and the elections themselves mean little and are functional rubber-stamps of the Clergy determination of who shall occupy various seats of government. The Clergy's stranglehold on government has created much of the popular frustration seen in recent protests against the government from the most liberal elements of Arianian society. The Arianian conservatives' belief in a system of clerical authority remains ironclad, and they see themselves as defenders of Ayatollah Khodadad's vision. If necessary, the conservatives would cheerfully remove the democratic institutions that occasionally challenge clerical authority. Conservatives believe they received their mandate from God, and neither popular will nor elected officials should challenge it. The conservatives display ambivalence toward popular opinion, because those who think as they do remain deeply entrenched in the institutions that ensure the conservatives' continued rule. The leader of Ariana's Islamic Truth Party noted, "The legitimacy of our Islamic establishment is derived from God. This legitimacy will not wash away even if people stop supporting it."

OTHER DOMESTIC INFLUENTIAL GROUPS

Arianian domestic groups split more often along ethnic and/or religious lines than ideologies. Examples include the predominantly Sunni Baluchis of southern Ariana, the New Dawn of Freedom of Arianian Kurdistan, and the approximately three million ethnic Arabs near the southwest Arianian-Iraqi border. Exceptions include the Arianian Freedom Movement, the Islamic Republic's primary opposition to the concept of velayat-e-faqih. Because of the Arianian Freedom Movement's opposition to the current regime, it cannot register as an official political party and its members cannot run for parliament seats or the presidency.

Summary

Though facing some internal discord, Ariana is firmly committed to the export of its version of Shia Islamic governance. The religious authorities and military are, despite high current levels of urban unrest, firmly in control of the country. Ariana will continue to be diplomatically hostile to both Atropia and the US for the foreseeable future.

TRADOC G-2

TRISA-THREATS

CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND THREAT INTEGRATION

DIRECTORATE (CTID)

MILITARY: ARIANA

Military: Ariana

The military variable explores the military and/or paramilitary capabilities of all relevant actors (enemy, friendly, and neutral) in a given OE. Relevant actors may include terrorists, militias, criminals, gangs, and insurgents.

KEY FACTS:

REGION

- Donovia has the dominant military of the five countries.
- Atropia and Minaria possess roughly the same size military and previously fought each other over disputed territory.
- Four of the five countries maintain a tier 2 military capability. The exception is Donovia, which has a predominantly tier 1 capability.
- Gorgas fields the smallest military of the five countries.

ARIANA

- The Arianian military consists of a large, capable ground force and a smaller, agile air and sea force. Ariana's military forces largely possess tier 2 capabilities, with potential for selected tier 1 niche capabilities.
- Ariana possesses a capable and growing chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) capability.
- Ariana's conventional military is capable of a wide range of operations, with the ability to shift from conventional to hybrid and/or adaptive warfare and back.
- Ariana is well-protected by a modern (tier 2) integrated air defense system complemented with tactical all-arms air defense capabilities.
- Three mechanized armies that can conduct combined arms operations serve as Ariana's main military threat.
- Previously successful joint exercises demonstrate Ariana fields a proficient military that can fight as a cohesive and capable military.

OPERATIONAL IMPACTS OF THE MILITARY VARIABLE IN THE OE:

REGION

- Four of the countries in the region operate a pervasively authoritarian National Command Authority (NCA), which makes military decisions that are passed down to subordinate units. The exception, Gorgas, utilizes a National Council that is similar but not quite as authoritarian in nature.
- Gorgas would most likely assist US forces if conflict started within the region.

ARIANA

- Ariana's army maintains a defensive posture that uses the Zagros Mountains to narrow a potential attacker's axis of advance.
- Ariana possesses nuclear weapons capability and would see any attack on its nuclear program or hydrocarbon production capability as an act of war.
- Anti-Western rhetoric continues to increase throughout the country, but especially in Ariana's military.

MILITARY OVERVIEW:


Ariana has an extensive history of various types of operations, from sponsorship of proxy terrorism to sustained force-on-force conflict. This history forms the basis for the military leadership mindset. The legacy of changing political boundaries between Ariana and its neighbors over the last century never terminated satisfactorily for the countries' ethnic groups, familial-clan geographical demographics, or theological divisions.

MILITARY FORCES

Ariana's military maintains a robust ground force with a smaller, agile air and sea force capability. The latest intelligence assessments indicate Ariana's military largely has tier 2 capabilities that consist of modern competitive military systems from two decades ago, fielded in significant numbers across the military's force structure. Ariana recently upgraded some systems to attain selected tier 1 niche capabilities. Ariana's forces field equipment to operate in all terrain with the ability to successfully conduct day and night operations. Ariana's military also maintains links to regional criminal and terrorist groups that further extend the country's potential as a global threat. (*For additional information on tier tables, see Section 4: Appendix C and the Worldwide Equipment Guide (WEG): Vol I, Chapter 1, COE Tier Tables.*)

MILITARY STRATEGY

NATIONAL COMMAND AUTHORITY




All countries share a similar National Command Authority (NCA) construct including Gorgas, who refers to it as a National Council. The Ariana NCA exercises overall control over the application of all national power instruments to plan and carry out the country's national security strategy. The NCA includes cabinet ministers responsible for military and civilian instruments of power such as the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Public Information, Finance and Economic Affairs, Interior, and Defense. The Arianian president chairs the NCA and may select additional members.

The president appoints the Minister of National Security, who is responsible for the NCA's Strategic Integration Department (SID). The SID is the overarching agency responsible for integrating all national power instruments under one cohesive national security strategy. The SID coordinates the plans and actions of all Ariana's ministries, but particularly those associated with the national power instruments. (*See TC 7-100.2 Opposing Force Tactics: Chapter 1, Strategic and Operational Framework.*)

STRATEGIC OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK

The strategic operational framework for all countries in the Caucasus region is similar in construct and application, primarily the result of historic influences.

The NCAs and the NC for all five countries exercise command and control (C2) of the Armed Forces via the Supreme High Command (SHC), which includes the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and a General Staff drawn from all the service components. In peacetime, the MOD and General Staff operate closely but separately. The MOD assumes responsibility for policy, acquisitions, and financing the Armed Forces. The General Staff promulgates policy and supervises the service components while its functional directorates are responsible for key aspects of defense planning. In wartime, the MOD and General Staff merge to form the SHC, which functions as a unified headquarters.



All five countries currently configure their militaries using an administrative force structure (AFS) for managing military forces in peacetime. This administrative force contains the aggregate of various military headquarters, facilities, and installations designed to man, train, and equip the forces. In peacetime, the various militaries group their forces into corps and armies for administrative purposes. In some cases, the militaries may group their forces administratively under

geographical commands designated as military regions or military districts. If the SHC elects to create more than one theater headquarters, it may allocate parts of the administrative force structure to each of the theaters, normally along geographic lines. Typically, these administrative groupings differ from the country's go-to-war (fighting) force structure. Other parts of the administrative force structure consist of assets centrally controlled at the national level. (See *FM 7-100.4 Opposing Force Organizational Guide: Chapter 3, Task Organizing*.)

NATIONAL STRATEGIC GOALS


The Arianian military has four priorities based upon the country's history. First, it wants to become the dominant regional military power. Second, the Arianian military must be strong enough to defend its borders, control the Strait of Hormuz, and deny access to hostile powers. Third, Ariana remains focused on maintaining weapons of mass destruction because some Arianians believe such weapons will deter conventional aggression by enemies and are the rightful possession of a great power, as Ariana views itself. This explains Arianian efforts to continue enhancing the country's nuclear capability. Ariana's final priority is global deployment of smaller clandestine units (irregular forces) to train and equip other anti-Western factions. This focus has two advantages for the Arianians, as it both disrupts US interests and creates an outlet for weapons sold by the Arianian military complex.

The NCA determines the direction and scope of Ariana's strategic mission. Ariana's overall goals are to continually expand its dominance within the region and eventually change its position within the global community. These long-term aims are supported by one or more specific goals, each based on a particular threat or opportunity, including:

- Defense of Ariana's sovereignty
- Economic expansion
- Destruction of insurgent groups
- Acquisition of natural resources located outside Ariana's borders
- Preclusion or elimination of outside intervention

IMPLEMENTING NATIONAL SECURITY GOALS

All five countries share similar strategies to achieve their national goals. Strategic operations for all five countries remain a continuous process not limited to wartime or war preparation. Once war begins, strategic operations continue during regional, transition, and adaptive operations and complement those operations. Each of the latter three types of operations occurs only during war and only under certain conditions. Transition operations can overlap regional and adaptive operations.



In pursuit of their national security strategies, all five countries are prepared to conduct four basic types of strategic-level courses of action:


- **Strategic operations** use all instruments of power in peace and war to achieve a country's national security strategy goals through attacks against the enemy's strategic centers of gravity.
- **Regional operations** include conventional, force-on-force military operations against overmatched opponents, such as regional adversaries and internal threats.
- **Transition operations** bridge the gap between regional and adaptive operations and contain some elements of both. The country continues to pursue its regional goals while dealing with developing outside intervention that has the potential to overmatch its military.
- **Adaptive operations** preserve the country's power and apply it in adaptive ways against opponents that overmatch the country's military.

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

Although Donovia, Ariana, Atropia, Gorgas, and Minaria may refer to them as "operations," each of these courses of action is actually a subcategory of strategy. Each type of operation aggregates the effects of tactical, operational, and strategic actions in conjunction with instruments of national power to achieve each country's strategic goals. The types of operations employed at a given time will depend on the types of threats, opportunities, and other conditions present.

Each country's strategy typically starts with actions directed at a regional opponent that the government overmatches in conventional military power, as well as other instruments of power. If possible, each government will attempt to achieve its ends without armed conflict. Accordingly, these governments do not limit strategic operations to military means and usually do not begin with armed conflict. They may achieve the desired goal through pressure applied by nonmilitary instruments of power, perhaps by merely threatening to use superior military power against the opponent. These actions fall under the general framework of "strategic operations."

The government may resort to armed conflict to achieve its desired end state when nonmilitary means prove insufficient or not expedient. Strategic operations, however, continue even if a particular regional threat or opportunity causes the country to undertake "regional operations" that may include military means. Prior to the initiation of hostilities and throughout the course of armed conflict with



its regional opponent, the government will continue to conduct strategic operations to preclude intervention by outside players, other regional neighbors, or an extra-regional power that could overmatch its forces. Such operations, however, always include branches and sequels to deal with the possibility of intervention by an extra-regional power.

MILITARY FORCES OVERVIEW

MILITARY STRATEGY

Ariana conducts overt and covert operations in order to maintain its position within the region. The country maintains strong relationships with Minaria and has ties with Donovia. Ariana also is focused on keeping Western influence out of the region and maintaining its current status as a regional强man.


ARMY OVERVIEW

The Arianians maintain a robust ground force capability that consists of a conventional military capable of conducting a wide range of operations. Multiple sources indicate the ground forces, which include paramilitary groups that supplement the regular army, boast an estimated 790,600 troops. The ground forces consist of three mechanized armies.

The ground forces tend to deploy along the country's external borders, particularly those with Iraq and Atropia, which are seen as the most likely land avenues for Western forces to approach. The military also tends to protect key infrastructure such as potential nuclear sites, dams, and political buildings.

Arianian ground forces will play the major role in any foreign invasion scenario. If a country invaded Ariana—most likely through the Persian Gulf or Iraq—the invader would face a wave of ground forces consisting of mechanized infantry. The ground forces would likely exert their main effort to repel the invader in a conventional force-on-force engagement.

A terrain analysis of Ariana's physical environment quickly explains the disposition of its military forces. The Zagros Mountains channelize movement from the northwest to the southeast. Overall, Ariana's size and terrain dictate the country's defense strategy. When facing an extra-regional force, a possible course of



action would be for the ground forces to fight a retrograde delay that would maximize the advantages of the difficult terrain to draw an invader into Ariana and extend its logistical lines. The Arianians could fight on interior lines of communication, a course of action that would allow them to concentrate on the enemy at choke points such as mountain passes.

Originally, the Arianian military developed mainly as a defensive force with the primary objective of maintaining territorial integrity. Some elements, however, received an additional mission to export ideology and policy abroad. While most unit leaders come from Ariana's more educated classes, fundamentalists and religious zealots lead some units, receiving their positions as a result of their perceived loyalty to the regime rather than their qualifications. Recently, the Arianian military initiated a program to educate and professionalize the force no matter how the leaders obtained their current position.

ARMY SIZE AND STRUCTURE

The maneuver brigade serves as Ariana's basic combined arms unit. In the AFS, some maneuver brigades are constituent, or organic, to the base structure, such as divisions. The NCA calls them *divisional brigades*. These armies, however, organize some units as *separate brigades*, designed to possess greater ability to accomplish independent missions without further allocation of forces from a higher tactical-level headquarters. Separate brigades possess some subordinate units with the same force structure as a divisional brigade of the same type (for example, the headquarters); some units that are especially tailored to the needs of a separate brigade, marked "(Sep)" in the organizational directories; and some that are the same as units of this type found at division level, marked "(Div)."

The Arianian army designs its maneuver brigades to serve as the basis to form a brigade tactical group (BTG) if necessary. A brigade, separate or as part of a BTG, can fight as part of a division or division tactical group (DTG), a separate unit in an operational-strategic command (OSC), an organization of the AFS (such as army, corps, or military district), or as part of field group (FG). (*See TC 7-100.2: Opposing Force Tactics, Chapter 2, Command and Control.*)

The Arianian ground forces consist of three (1st, 2nd, 3rd) mechanized infantry armies. Support and special purpose elements include air defense, artillery, engineer, militia, special purpose forces (SPF), and missile commands. Recently, Ariana established an Information Warfare (INFOWAR) brigade to develop electronic and computer warfare capabilities. (*See diagram on page 2A-2-3 and the Order of Battle (OB) at the end of this country's variable*).

Divisions and brigades are the Arianian army's two largest tactical-level organizations. In peacetime, the army units are often subordinated to a larger, operational-level administrative command. The Arianian army might also maintain some separate, single-service, tactical-level commands (divisions, brigades, or battalions) directly under the control of their service headquarters. For example, major tactical-level commands of the air force, navy, strategic forces, and the SPF Command often remain under the direct control of their respective service component headquarters. The army component headquarters may retain centralized control of certain elite ground force elements, including airborne units and army SPF. This permits flexibility in employing these relatively scarce assets in response to national-level requirements. For these tactical-level organizations (division and below), the AFS organizational directories contain standard table of organization and equipment (TO&E) structures. These administrative groupings normally differ from Ariana's go-to-war (fighting) force structure. (*See TC 7-100.2: Opposing Force Tactics, Chapter 3, Offense.*)

Ariana fields 12 divisions, Ariana's largest tactical unit. Divisions can serve as the foundation to form DTGs, though that is not always the case. A division can fight as part of an OSC, an organization in the AFS (such as army or military region), or a separate unit in an FG.

ARMY DOCTRINE AND TACTICS

The Arianian army derives most of its doctrine and tactics from Donovian military doctrine. The Arianian army gears its doctrine and tactics toward the opposition and the physical environment. Ariana can conduct large-scale operations, fluctuate back and forth from adaptive tactics, or operate in a hybrid configuration. Similar to most armies today, Arianian ground forces currently employ tactical control measures, including assembly areas, forming-up assembly areas just prior to attacks, advance axes, checkpoints, jump-off lines (similar to Western lines of departure), and attack lines. The Arianian military will likely engage, hoping to push back invaders or buy time to mobilize reserves and for adaptive doctrine to begin.

ARMY TRAINING AND READINESS

Ariana fields a well-trained army. Most units maintain a 98% operational readiness rate.

ARMY EQUIPMENT AND WEAPONS

Ariana's equipment and weapons largely reflect a tier 2 capability throughout the military's force structure. The Arianian army recently upgraded some systems for selected tier 1 niche capabilities. The Arianian army has the equipment to operate in all terrain types and successfully conduct both day and night operations. (*For further information see Section 4: Appendix C or the WEG: VOL 1, Chapter 1, COE and Tier Tables.*)

NAVAL FORCES OVERVIEW

The Arianian navy patrols the Persian Gulf and maintains a small, agile contingent on the Caspian Sea. The navy has attempted to upgrade its capabilities with the purchase of Donovian ships, including submarines, missiles, and fast attack craft. Recently, the Arianian navy conducted exercises in the Persian Gulf that demonstrated at least a tier 2 rating for both equipment and training.

Ariana maintains the strongest regional naval force after Donovia, and only the US Navy possesses enough ships and firepower to open the Strait of Hormuz if Ariana attempted to close it. If Ariana blocked shipment lanes in the Strait of Hormuz, many Middle Eastern countries would become essentially landlocked.

NAVY SIZE AND STRUCTURE

Like most navies, the Arianian navy's shore establishment borders its sea frontiers. The Arianian navy divides the country into four naval districts. The First Naval District, also the most important, sits astride the Strait of Hormuz at Bandar-e Abbas. This is Ariana's most modern and well-developed port facility and where Ariana constructed its main repair facilities. It also serves as the home port for most of its larger ships. The Second Naval District covers the northern Persian Gulf, and Third Naval operates in the general vicinity of the northern Persian Gulf. The Fourth Naval District covers Ariana's northern border where it shares the Caspian Sea with Donovian and Atropian fleets.

Ariana also has an Indian Ocean base in the very southeastern part of the country near the Pakistan border. This base serves as the Arianian navy's main outlet to the open sea. Some experts believe this port will eventually become the home port for the submarines currently berthed at Bandar-e Abbas. (*See diagram on page 2A-2-9 and the OB at the end of this country's variable*).

NAVY DOCTRINE AND TACTICS

Arianian naval strategy has four main priorities:

- Control the Strait of Hormuz and thereby access to the Persian Gulf
- Project naval power into the Persian Gulf and dominate the disputed islands there
- Disrupt sea lines of communication for nearby countries
- Intimidate other countries through its naval presence


Although Ariana maintains the second most capable regional naval force, it will likely operate more or less as a “guerilla navy.” The Arianian navy would employ small boats in hit-and-run type missions, deploy mines, fire anti-ship cruise missiles, and use fixed wing and helicopter forces against stronger naval forces.

Arianian naval missions might include:

- Mine laying, particularly of narrow channels and coastal areas
- Insertion/extraction of SOF
- Seizure of disputed islands
- Raids on coastal areas and isolated oil rig platforms
- Harassment and closure of the Strait of Hormuz
- Defensive patrolling of coastal areas

Ariana created a new and mixed naval dimension with the recent acquisition of three Donovanian submarines currently based at Bandar-e Abbas. A foreign navy could bottle up the submarines because of the location of Bandar-e Abbas in the constricted Strait of Hormuz.

There are seven naval bases including one headquarters element in Ariana's capital. The majority of the bases are in the Persian Gulf. The total service fleet consists of 120 craft and six submarines.



NAVY TRAINING AND READINESS

Ariana's naval forces can successfully conduct day and night operations. Ariana's navy is well-trained and at a high rate of readiness. Most naval units maintain operational readiness rates of approximately 93%.


NAVY EQUIPMENT AND WEAPONS

Ariana's naval equipment and weapons contain largely tier 2 capabilities throughout the navy's force structure, which is based on modern competitive military systems fielded over the last 10 to 20 years. Upgrades to some systems, however, provide a number of tier 1 niche naval capabilities.

AIR FORCE OVERVIEW

Ariana divides its air force into three commands: Western, Southern, and Eastern. The Arianian air force consists of four divisions, with the 10th Fighter Aviation Division as the premier air force unit.

The air force has a reputation for flying skill and the ability to put ordnance on target. Recent exercises provide evidence that, for regional standards, Arianian pilots remain skillful in air strikes against ground targets and using terrain to mask themselves from radar. Arianian pilots maintain a deep strike capability. The air force primarily supports its ground forces and is likely positioned near strategic sites such as nuclear plants, dams, and government buildings in order to intercept enemy air activity.



AIR FORCE SIZE AND STRUCTURE

The Arianian air force fields four aviation divisions divided up into one fighter, two bomber and one fighter/bomber units based on their aviation assets. It also possesses several other regiments designed for ground attack, reconnaissance, combat operations, transportation, or Arianian SPF unit support. The Arianian air force also has limited heliborne jamming capabilities. (*See the OB at the end of this country's variable*).

AIR FORCE DOCTRINE AND TACTICS

The Arianian air force modified its doctrine and tactics based on observing other countries' conflicts, including the US. It will use force-on-force engagement with a regional competitor. Additionally, the Arianian air force will likely exhibit a show of force as a warning before actually committing to air combat and use its air force to support ground troops and protect key infrastructure.

AIR FORCE TRAINING AND READINESS

Ariana's air force operates mostly well-trained units with a 95% equipment operational readiness rate throughout.

AIR FORCE EQUIPMENT AND WEAPONS

The Arianian air force operates mainly tier 2 equipment and weapons, but now possesses limited modern upgrades and the potential for random tier 1 niche capabilities. Ariana's air force can successfully conduct day and night operations. (*For further information see the WEG, Vol 2: Air Defense and Aircraft.*)

GOVERNMENT PARAMILITARY FORCES

The Arianian government tasks its paramilitary forces (government forces like police that are distinct from regular armed forces yet similar in organization or training) with the following missions: basic law enforcement, border control, and maintenance of public order. Arianian agencies with these responsibilities include the Ministry of Intelligence and the Law Enforcement Forces under the Interior Ministry. Last year, the US State Department reported Ariana's security forces and paramilitary forces faced corruption issues and acted with impunity as they conducted serious human rights violations, especially when reacting to demonstrations after recent presidential elections.

NON-STATE PARAMILITARY FORCES

INSURGENT/GUERRILLA FORCES

Attempting to generalize the irregular conflict motivation of different population segments is problematic. Nonetheless, two major considerations are an ethnocentric or separatist motivation compared to a nationalistic motivation. Such strife has devolved to forms of irregular warfare and a violent struggle among state and non-state actors to gain legitimacy and influence over relevant segments of the population.

Several foreign anti-Ariana insurgent groups operate with sporadic violence and have attacked current government entities and key leaders. The largest group is located in southeast Ariana and has been opposing leaders for two decades through a low-level pseudo-insurgency. The group, God's Helpers Brigade, promotes violent populace opposition to state taxation policies; unreliable electrical service, sewage treatment, and potable water issues; substandard medical preventive services; lack of access to state education programs for working class citizens; and a state judicial system that illegally favors the political party currently in control of the executive and legislative branches of the government.

Other groups and affiliates across Ariana are sympathetic to pro-Western economic initiatives and social-political state governance concepts. Whether these groups align with a pro-Western coalition in future possible operations or continue with separate domestic agendas, the distinction between criminal organizations, private militia, insurgents, or guerrillas will be significant in assessing which forces support coalition objectives.

At least three forms of armed and unarmed combatants will emerge from these domestic groups if a regional host nation invites US and coalition presence to the area. First, factions may oppose the host nation government and be unfriendly toward the US-coalition presence. These factions will initiate overt resistance through violent and nonviolent protests against the host nation and US coalition. Next, factions will oppose host nation government policies but be potentially friendly toward the US coalition presence when this regional presence promotes and supports a domestic

faction agenda. Third, several extremist factions will quickly resort to expanded terrorism if a US coalition enters the region. The groups will initially target US coalition forces, logistical staging points, host nation law enforcement, and internal security forces. Any of these domestic factions can be influenced by financing, training, and materiel support from foreign entities that are intent on agitating civil unrest or insurgency-like actions in the region.

Operational reach actions range from subversive and violent confrontations with adversary nation-states or a host nation government in power, to actions by a contracted individual or small cell capable of inflicting strategic consequences. Irregular forces can be unusually flexible and adaptable in ways and means to counter traditional advantages of stronger opponents, disregard sanctions intended to control conflict, and optimize actions with self-announced justification based on populist regional social justice or ideological perspectives. An irregular force will optimize a range of organizational options, from small, loosely affiliated cells to global networks, in order to promote mission success and psychological effect. Such networks can be local, regional, international, or transnational affiliations; host simple or sophisticated media affairs programs; and attain covert or overt financial, political, military, economic, or social support. In summary, people conducting irregular warfare will seek to gain capabilities such as co-opting an indigenous population or hiring a domestic criminal organization, encouraging a militia with robust international connections, protecting transnational networking affiliations, or applying a combination of these capabilities to degrade practical or perceived power by a rival criminal organization or militia, or the host nation governmental authority.

The NCA commands the militia, another category of reserve military personnel that was formed about 20 years ago. The militia became famous when young boys martyred themselves in suicidal human wave attacks against Iraq during the border wars. The militia can conduct limited traditional military operations; most units can perform civil support missions.

CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS

Despite a lack of official reports on criminal enterprises, the country's drug and weapons trades remain lucrative businesses. Reports indicate certain SPF elements have links to the black market. These domestic elements generally are categorized with criminal organizations.

PRIVATE SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS

In troubled areas of Ariana, small groups of local civilians band together to provide security for their businesses, homes, and families, as these people feel that the police and military cannot arrive in time when trouble does occur. The news media indiscriminately uses the "militia" label when reporting armed violence in the region by such groups. A militia is commonly defined as a paramilitary force organized and controlled by a sovereign government similar to an internal security force. Although militias typically are not irregular forces, some groups of armed Arianian individuals band together formally or informally, and either self-declare or are categorized with the "militia" term.

NONMILITARY ARMED COMBATANTS

While nonmilitary armed combatants (insurgent forces, guerrilla forces, criminal organizations, and private security organizations) may not see eye-to-eye with the Arianian government, they are at best neutral in support of US activities in the region and at worst, predominately hostile.

MILITARY FUNCTIONS

COMMAND AND CONTROL

The core of Ariana's command and control (C2) concept remains the assumption that modern communications are susceptible to attack and/or monitoring. Accordingly, the military operates from the view that centralized planning helps assure both command (establishing the aim) and control (sustaining the aim), leading to strategic and operational directions. Necessarily then, the military relies on the loyalty of its forces and extends far-ranging authority for troops to act while foregoing rigorous control as unproductive in the modern environment. (*See TC 7-100.2: Opposing Force Tactics, Chapter 2, Command and Control.*)

Arianian military battalions have a headquarters composed of a command section including the commander, deputy commander, and a small staff element, as well as a staff section with the chief of staff and the remainder of the battalion staff. The battalion staff consists of the operations officer, assistant operations officer, intelligence officer, and resources officer. The signal platoon leader also serves as the battalion communications officer, and the reconnaissance platoon leader acts as the chief of reconnaissance, while the materiel support platoon leader serves as the battalion resources officer. (*See TC 7-100.2: Opposing Force Tactics, Chapter 2, Command and Control.*)

C2 at the tactical level of command emphasizes survivability through mobility, redundancy, and security. Command posts and procedures are streamlined at the operational level, relying heavily on common procedures for important recurring tactical tasks.

MANEUVER

The Arianian military has a robust capability to conduct combined arms operations; the basic combined arms unit is the maneuver brigade. In the administrative force structure, maneuver brigades are typically constituent to divisions—called divisional brigades. However, some are organized as separate brigades, designed to have greater ability to accomplish independent missions without further allocation of forces from higher-level tactical headquarters.

AIR DEFENSE

The Arianian Air Defense Command (ADC), subordinate to the Supreme High Command, provides air defense coverage for Arianian units. It also supports combined arms combat by the comprehensive integration of a large number and variety of weapons and associated equipment into an effective, redundant air defense system. Employment of this system pursues the basic objectives of air defense by employing certain concepts and principles. This is best accomplished by establishing an integrated air defense system (IADS). Air defense weapons and surveillance systems at all levels of command are part of an IADS. This ability provides a continuous, unbroken (usually overlapping) umbrella of air defense coverage and presents a significant threat to any potential enemy air activity.

Ariana recognizes that air defense is an *all-arms* effort. Thus, all ground units possess some type of an organic air defense capability to differing degrees, depending on the type and size of the unit. The ADC continuously looks for new and adaptive ways of employing not only air defense systems but also systems not traditionally associated with air defense. Many weapons not designed as air defense weapons will also damage and/or destroy tactical aircraft when within range.

Throughout maneuver units, there are a number of systems designed for air defense and other systems that can be used in an air defense role. The heavy antiaircraft machineguns on tanks are specifically designed for air defense. Machineguns on armored personnel carriers and automatic cannon on infantry fighting vehicles can engage both ground and air targets. Most antitank guided

missiles (ATGMs) are extremely effective against low-flying helicopters. Several ATGM manufacturers offer antihelicopter missiles and compatible fire control, which are especially effective against low-flying rotary-wing aircraft. Field artillery and small arms can also be integral parts of the air defense scheme. All these weapons can be extremely lethal when used in this role.

Ariana considers every soldier with a man-portable air defense system (MANPADS) to be an air defense firing unit. These weapons are readily available at a relatively low cost and are widely proliferated. Therefore, Arianian ground forces are acquiring as many MANPADS as possible and issuing them in large numbers to a wide variety of units. The military can also disseminate them to selected affiliated forces. The small size and easy portability of these systems provides the opportunity for ambush of enemy airframes operating in any area near Arianian units. Ground units also employ them to set ambushes for enemy helicopters, especially those on routine logistics missions. (*For more information, see TC 7-100.2, chapter 11, air defense.*)

INFOWAR

Ariana defines information warfare (INFOWAR) as specifically planned and integrated actions to achieve an information advantage at critical points and times. The goal is to influence an enemy's decision-making cycle through collected and available information, information systems, and information-based processes, while retaining the ability to employ friendly information and information-based processes and systems. Ariana has a robust INFOWAR capability with the brigade headquarters out of Tehran.

RISTA

Reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition (RISTA) is viewed as the single-most important function for the Arianian military. Thus, Arianian forces typically commit significant resources to RISTA-related operations, which are usually aggressive with overlapping redundancy in the intelligence disciplines. The table on the next page summarizes the effective ranges for reconnaissance assets that can support Ariana's tactical commanders.

FIRE SUPPORT


Arianian military doctrine stresses that fire support combines air assets, surface-to-surface missiles, and artillery into an integrated attack against enemy defenses as well as for offense operations. In past conflicts, Ariana's military successfully integrated fire support into operations, from close to deep-strike capability. The commanders always seek to increase the effectiveness of air and missile strikes and artillery fire to destroy enemy formations, weapons systems, or key components of an enemy combat system. (*See TC 7-100.2: Opposing Force Tactics, Chapter 9, Indirect Fire Support.*)

PROTECTION

Ariana will attempt to minimize civilian casualties to a large extent. The military has engineering assets to reinforce civilian and military positions. The C2 and fire support systems are sophisticated enough to minimize the threat of "friendly fire" or other accidents. However, military and civilian populations are closely integrated, making it difficult for invaders to launch attacks without the risk of civilian casualties that would enrage the population and be used as ammunition for INFOWAR. (*See TC 7-100.2: Opposing Force Tactics, Chapter 12, Engineer and Chapter 7, INFOWAR.*)

LOGISTICS

The Arianian military fields a robust logistics capability that can support its maneuver units for any length of time. Ariana's military continues to improve its logistics systems, including increased emphasis on support zone security and plans to stockpile war materiel throughout the country.



CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR

Ariana possesses a capable and growing chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) capability. In this region emerging CBRN capability and technology is viewed as a status symbol. Countries possessing these capabilities are firm in their belief that they should be viewed as a powerbroker and that their weapons equate to symbols of national might with the ability to have regional and possibly strategic impact.

Arianian strategic policy supports a CBRN first strike in the event it believes its national security is in jeopardy. National policy also supports the use of preemptive CBRN strikes against a neighbor either to deter aggression or as a response to an enemy attack. It may also use, or threaten to use, CBRN weapons as a way of applying political, economic, or psychological pressure.

Ariana has a wide variety of CBRN delivery means organic to its military forces. In addition to surface-to-surface missiles capable of carrying CBRN warheads, most Arianian artillery systems are capable of delivering chemical munitions. Artillery systems that are 152-mm or larger are also capable of firing nuclear rounds. The Arianian air force can also use its aircraft to deliver a CBRN attack. Trained Arianian SPF may also be used as alternate means of delivering CBRN munitions packages. Ariana is also well-prepared to employ civilian and military CBRN protection measures and has chemical defense units organic to all division and brigade maneuver units.

Ariana has a substantial industrial base that produces large quantities of toxic industrial chemicals (TIC), which are chemical substances possessing acute toxicity. An adjunct to chemical weapons is

use of TIC, which can easily be exploited as improvised (or converted into) chemical weapons by military and civilians alike. (*For a listing of possible high- and moderate-risk toxic TIC possibly available to Ariana see the Worldwide Equipment Guide, Volume I, Chapter 16, Improvised Military Systems.*)

For additional information on the capabilities, release authority (NCA), and employment of CBRN see TC 7-100.2, *OPFOR Tactics*, Chapter 13, *CBRN and Smoke*. For specific technical information, delivery means, agents, and effects of CBRN see the *Worldwide Equipment Guide*, Volume I, Chapter 10, *CBRN*.

RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT GOALS

Over the past two decades, Ariana carried out secretive research supporting its uranium enrichment program, which directly violated the policy set forth by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). During this time period, Ariana strongly refuted any claims that it sought nuclear weapons while covertly pursuing a dual parallel uranium enrichment program. One program uses a laser process (based on Donovian technology) and the other applies a centrifuge process. The Donovian government terminated cooperation with Ariana on the laser enrichment program after extensive dialogue with the US, and the program still appears inactive. Ariana admitted that it has obtained uranium centrifuge technology through unofficial channels. Recently, Ariana became the tenth country in the world to develop a nuclear weapon. Though less powerful in terms of kilowatts compared with other nuclear powers, Ariana now possesses a small number of tactical nuclear weapons.

Summary

Ariana maintains the second-strongest military in the region after Donovia, with primarily tier 2 equipment and some limited tier 1 equipment. Ariana operates a capable army, navy, and air force that provide it with a considerable edge compared to its neighboring countries. The Ariana military has the capability to inflict severe losses on any military force that attempts to invade its homeland, but also fields the forces to conduct offensive operations against neighboring countries.

TRADOC G-2

TRISA-THREATS

CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND THREAT INTEGRATION

DIRECTORATE (CTID)

ECONOMIC: ARIANA

Economic: Ariana

The economic variable encompasses individual and group behaviors related to producing, distributing, and consuming resources.

KEY FACTS:

REGION

- Hydrocarbon resources drive the Caucasus economy and their uneven geographic disposition creates an unequal distribution of wealth and leads to regional conflicts.
- While economies continue to develop, insufficient large-scale industrial production limits overall economic growth.
- All economies in the region have high levels of corruption, heavy government involvement, and lack of developed non-hydrocarbon export industries.

ARIANA

- Ariana will remain a hydrocarbon-based economy.
- Sanctions will cripple Ariana's efforts to sell petroleum and natural gas. Without funds from these sales, the Arianian economy will not modernize to any appreciable degree.
- Pockets of economic vitality exist, but most of the economy suffers from over-regulation and government intervention.

OPERATIONAL IMPACTS OF THE ECONOMIC VARIABLE IN THE OE:

REGION

- All Caucasus countries consider critical economic infrastructure defense as a primary military effort.
- Hydrocarbon infrastructure will serve as a critical center of gravity in nearly all military operations in the region.
- Agriculture provides the majority of the jobs in the Caucasus, but not the bulk of its economic activity.

ARIANA

- In a regional conflict, Ariana will vigorously defend its hydrocarbon industrial infrastructure and likely target the adversary's oil and gas infrastructure. Its national strategy probably aims to drive global prices upward as part of a favorable conflict cessation strategy.

ECONOMIC OVERVIEW:

The Caucasus countries that possess hydrocarbon resources will continue to depend on the oil and gas industries to drive their economies, while those that do not possess such resources will attempt to tie themselves to hydrocarbon-rich nations. Both Ariana and Atropia face geopolitical difficulties in exporting their oil and natural gas. Bordered by adversaries, the Arianians and Atropians must rely on tenuous routes to export their resources. For Gorgas and Minaria, which lack extractive or

mature industries, transshipment of hydrocarbon products or providing other services to oil-wealthy countries will be their primary short- to medium-term means to achieve economic development. Donovia continues to recover from a collapse two decades ago that crippled its economy. All nations of the Caucasus have relatively high inefficiency due to corruption, government involvement in the economy, and/or lack of export industry development.

Ariana's economy has pockets of economic vitality but suffers from governmental legislation and regulation that restrict its growth. Ariana's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) consistently improves about 4-6% annually and even reached 7-8% growth in 2007. Much of Ariana's GDP growth, however, depends on hydrocarbon revenues that make up the largest sector of the Arianian economy and suffer the whims of international market commodity prices. The Arianian government continues to push for greater market liberalization and reform, but large Arianian special interests are expected to continue blocking economic progressive legislation to prevent any decrease in their power. Additionally, the government plays a significant role in the Arianian economy; its social welfare policies fund various charities and numerous subsidies for commodities ranging from foodstuffs to gasoline.

Ariana's economy is a series of contrasts. While a population surge reached the labor market over the last decade, Arianian unemployment continued to decrease over the same period. While trade and finance sanctions create significant foreign investment obstacles, overseas trade—especially with East Asian countries—continues to grow as Asia desires raw hydrocarbon resources and Ariana seeks finished consumer goods. Although Ariana's industrial sector continues as one of the region's strongest, its factories suffer from international sanctions on the parts and technology needed to update its hardware and techniques.

President Ahmad Moudin's financial policies support his populist agenda, including an expansionary fiscal policy. Moudin continues to support massive subsidies for the populace; energy subsidies alone account for approximately 12% of Ariana's GDP. The People's Wealth Fund (PWF), which uses oil revenue proceeds as a hedge against the volatile price fluctuations on the international petroleum market, supports oil subsidies to the Arianian people. The high oil prices of the last decade filled the PWF coffers with enough revenue to pursue Moudin's populist policies, like fuel subsidies, and possibly provided funds to continue Ariana's investment in nuclear technology.

As a result of Ariana's successful nuclear weapons program, the US Treasury enacted sanctions against Ariana that hamper its international and domestic economic systems and promote policy changes. In addition, the US hopes the sanctions will deter Ariana from providing financial support to Middle East terrorists.

TABLE OF ECONOMIC DATA

Measure	Data	Rank in World	Remarks (if applicable)
GDP	827.1 billion USD	19	
Labor Force	25.02 million	22	
Unemployment	11.8%	125	
Poverty	18%		Percent below poverty line
Investment	27.7% of GDP	36	
Budget	\$96.94 billion revenue \$93.04 billion expenditures		
Public Debt	16.7%	110	
Inflation	13.5%	211	

PARTICIPATION IN THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM

Over the past decade, the Caucasus nations made considerable efforts to integrate themselves into the global financial system. While focused on local conflicts, the Caucasus region opened to other countries to increase global markets for its products, especially petroleum, and looked to the West for economic developmental aid, usually in the form of loans and grants.

WORLD BANK/INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AID

The World Bank currently maintains two active Ariana portfolios, which are focused on land management and water sanitation efforts. The World Bank's activity in Ariana restarted a decade ago after a seven-year hiatus. World Bank disbursements to Ariana reached their peak in 2007, topping out at \$200 million, then began a downward trend to only \$120 million per fiscal year. Only the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), a World Bank sub-echelon organization, can lend to Ariana based on the World Bank's market rate.

Ariana's major donor countries in terms of bilateral official development assistance include Germany, France, the Netherlands, Norway, and Japan. In general, the United States does not provide aid to Ariana other than humanitarian assistance in extreme circumstances. For example, USAID contributed disaster assistance after the earthquake near Bam, Ariana, on 26 December 2003.

FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT

Ariana's hydrocarbon resources make it a potentially lucrative market for foreign investment. Foreign direct investment (FDI) in Ariana, however, continues its historical trend and remains low.

The Arianian government allows foreign investment only in certain economic sectors such as banking, telecommunications, transport, and border control. Investors can only own up to 65% of any state-owned enterprise. The Arianian government bars foreign investment in defense and security-related enterprises and in its national oil company. The government can prevent foreign investors from participating in any development plan in which the international community possesses the project's majority share. Recently, Ariana reluctantly began allowing new foreign investors to participate in its economy.

ECONOMIC ACTIVITY

The Arianian economy appears as a liberal free market, but that is only a veneer. In reality, the economic system is heavily influenced by participation in collective organizations that control vast segments of the economy. Patronage and favoritism form the business culture necessary for individual economic success. These organizations generally oppose reforms—usually in the form of policy liberalization—as such changes would reduce their power, wealth, or prestige in Arianian society.

ECONOMIC ACTORS

Ariana's military, charitable corporations, and government control large segments of its economy. Each one operates through a network of patronage and rules that favor its own operation and make it difficult for others to become a competitor. These near-monopolies limit the efficacy of market competition as they give one group an advantage over another in various economic fields. These concentrations further self-interests that often prevent economic reforms intended to reduce regulation or improve market function.

The Arianian military is one of the country's most prominent economic actors. It plays an increasingly active role on the domestic political scene and possesses extensive and diverse economic assets. President Ahmad Moudin served as an army commander in the 1980-88 Ariana-Iraq War, and his presidency will most likely only enhance the military's influence. Current military leaders and a network of current and former commanders operate Ariana's hydrocarbon industries and also dominate construction, agriculture, mining, transportation, defense, and import/export businesses. The military blatantly protects its business interests.

Charitable corporations operate as private holding companies but actually serve as quasi-governmental trust foundations. These corporations account for an estimated 33% to 40% of Ariana's non-oil economy. Many of the charitable corporations predate the Council of Guardians Revolution and are custodians of Arianian Shia holy sites. Following the Revolution, their influence increased to the current level of significant economic and political influence. The Supreme Leader appoints the heads of these corporations, which control vast assets gained from Ariana's confiscation of property during and after the Council of Guardians Revolution.

Charitable corporations provide social services to various elements of Arianian society, such as disabled war veterans, widows, and the indigent. The foundations have significant influence among the lower and lower-middle classes, and can exert tremendous political sway. As an ally of the conservative Arianian regime, charitable corporations give the government several avenues to exert social pressure and control when needed, including mobilizing citizens for protests, patronage, political indoctrination, and dissent repression.

As many as 123 different charitable corporations operate in Ariana. One of the largest and most important is the Foundation for the Oppressed and Disabled. This corporation has amassed an estimated \$12 billion in assets and employs more than 400,000 workers in its various enterprises.

The Arianian economy's so-called "cooperatives" also come under the control of key elites. In theory, the Ministry of Cooperatives oversees their operations. In practice, however, allies or relatives of the regime elites control the larger cooperatives and limit the ministry's oversight powers. The best-known cooperative, the Ariana Pistachio Growers Association, exemplifies the privileged status of these organizations. A former Arianian president runs this cooperative, which claims to represent over 70,000 pistachio farmers and generates an estimated \$746 million annually in revenue.

Historically, *bazaari* (Arianian merchants) contributed significantly to the country's economy. They seek economic stability and certainty, but are reportedly displeased with the current government. The bazaari do not necessarily want a completely free trade system, however, as it might impinge on their privileged business status. They remain skeptical of increased foreign investment, fearing that Western factories and companies might operate more efficiently and compete effectively with the bazaari. Some Arianians complain that the bazaari try to control certain markets by group actions such as joint boycotts that force a supplier to make concessions.

TRADE

International trade contributes significantly to the Arianian economy. Hydrocarbons constitute a major portion of the trade, as oil and natural gas represent 81% of Ariana's total exports. Other import/export commodities include agricultural goods (fresh and dried fruits), petrochemicals, consumer goods, industrial raw materials, and military items. Ariana generally fosters its relationship with East Asian countries as a hydrocarbon resources exporter and finished goods importer. To avoid international sanctions on certain items, Ariana uses Minaria as a principal trade route for re-exporting goods.

COMMERCIAL TRADE

During the last four years, Ariana's total trade in goods (exports and imports) nearly doubled to \$147 billion. Ariana benefits from a positive trade balance. Oil and natural gas, which dominate Ariana's export revenue, provide the country's most important foreign exchange earnings.

Instead of its traditional European partners, Ariana now trades primarily with East Asian countries (especially China and Japan) that are hungry for petroleum resources and can provide finished consumer goods for the Arianian market. Minaria serves as a vital link to the rest of the world's trading market.

MILITARY EXPORTS/IMPORTS

Last year Ariana exported over \$100 million worth of military hardware. Many countries across the globe import Arianian military equipment, goods, and services (includes training, technical support, and construction). Ariana recently signed defense cooperation agreements with Tajikistan and Algeria that include defense equipment sales, manufacturing or repair facility construction, and military unit training.

Ariana continues to increase its military spending through a growth in arms imports. Ariana carefully focused its military purchases to improve important capabilities like INFOWAR, naval combat, and armored vehicles. However, these recent purchases have not offset the steady aging of Ariana's military inventory. Without parts and upgrades for much of its Western-supplied equipment, Ariana has not achieved parity with the weapons and technology found in US, British, and many other Gulf forces, although its military inventory matches or exceeds other regional opponents. Ariana has attempted to compensate for its technology gap by creating its own military industries, but with only limited impact.

ECONOMIC DIVERSITY

Ariana's economy demonstrates diversity across multiple sectors: manufacturing, agriculture, and extractive industries. However, the country almost exclusively depends on its hydrocarbon industries to sustain its economy. Oil exports serve as Ariana's chief revenue producer internationally, while internally the Arianians rely on natural gas for most of their energy needs. Ariana works to increase its domestic reliance on natural gas due to its lower cost, and focuses on increasing its higher-priced oil exports to maximize revenues. The Arianian government created programs in its recent five-year plans to re-establish its agriculture and manufacturing sectors, but with only limited success.

ENERGY SECTOR

The Arianian government watches energy more closely than any other sector of its economy. Ariana's hydrocarbon resources and revenue remain key to the country's domestic economy and stability. Its large hydrocarbon resources are one of Ariana's few levers when dealing with the international community.

Ariana's energy sector continues to deteriorate from increasingly antiquated practices and equipment, as sanctions have limited international investment in Arianian hydrocarbon infrastructure and technology. The Ministry of Petroleum, through its system of nationally-owned subsidiaries, maintains responsibility for all Arianian oil and natural gas production and exploration. Ariana has an estimated 10% of the world's oil reserves and 15% of the world's natural gas reserves.

Oil

The Dastet region, near the Iraqi border, contains the vast majority of Ariana's onshore crude oil reserves. Ariana operates 40 oil production fields—27 onshore and 13 offshore. Currently, Ariana exports about 2.4 million barrels per day (bbl/d) primarily to Asian markets, making it the world's fourth largest exporter. The remaining 1.7 million bbl/d is used domestically. Ariana produces about 4.5% of all global oil, and its primary crude oil export market is East Asia, followed by Europe.

Currently, Ariana meets half its domestic energy needs with oil and the remainder with natural gas. Ariana refines most of its internal use oil into gasoline or diesel fuel. Because of its limited domestic refinery capability, Ariana imports much of its refined gasoline requirements. The Arianian government intends to shift a greater share of its domestic energy requirements to natural gas, hoping to become self-sufficient for gasoline and possibly a refined-gasoline exporter. Currently, however, substantial governmental gasoline subsidies encourage wasteful domestic gasoline use.

Natural Gas

Ariana has massive natural gas resources along the Persian Gulf coastline and shares the large South Pars gas field with Qatar, which is in the center of the Persian Gulf between the two countries. South Pars is Ariana's largest natural gas field and represents an estimated 27% of Ariana's total natural gas reserves. In addition to these developed natural gas fields, another two-thirds of Ariana's total natural gas resources are in undeveloped fields. Ariana has the world's second-largest known natural gas reserves after Donovia.

Over the last 20 years, Ariana has increased both its natural gas production and consumption. Natural gas currently accounts for nearly half of Ariana's current total energy consumption, and the government plans to invest billions of dollars to increase this share. To encourage consumption, the Arianian government significantly subsidizes natural gas prices for residential and industrial consumers. Despite large gas reserves, the artificially low domestic price promotes consumption and encourages waste, leaving only a minimal supply for export. The Arianian government hopes to increase its gas exports as a means to increase its revenue.

Ariana likely will face stiff natural gas competition given that many current gas suppliers—Oman, Qatar, and the UAE—have locked up much of the Far East market. International sanctions also limit Ariana to non-US liquefaction technology, an outdated process as most liquid natural gas (LNG) plants use newer US-developed processes. Ariana has no modern LNG facilities. Because of this, Ariana continues to court China, Donovia, and India to invest in its natural gas development.

AGRICULTURE

Agriculture constitutes approximately one-tenth of Ariana's GDP and employs one-quarter of its labor force. The country is a major world exporter for caviar and pistachio nuts, and Ariana's climate and terrain also support tobacco, tea, wheat, barley, and smaller amounts of other food crops. Ariana emphasizes agriculture as an important development focus in its governmental five-year plans but still struggles to become self-sufficient in subsistence crops because of resource underfunding, climatic issues, and rural population migration to urban areas.

Traditionally, Ariana has paid for agricultural imports with oil revenue. Despite recent high oil prices, international food price increases and a population growth surge continue to place pressure on the country's economy. The Arianian government supports substantial agricultural subsidies, which create artificially low food prices. If Ariana converted to a market-driven agricultural economy, it would likely cause domestic unrest due to higher food prices.

MINING

Despite large reserves of minerals like zinc, copper, iron, uranium, and lead, mining in Ariana is generally underdeveloped, accounting for less than 1% of GDP. Mining is likely to increase in importance, as the US government estimates that Ariana possesses 7% of global mineral reserves.

MANUFACTURING

Arianian industrial development shows tremendous promise coupled with extraordinary handicaps. Ariana has the most mature steel, automotive, and petrochemical industries in the Middle East. However, Arianian companies remain dependent upon oil export profits despite various government reforms to spur industrial growth.

Steel

Ariana produces nine million metric tons of steel, the most in the Middle East and 20th in the world. Despite this high production level, Ariana still must import steel to meet its domestic demands. Steel requirements continue to increase because of the rising need for project infrastructure and construction expansion throughout the Middle East.

Automotives

Ariana produces the most vehicles, both light and heavy, in the Middle East. However, outdated technology that depends on repair parts supplied through third-world countries hinders production, especially for the two largest automakers—Ariana Khodro and Sapia. Domestically produced cars are fuel inefficient and contribute to the country's pollution problems. Since Ariana's automobile demands outpace its domestic production, the country must import a variety of cars ranging from basic to luxury models.

Petrochemicals

Ariana manufactures many petrochemicals. The government funds petrochemical industrial development as part of efforts to diversify its exports.

Defense Industries/Dual Use

Ariana has a significant defense construction capability, and the government has identified increased defense industry self-reliance as a key strategic goal. Though Ariana has had few new, homegrown accomplishments in military production or design, the Arianian industrial base has proven its ability to reverse-engineer and build foreign military aircraft, radios, and vehicles.

SERVICES

Domestic services continue to grow in importance, especially as sanctions limit Arianian capabilities to source needed capabilities, particularly financial services, from abroad. Of the Caucasus countries, only Gorgas has a higher service level. The Arianian service industry currently accounts for 43% of GDP.

BANKING AND FINANCE

PUBLIC FINANCE

Ariana struggles with high inflation for a number of reasons, including government price controls, inefficient and cumbersome government regulations, pervasive consumer subsidies, expansionary government development programs, and financial policies that favor selected organizations, e.g.

charitable corporations. International sanctions have also resulted in high inflation, contributing to the economic imbalance.

Inflation has risen into the double-digit range in recent years and currently stands at 13.5%, a decrease from 25.6% just two years ago. Ariana uses price controls for consumer products such as gasoline, electricity, wheat, and a myriad of other articles and services. The country maintains multiple price subsidies as a result of the Council of Guardians Revolution and its ambition to provide social services for Arianians. Although inflation is prevalent throughout the Middle Eastern countries (usually around 10%), Ariana possesses the second-highest inflation rate behind Iraq.

Despite the subsidies, inflation hurts average Arianian citizens, particularly those in rural areas. Prices for food and services continue to rise, making the cost of living ever higher. Rural voters supported Ahmad Moudin for president because his populist message appealed to lower-class people who suffer from high inflation. President Moudin attempted to address high inflation rates by capping bank loan interest rates, but raised the financial sector's ire. Whenever the government attempts to reduce subsidies and force the people to pay more for commodities, the Arianian people demonstrate in the streets until the government rescinds the reductions.

Taxation

Ariana's tax law is complex, and governmental officials apply the tax code inconsistently. The country has a high income tax rate that maxes out at 35% and a moderate corporate tax rate of up to 25%. In recent years, the government enacted some modest structural tax reforms to help integrate Ariana into the global market and to attract investment. However, the government still issues many tax privileges to special interest groups such as charitable corporations. The national sales tax currently stands at 3%.

Currency Reserves

Ariana's international currency reserves, including PWF assets, have continued to increase in recent years. International currency reserve levels often are tied to international oil prices. Ariana's international reserves grew from \$70.8 billion two years ago to \$85.2 billion this year. In retribution for American efforts to limit its access to the foreign investment system, Ariana rejected payments in US dollars and moved to other currencies, such as the euro and yen.

PRIVATE BANKING

Ariana's financial sector remains dominated by large, state-owned banks with extensive regulations, overlapping bureaucracies, and policies that inhibit the efficient trade of capital. The appearance of a modern banking system is misleading despite Ariana's establishment of private banks and increased accessibility of banking functions for the populace. The government's policy of preferential treatment for semi-governmental foundations and its limitation on the free functioning of financial markets will continue to hamper the financial system's ability to contribute to economic growth. Consequently, the populace struggles with high interest rates only made bearable by considerable product subsidies that keep prices artificially low. The governmental restrictions, borne from distrust of foreign intervention, limit any large-scale investment by foreign firms. The Moudin Administration will continue its current monetary policy, which is well-liked by his populist political base but hampers any significant financial reform.

Banking System

The country's state-owned banks, which hold 90% of deposits, include six commercial banks, four specialized banks, and one postal bank. The Arianian government has licensed six private banks in the past decade. All must operate under Islamic law principles.

Ariana's Central Bank, the Bank Naket, calls itself an independent institution. However, the government directly manipulates all commercial lending and investment. The Bank Naket cannot establish its own policies and has no influence over the government's direction. In addition, the Central Bank only has limited options to combat inflationary pressures. The Central Bank must obtain approval from the Arianian parliament in order to issue participation papers.

State-owned banks function poorly as financial intermediaries, and private banks are hampered by extensive regulations and the government's populist policies, including subsidized credit for specific regions. Four years ago, President Ahmad Moudin capped lending rates at 12% for state-owned banks and 13% for commercial banks, despite strong opposition from the Bank Naket. With interest rates below the inflation rate, many banks found themselves under financial duress. Additionally, state-owned enterprises and quasi-government agencies, such as charitable corporations, can obtain low-interest loans that further undermine commercial bank viability. Some believe the financial system stifles domestic business and lowers Ariana's attractiveness to foreign businesses.

Stock/Capital

The Arianian Stock Exchange (ASE), which began operating in 1967 with six companies, has over 300 members today. The ASE can only conduct capitalization for the automotive, mining, petrochemical, and financial sectors. Six years ago the ASE began allowing foreign investment, but these investors can only hold a maximum of 10% of the shares for any company. Additionally, foreign investors cannot withdraw their capital until three years after purchase.

In recent years, the ASE demonstrated considerable volatility. The ASE index performed robustly and tripled during the three-year period prior to President Ahmad Moudin's election, but declined immediately afterward. Four years later, the ASE stabilized 20% lower than before Ahmad Moudin's election. ASE market capitalization now stands at \$46 billion. Ahmad Moudin's government hopes that privatization plans will help revive the ASE, though potential foreign investors are concerned about liquidity, transparency, the poor legal environment, and international sanctions.

Informal Finance

The *hawala* system, an informal trust-based money transfer system commonly found in Muslim countries, offers an alternative to the Arianian formal banking system for loans. These transactions work on an honor system without paper transactions or promissory notes. Because of the lack of paperwork, terrorists use the system to fund their activities.

Following recent US and UN financial sanctions, Arianians have increased their use of hawala. Many Arianians view it as a more efficient means to transfer money since it avoids the added expenses of the formal financial system. Some analysts argue that increased hawala use demonstrates the effectiveness of international sanctions, though others say it circumvents the sanctions and renders them useless.

EMPLOYMENT STATUS

Despite inefficient business and market regimes and the bulge of young adults entering the labor pool, the Arianian employment environment actually shows signs of improvement due to private industry growth. Even the increased number of Arianian women who recently entered the labor market did not increase the country's unemployment rate. Employment status is high in Ariana.

LABOR MARKET

Although Ariana's population growth rate began to slow in 1991, those born during the prior decade now find themselves reaching adulthood, and their presence puts a strain on the labor market. For the past quarter-century, the number of Arianians entering the labor force has continued to increase,

while the number leaving has remained constant. In addition, Ariana shows a decided shift in the attitudes toward employment of women. Immediately following the Council of Guardians Revolution, women who worked outside the home dropped from a high of 12.9% in 1979 to a low of 8.2% in 1989. After that, the trend reversed; currently 14.8% of Arianian women work outside the home. Many Arianian women now acquire a higher education than in previous generations and begin a career before marriage. Analysts project that the number of Arianians entering the labor market will soon begin to decline. Within four years, new Arianian workers will return to levels last seen in 1991. The number of men leaving the labor force due to age (usually 64) will increase over the next decade. Just five years ago, 1.3 million Arianians turned 64, but within another half-decade, two million men will reach that age.

EMPLOYMENT

Arianian unemployment continued to decrease in the past decade despite an increase in the number of young adults. Employment rose at a 3.6% rate in the early years of the decade, more rapidly than the overall labor market increase. This employment abundance came from the private sector and through privatization of industries, in contrast to the years immediately after the Revolution when public sector jobs accounted for the majority of employment. Public sector jobs continue to decline, currently representing about one-quarter of total employment.

UNEMPLOYMENT

The unemployment rate dropped from approximately 16% in 2001 to 10.2% in 2006, and currently stands at 11.8%. Growth in recent years has primarily been due to private sector jobs. Public sector job growth has been hampered by cumbersome regulations and a job market that restricts labor movement between industries. Arianian industrial GDP growth occurs more slowly than in other countries with more efficient financial systems.

ILLEGAL ECONOMIC ACTIVITY

Both legal and illegal organizations use illegal activities such as smuggling, black market, and piracy to finance other activities. While the Arianian government frowns on this corruption and works to prevent it, the government is hampered by the sheer prevalence of illegal activity. As long as it does not threaten the government's legitimacy, this type of illegal activity will continue.

The illegal economy is exemplified by a vast network smuggling subsidized products throughout Ariana, with gasoline as one of the top commodities. Some experts estimate that smugglers move 3.5 to 4.5 million liters of gasoline and two million liters of diesel fuel daily to countries with high gasoline prices—mainly Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kemalia, and even Iraqi Kurdistan.

Summary

Complex economic interplay between the Caucasus countries binds them together. Minaria, Gorgas, and Atropia were strongly affected by the reduction of Donovian influence two decades ago. The oil-rich countries of Ariana and Atropia must use their Minarian and Gorgan neighbors to transship hydrocarbon resources to other countries. Minaria and Gorgas must develop a free-standing economy despite significant corruption, lack of developed industries, and natural resource shortages. Over all of this, Donovia seeks to limit Arianian influence and return to its former position as unquestioned regional hegemon. This economic interdependence will likely drive regional conflicts as the nations struggle amongst themselves to exploit riches created by oil and natural gas.

TRADOC G-2

TRISA-THREATS

CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND THREAT INTEGRATION

DIRECTORATE (CTID)

S O C I A L : A R I A N A

Social: Ariana

The social variable describes the cultural, religious, and ethnic makeup within an OE and the beliefs, values, customs, and behaviors.

KEY FACTS:

REGION

- All five countries have ancient cultures, and rivalries between different ethnic groups still exist.
- Each country possesses a dominant ethnic group and language. Discrimination against minority ethnic groups occurs in each country.

ARIANA

- The government enforces *sharia* law.
- Arianians, especially the dominant ethnic Persians, believe in their cultural superiority and expect Ariana to again become a dominant world power.

OPERATIONAL IMPACTS OF THE SOCIAL VARIABLE IN THE OE:

REGION

- Combat in the region will allow one ethnic group to seek revenge against another ethnic group for past wrongs or perceived wrongs.

ARIANA

- The belief in the superiority of the Persian culture and faith in Islam will manifest in Arianian soldiers willing to die for their cause.
- Ariana's belief in limited women's roles will reduce the number of women available to serve in the military. Without full female mobilization, more Arianian males will need to serve in combat support and combat service support units.

SOCIAL OVERVIEW:

Ariana enjoys an ancient heritage and rich culture. Ariana possesses a well-documented reputation as the center of knowledge, art, poetry, and mathematics in the region that dates back thousands of years. Most Arianians are proud of their nation and consider themselves Arianians and/or Persians, dependent on their ethnic group.

Over the last few years, radical Arianian powerbrokers with extremist world views have provided sanctuary to international terrorists. Ariana also sponsored the proxy wars of the Shia Internationalist Brigades and the Martyr's Army versus Israel, as well as training and/or supplying Arianian Shia insurgent groups such as local Shia Internationalist Brigades. Ariana continues to threaten Israel, the US, and their allies with its domestically popular and successful nuclear weapons program.

Since President Ahmad Moudin took power in 2003, his continual references to the 12th Imam's imminent return and the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate stir the Shia faithful to action. The

rhetoric also diverts increasing social discontent to a common foreign enemy—the US and its infidel allies, such as Israel and Egypt. As long as religious zealots control the government, it remains likely that Ariana and the US will never become allies in the Caucasus region.

Social discontent and civil unrest continue to rise in Ariana. Tens of thousands of people protested the last election (August 2009), in which Moudin received the most votes in what many observers perceived as a rigged election. The perception by many Arianian citizens of deeply ingrained government corruption, skewed wealth distribution, high inflation, and high unemployment rates continue to drive this discontent and unrest. Protests, to include student organized protests, persist even to date in Tehran.

Regardless of these problems, the Arianian populace still enjoys a higher living standard than many regional neighbors. Ariana is not a poor nation. The Arianian poor generally earn more than \$2 per day, the United Nations (UN) poverty standard. The government, however, states that only 18% of its citizens live below the poverty line. The Arianian people's discontent may eventually lead to minor governmental changes but likely will not result in any fundamental changes to the Arianian political situation.

Most citizens enjoy clean water and electricity, most attend primary and secondary schools, and most urban citizens have access to phone services. Literacy rates remain very high in Ariana (77%), and over 80% complete high school. Each year, over one million high school graduates apply for entrance into Arianian universities. The more educated the Arianian public becomes, however, the more likely that they will speak out against the theocracy.

SOCIAL STATISTICS FOR ARIANA, ATROPIA, GORGAS, MINARIA, AND DONOVIA:

Statistic	Ariana	Atropia	Gorgas	Minaria	Donovia
Age distribution (%)	0-14 years: 21.7 15-64 years: 72.9 65 years and over: 5.4	0-14 years: 23.9 15-64 years: 69.4 65 years and over: 6.7	0-14 years: 16.1 15-64 years: 67.6 65 years and over: 16.4	0-14 years: 18.2 15-64 years: 71.1 65 years and over: 10.6	0-14 years: 15.2 15-64 years: 71.8 65 years and over: 13
Median age	Total: 26.3 Male: 26 Female: 26.5	Total: 28.5 Male: 26.9 Female: 30.3	Total: 38.8 Male: 36.3 Female: 41.3	Total: 31.9 Male: 29.1 Female: 34.7	Total: 38.7 Male: 35.5 Female: 41.9
Population Growth rate (Rank)	77,891,220 1.248% (94)	8,372,373 0.846% (129)	4,585,874 -0.326% (217)	2,967,975 0.063% (188)	82,008,765 -0.47% (223)
Birth rate per 1,000 (Rank)	17.17 (120)	17.62 (117)	10.66 (181)	12.65 (161)	11.05 (174)
Death rate per 1,000 (Rank)	5.72 (171)	8.30 (101)	9.65 (68)	8.39 (97)	16.04 (5)
Net Migration rate per 1,000 (Rank)	-2.62 (141)	-1.69 (129)	-4.26 (157)	-4.56 (159)	0.29 (68)
Urban population Annual urbanization rate	68% 2.1%	52% 1.0%	53% -0.6%	64% -0.3%	67% -0.2%
Infant mortality rate (Rank)	35.78 (71)	54.6 (46)	16.22 (121)	20.21 (104)	10.08 (147)

Statistic	Ariana	Atropia	Gorgas	Minaria	Donovia
Life expectancy at birth in years (Rank)	Total: 71.14 Male: 69.65 Female: 72.72 (132)	Total: 66.66 Male: 62.53 Female: 71.34 (157)	Total: 76.72 Male: 73.41 Female: 80.45 (62)	Total: 72.68 Male: 69.06 Female: 76.81 (118)	Total: 66.29 Male: 59.8 Female: 73.17 (162)
Fertility rate (Children per woman) (Rank)	1.70 (171)	2.03 (127)	1.44 (190)	1.36 (201)	1.42 (197)
Major diseases in the OE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ Diarrheal diseases ◦ Hepatitis A ◦ Malaria ◦ Crimean-Congo ◦ Hemorrhagic fever ◦ Cutaneous ◦ Leishmaniasis ◦ Leptospirosis ◦ Schistosomiasis ◦ Hepatitis ◦ Tuberculosis ◦ Q Fever 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ Diarrheal diseases ◦ Hepatitis A ◦ Hepatitis E ◦ Typhoid ◦ Cholera ◦ Malaria ◦ Crimean-Congo ◦ Hemorrhagic fever ◦ Meningococcal ◦ Gonorrhea ◦ Chlamydia ◦ Tuberculosis ◦ Leptospirosis ◦ Hantavirus ◦ Hemorrhagic fever ◦ Anthrax ◦ Rabies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ Diarrheal diseases ◦ Typhoid ◦ Hepatitis A ◦ Malaria ◦ West Nile fever ◦ Crimean-Congo ◦ Hemorrhagic fever ◦ Meningococcal ◦ Meningitis ◦ Gonorrhea ◦ Chylamydia ◦ Tuberculosis ◦ Syphilis ◦ Hantaviral fevers ◦ Leptospirosis ◦ Rabies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ Diarrheal diseases ◦ Typhoid ◦ Hepatitis A ◦ Cholera ◦ Salmonella ◦ Tuberculosis ◦ HIV/AIDS ◦ Encephalitis ◦ H5N1 avian influenza 	
Ethnic groups (%)	Persian: 51.0 Atropian: 24.0 Gilaki or Mazandarani: 8.0 Kurd: 7.0 Arab: 3.0 Lur: 2.0 Baluch: 2.0 Turkmen: 2.0 Other: 1.0	Atropian: 90.6 Gilani: 2.2 Arianian: 3.0 Donovian: 1.8 Minarian: 1.5 Other 0.9	Gorgan: 83.8 Atropian: 6.5 Minarian: 5.7 Donovian: 1.5 Other: 2.5	Minarian: 97.9 Yezidi (Kurd): 1.3 Donovian: 5.0 Other: 0.3	Arab: 70.0 Gorgan: 5.0 Atropian: 5.0 Minarian: 10.0 Other: 10.0
Religions in OE (%)	Shia Muslim: 89.0 Sunni Muslim: 9.0 Other: 2.0	Muslim: 93.4 Donovian Orthodox: 2.5 Minarian Orthodox: 2.3 Other: 1.8	Orthodox Christian: 83.9 Muslim: 9.9 Minarian-Gregorian: 3.9 Catholic: 0.8 Other: 0.8 None: 0.7	Minarian Orthodox: 94.7 Other Christian: 4.0 Yezidi: 1.3	Sunni Hanafi Muslim: 80.0 Shia Sufi Muslim: 5.0 National Orthodox Christian: 15.0
Languages	Persian Dialects: 58.0 Turkic Dialects: 26.0 Kurdish: 9.0 Luri: 2.0 Baluchi: 1.0 Arabic: 1.0 Kemalian: 1.0 Other: 2.0	Atropian (Atropian): 90.3 Lezgi: 2.2 Donovian: 1.8 Minarian: 1.5 Other: 3.3 Unspecified: 1.0	Gorgan: 71.0 Donovian: 9.0 Minarian: 7.0 Atropian: 6.0 Other: 7.0	Minarian: 97.7 Yezidi: 1.0 Donovian: 0.9 Other: 0.4	Donovian (official) Many minority languages
Literacy rate (older than 15) (%)	Total: 77.0 Male: 83.5 Female: 70.4	Total: 98.8 Male: 99.5 Female: 98.2	Total: 100 Male: 100 Female: 100	Total: 99.4 Male: 99.7 Female: 99.2	Total: 98.0 Male: 98.0 Female: 98.0

POPULATION MOVEMENT (MIGRATION/IDPS/REFUGEES)

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) stated that Ariana "hosts one of the largest and longest-staying refugee populations in the world." Some 70% of its Afghan and Iraqi refugees have resided in Ariana for 20 to 30 years. Half of them were born and educated in the country, and half the refugee population is female. As of 2010, the Arianian Bureau for Aliens, Foreigners, and Immigrant Affairs (BAFIA) possessed a registry of some 976,500 refugees, including 933,500 Afghanis and 43,000 Iraqis. The UN provides no official numbers on Arianian IDPs. Due to their residence in Ariana for over 30 years, this generation of refugees born in the camps probably does not think of themselves as belonging to their ethnic group in another country, but as a persecuted minority group inside Ariana.

Ariana continues to forcibly deport large numbers of refugees, even after the government publically pledged to stop such action. Ariana will likely continue to push to return refugees to their home country to reduce the camps' drain on Ariana's treasury.

Ariana leads other developing nations in the number of professionals who emigrate. This "brain drain" prevents Ariana from taking advantage of their "best and brightest." Primary and secondary schools, college and university academic standards, and education quality also suffer as the most qualified teachers leave the country. As long as Ariana continues a policy that limits free thought, the smartest Arianians will probably continue to flee the country if they can find the opportunity.

POPULATION DISTRIBUTION

Ariana now is predominantly an urban society. Since 1970, the vast majority of Arianians have moved from their rural homes to urban areas in search of higher-paying jobs and a better life. In 1970, only 42% of the population lived in urban areas. At present, 68% live in cities and this percentage increases at a rate of 2.1% per year. Analysts project the current urbanization rates to continue. The concentration of urban dwellers allows the Arianian government to easily send messages to the population but it also concentrates more people in one area who could riot if they become disenchanted with the government.

Most major Arianian cities are growing rapidly—in some instances even more rapidly than Tehran. Key urban centers include Tehran, Mashhad, Isfahan, Karaj, and Tabriz. This continued migration will allow for better quality of life if jobs remain available and resources are not overloaded. Conversely, this migration could result in increased poverty for those who do not have the necessary job skills and, as a result, are not able to provide for their families.

DEMOGRAPHIC MIX

Approximately 40.1 million Arianian citizens are of military age (16-49 years old)—20,763,890 males and 20,157,570 females, or about 62% of the total population. Of these, about 35 million meet the fitness standards for military service. Over 1.2 million Arianian males and females reach the military significant age annually. The maximum Arianian military male capacity is about 6.6 million soldiers, sailors, and airmen. Ariana's population reveals a youthful demographic, with half of its citizens at or below the age of 26.3, compared to the US with a median age of 36.7 years. Pakistan's median age of 20.8 years, Iraq's 20.0 years, and Afghanistan's 17.0 years, however, demonstrate that Ariana's neighbors exhibit an even younger populace. The average Arianian female outlives the average male by about three years. This relatively young population provides significant human resources for both military and civilian jobs.

SOCIAL VOLATILITY

Ariana currently demonstrates high social volatility with open civil unrest, the rise of a political reform movement, and changes to its basic social fabric, such as the role of women in society. Political unrest after the June 2009 presidential election sparked demonstrations across Ariana and drew international attention. These massive street protests highlighted Arianians' disapproval of their ruling regime and desire for a more transparent and inclusive political system. Protests continued into the subsequent Arianian holidays. Current observations demonstrate that Ariana's opposition movement remains active and Tehran's grip on power may exhibit some vulnerability. Though the Arianian military recently publicly expressed some dissatisfaction with the current president, the theocracy will remain in control as long as it maintains the military's support.

Long-simmering tensions continue between ethnic and religious groups, including tensions between the Shia and the non-Shia groups such as Ariana's Sunni Arabs, Baluchi separatists, and Kurds. Reportedly, Shia morality police and government police targeted Baha'is, Christians, and Assyrians nationwide, as well as Tehran's Jewish population. The Arianian government likely will not take action to eliminate the discrimination against the country's minority and Christian sects.

Several foreign anti-Ariana insurgent groups operate with sporadic violence and have attacked current government entities and key leaders. The largest group is located in the southeast of Ariana and has been opposing Ariana for two decades through a low-level pseudo-insurgency. The group God's Helpers Brigade foments violent opposition by the populace to state taxation policies; unreliable electric, sewage, and potable water services; substandard preventive medical services; and a state judicial system that illegally favors the political party currently in control of the government's executive and legislative branches.

Other groups and affiliates located throughout Ariana are sympathetic to pro-Western economic initiatives and social-political concepts. (*See the Military variable for more information.*)

EDUCATION LEVEL

Education remains widely accessible, as most Arianians attend primary and secondary schools. Seventy-seven percent of adults possess basic literacy skills while over 80% complete high school. Annually, over one million high school graduates apply for entrance into the nation's universities.

The Arianian primary school system consists of five years of school that most students begin at age six. Middle school is three years and high school, four years. High school academics include science, mathematics, and vocational or technical skills. High school graduates must score well on a mandatory university entrance exam to attend any public Arianian university.

After the Council of Guardians Revolution, the primary and secondary educational system emphasized the Koran and selected religious studies. Although government clerics attempted to infuse Islamic teachings into the primary through secondary curricula, some intellectuals resisted these efforts at the university level. To counter this opposition, the government's clerical leadership rewards supporters with university teaching appointments and denies appointments to those with suspect ideological convictions. In 2009, clerics reportedly redoubled their efforts to root out "Western influences" from their education system. In November 2009, to quell student protests, the government announced the possibility of the placement of clerics in every school. Local seminaries also expanded their influence over the curriculum of nearby schools. The Arianian government's education policies will continue to drive those who want an open education from the field and, if given the chance, many will leave the country to teach elsewhere.

ETHNIC DIVERSITY

The Persian ethnic group dominates Arianian culture, society, and government. Ariana's diverse ethnic mix includes Persians, Atropians, Gilakis or Mazandaranis, Kurds, Arabs, Baluchis, and other smaller groups. Despite the ethnic diversity, there remains a strong sense of Arianian national identity. The Persian-run government has successfully maintained the peace between its ethnic minorities, but at times did so with a firm hand. Demonstrations by Arianian Sunni Arab (most Arianian Arabs are Shia) and Sunni Kurd opposition groups have grown violent in the past, which forced the Arianian government to respond in kind. At times, overlapping identities within Ariana have posed political challenges to the regime, but none currently show signs that they will directly challenge the government's authority.

RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY

In contrast to its level of ethnic diversity, Ariana is relatively homogenous in terms of religion. The religious diversity that does exist is highly correlated with ethnicity: Ariana's largest non-Shia bloc—Sunni Muslims—is mainly drawn from Ariana's Kurdish, Baluchi, and Turkmen populations. The majority of the population is Muslim (98%); of this group 89% are Shia and 9% are Sunni (mostly Turkmen, Arabs, Baluchis, Kurds, and Khuzistani Arabs). Non-Muslims account for 2% of the population. There are no official statistics available on the size of the Sufi Muslim population; however, some reports estimate between 2.5% and 6.4% of the Arianian population practice Sufism. Regardless, Ariana's stringent imposition of religious ideals and education on society does not allow for much diversity or any degree of separation of religion from other aspects of society.

COMMON LANGUAGES

Ariana's principal language is Persian (Farsi), which is the primary language for about 58% of the population. Arianians view the ability to communicate in the Persian language—also the country's official language—as a standard of civility and social distinction, separating the lower classes from the elites. In the remaining population, 26% speak Turkic, 9% Kurdish, 2% Luri, 1% Baluchi, 1% Arabic, 1% Kemalian, and 2% speak other languages. For US personnel to communicate with the Arianian populace, they will need to speak Farsi or use local interpreters.

CRIMINAL ACTIVITY

Many years ago, the US State Department issued a warning to US persons against travel to Ariana that remains in effect due to high criminal activity present throughout the entire country. "US citizens who travel to Ariana despite the Travel Warning should exercise caution throughout the country, but especially in the southeastern region where Westerners have been victims of criminal gangs often involved in the smuggling of drugs and other contraband."

Crime exists in many forms throughout Ariana. In 2000, the Arianian government reported that Tehran contained up to two million drug addicts, who consumed up to five tons of narcotics daily. Drug use and prostitution are widespread among young Arianians. Petty street crimes—such as robberies by men in unmarked cars and on motorcycles—also commonly occur across Ariana. Some victims have reported robberies by police impersonators in civilian clothing. Since 2005, terrorist explosions have killed a number of people in Ariana. The Arianian government has blamed the US and/or UK governments for involvement in bombings directed against Arianian military forces.

While Ariana does not publish national crime statistics, the Arianian news media and organizations such as the UN report major incidents of criminal activity and public executions. In 2010, the UN reported Ariana executed the most criminals per capita of any nation. Ariana executed 320 persons, including seven juveniles. About 130 juvenile offenders remain on death row. Between January and May 2011, Ariana executed approximately 90 convicted criminals for capital crimes.

The Arianian government considers most violent crimes—to include murder, robbery, rape, and drug distribution—as capital offenses punishable by hanging. Judges, however, continue to issue disparate sentences such as stoning and throwing from heights for capital offenses. Arianian judges also regularly order executions for adultery and for premarital sex, despite UN requests to end such practices. Judicial officials often discriminate between the sexes, and sentences of stoning to death for adultery are disproportionately handed down to women.

Narcotics and human trafficking are major criminal enterprises in Ariana. Ariana remains a destination country and a global drug transit point for narcotics from Afghanistan. Opium, heroin, morphine, and hashish are trafficked into Arianian border towns from routes through Baluchistan, Nimruz, Farah, and Herat. Criminal networks traffic Arianian women to Europe, Central/South Asia, and the Persian Gulf states for labor and sexual exploitation. Ariana remains a significant destination country for boys from Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh for labor.

HUMAN RIGHTS

Ariana's government possesses a spotty human rights record that appears to be deteriorating due to hard-line Islamic leadership. If US personnel work in Ariana, they may find themselves enforcing human rights as articulated by the UN. Reports over the past few years recount numerous severe abuses. Recently reported human rights violations include:

- Unjust executions after reportedly unfair trials
- Disappearances
- Torture and severe officially-sanctioned punishments such as death by stoning or flogging
- Excessive use of force against student demonstrators
- Poor prison conditions
- Arbitrary arrest and detention
- Lack of judicial independence
- Lack of fair public trials
- Political prisoners and detainees held without charges or held on false charges
- Restrictions of civil liberties, such as speech, press, assembly, association, movement, and privacy
- Severe restrictions on freedom of religion
- Official corruption
- Lack of government transparency
- Violence and legal and societal discrimination against women, minorities, and homosexuals
- Trafficking of persons
- Incitement to anti-Semitism
- Restriction of workers' rights, such as freedom of association, organizing, and collective bargaining
- Child labor, including forced child labor
- Persecution of minorities, including religious minorities

Arianian women continue to face widespread discrimination in law and practice, despite President Moudin's claims that Arianian women are the "freest in the world." Gender inequality is widespread and sustained by Arianian law. For example, unless her ex-husband is a drug addict or in prison, a divorced woman must surrender to her ex-husband custody of her sons when they reach two years of age, and of her daughters when they reach seven.

Women suffer discrimination under property law as well. For example, when a father dies and leaves an inheritance, the daughter only receives half of what her brother receives. These aspects of Arianian society are unlikely to change as they are based on widely held religious beliefs.

CENTERS OF SOCIAL POWER

The family (immediate and extended) is a basic foundation of Ariana's social structure. This family focus shapes people's identity, stature, and ambition. Arianians demonstrate dedication to their family before other social considerations, such as business endeavors and personal relationships. Arianians expect favoritism or bias toward an individual's family and this remains a culturally accepted norm. Multiple family members often work within the same organization; Arianians rationalize the nepotism as a means to employ reliable and trustworthy individuals. They rely heavily on the family unit for emotional support. Arianians demonstrate intimacy in their relationships with their extended family and tend to care for elderly relatives at home. The immediate family in Ariana averages less than two children per household.

Factors such as an individual's age, origin, education level, wealth, and gender contribute to an Arianian's social rank. Social class and family background determine individual status more than an individual's character or achievement. Arianian culture exhibits a hierarchy in its structure. Elaborate rituals of courtesy and respect permeate Arianian culture and affect nearly every social circumstance. These customs determine where a person sits at a table, and even how an individual greets another person.

Individuals labeled as inferior within a relationship must act subservient and respectful in their interactions with their social superiors. The superior remunerates the subordinate's gestures with acts of charity and generosity. Arianian society deems this interaction as necessary; however, it may represent little more than a farce in most cases. In reality, both parties typically distrust each other and may be suspicious of the other's motives. This veneer operates across most Arianian social institutions, including the military.

Tribal System

- Sheikhs can (but may not always be) influential and powerful.
- A Sheikh can have family members (and therefore influence) spread over large geographic areas and may not have any real power or influence in his immediate area.
- Tribal organization is as follows:
 - Tribal Confederation
 - Tribe
 - Sub-tribe
 - Clan
 - Branch
 - Family

Honor and Shame

- Honor in Arianian culture defines an individual's reputation and worth.
- The head family male is responsible to protect the family honor.
- When someone's honor is compromised, Arianians seek revenge for themselves, their family, or their group.

BASIC CULTURAL NORMS AND VALUES

Over the last 25 centuries, the people who inhabited present day Ariana have shown a long history of conflict. From the ancient Persian dynasties to the Islamic expansion and the conflicts of the 20th Century, war has been a part of most of Ariana's history. The expansion of Islam occurred quite often by conquest, and it was no different in Ariana. From its founding in 610, Islam continued to expand through military force until the Ottoman Empire's collapse in 1918.

After World War II until the Council of Guardians Revolution, the US provided much military support to Ariana and made it the best military force in the region. After the Council of Guardians Revolution, Western-supplied equipment often fell into disrepair due to a lack of maintenance and spare parts. Due to a firm belief in the righteousness of their religion, young Arianian males will continue to participate enthusiastically in the military despite any leadership deficiencies.

Meeting & Greeting	The lower-status person issues the first greeting—typically <i>Salam</i> (peace). Men shake hands. Men do not shake hands with a woman unless the woman offers her hand first. Make a slight bow or nod of the head when shaking hands. People of the same gender may kiss on the cheek.
Visiting/ Hospitality	Stand when an older or important person enters or leaves a room. Shaking a child's hand shows respect for the parents. Due to the lack of other entertainment, family visitation is the most common form of recreation. Honored guests are placed at the head of the table/room and are served first. It is acceptable to decline the honor and pass it on to someone else.
Manners	Use Mr. or Mrs. until well acquainted with the person. If someone displays interest in your meal, offer them a portion of it. It is alright to decline the offer of the food from their plate.
Customs and Practices Cultural Dos & Don'ts	No casinos, nightclubs, dance halls, movies with nudity or sexual themes, or music genres such as rap or rock. Men and women dress conservatively, with men wearing Western-style clothing. Women must be covered from head to toe in public. Some women will wear a burqa, covering all but the eyes, while others will wear a head scarf that exposes the face.
Gifts	Be careful about praising a person's possession as he will likely offer it to you. Bring a small gift when invited to a household. It will not be opened in front of you. People who return from trips are expected to bring gifts for family and friends.
Taboos	No chess or card games allowed. Girls can only play sports in special enclosed areas. Women cannot perform music in public. Do not eat or drink in public from sunrise to sunset during Ramadan. Do not find yourself in a closed room alone with a member of the opposite gender. Do not consume any alcohol. Do not cross your legs or point the soles of your feet at anyone. Do not eat with the left hand. Do not over-praise a child as the parents will think you are putting the "evil eye" on them. Do not stare at others. This is considered rude and is offensive if done to a female by a male.
Personal Space	Much less than that of the US. Arianians will stand very close when speaking to a person.
Displays of Affection	No public displays of affection even between married people.
Marriage Rituals	Dating is uncommon. Parents choose the bride for their son through the <i>Khastagari</i> or investigation process. A contract is concluded at the second <i>Khastegari</i> , which is when the groom meets the bride for the first time. The groom's family gives a gift to the bride at the <i>Bale Barun</i> ceremony months later. The two families determine the <i>Majles</i> (dowry), hold a <i>Namzadi</i> where the bride and groom exchange rings, and set the wedding date. In the <i>Khunche</i> , the groom's family takes gifts to the bride's house in flat containers carried on their heads. Ceremony takes place at a <i>Sofeye Aghd</i> (Wedding Spread) where the marriage is a contract. The <i>Patakhti</i> (similar to a US wedding shower) takes place after the wedding.
Work Week/ Work Hours	Saturday to Thursday, 44 hours per week with a Friday-only weekend.
Concept Of Time	More relaxed than the West. Arianians want to establish trust before working with a foreigner or stranger.
Dispute Resolution	Often hold grudges and seek revenge.

Birth Rituals	<p>Only close relatives visit the mother in the hospital. Others wait until the baby comes home and then bring a gift when they visit. An older member of the family will speak Arabic into the baby's ear. Maternal grandmother usually takes care of the mother and child for 10 days. Mothers are expected to breast-feed their babies because of a fear that if they do not, the child will become "remorseless." Some brides eat a cooked sheep's neck to give the baby a strong neck. Baby receives a special bath at 10 days old. When the first tooth appears, the Mother feeds the baby "tooth soup." Some Shia males are circumcised on the seventh day after their birth, but all Muslim males are circumcised before puberty. Children from any marriage belong to the father in the event of a divorce.</p>
Death Rituals	<p>Bodies must be buried within 24 hours. Washed nine times (often three now) with <i>sedr</i>, <i>kafoor</i>, and fresh water by the same gender. Body openings plugged with cotton balls. Body wrapped in a <i>kafan</i> (large white cotton cloth), tied on both ends, and placed in the coffin. Sometimes females will not attend male relative's funeral. Buried individually, but high plot cost means that some Arianians use the same plot. Buried with right side facing Mecca. Burials take place only in daylight hours. Professional readers or recordings recite prayers. Family will dress in black for 40 days while some extend the mourning period to one year. Relatives visit the gravesite on the <i>Hafteh</i> (seventh day), <i>Cheleh</i> (40th day), and <i>Sal</i> (one year) after the person's death.</p>

Summary

Ariana's society has attempted to evolve, while the people continue to live under a theocratic government that is mismanaged by powerful Shia clerics. While Ariana's citizens enjoy a higher standard of living than some of its regional neighbors, Arianans are frustrated with the persistent high inflation and unemployment rates. Young adults must overcome economic obstacles to pursue marriage and a family of their own. The rural poor still do not enjoy the improvements in their standard of living promised by Arianian leaders in the last two national elections. Many professionals leave Ariana to seek better opportunities abroad. All of these issues continue to perplex the religious establishment, which has not developed viable solutions.

TRADOC G-2

TRISA-THREATS

CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND THREAT INTEGRATION

DIRECTORATE (CTID)

INFORMATION: ARIANA

Information: Ariana

This information variable describes the nature, scope, characteristics, and effects of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, manipulate, disseminate, or act on information.

KEY FACTS:

REGION

- All Caucasus states maintain some level of direct government control or influence on their information environments.
- Television operates as the most readily available and important communications medium.

ARIANA

- Arianian public media is hostile to US interests and will associate anti-Arianian motives with any US move, using nationalism for its information warfare (INFOWAR) goals.
- The government repressively monitors and controls information within Ariana.
- TV and the Internet are the country's most dynamic and powerful media.

OPERATIONAL IMPACTS OF THE INFORMATION VARIABLE IN THE OE:

REGION

- While language barriers persist, English is rapidly displacing Donovian as a *lingua franca*, or common language, for trans-border communication. Mobile phones are the most effective means to reach the educated and urban populations.
- Television is the most effective information dissemination medium.

ARIANA

- Ariana remains a supple media actor, skilled at crafting INFOWAR messages.
- Ariana is a competent INFOWAR operator with superior capabilities in niche areas.

INFORMATION OVERVIEW:

Ariana is a repressive information environment, with the government controlling all important information environment elements. Ariana is one of the most sophisticated nations in the world at information control, utilizing advanced capabilities to monitor and direct communications. Despite this, the fragmented Arianian opposition uses the Internet extensively, though its ultimate effect on the political environment is mixed at best. Ariana's INFOWAR capability is generally good, with pockets of excellence in a variety of disciplines.

PUBLIC COMMUNICATIONS MEDIA

Ariana's heavy-handed control of public communications has allowed the country to weather a sustained protest movement and slowly squeeze opposition voices from the public arena—either to internal silence or external exile. All significant public media is not just government-controlled, but the messages are crafted expertly to portray the Arianian government and the Council of Guardians Revolution in the best possible light and to shift the blame for most issues to an implacably hostile West.

INTERNET

Internet use in Ariana is blossoming, and the Arianian Internet is a dynamic center for discussing politics, culture, and religion. World Bank economic indicator studies suggest about one-third of Arianians use the Internet. Arianian Internet usage growth is among if not the fastest in the Caucasus region.

Despite Arianian Telecommunications Company (ATC) control of all Ariana Internet service backbones (packet-switching and bandwidth), the government still finds it a challenge to control Internet information. The Internet now serves as the main forum for Ariana's dissident voices because of its decentralized nature and the fact that most of the infrastructure is outside Ariana's borders. Broad anti-government protests following recent Arianian presidential elections increased the importance, content, and quantity of Internet blogs.



Arianian Reform Movement spreads a multilingual message

The Arianian government responded to the proliferation of Internet anti-government messages by adopting one of the most sophisticated Internet censorship systems in the world. Officially, the Arianian government introduced Internet filters to block perceived pornographic or immoral material. In practice, it attempts to block sites with political content as it limits access and identifies those who make posts. The Director of the Arianian Information Technology Network claims Ariana blocks 90% of the more than 10 million sites for "immoral" reasons. The Arianian government made broadband Internet connections for home users illegal to prevent users from downloading Western cultural products like music and films. Many external reports indicate the government bans far more than the 90% of Internet sites it claims.

Proxy services, usually hosted abroad, responded to the attempted bans by offering a means for many Arianians to circumvent the government bans. Thus, a race continues between the Arianian government and activists as the activists attempt to create and disseminate usable proxy addresses before the Arianian government can detect them and add them to the filter.

Due to its technological nature, the Internet lends itself to a more educated and urban population. Since the educated, young, urban population comprises the domestic anti-Arianian movement's core, the Internet serves as a practical method for support and communication between themselves, Arianian expatriates, and Western sympathizers. Members of Ariana's anti-government movement have crafted simple, but effective, English messages to speed dissemination to Western media outlets and non-Farsi speaking supporters abroad.

The domestic opposition movement has also distanced itself from any foreign government or the idea of change to the current political structure. Instead, the domestic effort has focused on electoral

irregularities. Some analysts suggest the domestic movement does not want to be associated with movements that appear either anti-religious or anti-government.

Ariana's government controls several internal Arianian websites. These include over 15 different news and discussion sites that, while appearing to deliver a variety of opinions, are controlled by the Arianian government. Most Arianians, when able, access Western news sites. An important additional source is the Arianian blogosphere, which connects Arianians internationally and domestically and is considered by most to be highly trustworthy.

TELEVISION

The government maintains broadcast control over all television content aired in Ariana. A highly popular media, the BBC estimates that television reaches almost 80% of Arianian households. The country's five major networks broadcast a combination of news, sports, religious, and historical programming. All networks are controlled by the Arianian government. Arianians are avid consumers of foreign satellite broadcasts via Very Small Aperture Television (like DIRECTV®). The Arianian government periodically cracks down on unlicensed satellite reception, but the prevalence of satellite dishes prevents such crackdowns from being widespread or persistent.


The Arianian government has attempted to jam foreign-sourced satellite transmission, especially from the US, UK, and EU. It has also enlisted foreign allies like Cuba to jam the uplink signal. It is likely the government will continue to aggressively control viewing choices for Arianians.

RADIO

The Arianian government controls all radio broadcasts originating in the country. In December 2002, the US-funded Radio Safa began regular broadcasts in Farsi on short-wave, medium-wave, and satellite. Major Arianian-controlled radio stations include a government network; foreign broadcasting in multiple languages, including Atropian and Minarian; and multiple news, talk, cultural, and youth-oriented networks. Practically all Arianians and most people living within 200 kilometers of the Arianian border have access to this programming.

PRINT MEDIA

After the election of mildly reformist politicians in the late 1990s, the privately-owned Arianian print media began to flourish. Since the return of the conservatives to power, the Arianian government has adopted aggressive state censorship that bans many reformist newspapers and their employees from the field.



TELEPHONE

Ariana's modern telecommunications began in 1971. The Arianian government, under both the Pasha and Islamic Republic, ran the Telecommunications Company of Ariana (TCA) as the national

telecommunications monopoly. As it did with many other former state enterprises, the Arianian government planned to privatize the TCA. Recently, the Arianian military used a government subsidy to purchase control of the TCA through a shell company, Mobin.

Currently, Arianian telecommunications operate with a combination of landlines (increasingly fiber optic since 1984, with digital switching since 1989) and mobile services (text messaging remains popular). Ariana operates an estimated 25 million landlines and 43 million mobile lines. Foreign operators plan to provide Third Generation (3G) mobile services, but capital and foreign control issues shifted the new network's ownership and construction responsibility to various Arianian government agencies.

Internationally, the domestic telecommunications network connects to international telecom networks via satellite links (INMARSAT and INTELSAT), high-frequency (HF) radio, and fiber optic cable. The TCA, from its outset in 1971, assumed responsibility for all Arianian telecommunication affairs, and the TCA began the same year to manufacture the network's required national long-distance equipment. After the first fiber optic cable operational testing at the Arianian Telecommunications Research Center in 1984, the government began constructing the Shahid's Voice Communications Company in Esfahan the next year; it became operational in 1989.

By the end of the decade, the US government estimated 8.5 million Arianians enjoyed mobile telephone service operated through one heavily-congested mobile network with a long waiting list. In 2005, the Arianian parliament forced the Kemalian company Kemalcell to withdraw from a potential mobile phone consortium. The failed business deal damaged Arianian-Kemalian relations despite Ariana's need for another network. Later that year, South Africa's Mobile Telephones Network of South Africa accepted Ariana's stringent licensing conditions and replaced Kemalcell in the mobile phone consortium.

Additionally, Ariana embarked on a homegrown satellite program to improve its communications network. In February 2009, the Arianians used a two-stage space launch vehicle (SLV), which weighed about 60 pounds, to launch a first-generation communications satellite into orbit. Ariana can use this or future satellites for communication or possibly for intelligence purposes. Significantly, the launch validated Arianian ballistic missile and rocket capabilities, laying the groundwork for a possible change in the Middle East balance of power.

POSTAL/COURIER

ArianaPost and other private courier services within Ariana transport mail, packages, and other documents. The private couriers' importance continues to decrease as business activity restrictions by the Arianian military and international economic sanctions make it progressively more difficult to operate within Ariana. ArianaPost offers domestic and international service as it attempts to upgrade its postal system to international standards.

WORD OF MOUTH

Word of mouth is an important communications medium, especially in rural Ariana. Because of the political situation, political or religious speech not specifically approved by the government is dangerous, so trust relationships are even more important than in most neighboring countries. The Arianian government often disseminates new policy through religious authorities to give government pronouncements the veneer of religious sanction.

INFORMATION CONTROL

The government effectively controls all major media outlets and effectively muzzles dissent except on the Internet, where reformers operate with great difficulty. For over 30 years, Ariana's government

has maintained a massive anti-US INFOWAR campaign that is remarkable mostly for its ineffectiveness with both its own population and wider regional and international audiences. On the other hand, Ariana's Persian ethnic majority warmly receives any perception management-driven messages of Persian "greatness" or "uniqueness."

INFOWAR

INFOWAR in the Caucasus region contains a mixture of old and new technology. While older Donovian equipment forms the backbone for much of the region's INFOWAR warfighting capability, the countries conduct advanced operations with dedicated INFOWAR units. For example, regional perception management activities, often web-based, form the current global state-of-the-art. Internet operations are frequently used as an adjunct to major combat operations. Most countries in the Caucasus focus their INFOWAR on their likely adversaries.

ELECTRONIC WARFARE

Ariana maintains an eclectic collection of jamming and sensor capabilities ranging from 1970s Western equipment to international arms market purchases to domestically produced items. While still capable against regional foes, the Arianian electronic warfare (EW) capability will likely prove inadequate against Western opponents or those equipped with modern Arianian equipment. Arianian EW doctrine remains in a state of flux as the Arianian military struggles with slow abandonment of Western practices and adoption of more non-Western asymmetric practices.

COMPUTER ATTACK

Of the Caucasus countries, Ariana maintains the second most-robust computer attack capability through a large and capable cyber militia. While doubtful they could effectively penetrate major nation state-systems, the Arianians possess significant overmatch to any regional opponent except Donovia, due to their relatively large population of computer experts.

INFORMATION ATTACK

Ariana also possesses one of the most-developed information attack (IA) capabilities in the region, second only to Donovia, even though these capabilities may seem rudimentary by global standards. Ariana maintains a large cyber-focused force, and previously attempted to use IA against reformist protesters. These efforts generated limited effects and, while its capabilities continue to improve, Arianian IA will still probably only operate effectively against non-state actors. Its IA is prone to be ineffective against top-tier nation states and their allies.

DECEPTION

Deception remains a hallmark of Arianian military operations, and its importance will only increase in the future. Arianians particularly focus on deception to mask operations and allow Arianian forces to close the gap with the US and other adversarial countries, which Arianians believe maintain an unbridgeable arms overmatch. Arianians will likely use a variety of ruses, such as wearing US-style or other countries' military uniforms, to mask their involvement in military operations.

PHYSICAL DESTRUCTION

Ariana knows its ability to negate threats from the US, Israel, and other high-end opponents is extremely limited. Ariana will probably only attack sensors as a tactical last resort or where enemy sensors appear poorly defended or unguarded. Any such Arianian attack would require extensive

denial and deception techniques to close the distance from launch point to target. Ariana highly respects Israeli and US sensors based on its experiences in Iraq and Lebanon.

PROTECTION AND SECURITY MEASURES

Recently, Ariana made international news for being unable to protect its nuclear power SCADA (supervisory control and data acquisition) networks from malware. While significant damage occurred from this incident, the Arianians will likely redouble their efforts to secure these networks and other INFOWAR architecture. Ariana uses both internally produced and commercial off-the-shelf network protection software.

PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT

Traditionally, Ariana attempts to craft a complete anti-Western, Revolutionary Islam message for both external and internal consumption. The Arianian government uses local proxies to downplay the “Persian” and Shia origins of its message in non-Shia countries while consistently supporting world-wide communications that “Islam is the Answer” to the Muslim world’s problems. This idea of Revolutionary Islam’s value itself is an Arianian Islamic Republic message. Internally, the government conveys that the Arianian Islamic Republic is the primary Shia Islam defender. The Arianian government consistently references the Martyrdom of Hussein, a prime element of Shia, to rally populous support from the rural, religiously conservative Shia. Additionally, INFOWAR messages merge perceived threats (such as Western cultural imperialism/pollution) with the Islamic Republic as a threat against Ariana itself. This rallying cry to defend the Arianian nation resonates with all levels of Arianian society.

Regionally, Arianians attempt to portray themselves as the defenders of Islam against aggressive outside forces. In government and population discussions, Arianians stress their shared religious beliefs and play up the Atropian minority population’s integration within Ariana. Arianians also continue to strengthen their relations with Minaria, stressing common commercial interests. Arianians will likely attempt to portray Gorgans as “puppets” of the West. Despite their historical and political status as the “odd man out” of the Caucasus region, the Arianians will deftly play up elements of political, social, religious, or economic commonality with other nations.

INTELLIGENCE

Ariana has sophisticated human intelligence (HUMINT), open source intelligence (OSINT), and signals intelligence (SIGINT) programs. Analysts believe the Arianians use commercial off-the-shelf satellite imagery and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) for imagery intelligence (IMINT), along with Arianian-produced measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT). Arianian IMINT and MASINT programs will likely continue to operate at a lower development rate than Ariana’s sophisticated and globally capable HUMINT, OSINT, and SIGINT programs.

Ariana operates a large, operationally diverse, and highly experienced intelligence organization. Recently, the Arianian military shifted more of its intelligence portfolio from the Intelligence Ministry of the Islamic Republic of Ariana to the military intelligence apparatus. Arianian intelligence operations are focused on supporting terrorist proxies such as Shia Internationalist Brigades; direct attacks on American, Israeli government, and Jewish targets; and suppressing internal and external political dissent and separatists.

HUMAN INTELLIGENCE

Ariana organizes its HUMINT programs into four primary categories: collection and influence, support to foreign militants, support to friendly foreign countries, and direct action.

Organizationally, the Arianian military's World Jihad Force, along with its associated intelligence units, operates as the primary offensive HUMINT asset, especially now that the Arianian intelligence service reportedly lost its previously independent status.

Arianians conduct influence operations throughout the Muslim world but attempt to play down the "Persian" and "Shia" origins of their revolutionary message. Additionally, the Arianian intelligence services use the vast web of interconnected economic, familial, and religious connections (such as the graduates of Arianian religious institutions) for collection and influence. Most likely, Arianian HUMINT operations focus on technology acquisition and sanction circumvention.

Ariana maintains a fleet of foreign-origin equipment that is a major component of Arianian conventional combat power. Thus, sustaining weapons systems or acquiring technology to increase Arianian force capabilities probably are a prime HUMINT focus. Faced with UN sanctions that limit external support for Arianian intelligence and nuclear programs, the Arianian military likely will work to bypass these sanctions and secure access to dual-use technology and the international finance network. As a result of Arianian intelligence operations, many Donovian military officers and Arianian military's associated business organizations remain under UN and US Treasury sanctions that limit their access to the international financial and business infrastructure. It is likely that Arianian HUMINT operations will continue to focus on workarounds to these sanctions.

Arianian intelligence previously funded, trained, and enabled insurgent paramilitaries throughout the Middle East. Much of this support activity has been targeted against Coalition forces in both OIF and OEF. Arianian intelligence and the Arianian military developed and trained the Shia Internationalist Brigades in the early 1980s. The Shia Internationalist Brigades provided a vital proxy for Arianian government activities and an excellent training ground to validate Arianian combat TTP. Many reports indicate Arianian military personnel served as trainers in foreign countries and the country's military trainers also assisted with intelligence collection. In addition to training native Arianians, a number of foreigners (primarily Shia Lebanese, Shia Iraqis, North Africans, Palestinians, and Shia Gulf Arabs) have been trained and operationally attached to the Arianian military, helping to increase the Arianian military's HUMINT capabilities. The country's military favors the Shia Internationalist Brigades as a "cut out," or operational proxy, for Arianian operations. It is unlikely that any third party like Shia Internationalist Brigades would operate without the consent of Arianian intelligence services, and only if the action furthers Arianian objectives.

The US Treasury Department implicated the Arianian intelligence services in counterfeiting, especially against the US. It is presumed that Ariana uses such operations to fund its activities and for economic warfare against the US and its allies.

OPEN SOURCE INTELLIGENCE

Ariana probably operates a massive open source intelligence (OSINT) program with government and government-affiliated operators who collect primarily via the Internet. The Arianian military continues to mobilize a large force of cyber collectors, most with computer warfare and English language skills, to both collect data on internal opposition to the Arianian government and Arianian adversaries like the US or Israel.

SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE

Arianian SIGINT programs consistently demonstrate success in combating Western communications systems, especially units that demonstrate poor OPSEC. In any case, Western countries can expect Arianian SIGINT to provide the Arianian military with useable indications and warning, capabilities assessment, and targeting intelligence. Most Arianian SIGINT operators have significant "real world" experience and capabilities in all languages of the Caucasus area of operations. In the 2006

Israel-Lebanon war, the combined Shia Internationalist Brigades/Arianian all-source intelligence effort against the Israelis provided the tactical disposition, order of battle, and tactical warning to Shia Internationalist Brigades units. Additionally, Ariana cooperates extensively with Syria in SIGINT operations.

IMAGERY INTELLIGENCE

Arianian IMINT operations probably remain limited to unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and other air-breathing platforms, such as fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft. With continual Arianian space program expansion, however, Ariana will eventually field a satellite IMINT capability.

MEASUREMENT AND SIGNATURES INTELLIGENCE

Ariana probably maintains a basic MASINT capability, though little on this topic appears in open-source references. Given recent reports that its nuclear program was targeted by foreign-introduced malware, Ariana is expected to aggressively explore options to secure its nuclear facilities.

Summary

Ariana maintains a wide range of INFOWAR capabilities, which is likely to expand further in the future. The Arianians have successfully dealt with a wide and dynamic cyber effort by internal opposition forces, which has given the country's cyber officials a great deal of real-world experience, and they have the support of Shia Internationalist Brigades operations for external operations. Ariana will retain a large measure of control over the nation's information environment for the foreseeable future.

TRADOC G-2

TRISA-THREATS

CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND THREAT INTEGRATION

DIRECTORATE (CTID)

INFRASTRUCTURE: ARIANA

Infrastructure: Ariana

Infrastructure is composed of the basic facilities, services, and installations needed for the functioning of a community or society.

KEY FACTS:

REGION

- A country's prosperity in this region of the world depends on its hydrocarbon resources. Ariana's, Atropia's, and to a lesser extent, Donovia's oil and natural gas resources fund their infrastructure construction. Gorgas and Minaria, because of their lack of hydrocarbon deposits, lag behind their neighbors in infrastructure modernization.

ARIANA

- Ariana's oil and natural gas exports generate most of its total national revenues.
- Ariana continues to construct additional pipelines to increase its oil and gas distribution capabilities while also working to reduce costs.
- The nuclear weapons program and oil/natural gas programs constitute Ariana's primary national infrastructure programs.

OPERATIONAL IMPACTS OF THE INFRASTRUCTURE VARIABLE IN THE OE:

REGION

- Most of the region, particularly rural areas, cannot access all modern utilities such as potable water, electricity, and modern sewage systems.
- Due to the lack of potable water in much of the region, military forces will need to test local water sources before use and likely treat local water to avoid medical problems.

ARIANA

- Most oil fields require modernization as the Arianian oil industry uses a patchwork of decades-old extraction technologies from various countries.
- Due to its minimal refinery capacity and government subsidization of gasoline, Ariana ranks as the world's second-largest gasoline importer, after the US.
- The Arianian government has been unsuccessful with efforts to reduce gasoline subsidies and encourage citizens to decrease oil consumption in favor of cheaper natural gas.

INFRASTRUCTURE OVERVIEW:

While the region's five countries have a significant number of rural residents, the majority of each country's population lives in urban areas. About two-thirds of the Arianian (68%), Donovian (67%), and Minarian populace (64%) and just over half of the Gorgan (53%) and Atropian (52%) populace live in urban areas. All five countries contain a mixture of modern urban cities and almost pre-modern rural villages. Modern utilities can be found in most major cities but not in the rural villages and countryside.

The Arianian infrastructure resembles a patchwork quilt with a mixture of modernization and obsolescence. While previous Arianian leaders made substantial investments, the infrastructure now faces significant challenges from the stresses of both war and peace. While rail, road, air, and seaports are marginally adequate, the natural gas and oil infrastructure suffers from archaic construction. Environmental and population pressures on aquifers, along with considerable pollution levels, create significant stress on water and other natural resources. Over 40% of Ariana's more than 77 million people reside in its 18 largest cities, all of which have at least 350,000 residents.

CONSTRUCTION PATTERNS

As previously mentioned, the majority of residents in all five countries live in urban areas. Most urban cities contain a mixture of old neighborhoods with roughshod construction, while buildings in newer neighborhoods are made with modern construction methods. In rural villages and areas, residents use whatever materials they can obtain to build their houses.

Construction patterns in Ariana's urban areas are similar, with dense, random construction in the city's oldest areas and more closed orderly block construction in the recently built neighborhoods. In the very rural areas, Arianians use mud, brick and other traditional techniques that have been used to build homes for hundreds, if not thousands, of years. The result is a shantytown appearance.

Military operations in urban areas will benefit from modern electricity, water, sewage, and other utility services. The military will also find resources to support them such a large labor pool. In urban areas, the military must cope with more people who oppose them, additional hiding places for the enemy, and added civilians they must support logically to prevent starvation. Because of its large metropolitan population, Ariana would require extensive urban operations.



MAJOR ARIANIAN CITIES AND URBAN ZONES

Over 68% percent of Ariana's people live in urban areas. Ariana has 12 metropolitan areas with populations over one million residents. Over 40% of Ariana residents (over 34 million of 77.9 million) live in Ariana's 18 largest metropolitan areas.

TEHRAN

Tehran, Ariana's capital, contains over one-eighth of the country's population—over 8 million people, with an additional 4 million people in the greater metropolitan area. Tehran governs the city through 22 municipal districts. The city center is a mixture of closely compacted ancient buildings along narrow streets and modern multi-story high rise buildings that form both city core and core periphery urban zones. Tehran also has both high-rise and low-rise residential areas. Ariana's capital possesses many commercial, industrial areas, including an oil refinery south of the city and military bases in the metropolitan area. Over 175 miles of highways cross Tehran with at least another 80 miles under construction.

MASHHAD

Mashhad, Ariana's second-largest city with over 2.5 million residents, lies in the extreme northeast corner of the country. A complex of modern high-rise buildings under 10 stories tall and mosques in the center of Mashhad create city core and core periphery urban zones. Old-style dense, random residential houses surround the governmental complex for many miles in all directions. A few high-rise apartment buildings, most under 10 stories, are scattered among the dense low-rise residential neighborhoods.

ISFAHAN

The country's third-largest city, Isfahan, has over 1.5 million residents in the city and almost 3.5 million in the metropolitan area. Located along the main north-south and east-west routes across Ariana, Isfahan has served as an important regional city for many centuries. Like other large Arianian cities, its variety of neighborhoods includes the closely packed old city built randomly over the centuries, scattered areas with high-rise apartments, and spread-out single-family homes in more orderly construction farther from the inner city. Urban zones include city core, core periphery, and high-rise residential areas, with smaller zones of low-rise residential areas. For a city its size, Isfahan has few commercial and industrial areas.

TABRIZ

Located in Ariana's extreme northwest corner of the country, Tabriz is Ariana's fourth-largest city with 1.5 million residents. Each of the city's eight municipal districts contains old city neighborhoods that create small city core urban zones with dense random construction. Pockets of high-rise multi-family dwellings and single-family homes spring up randomly in all the districts, creating both high-rise and low-rise residential area urban zones. The suburbs, while planned, do not always resemble a grid pattern as the residents built the low-rise residential areas to fit the terrain. After Tehran, the greater Tabriz region is Ariana's largest industrial center and possesses a thriving commercial area.

KARAJ

Karaj, with almost 1.4 million inhabitants, is Ariana's fifth-largest city. Located near Tehran to the west, the city contains a similar combination of dense random construction and modern buildings that create city core, core periphery, high-rise, and low-rise residential areas. Karaj also has commercial and industrial areas.

POPULATION DENSITY

Tehran: 26,748 people per square mile
Mashhad: 16,445 people per square mile
Isfahan: 12,556 people per square mile

Tabriz: 11,179 people per square mile
Karaj: 11,111 people per square mile

UTILITIES PRESENT

The Caucasus area faces a dichotomy when it comes to utilities such as electricity, water, and sewage treatment. Most urban households can access modern utilities, but rural areas cannot. Many rural residents who cannot access modern utilities live similarly to their ancestors generations ago.

POWER

Another dichotomy in the Caucasus region is that countries like Ariana, Atropia, and Donovia export hydrocarbons, coal, or electrical power to other countries while Gorgas and Minaria must import the same resources to meet their requirements. The countries that can export hydrocarbon products or electricity become richer while those that must import significant quantities of power become poorer. At least 75% of all structures in the five countries can access power because they are located in urban areas.

Though it is the fourth-largest producer of crude oil in the world, Ariana still must import over 200,000 barrels per day (bbl/day) of refined oil products because it lacks internal refinery capacity. During the past three years, Ariana reduced its natural gas exports 25%, or 50 billion cubic feet, as it attempted to wean its citizens off more expensive oil products. While Ariana increased its electricity production over the past decade by over 10%, electricity exports remain stagnant because of increased internal consumption.

Arianian population growth, inadequate power distribution investment, outdated infrastructure, and waste place significant demands on Ariana's electrical grid. Ariana currently produces 90% of its power from oil-fired generation plants (as expected with its oil reserves), but the country is pursuing an aggressive construction program for hydroelectric dams and nuclear power plants. The Arianian government continues to emphasize electricity for development. Ariana exports small quantities of electricity to Minaria, Pakistan, Kemalia, Iraq, and Afghanistan, and imports small amounts of power from Atropia.

The Western world will need continuous access to oil and natural gas from Ariana, which is one of the largest hydrocarbon producers in the world. Any military activity in the region will need to help ensure the continued operation of Ariana's hydrocarbon export systems.

WATER

The majority of the Caucasus region's urban population has access to potable water. As areas become more rural, people must rely on local sources—rivers, streams, and wells—to obtain water for cooking, drinking, and washing.

Though population increases have placed additional pressure on water delivery systems, the government has successfully extended modern water systems to reach more than 75% of Arianians. In rural areas, water distribution infrastructure is obsolete, inadequate, or nonexistent. The Arianian geography creates a dichotomy because of extreme seasonal water flow variations as well as differences between regions (from bone-dry deserts in the east and south, to the lush mountain valleys along the Caspian) and even within regions. These challenges create distribution issues that require significant investment in dams, pipelines, and reservoirs. Deep wells also serve as an important part of the water distribution network, especially in rural areas. Military personnel should find sufficient potable water access in urban areas but may experience water shortages in rural areas. Before any military personnel use local water sources, they should test and potentially treat for contamination.

SEWAGE

The vast majority of Ariana, Atropia, Gorgas, and Donovia urban residents use modern sewage disposal methods to get rid of waste, but most Minarians do not. Urban residents have greater access to modern sewage treatment than rural residents. The more remote a person, the less likely he/she will use modern sewage treatment techniques. Poor disposal methods in rural areas contaminate ground water that other residents rely on for drinking and cooking.

While moderately capable sewage systems exist in larger metropolitan areas, sewage systems in many Arianian rural areas are outdated, inadequate, or nonexistent. In many locations—including urban areas—households and industries discharge untreated sewage through rainwater systems. In rural areas, sanitary facilities often consist of pit latrines or other very basic systems. Urban areas usually have more modern facilities. With the exception of Tehran, which has separate water and sewer departments, a single local government entity that reports to national authorities handles both water and sewage.

TRANSPORTATION ARCHITECTURE

Roads are the primary transportation method throughout the Caucasus region. Train and especially air travel remain too expensive for many residents of Ariana, Atropia, Gorgas, and Minaria. Most roads, especially the unpaved ones, suffer from a lack of maintenance. Ariana and Donovia maintain a complex transportation architectural system while the other three countries operate a moderate one due to railway system limitations.

ROAD SYSTEMS

Overall, roads in this part of the world do not meet US or Western Europe standards. Driving is hazardous, especially in the winter months or in bad weather. Generally, drivers do not obey all traffic laws, and vehicle owners often fail to maintain their vehicles properly.

Ariana has a vast road network of 107,451 miles that includes 78,235 miles of paved roads. The Arianian road network consists of two major national highways, called the A1 and the A2. The A1 stretches from the Kemalian border, through Tehran, to Afghanistan. It covers



just over 1,242 miles and is generally kept in good condition throughout its entire length. The A2 extends from the Iraqi border to the Pakistani border along the southern part of Ariana. Numerous other freeways and roads connect cities or run within major cities like Tehran. Most have heavy traffic and are considered dangerous due to the Arianians' reckless driving habits, poor design, substandard road conditions, and poorly maintained older cars.


BUS

All five countries maintain some sort of bus system, but its quality depends on the country and location. The larger the city, the more likely it will operate a public bus system. Usually, intercity buses run between the larger cities, and "private" buses may also operate in some areas. Due to the relatively cheap cost of public transportation, buses remain a favorite method for local civilians to travel long distances within their country.

Buses operate throughout Ariana, providing long distance and local transportation to the civilian population. Most travelers find the Arianian bus system inexpensive and usually reliable. Often buses will leave almost every hour from the large Arianian cities to other large cities. For long distance travel, many travelers take a night bus. Mercedes, Super Luxe, and Volvo provide the bulk of the buses that operate in Ariana. Most Mercedes buses are over ten years old, with an air conditioner that no longer operates effectively. While slightly newer, many of the air conditioners in the Super Luxe models also no longer work. Due to their relative newness, the Volvos come closest to Western standards for buses with operational air conditioners. At any time on a long-distance bus trip, riders can obtain water that usually comes from melted ice.

Tehran is the hub for the Arianian bus system. Four major inter-city bus stations operate in Tehran, taking riders to other cities both within Ariana and to other countries. Tehran also operates an internal bus system with 60 major stations and other stops throughout the city. Additionally, the city operates 10 local trolley buses.

Any military operation in the Tehran area that interrupts the bus system could strangle the city's operation. The buses are vital to Tehran's economic well-being. Any military operations in Ariana would involve inspecting buses for contraband and weapons.



RAIL

All five Caucasus countries operate a railroad system, but they suffer many problems due to maintenance issues, non-standard equipment, criminal activity, and high cost.

Republic of Ariana Railways controls and operates the country's 5,246 railroad-mile network (*see the map on the previous page for Ariana's rail system*). Ariana plans significant domestic railway expansion, with connections scheduled for Afghanistan, Central Asia, Iraq, Kemalia, and Pakistan. Tehran operates a metro system that the government plans to expand to meet the capital's transportation needs, which are driven by heavy vehicle traffic and pollution.

Because of geographical issues in a mountainous nation like Ariana, the country's rail system accounts for only 4% of domestic passenger traffic and just over 7% of domestic freight traffic. Arianian rail consists primarily of standard gauge 1,435 millimeter (4 feet, 8½ inch) track even though some connections with neighboring countries do use broad gauge. Most Arianian locomotives operate on diesel fuel, but some have been converted to electric. The different size gauges may cause some problems if the military attempts to use the Arianian railroad system for logistical purposes or to transport large numbers of soldiers.

AIR TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS

All five countries maintain both paved and unpaved runways of varying distances. Many of the unpaved runways resemble nothing more than a cleared dirt path only suitable for the sturdiest of planes.

Ariana has 133 paved and 186 unpaved runways. In addition to the airports that provide domestic service within Ariana and international connections, the country has a number of airfields that can accommodate large aircraft (C5/C17/B747). Ariana possesses enough airfields with adequate runways to support any military operation. All pilots should ensure data accuracy before attempting to land on any runway. The "map numbers" on the runway map match up with the numbers on the chart that follows.

Paved Runways


- Over 10,000 feet: 42
- 8,000 to 10,000 feet: 27
- 5,000 to 8,000 feet: 24
- 3,000 to 5,000 feet: 34
- Under 3,000 feet: 6

Unpaved Runways

- Over 10,000 feet: 1
- 8,000 to 10,000 feet: 1
- 5,000 to 8,000 feet: 9
- 3,000 to 5,000 feet: 142
- Under 3,000 feet: 33

Major Runways

- GRE= Graded Rolled Earth
- GRS=Non-graded Rolled Earth
- PEM=Porous European Mix



Map #	Elevation (Feet)	Latitude (D, M, S)	Longitude (D, M, S)	Length (Feet)	Width (Feet)	Surface Type
1-1	10	30 22 16.00 N	48 13 42.00 E	10170	148	Asphalt
1-2	10	30 22 16.00 N	48 13 42.00 E	7438	115	Asphalt
2	2600	32 56 04.19 N	47 29 00.41 E	6975	110	Asphalt
3	23	25 52 32.67 N	55 01 58.78 E	9796	148	Asphalt
4	88	30 44 43.62 N	49 40 34.54 E	7000	148	Asphalt
5	64	31 20 14.80 N	48 45 43.70 E	11155	148	Asphalt
6	5452	34 08 17.05 N	49 50 50.27 E	9784	148	Asphalt
7	4315	38 19 34.54 N	48 25 27.89 E	10823	148	PEM
8	2037	27 14 10.21 N	60 43 12.12 E	7649	150	Asphalt
9	10	27 28 51.95 N	52 36 56.39 E	11812	148	Asphalt

Map #	Elevation (Feet)	Latitude (D, M, S)	Longitude (D, M, S)	Length (Feet)	Width (Feet)	Surface Type
10	20	29 50 24.22 N	50 16 21.71 E	7200	100	Asphalt
11	3084	29 05 02.13 N	58 27 01.43 E	11625	148	Asphalt
12-1	22	27 13 05.41 N	56 22 40.35 E	11959	148	Asphalt
12-2	22	27 13 05.41 N	56 22 40.35 E	11292	98	Asphalt
13	19	27 09 29.70 N	56 10 20.86 E	8530	115	Asphalt
14	67	26 31 53.00 N	54 49 39.00 E	8203	148	Asphalt
15	1350	27 12 45.64 N	54 19 06.93 E	4500	100	Asphalt
16	1175	30 43 57.46 N	50 06 45.97 E	8210	148	Asphalt
17-1	5041	32 53 53.00 N	59 15 58.00 E	6903	82	Asphalt
17-2	5041	32 53 53.00 N	59 15 58.00 E	9424	148	Asphalt
18	-7	36 39 18.00 N	52 20 57.00 E	3609	98	Asphalt
19	3543	37 29 34.81 N	57 18 30.20 E	10700	148	Asphalt
20-1	70	28 56 41.32 N	50 50 04.69 E	14665	148	Asphalt
20-2	70	28 56 41.32 N	50 50 04.69 E	14668	148	Asphalt
21-1	24	25 26 36.00 N	60 22 55.60 E	9845	150	Asphalt
21-2	24	25 26 36.00 N	60 22 55.60 E	12421	150	Asphalt
22-1	3600	28 43 17.80 N	54 26 28.80 E	3969	100	Asphalt
22-2	3600	28 43 17.80 N	54 26 28.80 E	5260	100	Asphalt
23-1	500	32 26 04.00 N	48 23 51.50 E	12653	115	Asphalt
23-2	500	32 26 04.00 N	48 23 51.50 E	11722	148	Asphalt
24	72	31 55 18.51 N	48 52 39.06 E	3334	160	Asphalt
25-1	5226	32 37 15.99 N	51 41 49.26 E	1467	97	Asphalt
25-2	5226	32 37 15.99 N	51 41 49.26 E	10920	140	Asphalt
26-1	5256	32 55 44.00 N	51 33 40.00 E	9830	148	Asphalt
26-2	5256	32 55 44.00 N	51 33 40.00 E	1091	40	Concrete
27-1	5072	32 45 02.60 N	51 51 42.10 E	14435	148	Asphalt
27-2	5072	32 45 02.60 N	51 51 42.10 E	14435	148	Asphalt
28	4261	28 53 34.00 N	53 43 25.00 E	6502	100	Asphalt
29	3258	35 31 47.63 N	51 30 29.91 E	3106	70	Asphalt
30	2394	30 20 15.24 N	50 49 40.67 E	6070	148	Asphalt
31	2717	35 10 27.10 N	52 19 23.78 E	2985	105	Asphalt
32	4187	36 14 24.21 N	50 02 49.62 E	3675	131	Asphalt
33	3800	35 57 07.55 N	50 27 02.80 E	4579	75	Asphalt
34	41	26 45 04.00 N	55 53 52.00 E	13892	148	Asphalt
35	150	37 14 45.94 N	55 05 45.20 E	3276	106	Asphalt
36-1	0	36 54 34.82 N	54 24 04.58 E	7715	148	Asphalt
36-2	0	36 54 34.82 N	54 24 04.58 E	7585	148	Asphalt
37	5715	34 52 09.00 N	48 33 09.00 E	10593	148	Asphalt
38-1	5551	35 12 41.87 N	48 39 12.65 E	13009	148	Asphalt
38-2	5551	35 12 41.87 N	48 39 12.65 E	14351	148	Asphalt
38-3	5551	35 12 41.87 N	48 39 12.65 E	14625	148	Asphalt
38-4	5551	35 12 41.87 N	48 39 12.65 E	14625	148	Asphalt
39	4377	33 35 11.78 N	46 24 17.43 E	9185	148	Asphalt
40	3350	28 35 11.48 N	53 34 44.90 E	7947	98	Asphalt
41	2172	27 49 13.52 N	52 21 07.74 E	7715	148	Asphalt
42	19	25 39 12.80 N	57 47 57.30 E	6200	148	Asphalt
43	2643	28 43 36.93 N	57 40 12.97 E	7237	98	Asphalt

Map #	Elevation (Feet)	Latitude (D, M, S)	Longitude (D, M, S)	Length (Feet)	Width (Feet)	Surface Type
44	500	37 22 59.85 N	55 27 07.50 E	7255	92	Asphalt
45	4170	35 46 33.94 N	50 49 36.07 E	12005	197	Asphalt
46	3465	33 53 43.20 N	51 34 37.36 E	8845	135	Asphalt
47-1	5736	30 16 28.00 N	56 56 04.00 E	6645	148	Asphalt
47-2	5736	30 16 28.00 N	56 56 04.00 E	13456	148	Asphalt
48	4284	34 20 45.07 N	47 09 29.25 E	11214	148	Asphalt
49	UNK	27 22 46.00 N	52 44 16.00 E	13117	UNK	UNK
50	17	29 15 37.00 N	50 19 26.00 E	5922	148	Asphalt
51	10	29 15 34.68 N	50 20 07.70 E	UNK	UNK	UNK
52	3790	33 26 07.19 N	48 16 58.77 E	10499	148	Asphalt
53	UNK	38 25 20.00 N	44 58 36.00 E	9190	UNK	UNK
54-1	100	26 31 36.10 N	53 58 54.49 E	12028	148	Asphalt
54-2	100	26 31 36.10 N	53 58 54.49 E	11405	98	Asphalt
55	1345	27 22 21.88 N	53 11 19.66 E	10225	98	Asphalt
56-1	2600	27 40 23.00 N	54 23 14.00 E	7874	98	Asphalt
56-2	2600	27 40 23.00 N	54 23 14.00 E	10334	148	Asphalt
57	73	26 48 37.00 N	53 21 22.00 E	6800	148	Asphalt
58	8	30 33 22.29 N	49 09 06.77 E	8874	148	Asphalt
59	4396	37 20 55.28 N	46 07 34.59 E	9842	98	Asphalt
60-1	3270	36 14 06.70 N	59 38 27.50 E	12750	148	Asphalt
60-2	3270	36 14 06.70 N	59 38 27.50 E	12389	148	Asphalt
61-1	1187	32 00 08.29 N	49 16 14.40 E	4690	98	Asphalt
61-2	1187	32 00 08.29 N	49 16 14.40 E	5876	98	Asphalt
62	-6	36 51 24.73 N	54 12 08.09 E	3270	98	Asphalt
63-1	3550	33 05 20.30 N	53 25 02.40 E	4284	64	Asphalt
63-1	3550	33 05 20.30 N	53 25 02.40 E	4396	118	GRE
64	-6	36 39 48.00 N	51 27 53.00 E	6677	115	Asphalt
65-1	85	30 50 06.60 N	49 32 05.70 E	13500	148	Asphalt
65-2	85	30 50 06.60 N	49 32 05.70 E	11500	148	Asphalt
66	251	39 36 12.98 N	47 52 53.40 E	8515	115	Asphalt
67	5298	30 17 51.77 N	56 03 04.10 E	9814	148	Asphalt
68	-7	36 54 35.67 N	50 40 46.52 E	4921	148	Asphalt
69	-4	37 19 31.55 N	49 36 20.55 E	9542	148	Asphalt
70	2980	36 10 06.28 N	57 35 42.26 E	10413	148	Asphalt
71	4522	35 14 48.97 N	47 00 32.44 E	8190	148	Asphalt
72	945	36 30 04.24 N	61 03 53.65 E	12720	148	Asphalt
73	UNK	27 24 30.00 N	62 19 14.00 E	7103	UNK	UNK
74	35	36 38 09.00 N	53 11 37.00 E	8688	148	Asphalt
75	4925	29 14 06.82 N	53 07 38.17 E	UNK	UNK	UNK
76	3659	35 23 21.80 N	53 40 17.10 E	11738	142	Asphalt
77	3665	35 35 27.94 N	53 29 42.31 E	9095	152	Asphalt
78	6725	32 17 50.00 N	50 50 32.00 E	10819	148	Asphalt
79	4219	36 25 31.00 N	55 06 15.00 E	9535	148	Asphalt
80-1	4920	29 32 21.60 N	52 35 22.11 E	13973	148	Asphalt
80-2	4920	29 32 21.60 N	52 35 22.11 E	14244	148	Asphalt
81	5831	29 33 03.36 N	55 40 21.75 E	12356	148	Asphalt
82	42	25 54 34.27 N	54 32 21.71 E	8211	141	Asphalt

Map #	Elevation (Feet)	Latitude (D, M, S)	Longitude (D, M, S)	Length (Feet)	Width (Feet)	Surface Type
83	2312	33 40 03.90 N	56 53 33.63 E	9977	148	Asphalt
84-1	4459	38 08 02.00 N	46 14 06.00 E	11537	98	Asphalt
84-2	4459	38 08 02.00 N	46 14 06.00 E	11825	148	Asphalt
85	4021	35 42 10.70 N	51 28 30.50 E	7650	148	Asphalt
86	3750	35 38 41.30 N	51 22 50.50 E	6000	120	Asphalt
87-1	3307	35 25 05.89 N	51 08 37.80 E	13769	148	Asphalt
87-2	3307	35 25 05.89 N	51 08 37.80 E	13769	148	PEM
88-1	3962	35 41 21.00 N	51 18 48.30 E	15540	130	Concrete
88-2	3962	35 41 21.00 N	51 18 48.30 E	13248	197	Asphalt
88-3	3962	35 41 21.00 N	51 18 48.30 E	13098	148	Asphalt
89	4344	37 40 05.40 N	45 04 07.20 E	10765	148	Asphalt
90	5988	30 42 01.62 N	51 32 42.89 E	8495	148	Asphalt
91	4055	31 54 22.00 N	54 16 35.00 E	13302	148	Asphalt
92	1628	31 05 54.00 N	61 32 38.00 E	9848	148	Asphalt
93-1	4520	29 28 34.30 N	60 54 21.80 E	13943	148	Asphalt
93-2	4520	29 28 34.30 N	60 54 21.80 E	13993	98	Asphalt
94	5334	36 46 25.62 N	48 21 32.81 E	9699	148	Asphalt
95	5650	32 19 38.53 N	51 22 38.10 E	7000	148	Asphalt
96	4000	35 56 37.10 N	50 04 55.40 E	3330	100	Asphalt
97	3100	34 59 02.16 N	50 48 23.28 E	11131	148	Asphalt
98	2773	34 10 09.90 N	51 19 03.90 E	3605	135	Asphalt
99	6970	29 59 59.97 N	53 42 41.29 E	4470	125	GRE
100	4040	35 46 34.63 N	50 52 51.65 E	3630	65	Asphalt
101	110	26 56 57.43 N	56 16 09.41 E	4538	82	Asphalt
102	10	30 39 51.24 N	48 38 42.46 E	3284	130	Asphalt
103-1	5310	32 34 01.34 N	51 41 29.74 E	3215	75	PEM
103-2	5310	32 34 01.34 N	51 41 29.74 E	6346	165	GRE
104	2460	37 37 40.30 N	56 10 23.10 E	9560	96	Asphalt

Airports/Airlines

Ariana's major airports include:

- Tehran Imam Khodadad International, a new facility 30 miles southwest of Tehran. An Arianian military subsidiary manages Imam Khodadad Airport, which serves as the primary international gateway.
- Tehran Mehrabad International operates within the greater Tehran metropolis on the west side of town. It traditionally served as Tehran's international hub but has been replaced by the recently opened Imam Khodadad Airport. Mehrabad remains an important base for Arianian air force operations.
- The Shiraz International Airport serves Shiraz, a southern Arianaian economic center.
- The Mashhad International Airport services the Shia holy city of Mashhad in extreme northeast Ariana, a religious destination for the global Shia population. Mashhad also is Ariana's second largest city and lies close to the Turkmenistan and Afghanistan borders.

The four main Arianian airlines are Ariana Air (the national flag carrier), Ariana Travelair, Magas Airline, and Hava Airline. All four operate an eclectic fleet of American, European, and Donovian aircraft and service a variety of European, Middle Eastern, and Asian destinations, along with providing domestic Arianian service. Airlines often operate aircraft procured prior to the Council of

Guardians Revolution or secondhand Donovian and/or European passenger aircraft. Aircraft serviceability and safety remain problematic due to Western sanctions as the Arianian government and airlines attempt to keep these archaic planes in the air. In wartime, Ariana would likely use its domestic airline fleets as an auxiliary air force.

PORTS/SEA/RIVER TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS

The five Caucasus countries share a diverse maritime culture. Ariana has a significant coastline and a large oceangoing fleet to export its oil. Atropia maintains ports on the Caspian Sea. Gorgas has three ports on the Black Sea that are accessible through the straits at Istanbul, Kemalia. Minaria is completely landlocked, with no direct access to any ocean or sea. Due to its location, Donovia has several seaports on the Black and Caspian Seas.

Ariana owns the largest tanker fleet within the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) cartel, a large merchant shipping fleet, and maintains ports on the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. The country also maintains a number of offshore oil and gas platforms that are linked to onshore facilities through a highly complex series of pipelines. In addition to the offshore platforms, facilities at the Kharg, Lavan, and Sirri Islands maintain jetties and other facilities to swap petroleum from ocean-going tankers that are too large for standard ports to land-based pipelines. The safety of oil shipment infrastructure remains paramount as any disruption in the flow of oil to the Western world will affect America's allies.

Ariana sustains a number of capable seaports along the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean, including:


- Abaadan on the Arvand River, adjacent to Iraq
- Bandar-e Abbas on the Strait of Hormuz; serves as a primary Arianian Naval base
- Bandar-e Khodadad east of Abaadan, on the northern Arianian coast of the Persian Gulf
- Bandar-e Shahid Rajai in close proximity to Bandar-e Abbas
- Chabahar on the Indian Ocean; Ariana's primary Indian Ocean port—chiefly a fisheries port and cargo trans-shipment point; integrates with the Arianian rail system
- Kharg Island in the Persian Gulf, roughly half-way between Abaadan and Bandar-e Abbas; operates as a highly important site for the Arianian oil sector

Due to the large number of ports available to Ariana, any military blockade would require significant naval assets. Interrupting the oil flowing through Ariana's tanker fleet could cause significant problems to the Western world. (*See map of railroads and ports on page 2A-6-3.*)

PIPELINES

The security of hydrocarbon pipelines will be paramount in any military operations in the region. Any disruption to the flow of crude oil and natural gas to the Western world could cause economic problems, as many modern countries rely on hydrocarbons to fuel their industries.

Ariana maintains an extensive pipeline system that connects with other nations but also serves as an essential internal link to refining and export operations. Five major pipelines represent the backbone of the oil/gas movement system, with connectivity points to the international distribution network. Ariana maintains crude oil swap points with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to export its oil internationally and receives Kazakh or Turkmen oil for internal use. Local pipelines move oil and gas from field production centers to refineries or transshipment points. The security of Ariana's pipelines remains an important issue, as any disruption may affect America's allies.



TELECOMMUNICATIONS ARCHITECTURE

For the most part, Caucasus-region residents use cellular telephones to communicate with each other due to the lack of landline telephone infrastructure. Many residents never owned any type of telephone until they received their first cellular phone. Most can access news from either television or radio, but some rural residents have no information access via modern methods. (*See Information variable for additional details.*)

The majority of Arianian citizens can access a telephone, use the Internet, or listen to a television or radio broadcast. Ariana contains nearly as many operational telephones as people. For its population of 77.9 million, Ariana has 25 million landlines and 43 million cellular telephones. The Arianian government wants to extend service to all villages not presently connected to the telephone system.

Arianian Internet use continues to climb as over 46,000 Internet hosts operate in Ariana and over 23 million Arianians can assess the Internet. The Islamic Republic of Ariana Broadcasting (IRAB) operates five nationwide networks, including a news channel, over 30 provincial channels, and several international channels. While satellite dishes remain technically illegal, Arianians are able to obtain and operate them, and receive broadcasts from about 20 Persian-language stations in foreign countries. The IRAB also operates eight nationwide and numerous provincial radio networks. Arianian residents can also listen to many foreign radio stations. The military will find television and radio are excellent methods for communicating with the majority of Arianian citizens.

AGRICULTURE

Agriculture production still dominates the labor forces of Gorgas (55.6%) and Minaria (46.2%), but not Ariana (25%), Atropia (38.3%), or Donovia (20%). Even in the Caucasus region's predominately agricultural countries, farming creates less than one-fourth of the country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Except for Atropia, the region relies on food imports to feed its people. Any food import disruption may increase the military's burden to feed civilians and prevent starvation.

While 25% of workers are employed in agriculture-related jobs, agriculture generates only 11% of Ariana's GDP. While 10.9% of Arianian land is farmable, less than one-quarter of that amount is cultivated due to issues with salinity, irrigation, and other related infrastructure. Ariana irrigates one-third of its productive farm land. Cereal crops (wheat, barley, and rice) cover almost 70% of the cultivated land, with wheat alone as 52% of the cereal crops. Other important crops include pistachios, grapes, dates, citrus fruits, and apples. Because of availability issues, the military probably cannot rely on locally-produced foodstuffs to supplement the ration system.

INDUSTRY

Because of their hydrocarbon resources, Ariana, Atropia, and Donovia are more industrialized than Gorgas and Minaria. Industry GDP ranges from a low of 27.1% in Gorgas to a high of 61.4% in Atropia. Ariana's industry accounts for 45.9% of its GDP. The protection of the hydrocarbon infrastructure remains paramount for any military operations in the area, and the military should refrain from unnecessary damage to the industrial sector to facilitate economic recovery after the end of hostilities. Ariana produces a large amount of toxic industrial chemicals for multiple purposes, including hydrocarbon production activities, water purification, wastewater management, and fertilizer to increase agricultural output.

Oil/Gas

Despite its position as a global force in the world's oil and gas economy, uneven investment and a lack of modern infrastructure hobble the Arianian oil and gas industry. While Ariana has some of the largest known oil and gas reserves in the world, it lacks the ability to adequately refine the petroleum it produces. The National Arianian Oil Company (NAOC) is the world's second largest oil company, after Saudi Aramco, and maintains access to some of the world's largest proven reserves. The vast majority of Arianian oil and gas fields lie in Ariana's southwest coastal area. The NAOC operates a massive organization that controls most, if not all, of Ariana's important oil and gas production and logistical support elements. The NAOC generates most of Ariana's revenue. Ariana currently only produces four million bbl/day compared to six million bbl/d before the Revolution. The reduction is due to combined effects of damage from the Ariana-Iraq War, a lack of infrastructure investment, and Western sanctions. Because of a refinery capacity shortage and high levels of domestic use (like gasoline), Ariana functions as a net petroleum importer. Some consider Ariana's lack of refining capability as a significant Achilles heel for its economy. The Arianian government recently ear-marked \$15 billion for refinery modernization and development, but even this massive investment may not eliminate the Arianian refinery shortfall.

Ariana's major refineries include:

- Abaadan (400,000 bbl/d capacity)
- Isfahan (265,000 bbl/d)
- Bandar-e Abbas (232,000 bbl/d)
- Tehran (225,000 bbl/d)
- Arak (150,000 bbl/d)
- Tabriz (112,000 bbl/d)

Minor refineries include:

- Kermancha
- Shiraz
- Lavan Island

Ariana plans additional refineries, modernization, or expansion at the following locations:

- Bandar-e Abbas
- Abaadan

Arianian oil and gas exploitation capability will drive the country's economy for the indefinite future. Authorities will need to continue balancing oil and gas reinvestment requirements with the need for oil and gas to provide financial security for the rest of the country's economy.

Defense Industries

In the last decade, Ariana took significant steps to create a domestic arms and military equipment manufacturing capability. The government took great pains to demonstrate its ability to indigenously produce aircraft and other high-profile items, and more importantly, Ariana reverse-engineered and produced Arianian versions of capable weapons such as the AH-1J Cobra helicopter gunship (referred to as the Panha 2091 by the Arianians) and the TOW antitank missile. The Arianians also attempted to provide depot and higher level maintenance for their aircraft through a variety of aviation companies, many owned by the Arianian government or senior Arianian military leaders.

Ariana's four important defense industries are:

- Defense Industries Organization: manufactures a wide range of ground and naval combat systems, from small arms to light naval combat systems
- Ariana Electronics Industries: produces radar, telecommunications, optics, electronic warfare, and related systems; organizationally subordinate to the Defense Industries Organization
- Ariana Aviation Industries Organization: provides aircraft maintenance, component replacement, and overhaul
- Aerospace Industries Organization: concerned with ballistic missile and rocket design, manufacturing, testing, and production

The Arianian defense industry has attempted to build an indigenous industry capable of simultaneously producing advanced equipment for its own forces and exporting weapons abroad. While UN sanctions limit Ariana's ability to export weapons, the country's engineers successfully developed sophisticated systems, such as battlefield radars and missile technology, for foreign sale and domestic use. The Arianian Shahab-3, developed with Donovian, North Korean, and Chinese assistance, offers Arianian leaders a capable intermediate-range missile. Arianian engineers reportedly are planning to reverse-engineer Donovian rocket motor designs to develop a new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) with a range of 3,107 miles that could target most of Europe with a nuclear warhead.

Nuclear

The Arianian nuclear program began in the 1950s as a research- and medical isotope-oriented program under the Pasha. With US support, the Pasha intended to eventually mature the activities into a large nuclear power program. In the aftermath of the Council of Guardians Revolution, however, the nuclear program went dormant in the 1980s, with little activity in the midst of the eight-year Ariana-Iraq War. In the early 1990s—with foreign technical assistance from Argentina, China, Donovia, and Germany—the nascent Arianian nuclear program blossomed from an almost abandoned and forgotten imperial legacy to a primary element of Ariana's internal and external political and military arenas. Open source reporting suggests that a shadow organization, the Arianian Energy Commission (AEC), functions as the center of the Arianian nuclear program. Fohsen Makhrizadeh, an Arianian military officer and university lecturer, leads the AEC. AEC is the latest name for the Arianian clandestine nuclear weapons development program that Arianians refer to as the “Physics Research Center” or the “Organization for Planning of Special Supply.”

In 2002, more troubling aspects of the Arianian nuclear program came to light with the public exposure of the Arianian nuclear facilities at Natanz (a uranium enrichment facility) and Arak (a heavy water reactor), whose very existence indicated a significant nuclear weapons program. Recently, Ariana became the tenth country in the world to develop a nuclear weapon. Though less powerful in terms of kilowatts compared with other nuclear powers, Ariana now possesses a small number of tactical nuclear weapons.

Space

The Arianian government has launched an ambitious national space program to significantly increase Arianian prestige and technical capability. The Arianian national space program will provide an internationally acceptable means for Ariana to validate much of its long-range missile technology if it produces space launch vehicles (SLVs). Dual-use technology such as satellite-based communications, earth observation/remote sensing, and scientific experiments can also produce direct military spinoffs and applications.

The Arianian Space Agency, the government organization with primary responsibility for space operations, maintains a variety of current operational and developmental launchers and payloads. The Safir-2 SLV is the Arianians' current primary operational launcher, with the potential ability (with Safir-2 follow-ons) to put 300+ kilogram satellites into low-earth orbit. The Arianians have placed a variety of payloads in orbit, including first-generation communications, photographic, and scientific missions. Ariana will likely attempt to increase its booster rockets' throw weight as well as its satellites' capabilities and complexities.

POLLUTION

All five Caucasus-region countries face significant pollution problems stemming from poor industrial practices. The governments cared more about natural resource extraction and product production than the stewardship of the planet. This lack of concern for the environment occurred regardless of which government controlled the various countries. While the Western world greatly influenced Arianian oil and natural gas production techniques, the lack of spare parts since the Revolution created excess pollution. The region's military operations will need to address pollution, with soldiers taking precautions due to high levels of air pollution and units considering any local water source not potable until tested.

Ariana faces significant concerns regarding pollution from byproducts of industrialization, urbanization, and oil production. Due to vehicle air pollution, Tehran ranks as one of the most polluted cities in the world.

Summary

Ariana's oil and gas infrastructure does not operate at optimal efficiency due to a broad mix of equipment and technology from several foreign countries and a lack of spare parts for some of its Western equipment. The Arianian hydrocarbon industry continues to rely on technology that is over 40 years old and susceptible to mechanical breakdown. While Ariana continues to build new infrastructure mainly in the form of pipelines to transport oil and natural gas around its country, the government spends its money on these new projects while failing to maintain the hydrocarbon infrastructure already in place.

TRADOC G-2

TRISA-THREATS

CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND THREAT INTEGRATION

DIRECTORATE (CTID)

PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT: ARIANA

Physical Environment: Ariana

The physical environment variable includes the geography and man-made structures as well as the climate and weather in the area of operations. This variable defines the physical circumstances and conditions that influence the execution of operations throughout the domains of air, land, and sea.



KEY FACTS:

REGION

- The Caucasus region covers the northern and southern portions of the Caucasus Mountains and its lowlands, and lies between Europe and Asia.

ARIANA

- Land and Caspian Sea borders allow Ariana direct access to all countries in the region save Gorgas.
- Poor terrain and lack of fertile agricultural land make the country dependent on imports to feed its population.

OPERATIONAL IMPACTS OF THE PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT VARIABLE IN THE OE:

REGION

- All countries in the region contain rugged mountain ranges that will hamper ground movement.
- The Black and Caspian Seas play an important role in regional movement of persons and goods.

ARIANA

- Rugged terrain makes Ariana ill-suited for armored or mechanized operations.
- Ariana's control of the Strait of Hormuz gives the country political and economic leverage over its Persian Gulf neighbors.

PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT OVERVIEW:

Over 200,000 square miles comprise the Caucasus, a mountainous region located between the Black Sea and Caspian Sea. The Caucasus includes Atropia, Minaria, and Gorgas, as well as parts of Ariana, Donovia, and Kemalia. The Caucasus Mountains, consisting of the Greater and Lesser Caucasus ranges, traditionally form the separation between Europe and Asia. The Caucasus region contains two major parts—the North Caucasus and the South Caucasus—that are divided by the Greater Caucasus Mountains. The North Caucasus region is contained entirely within Donovia, while the South Caucasus contains Gorgas, Minaria, Atropia, and parts of Ariana and Kemalia.


TERRAIN

Mountains and deserts form the majority of Ariana. A high plateau with vast sand deserts dominates eastern Ariana. High mountains such as the Zagros and Elburz mountain ranges encompass most of north-central, western, and southwestern parts of the country.

Ariana's total land area is 636,372 square miles located between two major depressions, with the Caspian Sea to the north and the Persian Gulf to the south. The rocky terrain located along most of Ariana's borders extends well into the nation's interior, making Ariana one of the world's most mountainous countries. Ariana's topography contains three principal regions: the mountain ranges, the lowlands, and the Arianian Plateau (also referred to as the Central Plateau).

BODIES OF WATER

Out of Ariana's 636,372 square miles, water constitutes only a little over 45,000 square miles. Major Arianian rivers include the Karun, the Sefid-Rud, the Haraz, the Qom, and the Zayandeh. The Karun River, located in southwest Ariana, represents Ariana's longest and only navigable river, and runs 515 miles through the country. Lake Urmia represents Ariana's and the Middle East's largest lake and the world's third largest salt lake. Located in northwestern Ariana near Kemalia, it covers an area that varies from 2,000 to 3,000 square miles.



MOBILITY CLASSIFICATION

Ariana's rugged terrain favors the defender, and the military will generally find the country ill-suited to armored or mechanized operations, particularly in the coastal regions. Travelers can only access most high basin areas through winding, narrow mountain passes.

Ariana's desert and mountains will complicate cross-country movement. The Zagros Mountains in the western half of the country prohibit vehicular travel. Equipment and vehicles will get stuck in muddy areas created at the base of the mountains by snow melt and spring rains. In heavy rains, southwestern Ariana's marshlands and rivers can flood and bring ground movement to a halt. The rugged mountains, due to their location, are an excellent place for smugglers of drugs, weapons, and fighters. The mountainous terrain will make vehicle breakdowns and tire changes a daily occurrence.

NATURAL HAZARDS

The most common natural hazards in Ariana include dust and sand storms, mirages, and earthquakes. The frequency and severity of dust and sand storms in Ariana depend on surface wind strength and topography. The Dastet Plain in the southwest often develops dust storms due to its soil. The southern coast, inland desert, and semi-desert areas remain subject to sand storms. Dust and sand storms occur in the interior for an average of five to ten days monthly. In winter, cold fronts or thunderstorms lift these storms over wide, dry areas. In summer, the most severe dust and sand storms occur in the heat of the day and make any type of travel impossible. The storms can even eliminate visibility. Dust and sand storms mostly occur in the spring and summer seasons, and people will stay inside unless absolutely necessary and wear a mask while outdoors.

Mirages accompany aridity and heat in the flat interior and southern parts of Ariana. Mirages pose no threat to aerial observation due to the mirage's moderate intensity of 16 to 33 feet. On the ground, however, mirages pose an obstacle to ground visibility as the outlines of objects become obscured. Mirages interfere with depth perception as they make objects appear closer to the eye.

Ariana, with its massive mountain ranges, finds itself at the center of an active earthquake zone, with the most vulnerable zone in the northwest. In the last two decades of the 20th century, at least 1,000 measurable earthquakes hit northwestern Ariana. On average, Ariana suffers about 100 earthquakes in any given year. Also on average, Ariana has received at least one earthquake of magnitude equal or greater than 6.0 on the Richter scale in every year for the last century. The frequency of serious earthquakes in northwest Ariana puts the approximately 12 million people in the urban area of Tehran in an extremely vulnerable position. Experts contend that if a major earthquake hit Tehran, thousands or perhaps tens of thousands would die. Most of these people live in poorly-built high-rise apartments or cheaply constructed mud-brick buildings.

VEGETATION

LAND COVER


Except for the lush forests that cover the Elburz Mountains' northern slopes, Ariana contains few forested areas. The deserts in central Ariana receive only a few inches of rain annually, and the scant moisture does not allow soil formation or much vegetation growth. The most common vegetation patterns in the Caspian Sea coastal region include thorny shrubs and ferns; broad-leaf deciduous trees such as oak and beech, and a few broad-leaf evergreens. In the Zagros Mountains, semi-humid oak forests grow along with elm and maple trees. Thin strands of juniper, almond, and wild fruit trees are found in the semi-dry plateau. Grasses and thorny shrubs cover steppes, while acacia and palms often grow in areas below 3,000 feet. (*See map on the following page.*)

AGRICULTURE

Although arable farmland only accounts for 10.9% of all Arianian territory, agriculture employs 25% of the labor force. Out of the total arable farmland available, Arianians cultivate less than a quarter due to poor soil conditions and lack of adequate water distribution. Arianian farmers irrigate one-third of the cultivated land and dry farm (rain-feed) the remainder. Arianian irrigation methods include diversion of rivers through deep wells. Ariana's western and northwestern areas possess the most fertile soils.


Ariana's wide temperature variations and its multiplicity of climatic zones make it possible to cultivate a diverse variety of crops such as rice, wheat, corn, barley, dates, figs, tea, tobacco, vegetables, and cotton. Barley, wheat, and rice dominate Arianian agricultural output. Arianians grow wheat and barley throughout the country in both rain-fed and irrigated areas, but limit rice production to the moist areas that border the Caspian Sea. Because of its large population, Ariana

must import a significant amount of food, particularly rice and wheat. Ariana claims the title of the world's largest pistachio nut producer. Nuts and dried fruits comprise Ariana's third most important export after oil and gas.



CLIMATE

The country's diverse topography contributes to a climate subject to extreme variation. The climate ranges from subtropical in the south to subpolar at high elevations. Summer and winter can generate extreme temperatures of hot and cold respectively. Rainfall mainly occurs in spring. Ariana experiences all four seasons: spring lasts from March to June, summer until September, fall occurs between September and December, and winter takes place from December to March. (*See map on the following page.*)



SEASONS

Country/Season	Winter	Spring	Summer	Fall
Ariana	Dec – Feb	Mar – May	Jun – Aug	Sep – Nov
Atropia	Jan – Mar	Mar – End May	Jun – Oct	Mid Oct – Dec
Gorgas	Dec – Feb	Mar – May	Jun – Aug	Sep – Nov
Minaria	Nov – Mar	Mar – May	Jun – Sep	End Sep – Nov
North Caucasus (Donovia)	Dec – Mar	Apr – May	Jun – Sep	Oct – Nov

Seasons for Ariana, Atropia, Gorgas, Minaria, and North Caucasus (Donovia)

WEATHER

PRECIPITATION

Most of Ariana's precipitation falls in the spring months. Ariana's national annual precipitation averages only about 14 inches. The Caspian Sea coastal region receives the country's greatest annual precipitation, which varies from 32 to 80 inches. With the exception of the high mountain valleys of the Zagros and Caspian coastal plain, little precipitation occurs throughout the rest of the country. The highest western slopes of the Zagros Mountains receive more than 40 inches of rain annually. Fewer than four inches of rain fall annually over the Dash-e Lut and Dash-e Kavir deserts. Heavy winter snow in the mountains combined with spring rains cause annual floods in parts of Ariana.

Torrential rains in dry seasons or parched areas may rapidly fill *wadis* (dry streambeds) with runoff water that causes flash floods.

TEMPERATURE-HEAT INDEX

Seasonal winds, elevations, and proximity to deserts or mountain ranges play a significant role in daily and seasonal temperature fluctuation. The extreme hot temperatures in the summer, partnered with dangerous winds, will make troop mobility slow, difficult, and limited. The harsh conditions will make operating in the area a challenge.

In the summer, daytime temperatures drop as low as 35°F in the mountains of the northwest region but can run as high as 120°F in the desert regions and near the Persian Gulf. In addition to the heat, summers occur without any precipitation. The south, especially near the Persian Gulf, possesses a reputation for its unpleasant climate. Hot and humid summers, with temperatures that can reach 123°F in Dastet province by the gulf, can make outside work difficult. Excessive heat and high humidity in Dastet makes the weather almost unbearable to people from other parts of the country. The heat can cause heat cramps, heat exhaustion, and even heatstroke.

TEMPERATURE-WIND CHILL INDEX

In winter, Ariana experiences temperatures at or below freezing. The northwest usually has the coldest winters, with heavy snows and subfreezing temperatures in December and January.

RELATIVE HUMIDITY

Relative humidity varies throughout Ariana. The central portion of the country experiences low relative humidity year-round, while the coastal areas near the Persian Gulf and the Caspian coast are known for their high humidity, especially during the summer months. The Zagros and Elburz mountain ranges experience higher humidity during the spring rains, but are relatively dry during the rest of the year.

WIND

The *baad-e sad-o-bist rooseh* (wind of 120 days) wind occurs during the hot summer days and carries sand particles. With a velocity of 70 miles per hour, the wind blows toward the province of Akroideh in the southeast, destroys plants and vegetation, strips away soil, and damages buildings and livestock. Traveling is limited and dust particles clog air intakes on cars and other vehicles. The dust also works its way into machinery of all kinds.

Large dust and sand storms in desert areas in the center of the country can limit visibility and adversely affect equipment and machinery. The storms carry dust and/or sand particles in the air and sometimes the dust becomes suspended in the air. Upsweeps and downdrafts also spread dust in the atmosphere in the summer, creating haze after strong storms. The storms cloud visibility, damage machinery and equipment, ruin electrical circuits, and wear away textiles.

Summary

The Caucasus region, containing the Greater and Lesser Caucasus Mountains, forms the traditional division between Europe and Asia. All countries contain different weather and terrain, and soldiers must prepare for seasonal extremes—winter and summer. Areas with flat plains and valleys, such as coastal plains, will favor troop mechanized movement. The mountainous regions, especially in the

Greater and Lesser Caucasus Mountains, will compound vehicle and equipment breakdowns. Numerous roads, already in poor condition in most of the countries, will become inaccessible for vehicular traffic because of winter snow. Military planners will need to anticipate the closure of mountain passes for up to six months a year due to snow.

TRADOC G-2

TRISA-THREATS

CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND THREAT INTEGRATION

DIRECTORATE (CTID)

TIME: ARIANA

Time: Ariana

The time variable describes the timing and duration of activities, events, or conditions within an OE, as well as how the timing and duration of events are perceived by various actors in the OE.

KEY FACTS:

REGION

- All five countries have ancient cultures, and rivalries generated over that time between different ethnic groups still exist.
- Most people in the region do not view time as a resource, but as something that people cannot control.

ARIANA

- Ariana uses three calendars: the solar (Persian), the lunar (Islamic), and the Gregorian (Western).
- Arianians use the solar, lunar, or Gregorian calendar based upon the event.

OPERATIONAL IMPACTS OF THE TIME VARIABLE IN THE OE:

REGION

- The lack of a sense of urgency for most people will frustrate the US as it deals with allied militaries in the Caucasus region.
- The US will most likely find opportunities to exploit the lackadaisical attitude about time to get inside the enemy military's decision cycle.

ARIANA

- The US must understand the Islamic calendar and its holiday schedule to take advantage of its effects on Arianian politicians and military personnel.
- Not all Muslims celebrate the same holidays or celebrate the same event at the same time.

TIME OVERVIEW:

The Caucasus countries, for the most part, do not believe in the sensitivity of time, and do not view punctuality or the importance of time as the US and most other Western countries do. Most of the people in the region do not view time as a resource and do not feel any compulsion to effectively manage their time. The people in the Caucasus region do not make the connection between effective use of their time and production. This lack of time consciousness will likely frustrate US soldiers as they work with their allies, but it will also give the US a battlefield advantage against its enemies.

KEY DATES, TIME PERIODS OR EVENTS

The entire region's recorded history extends back at least 3,000 years, but people populated the area long before that time as indicated by the archaeological objects discovered in caves and at other long-inhabited sites.

Arianian history dates back over 2,500 years to the ancient Persian Empire. Events over the past 25 centuries created an Arianian mindset of cultural superiority, and Arianians believe one day they will regain a position of global authority and dominance. During the 7th century, Arabs introduced Islam to the Persians, often forcibly converting Arianians. Shia Islam became the dominant religion in Ariana beginning in 1505. Shia Islam profoundly impacted the Persian culture and continues to affect Ariana today. Religion significantly influences almost every one of Ariana's vital cultural institutions, to include its government and military.

ROUTINE, CYCLICAL KEY DATES

TRADITIONAL WEDDING SEASONS

Due to the heavy Muslim influence, most people will not marry in the month of Ramadan. Some areas extend the time for prohibition against marriage to even longer periods, but it usually depends on the devoutness of the region's inhabitants.

Since Muslims base Ramadan on a lunar cycle, Ramadan, as well as the entire Islamic calendar, moves 10-11 days earlier each year. While some Muslims base Ramadan on the sighting of the moon from Mecca, others base it on the sighting at their own location. Due to a difference in the view of the moon from one's location on earth, Ramadan can actually begin and end on different dates in various parts of the world.

NATIONAL AND RELIGIOUS HOLIDAYS

Ariana uses three different calendars—solar, lunar, and Gregorian—to determine holidays. Since the lunar calendar moves 10-11 days earlier each year, the months of the year will move from season to season. Individuals must know when the New Year starts in Ariana to determine when holidays will take place.

The Arianian solar calendar begins on the vernal or spring equinox each year, when day and night each last the same amount of time. This occurs on 21 March, give or take one day.

Arianians also use the lunar calendar, based upon the moon's phases. Because 12 of the moon's 28-day orbits around the earth do not equal a solar year, the Islamic calendar moves through the seasons. One cannot associate any Islamic month with a particular season like those that use the solar or Gregorian calendar, even if the month's name harkens back to a particular time of the year. Islamic scholars base the start of each New Year on the actual sighting of the moon. Thus it is not possible to provide an exact Gregorian calendar date for future Islamic New Year's Days.

Lunar Month	Name	Remarks
1	Muharram	Second most sacred month of the year as the word <i>haram</i> means "forbidden." Some Muslims fast all month like in Ramadan while others fast only the first 10 days of the month, the 9th and 10th, or the 10th. The 10th of Muharram (Ashurah) commemorates Hussein ibn Ali, the grandson of Muhammad. Though fighting is forbidden during Muharram, this does not preclude fighting for the sake of Islam.
2	Safar	The root word <i>safr</i> means whistle, yellow, or empty depending on the context. The month received its name from the whistling of the wind in one of the windiest months of the year.

Lunar Month	Name	Remarks
3	Rabi' al-awwal	Original meaning of the month was the "first month of spring." Depending on a Muslim's sect, the birth date of the Prophet Muhammad is celebrated on either the 12th or 17th of the month.
4	Rabi' al-thani	Original meaning of the month was "second month of spring."
5	Jumada al-awwal	The month's name comes from the Arianian term for "parched earth," but it has lost its association with the dry season by the shifting of the months through the years.
6	Jumada al-thani	The month's name also comes from an Arianian word for "dry, parched land" but has since lost its actual meaning as it may actually occur in the rainy season.
7	Rajab	<i>Rajaba</i> means "respect" as Muslims begin to pray for Ramadan to arrive. Technically Muslims should not conduct war during this month, but exception is made if the warfare is for the cause of Islam.
8	Sha-aban	The month derives its name from the Arab word for "separation" as the clans would disperse to find water.
9	Ramadan	Most sacred of all months in Islam. Devout Muslims fast from sunup to sundown, avoiding all food and drink during daylight hours.
10	Shawwal	The month came from the word that meant "uplift" or "breakage." After the Eid ul-Fitr (the breaking of the Ramadan fast), some devout Muslims fast for the next 6 days while other Muslims fast for 6 non-consecutive days in the month.
11	Dhu al-Qi'dah	The month's name comes from the Arabic meaning "master of the truce" when Arabs did not conduct war. Technically Muslims should not conduct war during this month, but exception is made if the warfare is for the cause of Islam.
12	Dhu al-Hijjah	The month's name means "possessor of the pilgrimage" and the Hadj takes place on the 8th, 9th, and 10th of the month. This is the fourth and final month of the Islamic calendar during which devout Muslims are not to conduct warfare.

Arianians use the solar, lunar, or Gregorian calendar for significant dates, based upon the event. Holidays associated with religious or Council of Guardians Revolution events provide opportunities for Arianians to rally in support of or opposition to their government. Actual holidays based on the lunar calendar may fluctuate a day in either direction from what is listed below. In the month of Ramadan, very little activity takes place in daylight activities due to the requirement to fast.

Holiday	Date	Description	Western Dates
Nowrooz (Nowruz)	Farvardin 1-4 (21-24 March, +/- 1 day)	Arianian New Year.	21-24 March 2011 21-24 March 2012 21-24 March 2013
Islamic Republic Day	Farvardin 12	After a national referendum, Ayatollah Khodadad declared a new Arianian Islamic Republic.	01 April 2011 01 April 2012 01 April 2013
Nature Day (Sizde-Bedar)	Farvardin 13	Marks the end of the Persian New Year holiday season.	02 April 2011 02 April 2012 02 April 2013
Khodadad's Death	Khordad 14	Commemorates the death of Ayatollah Khodadad.	04 June 2011 04 June 2012 04 June 2013
Revolt of Khordad 15	Khordad 15	Commemorates the 3 June 1963 incarceration of the Ayatollah Khodadad by the Arianian government.	05 June 2011 05 June 2012 05 June 2013
Victory of the Revolution	22 Bahman	Celebration of the Council of Guardians victory over the Pasha.	11 February 2011 11 February 2012 11 February 2013
Nationalization of Oil Industry	29 Esfand	Commemorates the nationalization of Ariania's oil industry.	20 March 2011 20 March 2012 20 March 2013
Tasu'a of Imam Hussain	Muharram 9	Commemorates the attack on the camp of Muhammad's grandson.	04 December 2011 23 November 2012 12 October 2013

Holiday	Date	Description	Western Dates
Ashura of Imam Hussain	Muharram 10	Shia day of mourning; celebrates the martyrdom of Muhammad's grandson Hussein ibn Ali & his followers at the battle of Karbala; Shia communities reenact the day's events.	06 December 2011 24 November 2012 13 November 2013
Arba'een of Imam Hussain (Chelom)	Safar 20 (30 days after Ashura)	Commemorates the death of Muhammad's grandson.	06 January 2012 24 December 2012 13 December 2013
Demise of Prophet Muhammad (Mujtaba)	Safar 28	Commemorates the martyrdom of Muhammad & his grandson, Hassan.	1 February 2011 20 January 2012 09 January 2013
Martyrdom of Imam Reza	Safar 29	Commemorates the assassination & martyrdom of Imam Reza in 818.	02 February 2011 21 January 2012 10 January 2013
Birth of Muhammad & Imam Jafar	Rabi'-ul-Awwal 17	Commemorates the birth of both Muhammad in 570/571 AD & Imam Jafar 83 years after the founding of Islam.	16 February 2011 05 February 2012 24 January 2013
Martyrdom of Fatima	Jamaad-ath-Thaanee 3	Commemorates the death of Fatima, the daughter of Muhammad, in 632.	17 May 2013 17 May 2012 17 May 2013
Birth of Imam Ali	Rajab 13	Birthday of Imam Hazrat Ali.	15 June 2011 04 June 2012 24 May 2013
Mission of Muhammad	Rajab 27	Prophet Muhammad received his calling on this date.	29 June 2011 17 June 2012 06 June 2013
Birth of Imam Mahdi	Sha'aban 15	Commemorates the birth of Muhammad ibn al-Hasan al-Mahdi, who did not die but was hidden by God.	16 July 2011 05 July 2012 24 June 2013
Martyrdom of Imam Ali	Ramadan 21	Commemorates the death of Muhammad's cousin & son-in-law who the Shias believe was the original Imam.	21 August 2011 10 August 2012 31 July 2013
Eid ul-Fitr (End of Ramadan)	Shawwal 1	"Feast of Breaking the Fast" celebrates the end of Ramadan, the month of fasting.	31 August 2011 19 August 2012 08 August 2013
Martyrdom of Imam Jafar	Shawwal 25	Commemorates the death of Ja'far ibn Muhammad al-Sadiq, an Imam who was killed in December 765 AD.	24 September 2011 12 September 2012 01 September 2013
Eid-ul-Adha (Ghurban)	Dh-ul-Hajja 10	"Feast of the Sacrifice" celebrates Abraham's willingness to sacrifice his son to God; Muslims sacrifice a lamb & give 1/3 of the meat to the poor.	07 November 2011 26 October 2012 15 October 2013
Eid al-Ghadeer	Dh-ul-Hajja 18	Primary Shia Muslim holiday; celebrates the day the Prophet Muhammad gave his last instructions to his followers & named his successor.	14 November 2011 03 November 2012 23 October 2013

HARVEST CYCLES

Ariana's harvest cycle normally begins in May and lasts through August. The harvest cycle begins with lowland crops in southern provinces where they reach maturity first and continues north as the other areas reach harvest time. The harvest cycle tends to largely impact Ariana's rural population. Besides the actual harvest events in this period, other activities include the logistical support necessary to transport the crops from the rural areas to the urban cities. Planning, timing, and the weather determine whether Ariana realizes a successful harvest. The quality of the harvest impacts the entire country's population and not just the agricultural sector. (*See the Physical Environment variable for additional information on Ariana's agriculture and the country's seasons.*)

ELECTIONS

Ariana conducts elections every four years for most offices. Parliamentary elections occur every four years, with Presidential elections occurring every six years. There are no term limits in any elected office. Arianians also elect their city and village councils every four years. The people elect the Forum of Proficiency, the 86 Islamic scholars who select the Supreme Leader and Arianian head of state. Members of the Forum of Proficiency are elected for eight-year terms. While in theory the Forum of Proficiency is supposed to monitor the Supreme Leader, in practice they are only legally required to meet for two days, twice per year, and they usually do not discuss anything related to the Supreme Leader. All candidates must receive the approval of the Guardian Leadership Council to run for any office. In January 2007, Ariana raised the minimum voting age from 15 years old to 18 years old.

CULTURAL PERCEPTION OF TIME

Most of the Caucasus area does not perceive the importance of time as the Western world does, especially as it relates to business. The more a country interacts with Western nations, however, the more the country accepts the Western idea of the importance of time.

While Westerners take time commitments such as deadlines and schedules very seriously, in the Caucasus time commitments are seen more as an objective to be achieved, if possible, rather than a requirement. Promptness is based on relationships. In the West, time is money. In the Caucasus, there is no problem with making people wait all day, and then telling them to come back the next day. A person from the Caucasus will be much more likely to be on time if the person who set the time commitment is close to him, such as a friend or family member. Business is conducted more on the basis of personal relationships than on respect for time.

Arianian society is not as sensitive to time when compared to the Western perception of time and accountability. The Arianians' perception of time is more relaxed, both in the business setting as well as in their leisure hours. Many Arianians deem that personal requirements, needs, or desires take precedence over schedules, other people's time, business, or appointments.

Arianians view time as less important than other factors, which is evident even when dealing with planning military operations. Arianian leaders value the process of planning over meeting a deadline imposed by an outside schedule. The concept of time, however, stretches across all aspects of their society. Three different calendars characterize the Arianians' unique cultural concept of time.

TACTICAL EXPLOITATION OF TIME

CAUCASUS PERCEPTION OF TIME

For the most part, people in the Caucasus perceive time as an unimportant resource in their lives. They believe that things will occur whether they take proactive action or not. Each country in the region possesses a long history, and people believe that their country will continue well into the future. Most of the people in the region look back to times when their ethnic group held the upper hand in interactions with their neighbors and hope that one day their country can become the dominant power again. The people do not look at time in the short-term, but look forward to the long-term when conditions will again allow them to take their rightful place among the world's leaders. For Ariana and Atropia, their hydrocarbon resources may provide them the impetus to become a regional—if not world—power. For Gorgas and Minaria, their lack of natural resources will continue to plague their countries' ability to improve their situation in the short-term. Donovia wishes to regain the dominant regional influence it once commanded.

US PERCEPTION OF TIME

The time perception of allies in the region will frustrate the US, but the US can also take advantage of the lack of urgency of any enemies in the area. The US will need to help its regional allies understand that time is a precious resource that once wasted can never be recovered. Punctuality and a sense of urgency remain essential for a military to defeat the enemy on the battlefield. Due to the enemy's lack of a timetable and its apathetic disregard for punctuality, US forces and their allies will most likely find opportunities to get inside the enemy leaders' decision cycles. Rapid US and allied action will cause the enemy to react to their actions instead of the enemy taking the initiative.

Summary

For the most part, the Caucasus countries view time differently than the US. Time is relatively unimportant to the people of Ariana, Atropia, Gorgas, and Minaria in almost every aspect of their lives. They lack a sense of urgency to accomplish tasks, in complete contrast to the Western world where almost everyone wants to accomplish as much as possible in as little time as possible. While the Donovian view of time is closer to that of the US than the other nations of the Caucasus, it is still notably different. All five cultures contain an extensive history dating back centuries and the people feel that whatever they do, their country will continue into the future. The area's perception of time will cause the US to become frustrated with its allies, but will provide opportunities for exploitation of US enemies. To do so, however, the US will need to understand the nuances as each country perceives the relative importance of time somewhat differently.

TRADOC G-2

TRISA-THREATS

CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND THREAT INTEGRATION

DIRECTORATE (CTID)


ORDER OF BATTLE: ARIANA


Introduction to the Ariana Order of Battle


ORDERS OF BATTLE

All five countries have an administrative force structure (AFS) to manage their military forces in peacetime. This AFS is the aggregate of various military headquarters, facilities, and installations designed to man, train, equip, and sustain the forces. In peacetime, forces are commonly grouped into divisions, corps, or armies for administrative purposes. The AFS includes all components of the armed forces—not only regular, standing forces (active component), but also reserve and militia forces (reserve component). Normally, these administrative groupings differ from the country's order of battle (OB), which is its go-to-war (fighting) force structure that is task-organized to meet the combat situation.


The following pages outline the Arianian AFS. For information on how to use the AFS to obtain an OB, see Appendix B: OPFOR Task-Organizing for Combat on page 4-B-1.


Supreme High Command

1st Mechanized Infantry Army


11th Mechanized Infantry Division (IFV), 1st Army


12th Motorized Infantry Division, 1st Army





14th Motorized Infantry Division, 1st Army


13th Mechanized Infantry Division (APC), 1st Army



301st Separate Motorized Infantry Brigade, 1st Army


303rd Separate Mechanized Infantry Brigade (APC), 1st Army

305th Separate Tank Brigade (124-Tank), 1st Army


307th Reconnaissance Brigade, 1st Army

Ariana


309th Antitank Brigade, 1st Army




311th Combat Helicopter Brigade, 1st Army




313th Combat Helicopter Brigade, 1st Army



15th Artillery Command, 1st Army




1st Reconnaissance Intelligence Surveillance Target Acquisition Command, 1st Army




Ariana

1st Traffic Control Brigade, 1st Army




315th Materiel Support Brigade, 1st Army




Ariana

1st Engineer Command, 1st Army




Ariana


3251st Special-Purpose Forces (SPF) Brigade, 1st Army



16th Air Defense Command, 1st Army




317th Chemical Protection Brigade, 1st Army




Ariana

319th Smoke Brigade, 1st Army




Ariana

91st UAV Battalion, 1st Army





31st Signal Brigade, 1st Army





Ariana


21st Medical Battalion, 1st Army





2nd Mechanized Infantry Army


17th Mechanized Infantry Division (IFV), 2nd Army


18th Motorized Infantry Division, 2nd Army

20th Motorized Infantry Division, 2nd Army

19th Mechanized Infantry Division (APC), 2nd Army


300th Separate Mechanized Infantry Brigade APC, 2nd Army

302nd Separate Mechanized Infantry Brigade (IFV), 2nd Army

304th Separate Tank Brigade (124-Tank), 2nd Army


Ariana

306th Reconnaissance Brigade, 3rd Mech Inf, 2nd Army




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308th Antitank Brigade, 2nd Army




Ariana

310th Combat Aviation Brigade, 2nd Army




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
312th Combat Aviation Brigade, 2nd Army



21st Artillery Command, 2nd Army




2nd Reconnaissance Intelligence Surveillance Target Acquisition Command, 2nd Army




Ariana

2nd Traffic Control Brigade, 2nd Army




314th Materiel Support Brigade, 2nd Army




Ariana

2nd Engineer Command, 2nd Army




Ariana

3241st Special-Purpose Forces (SPF) Brigade, 2nd Army




Ariana

22nd Air Defense Command, 2nd Army




316th Chemical Protection Brigade, 2nd Army




Ariana

318th Smoke Brigade, 2nd Army




Ariana

92nd UAV Battalion, 2nd Army




32nd Signal Brigade, 2nd Army





Ariana


2nd Medical Battalion





3rd Mechanized Infantry Army





23rd Mechanized Infantry Division (IFV), 3rd Army


24th Motorized Infantry Division, 3rd Army


26th Motorized Infantry Division, 3rd Army

25th Mechanized Infantry Division (APC), 3rd Army


345th Separate Motorized Infantry Brigade, 3rd Army

347th Separate Mechanized Infantry Brigade (IFV)

349th Separate Tank Brigade (124-Tank)


351st Reconnaissance Brigade, 3rd Mech Inf Army

353rd Antitank Brigade, AT Brigade, Division & EAD




Ariana

355th Combat Aviation Brigade, 3rd Army




Ariana

357th Combat Aviation Brigade, 3rd Army




Ariana

27th Artillery Command, 3rd Army




3rd Reconnaissance Intelligence Surveillance Target Acquisition Command, 3rd Army




Ariana

3rd Traffic Control Brigade, 3rd Army




359th Materiel Support Brigade, Echelons Above Division




Ariana

3rd Engineer Command, 3rd Army




Ariana

3691st Special-Purpose Forces (SPF) Brigade, 3rd Army




Ariana

28th Air Defense Command, 3rd Army




Ariana

361st Chemical Protection Brigade, 3rd Army




Ariana

363rd Smoke Brigade, 3rd Army




Ariana

93rd UAV Battalion, 3rd Army





33rd Signal Brigade, 3rd Army




Ariana


3rd Medical Battalion, 6th Militia Command




91st Tank Division


92nd Motorized Infantry Division

99th Special-Purpose Forces Command





96th Airborne Infantry Division

93rd Artillery Command




94th Surface to Surface Missile Command




9th Information Warfare Brigade, Southern Army

7th Air Defense Command




9th Engineer Command





Ariana


9th Integrated Support Command



98th Internal Security Forces



Air Force

Ariana Navy

Total number of Surface Craft ----- 120
 Total number of Submarines ----- 6
 Total number of SSM Launchers ----- 36
 (includes coastal defense launchers)

TRADOC G-2

TRISA-THREATS

CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND THREAT INTEGRATION

DIRECTORATE (CTID)

OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

ASSESSMENT: ATROPIA

TRADOC G-2

TRISA-THREATS

CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND THREAT INTEGRATION

DIRECTORATE (CTID)

POLITICAL: ATROPIA

Political: Atropia

The political variable describes the distribution of responsibility and power at all levels of governance—formally constituted authorities, as well as informal or covert political powers.

KEY FACTS:

REGION

- Every country in the region has a center of political power wildly dissimilar from its neighbor.
- Ethnic nationalism and identity politics generate most conflicts in the region.

ATROPIA

- Atropia's government is a neutral, national-level dictatorship.
- The Artzak conflict permeates Atropian public consciousness. To improve Atropian regional power and status, President Salam Ismailov signed an agreement with Minaria to find a “political” solution for the unsolved Artzak issues.
- Even though Atropia attempts to follow a secular-Muslim model, few civil liberties exist in Atropia and the people’s human rights suffer. Atropian security forces and the Ismailov political machine root out any serious dissent and liquidate the opposition.
- The South Atropian People’s Army is the largest insurgency within Atropia.

OPERATIONAL IMPACTS OF THE POLITICAL VARIABLE IN THE OE:

REGION

- Despite Western influence, political maneuvering is frequently seen as a natural precursor to brutal purges.
- Any negotiations will have to include very intrusive methods of verification.

ATROPIA

- President Salam Ismailov continues to contain extreme elements of Islamic fundamentalism. Although predominately Shia Muslim, the country practices a more secular, less radicalized version than Ariana. Shia Islam in Atropia does not exercise the political influence it does in Ariana or other Middle Eastern nations.
- Atropia does not possess a political history of liberal government with fully-functioning civil liberties.
- Atropia bears much unfocused anger about the Artzak region, which is controlled by Minaria.

POLITICAL OVERVIEW:

Atropia is a neutral, Western-leaning dictatorship centered on the Ismailov family. While not a broadly democratic state, Atropia is secularized, and the population enjoys a high standard of living by regional standards due to oil revenue. Government repression is limited, although some degree of censorship exists. Corruption is extensive and creates a reformist desire in the population who, while

accepting of the Ismailov family dominance, would like greater freedom of expression and less official corruption.

CENTERS OF POLITICAL POWER

The Ismailov family controls modern Atropia and exercises political power based on a network of political, economic, judicial, and social associations that frequently involve organized crime. Corruption remains common and permeates the entire Atropian society. Although institutional processes exist, Atropians often circumvent the system to reach deals that reap better benefits for themselves. Many power bases depend on one's region, economic livelihood, social associations, etc., and operate in a symbiotic relationship with other power structures, legal or otherwise. Atropian politics function through a decentralized structure, but a few exceptional points do exist. One of the most important associations on the national stage centers on the Ismailov family with its connections in political, economic, social, and most other important facets of Atropian life.

MILITARY AUTHORITY

The Ismailov family closely controls the army, Atropia's primary military force. Along with the defense of the country's borders, the military possesses the mission to support the government's desire to re-establish Atropian territorial integrity over territories lost to ethnic Minarian separatists in the Artzak region. The Atropian Air Force and the Air Defense Force are subordinate to the ground forces. The Navy and the Maritime Border Guards protect Atropia's territorial waters in the Caspian Sea, often violated in the past by Arianian military vessels and oil exploration related survey ships.

FAMILY AUTHORITY



The Ismailov family continues as the center of power in Atropia, headed by the current president, Salam Ismailov. Salam's father, Hazi Ismailov, the deceased patriarch of the family, established the powerbase that continues Salam's current control of Atropia. Hazi created the modern Atropian state and solidified his position with the support primarily of Atropi intelligence agencies, which passed their loyalty to his son on Hazi Ismailov's death.

RELIGIOUS/CLERICAL AUTHORITY

Although Atropia is predominately Shia Muslim, the country practices a more secular, less radicalized version than Ariana. Shia Islam in Atropia does not possess the political influence it does

in Ariana or other Middle Eastern nations. While religious figures have been part of reformist demonstrations, the Atropian government maintains veto power on the selection of Shia Muslim religious leaders allowed to publically preach in Atropia.

ATTITUDES TOWARD THE US

Despite disfavor with Atropia's domestic policies and actions, the US generally favors Atropia as a counterbalance to Arianian and Donovian influence in the Caspian Sea region and as the largest export market for its petroleum resources. In April 2006, Salam Ismailov met President George W. Bush in an official state visit in which Bush hailed the strong relations with Atropia, a recognition of the strategic position Atropia gives the US in the region. Atropian troops continue to deploy in support of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Atropia also grants extensive freedom for US forces to use Atropian military facilities for multiple purposes to include logistics and flight routes. Atropia welcomes the growth of investment in its industries, especially hydrocarbon, and seeks to use its newfound economic clout to create an identity as an independent regional power.

ATTITUDE TOWARD US TRADE

Atropia currently welcomes and encourages US trade. Donovia and Ariana exert much influence on the Caucasus economic system and may affect the future of US trade in the region, especially in the hydrocarbon industry. Atropia views access to Western markets for its oil as its most important trade and political objective.

TYPE OF GOVERNMENT

The Republic of Atropia bases its government upon a 1995 constitution that articulates a republican form of government with three independent branches—the legislative, the judicial, and the executive. The Atropian constitution created a strong presidential system with a subordinate prime minister and a unicameral legislature. In theory, the branches balance each other's power like in the US. In reality, however, the president functions as the most powerful entity and controls the country's operations and policies. The judiciary and legislature do not possess the necessary power to seriously check the executive branch.

Under the guidance of Salam Ismailov's Republican Party of Democracy (RPD), Atropia functions effectively as a one-party state. Although the constitution creates a multi-party state, the RPD dominates political life. Opposition party representation in the parliament amounts to less than 10% of the assembly.



Official Flag of Atropia

BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT

Legislative Authority

Atropians elect a unicameral legislature of 125 members through direct voting based on districts. Each district elects one member. Each member serves a two-year term, with a limit of four consecutive terms in office. Prior to the 2005 elections, the assembly contained members directly elected via their district and a popular party vote. A 2002 constitutional amendment altered the arrangement to provide for only direct election based on districts, but kept the same total number of representatives.

Executive Authority

The executive branch functions as the center of Atropian government and wields effective control over both the legislative and judicial branches. The Atropian president, elected by popular vote, serves a five-year term. Subsequent to the constitutional reform in 2009, the president may now serve more than two terms, the previous limit. The Atropian president appoints a prime minister and cabinet ministers who require the approval of parliament. Additionally, the president also serves as commander in chief of the Atropian armed forces.

Judicial Authority

Nominally independent of the legislative and executive branch, the president heavily influences the Atropian judicial branch. The Atropian president appoints members of the Constitutional Court and Supreme Court, who are confirmed by parliamentary assent. Due to near-total control of the parliament by the president's ruling party, however, the legislative branch rubber-stamps Ismailov's choices. The Atropian constitution stipulates no requirement for parliamentary approval for lower courts, and the president possesses the freedom to make those appointments as he desires. In addition, the Atropian government controls the appointments of prosecutors at the local, regional, and national levels.


GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESS AND LEGITIMACY

Atropia demonstrates a mixed record when it comes to its legitimacy. Internationally, no country questions the legitimacy of Atropia's territorial sovereignty except for its dispute with Minaria over Artzak. The largest international issue involves Atropia's attempt to establish itself as a state free of interference from its much more powerful neighbors, Donovia and Ariana, and to create its own independent identity in the international realm. Many international organizations, however, continue to criticize Atropia's shortfalls in the adherence of the government to the rule of law and the protection of its citizens' civil liberties.

DOMESTIC POLITICAL ISSUES

Elections

Nearly all countries in the Caucasus possess a history of suspicious election practices followed by popular uprisings that meet varying degrees of success. From the peaceful revolutions in Gorgas, riots in Atropia, assassinations of political rivals in Minaria, to widespread crackdowns and the "disappearance" of opponents in Ariana, observers always consider elections a potential flashpoint. Elections occur every two years for legislative positions, while presidential elections occur every six years. There is a four consecutive term limit for parliament seats, but no such limitations on executive positions.



Rule of Law

Due to the relative youth of the respective judicial branches in the Caucasus, powerful people still overshadow the rule of law, as many governmental leaders do whatever keeps them rich and powerful. Corruption of law enforcement personnel pervades the region, as loyalties apply more to individuals or groups of people as opposed to something as ethereal as a constitution.

Corruption

What Western eyes perceive as corruption is in reality a carefully-cultivated survival mechanism born of decades under dictatorial rule. In an environment where the government encouraged family members to betray their relatives for small benefits, the people consider relationships as a resource while they avoid interaction with the state at all costs. Thus, a high level of official corruption exists in Atropia. Most official acts and access to government services require the payment of some level of bribe. Corruption is the single-largest threat to government legitimacy in Atropia.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS

REGIONAL ACTORS

Atropia finds itself in minor but active hostilities with Minaria, with regular sniping and small-scale skirmishes along the Artzak contact line. Atropians remain wary of Arianian pressure in the Caspian Sea and will strongly react to the perception of any country that condones the Minarian occupation of Artzak. Significant tension exists between Ariana and Atropia despite a shared religion and history. The shared Atropian population (Ariana's largest minority) does not provide for channels of goodwill, but suspicion, despite the significant integration of Atropians into Arianian society. Atropia and Gorgas are partners due to the requirement of Atropian oil to transit Gorgan pipelines to reach international markets.

Donovia's support for Minaria in the Artzak conflict and its aid to the enclave exemplifies the division between Donovia and Atropia. Donovian-sourced support for militants, particularly the Bilasuvar Freedom Brigade (BFB) operating in northern Vetlia and Erdabil provinces of Atropia, has also created significant tension in the bilateral relationship. Despite these considerations and the mutual distrust between them, strong economic considerations—mainly related to trade—tie the two countries together.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Atropia is active in a number of international organizations, including the Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OCSE), NATO (though not as a full member) and a variety of UN-sponsored regional, functional, and international forums. Atropia generally uses diplomacy as its prime international activity, and is strongly supportive of diplomatic solutions. Roughly 30 major Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and International Organizations operate within Atropia. The NGOs include extensive activities of The Human Fund regarding rural poverty and literacy programs. International Organizations like United Nations Development Program, World Bank and various EU-sponsored programs are also active in both urban and rural settings.

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ASSOCIATIONS

Atropia is a member of numerous trade and economic development institutions. While a comparatively wealthy nation due to petroleum reserves, economic development and the requirement to integrate large populations of IDPs from regional conflict have strained Atropian government reserves. Atropia is most notably not a member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and does not follow the pricing and output directives of that organization.

MILITARY ALLIANCES

Atropia receives a “soft power” approach, probably due to its 100 military protocols signed with Kemalia and, thereby, NATO connections. Through its additional direct NATO training and deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan in support of US operations, Atropia hopes to maintain warm relations with the West without angering its regional neighbors. Atropia also maintains bilateral relations with Gorgas, Israel, and other non-NATO nations.

INFLUENTIAL POLITICAL GROUPS

OFFICIAL POLITICAL PARTIES

Personalities determine political parties in Atropia. While strong party structure exists in the country, an Atropian citizen pledges his allegiance based on the party leaders. While Atropia supports a multi-party system with 42 registered parties, the system is dominated by a few main parties that do not base their appeal upon a single issue. Since Hazi Ismailov's election as president, the RPD (Republican Party of Democracy) has dominated national politics. Through legal and somewhat nefarious means, the RPD controls parliament with a sizeable majority. Access to many jobs requires membership in the RPD. Since the government controls a large share of jobs, many Atropians owe their livelihood to RPD membership. Hazi's son, Salam Ismailov, succeeded his father as president of Atropia through Hazi's direct guidance to the party. For international observers, it appears that recent Atropian elections contain indications of more transparency and fairness. Despite this movement to more open elections, the RPD continues to control Atropian politics. The South Atropian People's Party (SAPP), on the other hand, has little real power according to the South Atropian People's Army (SAPA), an insurgent group whose goal is to create a separate country composed primarily of ethnic Atropians located in southern and central Atropia and Ariana's northwestern provinces.



SAPA Flag

OTHER DOMESTIC INFLUENTIAL GROUPS

Due to the country's relatively pure ethnic composition, Atropian domestic groups distinguish themselves mainly through ideologies and personalities. The differences between these groups center more on the pursuit of domestic power than significant shifts in governmental policy. The only group that begins to pose a significant threat to the nation on violent terms is the SAPA, which remains somewhat isolated. Other insurgent activity present in Atropia is focused around the BFB in Veltia and Erdabil provinces, and Provisional Army of Lezgin (PAL) operations in southern Erdabil and western Sirvaki provinces.

Summary

The Ismailov family will continue to attempt to maintain its position of dominance and the independence of a secular Atropia. The South Atropian People's Army and a culture of corruption will continue to be the greatest internal threats, as political backlash against the corruption will undermine the Ismailov's best tool for securing the loyalty of various elements of society and government to fight the SAPA. Internationally, Atropia will continue to face Arianian pressure, especially if Atropia maintains independent oil and gas pricing and export policies.

TRADOC G-2

TRISA-THREATS

CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND THREAT INTEGRATION

DIRECTORATE (CTID)

MILITARY: ATROPIA

Military: Atropia

The military variable explores the military and/or paramilitary capabilities of all relevant actors (enemy, friendly, and neutral) in a given OE. Relevant actors may include terrorists, militias, criminals, gangs, and insurgents.

KEY FACTS:

REGION

- Donovia has the dominant military of the five countries.
- Atropia and Minaria possess roughly the same size military and previously fought each other over disputed territory.
- Four of the five countries maintain a tier 2 military capability, except for Donovia which has a predominantly tier 1 capability.
- Gorgas fields the smallest military of the five countries.

ATROPIA

- Atropia fields a capable army corps, a small air force, and an even smaller naval force.
- The Atropian military primarily operates tier 2 equipment with technology 10-20 years old, but possesses the potential for limited tier 1 niche capabilities.
- A modern (tier 2) integrated air defense system (IADS) protects the homeland and deployed units.
- Atropia has a limited stockpile of chemical weapons it has acquired from allies as well as the means for delivering chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) munitions.

OPERATIONAL IMPACTS OF THE MILITARY VARIABLE IN THE OE:

REGION

- Four of the countries in the region operate a pervasively authoritarian National Command Authority (NCA), which makes military decisions that are passed down to subordinate units. The exception, Gorgas, utilizes a National Council that is similar but not quite as authoritarian in nature.
- Gorgas would most likely assist US forces if conflict started within the region.

ATROPIA

- The Atropian military can conduct combat that ranges from conventional to adaptive operations with the ability to fluctuate between both ends of the spectrum.
- Due to increased hydrocarbon exports and the associated profits, Atropia's enemies will face a more capable military with newer technology.

MILITARY OVERVIEW:

Like most countries in the region, Atropia possesses a long history of regional irregular and regular warfare that shapes the country's military attitudes. Donovia's regional influence and over a century of ever-changing political boundaries never coincided satisfactorily with Atropia's ethnic groupings.


These unresolved issues contributed to the Atropian military's current state. Atropia contains a majority Muslim population that remains less radical than the religious fundamentalists found in Ariana, but the possibility remains for Islamist attitudes to gain noteworthy influence over the military, with the potential for increased radicalization.

MILITARY FORCES

The Atropian military consists of a small army, navy, and air force with limited offensive capabilities. The entire ground force roughly corresponds to the size of one US army corps, and the army dominates the Atropian military in terms of size and funding. The military generally uses equipment with technology 10 to 20 years old to make it a tier 2 fighting force. Due to the military's small size, Atropia limits its scope to defending the country's borders and regional operations, mostly directed against Minaria. The size of the Atropian military mirrors that of Minaria's forces. Continual skirmishes with Minaria over disputed territory drive Atropia's military doctrine, force structure, and deployment of forces. Like many of the countries in the region, Donovia's doctrine and force structure influence Atropia. Unlike Minaria, however, hydrocarbon revenue allows Atropia to modernize its military.

MILITARY STRATEGY

ATROPIAN NATIONAL COMMAND AUTHORITY



All countries share a similar National Command Authority (NCA) construct including Gorgas, who refers to it as a National Council. Atropia's NCA exercises overall control of the application of all instruments of national power to plan and carry out the national security strategy. The Atropian Army Chief of Staff, however, serves as the highest military individual in the chain of command over the military. The Atropian president serves as the commander in chief of the armed forces and functions at the top of the military hierarchy and decision-making process.

STRATEGIC OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK


The strategic operational framework for all countries in the region is similar in construct and application.

This is primarily the result of historic influences transcending the region.

The NCAs and the NC for all five countries exercise command and control (C2) of the Armed Forces via the Supreme High Command (SHC) that includes the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and a General Staff drawn from all the service components. In

peacetime, the MOD and General Staff operate closely but separately. The MOD assumes the responsibility for Armed Forces policy, acquisitions, and financing. The General Staff promulgates policy and supervises the service components while its functional directorates assume responsibility for key aspects of defense planning. In wartime, the MOD and General Staff merge to form the SHC, which functions as a unified headquarters.

All five countries currently configure their militaries in an administrative force structure (AFS) that manages its military forces in peacetime. This AFS contains the aggregate of various military headquarters, facilities, and installations designed to man, train, and equip the forces. In peacetime, the various militaries group their forces into corps for administrative purposes. In some cases, the



militaries may group their forces administratively under geographical commands designated as military regions or military districts. If the SHC elects to create more than one theater headquarters, it may allocate parts of the AFS structure to each of the theaters, normally along geographic lines. Typically, these administrative groupings differ from the country's go-to-war (fighting) force structure. Other parts of the AFS structure consist of assets centrally controlled at the national level. (See *FM 7-100.4 Opposing Force Organizational Guide: Chapter 3, Task Organizing.*)

NATIONAL STRATEGIC GOALS

The NCA determines the direction and scope of Atropia's strategic mission. Atropia's overall goals include the defense of its hydrocarbon resources, the eventual recovery of its Artzak region, and defense against any regional attacks by potential enemies. Atropia may possess one or more specific goals, each based on a particular threat or opportunity. Examples of specific strategic goals include:


- Resolution of territorial disputes, especially those with Minaria
- Defense of Atropia's sovereignty and hydrocarbon resources
- Economic expansion
- Destruction of insurgent groups, especially those in the Artzak region

IMPLEMENTING NATIONAL SECURITY GOALS

All five countries share similar strategies to achieve their national goals. Strategic operations for all five countries remain a continuous process not limited to wartime or preparation for war. Once war begins, strategic operations continue during regional, transition, and adaptive operations and complement those operations. Each of the latter three types of operations occurs only during war and only under certain conditions. Transition operations can overlap regional and adaptive operations.

In pursuit of their national security strategy, all four countries find themselves prepared to conduct four basic types of strategic-level courses of action. The four types of operations include:

- **Strategic operations** use all instruments of power in peace and war to achieve a country's national security strategy goals through attacks against the enemy's strategic centers of gravity.
- **Regional operations** include conventional, force-on-force military operations against overmatched opponents, such as regional adversaries and internal threats.
- **Transition operations** bridge the gap between regional and adaptive operations and contain some elements of both. The country continues to pursue its regional goals while dealing with developing outside intervention that has the potential to overmatch its military.
- **Adaptive operations** preserve the country's power and apply it in adaptive ways against opponents that overmatch the country's military.



NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

Although Donovia, Ariana, Atropia, Gorgas, and Minaria may refer to them as “operations,” each of these courses of action is actually a subcategory of strategy. Each type of operation aggregates the effects of tactical, operational, and strategic actions in conjunction with instruments of national power to achieve each country’s strategic goals. The types of operations employed at a given time will depend on the types of threats, opportunities, and other conditions present.

Each country’s strategy typically starts with actions directed at a regional opponent that the government overmatches in conventional military power, as well as other instruments of power. If possible, each government will attempt to achieve its ends without armed conflict. Accordingly, these governments do not limit strategic operations to military means and usually do not begin with armed conflict. They may achieve the desired goal through pressure applied by nonmilitary instruments of power, perhaps by merely threatening to use superior military power against the opponent. These actions fall under the general framework of “strategic operations.”

The government may resort to armed conflict to achieve its desired end state when nonmilitary means prove insufficient or not expedient. Strategic operations, however, continue even if a particular regional threat or opportunity causes the country to undertake “regional operations” that may include military means. Prior to the initiation of hostilities and throughout the course of armed conflict with its regional opponent, the government will continue to conduct strategic operations to preclude intervention by outside players, other regional neighbors, or an extra-regional power that could overmatch its forces. Such operations, however, always include branches and sequels to deal with the possibility of intervention by an extra-regional power.

MILITARY FORCES OVERVIEW

MILITARY STRATEGY

Atropian military strategy focuses on reclamation of lost territory from Minaria, and the two countries have an ongoing arms race. The Atropian military desires Ariana’s military support to seize such lost territory. To become more of a regional player, Atropia’s military continues to attempt to obtain more technologically-advanced equipment from other countries, primarily Donovia, Israel, and the US. Besides its design on lost territory, the Atropian military remains in mainly a defensive posture as it protects its oil and other key infrastructure.

ARMY OVERVIEW

Atropia maintains an army ground force, primarily composed of tank and mechanized forces and, due to equipment manufactured from technology 10 to 20 years old, the Atropian military fields a tier 2 fighting force. The size of the Atropian military keeps the force in a defensive posture and limits its actions to regional operations. The security of Atropia’s territorial integrity remains its military’s main objective. The Atropian military force intentionally mirrors Minaria’s military structure. Ongoing skirmishes with Minaria over disputed territory drive Atropia’s military doctrine, procurement, and disposition of forces. Donovian doctrine and force structure heavily influence the Atropian army. Lately, the army has enjoyed additional monetary resources due to government profits from hydrocarbon exports.

ARMY SIZE AND STRUCTURE

The maneuver brigade serves as the Arianian, Atropian, and Gorgan militaries’ basic combined arms unit. In the AFS, some maneuver brigades find themselves constituent, or organic, to the base structure such as divisions, in which case the NCA refers to them as *divisional brigades*. These armies, however, organize some units as *separate brigades*, designed to possess greater ability to

accomplish independent missions without further allocation of forces from a higher tactical-level headquarters. Separate brigades possess some subordinate units that contain the same force structure as a divisional brigade of the same type (for example, the headquarters); some units that are especially tailored to the needs of a separate brigade, marked "(Sep)" in the organizational directories; and some that are the same as units of this type found at division level, marked "(Div)." (See diagram on page 2B-2-3 and the Order of Battle (OB) at the end of this country's variable.)


All five militaries design their maneuver brigades to serve as the basis to form a brigade tactical group (BTG) if necessary. A brigade, separate or as part of a BTG, can fight as part of a division, division tactical group (DTG), a separate unit in an operational-strategic command (OSC), an organization of the AFS (such as army, corps, or military district), or as part of a field group (FG). (See TC 7-100.2: *Opposing Force Tactics, Chapter 2, Command and Control.*)

The brigade serves as the Atropian army's largest tactical organization. In peacetime, Atropia subordinates its brigades to a larger, operational-level administrative command. The Atropian army component headquarters may retain centralized control of certain elite elements of the ground forces, such as airborne and special purpose forces (SPF) units. This central control permits flexibility in the employment of these relatively scarce assets in response to national-level requirements. For these tactical-level organizations, the AFS organizational directories contain standard table of organization and equipment (TO&E) structures. These administrative groupings normally differ from Atropia's wartime force structure. (See TC 7-100.2: *Opposing Force Tactics, Chapter 3, Offense.*)

Atropia fields an army of approximately 68,400 personnel divided into one mechanized corps, two separate mechanized brigades, two tank brigades, and one motorized brigade. The Atropian army also contains various support and special purpose elements that include air defense, artillery, engineer, militia, SPF, and missile commands. Recently, the Atropian army established an information warfare brigade to develop electronic and computer warfare capabilities.

ARMY DOCTRINE AND TACTICS

The Atropian army gears its doctrine and tactics toward the opposition and the physical environment in which the army operates. The Atropian army can conduct large-scale operations with



the ability to fluctuate between adaptive tactics and hybrid operations. The Atropians employ tactical control measures that include assembly areas, advance axes, check points, jump-off lines (similar to Western lines of departure), and attack lines. The Atropian army will likely engage its enemy to push back the opposition or buy time for mobilization of reserves, or the onset of adaptive warfare. (See *TC 7-100.2: Opposing Force Tactics*.)

ARMY TRAINING AND READINESS

The Atropian army faces a consistently high turnover rate since it uses conscription to fill its ranks for the active duty force, but the system creates a large civilian population with previous military experience. Most Atropian males must serve for 18 months on active duty, but university graduates only need to serve 12 months. Atropia contains no official reserve force, but over 560,000 civilian Atropians possess military experience from the past 15 years and could serve again, if necessary. Despite the constant turnover in the enlisted ranks, the Atropian army fields a well-trained force with a 94% readiness rate.

ARMY EQUIPMENT AND WEAPONS


The Atropian army primarily uses tier 2 equipment and weapons or modern competitive military systems fielded from the last 10 to 20 years throughout its force structure. Due to the influx of funds from hydrocarbon exports, the Atropian army upgraded some of its systems so it now has some limited tier 1 niche capabilities. The Atropian army has the equipment to operate in all terrain types and can successfully conduct 24-hour operations. (*For further information see Section 4: Appendix C or the WEG: VOL 1, Chapter 1, COE and Tier Tables*.)

NAVAL FORCES OVERVIEW

The Atropian navy patrols the Caspian Sea, its main responsibility, with a small and agile force. The Atropian navy also secures the country's coastal waterways, conducts anti-smuggling operations, and protects the hydrocarbon infrastructure in the Caspian Sea.

NAVY SIZE AND STRUCTURE

The Atropian navy maintains its headquarters and operates its main facilities in the Atropian capital, Baku. Recently, the Atropian navy conducted Caspian Sea exercises that indicate it has improved equipment and training to at least a tier 2 rating level. (*See the OB at the end of this country's variable*.)



NAVY DOCTRINE AND TACTICS

Atropia maintains a naval force heavily influenced by Donovan naval doctrine. The navy may engage in hit-and-run tactics if attacked by larger Caspian Sea naval powers. At all times, the Naval Commander will attempt to preserve the capability to defend Baku and the off-shore hydrocarbon fields. Atropian naval missions include:

- Defensive patrolling of coastal areas
- Anti-smuggling operations
- Defensive mine laying
- Insertion/extraction of special operations forces
- Protection of isolated oil rig platforms

The Atropian navy possesses 39 surface craft with no submarines or major surface ships. It operates a variety of attack boats, patrol boats, submarine chasers, minesweepers, and amphibious squadrons. The Atropian navy also fields a small naval special operations forces (SOF) along with harbor salvage and clearance capabilities. (*See diagram on previous page for more detail.*)

NAVY TRAINING AND READINESS

Due to its small size and recent purchase of new equipment that reduce the likelihood of many maintenance problems, the Atropian navy operates a well-trained force at an overall 93% operational readiness rate.

NAVY EQUIPMENT AND WEAPONS


The Atropian navy fields largely tier 2 equipment and weapons with limited tier 1 niche capabilities financed through hydrocarbon resources. Atropian naval equipment focuses on defensive operations, especially the defense of off-shore hydrocarbon infrastructure. Atropia will continue to purchase equipment (like mine countermeasure ships), increase SOF capabilities, and improve its amphibious forces. The Atropian navy can operate in all seas and can successfully conduct 24-hour operations.

AIR FORCE OVERVIEW

The Atropian air force is small but could be deadly in a regional conflict and is best suited for defensive operations.

AIR FORCE SIZE AND STRUCTURE

The Atropian air force fields an estimated 8,000 personnel that operate approximately 110 fixed wing aircraft and 40 helicopters. The Atropian air force operates from military and civilian airfields all over the country, but the Baku metropolitan area contains the two largest military airports. The Atropian fighter aviation regiment is located in the Rimzi Airbase on the Hachzi peninsula. Smaller fixed wing and rotary wing elements can support ground troops in contested regions from any suitable runway. (*See the OB at the end of this country's variable.*)



AIR FORCE DOCTRINE AND TACTICS

The Atropian air force's missions include protection of the country's borders, troop transport, close air support for ground forces, and protection of key infrastructure such as political and economic targets. Atropian pilots possess a respectable reputation for their flying skills with the ability to conduct deep strikes.

Despite the heavy Donovian influence on the Atropian air force doctrine and tactics, the Atropians can adapt to a changed environment. Recent operations and training with Western air forces exposed the Atropians to non-Donovian ideas about flexible and adaptive operations.

AIR FORCE TRAINING AND READINESS

Due to its small size and ability to increase its flight hours because of a greater operational budget, the Atropian air force maintains a high level of training and a 94% operational readiness rate.

AIR FORCE EQUIPMENT AND WEAPONS

The Atropian air force operates equipment and weapons based on technology from 10 to 20 years ago to create a tier 2 capability rate. The infusion of funds from high hydrocarbon export revenues allowed Atropia to upgrade some air force systems for selected tier 1 niche capabilities. The Atropian air force can conduct 24-hour operations in all weather and over all terrain. (*See chart for examples, and for further information see the WEG.*)

GOVERNMENT PARAMILITARY FORCES

The Atropian government tasks the Atropian national police, a paramilitary force, with the following missions: basic law enforcement, border control, and maintenance of public order such as riot control. Besides the national police, which operate under the Interior Ministry, additional paramilitary forces work for the Ministry of Intelligence. The total number of Atropian paramilitary forces is around 65,000 personnel. In a conflict, the Atropian paramilitary organizations will likely provide presidential security and protect critical infrastructure. The Atropian military will probably use these paramilitary organizations' reserve elements in its national defense plans.

NON-STATE PARAMILITARY FORCES

INSURGENT/GUERRILLA FORCES

While numerous reasons exist for internal conflict in Atropia, two main reasons stand out above all others—ethnocentrism (separatist movement) and nationalism. This internal strife devolved to irregular warfare as state and nonstate actors struggled to gain legitimacy and influence over the populace. Sporadic violence over the last decade targeted government entities and key leaders. Several foreign-supported anti-Atropian insurgent groups operate within Atropian territory. The two dominant groups in the area of operations are Sadvol and the South Atropian Peoples' Army (SAPA).

Sadvol is the largest group within Atropia. Its center of gravity is in the southeast portion of the country, but the group is fully capable of conducting operations throughout the country, and in reality does so. It is also reported that the group may have ties to transnational criminal and terrorist actors. The extent and dynamic of the relationship between Sadvol and these transnational actors is unknown at this time.

For the last two decades, Sadvol has engaged the current Atropian regime in a low-level insurgency. Sadvol encourages the local populace to violently oppose the legitimate Atropian government due to state taxation policies; lack of reliable public services such as electrical power, sewage treatment,

and potable water; substandard preventive medical services; lack of access to state education programs for working class citizens; and a state judicial system that illegally favors the political party currently in control of the government's executive and legislative branches.

SAPA, the other major insurgent group, relates culturally to Ariana and wants to create a separate country composed of southern Atropia and Ariana's northwestern provinces that contain an ethnic Atropian majority. The SAPA feels that the South Atropian People's Party (SAPP) carries little weight in the Atropian political system, and reforms to assist the local people show few signs of progress. The SAPA, while it operates throughout Atropia, focuses on eight provinces in the south due to cultural ties with Ariana. The SAPA operates in three separate major units—Northern, Central, and Southern Commands. The group conducts most of its training in Ariana, where it receives most of its equipment and supplies. Reports indicate that Arianian SPF or other "advisors" may support the SAPA with logistics and training in the country. The Sadvol insurgents often clash violently with the SAPA over ideology, limited resources, and similar recruiting pools.


Two smaller insurgent groups that operate in northern Atropia are the Bilasuvar Freedom Brigade (BFB) and the Provisional Army of Lezgin (PAL). Donovia supports the BFB, which creates political tension between Donovia and Atropia.

Other groups and affiliates in Atropia find themselves sympathetic to pro-Western economic initiatives and social-political concepts of state governance. Coalition forces will need to not only determine each domestic group's agenda, but also discern whether they are criminal organizations, private militia, insurgents, or guerrillas to determine whether the groups will be useful to meet coalition objectives.

At least three forms of armed and unarmed combatants will emerge from these domestic groups if the US or coalition forces deploy to the region. First, factions currently opposed to the Atropian government and not friendly toward the US-led coalition presence will initiate overt resistance. They will initiate violent and nonviolent protests against both the Atropian government and the US-led coalition because they consider the outsiders to be an extension of the current Atropian regime. Second, factions currently against the Atropian governmental policies, but potentially friendly toward the US-led coalition, will support the outside military intervention in hopes that the current Atropian government will fall or at least change its policies toward their group. Third, several extremist anti-Western factions will quickly resort to expanded terrorism if a US-led coalition enters Atropia, as they do not want any Western inference. These anti-Western groups will target US-coalition forces, logistical staging points, and Atropian law enforcement and internal security forces. Foreign entities may influence any of these three domestic factions with money, materiel, or training to elevate civil unrest as long as it helps accomplish the outside group's long-term goals.

CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS


Organized crime and its interrelationships in irregular warfare are active throughout the region. Crime is widespread and mostly linked to historical traditions and ancestral allegiances. Distinguishing crime as distinct from ongoing ethnic feuds, ideological and theological extremism, or elements of the society that incite insurgency for particular political expectations is problematic at best. At its worst, this category of violence is enmeshed in the daily lives of most people whether they reside in urban centers or are part of a rural ecosystem.



The region contains criminal organizations such as the Bocyowicz Crime Family, the Atropian Organized Crime (AOC) group, and the Al Iksir Cartel, some of which have developed into sophisticated transnational criminal organizations (TCO) with ambitious economic and political agendas. The AOC operates primarily in Baku while the Al Iksir Cartel operates in northern Atropia and southern Donovia. The Bocyowicz Crime Family is a third-generation criminal organization with the ability to control ungoverned territory within nation-states, acquire political power in poorly-governed regions, and eventually vie for geographic controlled space. These political actions are intended to provide security and freedom of movement for the criminal organization's activities. As a result, the third-generation criminal organization and its leadership challenge the legitimate state authority on exercise of political control and use of criminal violence within a given geographical area.

PRIVATE SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS

Some of the foreign companies that help operate the Atropian oil and gas industry hire private security guards to protect the infrastructure.



NONMILITARY ARMED COMBATANTS

The insurgent and guerrilla forces operating in Atropia are openly hostile to US involvement in the region. The criminal organizations are predominantly neutral in their view of the US as long as the criminals' economic interests are not compromised. For the most part, the private security organizations that protect the Atropian oil and gas infrastructure are predominately neutral to somewhat friendly, since some of them work for foreign companies.

MILITARY FUNCTIONS

COMMAND AND CONTROL

The core of Ariana's, Atropia's, and Gorgas' C2 concept remains the assumption that modern communications find themselves susceptible to attack and/or monitoring. Accordingly, the military operates from the view that centralized planning defines the means for assuring both command (establishing the aim) and control (sustaining the aim), leading to strategic and operational directions. Necessarily then, the military relies on the loyalty of its forces and accords far-ranging authority to act within the aim while foregoing rigorous control as both unproductive and unlikely in the modern environment. (See TC 7-100.2: *Opposing Force Tactics Chapter 2, Command and Control.*)

Arianian, Atropian, and Gorgan military battalions are characterized by headquarters composed of a command section including the commander, deputy commander, and a small staff element. It also includes a staff section with the chief of staff and the remainder of the battalion staff. The battalion staff consists of the operations officer, the assistant operations officer, the intelligence officer, and the resources officer. The signal platoon leader also serves as the battalion communications officer, the reconnaissance platoon leader acts as the chief of reconnaissance, while the materiel support platoon leader serves as the battalion resources officer. (*See TC 7-100.2: Opposing Force Tactics, Chapter 2, Command and Control.*)

The Atropian military designs its tactical C2 with emphasis on survivability through mobility, redundancy, and security. The Atropian military streamlines procedures and uses common procedures at its tactical command posts, unlike its operational level command posts.

MANEUVER

The Atropian military has a robust capability to conduct combined arms operations; the basic combined arms unit is the maneuver brigade. In the administrative force structure, maneuver brigades are typically constituent to divisions. However, some are organized as separate brigades, designed to have greater ability to accomplish independent missions without further allocation of forces from higher-level tactical headquarters.

AIR DEFENSE

The Atropian Air Defense Brigade, subordinate to the Supreme High Command, provides air defense coverage for Atropian units. It also supports combined arms combat by the comprehensive integration of a large number and variety of weapons and associated equipment into an effective, redundant air defense system. Employment of this system pursues the basic objectives of air defense by employing certain concepts and principles. This is best accomplished by establishing a modern (tier 2) integrated air defense system (IADS). Air defense weapons and surveillance systems at all levels of command are part of an IADS. This ability provides a continuous, unbroken (usually overlapping) umbrella of air defense coverage and presents a significant threat to any potential enemy air activity.

Atropia recognizes that air defense is an *all-arms* effort. Thus, all ground units possess some type of an organic air defense capability to differing degrees, depending on the type and size of the unit. The air defense brigade continuously looks for new and adaptive ways of employing not only air defense systems but also systems not traditionally associated with air defense. Many weapons not designed as air defense weapons will also damage and/or destroy tactical aircraft when within range.

Throughout maneuver units, there are a number of systems designed for air defense and other systems that can be used in an air defense role. The heavy antiaircraft machineguns on tanks are specifically designed for air defense. Machineguns on armored personnel carriers and automatic cannon on infantry fighting vehicles can engage both ground and air targets. Most antitank guided missiles (ATGMs) are extremely effective against low-flying helicopters. Several ATGM manufacturers offer antihelicopter missiles and compatible fire control, which are especially effective against low-flying rotary-wing aircraft. Field artillery and small arms can also be integral parts of the air defense scheme. All these weapons can be extremely lethal when used in this role.

Atropia considers every soldier with a man-portable air defense system (MANPADS) to be an air defense firing unit. These weapons are readily available at a relatively low cost and are widely proliferated. Therefore, Atropian ground forces are acquiring as many MANPADS as possible and issuing them in large numbers to a wide variety of units. The military can also disseminate them to selected affiliated forces. The small size and easy portability of these systems provides the opportunity for ambush of enemy airframes operating in any area near Atropian units. Ground units


also employ them to set ambushes for enemy helicopters, especially those on routine logistics missions. (For more information, see TC 7-100.2, chapter 11, air defense.)

INFOWAR

Atropia defines information warfare (INFOWAR) as specifically planned and integrated actions to achieve an information advantage at critical points and times. The goal is to influence an enemy's decision-making cycle through collected and available information, information systems, and information-based processes, while retaining the ability to employ friendly information and information-based processes and systems. Atropia operates a robust INFOWAR capability with the brigade headquarters in Baku.

RISTA

The Atropian military views reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition (RISTA) as the single-most important function for the Atropian military, because it sets the stage for all other military operations. Atropian military forces tend to commit significant resources to RISTA-related operations with aggressive overlapping redundancy in the intelligence disciplines. The table below summarizes the range capabilities of the reconnaissance assets that support Atropia's tactical commanders.



Effective Ranges of Atropian Reconnaissance Assets

FIRE SUPPORT

During past conflicts, Atropia's military has successfully integrated fire support into operations, from close to deep-strike capability. The commanders always seek to increase the effectiveness of air and missile strikes and artillery fire to destroy enemy formations, weapons systems, or key components of an enemy combat system. (*See TC 7-100.2: Opposing Force Tactics, Chapter 9, Indirect Fire Support.*)

PROTECTION

Atropia will attempt to minimize civilian casualties to a large extent. The military has engineering assets to reinforce civilian and military positions. The C2 and fire support systems are sophisticated enough to minimize the threat of "friendly fire" or other accidents. The military and civilian populations are closely integrated, however, making it difficult for invaders to launch attacks without the risk of civilian casualties, which would enrage the population and be used as ammunition for INFOWAR. (*See TC 7-100.2: Opposing Force Tactics, Chapter 12, Engineer and Chapter 7, INFOWAR.*)

LOGISTICS

The Atropian military possesses robust logistics capabilities with the ability to support its maneuver units for any length of time. All five countries continue to improve in all aspects of their logistics systems, with Atropia doing so through the influx of funds from hydrocarbon resources. These improvements include an increased emphasis on support zone security and plans to stockpile war materiel throughout each country.

CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADILOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR

Atropia has a limited stockpile of chemical weapons it has acquired from allies over the years as well as the means for delivering chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) munitions. It also has a limited capability to manufacture radiological weapons using commercial materials as well as the ability to create rather sophisticated radiological dispersal devices. Atropia does not currently have the ability to manufacture chemical, biological, and nuclear (other than radiological) munitions. Should the strategic need arise, however, Atropia would have no difficulty quickly acquiring CBRN munitions, weapons, and/or components from its allies, black market, or other sources. It has long been suspected, but not proven, that Atropia possesses additional CBRN munitions.

Atropian strategic policy does not support a CBRN first strike. Its stockpiles, and contingency plans for the acquisition of CBRN when needed, are primarily for the defense of Atropia's sovereignty. In the event of an impending CBRN strike against the Atropian homeland, however, it could decide to use preemptive CBRN strikes. Should any opponent conduct a CBRN attack against Atropia, it is well-prepared to retaliate in kind.

Atropia has a wide variety of CBRN delivery means organic to its military forces. It has surface-to-surface missiles capable of carrying CBRN warheads. Most Atropian artillery is capable of delivering chemical munitions, and most systems that are 152-mm or larger are capable of firing nuclear rounds. Additionally, Atropia could use aircraft to deliver a CBRN attack. Trained Atropian SPF may also be used as alternate means of delivering CBRN munitions packages. Atropia is also well-prepared to employ CBRN protection measures—civilian and military—and has chemical defense units organic to all maneuver brigades.

Atropia has a substantial industrial base that produces large quantities of toxic industrial chemicals (TIC), which are chemical substances possessing acute toxicity. An adjunct to chemical weapons is use of TIC, which can easily be exploited as improvised (or converted into) chemical weapons by

military and civilians alike. (*For a listing of possible high- and moderate-risk toxic TIC possibly available to Atropia see the Worldwide Equipment Guide, Volume I, Chapter 16, Improvised Military Systems.*)

For additional information on the capabilities, release authority (NCA), and employment of CBRN, see TC 7-100.2, *OPFOR Tactics*, Chapter 13, *CBRN and Smoke*. For specific technical information, delivery means, agents, and effects of CBRN, see the *Worldwide Equipment Guide*, Volume I, Chapter 10, *CBRN*.

RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT GOALS

Atropia will continue to purchase its military equipment and arms from outsiders, especially the West. If oil and natural gas prices remain high, however, the Atropian military industrial complex may begin to flourish as government revenues slowly stream into military research and development (R&D). Atropia will likely focus its R&D efforts on INFOWAR or other capabilities that can level the playing field between Atropia and its larger neighbors.

SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS

Atropia's military policy focuses on its relationship with Minaria over the Artzak region. Atropia wants to regain the Artzak region, but will reluctantly settle for the current status quo. Atropia also wishes to maintain sufficient power to deter military action from Donovia or Ariana, or at least delay its attackers until it can receive Western assistance from the US and its allies. Atropians recognize their inability to sustain a successful defense against Donovia or Ariana. Out of self-interest, Kemalia or Gorgas will most likely support Atropian defense against any foreign attacker.

Summary

Atropia maintains a small but capable military that consist of ground, air, and naval forces. Its size almost mirrors that of the Minarian military except that Atropia maintains naval forces due to its location on the Caspian Sea while Minaria, as a land-locked country, fields no naval forces. Due to its hydrocarbon resources, Atropia is an important country for the Western world and the protection of its oil and gas infrastructure is a prime consideration for any military operation in the Caucasus region. Atropia's long-simmering antagonism against Minaria remains in the forefront of the Atropian military in all of its operations.

TRADOC G-2

TRISA-THREATS

CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND THREAT INTEGRATION

DIRECTORATE (CTID)

ECONOMIC: ATROPIA

Economic: Atropia

The economic variable encompasses individual and group behaviors related to producing, distributing, and consuming resources.

KEY FACTS:

REGION

- Hydrocarbon resources drive the region's economies and their uneven geographic disposition creates an unequal distribution of wealth and leads to regional conflicts.
- While economies continue to develop, insufficient large-scale industrial production limits overall economic growth.
- All economies in the region have high levels of corruption, heavy government involvement, and lack of developed non-hydrocarbon export industries.

ATROPIA

- Atropia will remain a hydrocarbon-based economy.
- Atropia will attempt to keep good relations with its neighbors to maintain export channels for its petroleum and gas, while it continues to import hydrocarbon industrial equipment and consumer goods.

OPERATIONAL IMPACTS OF THE ECONOMIC VARIABLE IN THE OE:

REGION

- All Caucasus countries consider critical economic infrastructure defense as a primary military effort.
- Hydrocarbon infrastructure will serve as a critical center of gravity in nearly all military operations in the region.
- Agriculture provides the majority of the jobs in the Caucasus, but not the bulk of its economic activity.

ATROPIA

- In any regional crisis, Atropia will focus on the defense of its critical hydrocarbon infrastructure, especially its extraction facilities and distribution pipelines.

ECONOMIC OVERVIEW:

The Caucasus countries that possess hydrocarbon resources will continue to depend on the oil and gas industries to drive their economies, while those that do not possess such resources will attempt to tie themselves to hydrocarbon-rich nations. Both Ariana and Atropia face geopolitical difficulties in exporting their oil and natural gas. Bordered by adversaries, the Arianians and Atropians must rely on tenuous routes to export their resources. For Gorgas and Minaria, which lack extractive or mature industries, transshipment of hydrocarbon products or providing other services to oil-wealthy countries will be their primary short- to medium-term means to achieve economic development. Donovia continues to recover from a collapse two decades ago that crippled its economy. All nations

of the Caucasus have relatively high inefficiency due to corruption, government involvement in the economy, and/or lack of export industry development.

Atropia's oil and natural gas resources generate most of the country's wealth. Since it began to actively exploit oil reserves in the late 1990s through international oil consortiums, the country has experienced strong GDP growth. Atropia launched a deliberate program to develop its own natural resources. This hydrocarbon-specific economic policy continues to bring big dividends for Atropia's economy. Additionally, it bolstered Atropia's quest to become a regional player and to secure its sovereignty and integrity from encroachment by Donovia and Ariana. The growth in its economy also benefitted Atropia's security as it became an integral player in the world energy sector, especially in supplying Western Europe. President Salam Ismailov, son of the previous President Hazi Ismailov, sits at the top of the pyramidal patronage system that flows through all aspects of Atropian bureaucracy and economy. Salam Ismailov directs the state oil and natural gas systems, which are the two biggest revenue producers in the Atropian economy. Despite all the hydrocarbon revenue in the country the economy is not balanced between sectors, with large portions of the population working in small service or agriculture industries. Atropia also lacks a significant middle class.

TABLE OF ECONOMIC DATA

Measure	Data	Rank in World	Remarks (if applicable)
GDP	85.77 billion USD	73	
Labor Force	4.38 million	82	
Unemployment	6%	57	
Poverty	11%		Percent below poverty line
Investment	17.5% of GDP	118	
Budget	\$12.85 billion revenue \$16.77 billion expenditures		
Public Debt	5.1% of GDP	132	Very low
Inflation	1.5%	42	Very low

PARTICIPATION IN THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM

Over the past decade, the Caucasus nations made considerable efforts to integrate themselves into the global financial system. While focused on local conflicts, the Caucasus region opened to other countries to increase global markets for its products, especially petroleum, and looked to the West for economic developmental aid, usually in the form of loans and grants.

WORLD BANK/INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AID

The World Bank funds a variety of development programs in Atropia, mostly focused on the large number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) generated by its mid-1990s war with Minaria. Additional resources attempt to slowly integrate minority, non-Atropian populations located in the country's north into Atropian society and economic life. Other programs in Atropia focus on infrastructure development and other public service/public use sectors such as health care.

FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT

As a part of its modernization programs, Atropia welcomes international investment as an important facet of its money supply. This openness began in the mid-1990s when Atropia encouraged the development of production-sharing agreements (PSAs) that focused on the oil and gas development industries. Atropian International Oil Company (AIOC) is a consortium of 10 petroleum countries,

including British Petroleum, Chevron, Devon Energy, StatoilHydro, Kemalia Petrol, Amerada Hess, ExxonMobil, Inpex, Itochu, and the State Oil Company of the Atropian Republic (SOCAR). British Petroleum participates in the AIOC as the largest foreign investor.

Most foreign investment in Atropia focuses on the extraction and transportation of crude oil and natural gas. Initially, foreign investment centered on oil extraction from the Kimaz oilfields, Atropia's largest, located 62 miles east of Baku in the Caspian Sea. The Kimaz oilfields presently account for over 80% of Atropia's total output. Later foreign investment focused on the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline that originates in Baku and transports crude oil to the Kemalian port of Ceyhan, via Tbilisi, for transshipment to Western Europe. The BTC pipeline serves as the primary oil export transportation method for Atropia. Natural gas exploitation also garners much PSA attention, although development of this energy sector lags behind the oil industry. Outside of the energy market, foreign investment in Atropia remains quite limited.

ECONOMIC ACTIVITY

ECONOMIC ACTORS

Government-related entities serve as the main economic actors in Atropia, with President Salam Ismailov at not only the political controls but the economic controls as well. This control is manifest through patronage and favors granted to the economic elite. SOCAR operates as the most important company in Atropian economic life.

SOCAR is a state-owned oil company that administers all issues related to the Atropian hydrocarbon industry. SOCAR's subsidiaries, Atropigaz and Atropineft, operate the Atropian natural gas production and distribution networks. Atropigaz operations encompass domestic supply processing, transport, and storage, while Atropineft controls exploration and production of the older gas wells.

Informal agreements and patronage among the Atropian societal elite drive the country's economic system. The larger the economic venture, the more important the person who helps the venture to succeed. While some may define this activity as corruption or illegal activity, the Atropians do not perform it to undermine the societal order but see it as a necessary part of the system. While this semi-illegal activity may or may not hamper the bureaucracy's efficiency or act as a means to circumvent the legal system, the patronage system in Atropia exists nonetheless.

TRADE

Hydrocarbon products dominate Atropian trade and account for 96.7% of it. Atropia's top export markets include Kemalia, Italy, Donovia, Ariana, Indonesia, Israel, and Gorgas. The top sources for imports include Donovia, Kemalia, Germany, Ukraine, UK, and Japan. While exports dramatically increased due to hydrocarbon exports, imports grew at a much more measured and steady rate. Non-fuel exports consist of food items and cotton. Imports consist of more complex manufactured items such as machinery, chemicals, and food.

State-owned enterprises control Atropia's heavy industries, and these companies oversee trade contracts and agreements. SOCAR controls the Atropian oil trade and Atropineft, a SOCAR subsidiary, manages natural gas exports. Foreign participation remains an important part of oil and natural gas field development agreements. Although foreign companies, especially British Petroleum, often enjoy the largest share of the enterprises, SOCAR remains the owner of the assets.

COMMERCIAL TRADE

Commercial trade in Atropia revolves around the oil and gas industries, which are the dominant elements of the national economy. The state oil monopoly generates the lion's share of commercial activity that drives Atropia's commercial trade.

MILITARY EXPORTS/IMPORTS

Atropia imports its military equipment and hardware primarily from Donovia, Israel, and the US. While the Atropian military equipped much of its forces with decades-old Donovian equipment, the country has purchased more recent equipment, such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), from abroad.

ECONOMIC DIVERSITY

The Atropian economy demonstrates a contradiction of sorts, as the hydrocarbon industry employs only about 12% of the population but accounts for 60.5% of the country's GDP. Over 38% of the population works in the agricultural industry. The service sector employs almost 50% of the population and produces 33% of the GDP. Due to this economic imbalance, a large gap exists in Atropian society between the wealthy and the lower class. Approximately 11% of Atropians live at or below the poverty line.

ENERGY SECTOR

Oil and natural gas drive the Atropian economy, both domestically and internationally. Despite employing a smaller share of the Atropian population than agriculture or services, the hydrocarbon industry brings in the vast majority of the country's wealth. Hydrocarbon exports account for 96.7% of total Atropian exports, and will likely continue to do so indefinitely.

Oil

SOCAR deals with all matters related to the acquisition, refining, and transportation of petroleum in the country. The Ministry of Industry and Energy directs exploration and production agreements but SOCAR always participates in these arrangements, particularly when they involve international investors and development projects such as the BTC pipeline or the Kimaz offshore fields.

Since Atropia brought in foreign investment and development to its oil industry, the country's production continues to rise. Only three years ago, oil production leaped to 228,000 bbl/d after the development of the Vapenaz portion of the oilfields. The development of the Kimaz fields played a key role in this rise, and last year the Kimaz fields accounted for 82% of Atropia's total oil production.

Development of the oilfields continues, with five operational platforms offshore in the Caspian Sea and another one under construction. With the completion of this platform (part of the Fransaz Oil Project), Atropia expects output to reach over one million bbl/d when it comes online next year. British Petroleum, the leader of the AIOC, expects that the new development will extend the output to one million bbl/d for a six-year period. In addition, Atropia possesses extensive land-based oil and gas reserves in the northeast that have yet to be developed.

Atropian oil exports continue to rise alongside increased oil resourcing. Recent exports reached 749,000 bbl/d, more than double the figure from three years ago. SOCAR ships most oil via pipeline, but small amounts travel by railway or truck. The 1,110-mile BTC pipeline, with its terminus in the Mediterranean port of Ceyhan, Kemalia, serves as the major SOCAR pipeline. Western Europe constitutes the majority of the market for the crude—especially Italy, which uses 40% of Atropian export oil.

A second major pipeline that originates in Atropia travels 830 miles to Novorossiysk, Donovia, on the Black Sea. This pipeline can operate at 100,000 bbl/d, but currently operates at half capacity. The flow through this pipeline will increase as development continues on the Kimaz fields and as more Kazakh oil enters Atropia. SOCAR operates the Atopian portion of the pipeline while the Donovian firm Vianeft operates the Donovian portion.

SOCAR operates a third pipeline, the Baku-Supsa, from Baku to Supsa, Gorgas on the Black Sea. The pipeline can transport 145,000 bbl/d, but operates at a much lower level. The pipeline closed five years ago for repairs, and the Donovia-Gorgas conflict two years later delayed its reopening. ExxonMobil, which is a part of the AIOC consortium to develop the Kimaz oil fields but not part of the BTC consortium, uses this pipeline to export its oil.

Atropia possesses two oil refineries to produce gasoline and other oil products for the domestic market. The Baku refinery can process 239,000 bbl/d per day, and the Nye Baku refinery has a maximum capacity of 160,000 bbl/d.

Natural Gas

Natural gas continues to play an increasingly important role in the Atopian economy, with the exploitation of the Caspian Sea Pasha Sarak gas field as the most important element of this industry. The 330-square-mile field remains a point of contention with Ariana, which believes that it owns a larger share of the field. Atropia transports the natural gas via a pipeline that parallels the Baku-Supsa oil pipeline.

AGRICULTURE

Atropia possesses significant fertile land for the purposes of agriculture, although the majority of farmers produce crops for their own subsistence or domestic consumption. Large-scale privatization in the 1990s from state to private ownership reversed the previous downward trend in output. The fishing industry, however, suffers from high levels of pollution in Atopian rivers and the Caspian Sea. Atropia possesses a nascent food-processing industry, but the industry needs significant levels of modern technology, new infrastructure, and better machinery to increase production. Main agricultural products include cotton, fruit, tea, grains, tobacco, and vegetables. Herding exists in the mountainous areas for cattle, sheep, and other livestock.

MANUFACTURING

Since the country now focuses so much on the hydrocarbon industry, most local manufacturing is centered on small-scale equipment supporting the oil and natural gas industries.

BANKING AND FINANCE

The growth of the energy sector and the revenue it brings form the backbone of the Atopian financial system. This abundance encouraged the Atopian government to adopt expansionary programs based on state oil fund wealth. Even with this newfound wealth and governmental efforts toward bank reform, Atropia still does not possess a modern banking and financial system. The reforms' failures stem mainly from an inefficient bureaucracy and business leaders who do not desire reforms because they would weaken their traditional forms of control.

PUBLIC FINANCE

Financial Policy

The recent abundance of oil development and transport revenue encouraged Atropia to embark on an ambitious expansionary fiscal policy. Expenditures rose from \$8.5 billion last year to \$16.8 billion

this year. The 17-year-old state oil fund acts as the main repository for the revenue reaped from the oil sector; it currently stands at \$11.2 billion. Development plans usually focus on improved social services for the Atropian citizen. Atropian critics complain, however, that plans contain no oversight and often come from the president with little input from other leaders.

Following the waning of Donovian influence in 1991, Atropia privatized most of its industries except for the very largest. The Atropian government owns SOCAR, the most important business in Atropia. Other state-owned industries include transportation and electrical generation/distribution. Atropia privatized most of its agricultural sector, which resulted in an explosion of small-scale farmsteads. Although farmers improved their production in recent years, the agriculturally-dependent Atropians do not share in the wealth generated by the hydrocarbon industries.

Taxation

Key issues in the Atropian economy include equitable taxation policy and tax avoidance. Taxes range from 12-35%, with corporate taxation at 25%. Additionally, the tax structure has an aggressive depreciation schedule that, unsurprisingly, encourages oil extraction. Excise taxes and other fees and taxes, especially on imports, round out the revenue stream.

Public Liabilities/Debt

At present, Atropian public debt stands at 5.1% of its total GDP.

PRIVATE BANKING

Atropia maintains a limited private banking capability, mostly to handle the large balance of payments from the petroleum trade. A key problem with the Atropian economy remains the weakness of the banking and finance sector. The Atropian Stock Exchange also handles the trade of local companies. A variety of state-owned, private, and international banks operate within Atropia. Most state-owned banks remain heavily saddled with non-performing debt. Many Atropian citizens keep large amounts of cash instead of depositing it into banks. The Atropia Central Bank handles central banking matters. It regulates the money supply, oversees banks, and creates monetary policy.

EMPLOYMENT STATUS

Atropia enjoys a low official unemployment rate, but this may be due to cultural beliefs against unemployment, even if the work does not fulfill the individual or the worker does not do anything productive. Atropian unemployment rates fluctuate around 6-7%, but many of these jobs occur in the service industry, agricultural sector, or in small-scale enterprises. Employment status is high in Atropia.

ILLEGAL ECONOMIC ACTIVITY

In Atropia, illegal activities operate alongside legal trade. Corruption occurs so commonly throughout Atropia that people see it as part of the normal economic system. Considerable Atropian crime occurs in a “loyal underworld” system, where economic and political corruption builds alliances and increases personal influence. Most Atropians do not want to undermine the system, but to benefit the most from it. Atropians view disruptive activity negatively, and both legal and illegal organizations maintain a vested interest in facilitating smooth operations in their ventures.

The region contains criminal organizations such as the Bocyowicz Crime Family (BCF), which has developed into a sophisticated transnational criminal organization with ambitious economic and political agendas. The BCF is a third-generation criminal organization with the ability to control ungoverned territory within nation-states, acquire political power in poorly-governed regions, and

eventually vie for geographic controlled space. These political actions are intended to provide security and freedom of movement for the organization's activities. As a result, the BCF and its leadership challenge the legitimate state authority on exercise of political control and use of criminal violence within a given geographical area.

Other major organized crime groups operating in the country are the Atropian Organized Crime (AOC) group and the Al Iksir Cartel. The AOC operates primarily in Baku, while the Al Iksir Cartel operates in northern Atropia and southern Donovia.

The growth of illegal narcotics, smuggling, and even human trafficking conducted outside of established channels only began recently. Many of those involved in Atropian illegal activities live in communities of displaced Atropians from Artzak and persons who fled Donovia. Atropia serves as a transit point for narcotics travelling to Donovia and Western countries.

Summary

Complex economic interplay between the Caucasus countries binds them together. Minaria, Gorgas, and Atropia were strongly affected by the reduction of Donovian influence two decades ago. The oil-rich countries of Ariana and Atropia must use their Minarian and Gorgan neighbors to transship hydrocarbon resources to other countries. Minaria and Gorgas must develop a free-standing economy despite significant corruption, lack of developed industries, and natural resource shortages. Over all of this, Donovia seeks to limit Arianian influence and return to its former position as unquestioned regional hegemon. This economic interdependence will likely drive regional conflicts as the nations struggle amongst themselves to exploit riches created by oil and natural gas.

TRADOC G-2

TRISA-THREATS

CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND THREAT INTEGRATION

DIRECTORATE (CTID)

S O C I A L : A T R O P I A

Social: Atropia

The social variable describes the cultural, religious, and ethnic makeup within an OE and the beliefs, values, customs, and behaviors.

KEY FACTS:

REGION

- All five countries have ancient cultures, and rivalries between different ethnic groups still exist.
- Each country possesses a dominant ethnic group and language. Discrimination against minority ethnic groups occurs in each country.

ATROPIA

- While primarily a Muslim country, Atropia's secular government allows females more freedoms than Arianian women.
- A social chasm exists in Atropia between the poor rural residents who rely primarily on agriculture for a living and the richer urban residents who work in industries such as the hydrocarbon field.

OPERATIONAL IMPACTS OF THE SOCIAL VARIABLE IN THE OE:

REGION

- Combat in the region will allow one ethnic group to seek revenge against another ethnic group for past wrongs or perceived wrongs.

ATROPIA

- Any major conflict in the Artzak region will give Atropia a pretense to recover its lost territory and revenge its previous defeat by Minaria.
- The difference between potential government benefits for any new internally displaced persons and those initially received by persons displaced two decades earlier may cause a rift between groups internal to Atropia.

SOCIAL OVERVIEW:

As a long-standing meeting place of the European and Middle Eastern civilizations, Atropian society possesses social elements from both Europe and the Middle East. This is reflected in a culture that embraces the emphasis on higher education as in Europe, along with the social conservatism and traditions of Islam. Many Atropians enjoy a high education level, and some are bilingual. Atropian authorities place much emphasis on their vision of social order, which includes suppression of journalists and restrictions on religious organizations and celebrations. Atropia and the US enjoy a history of cooperation, and this will likely continue into the future.

Atropians consider themselves a branch of the Kemalian people and spoken Atropian is linguistically similar to Kemalian. In addition to their links with Kemalia, Atropians have links with Ariana, especially to the large Atropian minority there. Any Arianian attacks on the Atropian minority in

Ariana, however, could trigger a reaction from the Atropian government or the people living along the Atropia/Ariana border.

SOCIAL STATISTICS FOR ARIANA, ATROPIA, GORGAS, MINARIA, AND DONOVIA:

Statistic	Ariana	Atropia	Gorgas	Minaria	Donovia
Age distribution (%)	0-14 years: 21.7 15-64 years: 72.9 65 years and over: 5.4	0-14 years: 23.9 15-64 years: 69.4 65 years and over: 6.7	0-14 years: 16.1 15-64 years: 67.6 65 years and over: 16.4	0-14 years: 18.2 15-64 years: 71.1 65 years and over: 10.6	0-14 years: 15.2 15-64 years: 71.8 65 years and over: 13
Median age	Total: 26.3 Male: 26 Female: 26.5	Total: 28.5 Male: 26.9 Female: 30.3	Total: 38.8 Male: 36.3 Female: 41.3	Total: 31.9 Male: 29.1 Female: 34.7	Total: 38.7 Male: 35.5 Female: 41.9
Population Growth rate (Rank)	77,891,220 1.248% (94)	8,372,373 0.846% (129)	4,585,874 -0.326% (217)	2,967,975 0.063% (188)	82,008,765 -0.47% (223)
Birth rate per 1,000 (Rank)	17.17 (120)	17.62 (117)	10.66 (181)	12.65 (161)	11.05 (174)
Death rate per 1,000 (Rank)	5.72 (171)	8.30 (101)	9.65 (68)	8.39 (97)	16.04 (5)
Net Migration rate per 1,000 (Rank)	-2.62 (141)	-1.69 (129)	-4.26 (157)	-4.56 (159)	0.29 (68)
Urban population Annual urbanization rate	68% 2.1%	52% 1.0%	53% -0.6%	64% -0.3%	67% -0.2%
Infant mortality rate (Rank)	35.78 (71)	54.6 (46)	16.22 (121)	20.21 (104)	10.08 (147)
Life expectancy at birth in years (Rank)	Total: 71.14 Male: 69.65 Female: 72.72 (132)	Total: 66.66 Male: 62.53 Female: 71.34 (157)	Total: 76.72 Male: 73.41 Female: 80.45 (62)	Total: 72.68 Male: 69.06 Female: 76.81 (118)	Total: 66.29 Male: 59.8 Female: 73.17 (162)
Fertility rate (Children per woman) (Rank)	1.70 (171)	2.03 (127)	1.44 (190)	1.36 (201)	1.42 (197)

Statistic	Ariana	Atropia	Gorgas	Minaria	Donovia
Major diseases in the OE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ Diarrheal diseases ◦ Hepatitis A ◦ Malaria ◦ Crimean-Congo ◦ Hemorrhagic fever ◦ Cutaneous Leishmaniasis ◦ Leptospirosis ◦ Schistosomiasis ◦ Hepatitis ◦ Tuberculosis ◦ Q Fever 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ Diarrheal diseases ◦ Hepatitis A ◦ Typhoid ◦ Hepatitis E ◦ Typhoid ◦ Cholera ◦ Malaria ◦ Crimean-Congo ◦ Hemorrhagic fever ◦ Gonorrhea ◦ Chlamydia ◦ Tuberculosis ◦ Leptospirosis ◦ Hantavirus ◦ Hemorrhagic fever ◦ Anthrax ◦ Rabies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ Diarrheal diseases ◦ Typhoid ◦ Hepatitis A ◦ Malaria ◦ West Nile Fever ◦ Crimean-Congo ◦ Hemorrhagic fever ◦ Meningococcal ◦ Meningitis ◦ Gonorrhea ◦ Syphilis ◦ Hantaviral fevers ◦ Leptospirosis ◦ Rabies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ Diarrheal diseases ◦ Typhoid ◦ Hepatitis A ◦ West Nile fever ◦ Crimean-Congo ◦ Hemorrhagic fever ◦ Meningococcal ◦ Meningitis ◦ Tuberculosis 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ Diarrheal diseases ◦ Typhoid ◦ Hepatitis A ◦ Cholera ◦ Salmonella ◦ Tuberculosis ◦ HIV/AIDS ◦ Encephalitis ◦ H5N1 avian influenza
Ethnic groups (%)	Persian: 51.0 Atropian: 24.0 Gilaki or Mazandarani: 8.0 Kurd: 7.0 Arab: 3.0 Lur: 2.0 Baluch: 2.0 Turkmen: 2.0 Other: 1.0	Atropian: 90.6 Gilani: 2.2 Arianian: 3.0 Donovian: 1.8 Minarian: 1.5 Other 0.9	Gorgan: 83.8 Atropian: 6.5 Minarian: 5.7 Donovian: 1.5 Other: 2.5	Minarian: 97.9 Yezidi (Kurd): 1.3 Donovian: 5.0 Other: 0.3	Arab: 70.0 Gorgan: 5.0 Atropian: 5.0 Minarian: 10.0 Other: 10.0
Religions in OE (%)	Shia Muslim: 89.0 Sunni Muslim: 9.0 Other: 2.0	Muslim: 93.4 Donovian Orthodox: 2.5 Minarian Orthodox: 2.3 Other: 1.8	Orthodox Christian: 83.9 Muslim: 9.9 Minarian-Gregorian: 3.9 Catholic: 0.8 Other: 0.8 None: 0.7	Minarian Orthodox: 94.7 Other Christian: 4.0 Yezidi: 1.3	Sunni Hanafi Muslim: 80.0 Shia Sufi Muslim: 5.0 National Orthodox Christian: 15.0
Languages	Persian Dialects: 58.0 Turkic Dialects: 26.0 Kurdish: 9.0 Luri: 2.0 Baluchi: 1.0 Arabic: 1.0 Kemalian: 1.0 Other: 2.0	Atropian (Atropian): 90.3 Lezgi: 2.2 Donovian: 1.8 Minarian: 1.5 Other: 3.3 Unspecified: 1.0	Gorgan: 71.0 Donovian: 9.0 Minarian: 7.0 Atropian: 6.0 Other: 7.0	Minarian: 97.7 Yezidi: 1.0 Donovian: 0.9 Other: 0.4	Donovian (official) Many minority languages
Literacy rate (older than 15) (%)	Total: 77.0 Male: 83.5 Female: 70.4	Total: 98.8 Male: 99.5 Female: 98.2	Total: 100 Male: 100 Female: 100	Total: 99.4 Male: 99.7 Female: 99.2	Total: 98.0 Male: 98.0 Female: 98.0

POPULATION MOVEMENT (MIGRATION/IDPs/REFUGEES)

The Artzak War forced the movement of hundreds of thousands of ethnic Atropian refugees into Atropia, where they remain one of the largest reminders of the war today. Over 15 years after the end of the conflict, more than a half million refugees remain unsettled. Atropia currently possesses one of the largest populations of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Europe. The IDPs originate from one of the bloodiest, but relatively unknown, late 20th century wars that occurred from 1991 to 1994 between Atropians and Minarians. The war killed over 30,000 on both sides, and the repercussions from the subsequent population displacement reverberate to the present day.

In 1994, an internationally brokered ceasefire ended the conflict, though the Atropian and Artzak government forces continue to exchange sporadic fire. The former Atropian residents of Artzak refuse to return to the separatist region. Artzak remains officially part of Atropia, but an Artzak Republic (supported by Minaria) politically and militarily controls the area. Minor conflict along the enclave's borders continues, as both sides often exchange small arms fire.

For the most part, Atropia failed to integrate the Atropian Artzak refugees due to a variety of factors. While monetary resources remain the primary issue, the Atropian government's official negotiation position remains that the IDPs possess the political right to return to their homes in the Artzak enclave. Recently, however, the Atropian government and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) increased the resources to support the refugees and exerted additional effort to normalize the IDPs' lives and status.

The refugees' status slowly shows signs of normalization, as the situation's permanency and continued Minarian control of Artzak become a *de facto* element of Atropian political life. By 2007, the Atropian government replaced most tent camps with permanent dwellings. Government services and economic opportunities available to IDPs outside major cities, however, remain extremely limited. This conflict, although unofficial at this point, still negatively affects the lives of those displaced. The IDP integration into Atropian society will continue to tax the government's resources. Even though the Atropians' loss in the Atropia-Minaria conflict occurred in 1994, the defeat stills affects the Atropian population's psyche today.

Migration is minimal, and usually consists of members of different ethnic groups repatriating to their country of origin.

POPULATION DISTRIBUTION

Atropia reflects an increasingly urban population and just over half of all Atropians (52%) live in cities, with an annual urbanization rate of 1%. Baku, the capital, is the largest metropolitan area with over two million inhabitants, or one-quarter of the total national population. The cities of Ganja and Sumgayit both contain over 300,000 people, while six other cities possess populations of 50,000 or higher. The most obvious impact of urbanization is the adoption of more Western cultural elements (most noticeably in dress, gender roles, the importance of religion, and educational practices) in lieu of traditional Atropian practices, which is a classic pattern in many developing countries. Atropia's ethnic Donovian population resides predominately in an enclave in the northeast tip of the country. This enclave is on the border with Donovia and has access to the Caspian Sea to the east.

DEMOGRAPHIC MIX

Demographically, Atropia follows the classic trends for a balanced society. Women represent 50.7% of the total population, and females outlive males in Atropia by nine years, on average. About 2,336,611 males and 2,329,275 females belong to the 16-49 age group and serve as Atropia's available manpower for military service. Of this 4.6 million, 3.7 million meet the medical standards for military service. About 84,441 males and 78,905 females reach military age annually in Atropia. It is likely that the maximum number of Atropian males ready for military service would top out at about 820,000. Atropia will likely always maintain a military advantage over its historical enemy Minaria due to its larger population, the greater number of people who reach military age each year, and its ability to fund the military through its hydrocarbon resources.

SOCIAL VOLATILITY

Persistent conflict with Minaria exists as one of a few defining and unifying elements throughout Atropian society and creates high social volatility. The fallout over the Artzak conflict manifests

itself as a legacy of external oppression, military defeat, and refugees. Moreover, the threat of conflict represents a useable tool for the Atropian government to justify a large military establishment and repressive internal measures. Few Atropians maintain positive feelings toward Minarians. With an increase in oil revenues and a generally positive growth in the Atropian economy, however, few Atropians harbor violent dissatisfaction with the current government. The Atropians will continue to support the current regime as indicated by the parliamentary election results of November 2010. However, Southern Atropians do not feel represented by their government and are seeking the establishment of a separate country of ethnic Atropians that would exist in Atropia's southern provinces and Ariana's northwestern provinces.

While numerous reasons exist for internal conflict in Atropia, two main reasons stand out above all others—ethnocentrism (separatist movement) and nationalism. This internal strife devolved to irregular warfare as state and nonstate actors struggled to gain legitimacy and influence over the populace. Sporadic violence over the last decade targeted government entities and key leaders. Several foreign-supported anti-Atropian insurgent groups operate within Atropian territory. The two dominant groups in the area of operations are the South Atropian Peoples' Army (SAPA) and Sadvol.

Sadvol is the largest group within Atropia. Its center of gravity is in the southeast portion of the country; however, the group is fully capable of (and does) conduct operations throughout the country. It is also reported that the group may have ties to transnational criminal and terrorist actors. The extent and dynamic of the relationship between Sadvol and these transnational actors are unknown at this time.

For the last two decades, Sadvol has engaged the current Atropian regime in a low-level insurgency. Sadvol foments violent opposition to the legitimate Atropian government by the local populace due to state taxation policies; lack of reliable public services such as electrical power, sewage, and potable water; substandard preventive medical services; lack of access to state education programs for working class citizens; and a state judicial system that illegally favors the political party currently in control of the government's executive and legislative branches.

SAPA, the other major insurgent group that relates culturally to Ariana, wants to create a separate country composed of southern Atropia and Ariana's northwestern provinces that contain an ethnic Atropian majority. The SAPA feels that the South Atropian People's Party (SAPP) carries little weight in the Atropian political system, and reforms to assist the local people show few signs of progress. The SAPA, while it operates throughout Atropia, focuses on eight provinces in southern and central Atropia due to cultural ties with Ariana. The SAPA operates in three separate major units—Northern, Central, and Southern Commands. The group conducts nearly all of its training in Ariana, where it receives most of its equipment and supplies. Reports indicate that Arianian Special Purpose Forces or other “advisors” may support the SAPA with logistics and training in the country. The Sadvol insurgents often clash violently with the SAPA over ideology, limited resources, and similar recruiting pools.

The Free Artzak Movement (FAM) is a rebel group fighting Minarians in the Artzak region. The FAM found a fertile recruiting ground in the IDP camps in northwestern Atropia. The FAM is passively supported by the government of Atropia.

Additional insurgent activity present in Atropia is focused around the Bilasuvar Freedom Brigade (BFB) operating in northern Vetlia and Erdabil provinces, and the Provisional Army of Lezgin (PAL) operating in southern Erdabil and western Sirvaki Provinces. Other groups and affiliates in Atropia find themselves sympathetic to pro-Western economic initiatives and social-political concepts of state governance.

EDUCATION LEVEL

There is a relatively high level of education among the Atropian population. The UN Human Development Index indicates an adult Atropian literacy rate of 98.8%. Atropian public education expenditures, however, remain comparatively low by regional standards. Atropia spends about 2.8% of its Gross National Product (GNP) on education. Along with stagnant spending, Atropian education demonstrates unsatisfactory progress, as 55% of students fail to meet the minimum score for national university entrance exams.

Atropia maintains a robust higher education system with a number of colleges and universities. Many Atropian colleges have partnered with Western universities, including American ones. While Atropia enjoys high literacy, the government will need to invest additional resources to adequately prepare Atropian children for college, meet the increased demands of a global economy, and provide proper stewardship for Atropia's oil wealth. For the immediate future, it remains likely that Atropia will educate enough of its populace to exploit the country's hydrocarbon resources and make up any shortfalls by the importation of skilled labor from other countries.

ETHNIC DIVERSITY

Atropia is almost entirely ethnically Atropian with a few non-Atropians who primarily reside in border areas or Baku. The official government census probably undercounts ethnic minorities, as the official numbers of the smaller ethnic groups consistently vary from self-counts and academic assessments. Atropians represent 90.6% of the total population while Arianians represent 3%, Gilani represent 2.2%, and Donovians 1.8%. A number of smaller groups that include Minarians in the Artzak area comprise the remainder. Atropians dominate almost all facets of the country's political, social, and economic life. While no minority harbors considerable anti-Atropian sentiment, non-Atropians hold no significant status in the country's cultural, economic, or social life.

RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY

The percent of Atropians who consider themselves Muslim is 93.4, but polls suggest that only about 21% of Atropians believe religion plays an important factor in their daily life. Eighty-nine percent of Atropians are of the Shia denomination. Additionally, 2.5% are Donovan Orthodox and 2.3% are Minarian Orthodox.

While religion does not color daily life like in neighboring Ariana, data suggests that some Atropians, especially the young, increasingly self-identify themselves as Muslims. From the late 1990s, the Atropian government implemented a variety of methods to control incipient Islamization. These programs include the deportation of foreign (predominately Arianian) religious instructors, arrest and conviction of pro-Arianian religious elements for espionage, and the subjugation of other religious elements to government oversight. This oversight allows for government approval of mullahs and other religious authorities. Other religions require government approval, and the Atropian government uses these actions to control other religions, such as Christianity.

Atropia risks the creation of a situation where the lack of political representation creates the conditions for the rise of militant political Islam, as seen in Egypt or Ariana in the 1970s. In both cases, the lack of political pluralism funneled discontent into religious extremism. The Atropian government seems willing to run that risk as seen by its limitation on public Ashura celebrations, an important Shia holiday.

COMMON LANGUAGES

Atropian serves as the common language in Atropia, but Atropians often understand other languages. Different languages spoken by large numbers of Atropians include Donovan and

Kemalian. By law, Atropian is the official language of Atropia, but the Atropian government protects the rights of “native” language speakers. Any US personnel who speak Donovian, Kemalian, or Atropian will likely find themselves with the ability to communicate with Atropian residents. Those who do not speak one of these three languages will need to use an interpreter.

CRIMINAL ACTIVITY

Atropia shows signs of increasingly violent crime and a high level of criminal activity. Baku, in particular, experiences a continuing problem with violent robbery gangs instead of the traditional pickpockets that inhabit many cities. However, nonviolent crimes such as theft remain the norm in Atropia. Terrorist elements have operated within Atropia in the past. Recently, terrorists targeted the American Embassy in Baku, but Atropian security forces arrested the plotters.

The US State Department strongly discourages travel within or around the borders of Artzak due to the threat of violence. As with many nations in the region, its central location and often corrupt police make Atropia a transit point for drugs, weapons, and trafficked persons. Most notably, Atropian law enforcement agents increased their drug seizures consistently over the last several years from 300 kilograms four years ago, to 600 kilograms three years ago, to over one metric ton of narcotics two years ago and over 1.25 metric tons last year. It remains unclear if these higher seizure figures resulted from additional narcotics traffic, increased police efficiency, or a combination of the two.

HUMAN RIGHTS

Most international monitoring groups consider the human rights situation in Atropia to be generally poor. Issues such as the government’s intervention in elections, deaths of journalists, and harsh treatment of police detainees make the Atropian human rights situation unsatisfactory by Western standards. If judged in concert with its regional neighbors, however, Atropia possesses a moderate human rights climate, especially compared to the repression found in Ariana. In addition, the Atropian government displays negative habits, such as police corruption and a biased judiciary that often serve the government’s political goals through the detention of political dissidents. Atropian citizens, however, generally trust their police forces, something unique when compared to Atropia’s regional neighbors. While the equality of women continues to slowly improve, significant gaps remain between the genders. Still, overall, Atropia is progressive in its politics and religion compared to Ariana, and its citizens enjoy a greater degree of freedom. Unless requested by the Atropian government, US personnel will probably not be called upon to enforce human rights except as designated by the Geneva Convention and other applicable rules of warfare.

CENTERS OF SOCIAL POWER

The family serves as the primary social unit in Atropia. Some 93.4% of Atropians practice Islam. While 89% of Atropian Muslims are Shia, they do not practice their faith with the same fervor as their Arianian neighbors. Visitation to extended families serves as a primary social activity, especially in the rural areas.

BASIC CULTURAL NORMS AND VALUES

Atropia possesses a history of military service and directs its military focus at Minaria, a Christian nation. The 1990s war over the Artzak region continued the Muslim-Christian conflict in the region. Atropia still believes that the Artzak region belongs to its country and ultimately wants to force the reunification of the two areas. This goal serves as a rallying cry and a point of honor for Atropia.

CUSTOMS AND PRACTICES

Cultural Dos & Don'ts	Men are breadwinners; women take care of the home. Women are more traditional in rural areas than in urban areas. Neatness in clothing is valued. Women sometimes wear heavy makeup. Men and women wear Western-style clothing, but traditional clothing may be worn in rural areas. Young women wear a light kerchief; older men wear a lambskin hat. It is ok to point with the finger at objects, but not at people. The "thumbs-up" sign demonstrates acceptance or a positive response to a question.
Meeting & Greeting	Men shake hands and say <i>Salam</i> (peace). Women say <i>Salam</i> , but do not shake hands. Female relatives may hug or kiss.
Visiting/ Hospitality	Stand when an elderly person enters a room. Relatives and friends drop in unannounced. Host offers meal or tea with pastries, fruit, or candy. Atropians rarely eat at restaurants and only on special occasions. The host pays the entire bill and tip. If the host gives you a small bag of food to take home, it is a sign that he wants you to leave.
Manners	In formal occasions, greet men with <i>Bey</i> and the man's given (first) name. Use <i>ami</i> or <i>dayi</i> (uncle) after a man's given name or <i>hanum</i> (Miss or Mrs.) after a woman's given name. People of the same age call each other by their first names. Eat with fork in left hand and knife in right hand. The cook serves the meal to each person.
Gifts	Guests bring gifts—flowers, candy, or pastries.
Taboos	Do not dress sloppily. Do not serve yourself at a meal Remove shoes before entering a mosque. Do not cross your legs, chew gum, or smoke in the presence of elders. Do not raise your voice when speaking to peers or elders. Do not use the left hand for any interaction unless the right hand is occupied. Do not use the "ok" sign with the index finger and thumb in a circle—it is considered obscene. Atropians usually do not marry in the months of Muharram, Safar, and Ramadan due to religious beliefs. Do not talk openly about sex and the body in public areas.
Personal Space	No concept of personal space. In lines or crowded spaces, Atropians prefer not to stand close to strangers of the opposite gender.
Displays of Affection	Public displays of affection are frowned upon, even more so in rural areas than urban areas.
Marriage Rituals	Marriage age for women is 18. Despite a 2005 Atropian law to outlaw bride kidnapping, <i>qiz qacirmaq</i> (capture) and <i>goshulop gachmak</i> (elopement) still take place. If a woman is raped, her family considers the woman unpure and usually forces her to marry her kidnapper. Normal marriage procedures: <i>Preliminary Notification</i> (check out the female); <i>Prior Wooing</i> (important family members from both sides meet); <i>Wooing</i> (families meet to decide on the <i>Mehriye</i> , or marriage money for the girl); Engagement (entire families meet at the bride's house). People do a traditional dance—the <i>Asma Kasma</i> —as they escort the bride to the groom's house. People do a traditional dance—the <i>Anzali</i> —at the wedding celebration.
Work Week/ Work Hours	Monday to Friday, 40 hours per week with a Saturday-Sunday weekend. Normal work hours are 0900-1700, but late starts and long lunches are not uncommon. Restaurants in Baku usually open from 1100 to 2300 daily, but operating hours for rural restaurants depend on the clientele. Bazaars are usually open only in the mornings.

Concept Of Time	More relaxed than the Western world, but the urban areas such as Baku are becoming more time-conscious.
Dispute Resolution	No formal customs for dispute resolution.
Birth Rituals	Relatives of newly married women like them to hold babies, put a baby on the newlyweds' bed, and throw the bride's veil on the branches of a fruit-bearing tree to express their desires for the bride to become a mother. While pregnant, the woman tries to be cordial and affable for the baby's health. Pregnant women try to look at beautiful colors, still water, and the blue sky to have a healthy baby. After the baby is born, others bathe it with salt so it will be truthful, bold, and smart. When babies get their first tooth, they receive a special meal of seven grains to make their teeth grow faster. The baby's fingernails and hair are not cut until the baby reaches the age of 1. The nails are wrapped in a clean cloth and hidden in a crack in the floor or wall. The parents keep the baby's hair from its first haircut.
Death Rituals	When someone is dying, they are made comfortable, distant relatives are called, and a clergyman is summoned to read the Koran. After the person dies, his jaw, feet, and both thumbs are tied together. A funeral takes place less than 15 hours after death. The body is washed and shrouded in white cloth by the same gender. The corpse is buried without a coffin. Ritual prayers are performed along with comments about the person's life. Condolence visits last from 3-7 days at the house of the deceased. Relatives do not wear any new garments for 40 days (up to two years in some locations). In some areas, men do not shave for 40 days. <i>Halvah</i> (sweet cake) is served at the cemetery on the special remembrance days for the deceased—3 rd day, 7 th day, 40 th day, and a year after death.

Summary

Atropian society represents a secularized Muslim country. Atropia wants to adopt Western attitudes culturally while simultaneously seeking to reclaim traditional Atropian characteristics such as their language. While the Atropian government often acts heavy-handedly and exhibits some corruption, there is considerable latitude socially when measured against comparable neighbors, such as Ariana. The potential for fundamentalist Islamization of the Atropian population remains, especially as the response to a lack of political pluralism. Aggressive Islam, however, could well find rocky soil in Atropia, as the high levels of secularization will keep cultural Muslims from the adoption of an aggressive, politically Muslim identity. Atropians will likely continue their path to espouse more Western social standards as the population continues to become more urbanized. The effects of centuries of Islamic practices, however, will continue to echo in Atropian thought. The outcome will likely result in a uniquely Atropian state and maintain Atropia's place as a cultural crossroads between the Islamic Middle East and Europe.

TRADOC G-2

TRISA-THREATS

CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND THREAT INTEGRATION

DIRECTORATE (CTID)

INFORMATION: ATROPIA

Information: Atropia

The information variable describes the nature, scope, characteristics, and effects of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, manipulate, disseminate, or act on information.

KEY FACTS:

REGION

- All states of the Caucasus maintain some level of direct government control or influence on their information environments.
- Television operates as the most readily available and important communications medium.

ATROPIA

- Atropian INFOWAR capabilities will focus primarily on Minaria and Ariana, which Atropia sees as its primary threats.
- Social media is growing in importance in Atropia, especially among the urban, young, and educated populations.

OPERATIONAL IMPACTS OF THE INFORMATION VARIABLE IN THE OE:

REGION

- While language barriers persist, English continues to rapidly displace Donovian as a *lingua franca*, or common language, for trans-border communication. Mobile phones serve as the most effective means to reach the educated and urban populations.
- Television is the most effective medium for information dissemination.

ATROPIA

- Atropia is slowly integrating key INFOWAR capabilities into its force structure.
- Atropian media is generally aligned with government and political leaders.

INFORMATION OVERVIEW:

Atropia is slowly developing its public broadcast and INFOWAR capabilities, both of which are driven by oil revenue. TV and the Internet are the most powerful media, while Atropian INFOWAR capability focuses on potential threats from Ariana and Minaria. Atropian INFOWAR assets are generally tier two and three, though increasingly tier one elements are being purchased from abroad and integrated into the Atropian military and government.

PUBLIC COMMUNICATIONS MEDIA

Public communications media is growing in importance in Atropia, though most major outlets are controlled by the government or by confederates of the president. The exception is the Internet,

where relative freedom exists, but government monitoring for anti-government messages occurs. While social media is blossoming, TV remains the most widely available medium.

INTERNET

The Internet in Atropia exists in a zone relatively free from state interference or censorship, though evidence indicates some limited state filtering and direct monitoring of political content. Despite this relative Internet freedom, mockery of the government by Atropian users recently resulted in arrest and detention. The Atropian government likely takes a view that as long as Internet activity does not threaten Atropian government interests, it is allowed, but mockery or criticism is forbidden.

Almost 1.45 million Atropians, or over one in every eight of the Atropian populace, use the Internet. Most users access the Internet from cybercafés or their workplaces, as the cost of computers and the Internet connection (\$40-50 per month, compared to an average income of \$100 per month) preclude personal Internet connections.

The Atropian government maintains centralized Internet control via two governmental Internet Service Providers (ISPs). They, in turn, distribute bandwidth to over 20 private Internet providers.

TELEVISION

Atropians receive the majority of their information through television. While the Atropian government banned rebroadcasts of foreign-produced English language programs by their local television outlets in December 2008 (presumably due to reporting on government fraud and corruption), the authorities do allow Kemalian state television rebroadcasts. Atropians who live along the southern border can also receive spillover from Arianian television stations. Recent reports indicate that 10 television stations operate within Atropia. The top five television networks are:

- **ASTV** - Atropian State TV
- **PTVA** - Atropian Public TV; the Atropian government created PTVA to meet requirements for joining the Council of Europe
- **National TV Atropi** - Private broadcaster
- **DeepSpaceBroadcasting TV** - Private broadcaster; owned by the sister of the president
- **Atropi Broadcasting System** - Private broadcaster; controlled by a cousin of the president

The Atropian television media ownerships' connections to the highest sectors of government remain quite obvious. Due to the power of broadcast media in elections and the Atropian television stations' compliant nature, the television media serves as a powerful tool in the hands of the president and most Atropians receive their news through government-controlled sources.

RADIO

A variety of radio stations serve Atropia and include state-run, public radio networks and private stations. Additionally, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty operates Atropian language programming, known as Radio Qaja. Radio Qaja broadcasts over the Internet, via satellite, and over shortwave. Ten FM, 11 AM, and one shortwave station are in operation. The top five radio networks are a combination of private and public broadcasters. In Atropia, even private broadcasts have significant ownership links to the ruling family and are generally unlikely to report adverse material about the government.

PRINT MEDIA

For a nation of its size, Atropia maintains a remarkably large print media establishment. Significant numbers of magazines, newspapers, and news bureaus exist, but must operate within the limits of politically permissible speech. While a nominal freedom of the press exists within Atropia, watchdog

groups chronicled recent incidents of journalists killed or imprisoned for reporting that was critical of the government or political conditions within Atropia. The Committee to Protect Journalists reports four journalists killed in Atropia and one death while in prison. In addition to governmental interference, the relatively high cost and low print runs of the country's magazines make them significantly less important in Atropia than broadcast media.

Three major Atopian news bureaus exist and all offer English, Donovian, and Atopian feeds. More importantly, all generally support the Atopian government, especially on issues that involve Minaria.

A number of magazines offer both online and hard-copy versions. Most print is in the Atopian language, though English language outlets like *Our Century*, *Atopian Times*, and *Atopian News* exist. Four major Atopian language publications are dominant, though their circulation is primarily among Atopian-speaking expatriates, urban Atropians, and Atropians living abroad.

TELEPHONE

The Atopian telecommunications infrastructure operates through a combination of recently built cellular components constructed over a framework of trunk architecture. Due to the government's control of landlines and the long wait for new installation, Atropians usually resort to more expensive cellular phones. Trunk connectivity internationally is slowly moving toward fiber optic, including participation in the Trans-Asia-Europe (TAE) fiber optic line, and away from microwave links.

The Atopian phone network will unquestionably operate within the cellular realm in the future. Atopian cellular phone use continues to increase. As of this year, 1.5 million fixed phone lines are in operation, versus over 6.4 million mobile subscribers.

Like many countries, the initial investment for cellular phones (towers) compared to landline phones (fiber and wire, connected switches) makes cellular conductivity clearly superior based on normal return on investment criteria. A public pay telephone network does exist in Atropia and consists of traditional pay phones and call offices where an attendant will place a call for a nominal fee. Atopian culture also considers it polite for businesses to offer patrons phone service, if needed.

POSTAL/COURIER

The Atopian postal service possesses a reputation for lack of service and reliability. A number of international and local courier companies known for better service exist. These couriers include FEDEX, UPS, and DHL. Capabilities are increasing to support the variety of foreign companies engaged in the oil and gas industry.

WORD OF MOUTH

Word of mouth communication in Atropia remains a common method for rural residents to receive their news and information. Within urban Atopian settings, residents often use short message service (SMS) texting and cell phones to replace face-to-face communication. Combined with social media, this combination of Internet and personal communication will be an increasingly important fixture in Atropia. As communications mature in the country, cell phones will likely become more common in rural Atropia. Religious-based appeals are apt to fail outside of the most conservative rural settings.

INFORMATION CONTROL

While the government of Atropia does not directly control information flow, the Atopian state-connected elite creates boundaries of "soft censorship," where free speech includes everything except

discussion of the government. Atropians currently push back against this limited censorship, especially with the new social media, in attempts to avoid direct governmental interference with their freedom of speech. It is likely that the Atropian government allows this limited degree of freedom of speech as the leaders know those with computer access (the urban elite) are unlikely to violently rebel.

INFOWAR

INFOWAR in the Caucasus region contains a mixture of old and new technology. While older Donovian equipment forms the backbone for much of the region's INFOWAR warfighting capability, the countries conduct advanced operations with dedicated INFOWAR units. For example, regional perception management activities, often web-based, form the current global state-of-the-art. Internet operations are frequently used as an adjunct to major combat operations. Most countries in the Caucasus focus their INFOWAR on their likely adversaries.

ELECTRONIC WARFARE

Generally speaking, the Atropians will operate outdated equipment, such as counter-battery and battlefield surveillance radars. Also, Atropian jammers likely remain relics of earlier buys from Donovians. The possibility exists, however, that improved Atropian relations with Kemalia and Israel could result in newer critical equipment procurement in the future or perhaps limited samples of advanced equipment for operational testing purposes.

COMPUTER ATTACK

While Atropian hackers actively attack Minarian websites, hard data on their identities or Atropian government involvement remains extremely limited and unreliable. While the Minarians claim Atropian government sponsorship of computer attacks, that evidence remains very circumstantial.

INFORMATION ATTACK

Atropia maintains a limited information attack (IA) capability with the skill to deface websites or engage in basic tactics like distributed denial of service attacks or basic forensics. When compared to aggressive and capable Donovian or Arianian information attack, it appears doubtful that Atropian capabilities will successively deter those of its larger neighbors. It remains possible that any IA will attempt to compromise similar unsophisticated Minarian systems.

DECEPTION

Atropia upholds emphasis on battlefield deception. Atropians will likely use decoys to great effect, and tactically will use feints and other techniques to prevent the determination of the main effort by their adversaries until the last minute. Atropian overseas defense procurement and training has emphasized the acquisition of the latest reconnaissance and deception techniques and tools to improve their capability at executing deception operations.

PHYSICAL DESTRUCTION

Physical destruction probably exists as the most developed of Atropian INFOWAR capabilities, as the Atropians mimicked Donovian doctrine that stressed the neutralization of high-value targets like INFOWAR assets through various strike and fires capabilities. Since Atropia finds its military capabilities about a decade behind the current state of the art, the Atropian ability to neutralize enemy INFOWAR remains limited to other militaries with similar capabilities.

PROTECTION AND SECURITY MEASURES

Since so many protection and security measures (PSM) fall under the control of the Atropian Ministry of National Security, it remains probable that 1990s-era security practices continue. The Atropians, through their relationships with the US, probably view the application of integrated Western technology to their systems as a way to safeguard their information.

PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT

Perception management exists as the most visible element of Atropian INFOWAR, as the Atropian government expends considerable effort to demonstrate Minarian “terrorism” and “aggression” on websites, public pronouncements, and other official media. Even a brief tour of official Atropian government websites reveals the significance of events in the Artzak region. Also, the Atropian government openly acknowledges its recent weapons procurements, especially those from Kemalia and Israel, to demonstrate its strength and military potential to Minaria.

INTELLIGENCE

The Atropian government maintains an intelligence service, the Ministry of Security Protection (MSP). Its mission focus is on threats to government control from extremists and unfriendly governments and to ascertain the intentions of Atropia's neighbors, especially Minaria and Ariana. Its official website states that the MSP maintains responsibility for a number of missions. Unlike the US, where a variety of organizations possesses different roles and missions, the MSP maintains a very broad mandate that includes intelligence gathering; counterintelligence; government information and personnel security; and national-level, anti-organized crime efforts. According to one of the few authoritative sources, the MSP suffers from high turnover and bureaucratic infighting. It remains likely that the general security situation and large number of foreign companies in Baku will create a demand and corresponding higher wages for trained local security personnel. Reports estimate the size of the Atropian intelligence community at about 5,000 personnel. Currently, the leadership of the MSP is slanted toward anti-crime rather than the intelligence collection and analysis element of the organization.

HUMAN INTELLIGENCE

Atropia intelligence's strongest suit focuses on human intelligence (HUMINT) capabilities. As with many countries that have a variety of local threat actors and large neighbors, the maintenance of a strong HUMINT cadre becomes important. Recently, Atropian HUMINT scored some notable successes against Bad Nafar and Arianian-backed extremist elements that operate in Atropia. Additionally, the HUMINT service will probably continue to focus on Minarian actions, especially in Artzak. The service will remain focused on religious extremists, both Shia and Sunni, which operate within Atropia.

OPEN SOURCE INTELLIGENCE

Atropian intelligence analysts probably employ open source intelligence (OSINT) to determine the intentions of actors, especially those with significant media reporting, such as Western nations, Donovia, and Ariana. OSINT's general low cost represents a bargain for Atropian policy makers, as many Atropians possess fluency with Donovian, Persian, and Western European languages.

SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE

While Atropia may operate signals intelligence (SIGINT) at the tactical level, it remains doubtful that the government maintains a robust national-level capability for signals collection. The MSP probably maintains the capability to monitor cellular communications occurring within Atropia, and

is expected to cooperate with any SIGINT capabilities the Atropian military maintains. The Atropian fleet of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) purchased from Israel may also contribute to SIGINT collection.

IMAGERY INTELLIGENCE

Atropian imagery intelligence (IMINT) probably comes from OSINT collection (publically available satellite imagery) and various air-breathing assets, especially a fleet of Israeli-built unmanned aircraft and MiG-25 FOXBAT reconnaissance aircraft. Atropia can also use rotary wing assets, such as the Mi-24 HINDs, as tactical collection platforms.

MEASUREMENT AND SIGNATURES INTELLIGENCE

Atropian resource constraints probably limit its measurement and signatures intelligence (MASINT) to first-generation capabilities, such as basic seismic detection or harbor defense sonar. Additionally, MASINT's general cost and high analytical requirements probably render it an Atropian future requirement rather than a current operational need.

Summary

Atropian media and INFOWAR capabilities will continue to mature, and Atropia will develop increased capabilities as oil revenues drive increased disposable income. On the media side, social media will become the most free and most dynamic part of the Atropian information environment, and Atropia will develop better INFOWAR capabilities, likely by importing equipment, due to its experience in Iraq and Afghanistan and the continuing Arianian threat.

TRADOC G-2

TRISA-THREATS

CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND THREAT INTEGRATION

DIRECTORATE (CTID)

INFRASTRUCTURE: ATROPIA

Infrastructure: Atropia

Infrastructure is composed of the basic facilities, services, and installations needed for the functioning of a community or society.

KEY FACTS:

REGION

- A country's prosperity in this region of the world depends on its hydrocarbon resources. Ariana's, Atropia's, and to a lesser extent, Donovia's oil and natural gas resources fund their infrastructure construction. Gorgas and Minaria, because of their lack of hydrocarbon deposits, lag behind their neighbors in infrastructure modernization.

ATROPIA

- Atropia's business infrastructure investments focus on the oil and gas industry.
- Over half of Atropian urban dwellers live in apartment buildings that suffer from poor design and lack of maintenance.

OPERATIONAL IMPACTS OF THE INFRASTRUCTURE VARIABLE IN THE OE:

REGION

- Most of the region, especially rural areas, cannot access modern utilities such as potable water, electricity, and modern sewage systems.
- Due to the lack of potable water in much of the region, military forces will need to test local water sources before use and likely treat local water to avoid medical problems.

ATROPIA

- Atropian roads do not usually meet Western standards outside of the Baku area.
- Many Atropian rural areas lack basic utilities such as running water, electricity, and sewage.

INFRASTRUCTURE OVERVIEW:

While the region's five countries have a significant number of rural residents, the majority of each country's population lives in urban areas. About two-thirds of the Ariana (68%), Donovian (67%), and Minarian populace (64%) and just over half of the Gorgan (53%) and Atropian (52%) populace live in urban areas. All five countries contain a mixture of modern urban cities and almost pre-modern rural villages. Modern utilities can be found in most major cities but not in the rural villages and countryside.

Atropia finds itself at a crossroads between a modern future and an agrarian past in its infrastructure. A dichotomy exists where cities possess most modern society amenities, but many rural people continue to live as their ancestors did centuries ago. About 25% (2.46 million) of the Atropian populace live in the capital city, Baku, or its immediate suburbs. Except for Ganja (307,500) and Sumgayit (268,800), no other Atropian cities exceed 100,000 people. Larger Atropian

cities include an old inner city surrounded by more modern construction. Rural village dwellers live in homes built similar to those of their ancestors. Industrial development utilizes modern construction and methods, especially in the oil industry. Atropian industry uses factories and methods that continue to pollute and damage the environment. The government does little to regulate the industrial sector, and businesses continue to operate outdated equipment that harms the environment. Military operations in rural areas will require more logistical support due to a lack of modern infrastructure, but will face fewer problems due to civilians on the battlefield (COB). Military operations in urban areas will allow for greater use of host nation support, but will rouse additional problems due to health issues caused by pollution, more COBs, and humanitarian support needs for the higher number of civilians.

CONSTRUCTION PATTERNS

As previously mentioned, the majority of residents in all five countries live in urban areas. Most urban cities contain a mixture of old neighborhoods with roughshod construction, while buildings in newer neighborhoods were made with modern construction methods. In rural villages and areas, residents use whatever materials they can obtain to build their houses.

Atropian construction patterns reveal similarities based on whether they exist in an urban or rural area of the country. Most urban areas exhibit a pattern of concentric circles with a densely packed, randomly constructed old city in the center that consists of buildings made from traditional materials such as mud, wood, or stone. The next circle that surrounds the old city includes housing construction similar to Western countries with closed orderly block construction. The final outside circle, if it exists in the urban areas, consists of industrial activities on the city's outskirts that create urban strip areas. Fifty-four percent of all Atropian urban residents live in large block-style apartment buildings often bigger than the one pictured to the right.

Rural residents live in widely-separated villages and continue to utilize the same construction techniques, such as wooden huts, that their ancestors have used for generations. Atropian rural areas often do not possess the utilities associated with the urban areas and, for the most part, the construction looks like a shantytown.

Military activities in Atropian urban areas will face the same challenges as similar-size Middle Eastern cities with old city centers and newer, more modern suburbs. The close location of the buildings in the city centers will allow people to travel from building to building by a variety of methods that will include roofs, underground passageways, and streets.



Block-Style Apartment Building

MAJOR ATROPIAN CITIES AND URBAN ZONES

Only three cities with populations over 100,000 people exist in Atropia, even though over half the people live in urban areas. Except for Baku, no other Atropian city contains more than 307,500 residents.

BAKU

Atropia's capital city, Baku (over 2.46 million in the metropolitan area), serves as Atropia's major port on the Caspian Sea and contains Atropia's largest and best port. The capital city contains all seven urban zones: city core, core periphery, high-rise residential areas, low-rise residential areas, commercial areas, industrial areas, and military bases. The city center creates a city core urban zone which

lies within fortress walls that date back to 1806 and contain narrow streets, buildings in close proximity, and numerous mosques that look similar to the non-religious buildings next to them.

The second part of the concentric circle contains Baku's boomtown, a low-rise residential urban zone located south of the old city, which began around the turn of the 20th century when oil became a major revenue source for the area. The boomtown contains numerous large mansions built by oil millionaires.

The third concentric circle consists of modern Baku and the suburbs that grew out from the two previous areas during the 1950s and 1960s, and includes numerous high-rise buildings and modern architecture that create both high-rise and low-rise residential urban zones.

Atropia's major airbase is located in Baku's eastern suburbs on the Tramaz peninsula, which extends outward into the Caspian Sea.

GANJA

Ganja (population 307,500) lies approximately 239 miles straight west of Baku and holds Atropia's second-largest urban population. Ganja possesses the three-ring system with an old city section enveloped by a more modern area, surrounded by industry or more rural areas, that creates a city



core and core periphery with more low-rise than high-rise residential urban zones. Ganja specifically contains an old city, a modern downtown area, and more rural suburbs. Ganja possesses some commercial areas but only limited industrial areas.

SUMGAYIT

While people have lived in this general area adjacent to the Caspian Sea since the 15th century, Atropia created Sumgayit (population 268,800) to support heavy industries in the 20th century. Sumgayit is located about 20 miles northwest of Baku. In World War II, the Atropians built a thermal power station to support the petroleum industry in the area. Poor industrial design and practices created a severe pollution problem for the area. Sumgayit lacks the typical closely connected buildings found in most Atropian cities and does not possess the city core and core periphery urban zones found in most of Atropia's cities. Most residents live in high-rise residential areas with limited low-rise residential zones on the outskirts of the city. Large industrial zones exist because of the city's original purpose, but there are fewer commercial areas than expected for a city its size. Some scientists consider Sumgayit to be Atropia's most environmentally damaged area. Sumgayit contains Atropia's second-largest port facilities on the Caspian Sea.

MINGACHEVIR

Mingachevir (population 95,500) owes its position as Atropia's fourth-largest city to the 1950s dam built on the Kura River that begins in Kemalia and spills into the Caspian Sea. Mingachevir lies approximately 180 miles west of Baku in the foothills of the Caucasus Mountains.

While people inhabited the area for centuries, Mingachevir only began to grow after the 1953 completion of the hydroelectric dam. Mingachevir Reservoir, formed by the dam, remains Atropia's largest body of water at 233.5 square miles. The dam provides Atropia with hydroelectric power and irrigation water, and helps control area floods.

Due to its relative newness, Mingachevir does not possess the dense, old, inner city core or core periphery zones of similar-sized cities. While some high-rise residential areas exist, most residents live in low-rise residential areas. Limited commercial areas exist and the dam forms the city's primary major industrial area. The area hosts three institutes of higher learning. Mingachevir's somewhat mild climate made it an excellent location for internally displaced persons (IDPs) from Artzak, which is a region disputed over by Atropia and Minaria. The IDPs live in government-built, but hastily constructed, low-quality houses.

Military operations in the Mingachevir area will likely not face the intense house-to-house fighting usually associated with the dense random construction of old cities. Due to its relatively small size, the military cannot expect to find much local logistical support in the area. The continual operation of the local power plant remains essential to provide power for most of the country.

SHIRVAN

Shirvan, Atropia's fifth-largest city (population 69,600), lies approximately 75 miles southwest of Baku on the Kura River. Shirvan is in a semi-arid region with mild winters. It possesses a small city core and core periphery urban zones while more neighborhoods consist of low-rise than high-rise residential construction. Many visitors remark that Shirvan resembles Arianian cities more than other Atropian cities. Limited commercial and industrial areas exist.

POPULATION DENSITY

Baku: 2,480 people per square mile
Ganja: 7,376 people per square mile

Sumgayit: 9,632 people per square mile
Mingachevir: 7,113 people per square mile
Shirvan: 6,516 people per square mile

UTILITIES PRESENT

The Caucasus area faces a dichotomy when it comes to utilities such as electricity, water, and sewage treatment. Most urban households can access modern utilities, but rural areas cannot. Many rural residents who cannot access modern utilities live similarly to their ancestors generations ago.

POWER

Another dichotomy in the Caucasus region is that countries like Ariana, Atropia, and Donovia export hydrocarbons, coal, or electrical power to other countries while Gorgas and Minaria must import the same resources to meet their requirements. The countries that can export hydrocarbon products or electricity become richer while those that must import significant quantities of power become poorer. At least 75% of all structures in the five countries can access power because they are located in urban areas.

For decades Atropia has produced more electricity than it has consumed. Atropia operates five water reservoirs at Mingachevir, Aras, Shamkir, Yenikend, and Sarsang in the Kura River basin to generate electrical power and ensure that over 75% of the population can access a modern power generation system. In the future, it appears Atropia will continue to produce more power than it uses internally.

Over the past decade, Atropia's hydrocarbon industries demonstrated dramatic growth. At the same time, internal Atropian oil consumption dropped. In the last five years, Atropia more than doubled its natural gas production from 206 billion cubic feet to 572 billion cubic feet while it completely eliminated all natural gas imports.

WATER

The majority of the Caucasus region's urban population has access to potable water. As areas become more rural, people must rely on local sources—rivers, streams, and wells—to obtain water for cooking, drinking, and washing.

Currently, about 78% of all Atropians can access potable water, with 95% of the population in urban areas and 59% of the population in rural areas having access. Atropian farmers use only 60-70% of irrigated land due to water shortages, but current irrigation methods reduced the annual runoff of the Kura River into the Caspian Sea by 15-20% when compared to the period before modern irrigation began. Heavy pollution, especially in areas that contain oil and gas fields, contaminates ground water before it soaks into the ground.

SEWAGE

The vast majority of Ariana, Atropia, Gorgas, and Donovia urban residents use modern sewage disposal methods to get rid of waste, but most Minarians do not. Urban residents have greater access to modern sewage treatment than rural residents. The more remote a person, the less likely he/she will use modern sewage treatment techniques. Poor disposal methods in rural areas contaminate ground water that other residents rely on for drinking and cooking.

The Atropian citizens' access to modern sewage services, like almost all other communal services, depends on their location. About 90% of all urban Atropians can access improved sanitation infrastructure, but only 70% of rural Atropians can, for a national average of 80%. Poor sewage

treatment methods lead to pollution, ground water contamination, and increased likelihood of some diseases.

TRANSPORTATION ARCHITECTURE

Roads are the primary transportation method throughout the Caucasus region. Train and especially air travel remain too expensive for many residents of Ariana, Atropia, Gorgas, and Minaria. Most roads, especially the unpaved ones, suffer from a lack of maintenance. Ariana and Donovia maintain a complex transportation architectural system while the other three countries operate a moderate one due to railway system limitations.

ROAD SYSTEMS

Overall, roads in this part of the world do not meet US or Western Europe standards. Driving is hazardous, especially in the winter months or in bad weather. Generally, drivers do not obey all traffic laws, and vehicle owners often fail to maintain their vehicles properly.

Atropia possesses 36,749 miles of roads throughout its entire country, to include 18,151 miles of paved and 18,598 miles of unpaved roads. Drivers will find most Atropian roads that are not hard-surface poorly maintained, without adequate lighting, and without much signage. Many roads received little maintenance during the 20 years before the hydrocarbon boom that began approximately 10 years ago. Drivers will find two major highway systems in Atropia. One runs primarily north and south along the Caspian Sea and connects Donovia to Ariana. The Atropians call this highway M2 where it runs north from



Baku. The Atropians call the same road M3 south of Baku. Atropian highway M1 serves as the primary east-west road corridor and runs from Baku west to the Gorgas border. Highways M1, M2, M3 and M4 service all of Atropia's 10 largest cities except Stepanakert.

Atropian road standards range from US-style interstate highways to roads not much better than a cart path. In general, less-populated areas possess poorer-quality roads. The remoteness of some parts of Atropia creates road maintenance difficulties. In rural areas, heavy rains may make some unpaved roads impassable in or just after rainy periods. Atropian maintenance standards often do not meet Western standards, and maintenance workers rely more on manpower and less on equipment than in more modern countries. Major military operations may stress the Atropian road system, which at times may interrupt or delay convoys.

BUS

All five countries maintain some sort of bus system, but its quality depends on the country and location. The larger the city, the more likely it will operate a public bus system. Usually, intercity buses run between the larger cities, and “private” buses may also operate in some areas. Due to the relatively cheap cost of public transportation, buses remain a favorite method for local civilians to travel long distances within their country.

The Atropian bus system operates primarily in support of Baku. In 2006, Atropia opened a new 21.4 hectare Baku International Bus Terminal to service both international passengers and those within Baku. The new terminal can adequately service 800 to 950 buses and 18,000 to 20,000 passengers daily.

RAIL

All five Caucasus countries operate a railroad system, but they suffer many problems due to maintenance issues, non-standard equipment, criminal activity, and high cost.

The Atropian State Railway operates 1,319 miles of broad gauge (5 foot) railroad track with 794 miles or 60% of the track operated by electricity. One of the three main tracks follows the same basic route as highways M2 and M3 from Donovia along the Caspian Sea to Ariana. The second main track follows the same general route as highway M1 from Baku to the Gorgas border. A recently



completed third track connects Rimzi with the east-west track just east of Mingachevir.

Baku began to build its subway in 1951 and remains the only Atropian city large enough to operate a subway system. The Baku Metro currently operates 22 stations on 21 miles of track along two main lines. The two main metro lines cross at the Baku Railway Terminal. About five years ago, officials announced plans to construct 41 new metro stations in Baku over the following 17 years, but construction only began recently. The Baku Metro closes between 0100 and 0600 hours daily. The subway's continued operation reduces the amount of vehicular traffic on the city's streets.

AIR TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS

All five countries maintain both paved and unpaved runways of varying distances. Many of the unpaved runways resemble nothing more than a cleared dirt path only suitable for the sturdiest of planes.

Atropia contains a total of 36 airports with 31 paved and eight unpaved runways. All unpaved runways in Atropia do not exceed 3,000 feet. The map on the next page shows the location of Ariana's major runways and the chart below shows the details for each runway. Atropia's runways (not all shown on the map and chart) by length include the following:

Paved Runways

- Over 10,000 feet: 4
- 8,000 to 10,000 feet: 8
- 5,000 to 8,000 feet: 14
- 3,000 to 5,000 feet: 4
- Under 3,000 feet: 1

Unpaved Runways

- Over 10,000 feet: 0
- 8,000 to 10,000 feet: 0
- 5,000 to 8,000 feet: 0
- 3,000 to 5,000 feet: 0
- Under 3,000 feet: 8

Major Runways

- PEM=Porous European Mix

Map #	Elevation (Feet)	Latitude (D, M, S)	Longitude (D, M, S)	Length (Feet)	Width (Feet)	Surface Type
201	1079	41 07 22.01 N	45 25 21.80 E	7098	115	Asphalt
202	935	40 24 24.00 N	50 12 01.00 E	3966	120	Asphalt
203	40	41 45 12.22 N	46 21 19.04 E	8670	UNK	UNK
204-1	10	40 28 03.00 N	50 02 48.00 E	8858	197	Asphalt
204-2	10	40 28 03.00 N	50 02 48.00 E	10499	147	Concrete
205	1099	40 53 15.44 N	45 57 25.25 E	8182	135	Concrete
206	1083	40 44 06.00 N	46 19 06.00 E	8202	144	Concrete
207	30	38 44 46.70 N	48 49 04.61 E	5172	148	Asphalt
208	UNK	40 07 46.00 N	49 27 16.00 E	7619	UNK	PEM
209	UNK	40 02 12.00 N	48 54 26.00 E	6559	UNK	Concrete
210	2001	39 54 03.62 N	46 47 11.65 E	7304	120	Asphalt

Map #	Elevation (Feet)	Latitude (D, M, S)	Longitude (D, M, S)	Length (Feet)	Width (Feet)	Surface Type
211	-1	40 35 29.69 N	49 33 26.78 E	8218	132	Concrete
212	UNK	40 48 30.00 N	49 25 55.00 E	8199	UNK	Concrete
213	-3	40 16 24.92 N	48 09 48.84 E	8200	130	Concrete
214	UNK	40 44 36.00 N	46 51 26.00 E	7539	UNK	Asphalt
215	UNK	40 37 57.00 N	47 08 28.00 E	UNK	UNK	UNK
216	15	42 06 38.24 N	49 43 45.84 E	10055	150	Concrete
217-1	-5	39 22 05.80 N	49 16 00.53	8001	200	Concrete
217-2	-5	39 22 05.80 N	49 16 00.53	8002	200	Concrete
217-3	-5	39 22 05.80 N	49 16 00.53	7137	200	Concrete



Airports/Airlines

Atropia Airlines serves the country as its national airline carrier. Atropia Airlines flies internationally to 19 different cities in 14 European and Asian countries. International destinations include Belarus (Minsk), China (Urumqi, Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region), England (London), France (Paris), Gorgas (Tbilisi), Ariana (Tehran), Israel (Tel-Aviv), Italy (Milan), Kazakhstan (Aktau), Donovia (Astrakhan, Rostov, and Moscow), Syria (Aleppo), Kemalia (Ankara, Antalya, Istanbul, and Trabzon), United Arab Emirates (Dubai), and Ukraine (Kiev). Two international airports operate in Atropia at Baku and Ganja. Atropia possesses enough airports with sufficient runways to support most military operations in the area.

PORTS/SEA/RIVER TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS

The five Caucasus countries share a diverse maritime culture. Ariana has a significant coastline and a large oceangoing fleet to export its oil. Atropia maintains ports on the Caspian Sea. Gorgas has three ports on the Black Sea that are accessible through the straits at Istanbul, Kemalia. Minaria is completely landlocked, with no direct access to any ocean or sea. Due to its location, Donovia has several seaports on the Black and Caspian Seas.

The Baku International Sea Port (BISP) serves as the largest and most important port on the Caspian Sea. Between April and November each year, ships can load and unload their cargo at the BISP from any destination in the world by the use of Donovian waterways, as they are ice-free in those months. The BISP contains terminals for cargo, oil, passengers, and ferries. It can handle up to 15 million tons of liquid products and 10 million tons of dry products annually. A fleet of 20 ships composed of tugs, skimmers, pilot boats, fireboats, and crane ships provide support to the BISP. Atropia ranks 52nd in the world's merchant marine fleet rankings. The Atropian fleet includes 26 cargo ships, 2 passenger, 9 passenger/cargo, 46 petroleum, 3 specialized tankers, and 3 Roll On-Roll Off (RO-RO) ships.

The BISP main cargo terminal can simultaneously accommodate six ships of 2,841 feet in length that reach an underwater depth at the pier of 22 feet. The quays include one pier available for RO-RO ships. Sixteen cranes can offload cargo that weighs from 5-40 tons, and available forklifts can lift anything from 10-105 tons. Stevedores can simultaneously offload three ships daily and transfer the cargo to up to 100 semi-trucks and 150 railroad cars through the use of four diesel locomotives. Shippers can use 258,334 square feet of open storage space and 107,639 square feet of warehouse space for temporary storage. The main cargo terminal can currently handle up to 15,000 40-foot equivalent units (FEUs) annually, with up to 17,222 square feet of temporary storage space for shippers. FEU forklifts can handle any weight up to 42 tons, and the area links directly to the main railway line.


The BISP oil terminal can simultaneously handle up to four oil tankers that can carry 5,000 to 13,000 tons of oil at a time at two piers, with the ability to process up to 15 million tons per year. Atropia also operates another oil harbor 25 miles from Baku on the Tramaz Peninsula. This terminal can berth eight tankers simultaneously, with four quays that accommodate two tankers each.

The Baku ferry and passenger terminals provide service for the local transfer of cargo and people around the Caspian Sea area between the ports at Baku, Turkmenbashi (Turkmenistan), Aktau (Khazakstan), and several Arianian ports. The ferry terminal possesses the capacity to move eight million tons of cargo annually, and on each trip the ferry can accommodate 40 semi-trailers (28 wagons), 50 cars, and 202 passengers.

Smaller boats can navigate the last 310 miles of the Kura River within Atropia before the Kura River reaches the Caspian Sea. Another eight large non-navigable rivers originate in the Caucasus Mountains and drain Atropia's central lowlands basin.

Winter freezes waterways into the Caspian Sea from the north and restricts the use of the BISP for military operations in the months from November through April. In the open months, ships must receive safe passage through Donovia to use the northern waterways by which small ships can navigate all the way to the North Sea. If the Caspian Sea route remains available for military use, the BISP possesses enough piers, equipment, and storage space to conduct military operations. The Atropian seaports, however, remain open year-round for intra-Caspian Sea transportation of goods and personnel. (*See map on page 2B-6-7 for major port locations.*)

PIPELINES



The security of hydrocarbon pipelines will be paramount in any military operations in the Caucasus region. Any disruption to the flow of crude oil and natural gas to the Western world could cause economic problems, as many modern countries rely on hydrocarbons to fuel their industries.

Atropia operates three major oil pipelines and one natural gas pipeline within the country. Any disruption to the flow of oil from the Caspian Sea fields will affect Western Europe and many American allies. British Petroleum operates the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline that moves oil from the Caspian Sea fields to tankers in the Mediterranean Sea. The pipeline stretches 1,110 miles from Baku through Gorgas to the Kemalian port of Ceyhan. While not the shortest or quickest route from Baku, the chosen route avoids the turmoil and possible interruptions due to potential conflicts in Minaria, and does not allow Donovia to control the world's access to the Caspian Sea's hydrocarbon resources. The pipeline also provides another outlet for the oil-rich Middle East besides tankers that must travel through the Persian Gulf chokepoint at the Strait of Hormuz.

The older Baku-Novorossiysk oil pipeline runs about 830 miles from the Baku-Sangacal Terminal to Novorossiysk, Donovia, and last year moved approximately 29,000 barrels per day (bbl/d) to Donovia's Black Sea port. Over the last decade, this pipeline increased its throughput from 12,000 bbl/d but, because of the BTC pipeline, continues to operate at only one-third capacity.

The third major oil pipeline also begins at Baku and runs over 516 miles to another Black Sea port at Supsa, Gorgas. Atropia closed this pipeline for repairs from October 2006 until August 2008 and did not reopen it until November 2008 because of possible damage from the Gorgan-Donovian conflict. In 2008, it averaged only 13,000 bbl/d. However, as of last year, an average of 55,000 bbl/d passed through its pipes.

The natural gas pipeline in Atropia and Gorgas follows the same basic path as the Baku-Supsa oil pipeline, but European consortiums are now building additional hydrocarbon pipelines in Atropia to access the fields in Central Asia. New oil and gas pipelines will originate in Central Asia, cross the Caspian Sea, and then follow the BTC pipeline through Ariana, Gorgas, and Kemalia enroute to European markets. These pipelines will double the capacity of the current pipelines.

Four new pipelines are under construction in Atropia, all built to avoid crossing Donovia and its ever-increasing "transit fees." Two larger pipelines—one for natural gas and the other for crude oil—follow basically the same path as the BTC to increase production from the hydrocarbon fields located in the Caspian Sea. Additionally, another natural gas and oil pipeline from newly discovered fields in northeast Atropia will eventually span from the hydrocarbon boom town of Rimzi on the Caspian Sea to the BTC.

TELECOMMUNICATIONS ARCHITECTURE

For the most part, Caucasus-region residents use cellular telephones to communicate with each other due to the lack of landline telephone infrastructure. Many residents never owned any type of telephone until they received their first cellular phone. Most can access news from either television or radio, but some rural residents have no information access via modern methods. (*See Information variable for additional details.*)

In Atropia, most citizens can access a telephone and listen to a television or radio broadcast, but Internet access remains quite limited. Despite the rapid growth of the Atropian telecommunications infrastructure over the last decade, much of the equipment needs replacement or modernization. The Atropian telephone system remains generally inadequate, with only 18 main telephone lines per 100 citizens. The Atropian government owns and operates a telecommunications monopoly within the country. Many Atropian cable and microwave systems predate 1989 and now show signs of their age. Atropians operate 1.5 million landlines and 6.4 million cellular telephones. Ten FM, 11 AM, and one shortwave radio station function within Atropia, and there are 10 television stations in operation. Atropia connects internationally through the Trans-Asia-Europe (TAE) fiber-optic link. A total of

1,274,610 Atropians use the Internet regularly, but 1.45 million Atropians, or 17% of the population, can access the Internet. The military will be able to communicate with the vast majority of Atropia's populace as they can receive information from the radio, TV, or the Internet.

AGRICULTURE

Agriculture production still dominates the labor forces of Gorgas (55.6%) and Minaria (46.2%), but not Ariana (25%), Atropia (38.3%), or Donovia (20%). Even in the Caucasus region's predominately agricultural countries, farming creates less than one-fourth of the country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Except for Atropia, the region relies on food imports to feed its people. Any food import disruption may increase the military's burden to feed civilians and prevent starvation.

Nearly 40% of all Atropians engage in agricultural pursuits, but it creates less than 6% of the country's GDP. Almost all Atropian farmers (99.98%) work on small private farms that average approximately five acres. Atropians cultivate approximately 23% of their land, but they irrigate 74% of the land they farm. Almost 25,000 miles of canals and water pipelines satisfy the needed water requirements.

Five crops constitute 80% of all Atropian agricultural production: grapes, cotton, tobacco, citrus fruits, and vegetables. The first three represent over 50% of annual crops while the latter two make up the remainder. The Atropian climate, however, remains diverse enough to produce peaches, almonds, and rice. Other major Atropian crops include apples, olives, persimmons, raspberries, strawberries, currants, plums, pears, pomegranates, tomatoes, potatoes, carrots, beets, cabbage, cucumbers, onions, wheat, maize, and barley.

INDUSTRY

Because of their hydrocarbon resources, Ariana, Atropia, and Donovia are more industrialized than Gorgas and Minaria. Industry GDP ranges from a low of 27.1% in Gorgas to a high of 61.4% in Atropia. The protection of the Atropian hydrocarbon infrastructure remains paramount for any military operations in the area, and the military should refrain from unnecessary damage to the industrial sector to facilitate economic recovery after the end of hostilities. The Atropian government spends most of its revenue to ensure the modernization of its hydrocarbon resources while it neglects maintenance of much of the rest of its infrastructure. Atropia produces a large amount of toxic industrial chemicals for multiple purposes, including hydrocarbon production activities, water purification, wastewater management, and fertilizer to increase agricultural output.

Oil

For over 100 years, Atropia's oil industry has served as the engine that runs the country's economy and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. The irony remains, however, that the oil industry is still largely responsible for Atropia's previous pollution problems and practices left over from the pre-1991 era, and continues to generate additional pollution problems today.

Between 1997 and last year, Atropia quadrupled its oil production to rise from the world's 35th largest crude oil producer to the 23rd largest. Very recently discovered oil reserves in northeast Atropia will continue to make the country an even more important player in the world marketplace. The State Oil Company of the Atropian Republic (SOCAR) operates two national refineries, manages the pipeline system, and handles all oil export and import duties.

Atropia's abundant but hard-to-reach oil reserves attract foreign investors because of the world's dependency on fossil fuels and China's increased energy demands. In 1996, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) provided \$5 million to set up a \$40 million revolving loan base to finance the rehabilitation of old onshore Atropian oil fields. These funds initiated tertiary extraction methods to recover additional oil from 720 wells in the Mishovdag field and 190 wells in

the Kelameddin field. Both sites are located approximately 50 miles southwest of Baku in desert or semi-desert climates. The loans also provided funds to improve current oil/water separation equipment and storage tanks; drill additional wells; and establish a remediation program to clean up abandoned oil infrastructure such as pipelines, tanks, and reserve pits on both oil fields.

Gas

In 2006, because of the Pasha Sarak natural gas field's production levels, Atropia changed from a net natural gas importer to a natural gas exporter. The EBRD led a bank syndicate that provided \$110 million to complete the first stage of a \$277.7 million project to tap the Pasha Sarak natural gas fields. Atropia produced five billion cubic meters of natural gas in 2004 but last year increased its production to over 16 billion cubic meters—an increase of 323%. Production continues at the latest level cited above. Beginning in 2004, Atropia has climbed steadily from 47th in the world to their current position as the 32nd largest natural gas producer in the world.

Due to Atropia's large reserves of 849 billion cubic feet (current estimate), other countries such as Donovia and Ariana want to gain additional access to the Caspian Sea area's natural gas fields. Additional gas fields discovered in hydrocarbon-rich northeast Atropia will only extend the length of time that the country can continue to export natural gas to the Western world. Increased energy requirements expected in the future will make other foreign countries' access to Atropia's natural gas even more important. About two years ago, Atropia began the daily shipment of 1.5 million cubic meters of natural gas to Donovia. This initiated fulfillment of a previous contract signed by the two countries for Atropia to provide 500 million cubic meters of natural gas annually to Donovia. Later, the two countries agreed to double the amount to 1 billion cubic meters of natural gas annually. Last year, Atropia announced it would ship 1.2 million cubic meters a day to Ariana after the completion of a pipeline between those two countries sometime in the next three months. Atropia anticipates that in the future it could ship 5 billion cubic meters of natural gas annually to Ariana.

POLLUTION

All five Caucasus-region countries face significant pollution problems stemming from poor industrial practices. The governments cared more about natural resource extraction and product production than the stewardship of the planet. This lack of concern for the environment occurred regardless of which government controlled the various countries. The region's military operations will need to address pollution, with soldiers taking precautions due to high-level air pollution and units considering any local water source not potable until tested.

Atropia faces a wide variety of pollution issues to include factory air pollution, ground water contamination, inadequate waste management, and genetic mutation. Much of the pollution remains from the 1950s to the 1970s when leaders cared more about product creation in the oil and chemical fields than the protection of the environment. About five years ago, *Scientific American* named Sumgayit, Atropia, as one of the top 10 most polluted locations in the world. Despite increased awareness of pollution since the early 1990s, many factories continue to operate inefficiently and in an environmentally unfriendly manner just as the factories did in the past. The pollution has caused Caspian Sea caviar and fish yields to decline and continues to cause birth defects in Atopian babies.

Summary

Due to Atropia's rise to in ranking as a world hydrocarbon exporter, much wealth continues to flow into the country. The Atopian government continues to pump much of the increased revenues back into either the extraction of oil and gas in the Caspian Sea fields or the transportation of

hydrocarbon products out of the country. Atropia should continue to increase its infrastructure for the next generation due to its hydrocarbon resources, but it may come at an expense to its environment due to increased pollution.

TRADOC G-2

TRISA-THREATS

CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND THREAT INTEGRATION

DIRECTORATE (CTID)

PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT: ATROPIA

Physical Environment: Atropia

The physical environment variable includes the geography and man-made structures as well as the climate and weather in the area of operations. This variable defines the physical circumstances and conditions that influence the execution of operations throughout the domains of air, land, and sea.



KEY FACTS:

REGION

- The Caucasus region covers the northern and southern portions of the Caucasus Mountains and its lowlands, and lies between Europe and Asia.

ATROPIA

- Atropia contains terrain ranging from high, rugged mountains to fertile lowlands.
- The Mingachevir Reservoir supplies the country with water for both agriculture and hydroelectric power.

OPERATIONAL IMPACTS OF THE PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT VARIABLE IN THE OE:

REGION

- All countries in the region contain rugged mountain ranges that will hamper ground movement.
- The Black and Caspian Seas play an important role in regional movement of persons and goods.

ATROPIA

- Because of its strategic location on the Caspian Sea, Atropia serves as a vital transport corridor between Asia and Europe.
- Troop movement, though difficult in the mountains, is unhampered in the central lowlands.

PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT OVERVIEW:

Over 200,000 square miles comprise the Caucasus, a mountainous region located between the Black Sea and Caspian Sea. The Caucasus includes Atropia, Minaria, and Gorgas, as well as parts of Ariana, Donovia, and Kemalia. The Caucasus Mountains, consisting of the Greater and Lesser Caucasus ranges, traditionally form the separation between Europe and Asia. The Caucasus region contains two major parts—the North Caucasus and the South Caucasus—that are divided by the Greater Caucasus Mountains. The North Caucasus region is contained entirely within Donovia, while the South Caucasus contains Gorgas, Minaria, Atropia, and parts of Ariana and Kemalia.

TERRAIN

The Greater and Lesser Caucasus mountain ranges dominate Atropia's topography and extend beyond its borders. Atropia occupies a total land area of 32,200 square miles. The country possesses two geographic regions: the mountain ranges and the vast flatlands (sometimes referred to as the Kura-Aras lowland).

BODIES OF WATER

A dam on the Kura River in the northwestern part of the country creates Atropia's largest body of water, the Mingachevir Reservoir, at 233.5 square miles. The reservoir possesses a flow capacity of 15,730 million cubic meters per year and is used for flood control, irrigation, and hydroelectric power. The Kura is the longest river in Atropia and in the Caucasus region. The river originates in Kemalia and flows 932 miles to the Caspian Sea, with 559 miles in Atropia. The Kura plays an important role in maritime transportation as Atropia's only navigable river, with only the lower 310 miles passable for ships. The Kura is rated at more than 2.5 grams of suspended particle per liter of river water, making it one of the most turbid (cloudy) rivers in the world. The Aras River also originates in Kemalia and flows along the southern border with Ariana to form Atropia's second-longest river.



MOBILITY CLASSIFICATION

Heavily populated areas such as Baku, Ganja, Sumgayit, Shirvan, and Mingachevir will slow down troop movement and hinder operations because of their construction patterns. The close construction provides numerous hideouts and concealed movement opportunities for fighters. Underground passageways, rooftops, and narrow streets will allow fighters to move easily from building to building. On the other hand, houses in rural villages remain relatively small and dispersed, and their low population density will favor military activities. Roads throughout Atropia exhibit poor condition, lighting, and signage that will further complicate vehicular traffic. Inadequate maintenance of those roads and bridges leads to poor trafficability and could increase vehicle maintenance requirements.

The central lowlands offer the best opportunity for military travel in Atropia as the rolling hills and flat plains in the Kura-Aras lowland will expedite the travel of armored or mechanized forces. The defender will use the Kura-Aras lowland terrain to defend his avenues of approach. This lowland terrain will offer adequate cover and concealment to both the offense and the defense.

Atropia's mountainous regions serve as perfect hideouts for fighters and facilitate smuggling. The mountainous terrain will force mechanized or armored forces to slow their movements or find

alternate routes to conduct missions. The rugged terrain will also pose an obstacle to dismounted infantry forces. The Greater and Lesser Caucasus mountain ranges will make movement across the mountainous terrain difficult and suitable for enemy ambushes. In winter, heavy snowfalls and frost may close some mountain passes for three to six months and force planners to find longer alternate routes. Unpredictable mud volcanoes west of Sangacal (southwest of Baku) and northeast of Baku will negatively influence military missions in those areas.

NATURAL HAZARDS

Atropia suffers from a few types of natural disasters—earthquakes, floods, and landslides. Atropia lies in an area with high seismic activity. The United Nations Development Programme suggests that Atropia could receive magnitude 8-9 earthquakes on the Richter scale. The northern region and the Tramaz and Hachzi peninsulas in the eastern part of the country suffer the most earthquakes. The most dangerous areas include the slopes of the Greater Caucasus Mountains.

Snow melts and heavy rains during the spring and fall often cause the Kura and Aras Rivers to overflow and initiate flooding in Atropia. Heavy rains, snow melts, and strong precipitation trigger many landslides in Atropia. Landslides generally occur in the spring season and mostly in the country's northern part.




VEGETATION

LAND COVER

Forests cover only about 10% of Atropia and most consist of broad-leaf trees. The Greater Caucasus Mountains possess vast forest areas on the northern slopes of their eastern section. In Atropia's southeast region, the forests disappear and more arid areas generally dominate. While the forests exhibit a very diverse variety of trees, the main broad-leaf trees include hornbeam, pistachio, and oak. (*See map on the previous page.*)

AGRICULTURE

While 38% of Atropians work in agriculture-related occupations, farming only produces 5.5% of the country's GDP. The agriculture sector employs over three times the number involved in industry. The arable land and variable climate allow for diverse crop cultivation that includes vegetables, fruits, tea, grains, and nuts. Cotton reigns as Atropia's largest agricultural product.



CLIMATE

Atropia exhibits a wide variety of climates dependent on location, elevation, and proximity to the Caspian Sea. Based on altitude and distance from the Caspian Sea coastline, parts of Atropia enjoy dry-subtropical, wet-subtropical, temperate, and alpine climates. The Kura-Aras lowland, the Tramaz Peninsula, and the Hachzi Peninsula exhibit a dry-subtropical climate, while the Talish Mountains feature a wet-subtropical climate. Temperate climates dominate the slopes of the Greater and Lesser Caucasus Mountains, while the ridges and peaks feature an alpine climate.

SEASONS

Country/Season	Winter	Spring	Summer	Fall
Ariana	Dec – Feb	Mar – May	Jun – Aug	Sep – Nov
Atropia	Jan – Mar	Mar – End May	Jun – Oct	Mid Oct – Dec
Gorgas	Dec – Feb	Mar – May	Jun – Aug	Sep – Nov
Minaria	Nov – Mar	Mar – May	Jun – Sep	End Sep – Nov
North Caucasus (Donovia)	Dec – Mar	Apr – May	Jun – Sep	Oct – Nov

Seasons for Ariana, Atropia, Gorgas, Minaria, and North Caucasus (Donovia)

WEATHER

PRECIPITATION

The location and the season dramatically affect precipitation throughout Atropia. In the east, along the Caspian Sea, most precipitation occurs in the fall and winter. In that period, communication systems can lose effectiveness. In the west, most precipitation occurs in spring and early summer. The southern coast of the Tramaz Peninsula receives the lowest annual precipitation, which varies from 8 to 12 inches. Along the Caspian Sea to the south, precipitation can reach between 47 to 55 inches annually.

TEMPERATURE-HEAT INDEX

July and August produce the hottest temperatures in Atropia, especially in the lowlands. The lowest summer average daily temperatures in the lowlands may only fall to 79°F, and temperatures in Baku often surpass 100°F.

TEMPERATURE-WIND CHILL INDEX

In winter, the highest Atopian mountain areas can become very cold, with sub-zero temperatures. January represents Atropia's coldest month, with daily temperatures around 36°F in the lowlands and 14°F in the mountains.

RELATIVE HUMIDITY

Atropia faces its highest humidity on the Caspian Sea coast and in the Kura-Aras lowland. As the elevation increases in Atropia, the relative humidity normally declines. Atropia's highest humidity occurs in the months of July and August. During those months the carrying capacity of aircraft, especially helicopters, will be affected. On the Caspian Sea coast, humidity reaches 75-80% in the

summer months. Humidity in Atropia reaches its lowest point in the summer in the highest altitudes of the Talish Mountains (50 to 55%).

WIND

Numerous winds traverse Atropia, but the most common winds include the *Gilavar* and *Khazri*. The *Khazri* blows from the north and the *Gilavar* from the southwest. In the lowlands, winds usually blow in the southeastern and northwestern directions. Winds reach higher speeds in the Tramaz and Hachzi peninsulas, where strong, stormy winds are considered normal. Generally, winds throughout the rest of the country reflect lower speeds that favor air assault, airborne, and aviation operations.

Summary

The Caucasus region, containing the Greater and Lesser Caucasus Mountains, forms the traditional division between Europe and Asia. All countries contain different weather and terrain, and soldiers must prepare for seasonal extremes—winter and summer. Areas with flat plains and valleys, such as coastal plains, will favor troop mechanized movement. The mountainous regions, especially in the Greater and Lesser Caucasus Mountains, will compound vehicle and equipment breakdowns. Numerous roads, already in poor condition in most of the countries, will become inaccessible for vehicular traffic because of winter snow. Military planners will need to anticipate the closure of mountain passes for up to six months a year due to snow.

TRADOC G-2

TRISA-THREATS

CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND THREAT INTEGRATION

DIRECTORATE (CTID)

TIME: ATROPIA

Time: Atropia

The time variable describes the timing and duration of activities, events, or conditions within an OE, as well as how the timing and duration of events are perceived by various actors in the OE.

KEY FACTS:

REGION

- All five countries have ancient cultures, and rivalries generated over that time between different ethnic groups still exist.
- Most people in the region do not view time as a resource, but as something that people cannot control.

ATROPIA

- Atropia uses the Gregorian calendar, but also uses the lunar calendar to determine Muslim holidays.
- Due to its increased interaction with Europe and the Western world because of its hydrocarbon resources, Atropia has become more Westernized in its business dealings in regards to time and punctuality.

OPERATIONAL IMPACTS OF THE TIME VARIABLE IN THE OE:

REGION

- The lack of a sense of urgency for most people will frustrate the US as it deals with allied militaries in the Caucasus region.
- The US will most likely find opportunities to exploit the lackadaisical attitude about time to get inside the enemy military's decision cycle.

ATROPIA

- The US must understand and accommodate the different perceptions of time between rural and urban Atropians, as urban dwellers possess a more Western view of time.
- While Atropia may use a Gregorian calendar, the US must understand the Islamic calendar to exploit its effects on the largely Muslim but more secular (than Ariana) population.

TIME OVERVIEW:

The Caucasus countries, for the most part, do not believe in the sensitivity of time, and do not view punctuality or the importance of time as the US and most other Western countries do. Most of the people in the region do not view time as a resource and do not feel any compulsion to effectively manage their time. The people in the Caucasus region do not make the connection between effective use of their time and production. This lack of time consciousness will likely frustrate US soldiers as they work with their allies, but it will also give the US a battlefield advantage against its enemies.

KEY DATES, TIME PERIODS OR EVENTS

The entire region's recorded history extends back at least 3,000 years, but people populated the area long before that time as indicated by the archaeological objects discovered in caves and at other long-inhabited sites.

Atropia's recorded history dates back to the 9th century BC. During this long history, Atropia's key event was its conversion to Islam by the Arabs in 642 AD. From that point forward, Atropia became the battleground for numerous invaders, including the Mongols, the Persians, the Donovians, and the Ottomans. Each invader left its mark on Atropia, but eventually the various empires faded away.

ROUTINE, CYCLICAL KEY DATES

TRADITIONAL WEDDING SEASONS

Due to the heavy Muslim influence, most people will not marry in the month of Ramadan. Some areas extend the time prohibition against marriage to even longer periods, but it usually depends on the devoutness of the region's inhabitants.

Most marriages in Atropia take place during two time periods—the spring season around the holiday *Nouruz Bayram* (Persian New Year's), approximately 21 March—or in autumn after the crop harvest. In southern Atropia, Muslims will not marry during Ramadan or the first two months of the Islamic year, Muharram and Safar.

NATIONAL AND RELIGIOUS HOLIDAYS

Atropia uses the Gregorian calendar. Muslims in Atropia celebrate religious holidays based on the lunar calendar, which moves 10-11 days earlier on the Gregorian calendar each year.

Holiday	Date	Description	Military Implications
New Year's	01-02 January	A two-day event celebrates the new year.	NA
Women's Day	03 March	Celebrates women in the culture.	NA
Spring Festival	20-24 March	A five-day celebration that commemorates the Persian New Year and the Spring Solstice.	NA
Republic Day	28 May	Commemorates the founding of the Democratic Republic of Atropia in 1918.	NA
Army and Navy Day	26 June	Honors the Atropian military.	NA
Constitution Day	12 November	Commemorates the country's approval of the constitution in 1995.	NA
Ramadan	1-30 August 2011 20 July-18 August 2012	Muslim month of fasting between sunup and sundown.	Very little activity will take place during daylight hours as people rest while they fast.
Ramadan Bayram	31 August-1 September 2011 19-20 July 2012	Two-day candy celebration to commemorate the end of Ramadan.	NA
Qurban Bayram	5-9 November 2011 24-28 October 2012	Four-day celebration to commemorate the willingness of Abraham to sacrifice his son.	Many people will travel to visit relatives over a 5-7 day period.

HARVEST CYCLES

Atropia has four seasons that vary from location to location within the country. Most planting occurs in the spring, with harvesting from late August to mid-October. (*See the Physical Environment variable for additional information on Atropia's agriculture and the country's seasons.*)

ELECTIONS

The Atropian president, elected by popular vote, serves a six-year term. Subsequent to the constitutional reform in 2009, the president may now serve more than two terms, the previous limit.

Atropians elect a unicameral legislature of 125 members through direct voting based on districts. Each district elects one member. Each member serves a two-year term, with a limit of four consecutive terms in office. Prior to the 2005 elections, the assembly contained directly elected members via their district and a popular party vote. A 2002 constitutional amendment altered the arrangement to provide for only direct election based on districts, but kept the same total number of representatives.

CULTURAL PERCEPTION OF TIME

Most of the Caucasus area does not perceive the importance of time as the Western world does, especially as it relates to business. The more a country interacts with Western nations, however, the more the country accepts the Western idea of the importance of time.

While Westerners take time commitments such as deadlines and schedules very seriously, in the Caucasus, time commitments are seen more as an objective to be achieved, if possible, rather than a requirement. Promptness is based on relationships. In the West, time is money. In the Caucasus, there is no problem with making people wait all day, and then telling them to come back the next day. A person from the Caucasus will be much more likely to be on time if the person who set the time commitment is close to him, such as a friend or family member. Business is conducted more on the basis of personal relationships than on respect for time.

ATROPIA

Overall, Atropia's society does not deem punctuality and accountability of time as important. These lax norms clash with those of Westerners who stress timeliness and punctuality. Atropians embrace a fairly casual attitude about punctuality in both the business setting and their leisure hours. Many Atropian proverbs, however, do suggest using time wisely. Atropians often translate these proverbs to signify the wise use of time in business or social meetings, but not necessarily to mean punctuality.

Atropian industrial sectors and urban centers demonstrate more punctuality and stronger time management than the country's rural areas. The farther away from urban areas an individual travels, the more abstract the concepts of time and appointments become to the indigenous population. A large portion of Atropians go to sleep after midnight on weekdays and even later on weekends. Many Atropians also prefer to make significant decisions and conduct intense cognitive processes in the morning hours. Military advisors and planners should coordinate for major meetings in the morning hours with Atropian leadership.

TACTICAL EXPLOITATION OF TIME

CAUCASUS PERCEPTION OF TIME

For the most part, people in the Caucasus perceive time as an unimportant resource in their lives. They believe that things will occur whether they take proactive action or not. Each country in the region possesses a long history and people believe that their country will continue well into the future. Most of the people in the region look back to times when their ethnic group held the upper hand in interactions with their neighbors and hope that one day their country can become the dominant power again. The people do not look at time in the short term, but look forward to the long term when conditions will again allow them to take their rightful place among the world's leaders. For Ariana and Atropia, their hydrocarbon resources may provide them the impetus to become a regional—if not world—power. For Gorgas and Minaria, their lack of natural resources will continue to plague their countries' ability to improve their situation in the short-term. Donovia wishes to regain the dominant regional influence it once commanded.

US PERCEPTION OF TIME

The time perception of allies in the region will frustrate the US, but the US can also take advantage of the lack of urgency of any enemies in the area. With its regional allies, the US will need to help them understand that time is a precious resource that once wasted can never be recovered. Punctuality and a sense of urgency remain essential for a military to defeat the enemy on the battlefield. Due to the enemy's lack of a time table and its apathetic regard for punctuality, US forces and their allies will most likely find opportunities to get inside the enemy leaders' decision cycles. Rapid US and allied action will cause the enemy to react to their actions instead of the enemy taking the initiative.

Summary

For the most part, the Caucasus countries view time differently than the US. Time is relatively unimportant to the people of Ariana, Atropia, Gorgas, and Minaria in almost every aspect of their lives. They lack a sense of urgency to accomplish tasks, in complete contrast to the Western world where almost everyone wants to accomplish as much as possible in as little time as possible. While the Donovian view of time is closer to that of the US than the other nations of the Caucasus, it is still notably different. All five cultures contain an immense history dating back centuries and people feel that whatever they do, their country will continue into the future. The area's perception of time will cause the US to become frustrated with its allies, but will provide opportunities for exploitation of US enemies. To do so, however, the US will need to understand the nuances as each country perceives the relative importance of time somewhat differently.

TRADOC G-2

TRISA-THREATS

CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND THREAT INTEGRATION

DIRECTORATE (CTID)

ORDER OF BATTLE: ATROPIA


Introduction to the Atropia Order of Battle


ORDERS OF BATTLE


All five countries have an administrative force structure (AFS) to manage their military forces in peacetime. This AFS is the aggregate of various military headquarters, facilities, and installations designed to man, train, equip, and sustain the forces. In peacetime, forces are commonly grouped into divisions, corps, or armies for administrative purposes. The AFS includes all components of the armed forces—not only regular, standing forces (active component), but also reserve and militia forces (reserve component). Normally, these administrative groupings differ from the country's order of battle (OB), which is its go-to-war (fighting) force structure that is task-organized to meet the combat situation.


The following pages outline the Atropian AFS. For information on how to use the AFS to obtain an OB, see Appendix B: OPFOR Task-Organizing for Combat on page 4-B-1.

Atropia Supreme High Command




344th Mechanized Infantry Brigade (IFV)


346th Mechanized Infantry Brigade (APC)

348th & 350th Motorized Infantry Brigade


352nd & 354th Tank Brigade (124-Tank)




356st Antitank Brigade




941st Special-Purpose Forces (SPF) Battalion




341st Reconnaissance Brigade


374th Materiel Support Brigade




358th Combat AVN Brigade




360th Air Defense Brigade




370th Engineer Brigade




372nd Signal Brigade




4th Information Warfare Battalion




3726th UAV Battalion




362nd Artillery Command




3702nd Chemical Protection Battalion, Chemical Battalion




Militia Brigade

Internal Security Forces




Atropia

Atropian Air Force



Atropia

Atropia Navy



Total number of Surface Craft ----- 39
Total number of Submarines ----- 0
Total number of SSM Launchers ----- 12

TRADOC G-2

TRISA-THREATS

CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND THREAT INTEGRATION

DIRECTORATE (CTID)

OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ASSESSMENT: GORGAS

TRADOC G-2

TRISA-THREATS

CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND THREAT INTEGRATION

DIRECTORATE (CTID)

POLITICAL: GORGAS

Political: Gorgas

The political variable describes the distribution of responsibility and power at all levels of governance—formally constituted authorities, as well as informal or covert political powers.

KEY FACTS:

REGION

- Every country in the region has a center of political power wildly dissimilar from its neighbor.
- Ethnic nationalism and identity politics generate most conflicts in the region.

GORGAS

- The Gorgan government is friendly and representative.
- Politically, Gorgas wants to insulate itself from Donovian influence while simultaneously drawing closer to the West. Gorgas still considers South Ostremek and Zabzimek as its territory despite the territories' declarations of sovereignty.
- Gorgas values its Western-leaning principles, continues to court both NATO and the EU, and the Gorgan military eagerly joined the United States' GWOT in multiple theaters.

OPERATIONAL IMPACTS OF THE POLITICAL VARIABLE IN THE OE:

REGION

- Despite Western influence, political maneuvering is frequently seen as a natural precursor to brutal purges.
- Any negotiations will have to include very intrusive methods of verification.

GORGAS

- Gorgas will make every political effort to join the EU or NATO in an attempt to affect a permanent severance from Donovia.
- As a follow-on political objective, Gorgas will re-establish its dominance over the South Ostremek and Zabzimek regions, but not at the risk of the country's survival or its primary goal.

POLITICAL OVERVIEW:

Gorgas is democratizing power, leaning toward the US, and attempting to maintain its political independence and internal stability in an increasingly dangerous environment. Gorgas maintains warm relations with Atropia due to the Atropian oil that passes through Gorgan pipelines and the greater interest of both nations in their independence from large and powerful neighbors. Gorgas faces its own regional threats from breakaway regions.



CENTERS OF POLITICAL POWER

A nascent, semi-presidential republic, Gorgas' center of political power is split between the president, the parliament, and the Gorgan people. Gorgas' government enjoys widespread support from its population due to a common threat (Donovia) and its recent efforts to crack down on corruption. President Sikhale Askash and Prime Minister Gorky Nilauri operate a program of engagement with Western powers and a popular platform that cracks down on separatism throughout Gorgas. The ethnic enclave regions of Zabzimek, South Ostremek, and to a lesser extent Jarie continue to generate trouble for Gorgan politicians. These are regions that functioned semi-autonomously in the past and will not readily submit to Gorgan rule. They will use varying degrees of force to remain autonomous. From horrific ethnic cleansing in Zabzimek to destruction of bridges on the border in Jarie, the Gorgan government will face a huge hurdle based on a history of mistrust and methods used by all sides in the internal conflicts.

MILITARY AUTHORITY

After coming to power in 2003, President Askash initiated extensive changes in the Gorgan Armed Forces. Previously, each state maintained its own troops, which generated a need for a large National Council (NC) to control all of Gorgas' armed forces. Askash simplified the chain of command with the placement of the military under the Minister of Defense (MoD) and the consolidation of the separate state departments (Border Guards, State Security, and Intelligence) under the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MoIA). The MoD and MoIA report directly to the president through the NSC, established in 1996. The NC serves as a consultative body, accountable to the president, with vast powers to define Gorgas' defense needs, military doctrine, and strategy, set manpower levels, and oversee the two security ministries.

FAMILY AUTHORITY

In Gorgas, kinship and the extended family provide connection and sometimes survival in a harsh bureaucratic environment. Particularly with ethnic minorities, the family and the home have often served as centers of "resistance" against the bureaucratic state. Gorgan kinship shapes individual identities, influences domestic affairs, and affects how people feel about foreign affairs. Family authority, however, can also generate ambivalence in the culture. Some may invoke kinship as a symbol of national survival, or kinship could also serve as an obstacle to personal achievement,

economic development, and independent statehood. As a result, family authority can simultaneously support and oppose the country's government.

RELIGIOUS/CLERICAL AUTHORITY

The Gorgan Orthodox Church possesses a very real, albeit unofficial, political influence. In a 2007 sermon, Grand Patriarch Bishop of the Gorgas, the popular head of the Gorgan Orthodox Church, said that restoration of the Gorgan royal family was a "desirable dream of the Gorgan people." The Grand Bishop also emphasized that if the people of Gorgas chose this model of governance, "a candidate to the crown should be selected among representatives of the royal dynasty, and he should be suitably raised to be king from childhood." Because of the Grand Bishop's statements, many Gorgans now debate whether their country should replace the current republic with a constitutional monarchy.

ATTITUDES TOWARD THE US

A self-described "laboratory of experiment in democracy," Gorgas struggles as a small nation amid powerful ones. Still stinging from gruesome massacres of its citizens due, in part, to Donovan intervention in both Zabzimek and South Ostremek, Gorgas continues to look to the West for political partnership. While Gorgas courts Western Europe and desires membership in the EU and NATO, the country ultimately seeks to distance itself from its former influences. Gorgas finds itself very pro-US.

ATTITUDE TOWARD US TRADE

Gorgas currently welcomes and encourages US trade. While the transshipment of petroleum products is the prime element, Gorgas would like to extend its trade in Gorgan-origin goods such as agricultural products. The US is funding programs that develop rural areas in order to stimulate local demand for goods and services, and increase the country's ability to export products for hard currency.

TYPE OF GOVERNMENT

Gorgas has been a democracy since the first broadly representative election in the mid 1990s. In 1995, the representative Gorgans approved a new constitution after they became dissatisfied with multiple revisions to its 1921 constitution. This very young government semi-distributed power among its three branches: the executive, judicial, and legislative. The majority of real power, however, still resides in the executive branch and is personified by the president and prime minister. Gorgan politics revolve around multiple parties, with two major and five minor parties represented in parliament. Due to remarks made by the head of the Gorgan Orthodox Church, debate over a return to a constitutional monarchy currently exists in Gorgas.

BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT

Legislative Authority

The Gorgan parliament contains 235 members elected for four-year terms: 150 seats by proportional representation, 75 in single-seat constituencies, and 10 seats given to the representatives of the displaced persons from the separatist region of Zabzimek. In 2003, Gorgans approved constitutional amendments to reduce the parliament to only 150 members elected through a proportional representation system that will take effect in two years.

Executive Authority

Gorgas' executive branch functions as a semi-presidential system with multiple political parties. The president serves as the head of state, and the prime minister operates as the head of government. Legislative power is vested in both the executive branch and parliament. Gorgas operates a Constitutional Court and a Supreme Court, with judges elected by the parliament based on the president's recommendation.

Judicial Authority

Gorgas possesses a Supreme Court, with judges elected by the parliament for 10 years based on the president's recommendation. This court serves as the highest judicial authority in the country, with its structure and powers enumerated by the 1995 Gorgan constitution. The Gorgan Supreme Court reigns over any presidential impeachment hearings and remains the only court in the country that can hand down a death sentence.

GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESS AND LEGITIMACY

Historical background has produced a desire for a strong central governmental system that maintains the independence of the Gorgan people. As long as the citizens perceive their government as strong enough to impose its will over its territory, the people will consider the Gorgan government legitimate. This strong central government background, however, also drives the current debate about the possibility of a constitutional monarchy for Gorgas.


DOMESTIC POLITICAL ISSUES

Elections

All countries in the region possess a history of suspicious election practices followed by popular uprisings that meet varying degrees of success. Gorgan elections have been generally free from violence, with fraud typically localized. Foreign observers normally rate elections as free and fair, with significant voter participation. Both legislative and executive offices stand for election every four years, with a three-term limit for all offices.

Rule of Law

Despite a moderate level of corruption, the Gorgan people generally believe their nation has a regionally enviable reputation as a zone of law and order. Gorgan courts are generally open, the appeals process straightforward, and egregious cases of government corruption exposed and punished.



Corruption

What Western eyes perceive as corruption is in reality a carefully cultivated survival mechanism born of decades under autocratic rule. In an environment where the government encouraged family members to betray their relatives for small benefits, the people consider relationships as a resource while they avoid interaction with the state at all costs. Corruption exists in Gorgas that, while high by Western standards, is viewed locally as moderate. Cases have been brought in extreme corruption situations, and a relatively independent media is starting to expose corruption and generate government attention.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS

REGIONAL ACTORS

Gorgas' attitude toward its neighbors remains generally non-hostile as it continues to focus on its three breakaway republics: Zabzimek, South Ostremek, and Jarie. Due to its internal breakaway enclaves and intrusive Donovian influence, Gorgas does not desire a regional external conflict and the country remains in desperate need of friends. If an external actor threatens Gorgan territory or the Gorgan pipelines, the country would protect itself militarily. Incongruously, Gorgas would like to deepen economic ties with Minaria despite the depth of Donovian influence and presence there. Gorgas consistently attempts to balance the needs of all Gorgan neighbors. As an example, the Gorgans enacted a limited version of Atropia's and Kemalias' trade embargoes against Minaria, but continue to turn a blind eye to existing unofficial cross-border Gorgan/Minarian trade.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

The Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OCSE) operates as the region's most active international organization. Its mandate includes issues such as arms control, human rights, freedom of the press, and fair elections. Gorgas is very accepting of OCSE operations in the country, and is actively pursuing deeper ties with the EU and other multi-lateral diplomatic organizations. Because of these deep EU ties, various EU-sponsored and other European-based economic and social development organizations are present in Gorgas. International organizations, like the UN Development Program, International Finance Program, and World Bank are aggressively aiding the transformation of the Gorgan economy, especially targeting rural poverty and increasing economic competitiveness. Non-government organizations (NGOs) like the Human Fund, International Gorgan Development Fund, and Transnational Legal/Political Progress Project are attempting to move Gorgan social and other development measures closer to European norms.

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ASSOCIATIONS

Gorgas' comparative lack of extractive wealth like oil has made it dependent on European and other development aid to grow its economy. A variety of aid projects attempt to develop the Gorgan agriculture and manufacturing centers and grow an enabling service economy.

MILITARY ALLIANCES

Gorgas has attempted to integrate itself with NATO as a defense against Donovia. Active Donovian military support for the separatism movements in South Ostremek and Zabzimek has limited NATO support for membership. However, US and other Western nations continue to support the modernization and overall capability of the Gorgan military.

INFLUENTIAL POLITICAL GROUPS

OFFICIAL POLITICAL PARTIES

The National Party of Gorgas (NPG), a center-right party and the largest political organization in the country, currently governs Gorgas. Sikhale Askash, the current Gorgan president, founded the NPG in October 2001. A reformist party, the NPG favors closer ties with NATO and the European Union, as well as the restoration of Gorgan control over the separatist self-proclaimed states of Zabzimek and South Ostremek. NPG leaders label themselves as liberal-conservative and in the last few years, the party became an observer member of the center-right European People's Party (EPP). In the past three years, the NPG moved its political ideology from center-left to center-right as it combined political, economic, and cultural liberalism with civic nationalism. The NPG's main political priorities include improved social services to the poor (its main support base), anti-corruption, and reduced administrative barriers for business.

OTHER DOMESTIC INFLUENTIAL GROUPS

As the concept of free political speech takes hold in the country, political activism is more prevalent in Gorgas. As a result of a more open political system, opposition party negotiations with ruling parties demonstrate more transparency for the public. Consequently, Gorgans welcome the involvement of international organizations in their political process. The eight major political parties include the National Forum, Conservative Party, Republican Party, Our Gorgas - Free Democrats, Way of Gorgas, New Rights, Christian-Democrats, and People's Party.

Summary

Gorgas remains a generally liberalizing state living beside potentially hostile forces in Donovia. Gorgas' economic links as the outlet for Atropian oil tie the fates of Atropia and Gorgas together as the two small nations attempt to protect their political systems from interference. Gorgas remains the most democratic of the states within the region, and will likely lead the region in terms of fighting corruption, political plurality, and overall freedom. However, its international political situation will ensure it continues to be torn between competing interests.

TRADOC G-2

TRISA-THREATS

CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND THREAT INTEGRATION

DIRECTORATE (CTID)

MILITARY: GORGAS

Military: Gorgas

The military variable explores the military and/or paramilitary capabilities of all relevant actors (enemy, friendly, and neutral) in a given OE. Relevant actors may include terrorists, militias, criminals, gangs, and insurgents.

KEY FACTS:

REGION

- Donovia has the dominant military of the five countries.
- Atropia and Minaria possess roughly the same size military and previously fought each other over disputed territory.
- Four of the five countries maintain a tier 2 military capability, except for Donovia which has a predominantly tier 1 capability.
- Gorgas fields the smallest military of the five countries.

GORGAS

- Gorgas fields small but capable ground, air, and sea forces.
- The Gorgan military operates primarily tier 2 equipment, but maintains potential random tier 1 niche capabilities.

OPERATIONAL IMPACTS OF THE MILITARY VARIABLE IN THE OE:

REGION

- Four of the countries in the region operate a pervasively authoritarian National Command Authority (NCA), which makes military decisions that are passed down to subordinate units. The exception, Gorgas, utilizes a National Council that is similar but not quite as authoritarian in nature.
- Gorgas would most likely assist US forces if conflict started within the region.

GORGAS

- The Gorgan military can conduct operations anywhere on the continuum from conventional to adaptive operations.
- Gorgas currently deploys its army in defensive positions focused on its breakaway republics.

MILITARY OVERVIEW:

Gorgas has a history of irregular and regular warfare that is common throughout the region. The country remains unsatisfied with the tumultuous regional political boundaries over the last century, especially with Donovia. Like most countries, Gorgan military strategy reflects the country's political agenda. The country uses the military for defensive purposes and to maintain territorial sovereignty that includes force against breakaway regions. Gorgas currently wants to join NATO and remains the most accepting of Western influence of the five countries in the region.

MILITARY FORCES


Gorgas maintains the smallest military of the five countries in this region, which consists of a ground force, air force, and sea force (coast guard) capable of defensive operations, with limited offensive capabilities. The Gorgas military operates primarily tier 2 equipment throughout its structure. The Gorgas military poses little threat to any of its regional neighbors, but possibly serves as a threat to the separatists in the two breakaway republics, Zabzimek and South Ostremek.

MILITARY STRATEGY

NATIONAL COMMAND AUTHORITY

Gorgas established a National Council (NC) 20 years ago to address the country's defense needs, military doctrine, and strategy. The organizational structure consists of a consultative body that answers to the Gorgas president. The NC structure includes but is not limited to the following:

- President (Chairman of the NC)
- NC Secretary
- Minister of Defense (includes a General Staff)
- Minister of Finance
- Minister of Foreign Affairs
- Minister of Internal Affairs
- Chair of Parliament




STRATEGIC OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK

The strategic operational framework for all countries in the region is similar in construct and application. This is primarily the result of historic influences transcending the region.

The NCAs and the NC for all the countries exercise command and control (C2) of the Armed Forces via the Supreme High Command (SHC) that includes the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and a General Staff drawn from all the service components. In peacetime, the MOD and General Staff operate closely but separately. The MOD assumes the responsibility for policy, acquisitions, and financing the Armed Forces. The General Staff promulgates

policy and supervises the service components while its functional directorates assume responsibility for key aspects of defense planning. In wartime, the MOD and General Staff merge to form the SHC, which functions as a unified headquarters.



All five countries currently configure their militaries in an administrative force structure (AFS) that manages its military forces in peacetime. This AFS contains the aggregate of various military headquarters, facilities, and installations designed to man, train, and equip the forces. In some cases, the military may group its forces administratively under geographical commands designated as military regions or military districts. If the SHC elects to create more than one theater headquarters, it may allocate parts of the AFS to each of the theaters, normally along geographic lines. Typically, these administrative groupings differ from the country's go-to-war (fighting) force structure. Other parts of the AFS consist of assets centrally controlled at the national level. (See FM 7-100.4 *Opposing Force Organizational Guide: Chapter 3, Task Organizing.*)


NATIONAL STRATEGIC GOALS

The Gorgan military historically demonstrates two major objectives: to defend the country's borders and stop an invasion of its country by any outside force, and to recover breakaway territories. The Gorgan military continues to build its troops to a sufficient level to meet these strategic goals. Gorgas' specific strategic goals include:

- Defense of Gorgan sovereignty
- Recovery of breakaway territories
- Economic expansion
- Elimination of insurgent groups, to include those in breakaway territories

IMPLEMENTING NATIONAL SECURITY GOALS

All five countries share similar strategies to achieve their national goals. Strategic operations for all five countries remain a continuous process not limited to wartime or preparation for war. Once war begins, strategic operations continue during regional, transition, and adaptive operations and complement those operations. Each of the latter three types of operations occurs only during war and only under certain conditions. Transition operations can overlap regional and adaptive operations.



In pursuit of their national security strategies, all five countries find themselves prepared to conduct four basic types of strategic-level courses of action:

- **Strategic operations** use all instruments of power in peace and war to achieve a country's national security strategy goals through attacks against the enemy's strategic centers of gravity.
- **Regional operations** include conventional, force-on-force military operations against overmatched opponents, such as regional adversaries and internal threats.
- **Transition operations** bridge the gap between regional and adaptive operations and contain some elements of both. The country continues to pursue its regional goals while dealing with developing outside intervention that has the potential to overmatch its military.
- **Adaptive operations** preserve the country's power and apply it in adaptive ways against opponents that overmatch the country's military.

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

Although Donovia, Ariana, Atropia, Gorgas, and Minaria may refer to them as "operations," each of these courses of action is actually a subcategory of strategy. Each type of operation aggregates the effects of tactical, operational, and strategic actions in conjunction with instruments of national power to achieve each country's strategic goals. The types of operations employed at a given time will depend on the types of threats, opportunities, and other conditions present.


Each country's strategy typically starts with actions directed at a regional opponent that the government overmatches in conventional military power, as well as other instruments of power. If possible, each government will attempt to achieve its ends without armed conflict. Accordingly, these governments do not limit strategic operations to military means and usually do not begin with armed conflict. They may achieve the desired goal through pressure applied by nonmilitary instruments of power, perhaps by merely threatening to use superior military power against the opponent. These actions fall under the general framework of "strategic operations."

The government may resort to armed conflict to achieve its desired end state when nonmilitary means prove insufficient or not expedient. Strategic operations, however, continue even if a particular regional threat or opportunity causes the country to undertake "regional operations" that may include military means. Prior to the initiation of hostilities and throughout the course of armed conflict with its regional opponent, the government will continue to conduct strategic operations to preclude intervention by outside players, other regional neighbors, or an extra-regional power that could overmatch its forces. Such operations, however, always include branches and sequels to deal with the possibility of intervention by an extra-regional power.

MILITARY FORCES OVERVIEW

MILITARY STRATEGY

Of the five countries in the region, Gorgas maintains the smallest military, with approximately 33,600 active duty personnel. The military organization consists of the Gorgan Land Forces, the Gorgan Army Air Section, the Gorgan Coast Guard, and the National Guard of Gorgas. The Gorgan military poses little threat to any of its regional neighbors as it primarily possesses defensive capabilities. The military recently, however, engaged in offensive military operations against separatist military elements in the country's two breakaway republics, Zabzimek and South Ostremek.



The Gorgan military's major responsibility remains the country's security and territorial integrity. A number of years ago, a civil war erupted in both Zabzimek and South Ostremek, where the territory still remains in the hands of separatists. Gorgas launched numerous operations in an attempt to bring the disputed areas back under Gorgan control. Donovia crossed the northern Caucasus to support the breakaway regions, counterattacked the Gorgan military forces, and recognized the breakaway regions as independent states. The Gorgan military failed in its mission to maintain the

country's boundaries in both of these territories. The desire to bring Zabzimek and South Ostremek back under Gorgan control exists in the minds of most Gorgan politicians and remains a steadfast Gorgan military mission.

ARMY OVERVIEW

The Gorgas Land Force consists primarily of light infantry brigades with some armor and mechanized capabilities. The Gorgas Land Force mainly employs Donovian equipment with tier 2 capabilities. In recent history, the US trained small elements of the Gorgan army in Western military tactics and doctrine. At this time, Gorgas plans to increase its reserve forces while it reduces its active duty strength.

ARMY SIZE AND STRUCTURE

The maneuver brigade serves as the Arianian, Atropian, and Gorgan militaries' basic combined arms unit. In the AFS, some maneuver brigades find themselves constituent, or organic, to the base structure such as divisions. The NC calls them *divisional brigades*. These armies, however, organize some units as *separate brigades*, designed to possess greater ability to accomplish independent missions without further allocation of forces from a higher tactical-level headquarters. Separate brigades possess some subordinate units that contain the same force structure as a divisional brigade of the same type (for example, the headquarters); some units that are especially tailored to the needs of a separate brigade, marked "(Sep)" in the organizational directories; and some that are the same as units of this type found at division level, marked "(Div)." (See diagram on page 2C-2-3 and the Order of Battle (OB) at the end of this country's variable.)

The militaries in the region design their maneuver brigades to serve as the basis to form a brigade tactical group (BTG) if necessary. A brigade, separate or as part of a BTG, can fight as part of a division, division tactical group (DTG), a separate unit in an operational-strategic command (OSC), an organization of the AFS (such as army, corps, or military district), or as part of a field group (FG). (See TC 7-100.2: *Opposing Force Tactics, Chapter 2, Command and Control.*)

The Gorgan Land Force contains three light infantry brigades, one artillery brigade, a separate tank brigade, one anti-tank battalion, and the National Guard. Each infantry brigade contains between 4,800 and 6,000 motorized soldiers and operates a variety of vehicles for transport. The Land Force uses at least two types of main battle tanks along with a variety of artillery weapons. The Land Force splits its army between its capital city and the two breakaway territories.

The small National Guard serves Gorgas in a variety of ways. The Gorgan National Guard assists the civil government during a natural or manmade crisis, mobilization resource registration, mobilization manning system operations, ceremonial activity support, and Gorgan Reserve Forces training.

ARMY DOCTRINE AND TACTICS

Gorgas relies on a doctrine similar to Donovia's. The Gorgan army, however, seems to want to break away from Donovian influence and adopt military doctrine and tactics that will enhance its ability to interact with NATO or other Western country militaries.

ARMY TRAINING AND READINESS

Gorgas possesses a well-trained but small army with a high readiness rate of 92%. The Gorgan army primarily uses Donovian-style tactics because of its Donovian equipment. The Gorgans demonstrated signs that they may turn to more Western doctrine, as the US recently trained three light infantry battalions and one motorized company, making them compatible with NATO. In an attempt to

obtain admission to NATO, Gorgas increased its military expenditures from \$172 million to \$403 million, as NATO requires each country to spend at least 2% of its GDP on defense. Gorgas spent much of this increase on armored personnel carriers, self-propelled artillery, helicopters, and tanks.

The Gorgan military can conduct conventional and adaptive operations, and can rapidly fluctuate between the two to conduct hybrid operations. The Gorgan ground forces currently employ tactical control measures like most armies do today. These include assembly areas, advance axes, checkpoints, jump-off lines (similar to Western lines of departure), and attack lines.

Gorgas used its recently-obtained offensive weapons and tactics to launch its attack to force South Ostremek to return to Gorgan control. Even though the Gorgan military failed to achieve its mission, the ground forces still possess much of the equipment. Gorgas plays an active role in deployments outside of its borders to increase its ties to Western nations, increase Gorgas' possible inclusion in NATO, and provide funds to the Gorgan government. Gorgas provided two light infantry battalions for low-intensity insurgency operations in support of three different NATO and US operations.

ARMY EQUIPMENT AND WEAPONS


Overall, the Gorgan army possesses primarily tier 2 capabilities. Recent Gorgan purchases of newer equipment and weapons provide the army with the potential for tier 1 niche capabilities. The Gorgan army can operate in all terrain types and can successfully conduct 24-hour operations. (*For further information see Section 4: Appendix C or the WEG: VOL 1, Chapter 1, COE and Tier Tables.*)

NAVAL FORCES OVERVIEW

A few years ago, because of the ship losses that occurred in naval combat with Donovian ships associated with the Gorgan invasion of South Ostremek, Gorgas consolidated the remainder of its navy with its coast guard and placed the combined force under the control of the Ministry of Interior. Though known to be small, the exact numbers of ships available to Gorgas remains unknown due to the losses, subsequent salvage operations, and the consolidation of the two forces. Before the war with Donovia, the Gorgan navy operated 19 ships but then lost four to the Donovians.

NAVAL FORCES SIZE AND STRUCTURE

The Gorgan coast guard operates primarily in the Black Sea, with its major port at Poti and its Naval Academy in Batumi. Most of the ships operate anti-aircraft guns. Gorgas continues to replace its Donovian-era ships with more modern Western ships compatible with NATO forces. (*See the OB at the end of this country's variable.*)



NAVAL FORCES DOCTRINE AND TACTICS

Gorgas' maritime forces protect coastal borders and patrol the rivers for illegal activities. The security of the pipeline that ends at Supsa near Batumi remains a paramount mission for the Gorgan coast guard. As secondary missions, Gorgas' maritime forces conduct search and rescue (SAR) and port security operations.

Coast Guard missions might include:

- Defensive patrolling of coastal areas
- Anti-smuggling operations
- Mine laying

NAVAL FORCES TRAINING AND READINESS

The Gorgan coast guard conducts most of its training on the Black Sea and partners with Kemalia in joint exercises. Gorgas also sends its naval personnel to train in NATO countries. For the most part, Gorgas' maritime forces only possess the strength to conduct Coast Guard-type operations. The Gorgan coast guard elements possess a high level of training with a high readiness rate of 94%.

NAVAL FORCES EQUIPMENT AND WEAPONS


The Gorgan coast guard operates weapons and equipment with primarily tier 2 capabilities. The coast guard recently purchased some newer ships to upgrade its weapons and equipment for the potential for limited tier 1 niche capabilities. Gorgan naval forces can operate in all waters in and around the country, with the ability to conduct both day and night operations. Most Gorgan coast guard ships serve as patrol boats, but the country does possess some limited fast attack and landing craft ship capability.

Due to the consolidation of the Gorgan navy with its coast guard, the country's maritime assets will more likely focus on the interdiction of criminal activity and the security of the hydrocarbon infrastructure along the Black Sea coast than protecting the country from outside invasion.

AIR FORCE OVERVIEW

The small Gorgan air force is well-trained but has limited offensive capabilities. It does not possess the size, strength, or capabilities to defend itself against a major military force such as Donovia's, but it can more than hold its own against other regional foes such as Atropia or Minaria.

AIR FORCE SIZE AND STRUCTURE



The Gorgas air force is relatively small with only one ground attack squadron, one transport squadron, a training squadron, and support elements. In addition, the air force also fields two helicopter squadrons, one for attack and the other for transportation missions. (*See the OB at the end of this country's variable.*)

AIR FORCE DOCTRINE AND TACTICS

The air force's missions include the protection of the country's borders, troop transport, close air support for ground forces, and protection of key infrastructure. The Gorgans use primarily Donovian-style aviation doctrine. With so few attack fighters, the Gorgans have little offensive air capability. Although its mission requires it to defend Gorgan air space, the air force seriously lacks air support

capability. The Gorgan military uses much of its fixed and rotary wing aircraft for transportation and logistical purposes.

AIR FORCE TRAINING AND READINESS

The small Gorgan air force is well-trained, with a high readiness rate of 92%. Most Gorgan air force equipment and weapons use technology from 10 to 20 years ago, making it a tier 2 capable force, although upgrades to equipment and weapons produce the potential for random tier 1 niche capabilities. The Gorgan air force can conduct all-terrain, all-weather, and 24-hour operations.

AIR FORCE EQUIPMENT AND WEAPONS

Gorgan air force assets include a combination of Donovan equipment and some Western helicopters. All air defense weapons now come under control of the army. Almost all the air defense missile systems come from Donovia. Slowly, Gorgas wants to retire its aging Donovan airplanes and replace them with more modern equipment, probably from Western countries. The military airfields near Tbilisi constitute Gorgas' most important aviation locations.

GOVERNMENT PARAMILITARY FORCES

Gorgas contains two governmental paramilitary forces that may be useful in any military conflict. Approximately 5,500 border guards control Gorgas' land and seacoast. The border guards' mission is to prevent the smuggling of drugs, weapons, or sensitive materials such as nuclear fission material into the country; stop the illegal movement of migrants or terrorists into or through Gorgas; and enforce customs regulations to improve the economy. The Special Protective Service secures Gorgas' hydrocarbon pipelines and other vital economic assets.

NONSTATE PARAMILITARY FORCES

INSURGENT FORCES

Both breakaway republics in Gorgas maintain armed military forces. While Zabzimek declared its independence, Gorgas did not recognize this declaration. Gorgas fought the Zabzimek separatists to reinstate its control, but Donovia intervened on behalf of the Zabzimeks. The Donovians oversaw the ceasefire agreement that left Zabzimek independent. A few years later, another six-day confrontation took place between the Zabzimek military and Gorgan militia units when Zabzimek recovered its territory occupied by the People's Liberal Republican Martyrs Group and the Falcon Brothers, two pro-Gorgan groups.

The Zabzimek military's current numbers are unknown. The Zabzimek ground forces possess tanks, armored personnel carriers (APCs), and artillery pieces. Zabzimek's "navy" operates smaller patrol boats. Zabzimek has converted fishing vessels into patrol boats, which make up the remainder of its fleet.

When South Ostremek also declared its independence, Gorgas attempted to bring the runaway republic back under its control. Gorgas failed again due to Donovan intervention on South Ostremek's behalf. While Gorgas contributes an infantry battalion to the Donovan-led peacekeeping force in South Ostremek, the status quo remains—with the Ostremeks claiming their independence and the Gorgans believing that South Ostremek belongs to Gorgas. South Ostremek also supports a small military force of an unknown number of military personnel, tanks, APCs, and artillery pieces.

GUERRILLA FORCES

Two partisan paramilitary groups operate in the vicinity of the Zabzimek-Gorgas border. People's Liberal Republican Martyrs Group and the Falcon Brothers both contain ethnic Gorgans who remained behind in Zabzimek after the civil war. These two groups conduct low-level guerrilla warfare in an attempt to reunite Zabzimek with Gorgas. Both groups will support any attempts by Gorgas to force Zabzimek back under Gorgan control.

CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS

A great variety of criminal activity occurs throughout Gorgas. The country serves as a prime transshipment point for drugs from Central Asia and corruption exists, driven in part by organized crime. The Gorgan state apparently lacks the resources to effectively tackle crime, especially in the mountainous northeastern border with the Republic of Failaq in Donovia. It remains likely that much of the support provided to anti-Donovian elements in Failaq comes from criminal and terrorist organizations that operate in this region. Zabzimek and South Ostremek are also dangerous, and organized crime permeates both areas. In addition, while Gorgas enacted a limited official trade embargo against Minaria in order to placate Atropia and Kemalia, it purposefully turns a blind eye to illegal Gorgan-Minarian cross-border trade.

PRIVATE SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS

Any company that operates near Zabzimek and South Ostremek hires locals to provide security against attacks by local insurgents. Additionally, companies involved in the maintenance of the oil and gas pipelines across Gorgas hire guards to protect this hydrocarbon infrastructure critical to the country's economy.

NONMILITARY ARMED COMBATANTS

The insurgent and guerilla forces that operate primarily in the runaway republics and the adjacent Gorgan areas are predominately hostile to the US, as they fear a return of Gorgan control to their areas. The criminal organizations in Gorgas are generally neutral to any US presence in their country as long as it does not interfere with their enterprises. Most private security organizations that provide protection to the hydrocarbon pipelines that cross the country support US presence in Gorgas.

MILITARY FUNCTIONS

COMMAND AND CONTROL

The core of Ariana's, Atropia's, and Gorgas' command and control (C2) concept remains the assumption that modern communications are susceptible to attack and/or monitoring. Accordingly, the military operates from the view that centralized planning defines the means for assuring both command (establishing the aim) and control (sustaining the aim), leading to strategic and operational directions. Necessarily then, the military relies on the loyalty of its forces and gives them far-ranging authority to act within the aim while foregoing rigorous control as both unproductive and unlikely in the modern environment. (*See TC 7-100.2: Opposing Force Tactics Chapter 2, Command and Control.*)

Arianian, Atopian, and Gorgan military battalions are characterized by headquarters composed of a command section including the commander, deputy commander, and a small staff element. It also includes a staff section with the chief of staff and the remainder of the battalion staff. The battalion staff consists of the operations officer the assistant operations officer, the intelligence officer, and the resources officer. The signal platoon leader also serves as the battalion communications officer, the

reconnaissance platoon leader acts as the chief of reconnaissance, and the materiel support platoon leader serves as the battalion resources officer. (*See TC 7-100.2: Opposing Force Tactics, Chapter 2, Command and Control.*)

The Gorgan military places emphasis on survivability through mobility, redundancy, and security for tactical C2. The Gorgan military streamlines its command posts (CPs) and relies on common procedures to streamline tactical operations, unlike the slower operations found at the operational level.

MANEUVER

The Gorgan Land Force contains all the elements necessary for combined operations and to conduct modern maneuver warfare. The Gorgan military, despite its small size, possesses a robust capability to conduct combined arms operations.

AIR DEFENSE

The Gorgan military fields one air defense brigade, composed primarily of short-range ground to air missiles. The Gorgan military, however, recognizes that air defense is an *all-arms* effort. Thus, all ground units possess some type of an organic air defense capability to differing degrees, depending on the type and size of the unit. Many weapons not designed as air defense weapons will also damage and/or destroy tactical aircraft when within range.

Throughout maneuver units, there are a number of systems designed for air defense and other systems that can be used in an air defense role. The heavy antiaircraft machineguns on tanks are specifically designed for air defense. Machineguns on armored personnel carriers and automatic cannon on infantry fighting vehicles can engage both ground and air targets. Most antitank guided missiles (ATGMs) are extremely effective against low-flying helicopters. Several ATGM manufacturers offer antihelicopter missiles and compatible fire control, which are especially effective against low-flying rotary-wing aircraft. Field artillery and small arms can also be integral parts of the air defense scheme. All these weapons can be extremely lethal when used in this role.

Gorgas considers every soldier with a man-portable air defense system to be an air defense firing unit. These weapons are readily available at a relatively low cost and are widely proliferated. The small size and easy portability of these systems provides the opportunity for ambush of enemy airframes operating in any area near Gorgan units. Ground units also employ them to set ambushes for enemy helicopters, especially those on routine logistics missions. (*For more information, see TC 7-100.2, chapter 11, air defense.*)


INFOWAR

The Gorgan Land Force defines INFOWAR as specifically planned and integrated actions taken to achieve an information advantage at critical points and times. Gorgan INFOWAR strives to influence an enemy's decision making through collected and available information, information systems, and information-based processes, while the Gorgan military retains the ability to employ friendly information and information-based processes and systems.

RISTA

The Gorgan land forces contain limited reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition (RISTA) capabilities. Most of the RISTA capabilities operate from the technical reconnaissance battalion and the brigade intelligence company. Due to a lack of funds and the necessity to replace \$250 million in lost equipment from its 2008 incursion into South Ostremek, Gorgas lacks the financial capacity to field the newest and most sophisticated RISTA equipment.

US-made radars cover the entire Gorgan airspace but do not operate with the latest technology. The table below summarizes the effective ranges for reconnaissance assets that can support Gorgan tactical commanders.



FIRE SUPPORT

The Gorgan military still relies on a large amount of artillery to support its ground forces. The Gorgan ground forces contain a mixture of artillery types. These forces operate self-propelled guns along with rockets and mortars. Gorgas relies on close air support from fixed- and rotary-wing helicopters.

PROTECTION

Gorgas will attempt to minimize civilian casualties to a large extent. The military has engineering assets to reinforce civilian and military positions. The C2 and fire support systems are sophisticated enough to minimize the threat of “friendly fire” or other accidents. The military and civilian populations are closely integrated, however, making it difficult for invaders to launch attacks without the risk of civilian casualties, which would enrage the population and be used as ammunition for INFOWAR. (See TC 7-100.2: *Opposing Force Tactics, Chapter 12, Engineer and Chapter 7, INFOWAR.*)

LOGISTICS

The Gorgan military possesses robust logistics capabilities with the ability to support its maneuver units for any length of time. All five countries continue to improve in all aspects of their logistics systems. These improvements include an increased emphasis on support zone security and plans to stockpile war materiel throughout each country.

RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT GOALS

Gorgas does not focus on research to build its own military equipment and will continue to purchase its military hardware from other countries. Gorgas wants to retire its obsolete equipment and replace the weapons systems with more modern and more efficient ones, preferably non-Donovian and compatible with NATO systems.

SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS

Gorgas wants to foster favor with NATO and other Western countries while it attempts to get out from under Donovian influence. To obtain favorable treatment from the West, Gorgas often volunteers to help out in coalition operations with Western nations. For that reason, Gorgas continues to supply troops in support of NATO missions.

Summary

Gorgas operates the smallest military of the five countries in the Caucasus region, but the country fields a capable army, navy, and air force with mostly tier 2 equipment and random tier 1 capabilities. Due to its poor relationship with Donovia, Gorgas continues to look towards NATO and other Western countries for military support against its regional enemies.

TRADOC G-2

TRISA-THREATS

CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND THREAT INTEGRATION

DIRECTORATE (CTID)

ECONOMIC: GORGAS

Economic: Gorgas

The economic variable encompasses individual and group behaviors related to producing, distributing, and consuming resources.

KEY FACTS:

REGION

- Hydrocarbon resources drive the Caucasus economy and their uneven geographic disposition creates an unequal distribution of wealth and leads to regional conflicts.
- While economies continue to develop, insufficient large-scale industrial production limits overall economic growth.
- All economies in the region have high levels of corruption, heavy government involvement, and lack of developed non-hydrocarbon export industries.

GORGAS

- Gorgas lacks any major industry to drive its economy and will remain dependent on trans-border trade.
- Gorgas will face structural limitations on growth due to poor relations with Donovia.

OPERATIONAL IMPACTS OF THE ECONOMIC VARIABLE IN THE OE:

REGION

- All Caucasus countries consider critical economic infrastructure defense as a primary military effort.
- Hydrocarbon infrastructure will serve as a critical center of gravity in nearly all military operations in the region.
- Agriculture provides the majority of the jobs in the Caucasus, but not the bulk of its economic activity.

GORGAS

- Regional conflict will cause Gorgas to attempt to defend the hydrocarbon distribution pipelines that cross the country, as they provide a significant amount of income.

ECONOMIC OVERVIEW:

The Caucasus countries that possess hydrocarbon resources will continue to depend on the oil and gas industries to drive their economies, while those that do not possess such resources will attempt to tie themselves to hydrocarbon-rich nations. Both Ariana and Atropia face geopolitical difficulties in exporting their oil and natural gas. Bordered by adversaries, the Arianians and Atropians must rely on tenuous routes to export their resources. For Gorgas and Minaria, which lack extractive or mature industries, transshipment of hydrocarbon products or providing other services to oil-wealthy countries will be their primary short- to medium-term means to achieve economic development. Donovia continues to recover from a collapse two decades ago that crippled its economy. All nations of the Caucasus have relatively high inefficiency due to corruption, government involvement in the economy, and/or lack of export industry development.

Gorgas possesses a somewhat weak economy as it attempts to emerge from the chaos created by its former economic dependence on Donovia. The Gorgan economy shows signs of growth despite a small population, lack of any flagship industry, and an uncertain geopolitical landscape. Gorgas enjoys significant investment from the West while it diversifies trade and locates new partners in Europe as a means to wean itself away from previous dependence on Donovia. Gorgas' largest exports include agricultural products such as wine, nuts, and mineral water. Gorgas also exports scrap metal, ammonium nitrate, and other industrial products. The country imports most high value-added products including medicines, vehicles, aircraft, and power production equipment.

TABLE OF ECONOMIC DATA

Measure	Data	Rank in World	Remarks (if applicable)
GDP	20.23 billion USD	121	
Labor Force	1.918 million	122	
Unemployment	16.4%	153	
Poverty	31%		Percent below poverty line
Investment	22.5% of GDP	65	
Budget	\$3.125 billion revenue \$4.033 billion expenditures		
Public Debt	34%	84	
Inflation	1.5%	45	Very low

PARTICIPATION IN THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM

Over the past decade, the Caucasus nations made considerable efforts to integrate themselves into the global financial system. While focused on local conflicts, the Caucasus region opened to other countries to increase global markets for its products, especially petroleum, and looked to the West for economic developmental aid, usually in the form of loans and grants.

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AID

International development aid to Gorgas focuses on infrastructure improvements and government services. Critical shortfalls in the Gorgan economy include public sector finance, medical services, and public infrastructure.

FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT

Gorgas received \$1.05 billion in FDI last year from foreign sources. Thirty-eight percent of FDI went into the energy field, while 25% went to services and 20% to construction. The Netherlands, Britain, and Denmark provide the most FDI in Gorgas.

ECONOMIC ACTIVITY

Unlike its petroleum-rich neighbors, Gorgas emerged from the shadow of Donovia on the backs of service providers, where one-third of the populace work but generate 62% of the country's GDP. Agriculture, much of it at subsistence levels, employs the majority of the population but produces just 11% of the GDP. Within certain sectors such as wine, Gorgas maintains an excellent export position. Gorgas has teamed extensively with Atropia to export hydrocarbon products through pipelines that terminate at Gorgan and Kemalian ports on the Black Sea. Despite all this, Gorgan economic growth will continue to be limited due to ongoing tensions with Donovia that limit economic interactions between the two countries.

ECONOMIC ACTORS

Gorgas maintains a relatively free and open society, and a number of large corporations like the Bank of Gorgas, Gorgan Airways, and MagniCom dominate the country's economy. Many sectors in Gorgas, like airlines and banking, only possess one or two large actors along with a smattering of smaller players.

COMMERCIAL TRADE AND MILITARY EXPORTS/IMPORTS

Gorgas maintains a small commercial trade sector with slow but steady growth. The country generally imports its military goods. Most Gorgan trade occurs domestically, with minimal international trade with Atropia, Kemalia, and the EU. Gorgas imports its military hardware primarily from the US, Israel, and other Western nations.

ECONOMIC DIVERSITY

ENERGY SECTOR

Without hydrocarbon natural resources, hydroelectric power provides the bulk of Gorgan-produced energy supplies. Gorgas imports most of its energy from neighboring states and receives 10% transmission fee for Donovian natural gas that passes through the country. Gorgas continues to build a strong hydrocarbon transshipment relationship with Atropia and hopes to obtain the majority of its energy requirements from there. Investments in the various pipelines that cross Gorgas and more modern handling facilities on the Black Sea will increase this capability.

AGRICULTURE

Droughts hit the Gorgan agricultural industry very hard over the past five years, but the farmers expect to eventually rebound. For the immediate future, the agricultural field will only grow about 0.5% annually.

Forestry is a traditional Gorgan industry. While forests occupy over 40% of all Gorgan territory, their qualitative consistency and productivity continue to degrade, thus decreasing production. Worsening conditions in Gorgan forests led to reduction and sometimes even loss of functionality. As a result, avalanches and landslides in the mountainous regions of western areas cause many accidents.

MANUFACTURING

Manufacturing remains a limited element of the Gorgan economy. A small number of manufacturing plants produce the bulk of the country's industrial output. Through recent labor reforms and investment laws, the Gorgan government attempted to increase its manufacturing output. While the current economic downturn choked off foreign investment, it remains likely that Gorgan's low structural costs will attract some investors to its manufacturing sector.

BANKING AND FINANCE

PUBLIC FINANCE

The National Bank of Gorgas functions as the central bank and creates the country's monetary policy. The Bank operates as an independent entity, with the Gorgan president appointing its members. Gorgan businesses pay no taxes, and individuals pay a 25% flat tax. Gorgan public debt stands at 34% of the GDP, and the country possesses foreign reserves of \$1 billion.

PRIVATE BANKING

Banking remains a primary weakness of the Gorgan economy. Individual entrepreneurs established the Gorgan banks with little capital and virtually no government oversight. The resultant failures created a consolidation in the industry but undercut public confidence. Both international and domestic banks operate in Gorgas.

EMPLOYMENT STATUS

A lack of economic development and a decline in international trade mean that unemployment remains high in Gorgas. Labor-intensive markets with low productivity, especially in the rural areas, hinder the country's overall productivity. Many non-agricultural employment opportunities exist in export-driven market sectors and remain highly susceptible to international market forces. Gorgas' unemployment rate increased from 13.6% in 2007 to 16.4% at present. Employment status nationally is assessed as medium.

ILLEGAL ECONOMIC ACTIVITY

A great variety of criminal activity occurs throughout Gorgas. The country serves as a prime transshipment point for drugs from Central Asia, and corruption exists, driven in part by organized crime. The Gorgan state apparently lacks the resources to effectively tackle crime, especially crime in the mountainous northeastern border with the Republic of Failaq in Donovia. It remains likely that much of the support provided to anti-Donovian elements in Failaq comes from criminal and terrorist organizations that operate in this region. Zabzimek and South Ostremek are also dangerous, and organized crime permeates both areas. In addition, while Gorgas enacted a limited official trade embargo against Minaria in order to placate Atropia and Kemalia, it purposefully turns a blind eye to illegal Gorgan-Minarian cross-border trade.

Summary

Complex economic interplay between the Caucasus countries binds them together. Minaria, Gorgas, and Atropia were strongly affected by the reduction of Donovian influence two decades ago. The oil-rich countries of Ariana and Atropia must use their Minarian and Gorgan neighbors to transship hydrocarbon resources to other countries. Minaria and Gorgas must develop free-standing economies despite significant corruption, lack of developed industries, and natural resource shortages. Over all of this, Donovia seeks to limit Arianian influence and return to its former position as unquestioned regional hegemon. This economic interdependence will likely drive regional conflicts as the nations struggle amongst themselves to exploit riches created by oil and natural gas.

TRADOC G-2

TRISA-THREATS

CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND THREAT INTEGRATION

DIRECTORATE (CTID)

S O C I A L : G O R G A S

Social: Gorgas

The social variable describes the cultural, religious, and ethnic makeup within an OE and the beliefs, values, customs, and behaviors.

KEY FACTS:

REGION

- All five countries have ancient cultures, and rivalries between different ethnic groups still exist.
- Each country possesses a dominant ethnic group and language. Discrimination against minority ethnic groups occurs in each country.

GORGAS

- The internally displaced persons (IDPs) from the wars with its breakaway republics create social stresses within Gorgas. The government assistance given to the new IDPs created resentment from the old IDPs who received little support when they fled their homelands.
- About half the people live in the rural areas and rely upon agriculture for their subsistence. They live their lives in stark contrast to the one-third of the population that possesses a higher standard of living in Gorgas' capital city, Tbilisi.

OPERATIONAL IMPACTS OF THE SOCIAL VARIABLE IN THE OE:

REGION

- Combat in the region will allow one ethnic group to seek revenge against another ethnic group for past wrongs or perceived wrongs.

GORGAS

- Gorgas' national honor revolves around the return of its breakaway regions to governmental control; most Gorgans support this ultimate goal.
- Gorgans dislike the Donovians and will do almost anything to reduce Donovian influence in the Caucasus region.

SOCIAL OVERVIEW:

A large majority of Gorgans speak the same language, practice the same religion, and claim the same ethnic heritage. Gorgas, however, does not contain the same type of homogeneous population found in Minaria. While 71% of its residents speak Gorgan as their first language and 83.9% practice the Orthodox Christian faith, 83.8% declared themselves as ethnic Gorgans. Unlike many other countries in the Caucasus, most Gorgans will call themselves Gorgan when asked their nationality instead of another ethnic group or tribe. The effects of two runaway republics—Zabzimek and South Ostremek—changed Gorgas, as it created many IDPs and forced the Gorgan government to provide additional social services or create new refugee settlements. The tension between Gorgas' claim on Zabzimek and South Ostremek and the inability to bring them back under Gorgan control, largely due to Donovian support for the runaway republics, influence many Gorgans' daily lives.

SOCIAL STATISTICS FOR ARIANA, ATROPIA, GORGAS, MINARIA, AND DONOVIA:

Statistic	Ariana	Atropia	Gorgas	Minaria	Donovia
Age distribution (%)	0-14 years: 21.7 15-64 years: 72.9 65 years and over: 5.4	0-14 years: 23.9 15-64 years: 69.4 65 years and over: 6.7	0-14 years: 16.1 15-64 years: 67.6 65 years and over: 16.4	0-14 years: 18.2 15-64 years: 71.1 65 years and over: 10.6	0-14 years: 15.2 15-64 years: 71.8 65 years and over: 13
Median age	Total: 26.3 Male: 26 Female: 26.5	Total: 28.5 Male: 26.9 Female: 30.3	Total: 38.8 Male: 36.3 Female: 41.3	Total: 31.9 Male: 29.1 Female: 34.7	Total: 38.7 Male: 35.5 Female: 41.9
Population Growth rate (Rank)	77,891,220 1.248% (94)	8,372,373 0.846% (129)	4,585,874 -0.326% (217)	2,967,975 0.063% (188)	82,008,765 -0.47% (223)
Birth rate per 1,000 (Rank)	17.17 (120)	17.62 (117)	10.66 (181)	12.65 (161)	11.05 (174)
Death rate per 1,000 (Rank)	5.72 (171)	8.30 (101)	9.65 (68)	8.39 (97)	16.04 (5)
Net Migration rate per 1,000 (Rank)	-2.62 (141)	-1.69 (129)	-4.26 (157)	-4.56 (159)	0.29 (68)
Urban population Annual urbanization rate	68% 2.1%	52% 1.0%	53% -0.6%	64% -0.3%	67% -0.2%
Infant mortality rate (Rank)	35.78 (71)	54.6 (46)	16.22 (121)	20.21 (104)	10.08 (147)
Life expectancy at birth in years (Rank)	Total: 71.14 Male: 69.65 Female: 72.72 (132)	Total: 66.66 Male: 62.53 Female: 71.34 (157)	Total: 76.72 Male: 73.41 Female: 80.45 (62)	Total: 72.68 Male: 69.06 Female: 76.81 (118)	Total: 66.29 Male: 59.8 Female: 73.17 (162)
Fertility rate (Children per woman) (Rank)	1.70 (171)	2.03 (127)	1.44 (190)	1.36 (201)	1.42 (197)
Major diseases in the OE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ Diarrheal diseases ◦ Hepatitis A ◦ Malaria ◦ Crimean-Congo ◦ Hemorrhagic fever ◦ Cutaneous ◦ Leishmaniasis ◦ Leptospirosis ◦ Schistosomiasis ◦ Hepatitis ◦ Tuberculosis ◦ Q Fever 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ Diarrheal diseases ◦ Hepatitis A ◦ Hepatitis E ◦ Typhoid ◦ Cholera ◦ Malaria ◦ Crimean-Congo ◦ Hemorrhagic fever ◦ Gonorrhea ◦ Chlamydia ◦ Tuberculosis ◦ Leptospirosis ◦ Hantavirus ◦ Anthrax ◦ Rabies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ Diarrheal diseases ◦ Typhoid ◦ Hepatitis A ◦ Malaria ◦ West Nile fever ◦ Crimean-Congo ◦ Hemorrhagic fever ◦ Meningococcal ◦ Meningitis ◦ Gonorrhea ◦ Syphilis ◦ Hantaviral fevers ◦ Leptospirosis ◦ Rabies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ Diarrheal diseases ◦ Typhoid ◦ Hepatitis A ◦ West Nile fever ◦ Crimean-Congo ◦ Hemorrhagic fever ◦ Meningococcal ◦ Meningitis ◦ Gonorrhea ◦ Syphilis ◦ Hantaviral fevers ◦ Leptospirosis ◦ Rabies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ Diarrheal diseases ◦ Typhoid ◦ Hepatitis A ◦ Cholera ◦ Salmonella ◦ Tuberculosis ◦ HIV/AIDS ◦ Encephalitis ◦ H5N1 avian influenza

Statistic	Ariana	Atropia	Gorgas	Minaria	Donovia
Ethnic groups (%)	Persian: 51.0 Atropian: 24.0 Gilaki or Mazandarani: 8.0 Kurd: 7.0 Arab: 3.0 Lur: 2.0 Baluch: 2.0 Turkmen: 2.0 Other: 1.0	Atropian: 90.6 Gilani: 2.2 Arianian: 3.0 Donovian: 1.8 Minarian: 1.5 Other: 0.9	Gorgan: 83.8 Atropian: 6.5 Minarian: 5.7 Donovian: 1.5 Other: 2.5	Minarian: 97.9 Yezidi (Kurd): 1.3 Donovian: 5.0 Other: 0.3	Arab: 70.0 Gorgan: 5.0 Atropian: 5.0 Minarian: 10.0 Other: 10.0
Religions in OE (%)	Shia Muslim: 89.0 Sunni Muslim: 9.0 Other: 2.0	Muslim: 93.4 Donovian Orthodox: 2.5 Minarian Orthodox: 2.3 Other: 1.8	Orthodox Christian: 83.9 Muslim: 9.9 Minarian-Gregorian: 3.9 Catholic: 0.8 Other: 0.8 None: 0.7	Minarian Orthodox: 94.7 Other Christian: 4.0 Yezidi: 1.3	Sunni Hanafi Muslim: 80.0 Shia Sufi Muslim: 5.0 National Orthodox Christian: 15.0
Languages	Persian Dialects: 58.0 Turkic Dialects: 26.0 Kurdish: 9.0 Luri: 2.0 Baluchi: 1.0 Arabic: 1.0 Kemalian: 1.0 Other: 2.0	Atropian (Atropian): 90.3 Lezgi: 2.2 Donovian: 1.8 Minarian: 1.5 Other: 3.3 Unspecified: 1.0	Gorgan: 71.0 Donovian: 9.0 Minarian: 7.0 Atropian: 6.0 Other: 7.0	Minarian: 97.7 Yezidi: 1.0 Donovian: 0.9 Other: 0.4	Donovian (official) Many minority languages
Literacy rate (older than 15) (%)	Total: 77.0 Male: 83.5 Female: 70.4	Total: 98.8 Male: 99.5 Female: 98.2	Total: 100 Male: 100 Female: 100	Total: 99.4 Male: 99.7 Female: 99.2	Total: 98.0 Male: 98.0 Female: 98.0

POPULATION MOVEMENT (MIGRATION/IDPS/REFUGEES)

Conflicts between Gorgas and its two runaway republics—Zabzimek and South Ostremek—generated 378,000 IDPs within Gorgas and 30,000 additional refugees in Donovia. After the return of some of the IDPs, about 246,000 ethnic Gorgans remain displaced from the civil wars over the last 20 years. Gorgas will likely maintain its refugee camps for an indefinite period in hopes that one day the IDPs will find the opportunity to return to their own homes.

The 1992 conflict between Gorgas and Zabzimek killed 10,000 people and displaced over 250,000 civilians, almost 46% of the pre-war Zabzimek population. Most ethnic Gorgans fled to other parts of the country while some sought refuge in Donovia along with most of the ethnic Zabzimeks displaced by the war. About 40,000 to 50,000 ethnic Gorgans returned to Zabzimek, most to the Kalli district. Due to the threat of Zabzimek violence, about 220,000 ethnic Gorgans could not or refused to return to their Zabzimek homes. The Gorgan government did little for these IDPs and left them to fend for themselves. About 46% of the IDPs live in state or privately owned buildings such as hospitals, hotels, barracks, or sanatoriums not originally designed for long-term habitation. The elderly, children, or the disabled compose most of this group as they cannot afford alternative housing arrangements.

Three years ago, South Ostremek military forces with support from Donovia preempted an attempt by the Gorgan military to reunify South Ostremek with Gorgas. This conflict caused the internal displacement of 162,000 Gorgan civilian supporters to Gorgas and 30,000 ethnic Ostremeks to North Ostremek in Donovia. When Zabzimek saw Gorgas' military tied up with the Ostremeks and the Donovians, the Zabzimeks seized the opportunity to retake the Kodori Valley, the last Zabzimek

territory controlled by Gorgas. This forced 2,000 Kodori Valley residents to flee to other places in Gorgas. Since then, almost all Ostremeks returned to their homes along with all but 26,000 of the ethnic Gorgans that include the Kodori Valley dwellers. Unlike the Zabzimek IDPs, the Gorgan government took positive action for the “new” refugees and built 38 IDP settlements with gardens in primarily the Saurie and Tweedli regions. About 18,000 of these new IDPs come from South Ostremek, including 5,000 from the Haki District and 2,000 from Kodori Valley. While Gorgas built housing for these new IDPs, the governmental officials did not consult with the IDPs on their location. Those IDPs who did return home found their houses destroyed, barns burned, moveable property stolen, and grazing areas and firewood cutting zones previously used declared off limits. These results made it very difficult for the repatriated IDPs to return to their previous way of life.

While IDPs are plentiful, there are very few refugees in the country. Most of these are ethnic Gorgans that previously lived just over the border in Donovia and fled during the aforementioned conflicts. Migration both into and out of Gorgas is minimal, and usually consists of members of different ethnic groups repatriating to their country of origin.

POPULATION DISTRIBUTION

Similar to Atropia, just over half, or about 53%, of Gorgans live in urban areas. The urbanization rate in Gorgas, however, trends in the opposite direction, with a net loss (-0.6%) per year instead of a positive urbanization rate. About one-third of all Gorgans live in the capital city of Tbilisi, the only Gorgan city with over a million residents. An additional three cities—Kutaisi, Batumi, and Rustavi—contain populations of over 100,000. No other Gorgan cities contain a population of more than 50,000 residents. The control of Tbilisi probably equals control of the entire country.

DEMOGRAPHIC MIX

Gorgas possesses the oldest population in the Caucasus region. With a median age of 38.8 years, the Gorgan population is at least seven years older than all other regional countries except Donovia, with which it is effectively tied. On average, Gorgans live much longer than their neighbors: four years longer than Minarians; five years longer than Arianians; and 10 years longer than Atropians and Donovians. Gorgas possesses the second-smallest population in the region that is less than 14 years of age, and the largest 65-and-older population. Women represent 53.3% of all Gorgans, and the percent increases with age as females, on average, outlive males by seven years. Gorgas has about 1,094,390 males and 1,140,758 females in the 16-49 age categories available for military service, with about 1.8 million total fit for military service. Annually, 30,314 Gorgan males and 28,299 Gorgan females reach military age. The Gorgan military might possess the capacity to reach 460,000 personnel. Gorgas will never possess the manpower resources to compete with its historical enemy Donovia, and thus will continue to look for other nonmilitary methods to influence the Caucasus region.

Two partisan groups operate in the vicinity of the Zabzimek-Gorgas border. People’s Liberal Republican Martyrs Group and the Falcon Brothers both contain ethnic Gorgans who remained behind in Zabzimek after the Civil War. These two groups both conduct low-level guerrilla warfare in an attempt to reunite Zabzimek with Gorgas. Both groups will support any attempts by Gorgas to force Zabzimek back under Gorgan control.

SOCIAL VOLATILITY

Gorgas suffers from high social volatility because of two separatist regions that want autonomy. Gorgas still considers Zabzimek and South Ostremek as part of Gorgas even though both territories operate independently of the Gorgan government. Donovia assisted both breakaway republics, Zabzimek in the 1990s and South Ostremek more recently in 2008, in their civil wars against Gorgas. Most Gorgans still consider Zabzimek and South Ostremek as theirs, would desire their

return, and most likely would support any governmental efforts to accomplish reunification. Donovia, however, will continue to support the runaway republics as its method to reduce Gorgan influence in the Caucasus region.

EDUCATION LEVEL

Gorgas possesses an excellent elementary and high school education system. The Gorgan constitution makes elementary education universal and mandatory for its citizens. Almost every town, village, and settlement contains primary, basic, and secondary schools. Children begin their education in kindergarten and graduate from secondary school at about 17 years of age. Students can continue their education at a university or technical institute. Tbilisi hosts most institutions of higher learning, but a few others operate in the other large Gorgan cities.

ETHNIC DIVERSITY

Ethnic Gorgans dominate their country with 83.8% of the population. Gorgans consider themselves as an important political, economic, and cultural group by their connection to ancient Greece, as one of the first nations to adopt Christianity, and through their belief in their importance to the development of Western civilization. While the people may belong to a subgroup with its own unique dialect and culture, the group's members think of themselves as Gorgans first. Five significant ethnic groups live in Gorgas but do not call themselves Gorgans.

The largest minority ethnic group, Atropians, compose about 6.5% of the Gorgan population. Atropians identify with the Kemalian culture, and non-Muslim Gorgans call them Atropians, Atropian Kemalians, or just Kemalians. The ability to speak the Atropian language provides this group with their separate social identity. While nominally Shia Muslim, most Atropians rarely practice their religion. Recently, however, more Atropian youth attend foreign-funded *madrassas* or religious schools that follow the Sunni or Wahabbist Islamic teachings. The Gorgan government will need to continue to watch this latter group to prevent the radicalization of Islam within their country.

Minarians make up the next largest ethnic minority group at 5.7% of Gorgas' population, and many Minarians consider Gorgas as their second homeland. Most Minarians live in either Tbilisi or Sokhumi in Zabzimek, or in the Javeki region that touches the Minarian border. Many of the Zabzimek Minarians took up arms and formed their own brigade to fight against the Gorgans in the 1990s civil war when Zabzimek declared its independence from Gorgas. Most ethnic Minarians in Gorgas, however, will continue to think of themselves as Minarians first and Gorgans second.

Ethnic Donovians make up about 1.5% of the Gorgan population and about half live in the Tbilisi area. Due to their small size and their wide distribution throughout the country, most ethnic Donovians think of themselves as Gorgans first and Donovians second.

Gorgas considers the Ostremeks and Zabzimeks as ethnic Gorgans, but the minority groups do not. Ostremeks comprise about 3% of the Gorgan population or about 165,000 people. While culturally similar to the Donovians, the Ostremeks are a distinct ethnic group. Ostremeks reside in both southern Donovia and northern Gorgas, but consider the entire area as part of the North Ostremek Republic of Donovia. Most Ostremeks are Sunni Muslims of the Hanafi school. The Ostremeks fought a quasi-civil war with Gorgas beginning in the 1990s and, with Donovian help, defeated the Gorgans in 2008 when Gorgas tried to bring South Ostremek back under Gorgan governmental control. The Ostremeks will continue to oppose the Gorgan government as they seek to unify their ethnic group under the same government.

Zabzimeks make up about 1.8% of the Gorgan population, and most reside in Zabzimek, the autonomous enclave in northwest Gorgas. Zabzimeks assert that they possess a unique genetic heritage different from the rest of Gorgas. Religion does not play a huge role in Zabzimek, but most

identify themselves as Sunni Muslims. Some Zabzimeks practice Christianity, but no churches exist in their region. In the 1990s, Zabzimek proclaimed its independence from Gorgas and with Donovian help defeated Gorgas in a civil war that produced massacres and ethnic cleansing of the Gorgan majority. Zabzimeks will fight to maintain the regional status quo where they operate as an autonomous republic supported by the Donovians.

RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY

The Orthodox Christian faith dominates Gorgas, as over 83.9% of the population identifies it as their religion. Most Gorgans consider themselves devout but are, in reality, secular. Muslims make up a large minority at 9.9% of the Gorgan population. Just over 6% of Gorgans belong to the Minarian-Gregorian Church, the Roman Catholic Church, other faiths, or claim no religion at all.

COMMON LANGUAGES

Over seven in every ten (71%) Gorgans speak Gorgan as their primary language. This serves as a cultural tie that binds the people together. About 9% speak Donovian, 7% speak Minarian, and 6% speak Atropian. Only about 7% of the population speaks any other language as their native tongue. US personnel will need to speak Gorgan or use an interpreter to communicate with the local residents.

CRIMINAL ACTIVITY

High levels of criminal activity occur throughout Gorgas; the criminals target foreigners they perceive as wealthy. Almost 75% of all crimes against Americans in Gorgas are violent and include armed robbery, break-ins, carjacking, and kidnapping. When present, Gorgan police will usually assist crime victims. The police, however, usually do not speak English, do not act quickly, and work inefficiently. Gorgas has attempted to reduce police inefficiency and corruption since 2004, but with only limited success. US personnel may need to assist the Gorgan government to eliminate illegal activities that interfere with the military mission.

HUMAN RIGHTS

While the Gorgan constitution guarantees human rights in the country, several organizations such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the US Department of State claim that the Gorgan government either ignores or breaches these rights. The Gorgan government, however, is demonstrating some improvement as it has begun to protect the rights of religious minorities, with a significant drop in attacks against those with different religious beliefs than the majority of Gorgans. The Gorgan government also improved its protection of the freedoms of speech and press with recent laws to decriminalize libel. Many Gorgan IDPs from the 1990s civil war with Zabzimek, however, still cannot access satisfactory housing, medical care, or job opportunities. The Gorgan government learned from its previous mistakes and provided settlements for the IDPs generated by Gorgas' attempt to take control of South Ostremek in 2008. Unless requested by the Gorgan government, US personnel will probably not be called upon to enforce human rights except as designated by the Geneva Convention and other applicable rules of warfare.

CENTERS OF SOCIAL POWER

Although family serves as the centerpiece of a Gorgan's social life, most citizens see themselves as Gorgans first and any other social group second. The extended family develops clientelism, protectionism, and even organized crime in the close-knit group. Gorgans consider third- and even fourth-generation family members as close and expect them to pay their social duty to attend family weddings and funerals. As the second country in the world to adopt Christianity as their state religion, most Gorgans practice their Orthodox faith regularly.

BASIC CULTURAL NORMS AND VALUES

While Gorgas at one time in the past may have been a military force, it is not today. In the two conflicts fought to return runaway republics back under governmental control, the Gorgan military lost both rather quickly. Zabzimek and South Ostremek received Donovian support, however, to win their quasi-independence from Gorgas. Most Gorgans believe Zabzimek and South Ostremek belong to their country and that their national honor requires the eventual return of the runaway republics to Gorgas. Gorgas sees its major enemy as Donovia and will do anything to hinder the Donovians in any aspect.

CUSTOMS AND PRACTICES

Meeting & Greeting	Men shake hands and say <i>Gamarjoba</i> (let you win). Do not greet strangers in urban areas. It is alright to smile and greet strangers in rural areas. Friends hug and both kiss the other's cheek, even among the same gender.
Visiting/ Hospitality	Stand when an elderly person enters a room. Host offers coffee and cookies to guests regardless of financial situation. Hostess may serve food, but not partake unless other women are present. Visitors should not wear shorts.
Manners	Address adults with their professional title and last name; or Address people with <i>Batano</i> (Sir) or <i>Kalbatano</i> (Madam) and their first name. <i>Batano</i> or <i>Kalbatano</i> with a last name is considered very formal. Use first and last names in correspondence and the media. Eat with fork in left hand and knife in right hand. After the <i>Tamada</i> (toastmaster) speaks, males drain their glass and females take a sip of theirs.
Cultural Dos & Don'ts	Men are breadwinners; women take care of the home. You must receive permission from a male relative before speaking to a female. Laws are loosely interpreted. Business clothing is similar to Westerners'. Gorgans dress carefully and value quality clothing. Women should cover their heads with a scarf. The "thumbs-up" sign demonstrates approval.
Gifts	Guests bring gifts—chocolate, flowers, or alcoholic beverages.
Taboos	Do not shake hands across the threshold of someone's home. Do not decline the offer of an alcoholic beverage—it is considered very rude. Do not ask for more food than initially offered—decline second servings. Do not drink before the toast is offered. Do not dress sloppily, but good jeans are ok. Adult females and teenage girls do not wear shorts in public.
Personal Space	Much less than that of the US.
Displays of Affection	Lip kissing and intimate hugging in public is not approved. Same genders may kiss each other on the cheek.

Marriage Rituals	Unplanned bride kidnapping still occurs, and the family feels shame if the woman returns to her home unmarried. General tendency for later marriage, but a significant number of early age marriages do occur. Unofficial polygamy exists in some Muslim areas. While parents may stay involved, it is more likely that the couple mutually decides on the marriage proposal. After consent by both families, the betrothal ceremony is held where the groom climbs to the top of the bride's roof and releases a white bird, the guests throw grains of cereal to the house corners, and the bride walks around a pot with oil or wheat three times. A Gorgan wedding is a big celebration with usually hundreds of guests.
Work Week/ Work Hours	Monday to Friday, 40 hours per week with a Saturday-Sunday weekend. Stores usually open at 1000, but close sometime between 1800 and 2000. Restaurants usually open for lunch, but remain open until the early morning hours.
Concept Of Time	More aware of time's importance than most of the region, but still not like the Western world.
Dispute Resolution	Conflicts between individuals are resolved by families.
Birth Rituals	Grandparents live with the parents to help raise the children due to shortage of daycare providers and kindergartens.
Death Rituals	Beliefs and rituals about death and the afterlife come from a mixture of Christian and Pagan traditions. The people respect the dead and spend much time caring for the graves. Though the people believe in an afterlife, they reduce grief by ritualizing the mourning process.

Summary

Gorgan society is homogeneous as most people belong to the same ethnic group, speak the same language, and practice the same religion. These three traits bind the Gorgans to each other and make almost everyone else an outsider. While Gorgas made some societal progress in recent years, it still finds itself below the living standards of Ariana and Atropia. The relatively ethnically homogeneous Gorgan population creates a situation in which most of its citizens dislike Donovia, want the return of their three runaway republics to their control, and remain leery of most of their other neighbors.

TRADOC G-2

TRISA-THREATS

CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND THREAT INTEGRATION

DIRECTORATE (CTID)

INFORMATION: GORGAS

Information: Gorgas

The information variable describes the nature, scope, characteristics, and effects of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, manipulate, disseminate, or act on information.

KEY FACTS:

REGION

- All states of the region maintain some level of direct government control or influence on their information environments.
- Television operates as the most readily available and important communications medium.

GORGAS

- Gorgans will probably present their INFOWAR operations against the Donovians. Except for the Donovians, Gorgas maintains the best-quality INFOWAR collections platforms in the Caucasus.
- The public communications media is growing, relative free, and dynamic. Little official censorship exists.
- Lack of economic resources will be a prime limiter of growth.

OPERATIONAL IMPACTS OF THE INFORMATION VARIABLE IN THE OE:

REGION

- While language barriers will persist, English continues to rapidly displace Donovian as a *lingua franca*, or common language, for trans-border communication. Mobile phones serve as the most effective means to reach the educated and urban populations.
- Television is the most effective medium for information dissemination.

GORGAS

- Gorgas' INFOWAR operations will conform generally to NATO doctrine.
- Donovia is the prime focus of INFOWAR operations.
- Gorgans will be friendly and Western leaning.

INFORMATION OVERVIEW:

Gorgas has a dynamic and relatively free media environment. Gorgan INFOWAR capability is growing, with training and equipment adhering closely to NATO standards. Gorgas will be limited compared to regional neighbors on the resources it will be able to expend to grow both information and INFOWAR infrastructure.

PUBLIC COMMUNICATIONS MEDIA

With the exception of Ariana's heavy-handed control of its public communications, the Caucasus region enjoys comparative freedom of the press, within broad content boundaries, policed by relatively soft governmental censorship. Independent press demonstrates significant growth.

INTERNET

According to current statistics, over 28% of Gorgans use the Internet. In the last decade, Internet users in Gorgas grew from 20,000 to 1.3 million people. Combined with increased mobile phone use, Internet use will likely continue to grow. The Gorgan Internet plays an integral role in the country's political and economic development, but also became key terrain in the recent war against Donovia. Donovia targeted Gorgan Internet operations, and this experience will likely temper Gorgas' use of the Internet in future military operations. Gorgas, however will probably increase its Internet use for perception management operations targeted at both domestic and foreign audiences.

TELEVISION

Television serves as the major source of information for the vast majority of the Gorgan population. Once primarily state-controlled, Gorgan broadcasters have slowly drifted away from governmental control to a more independent status. Currently, the Gorgan government only directly funds one public television station, also controls one of the two major TV networks, TV Gorgas. Not surprisingly, viewers see TV Gorgas as generally pro-government and, because of that association, TV Gorgas receives better access to government operations such as military maneuvers. Radio/TV Gorgas National operates as the other major Gorgan television outlet—with a history of independence that includes reports unflattering to the government.

RADIO

Gorgas operates two national and three regional radio broadcast stations. Radio broadcasts begin at 0600 and conclude at midnight. Programs include news, talk shows, music, and children's programs. FM radio stations broadcast on Radio 2, ACL Radio, Scarlett Band, and NOLE Radio. Gorgas also receives European-sourced programming and locally rebroadcasts it.

PRINT MEDIA

Though technically private, such publications as the Gorgan-language *Republican Gorgan* and the Donovian-language *United Gorgas* receive government subsidies, have editors appointed by the president, and serve as official propaganda outlets. Since government agencies must subscribe to *Republican Gorgan*, its daily circulation reaches 6,000 to 7,000. The *Republican Gorgan* covers Gorgan news and summarizes international news. The Gorgan-language *Tbilisi Times* serves as the capital city's newspaper. Several other local newspapers serve Tbilisi, but their circulation and reporting remain unreliable.

Independent newspapers dominate the Gorgan newspaper market. Major dailies include *Gorgan Independence News*; a popular weekly digest, *GorgasNOW!* and a tabloid, *Click!Gorgas!* Small newspapers outside the capital struggle to maintain both financial viability and editorial independence. While available, magazines and other periodicals maintain limited circulation due to paper shortages.

TELEPHONE

While primarily found in the larger cities, Gorgan telephone service remains limited and unreliable, with outdated international connectivity. Public phone use requires city tokens or phone cards that

Gorgans can purchase at kiosks or in the central post office, the country's long-distance provider. Cellular telephones currently remain limited to the larger cities. One international landline connects Gorgas with Donovia and Kemalia. A leased gateway switch located in Donovia provides satellite telephone service.

POSTAL/COURIER

While Gorgas operates a postal system, users consider the government service less reliable than private couriers for important deliveries. Private couriers operate efficiently, with short delivery times along the major Gorgan roads or large cities such as Tbilisi or Poti. Not surprisingly, postal service remains weak or non-existent along the Gorgan borders with South Ostremek and Zabzimek.

WORD OF MOUTH

Cell phone technology, especially for the youth and urban dwellers, established SMS as a popular medium. As cell phone technology matures and the price falls, Gorgans will likely supplement their conversations with social media outlets.

INFORMATION CONTROL

Gorgas traditionally uses the external threat from Donovia to rally support for the Gorgan government and its ruling elites. Fear of Donovian dominion remains omnipresent in many Gorgan TV and radio programs generally controlled by the government or those closely aligned with it. Gorgas will also play up its Western orientation for foreigners of all varieties, part of efforts to bring Western nations into closer alignment to better deter aggressive Donovian activities.

INFOWAR

INFOWAR in the Caucasus region contains a mixture of old and new technology. While older Donovian equipment forms the backbone for much of the region's INFOWAR warfighting capability, the countries conduct advanced operations with dedicated INFOWAR units. For example, regional perception management activities, often web-based, form the current global state-of-the-art. Internet operations are frequently used as an adjunct to major combat operations. Most countries in the Caucasus focus their INFOWAR on their likely adversaries.

ELECTRONIC WARFARE

The Gorgan military builds its jammers and sensors around a collection of some outdated and more recently purchased Western equipment. Gorgan OIF and OEF participation likely exposed its forces to a variety of the latest Western electronic warfare (EW) hardware. Additionally, recent close working relations with the Israelis probably created a significant cross-pollination of EW equipment, tactics, and techniques.

COMPUTER ATTACK

The Gorgans maintain a computer attack capability, but are apt to face significant over-match from their probable regional opponents. After Gorgas received cyber attacks in its recent war with Donovia, Gorgas increased its capabilities significantly with help from its NATO and Israeli allies.

INFORMATION ATTACK

Gorgas possesses limited information attack (IA) capabilities, but these continue to grow. Gorgas received aggressive IA by a variety of non-state and probable Donovian state actors in its 2008 war. Unclassified studies discussed in depth the various hacker operations for both sides, but neither side

was able to conduct any advanced IA. Any IA attacks in 2008 failed or resulted in limited damage to the Gorgan computer system because of lack of a significantly large enough network within the Gorgan military.

DECEPTION

Gorgas possesses a limited deception capability, with most resources likely focused on denying Donovian collection efforts. The relative size disparity between Gorgas and Donovia as well as Gorgan experience at the hands of Donovian deep-strike operations probably increased Gorgan efforts to frustrate the ability of Donovian forces to see and strike Gorgan military assets.

PHYSICAL DESTRUCTION

Since Donovia presents an overmatch in physical destruction capability, the Gorgan military is apt to only attack sensors in the most critical situations. Gorgas likely possesses few capabilities to conduct deep strikes against INFOWAR targets.

PROTECTION AND SECURITY MEASURES

Gorgas faces a large and obvious threat from Donovia; thus it remains likely that the Gorgan government will exert maximum effort to defend its sensors, platforms, and systems from attack. Due to Donovia's advanced capabilities, Gorgan protection and security measures (PSM) will focus as much on the remediation of damage and the capacity to rebuild capability as avoiding an attack. Gorgas does have a relatively deep INFOWAR civilian capability for a country its size, and thus might mobilize its civilian sector in such an effort.

PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT

Gorgan perception management will likely stress traditional Gorgan messages of mortal threat at the hands of the Donovians. Externally, the Gorgans will attempt to paint themselves as a Western nation with significant links to Europe and the US. When the US Army Corps of Engineers planned a railroad improvement project for Gorgas and Atropia, Ariana condemned the project in regular broadcasts by the "Voice of the Free Atropians" in northwestern Ariana and to listeners in Gorgas and Atropia. The message insinuated that the government did not build the railroad to improve life for the region's poor, but to provide a means for the corrupt and oppressive governments in Tbilisi and Baku to efficiently control the people.

INTELLIGENCE

Gorgas maintains a small but reasonably competent intelligence service. Western support, combined with active service in both OIF and OEF, gives the Gorgans exposure to the latest Western tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). Gorgan intelligence will likely engage primarily Donovian targets or their Zabzimek or South Ostremek proxies. Gorgan intelligence maintains a standard five directorate intelligence service, with analytical, collection (known as information), counterintelligence (known as security), administrative, and training elements.

HUMAN INTELLIGENCE

Human intelligence (HUMINT) serves as Gorgas' most important collection disciplines—targeting Donovian military activities in the Black Sea and the Donovian-controlled republics of South Ostremek and Zabzimek. Gorgan counterintelligence operations focus on high-value targets such as the hydrocarbon pipelines and against Donovian activities within Gorgas.

OPEN SOURCE INTELLIGENCE

Gorgas probably relies on open source intelligence (OSINT) as its primary means of strategic intelligence. Gorgan OSINT likely focuses on Donovian collection, especially on Donovian activities in South Donovia and areas that border the Ukraine.

SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE

Gorgan signals intelligence (SIGINT) collection revolves around a series of ground collection stations that use a variety of Western and Donovian-era hardware. As more unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) enter service, Gorgas is expected to integrate the UAVs into the SIGINT collection architecture.

IMAGERY INTELLIGENCE

Gorgan imagery intelligence (IMINT) capability probably remains limited to air-breathing platforms, with UAVs as the most important. Gorgas maintains a small fleet of helicopters and light aircraft capable of IMINT collection, though it is unlikely they will conduct this task. Due to limited platforms, Gorgan IMINT capability remains extremely restricted.

MEASUREMENT AND SIGNATURES INTELLIGENCE

Gorgan measurement and signatures intelligence (MASINT) capability remains limited and is used primarily for biometrics for security and counterintelligence purposes. Gorgans will probably explore MASINT capabilities like facial recognition for border security with Donovia, Zabzimek, and South Ostremek.

Summary

Despite resource constraints, Gorgan capability to effectively engage larger INFOWAR adversaries will grow, probably with significant outside support. Likewise, should international economic development foster overall economic development, the current free and dynamic information environment could blossom to become the region's largest. Ultimately, Gorgas stands at a crossroads of information development—a path ultimately dictated by economic factors.

TRADOC G-2

TRISA-THREATS

CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND THREAT INTEGRATION

DIRECTORATE (CTID)

INFRASTRUCTURE: GORGAS

Infrastructure: Gorgas

Infrastructure is composed of the basic facilities, services, and installations needed for the functioning of a community or society.

KEY FACTS:

REGION

- A country's prosperity in this region of the world depends on its hydrocarbon resources. Ariana's, Atropia's, and to a lesser extent, Donovia's oil and natural gas resources fund their infrastructure construction. Gorgas and Minaria, because of their lack of hydrocarbon deposits, lag behind their neighbors in infrastructure modernization.

GORGAS

- About one-third of Gorgas' populace lives in Tbilisi despite the fact that 55.6% of the people derive their income from agriculture-related jobs.
- Even though Gorgas' economic system shows significant growth, the country suffers from a lack of raw materials to feed its factories.

OPERATIONAL IMPACTS OF THE INFRASTRUCTURE VARIABLE IN THE OE:

REGION

- Most of the region, especially in rural areas, cannot access modern utilities such as potable water, electricity, and modern sewage systems.
- Due to the lack of potable water in much of the region, military forces will need to test local water sources before use and likely treat local water to avoid medical problems.

GORGAS

- The hydrocarbon pipelines that cross Gorgas must remain secure to ensure the continued export of crude oil from Atropia to the Western world.
- The large rural areas of Gorgas will prevent any outside military from much host nation support, but it will also reduce the number of displaced persons who may hinder military operations.

INFRASTRUCTURE OVERVIEW:

While the region's five countries have a significant number of rural residents, the majority of each country's population lives in urban areas. About two-thirds of the Arianian (68%), Donovian (67%), and Minarian populace (64%) and just over half of the Gorgan (53%) and Atropian (52%) populace live in urban areas. All five countries contain a mixture of modern urban cities and almost pre-modern rural villages. Modern utilities can be found in most major cities but not in the rural villages and countryside.

Gorgas contains few natural resources and little industry and needs to find its role in the Caucasus region. This is true for Gorgan infrastructure, as the country possesses a negative urbanization rate of 0.6%. In order for some urban Gorgans to avoid starvation, they returned to their rural roots

where they can attempt to survive through subsistence farming. Most rural Gorgans cannot access modern utilities (electricity, potable running water, and a modern sewage disposal system), and the same holds true for many urban Gorgans. Even with one-third of the Gorgan people located in one city, Gorgas remains almost evenly split between urban and rural dwellers.

CONSTRUCTION PATTERNS


As previously mentioned, the majority of residents in all five countries live in urban areas. Most urban cities contain a mixture of old neighborhoods with roughshod construction, while buildings in newer neighborhoods are made with modern construction methods. In rural villages and areas, residents use whatever materials they can obtain to build their houses.

Gorgas' largest cities contain four distinct types of neighborhoods based on the time of their construction. The oldest parts of the cities contain the dense random construction as the city grew from a village to a metropolitan area. The second area consists of extra large rectangular block apartment buildings in closed orderly block construction that suffer from a lack of maintenance. The third area consists of neighborhoods that use more Western-style construction methods. In those cities that possess significant industrialization, houses built to support a factory exist to create a strip area neighborhood. For the most part, Gorgas does not possess the financial capacity to maintain its infrastructure, either private or public.


Tbilisi remains the only Gorgan city with enough people where military operations would likely require a significant amount of urban operations. No other city possesses a population of over 200,000 people. Even in these smaller cities, however, military personnel will face dense random construction in the inner cities with narrow alleys and buildings built close to each other. Except for Tbilisi, the lack of an urban population may create manpower shortages for any host nation support requests.

MAJOR GORGAN CITIES AND URBAN ZONES

While the majority of Gorgas' citizens live in urban areas, 47% of its citizens live in rural areas. One-third of Gorgas' 4.5 million inhabitants live in their capital city, Tbilisi. In fact, no other Gorgan city possesses a population with over 200,000 inhabitants. The lack of any major cities other than Tbilisi could make the distribution of information to the citizens difficult, but will also deter any insurgents' ability to unite their supporters.



Block-Style Apartment Building



TBILISI

Tbilisi, Gorgas' capital and largest city at around 1.5 million metropolitan area residents, grew on both sides of the Kura River due to its strategic location on the trade routes between Europe and Asia. It lies over 200 miles east of the Black Sea, surrounded by mountains on three sides. The mountain ridges that extend down from the Trialeti Range of the Lesser Caucasus Mountains to the city mean Tbilisi contains both densely populated low-rise residential neighborhoods and largely uninhabited tracts of land on the south side of the Kura River. This difficult terrain forced Tbilisi to build on the north side of the Kura River to the east and northeast. The oldest city neighborhoods contain buildings that feature Middle Eastern-influenced dense random construction, forming city core and core periphery urban zones. Tbilisi contains the country's largest industrial area and possesses several thriving commercial areas. The city operates a subway system with two lines, 22 stations, and 186 cars. The Gorgan military places several of its key military units in bases in the Tbilisi metropolitan area.

KUTAISI

Kutaisi, Gorgas' second-largest city at just under 200,000 people, lies about 138 miles west of Tbilisi and 60 miles east of the Black Sea along both banks of the Rioni River. Due to the physical constraints of the Greater Caucasus Mountains to the north, Kutaisi grew primarily toward the southeast to its current population of 199,780 residents. The city features a large number of parks and abundant greenery attributable to its physical location, climate, and spring snowmelt. Kutaisi contains both city core and core periphery urban zones. While some high-rise residential areas exist, most residents live in low-rise residential urban zones. The city contains the normal number of commercial areas for a city its size, but not many industrial areas.

Military activities in the Kutaisi area will find a dichotomy of urban and rural military operations at the same time. The random construction, while not as dense as many other old cities, will require significant numbers of soldiers to clear. Due to the large number of farms on Kutaisi's outskirts, military operations should not significantly damage the food transportation network.

BATUMI

Batumi, with a population of over 120,000 residents, is Gorgas' third-largest city and most important Black Sea port. Batumi only lies 12 miles north of the Gorgas-Kemalia border and serves as the last

stop of the Transcaucasian Railway. Batumi once served as a kerosene pipeline terminus from Baku, Atropia, but became obsolete once the new Baku-Supsa (Gorgas) pipeline began operation in the mid-1990s. Still, for its size, Batumi contains a large industrial area as the city serves as Gorgas' primary port for oil exports. Batumi's other industries include shipbuilding, food processing, and light manufacturing. While the city does not demonstrate the dense random construction of other old cities, it does not resemble planned orderly square blocks either. More people live in low-rise residential areas than high-rise areas.

Any military operations in the local area will need to ensure that the Batumi port continues its operations so Gorgas can export hydrocarbon products to the Western world and import needed supplies from the rest of the world. Military operations in Batumi will not require much urban operations, and the port should provide a logistics port for any military operations in Gorgas.

RUSTAVI

Rustavi, Gorgas' fourth-largest city at under 120,000 people, lies only 15 miles southeast of Tbilisi along the Kura River. Founded before the 4th century BC on a primary trade route, invaders completely destroyed the city in 1265. Primary industries include iron, steel, chemicals, cement, and synthetic fibers. Over 25% of the population in the mid-1990s left the Rustavi area to find work elsewhere. Still, the city currently contains 90 large- and medium-size industrial plants. While Rustavi lacks the normal city core found in most Gorgan cities, it does possess a core periphery urban zone. Most Rustavis live in high-rise residential areas, with some low-rise residential areas on the city's edges. While commercial areas exist, the exodus of the population created a large number of vacant buildings.

Any military operations in the Rustavi area will likely encounter high levels of pollution. Military units will need to test any water sources before use. The city does not contain much dense random construction. The old rectangular box-style apartment buildings, however, may require room-by-room clearance in any urban operation. Any military activities in the Rustavi area may find a limited amount of manpower and supplies from the host nation, so the military should plan on providing all its own logistics support.

ZUGDIDI

Zugdidi, with a population of just over 75,000 people, is Gorgas' fifth-largest city. Due to its nearness to one of Gorgas' breakaway territories, Zugdidi has doubled its population with the influx of refugees since the mid-1990s. Most construction consists primarily of random construction but not as dense as most center cities. In the 1993 Gorgan Civil War, Zugdidi changed hands several times in the fighting between the two sides. Zugdidi contains a dense city core urban zone with the adjacent core periphery. Most citizens live in low-rise residential urban zones. Few industrial areas exist due to its relatively small size, but commercial areas thrive to support the recent growth in population.

Any military activity in the Zugdidi area may cause additional internally displaced persons (IDPs) as the people may fear possible extermination from the other side as in previous recent wars. Due to the city's small size, the military should not expect either manpower or supplies from the local area so all logistical support will likely remain organic to the military unit. Military units should expect that the local civilians will want protection from the other side as local combatants may use any excuse to obtain vengeance for past wars. As a result of the dense random construction of much of Zugdidi, military operations could face extensive urban operations in the local area.

POPULATION DENSITY

Tbilisi: 1,588 people per square mile
Kutaisi: 7,124 people per square mile

Batumi: 6,027 people per square mile
Rustavi: 5,258 people per square mile
Zugdidi: 3,999 people per square mile

UTILITIES PRESENT

The Caucasus area faces a dichotomy when it comes to utilities such as electricity, water, and sewage treatment. Most urban households can access modern utilities, but rural areas cannot. Many rural residents who cannot access modern utilities live similarly to their ancestors generations ago.

POWER

Another dichotomy in the Caucasus region is that countries like Ariana, Atropia, and Donovia export hydrocarbons, coal, or electrical power to other countries, while Gorgas and Minaria must import the same resources to meet their requirements. The countries that can export hydrocarbon products or electricity become richer while those that must import significant quantities of power become poorer. At least 75% of all structures in the five countries can access power because they are located in urban areas.

Gorgas contains very little hydrocarbon resources, small coal deposits, and limited electrical generation capacity. What electricity Gorgas produces comes from a limited number of very small hydroelectric plants. Gorgas increased its natural gas and coal imports between 2005 and the present to offset its reduced ability to purchase crude oil. Over the last decade, Gorgas barely managed to obtain enough power to keep its people from freezing in the winter months. Overall, at least 75% of the people in Gorgas can access a modern power system.

Gorgas' lack of hydrocarbon resources forces it to purchase oil and gas from other countries. Unless Gorgas finds a way to produce more electricity through hydropower, the country will always need to rely on other countries for its energy resources.

WATER

The majority of the Caucasus region's urban population has access to potable water. As areas become more rural, people must rely on local sources—rivers, streams, and wells—to obtain water for cooking, drinking, and washing.

Most residents in Gorgas' four largest cities—Tbilisi, Kutaisi, Batumi, and Rustavi—can access potable water. Except for Kutaisi, where 96% of the people receive their water from wells, all residents in the other three cities receive drinking water through a modern system. Only 31% of Zugdidi residents, however, can access potable water through a Western-style system. Most rural residents do not have access to a modern water system and still obtain their water through rivers, streams, and wells that remain susceptible to contamination. Since most people live in Tbilisi or one of the other larger cities, at least 75% of the Gorgas people can access a modern water system.

SEWAGE

The vast majority of Ariana, Atropia, Gorgas, and Donovia urban residents use modern sewage disposal methods to get rid of waste, but most Minarians do not. Urban residents have greater access to modern sewage treatment than rural residents. The more remote a person, the less likely he/she will use modern sewage treatment techniques. Poor disposal methods in rural areas contaminate ground water that other residents rely on for drinking and cooking.

Overall, only 45% of Gorgas' cities and towns possess a functional modern sewage system. In Gorgas' four largest cities, at least 75% of all residents can access a modern sewage disposal system. This ranges from a high of 97% in Tbilisi to a low of 74% in Rustavi, with Kutaisi and Batumi in the 80%


range. Gorgas' fifth largest city, Zugdidi, remains an outlier as only 8% of its residents can access a modern sewage system. The majority of Gorgan rural residents cannot access a modern sewage system either, but the overall access rate for Gorgan people is 75%.

TRANSPORTATION ARCHITECTURE

Roads are the primary transportation method throughout the Caucasus region. Train and especially air travel remain too expensive for many residents of Ariana, Atropia, Gorgas, and Minaria. Most roads, especially the unpaved ones, suffer from a lack of maintenance. Ariana and Donovia maintain a complex transportation architectural system while the other three countries operate a moderate one due to railway system limitations.

ROAD SYSTEMS

Overall, roads in this part of the world do not meet US or Western Europe standards. Driving is hazardous, especially in the winter months or in bad weather. Generally, drivers do not obey all traffic laws, and vehicle owners often fail to maintain their vehicles properly.



Gorgas contains approximately 12,632 miles of road. About 39% or 4,880 miles of paved roads exist throughout the country. From Tbilisi, four main highways spoke off in the four cardinal directions—north, south, east, and west—to Donovia, Minaria, Atropia, and the Black Sea. Gorgas labels its three best highways M1, M2, and M3. Highway M1 (M27) goes west from Tbilisi to Kutaisi and then to Senaki, where it turns north to the Gorgan border. Highway M2 (A305) parallels the coastline from the Kemalian border through Batumi and Poti, both Black Sea ports, before it turns northeast to Senaki. M3 starts in Tbilisi and goes almost due north into Donovia. Most rural Gorgan roads do not receive proper maintenance, and rain further deteriorates the road system.

BUS

All five countries maintain some sort of bus system, but its quality depends on the country and location. The larger the city, the more likely it will operate a public bus system. Usually, intercity buses run between the larger cities, and “private” buses may also operate in some areas. Due to the relatively cheap cost of public transportation, buses remain a favorite method for local civilians to travel long distances within their country.


Both official and unofficial buses operate in Gorgas. Intercity bus service operates between Tbilisi and other larger Gorgan cities such as Batumi and Kazbegi. Buses also operate on routes from Tbilisi to cities in Kemalia and Atropia. Currently, no buses operate between Tbilisi and Donovia.

RAIL

All five Caucasus countries operate a railroad system, but they suffer many problems due to maintenance issues, non-standard equipment, criminal activity, and high cost.

Gorgas contains 1,002 miles of railway track throughout the country that link it with Donovia, Atropia, and Minaria. The Gorgan railroad suffers from poor maintenance, criminal activity, and fuel shortages that make it unreliable.

Tbilisi operates a subway system that covers just over 16 miles in the Gorgan capital city. Twenty below-ground and two above-ground stations service over 105 million passengers annually. The Tbilisi subway operates between 0600 and 2400 daily.



AIR TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS

All five countries maintain both paved and unpaved runways of varying distances. Many of the unpaved runways resemble nothing more than a cleared dirt path only suitable for the sturdiest of planes.

Gorgas contains 18 paved and 4 unpaved runways for a total of 22 runways in the entire country. All unpaved runways in Gorgas do not exceed 5,000 feet. The map on the following page indicates the location of the major Gorgan runways, and the chart provides the data on each runway (not all runways shown on map or chart).


Paved Runways

- Over 10,000 feet: 1
- 8,000 to 10,000 feet: 7
- 5,000 to 8,000 feet: 4
- 3,000 to 5,000 feet: 4
- Under 3,000 feet: 2

Unpaved Runways

- Over 10,000 feet: 0
- 8,000 to 10,000 feet: 0
- 5,000 to 8,000 feet: 0
- 3,000 to 5,000 feet: 2
- Under 3,000 feet: 2

Major Runways



Map #	Elevation (Feet)	Latitude (D, M, S)	Longitude (D, M, S)	Length (Feet)	Width (Feet)	Surface Type
301	105	41 36 37.00 N	41 35 58.90 E	7325	150	Asphalt
302	79	43 06 14.56 N	40 34 45.38 E	9802	164	Concrete
303	223	42 10 36.57 N	42 28 57.77 E	8202	144	Concrete
304	384	42 14 55.01 N	42 37 28.78 E	4692	114	Asphalt
305-1	1624	41 40 09.00 N	44 57 17.00 E	9843	147	Concrete
305-1	1624	41 40 09.00 N	44 57 17.00 E	8202	196	Asphalt
306	1305	41 27 33.16 N	44 46 59.56 E	8170	130	Concrete
307	1250	41 38 57.24 N	44 56 11.15 E	8131	255	Concrete
308	1460	41 37 40.95 N	45 01 50.70 E	8205	175	Concrete
309	1795	41 22 46.36 N	46 22 02.40 E	8862	130	Concrete
310	53	42 51 29.64 N	41 07 41.32 E	12012	172	Concrete
311	1489	41 57 12.35 N	45 30 28.78 E	5551	110	Asphalt

Airlines

Gorgan Airlines operates as the country's national carrier. Gorgan Airlines provides direct service domestically to Batumi and internationally to Almaty, Amsterdam, Athens, Dubai, Frankfurt, Kharkov, Kiev, Minsk, Paris, Tel Aviv, and Vienna. Gorgas Airlines operates daily flights to some cities, but only once or twice per week to others. Several foreign carriers such as Lufthansa and

British Airlines operate flights into Tbilisi. Tbilisi power outages sometimes strike the airport and force pilots to land without electronic airport navigation aids. Gorgan Airlines operates Canadian Regional Jet (CRJ)-100, CRJ-200, and Boeing 737 airplanes. The American Embassy advises travelers to use Western carriers to avoid the risk from poorer maintenance procedures by non-Western airlines.

PORTS/SEA/RIVER TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS

The five Caucasus countries share a diverse maritime culture. Ariana has a significant coastline and a large oceangoing fleet to export its oil. Atropia maintains ports on the Caspian Sea. Gorgas has three ports on the Black Sea that are accessible through the straits at Istanbul, Kemalia. Minaria is completely landlocked, with no direct access to any ocean or sea. Due to its location, Donovia has several seaports on the Black and Caspian Seas.

Gorgas operates three major ports on the Black Sea—Batumi, Poti, and Sokhumi—from which the country receives most of its imports. Batumi operates year-round and serves as the primary port to handle oil exports and imports that range from four to five million tons annually. Poti, located at the end of the Rioni River, contains 17 berths that include some floating cranes. With its current storage facilities, both warehouse and open space, the port can handle five to six million tons of imports and exports annually. Sokhumi, located on the bay of the same name, contains one cargo pier and two passenger quays. Due to damage from Gorgas' civil war, the port is currently inoperable.

Gorgas also contains several navigable rivers that the country uses for the transportation of goods. Luckily, the two major rivers—the Kura and the Rioni—flow in opposite directions. The Kura River begins in Kemalia and flows eastward to the Caspian Sea. The Rioni River flows west, and the water eventually reaches the Black Sea. While the Gorgans use their rivers for transportation, they primarily use them to generate electrical power. The majority of commercial shipping occurs on the Black Sea and not inland (*see railroad map on page 2C-6-7 for locations of major Gorgan ports*).


Any military operations in Gorgas could possibly use the three major ports to support the deployment logistically. Sokhumi port, however, would require some rehabilitation before its use by the military. Additionally, Kemalia would need to allow the military's resupply ships to pass through the Bosphorus Straits in order to support the force through the Black Sea.

PIPELINES

The security of hydrocarbon pipelines will be paramount in any military operations in the Caucasus region. Any disruption to the flow of crude oil and natural gas to the Western world could cause economic problems, as many modern countries rely on hydrocarbons to fuel their industries.

Sections of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) and the Baku-Supsa oil pipelines pass through Gorgas on their way to Black Sea ports where the crude oil flows into tankers for refinement in other countries. Gorgas serves as an intermediate country for 155 miles of the 1,099-mile BTC pipeline that originates in Baku, Atropia and concludes in Ceyhan, Kemalia. The Baku-Supsa pipeline, also known as the Western Early Oil Pipeline, travels basically the same route as the BTC pipeline until just south of Tbilisi. There, the Baku-Supsa pipeline veers north and then west after it skirts Tbilisi to the north before it arrives in Supsa, near Batumi. Any military activity in Gorgas will need to mitigate possible damage to the two major oil pipelines, as the disruptions would hurt the economic systems of several Western countries.

European consortiums are now building additional hydrocarbon pipelines in Gorgas to access the fields in Central Asia. New oil and gas pipelines will originate in Central Asia, cross the Caspian Sea, and then follow the BTC pipeline through Ariana, Gorgas, and Kemalia before reaching the European markets. These pipelines will double the capacity of the current pipelines.



TELECOMMUNICATIONS ARCHITECTURE

For the most part, Caucasus-region residents use cellular telephones to communicate with each other due to the lack of landline telephone infrastructure. Many residents never owned any type of telephone until they received their first cellular phone. Most can access news from either television or radio, but some rural residents have no information access via modern methods. (*See Information variable for additional details.*)

Similar to other countries in the Caucasus, most Gorgan citizens can use telephone or receive information from a television or radio station. In a country of 4.6 million people, only 618,000 landlines exist but there are over 2.7 million cell phones. Since a long waiting list exists for connection to the fixed lines, most Gorgans turn to the cell phone for their communication needs. In urban areas, about 20% of the people can access a landline, but only about 4% in rural areas. Across the entire country, 75% of all Gorgans can access a cellular telephone. About one-fifth of Gorgas' population or over 1.3 million residents can access the Internet from one of the 104,243 Internet hosts. Gorgas operates one state-owned television station with two networks. Eight private television stations also operate along with a dozen cable operators. Gorgas also operates two state-owned radio stations alongside many private stations. The military will find the radio and television are excellent methods to communicate with most of the Gorgan people.

AGRICULTURE

Agriculture production still dominates the labor forces of Gorgas (55.6%) and Minaria (46.2%), but not Ariana (25%), Atropia (38.3%), or Donovia (20%). Even in the Caucasus region's predominately agricultural countries, farming creates less than one-fourth of the country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Except for Atropia, the region relies on food imports to feed its people. Any food import disruption may increase the military's burden to feed civilians and prevent starvation.

Of the five countries in the region, more Gorgans work in agriculture-related jobs than any other, at 55.6% of the population. Since 1992, the number of Gorgans who work in agriculture has more than doubled from 25%. Even with this large number of farm workers, agriculture only generates 11% of Gorgas' GDP. Family-operated farms dominate Gorgas as the average farm contains less than one hectare, and only 4.6% of the farms contain more than two hectares. Only about 12% of Gorgas' land

is arable enough for farming, with over 85% of its croplands dedicated to grain production. Corn accounts for 40% and winter wheat for 37% of the cultivated grains produced. Gorgas' main crops include corn, winter wheat, grapes, tea, citrus fruits, and non-citrus fruits. Gorgans also maintain cattle, pigs, and sheep that account for about 25% of their agriculture economy.

INDUSTRY

Because of their hydrocarbon resources, Ariana, Atropia, and Donovia are more industrialized than Gorgas and Minaria. Industry GDP ranges from a low of 27.1% in Gorgas to a high of 61.4% in Atropia. The protection of the Gorgan hydrocarbon infrastructure remains paramount for any military operations in the area and the military should refrain from any unnecessary damage to the industrial sector to facilitate economic recovery after the end of hostilities.

Since the turn of the 21st century, Gorgas has chosen to change the way it does business to improve its economy, moving up from 112th to 18th ranking in the world for "the ease of doing business." The country, however, still suffers from the residue of Donovian influence in its industrial sector. Prior to 1991, 90% of the raw materials for Gorgan light industry came from outside the country, and Gorgas cannot operate without these raw materials. Major Gorgan products include machine tools, prefabricated buildings, cast iron, steel pipe, synthetic ammonia, and silk thread. Gorgas also possesses some gasoline and diesel fuel plants that use imported crude oil. Large amounts of toxic industrial chemicals exist throughout Gorgas that are used for multiple purposes, including water purification, wastewater management, and fertilizer to increase agricultural output.

POLLUTION

All five Caucasus-region countries face significant pollution problems stemming from poor industrial practices. The governments cared more about natural resource extraction and product production than the stewardship of the planet. This lack of concern for the environment occurred regardless of which government controlled the various countries. The region's military operations will need to address pollution, with soldiers taking precautions due to high-level air pollution and units considering any local water source not potable until tested.

Gorgas suffers from significant levels of air and water pollution throughout the entire country. Of the cities in the country, Tbilisi, Kutaisi, and Rustavi rank at the top of the list as most polluted. Despite the drop in industrial output since 1992, pollution remains rampant. Most air pollution comes from vehicles, industries, and energy production centers. Almost all Gorgan rivers contain excessive pollution, with high concentrations of phenols, hydrocarbons, copper, manganese, zinc, and nitrogen. Most water treatment plants do not work properly or operate on the low level of the efficiency scale. Experts consider at least 60% of Gorgan sewage treatment plants obsolete and in need of immediate replacement. Only 18% of Gorgas' wastewater receives adequate sewage treatment, and the remainder pollutes its final destination, the Black Sea. The Black Sea pollution, in turn, harms Gorgas' tourism industry. While the Gorgan government may have attempted to address pollution problems over the last 20 years, results do not show any significant improvements. Gorgas, however, does possess a dedicated Environmental Response Store in case of an oil spill from the pipeline that ends at Supsa.

Summary

Most of Gorgas contains outdated infrastructure that suffers from a combination of age, outdated technology, lack of maintenance, and damage from conflicts. Due to a lack of funds over the past 25 years, Gorgas never invested much in any type of infrastructure. Lack of financial resources meant

that the Gorgan people made shoddy repairs to old equipment if factories possessed the raw materials to continue their production lines. Gorgan infrastructure also suffered collateral damage from combat as parts of the country attempted to break off and form their own independent states. While some improvement occurred over the last decade, the lack of any sizeable capital prevents the modernization of Gorgan infrastructure.

TRADOC G-2

TRISA-THREATS

CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND THREAT INTEGRATION

DIRECTORATE (CTID)

PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT: GORGAS

Physical Environment: Gorgas

The physical environment variable includes the geography and man-made structures as well as the climate and weather in the area of operations. This variable defines the physical circumstances and conditions that influence the execution of operations throughout the domains of air, land, and sea.



KEY FACTS:

REGION

- The Caucasus region covers the northern and southern portions of the Caucasus Mountains and its lowlands, and lies between Europe and Asia.

GORGAS

- The Rioni River's untreated domestic and industrial wastewater discharge serves as the largest source of pollution along Gorgas' Black Sea coast.
- Due to higher elevations and poor transportation infrastructure, many mountain villages are virtually isolated from the outside world in winter.

OPERATIONAL IMPACTS OF THE PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT VARIABLE IN THE OE:

REGION

- All countries in the region contain rugged mountain ranges that will hamper ground movement.
- The Black and Caspian Seas play an important role in regional movement of persons and goods.

GORGAS

- With a strategic location east of the Black Sea, Gorgas controls much of the Caucasus Mountains and the routes through them.
- The largely mountainous terrain, coupled with frequent earthquakes and mudslides, makes ground movement both difficult and dangerous.

PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT OVERVIEW:

Over 200,000 square miles comprise the Caucasus, a mountainous region located between the Black Sea and Caspian Sea. The Caucasus includes Atropia, Minaria, and Gorgas, as well as parts of Ariana, Donovia, and Kemalia. The Caucasus Mountains, consisting of the Greater and Lesser Caucasus ranges, traditionally form the separation between Europe and Asia. The Caucasus region contains two major parts—the North Caucasus and the South Caucasus—that are divided by the Greater Caucasus Mountains. The North Caucasus region is contained entirely within Donovia, while the South Caucasus contains Gorgas, Minaria, Atropia, and parts of Ariana and Kemalia.

TERRAIN

Mountain ranges dominate Gorgas. The Likhi Range divides the country into eastern and western halves, the Greater Caucasus Mountain Range separates Gorgas from Donovia's North Caucasus Republics, and the Lesser Caucasus Mountains serve as Gorgas' southern boundary with Minaria. At 16,400 feet above sea level, the Greater Caucasus Range reaches a much higher elevation than the Lesser Caucasus. Mount Shkhara in the Greater Caucasus, at 17,059 feet, represents Gorgas' highest peak. The Lesser Caucasus Mountains do not exceed 1,000 feet in elevation and actually consist of various, interconnected mountain ranges. Prominent features of the area include the Javeki volcanic plateau, numerous lakes, mineral water, and hot springs.

BODIES OF WATER

Gorgas possesses numerous rivers, many of which provide power to small hydroelectric stations. The Kura River originates in northeast Kemalia, flows across the plains of eastern Gorgas through the capital of Tbilisi, and spills into the Caspian Sea; it is Gorgas' longest river. The Rioni, Gorgas' second largest river, originates in the Lesser Caucasus Mountains, flows west, and enters the Black Sea near Poti. Used as a means of both domestic and industrial waste disposal, the Rioni is highly polluted.



MOBILITY CLASSIFICATION

The dense random construction patterns in major cities will slow down troop movement, especially mechanized or motorized. The enemy will use the narrow alleys between buildings to conduct ambushes. Poor winter weather and lack of roads will challenge military planners, as significant areas may become inaccessible for nearly half of the year. Travelers will find Gorgan roads in generally poor condition, subject to banditry, vulnerable to rock and mudslides, and even possibly having landmines in some areas. The terrible road conditions will increase vehicle breakdowns and increase maintenance requirements.

NATURAL HAZARDS

Gorgas, as a mountainous area, is subject to both seismic activity and mudslides. The most recent earthquake occurred on 8 September of last year in the mountainous northern province of Rioni. This earthquake measured 6.2 on the Richter scale but caused no causalities or major damage. The previous major earthquake measured 6.0 on the Richter scale and struck Tbilisi in 2003. The earthquake killed six people and caused significant damage to the capital's Old Town. Earthquakes, spring snow melt, and heavy autumn rains often cause mudslides throughout the mountainous country.

VEGETATION

LAND COVER


Forests cover 41% of Gorgas' territory, mainly along the foothills and the mountains. Forests in the western part of the country located below 1,968 feet above sea level consist of oak, ash, beech, and chestnut. Between 1,968 and 5,904 feet, forests with broad-leaf trees such as spruce and beech are prevalent. The tree line ends at about 5,904 feet, and the alpine zone extends to 9,840 feet. In eastern Gorgas, forests usually grow between 1,640 and 6,560 feet, with the alpine zone from 6,560 to 11,480 feet.



AGRICULTURE

While Gorgans can only cultivate 12% of the country's land, the agricultural industry employs 55.6% of Gorgas' total labor force and generates 11% of the total GDP. Agricultural products include citrus, grapes, tea, and hazelnuts. Tea plantations occupy more than 150,000 acres and possess the most modern picking machinery. The vineyards constitute one of the oldest and most important branches of Gorgan agriculture. Gorgan winemaking dates to 300 BC and, through centuries of trial and error, winemakers have produced more than 500 grape varieties. Orchards occupy some 320,000 acres, and

the slight differences in climate and soil affect the yield, quality, and taste of Gorgan fruit. Sugar beets and tobacco also play a significant role as Gorgan commercial crops. Gorgan farmers produce some grains, especially wheat, but not enough to meet domestic needs, so Gorgas must import wheat.



CLIMATE

The subtropics to the east and the Black Sea in the west greatly affect Gorgas' climate. The Greater Caucasus mountain range also plays an important role, as it moderates Gorgas' climate and protects the country from the penetration of colder air masses from the north while warm, moist air from the west moves into the coastal lowlands.

SEASONS

Country/Season	Winter	Spring	Summer	Fall
Ariana	Dec – Feb	Mar – May	Jun – Aug	Sep – Nov
Atropia	Jan – Mar	Mar – End May	Jun – Oct	Mid Oct – Dec
Gorgas	Dec – Feb	Mar – May	Jun – Aug	Sep – Nov
Minaria	Nov – Mar	Mar – May	Jun – Sep	End Sep – Nov
North Caucasus (Donovia)	Dec – Mar	Apr – May	Jun – Sep	Oct – Nov

Seasons for Ariana, Atropia, Gorgas, Minaria, and North Caucasus (Donovia)

WEATHER

PRECIPITATION

Compared to other countries in the Caucasus, precipitation in Gorgas tends to occur somewhat uniformly throughout the year. Western Gorgas, with an annual precipitation between 40 to 80 inches, experiences heavy rainfall throughout the year but reaches its peak in the autumn and winter. In eastern Gorgas, precipitation decreases in proportion with distance from the Black Sea. The eastern plains and foothills receive between 16 and 28 inches of precipitation annually, but this amount doubles in the mountains. Southeastern Gorgas contains the country's driest region, with little precipitation in the winter and the most rainfall in late spring.

TEMPERATURE-HEAT INDEX

Low-elevation areas in much of eastern Gorgas have hot summers, but the mountainous areas usually experience mild temperatures. The highest lowland temperatures occur in July and reach about 77°F. Summer temperatures in the mountains shielding eastern Gorgas' plains from the Black Sea range from 38°F to 74°F.

TEMPERATURE-WIND CHILL INDEX

Eastern Gorgas has relatively cold winters, while the areas farther west experience a much milder season. In eastern Gorgas, mean daily temperatures only reach the low 30s. Along the Black Sea coast and adjacent plains, the mean daily temperature is 42°F in the winter months.

RELATIVE HUMIDITY

Most of Gorgas experiences moderate to high humidity year-round. The Black Sea coastal areas and Kolkheti lowland in the west are humid, with the lowlands gradually giving way to the semi-humid areas surrounding the Kura River. The Greater Caucasus Mountains to the north experience moderate humidity, while the Lesser Caucasus to the south are semi-arid. Humidity is lowest in the far southeast portion of Gorgas along the Kura River, which experiences an arid climate.

Summary

The Caucasus region, containing the Greater and Lesser Caucasus Mountains, forms the traditional division between Europe and Asia. All countries contain different weather and terrain, and soldiers must prepare for seasonal extremes—winter and summer. Areas with flat plains and valleys, such as coastal plains, will favor mechanized troop movement. The mountainous regions, especially in the Greater and Lesser Caucasus Mountains, will compound vehicle and equipment breakdowns. Numerous roads, already in poor condition in most of the countries, will become inaccessible for vehicular traffic because of winter snow. Military planners will need to anticipate the closure of mountain passes for up to six months a year due to snow.

TRADOC G-2

TRISA-THREATS

CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND THREAT INTEGRATION

DIRECTORATE (CTID)

TIME: GORGAS

Time: Gorgas

The time variable describes the timing and duration of activities, events, or conditions within an OE, as well as how the timing and duration of events are perceived by various actors in the OE.

KEY FACTS:

REGION

- All five countries have ancient cultures, and rivalries generated over that time between different ethnic groups still exist.
- Most people in the region do not view time as a resource, but as something that people cannot control.

GORGAS

- Gorgas uses the Gregorian calendar to determine its holidays.
- The Gorgan Orthodox Church uses a different method to determine Easter than most other Christian faiths, and the holiday may or may not fall on the same day as determined by other users of the calendar.

OPERATIONAL IMPACTS OF THE TIME VARIABLE IN THE OE:

REGION

- The lack of a sense of urgency for most people will frustrate the US as it deals with allied militaries in the Caucasus region.
- The US will most likely find opportunities to exploit the lackadaisical attitude about time to get inside the enemy military's decision cycle.

GORGAS

- The US must understand and mitigate the effects on military operations of religious Gorgans celebrating Orthodox Christian holidays.
- The US must understand Gorgas' historic conflicts with its neighbors to determine how best to deal with Gorgan leaders as allies.

TIME OVERVIEW:

The Caucasus countries, for the most part, do not believe in the sensitivity of time, and do not view punctuality or the importance of time as the US and most other Western countries do. Most of the people in the region do not view time as a resource and do not feel any compulsion to effectively manage their time. The people in the Caucasus region do not make the connection between effective use of their time and production. This lack of time consciousness will likely frustrate US soldiers as they work with their allies, but it will also give the US a battlefield advantage against its enemies.

KEY DATES, TIME PERIODS OR EVENTS

The entire region's recorded history extends back at least 3,000 years, but people populated the area long before that time as indicated by the archaeological objects discovered in caves and at other long-inhabited sites.

Gorgas' recorded history dates back to the 12th century BC. Sometime between 319 or 337 AD, Gorgas became the second country to adopt Christianity as its state religion. Gorgas faces a situation where Zabzimek and South Ostremek want their independence, and Donovia's large military coerces the Gorgan government to allow the separatist republics to exist as such.

ROUTINE, CYCLICAL KEY DATES

TRADITIONAL WEDDING SEASONS

The seasons have no major effect on when urban Gorgans marry, as there is no defined rainy season and temperatures tend to be moderate year-round. This is generally true of the large farming population as well, though spring planting and fall harvest times are usually avoided.

NATIONAL AND RELIGIOUS HOLIDAYS

Gorgans use the Gregorian calendar to determine their holidays, and they celebrate many special occasions associated with the Christian faith. Since most Gorgan Christians practice the Orthodox faith, their Easter celebration sometimes does not occur at the same time Easter is celebrated in the rest of the world.

Holiday	Date	Description	Military Implications
New Year's Day	01 January	Celebrates the new year according to the Gregorian calendar.	NA
Orthodox Christmas	07 January	Uses the Julian calendar.	NA
Baptism of Jesus	19 January	Celebrates the baptism of Jesus.	NA
Mother's Day	03 March	Honors Gorgan mothers.	NA
International Women's Day	08 March	Honors all Gorgan women.	NA
Orthodox Good Friday, Great Saturday, Easter Sunday, and Easter Monday	Varies 05-08 May 2013 20-23 April 2014 12-15 April 2015	Commemorates the death & resurrection of Jesus.	NA
Saint Andrew I Day	12 May	Celebrates the Apostle Andrew, the founder of the Gorgan Orthodox Church.	NA
Independence Day	26 May	Celebrates the National Council of Gorgas' declaration of independence and the creation of the Democratic Republic of Gorgas in 1801.	NA
Saint Mary's Day	28 August	Celebrates Saint Mary, the Mother of Jesus.	NA
Saint George's Day	23 November	Celebrates Saint George, the patron Saint of Gorgas.	NA

HARVEST CYCLES

With mountains separating eastern and western Gorgas, the country contains a variety of climates affecting the harvest cycle. The western part of Gorgas receives the most rainfall, and it falls throughout the year. Gorgan farmers plant their crops in April and harvest them before the end of

October. Eastern Gorgas possesses a drier climate, and farmers wait until the spring melt in the mountains to plant their crops. Eastern Gorgas will usually plant and harvest crops later than western Gorgas. The Caucasus Mountains also affect the harvest cycle. While the mountains may provide an excellent opportunity to grow grapes to make wine, the harsh winters and frosts even in the summer may make it difficult to grow seasonal crops. The mountain weather will most likely influence the Gorgan farmers to plant crops that can withstand the weather, grow in a shorter growing season, and be harvested before the fall weather becomes too harsh. (*See the Physical Environment variable for additional information on Gorgas' agriculture and the country's seasons.*)

ELECTIONS

Gorgas elects its public officials for four years, with a three-term limit. The Gorgan parliament has 235 members—150 seats by proportional representation, 75 in single-seat constituencies, and 10 given to the representatives of the displaced persons from the separatist region of Zabzimek. In 2003, Gorgans approved constitutional amendments to reduce the parliament to only 150 members elected through a proportional representation system, to take effect in two years.

CULTURAL PERCEPTION OF TIME

Most of the Caucasus area does not perceive the importance of time as the Western world does, especially as it relates to business. The more a country interacts with Western nations, however, the more the country accepts the Western idea of the importance of time.

While Westerners take time commitments such as deadlines and schedules very seriously, in the Caucasus, time commitments are seen more as an objective to be achieved, if possible, rather than a requirement. Promptness is based on relationships. In the West, time is money. In the Caucasus, there is no problem with making people wait all day and then telling them to come back the next day. A person from the Caucasus will be much more likely to be on time if the person who set the time commitment is close to him, such as a friend or family member. Business is conducted more on the basis of personal relationships than on respect for time.

Gorgas, like most other countries in the Caucasus region, does not view time with the same criticality as the Western world. Most Gorgans do not feel a sense of urgency to complete any activity, and this remains especially true in the rural areas.

TACTICAL EXPLOITATION OF TIME

CAUCASUS PERCEPTION OF TIME

For the most part, people in the Caucasus perceive time as an unimportant resource in their lives. They believe that things will occur whether they take proactive action or not. Each country in the region possesses a long history, and people believe their country will continue well into the future. Most of the people in the region look back to times when their ethnic group held the upper hand in interactions with their neighbors and hope that one day their country can become the dominant power again. The people do not look at time in the short term, but look forward to the long term when conditions will again allow them to take their rightful place among the world's leaders. For Ariana and Atropia, their hydrocarbon resources may provide them the impetus to become a regional—if not world—power. For Gorgas and Minaria, their lack of natural resources will continue to plague their ability to improve their situation in the short term. Donovia wishes to regain the dominant regional influence it once commanded.

US PERCEPTION OF TIME

The time perception of allies in the region will frustrate the US, but the US can also take advantage of the lack of urgency of any enemies in the area. The US will need to help its regional allies understand that time is a precious resource that once wasted can never be recovered. Punctuality and a sense of urgency remain essential for a military to defeat the enemy on the battlefield. Due to the enemy's lack of a time table and its apathetic regard for punctuality, US forces and their allies will most likely find opportunities to get inside the enemy leaders' decision cycles. Rapid US and allied action will cause the enemy to react to their actions instead of the enemy taking the initiative.

Summary

For the most part, the Caucasus countries view time differently than the US. Time is relatively unimportant to the people of Ariana, Atropia, Gorgas, and Minaria in almost every aspect of their lives. They lack a sense of urgency to accomplish tasks, in complete contrast to the Western world where almost everyone wants to accomplish as much as possible in as little time as possible. While the Donovian view of time is closer to that of the US than the other nations of the Caucasus, it is still notably different. All five cultures have extensive histories dating back centuries; and people feel that whatever they do, their country will continue into the future. The area's perception of time will cause the US to become frustrated with its allies but will provide opportunities for exploitation of US enemies. To do so, however, the US will need to understand the nuances as each country perceives the relative importance of time somewhat differently.

TRADOC G-2

TRISA-THREATS

CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND THREAT INTEGRATION

DIRECTORATE (CTID)

ORDER OF BATTLE: GORGAS

Introduction to the Gorgas Order of Battle


ORDERS OF BATTLE

All five countries have an administrative force structure (AFS) to manage their military forces in peacetime. This AFS is the aggregate of various military headquarters, facilities, and installations designed to man, train, equip, and sustain the forces. In peacetime, forces are commonly grouped into divisions, corps, or armies for administrative purposes. The AFS includes all components of the armed forces—not only regular, standing forces (active component), but also reserve and militia forces (reserve component). Normally, these administrative groupings differ from the country's order of battle (OB), which is its go-to-war (fighting) force structure that is task-organized to meet the combat situation.

The following pages outline the Gorgan AFS. For information on how to use the AFS to obtain an OB, see Appendix B: OPFOR Task-Organizing for Combat on page 4-B-1.


Gorgas

Gorgas Supreme High Command




Gorgas

90th Integrated Fires Command Headquarters




Gorgas


90th Integrated Support Command Headquarters



901st Mechanized Infantry Brigade (IFV)




902nd Mechanized Infantry Brigade (APC)




Gorgas

903rd Motorized Infantry Brigade




904th Tank Brigade




Gorgas


961st Special-Purpose Force Company




905th Self-Propelled Artillery Brigade



90th Air Defense Brigade (Short-Range)




90th Materiel Support Brigade




Gorgas

**Antitank Battalion, Mechanized and Motorized Infantry Brigade (Separate),
Anti-Tank Brigade, Division & EAD**




90th Reconnaissance Battalion




Gorgas

90th Sniper Company




Gorgas

90th Engineer Battalion




Gorgas

90th Signal Battalion




Gorgas

90th Chemical Protection Battalion




Gorgas


90th Medical Battalion




90th Information Warfare Company (Multi-Purpose)




Militia Battalion



Internal Security Forces




Gorgas Air Force



Gorgas

Gorgas Coast Guard



TRADOC G-2

TRISA-THREATS

CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND THREAT INTEGRATION

DIRECTORATE (CTID)

OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ASSESSMENT: MINARIA

TRADOC G-2

TRISA-THREATS

CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND THREAT INTEGRATION

DIRECTORATE (CTID)

POLITICAL: MINARIA

Political: Minaria

The political variable describes the distribution of responsibility and power at all levels of governance—formally constituted authorities, as well as informal or covert political powers.

KEY FACTS:

REGION

- Every country in the region has a center of political power wildly dissimilar from its neighbor.
- Ethnic nationalism and identity politics generate most conflicts in the region.

MINARIA

- Minaria's government is neutral, provincial, recovering, and autocratic.
- Minaria remains in a low-grade insurgency with Atropia as indicated by daily ceasefire violations and "mysterious" deaths that occur regularly near the Artzak contact line.
- Political decisions are strongly colored by previous wide-scale violence. Minaria will deal pragmatically with anyone to ensure its survival and to prevent another genocide.

OPERATIONAL IMPACTS OF THE POLITICAL VARIABLE IN THE OE:

REGION

- Despite Western influence, political maneuvering is frequently seen as a natural precursor to brutal purges.
- Any negotiations will have to include very intrusive methods of verification.

MINARIA

- Minaria will continue to cultivate political and economic relationships with Donovia if its likelihood of survival improves through that relationship. If another alliance becomes more advantageous or Donovia becomes a threat, expect Minaria to switch allegiances instantly and spectacularly.
- As long as indications of ethnic violence against Minarians living in the Artzak region remain, Minaria will never willingly remove its military, as it protects the Minarians living there and provides a buffer with its historical enemy—Atropia.

POLITICAL OVERVIEW:

Minaria is a small state within the Caucasus that is generally autocratic and neutral or aligned broadly with Donovia, depending on the issue. Alignment exists despite differences in religion, and Minaria understands the importance of the security guarantees implicit in its relationship with Donovia. Minaria sees Atropia as its most direct external threat.

CENTERS OF POLITICAL POWER

Although Minaria seems to be a parliamentary democracy with the implied separation of powers, many international observers question the fairness of any Minarian election. While Minaria's president, Sergei Zarsan, may be the titular head of state and thus in control of foreign affairs, outside agencies such as the UN and the World Bank express concern over political and economic corruption as well as serious doubts as to the rule of law. Minaria lacks many of the human rights found in Western countries. Police brutality commonly occurs, and Minaria does not protect US-style freedoms such as speech, press, or religion. True Minarian political power resides through an autocracy that is closely allied with its primary patron, Donovia.



MILITARY AUTHORITY

The president serves as the Minarian military's commander-in-chief, but the minister of defense (MoD) exercises political control. Minaria also maintains a minister of state for defense who checks the MoD's power. The chief of the main staff assumes operational control of the Minarian military. Minaria divides its armed forces into Army, Air, and Air Defense Forces; National Guard; and Security Forces (internal and border troops).

FAMILY AUTHORITY

In Minaria, kinship and the extended family provide connection and sometimes survival in a harsh bureaucratic environment. In the Minarian context, kinship shapes individual identities, influences domestic affairs, and affects how people feel about foreign affairs. Family authority, however, can also generate ambivalence in the culture. Some may invoke kinship as a symbol of national survival, or kinship could also serve as an obstacle to personal achievement, economic development, and independent statehood. As a result, family authority can simultaneously support and oppose the country's government.

RELIGIOUS/CLERICAL AUTHORITY

The Minarian Christian Church functions as Minaria's official church. The Western paradigm of church separated from political power, however, does not apply here. The Minarian folk hero, Aregat Razdanian, formulated the Minarian nationalist ideology (roughly translated as "nation-religion"). This holds that the Minarian national identity and state should carry religious significance for all

ethnic Minarians. In other words, Minarian Church membership exists inseparably from *being* Minarian.

ATTITUDE TOWARD THE US

A pro-democratic state, Minaria supposedly desires to construct a Western-style parliamentary democracy. Autocratic monopolies usurp the rule of law, however, as a small group of wealthy businessmen and high-ranking government and security officials operate the system in a way that benefits them, not the Minarian people. Local anti-graft campaigners say the autocracy serves as the root cause of government corruption in Minaria.

ATTITUDE TOWARD US TRADE

Minaria currently welcomes and encourages US trade. A large Minarian Diaspora encourages trade and investment and links Minaria with nations that would not have close links politically. Minaria is seeking closer trade ties with the US, especially in the service sector.

TYPE OF GOVERNMENT

As a functional autocracy, Minarians have slowly changed their constitution by a nationwide referendum nearly 30 years ago and updated the document in 1995, centralizing power in the presidency on both occasions. From this latest referendum, the Minarian president appoints the prime minister based on the distribution of the seats in the National Assembly and after consultations with the parliamentary factions. The president also appoints (or dismisses) the members of the government upon the recommendation of the prime minister. With these increased constitutional powers for the president, Minaria now functions as an autocratic presidential republic. The government consists of the executive branch with a president and prime minister, a legislative branch represented by the National Assembly, and a judicial branch. Minarians operate through a multi-party political system with three major and 10 minor parties represented in the legislative branch. While this preserves a veneer of democracy, the Minarian Socialist Democratic Party, the Minarian Revolutionary Federation, and the Legal Reform Party are connected by strong family and business bonds, creating a ruling *troika*, with President Sergei Zarsan and his family at its head.

BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT

Legislative Authority

The National Assembly serves as the Minarian legislative body with a unicameral parliament of 131 members elected for five-year terms. Minarians elect 56 members through single-seat constituencies, and 75 additional representatives receive their seats based on their party's proportion of popular votes. For a party to receive a proportional representative seat, the party must receive at least 5% of the total number of votes. A coalition of three political parties—the Minarian Socialist Democratic Party, the Minarian Revolutionary Federation, and the Legal Reform Party—currently controls the Minarian legislature. The ruling coalition's main opposition comes from the Minarians for Justice Block, composed of several smaller parties that banded together to oppose the current regime.

Executive Authority


Minaria functions as a republic with a presidential system wherein the president serves as the head of state. The Minarian people directly elect the president for five-year terms, with no term limits. The president formulates policy, conducts foreign policy, and ensures that normal executive institutions function. Sergei Zarsan became the Minarian president in 2008.

Judicial Authority

In the Republic of Minaria, the judicial branch contains three levels—the courts of first instance, review courts, and Court of Appeals. Minarian law also allows for economic, military, and other types of courts. The president serves as a guarantor of independence for all judicial bodies and as the Head of the Council of Justice. In 1996, Minaria established a Constitutional Court of nine members—five appointed by parliament and four by the president. The Constitutional Court judges the constitutionality of the laws, presidential decrees, and governmental resolutions. The Constitutional Court also judges the constitutionality of international agreements and resolves disputes over the results of elections and referenda.

GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESS AND LEGITIMACY

Corruption damages the Minarian government's credibility both externally and internally. Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index ranks Minaria on the same level as Syria and Nicaragua in terms of a criminally-influenced government, which is in the bottom quarter of all countries. Recently, Minaria took much-publicized steps to tackle its prevalent corruption problem. To improve the probability of loans from international monetary organizations such as the World Bank and the World Trade Organization, Prime Minister Kaiza Sosay developed an anti-corruption strategy, while the government sought assistance from the Council of Europe's Group of States against Corruption (GRECO).



Political subdivisions of Minaria

DOMESTIC POLITICAL ISSUES

Elections

Elections in Minaria have been overshadowed by violence; assassinations of key opposition leaders at times convenient to the current government have created a chilling effect on opposition. Elections have been conducted that were considered relatively free, but the lack of an effective opposition makes elections somewhat moot. The ruling party has also been accused of using officials like police to conveniently block the passage of opposition leaders and arrest them on charges that are later dropped. All offices have elections every five years. There are no term limits.

Rule of Law

Rule of law is based on fear within Minaria, with most citizens spending a great deal on bribes and kickbacks to avoid running afoul, even inadvertently, of protected interests. The judiciary is considered honest on minor offenses and lower-grade civil matters, but the perception that corruption exists at the highest levels is still present in Minaria. Attempts at publicly fighting corruption by the government are widely viewed as a self-serving farce by the population.

Corruption

What Western eyes perceive as corruption is in reality a carefully cultivated survival mechanism born of decades under autocratic rule. In an environment where the government encouraged family members to betray their relatives for small benefits, the people consider relationships as a resource while they avoid interaction with the state at all costs. Corruption is an endemic fact of life in Minaria, and bribes and kickbacks are accepted in Minaria society when attempting any significant interface with the government.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS

REGIONAL ACTORS

Minaria suffers from massive internal corruption and finds itself between two enemies, Atropia and Kemalia. Minarians hold enormous, ingrained, ethnic resentment for the genocide of millions of ethnic Minarians by the Ottoman Empire between 1915 and 1922. This focus on the extermination of its people strongly colors all Minarian interaction with other countries, sometimes as the sole decision point for relations. The Minarians continue to actively cultivate a strong relationship with Donovia, and have considerable economic ties to Ariana. Relations are cordial with Gorgas despite a limited trade embargo against Minaria, with both countries turning a blind eye to unofficial cross-border trade.

The major flash point of Minarian relations continues to be control of Artzak, over which Minaria gained control via military action during the 1991-1994 war. The ethnic Atropian population almost entirely returned to Atropia, leaving Artzak relatively peaceful internally, though sniping and other exchange of fire periodically occurs along the Minarian-Atropian line of control. Negotiations on the final status of Artzak continue, and the conflict has consistently poisoned relations between Minaria and Atropia.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Minaria has membership in a significant number of international organizations, and will generally support Donovian interests in these venues, such as the UN. Minaria will often attempt to demonstrate an independent or neutral stance to avoid the perception of being a Donovian puppet. Minaria also hopes to stymie any attempt by either Atropia or Kemalia to increase its stature.

Open source reporting has indicated that Minaria possesses two to five functioning nuclear weapons. The Minarian government strenuously denies the claim. Minaria has denied inspection access by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or other watchdog organizations, based on the absence of a Minarian nuclear energy or weapons program.

International Organizations (IOs) and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) are active in Minaria, focused primarily on rural social and economic development. The major NGOs are the Minarian Import/Export Development Account, the United Minarian Development Alliance and the Human Fund. The first two receive significant funding from expatriate Minarians. International Organizations like the Asian Development Bank, World Bank, and United Nations Development Program are focused on a variety of reform projects to increase the competitiveness of the Minarian economy.

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ASSOCIATIONS

Minaria—lacking oil, gas, or other major extractive wealth—has applied for international development aid to cultivate its economy, specifically the service sector. Minaria has especially tried

to develop links with European and North American banks and government development agencies. This is specifically due to the political sway of ethnic Minarian populations in these areas.

MILITARY ALLIANCES

Since 5,000-10,000 Donovian troops operate in Minaria at any given time. NATO's Partnership for Peace and the EU's European Neighborhood cannot compete with Minaria's close military relationship with Donovia. Additionally, Donovian soldiers currently patrol both the Minaria/Ariana and the Minaria/Kemalia borders.

INFLUENTIAL POLITICAL GROUPS

OFFICIAL POLITICAL PARTIES

The country's first political party, the Minarian Socialist Democratic Party, controls most Minarian government bodies. A national conservative party and the largest in Minaria, this party claims over 140,000 members. The Minarian Socialist Democratic Party bases its national conservative ideology on an early 20th Century Minarian nationalist ideology (or "nation-religion"). The ideology holds that the Minarian national identity and state should carry religious significance for all ethnic Minarians. Allied with the party are the Minarian Revolutionary Federation and the Legal Reform Party, both of whom are in government but subordinate to the Minarian Socialist Democratic Party. The opposition is built around the Minarians for Justice Block, which is a largely ineffectual collection of smaller parties.

OTHER DOMESTIC INFLUENTIAL GROUPS

Minarian crime syndicates permeate the current government to such a level that the criminals provide an easy enemy for new political movements to unify against. Whether or not the myriad of small opposition parties actually offer any improvement for the average Minarian is yet to be seen. The anti-criminal parties' platforms, however, provide an additional anti-corruption platform plank in addition to the old standby struggle for international genocide recognition.

Summary

It is likely that the autocracy in Minaria will remain stable for some time and that the country will continue to rely on its relationship with Donovia, while attempting to cultivate less important links with others, especially the US and Europe. The isolation of Atropia will be Minaria's biggest long-term goal. Corruption and crime will be the largest domestic political threat, but will likely not lead to a Minarian loss of control over its population.

TRADOC G-2

TRISA-THREATS

CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND THREAT INTEGRATION

DIRECTORATE (CTID)

MILITARY: MINARIA

Military: Minaria

The military variable explores the military and/or paramilitary capabilities of all relevant actors (enemy, friendly, and neutral) in a given OE. Relevant actors may include terrorists, militias, criminals, gangs, and insurgents.

KEY FACTS:

REGION

- Donovia has the dominant military of the five countries.
- Atropia and Minaria possess roughly the same size military and previously fought each other over disputed territory.
- Four of the five countries maintain a tier 2 military capability, except for Donovia which has a predominantly tier 1 capability.
- Gorgas fields the smallest military of the five countries.

MINARIA

- The Minarian military consists of a skilled army corps and a small, agile air force capable primarily of defensive operations.
- The Minarian military force possesses largely tier 2 weapons and equipment, with limited tier 1 niche capabilities.

OPERATIONAL IMPACTS OF THE MILITARY VARIABLE IN THE OE:

REGION

- Four of the countries in the region operate a pervasively authoritarian National Command Authority (NCA), which makes military decisions that are passed down to subordinate units. The exception, Gorgas, utilizes a National Council that is similar but not quite as authoritarian in nature.
- Gorgas would most likely assist US forces if conflict started within the region.

MINARIA

- If a technologically advanced military engaged the Minarian armed forces, it would likely face a variety of warfare ranging from conventional to adaptive operations.
- Donovia would likely intervene to protect its interests if large-scale conflict started in Minaria.
- The Multiple Minarian Factions (MMF) and Free Artzak Movement (FAM) terrorist groups would likely hinder any military operations within the country. The groups would play one side against the other, blaming each other for attacks on potential forces within the country.
- Reporting indicates that either the MMF or the FAM are attempting or in the process of obtaining a dirty bomb that could have a severe psychological impact on the civilian and military population.

MILITARY OVERVIEW:


The Minarian military finds itself heavily influenced by the region's history of irregular and regular warfare. Donovia's influence is significant, and it currently deploys advisors and border guards to Minaria. Minaria will most likely remain neutral if Ariana becomes involved in any conflict. Minaria will probably use any regional conflict to expand its territory at the expense of Atropia.

MILITARY FORCES

Because Minaria possesses no ocean or sea outlet, the Minarian military consist of only an army and an air force. In addition to Minaria's own military forces, the Artzak region maintains a separate army of an estimated 68,400 soldiers and a very small air force heavily influenced by the Minarian military, with numerous Minarian and Donovian advisors collocated on the ground.

MILITARY STRATEGY

NATIONAL COMMAND AUTHORITY



All countries share a similar National Command Authority (NCA) construct including Gorgas, who refers to it as a National Council. Minaria's NCA exercises overall control of the application of all instruments of national power to plan and carry out the country's national security strategy. The NCA includes the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Public Information, Finance and Economic Affairs,


Interior, and Defense, along with other members selected by Minaria's president, who chairs the NCA.

The president appoints the Minister of National Security, who exercises responsibility for the National Command Authority's (NCA's) Strategic Integration Department (SID). The SID serves as the overarching agency responsible to integrate all the instruments of national power under one cohesive national security strategy. The SID coordinates the plans and actions of all Minaria's ministries, but particularly those associated with the instruments of national power. (*See TC 7-100.2 Opposing Force Tactics: Chapter 1, Strategic and Operational Framework.*)

STRATEGIC OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK

The strategic operational framework for all countries in the region is similar in construct and application. This is primarily the result of historic influences transcending the region.

The NCAs and the NC for all five countries exercise command and control (C2) of the Armed Forces via the Supreme High Command (SHC) that includes the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and a General Staff drawn from all the service components. In peacetime, the MOD and General Staff operate closely but separately. The MOD assumes the responsibility for policy, acquisitions, and financing the Armed Forces. The General Staff promulgates policy and supervises the service components planning. In war headquarters.



service components, while its functional directorates assume responsibility for key aspects of defense planning. In wartime, the MOD and General Staff merge to form the SHC that functions as a unified headquarters.

All five countries currently configure their militaries in an administrative force structure (AFS) that manages its military forces in peacetime. This AFS contains the aggregate of various military headquarters, facilities, and installations designed to man, train, and equip the forces. In peacetime, the various militaries group their forces into a corps for administrative purposes. In some cases, the militaries may group their forces administratively under geographical commands designated as military regions or military districts. If the SHC elects to create more than one theater headquarters, it may allocate parts of the AFS to each of the theaters, normally along geographic lines. Typically, these administrative groupings differ from the country's go-to-war (fighting) force structure. Other parts of the AFS consist of assets centrally controlled at the national level. (See FM 7-100.4 *Opposing Force Organizational Guide: Chapter 3, Task Organizing.*)


NATIONAL STRATEGIC GOALS

Minaria forms its strategic goals from its history that often involved the annexation of disputed territory from Atropia, the maintenance of Minaria's sovereignty, and the suppression of small insurgent groups. Minaria's strategic mission includes the expansion of regional dominance. Minaria may formulate one or more specific short-term goals, each based on a particular threat or opportunity. Examples of specific strategic goals include:

- Defense of Minaria's sovereignty
- Protection of a Minarian population in a neighboring country, causing tensions over disputed territory
- Annexation of territory, especially the disputed territory with Atropia that contains many ethnic Minarians
- Economic expansion
- Destruction of insurgent groups against the government

IMPLEMENTING NATIONAL SECURITY GOALS

All five countries share similar strategies to achieve their national goals. Strategic operations for all five countries remain a continuous process not limited to wartime or preparation for war. Once war begins, strategic operations continue during regional, transition, and adaptive operations and complement those operations. Each of the latter three types of operations occurs only during war and only under certain conditions. Transition operations can overlap regional and adaptive operations.



In pursuit of its national security strategy, all five countries find themselves prepared to conduct four basic types of strategic-level courses of action. The four types of operations include:

- **Strategic operations** use all instruments of power in peace and war to achieve a country's national security strategy goals through attacks against the enemy's strategic centers of gravity.
- **Regional operations** include conventional, force-on-force military operations against overmatched opponents, such as regional adversaries and internal threats.

- **Transition operations** bridge the gap between regional and adaptive operations and contain some elements of both. The country continues to pursue its regional goals while dealing with developing outside intervention that has the potential to overmatch its military.
- **Adaptive operations** preserve the country's power and apply it in adaptive ways against opponents that overmatch the country's military.

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

Although Donovia, Ariana, Atropia, Gorgas, and Minaria may refer to them as "operations," each of these courses of action is actually a subcategory of strategy. Each type of operation aggregates the effects of tactical, operational, and strategic actions in conjunction with instruments of national power to achieve each country's strategic goals. The types of operations employed at a given time will depend on the types of threats, opportunities, and other conditions present.

Each country's strategy typically starts with actions directed at a regional opponent that the government overmatches in conventional military power, as well as other instruments of power. If possible, each government will attempt to achieve its ends without armed conflict. Accordingly, these governments do not limit strategic operations to military means and usually do not begin with armed conflict. They may achieve the desired goal through pressure applied by nonmilitary instruments of power, perhaps by merely threatening to use superior military power against the opponent. These actions fall under the general framework of "strategic operations."

The government may resort to armed conflict to achieve its desired end state when nonmilitary means prove insufficient or not expedient. Strategic operations, however, continue even if a particular regional threat or opportunity causes the country to undertake "regional operations" that may include military means. Prior to the initiation of hostilities and throughout the course of armed conflict with its regional opponent, the government will continue to conduct strategic operations to preclude intervention by outside players, other regional neighbors, or an extra-regional power that could overmatch its forces. Such operations, however, always include branches and sequels to deal with the possibility of intervention by an extra-regional power.

MILITARY FORCES OVERVIEW

MILITARY STRATEGY


Minarian military strategy revolves around the Artzak region and remains focused against Atropia. The military doctrine published by the Minister of Defense specifically states that Minaria serves as the guarantor of security for the Artzak region's populace. Other important parts of the doctrine state that the Minarian military must prevent any ethnic cleansing directed against ethnic Minarians, ensure that the Artzak region can self-determine its political ties, and that the Minarian strategy remains defensive in nature.

ARMY OVERVIEW

The Minarian army fields approximately 68,400 soldiers, but short-term draftees for 24 months compose approximately 75% of this force. Minarian ground forces, primarily armor and mechanized infantry units, are pretty equal to the Atropian military, and thus the two sides remain in a stalemate over the disputed Artzak region. While a ceasefire has reigned over the region, both sides continually claim the other side violates the ceasefire agreement. The Minarian army's primary purpose remains the maintenance of the status quo over the Artzak region and defense of its ethnic Minarian population.

ARMY SIZE AND STRUCTURE

The maneuver brigade serves as Minaria's basic combined arms unit. In the AFS, some maneuver brigades are constituent, or organic, to the base structure such as divisions. The NCA calls them *divisional brigades*. These armies, however, organize some units as *separate brigades*, designed to possess greater ability to accomplish independent missions without further allocation of forces from a higher tactical-level headquarters. Separate brigades possess some subordinate units with the same force structure as a divisional brigade of the same type (for example, the headquarters); some units that are especially tailored to the needs of a separate brigade, marked "(Sep)" in the organizational directories; and some that are the same as units of this type found at division level, marked "(Div.)."



The Minarian army designs its maneuver brigades to serve as the basis to form a brigade tactical group (BTG) if necessary. A brigade, separate or as part of a BTG, can fight as part of a division or division tactical group (DTG), a separate unit in an operational-strategic command (OSC), an organization of the AFS (such as army, corps, or military district), or as part of a field group (FG). (See TC 7-100.2: *Opposing Force Tactics, Chapter 2, Command and Control.*)

The Minarian army has an estimated 68,400 ground troops and contains no permanent maneuver command structure over the brigade level. The one army headquarters directs the actions of four motorized and mechanized brigades, two tank brigades, one artillery brigade, one artillery battalion, one multiple rocket launcher (MRL) brigade, one anti-tank brigade, one special forces battalion, and one helicopter squadron. (See diagram on page 2D-2-3 and the Order of Battle (OB) at the end of this country's variable.)

ARMY DOCTRINE AND TACTICS

Donovia's influence over and cooperation with Minaria has driven its military to use mostly Donovian tactics. Donovia maintains a military presence in Minaria, and many Minarian officers travel to Donovia to attend military schools.

ARMY TRAINING AND READINESS

For the most part, the Minarian army relies on short-term conscription to field the majority of its army. Each year, almost 32,000 of those Minarians reaching the draft age of 18 must serve for 24 months. About 48% of the university students, however, find ways to avoid the draft. Most middle and senior officers and many noncommissioned officers received their training in Donovia. Due to its inability to find volunteers to serve as officers, the Minarian army still recalls reserve officers to active duty. Some of these officers last served on active duty over 15 years ago. Donovia trains almost all of the Minarian helicopter crews because of Minaria's lack of facilities and training experience.

Minaria maintains a small, but reasonably competent, special operations force (SOF) that cross-trains with Donovian SOF. The Minarian SOF most likely serves actively in the Artzak region and probably reports directly to the Supreme High Command for national-level missions. The intelligence organizations will likely maintain the SOF, and most maneuver elements will contain "special purpose" type units primarily for reconnaissance purposes. In addition to constant cross-training with the Donovians, the Minarians also send officers to NATO and the US for training.

ARMY EQUIPMENT AND WEAPONS

The Minarian army operates primarily tier 2 equipment throughout its force structure. Recently, Donovia provided the country with some more modern systems, so the Minarian army does possess the potential for selected tier 1 niche capabilities. The Minarian military forces can operate in all terrain types and can successfully conduct 24-hour operations. (*For further information see Section 4: Appendix C or the WEG: VOL 1, Chapter 1, COE and Tier Tables.*)

AIR FORCE OVERVIEW

The Minarian air force's missions include the protection of the country's borders, troop transport, close air support for ground forces, and protection of key infrastructure, primarily focused on political and economic targets. The Minarian air force operates primarily tier 2 equipment and planes. Minarian pilots possess a respectable reputation for their flying skills.

AIR FORCE SIZE AND STRUCTURE

Minaria operates a small air force that consists of a headquarters, two regiments, and five squadrons. Assets that the Minarian air force can use on the battlefield include one fighter regiment and one helicopter regiment. In addition to its maintenance units, the Minarian air force fields an aviation transport squadron. (*See diagram on the next page and the OB at the end of this country's variable.*)

AIR FORCE DOCTRINE AND TACTICS


Donovian aviation doctrine heavily influences Minarian air force operations. Despite the heavy Donovian influence, the Minarian air force still demonstrates the ability to adapt its tactics based on the constraints of a conscript heavy force and limited new equipment procurement.

AIR FORCE TRAINING AND READINESS

Minaria maintains a well-trained air force with a 93% operational readiness rate.

AIR FORCE EQUIPMENT AND WEAPONS

The Donovians also maintain a significant air defense presence in Minaria, as they man a large radar site and forward-deployed interceptor aircraft. Most likely, the Minarians and Donovians integrate their air defense assets located in Minaria. By regional standards, the Minarians also maintain a robust anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) and surface-to-air missile (SAM) capability likely supported by Donovian contingents, in addition to the forward-deployed Donovian military forces described later.



GOVERNMENT PARAMILITARY FORCES

The Minarian Ministry of the Interior (MOI) controls about 1,000 personnel who use military-style light weapons. The security force's original mission was the prevention of guerilla attacks on military installations, and now the force performs police duties. The MOI is also the likely riot control formation, and is probably tasked with rear-area security for military forces in wartime. It maintains a SOF-like capability for anti-terrorism and crime fighting.

The Minarian MOI operates a border guard unit to enforce the country's importation laws. Donovia trained the MOI border guard unit, which operates out of Yerevan. Tasked with anti-smuggling and border control, the border guard is thinly stretched between the borders of Ariana, Gorgas, and Kemalia.

NON-STATE PARAMILITARY FORCES

INSURGENT/GUERRILLA FORCES

The Artzak region previously seceded from Atropia and declared its independence. This action has created friction and violence within the mixed population. Depending on one's point of view, this tension spawned two major terrorist groups or guerilla forces in the Artzak region—the Multiple Minarian Fractions (MMF) and the Free Artzak Movement (FAM). Violent attacks are sporadic and unappreciable, with relatively low casualties. However, reporting indicates that one of these radical groups is attempting and in an unknown stage of smuggling “dirty bomb(s)” into the region. The

dirty bomb “wild card” has the potential to create mass casualty attacks and seriously harm the psychological well-being of the population within the region.

FAM conducts military activities in the Artzak region general focused against Minarians in hopes of intimidating the population into leaving the region. FAM’s ultimate objectives are to establish Artzak as an Islamic territory under the control of the government of Atropia, and displace the Minarian population in the region. Reporting indicates (with high confidence) that Atropia may assist the FAM in a clandestine fashion with regard to military support. Members of FAM are active in local business and politics, providing legitimate cover for FAM activity. FAM clashes frequently with MMF elements, with both sides blaming the other for assorted acts of banditry and random violence.

MMF consists of a number of independent radical Minarian threat groups that are fused together by ideology and the common enemy found in the FAM. The driving motivation for this assorted federation is to deny the FAM Artzak and keep the region for Minarians. Reporting indicates that MMF will cooperate with Arianian special forces when it is in the group’s best interest. However, most in the MMF do not want a permanent relationship with Arianian forces. Most violent attacks are against FAM members and Atropian civilians. The group can conduct small cross-border attacks and has links to other global radical groups.

CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS

Minarian crime syndicates permeate the current government to such a level that the criminals provide an easy enemy for new political movements to unify against.

PRIVATE SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS

In the Artzak region and other troubled spots in Minaria, small groups of local civilians band together to provide security for their businesses, homes, and families as these people feel that the police and military cannot arrive in time when trouble does occur. Additionally, Donovian VIPs hire local Minarians to provide protection for them as they travel throughout the country.

FOREIGN MILITARY PRESENCE

Donovia maintains a significant military presence in Minaria and recently signed an agreement to remain in the country. Donovian soldiers of all types operate primarily out of the Donovian military base in Kanaker. The Donovian military force includes tanks, armored infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers, and artillery pieces. Any military action in Minaria will likely draw Donovia into the conflict.

The Donovians are apt to maintain their military presence in Minaria, a traditional Donovian political sphere of influence, to protect critical bases and sites and to gain the benefit of operations in a deployed environment. Donovia views its deployment to Minaria as a critical public statement of its ability to conduct operations in what Donovia sees as its rightful sphere of influence.

NONMILITARY ARMED COMBATANTS

Nonmilitary armed combatants range from those that support US presence in the region to those that are openly hostile to US regional influence. The insurgent groups that supported the separation of the Artzak Region from Atropia are normally hostile to the US. The FAM generally supports US influence as it wants Artzak to return to Atropian control. Minarian criminal organizations are generally neutral to US presence in the region as long as the US influence does not hurt the crime syndicates financially. Private security organizations range from hostile to neutral depending on

whether they are operating as security for Donovian VIPs or just protecting their homes and businesses.

MILITARY FUNCTIONS

COMMAND AND CONTROL

The Minarian military will likely use Donovian C2 procedures due to the historical ties between Minaria and Donovia, Minarian officers who received training in Donovia, and the presence of Donovian troops at Kanaker. This will mean that most leaders will take little initiative because of fear of failure, and will wait for orders from above before they execute any action.

MANEUVER

The Minarian army possesses the ability to move most of its maneuver force in combat vehicles. The country's mountainous terrain, however, may force these armored and motorized units to remain road-bound.

AIR DEFENSE

The Minarian military possesses limited air defense capability and most of it resides in one air defense brigade. Minaria recognizes that air defense is an *all-arms* effort. Thus, all ground units possess some type of an organic air defense capability to differing degrees, depending on the type and size of the unit. Many weapons not designed as air defense weapons will also damage and/or destroy tactical aircraft when within range.

Throughout maneuver units, there are a number of systems designed for air defense and other systems that can be used in an air defense role. The heavy antiaircraft machineguns on tanks are specifically designed for air defense. Machineguns on armored personnel carriers and automatic cannon on infantry fighting vehicles can engage both ground and air targets. Most antitank guided missiles (ATGMs) are extremely effective against low-flying helicopters. Several ATGM manufacturers offer antihelicopter missiles and compatible fire control, which are especially effective against low-flying rotary-wing aircraft. Field artillery and small arms can also be integral parts of the air defense scheme. All these weapons can be extremely lethal when used in this role.

Minaria considers every soldier with a man-portable air defense system to be an air defense firing unit. These weapons are readily available at a relatively low cost and are widely proliferated. The small size and easy portability of these systems provides the opportunity for ambush of enemy airframes operating in any area near Minarian units. Ground units also employ them to set ambushes for enemy helicopters, especially those on routine logistics missions. (*For more information, see TC 7-100.2, chapter 11, air defense.*)


INFOWAR

Minaria conducts an excellent Information Warfare (INFOWAR) campaign when it comes to its relationship with Atropia. Minaria continues to define the conflict as one of ethnic cleansing against Minarians. Most of the published Minarian military doctrine focuses on the protection of ethnic Minarians in the Artzak region and Minaria's concern about another genocide against its people.

RISTA

The Minarian military possesses reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition (RISTA) capabilities, with most in elements organic to its motorized brigades. If the Donovian forces that operate in Minaria decide to assist the Minarian military, however, the Donovians could provide

reports from their RISTA assets to the Minarian military. The table below summarizes the effective ranges for reconnaissance assets that can support Minaria's tactical commanders.



FIRE SUPPORT

Minaria emphasizes artillery and fire support for its ground forces. The Minarian army operates a variety of towed and self-propelled artillery systems. All of the Minarian air defense force fixed-wing aviation assets possess the ability to provide close-air support.

PROTECTION

The Minarian army maintains some protection from small arms fire as much as its ground forces operate from tanks, armored infantry fighting vehicles, or armored personnel carriers. The Donovians who patrol the Arianian and Kemalian borders may provide an early warning capability that may allow the Minarians to deploy their forces against an incursion into their country. (*See TC 7-100.2: Chapter 12, Engineer and Chapter 7, INFOWAR.*)

LOGISTICS

Like many non-Western armies, Minaria concentrates on its combat units and often neglects the logistics infrastructure necessary to support modern warfare. Unless Donovia provides supplies, it remains likely that Minaria could not sustain a long war against any enemy.

RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT GOALS

Due to limited industrial capacity, Minaria will likely continue to purchase its military equipment and arms from outsiders, primarily from Donovia. Minaria will focus R&D on its traditional strength in INFOWAR capabilities.

SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS

Minaria's entire military policy evolves from its relationship with Atropia over the Artzak region. Minaria would like to incorporate the Artzak region into Minaria, but will settle for the current situation. Minaria will oppose any action that improves Atropia's chances to forcibly return the Artzak region to Atropian control. As such, Minaria places most of its forces in areas bordering the Artzak region instead of on its borders with Kemalia or Ariana.

Donovia's special relationship with Minaria also plays a role in any military action in the area. Since Donovian troops will remain in Minaria for the next three decades, Donovia will most likely want a say in what happens there militarily and politically. Donovia will use its soldiers stationed at Kanaker as a "tripwire" to justify its military intervention in the Caucasus region.

Minaria will also attempt to maintain a defensive posture against Kemalian involvement in a future Artzak conflict and spillover from future violence in Ariana or Gorgas. Surrounded by potential or real adversaries on all borders, Minaria will likely maintain its close relationship with its security protector in Donovia and continue to field a robust military force.

Open source reporting has indicated that Minaria possesses two to five functioning nuclear weapons. The Minarian government strenuously denies the claim. Minaria has denied inspection access by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or other watchdog organizations, based on the absence of a Minarian nuclear energy or weapons program.

Summary

Minaria maintains a relatively small military that is approximately the same size as the Atropian military except that, as a landlocked country, Minaria does not field any naval forces. Minaria's military focuses on the security of the Artzak region and the defeat of any insurgent groups, and its aims include the creation of an independent Artzak state. Due to Minaria's close relationship with Donovia and the presence of Donovian military personnel in the country, Donovia would likely intervene in any conflict if it appeared that Minaria's place in the current *status quo* situation would drastically change.

TRADOC G-2

TRISA-THREATS

CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND THREAT INTEGRATION

DIRECTORATE (CTID)

ECONOMIC: MINARIA

Economic: Minaria

The economic variable encompasses individual and group behaviors related to producing, distributing, and consuming resources.

KEY FACTS:

REGION

- Hydrocarbon resources drive the Caucasus economy and their uneven geographic disposition creates an unequal distribution of wealth and leads to regional conflicts.
- While economies continue to develop, insufficient large-scale industrial production limits overall economic growth.
- All economies in the region have high levels of corruption, heavy government involvement, and lack of developed non-hydrocarbon export industries.

MINARIA

- Minaria will tie its economic fortunes to Ariana and Donovia, as neither Kemalia nor Atropia support any major Minarian economic development.
- Due to economic sanctions on Ariana, Minaria will increasingly operate as Ariana's export window to the rest of the world.

OPERATIONAL IMPACTS OF THE ECONOMIC VARIABLE IN THE OE:

REGION

- All Caucasus countries consider critical economic infrastructure defense as a primary military effort.
- Hydrocarbon infrastructure will serve as a critical center of gravity in nearly all military operations in the region.
- Agriculture provides the majority of the jobs in the Caucasus but not the bulk of its economic activity.

MINARIA

- Minaria will attempt to maintain trade relations with both Donovia and Ariana if there is a regional crisis.

ECONOMIC OVERVIEW:

The Caucasus countries that possess hydrocarbon resources will continue to depend on the oil and gas industries to drive their economies, while those that do not possess such resources will attempt to tie themselves to hydrocarbon-rich nations. Both Ariana and Atropia face geopolitical difficulties in exporting their oil and natural gas. Bordered by adversaries, the Arianians and Atropians must rely on tenuous routes to export their resources. For Gorgas and Minaria, which lack extractive or mature industries, transshipment of hydrocarbon products or providing other services to oil-wealthy countries will be their primary short- to medium-term means to achieve economic development. Donovia continues to recover from a collapse two decades ago that crippled its economy. All nations of the Caucasus have relatively high inefficiency due to corruption, government involvement in the economy, and/or lack of export industry development.

Under former Donovian influence, Minaria developed a modern industrial sector that supplied machine tools, textiles, and other manufactured goods to Donovia in exchange for its raw materials and energy. Since Donovian influence waned two decades ago, the lack of access to raw materials has forced Minaria to switch from a large agro-industrial based economy to an economy based on small-scale agriculture. The agricultural sector suffers from the need for long-term investment and modern technology. While industrial privatization in Minaria continues to occur at a slow pace, it remains ahead of neighbors in the region. Minaria imports much of its food and possesses very few mineral deposits. The Artzak regional conflict and the embargoes imposed by Atropia and Kemalia contributed to a sharp economic decline in the early 1990s. By 1994, however, the Minarian government decided to launch an ambitious, IMF-sponsored economic program that resulted in positive growth rates. Minaria also cut inflation and privatized most small- and medium-sized enterprises. Minaria's nine primary hydroelectric power plants partially offset the country's chronic energy shortages. At present, these plants supply 33% of the country's energy needs. Moreover, Minaria continues to expand its energy imports from Ariana. Like Gorgas, Minaria wants to build an export-driven economy, characterized by openness and transparency.

TABLE OF ECONOMIC DATA

Measure	Data	Rank in World	Remarks (if applicable)
GDP	16.24 billion USD	132	
Labor Force	1.481 million	127	
Unemployment	7.1%	72	
Poverty	26.5%		Percent below poverty line
Investment	38.4% of GDP	4	
Budget	\$1.923 billion revenue \$2.484 billion expenditures		
Public Debt	27.2%	95	
Inflation	3.4%	112	9% over last decade

PARTICIPATION IN THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM

Over the past decade, the Caucasus nations made considerable efforts to integrate themselves into the global financial system. While focused on local conflicts, the Caucasus region opened to other countries to increase global markets for its products, especially petroleum, and looked to the West for economic developmental aid, usually in the form of loans and grants.

WORLD BANK/INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AID

World Bank and other international aid programs in Minaria focus on the development of agriculture and infrastructure, especially in more rural areas. Like many countries in the region, aid focuses on the stabilization of public finances to reduce Minarian vulnerability to global macroeconomic events.

FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT

Donovia, Lebanon, Argentina, the US, and the EU provide the majority of foreign investment in Minaria. In recent years, Donovia and Argentina provided over \$100 million in FDI to Minaria, with primary emphasis on the country's energy, telecom, and transportation sectors.

ECONOMIC ACTIVITY

Minaria has the least-developed economy of the Caucasus region due to a combination of structural elements that stifle growth and trade embargoes by Atropia, Kemalia, and Gorgas, with the latter participating in a limited fashion purely due to economic dependence on the other two. The US, along with the EU, continues to pressure the Minarians to limit their interaction with the Arianans, but with only limited success. The Minarians, physically separated from their primary Donovian patrons, must form an economically beneficial relationship with the Arianans to their south to survive without causing additional Western antagonism.

ECONOMIC ACTORS

One or two major actors dominate in each economic sector, with the organizations' leaders typically connected with the political elite through a variety of relationships. Minaria operates a generally anti-competitive economic environment that inflates costs, stifles innovation, and restrains competition. The close connection between the economic and political realms also creates a climate of corruption and self-dealing.

COMMERCIAL TRADE AND MILITARY EXPORTS/IMPORTS

Minarian trade occurs primarily with Donovia and Ariana; there is very limited trade with Kemalia and the EU. Minaria primarily imports military equipment, mainly from the US and Donovia. A current key point of contention in the Minarian trade environment revolves around the slow encroachment of Donovian ownership into previously Minarian-owned businesses, such as robotics, machine plants, and energy production facilities.

ECONOMIC DIVERSITY

ENERGY SECTOR

Without any hydrocarbon resources, Minaria must import a large portion of its energy requirement, mostly from Ariana and Donovia. Minaria imports both petroleum and coal, but the government wants to use more natural gas to solve its electrical production problem.

AGRICULTURE

Minarian agriculture accounts for 22% of the GDP, but almost half the people work as farmers or in agriculture-related jobs. Items grown, raised, or processed include fruit (especially grapes), vegetables, brandy and other liqueurs, and livestock. The labor-intensive Minarian agricultural system limits export opportunities due to a high cost compared with other countries.

MINING

Mined products account for 40% of all Minarian exports—mainly copper, zinc, molybdenum, and mineral water. The Minarian government identified the country's dependence on ore extraction as a key weakness of its economy. Recently, the Minarian government attempted to diversify its export economy, but without much success.

MANUFACTURING

Minarian industries employ 15.6% of the populace and, despite a recent downturn, still account for 46.6% of the GDP. Products include metal-cutting machine tools, forging presses, electric motors, tires, knit fabric and hosiery, shoes, silk fabric, washing machines, chemicals, trucks, watches, and

microelectronics. Most factories date from the 1970s and lack the latest technology. The factories' dependence on comparatively high levels of labor also drives product costs higher.

SERVICES/OTHER

Services play a vital role in the Minarian economy, as they employ 38.2% of the people and account for 31.4% of the country's GDP. Both the services industry and tourism continue to play a major role in the Minarian economy. Minarian dependence on the service industries and tourism, however, papers over the inherent weakness of inadequate manufacturing jobs.

EXPAT LABOR

Expatriate labor serves as a prime Minarian export. Most Minarians work in Donovia, the EU, and North America. Remittances sent to families in their home country provide a vital input to the Minarian economy.

BANKING AND FINANCE

PUBLIC FINANCE

The Central Bank of Minaria regulates the country's monetary policy and establishes bank regulations. Minaria levels a two-tier flat tax, with a small levy for low earners and a higher levy and surcharge for higher earners. Property taxes, excise taxes, social security, and pension taxes also exist. Since Minaria also possesses a value-added tax (VAT), Minarians find themselves heavily taxed but also skilled at tax avoidance. Minaria faces a perennial revenue shortfall because its residents hide their financial assets.

PRIVATE BANKING

A number of private banks operate in Minaria, and three stock exchanges operate in Yerevan. International banks from Europe, Asia, and Donovia have private bank branches in Minaria. Minaria also likely serves as a hub of Arianian banking to circumvent international sanctions.

EMPLOYMENT STATUS

The Minarian labor market demonstrates a dichotomy between the large monopolies that provide stable long-term employment and the inability of new businesses to produce additional jobs. Minaria claims an official unemployment rate of about 7.1%, but it is most likely significantly higher. Many Minarians seek employment as expatriates, especially in Donovia, which helps reduce the unemployment rate back in their home country. Employment status in Minaria is high.

ILLEGAL ECONOMIC ACTIVITY

Crime is an extremely serious problem in Minaria—with organized crime gangs/clans, referred to locally as *akhperutyuns* (brotherhoods), running robust human and drug trafficking operations. Due to official corruption, these clans operate nearly openly, mainly in Yerevan, and control much of the country's economy. The major *akhperutyuns* include Minarian United Labor, the Minarian Democratic Socialist Party, and Abgar Bozian's Bozian *akhperutyun*. The US Department of Defense has declared Minaria a country of concern due to human trafficking. Official corruption is not limited to the neglect of organized crime. International watchdog agencies also note the misuse of imminent domain, misappropriation of loans, and tax avoidance as significant problems. Minarian breaches of the Gorgan trade embargo via unofficial cross-border trade are purposefully ignored by both countries. While the Minarian government enacted anti-corruption measures in response to high-level interest, the culture of corruption and crime is a sad fact of Minarian life.

Summary

Complex economic interplay between the Caucasus countries binds them together. Minaria, Gorgas, and Atropia were strongly affected by the reduction of Donovian influence two decades ago. The oil-rich countries of Ariana and Atropia must use their Minarian and Gorgan neighbors to transship hydrocarbon resources to other countries. Minaria and Gorgas must develop a free-standing economy despite significant corruption, lack of developed industries, and natural resource shortages. Over all of this, Donovia seeks to limit Arianian influence and return to its former position as unquestioned regional hegemon. This economic interdependence will likely drive regional conflicts as the nations struggle amongst themselves to exploit riches created by oil and natural gas.

TRADOC G-2

TRISA-THREATS

CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND THREAT INTEGRATION

DIRECTORATE (CTID)

S O C I A L : M I N A R I A

Social: Minaria

The social variable describes the cultural, religious, and ethnic makeup within an OE and the beliefs, values, customs, and behaviors.

KEY FACTS:

REGION

- All five countries have ancient cultures, and rivalries between different ethnic groups still exist.
- Each country possesses a dominant ethnic group and language. Discrimination against minority ethnic groups occurs in each country.

MINARIA

- Most Minarians feel culturally superior to their neighbors but also feel persecuted by them. The Minarian genocide, conducted primarily by Muslims, reverberates throughout Minarian culture.
- Minarians feel a natural kinship with others of their culture and feel that they must protect them. The conflict with Atropia over the Artzak region is a manifestation of this necessity to prevent future genocides against Minarians.

OPERATIONAL IMPACTS OF THE SOCIAL VARIABLE IN THE OE:

REGION

- Combat in the region will allow one ethnic group to seek revenge against another ethnic group for past wrongs or perceived wrongs.

MINARIA

- The major event in the Minarian collective history remains the genocide programs enacted by Muslims against their ethnic group. Minarians always make political decisions based on a desire to ensure that such ethnic cleansing never occurs again.
- Most Minarians culturally accept the Artzak Autonomous Republic as part of Minaria and desire to maintain the status quo in the region and/or future annexation into their own country.

SOCIAL OVERVIEW:

Minaria contains one of the most homogeneous populations of any of the Caucasus countries. Nearly 95% of all Minarian residents come from Minarian ancestry, speak Minarian as their first language, and belong to the Minarian Apostolic Church. This unity among its citizens tends to make most Minarians wary and distrustful of those without a similar background. The Minarians are proud to inhabit the country that chose Christianity as the state religion before any other nation in the world. An additional key historical factor for all Minarians is the attempted genocide of the Minarians by the Kemalians. This traumatic event resonates throughout the Minarian culture, and much of their distrust of their Muslim neighbors stems from an intense desire to ensure that no such genocide against any Minarian people ever occurs again. After centuries of persecution, Minarians consider themselves survivors and do whatever they believe necessary to continue their lineage.

When Minarians deal with each other, several attitudes emerge and at least five traits appear. First, Minarians always plan to negotiate with each other over price, as Minarians expect to pay less than if the Minarian sold the product to an outsider. Even if the Minarian buyer changes the job specifications in the middle of the work, the Minarian buyer does not expect the Minarian craftsman to change his price. Second, the Minarian tradesman already knows the previous tenet so he will exaggerate the true value of the project or do a substandard job. Third, when Minarians deal with any Minarian institution, they will consider the cost in money; the political, social, or religious connotation of the institution; and the immediate benefits to the institution before getting involved. Fourth, a Minarian business owner expects something free or at a greatly discounted price when a Minarian institution approaches him on business. Lastly, Minarian institutions hardly ever work together because they can never agree on anything.

When Minarians deal with foreigners, they often take a completely different approach than when they deal with each other. First, Minarians believe themselves inferior to Westerners or Europeans. Minarians often attempt to imitate the other culture or even adopt the other culture. Second, Minarians often tolerate other nations' bad habits that they would not tolerate among themselves. Third, Minarians do not attempt to negotiate a cheaper price when they deal with foreigners and will raise their level of politeness in order to avoid the shame of haggling.

SOCIAL STATISTICS FOR ARIANA, ATROPIA, GORGAS, MINARIA, AND DONOVIA:

Statistic	Ariana	Atropia	Gorgas	Minaria	Donovia
Age distribution (%)	0-14 years: 21.7 15-64 years: 72.9 65 years and over: 5.4	0-14 years: 23.9 15-64 years: 69.4 65 years and over: 6.7	0-14 years: 16.1 15-64 years: 67.6 65 years and over: 16.4	0-14 years: 18.2 15-64 years: 71.1 65 years and over: 10.6	0-14 years: 15.2 15-64 years: 71.8 65 years and over: 13
Median age	Total: 26.3 Male: 26 Female: 26.5	Total: 28.5 Male: 26.9 Female: 30.3	Total: 38.8 Male: 36.3 Female: 41.3	Total: 31.9 Male: 29.1 Female: 34.7	Total: 38.7 Male: 35.5 Female: 41.9
Population Growth rate (Rank)	77,891,220 1.248% (94)	8,372,373 0.846% (129)	4,585,874 -0.326% (217)	2,967,975 0.063% (188)	82,008,765 -0.47% (223)
Birth rate per 1,000 (Rank)	17.17 (120)	17.62 (117)	10.66 (181)	12.65 (161)	11.05 (174)
Death rate per 1,000 (Rank)	5.72 (171)	8.30 (101)	9.65 (68)	8.39 (97)	16.04 (5)
Net Migration rate per 1,000 (Rank)	-2.62 (141)	-1.69 (129)	-4.26 (157)	-4.56 (159)	0.29 (68)
Urban population Annual urbanization rate	68% 2.1%	52% 1.0%	53% -0.6%	64% -0.3%	67% -0.2%
Infant mortality rate (Rank)	35.78 (71)	54.6 (46)	16.22 (121)	20.21 (104)	10.08 (147)
Life expectancy at birth in years (Rank)	Total: 71.14 Male: 69.65 Female: 72.72 (132)	Total: 66.66 Male: 62.53 Female: 71.34 (157)	Total: 76.72 Male: 73.41 Female: 80.45 (62)	Total: 72.68 Male: 69.06 Female: 76.81 (118)	Total: 66.29 Male: 59.8 Female: 73.17 (162)

Statistic	Ariana	Atropia	Gorgas	Minaria	Donovia
Fertility rate (Children per woman) (Rank)	1.70 (171)	2.03 (127)	1.44 (190)	1.36 (201)	1.42 (197)
Major diseases in the OE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ Diarrheal diseases ◦ Hepatitis A ◦ Malaria ◦ Crimean-Congo ◦ Hemorrhagic fever ◦ Cutaneous ◦ Leishmaniasis ◦ Leptospirosis ◦ Schistosomiasis ◦ Hepatitis ◦ Tuberculosis ◦ Q Fever 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ Diarrheal diseases ◦ Hepatitis A ◦ Hepatitis E ◦ Typhoid ◦ Cholera ◦ Malaria ◦ Crimean-Congo ◦ Hemorrhagic fever ◦ Gonorrhea ◦ Chlamydia ◦ Tuberculosis ◦ Leptospirosis ◦ Hantavirus ◦ Anthrax ◦ Rabies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ Diarrheal diseases ◦ Typhoid ◦ Hepatitis A ◦ West Nile fever ◦ Crimean-Congo ◦ Hemorrhagic fever ◦ Meningococcal ◦ Meningitis ◦ Gonorrhea ◦ Syphilis ◦ Hantaviral fevers ◦ Leptospirosis ◦ Rabies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ Diarrheal diseases ◦ Typhoid ◦ Hepatitis A ◦ Cholera ◦ Salmonella ◦ Tuberculosis ◦ HIV/AIDS ◦ Encephalitis ◦ H5N1 avian influenza 	
Ethnic groups (%)	Persian: 51.0 Atropian: 24.0 Gilaki or Mazandarani: 8.0 Kurd: 7.0 Arab: 3.0 Lur: 2.0 Baluch: 2.0 Turkmen: 2.0 Other: 1.0	Atopian: 90.6 Gilani: 2.2 Arianian: 3.0 Donovian: 1.8 Minarian: 1.5 Other: 0.9	Gorgan: 83.8 Atropian: 6.5 Minarian: 5.7 Donovian: 1.5 Other: 2.5	Minarian: 97.9 Yezidi (Kurd): 1.3 Donovian: 5.0 Other: 0.3	Arab: 70.0 Gorgan: 5.0 Atropian: 5.0 Minarian: 10.0 Other: 10.0
Religions in OE (%)	Shia Muslim: 89.0 Sunni Muslim: 9.0 Other: 2.0	Muslim: 93.4 Donovian Orthodox: 2.5 Minarian Orthodox: 2.3 Other: 1.8	Orthodox Christian: 83.9 Muslim: 9.9 Minarian-Gregorian: 3.9 Catholic: 0.8 Other: 0.8 None: 0.7	Minarian Orthodox: 94.7 Other Christian: 4.0 Yezidi: 1.3	Sunni Hanafi Muslim: 80.0 Shia Sufi Muslim: 5.0 National Orthodox Christian: 15.0
Languages	Persian Dialects: 58.0 Turkic Dialects: 26.0 Kurdish: 9.0 Luri: 2.0 Baluchi: 1.0 Arabic: 1.0 Kemalian: 1.0 Other: 2.0	Atropian (Atropian): 90.3 Lezgi: 2.2 Donovian: 1.8 Minarian: 1.5 Other: 3.3 Unspecified: 1.0	Gorgan: 71.0 Donovian: 9.0 Minarian: 7.0 Atropian: 6.0 Other: 7.0	Minarian: 97.7 Yezidi: 1.0 Donovian: 0.9 Other: 0.4	Donovian (official) Many minority languages
Literacy rate (older than 15) (%)	Total: 77.0 Male: 83.5 Female: 70.4	Total: 98.8 Male: 99.5 Female: 98.2	Total: 100 Male: 100 Female: 100	Total: 99.4 Male: 99.7 Female: 99.2	Total: 98.0 Male: 98.0 Female: 98.0

POPULATION MOVEMENT (MIGRATION/IDPS/REFUGEES)

The 1988 conflict between Minaria and Atropia over the Artzak region and the 2003 US invasion of Iraq created most of the IDPs who now reside in Minaria. The Artzak dispute generated over a million refugees, and 360,000 ethnic Minarians left Atropia for Minaria. Since then, more than

50,000 (or 21%) of these ethnic Minarians chose to become Minarian citizens. Others do not wish to become citizens because they see no benefits to the possession of a Minarian passport. Many of the others, however, are elderly with no job skills and must rely on governmental benefits to survive. Several of the ethnic Minarians who lived in Atropian cities now live in rural areas where they must farm to feed their families even though they did not know anything about agriculture before they arrived in Minaria. The Minarian refugees will likely continue to struggle until they find a permanent place to settle, because it is unlikely that the refugees will ever return to their homes in Atropia.

The 2003 US invasion of Iraq caused about 17,000 of the 25,000 ethnic Minarians who lived in Iraq to flee to Minaria. While most of these “new” refugees live better than those ethnic Minarians displaced 15 years earlier, they suffer with an official unemployment rate of 7.3% and an unofficial unemployment rate of 27%. Most ethnic Minarians who fled Iraq must cope with a smaller living area, foreign customs, and scarcity of jobs. Most of these refugees would not survive without support from various UN activities. Many of these new refugees look forward to the time when they can safely return to Iraq, where they believe life will be better than their current situation.

Most emigration is for economic purposes, with Minarian males moving to Donovia, the EU, and North America in order to secure jobs. Remittances are then sent back to Minaria and play an important role in the country’s economy. Immigration is minimal, and usually consists of ethnic Minarians repatriating from Atropia or Gorgas.

POPULATION DISTRIBUTION

Almost two-thirds (64%) of all Minarians live in urban areas, nearly the same levels as Ariana and Donovia. Minarian cities show a small annual decrease with an urbanization rate of -0.3%. Over one-third of Minaria’s citizens live in its capital city, Yerevan. The rest of the country remains rural, with no other cities larger than 200,000 people. Only three Minarian cities contain over 100,000 people and only an additional two support a population of over 50,000 residents. Whoever controls Yerevan will likely control the rest of Minaria.

DEMOGRAPHIC MIX

Minaria almost duplicates Gorgas with a female population of 52.9% and a net negative migration rate of 4.56 people per thousand, but that is where the similarities end. Minaria’s median age of 31.9 years is seven years younger than Gorgas’s median age. Minaria possesses a higher birth rate and lower death rate than Gorgas. While Minarians, as a whole, do not live as long as Gorgans, female Minarians outlive males by about seven years. A larger percent of Minaria’s population belongs to the 15-64 age categories than either Gorgas or Atropia. Due to its smaller size, Minaria has only about 809,293 males and 862,679 females available for military service in the age 16-49 category. Medical screening, however, reduces the number of Minarians fit for military service to about 1.3 million personnel or 644,195 males and 724,085 females. Only about 24,611 Minarian males and 22,682 females reach military age annually, less than half of that of their contentious neighbor, Atropia. The maximum military that Minaria could generate is likely to reach only about 300,000 personnel. Due to its smaller population and lack of economic resources, Minaria will always maintain a smaller army than its neighboring countries.

SOCIAL VOLATILITY

A leading cause of Minaria’s high social volatility is that Minaria bases nearly all of its foreign policy on its long-standing conflict with Atropia, support for the “independent” Artzak Republic, and hatred of the Kemalians. Most of Minaria’s military supports the Artzak Republic and the tenuous ceasefire between Atropia and Minaria. Both countries claim numerous ceasefire violations by the other side with casualties on both sides, usually due to sniper fire. Even though it occurred nearly 100 years

ago, Minaria still remembers the ethnic cleansing by the Ottoman Empire against ethnic Minarians during World War I. This event remains etched in Minaria's collective consciousness, and the fallout from this slaughter affects all Minarian governmental decisions. Minarian government and military policy direct that genocide aimed against Minarians either inside or outside their country will never occur again.

Minaria advocates an autonomous Artzak. Minaria's interests are opposed by the Free Artzak Movement (FAM), a rebel group fighting Minarians in the Artzak region. The FAM found a fertile recruiting ground in the IDP camps in northwestern Atropia. The FAM is passively supported by the government of Atropia.

FAM conducts military activities in the Artzak region (generally focused against Minarians) in hopes of intimidating the population into leaving the region. FAM's ultimate objectives are to establish Artzak as an Islamic territory under the control of the Government of Atropia, and to displace the Minarian population in the region. Reporting indicates (with high confidence) that Atropia may assist the FAM in a clandestine fashion with regard to military support. Members of FAM are active in local business and local politics, providing legitimate cover for FAM activities. FAM clashes frequently with Multiple Minarian Factions (MMF) elements, with both sides blaming the other for assorted acts of banditry and random violence.

MMF consists of a number of independent radical Minarian threat groups that are fused together by ideology and the common enemy found in the FAM. The driving motivation of this assorted federation is to deny the FAM Artzak and keep the region for Minarians. Reporting indicates that MMF will cooperate with the Arianian military when it is in the group's best interest. However, most in the MMF do not want a permanent relationship with Arianian forces. Most violent attacks are against FAM members and Atropian civilians. The group can conduct small cross-border attacks and has links to other global radical groups. Reporting indicates that either the MMF or the FAM are attempting or in the process of obtaining a dirty bomb, which could have a severe psychological impact on the civilian and military population. (*For more on FAM and MMF, see the Military variable.*)

EDUCATION LEVEL

Similar to Gorgas, Minaria enjoys a high literacy rate of 99.4% for those 15 years of age and older. Donovan is a widely-taught second language in Minarian schools. By law, students must attend both elementary and secondary schools funded by the government. Over 90 institutes of higher learning operate in Minaria, most located in Yerevan. Nineteen public and 71 private universities operate in Yerevan, with the others scattered in the other largest Minarian cities. The Minarian government also operates 12 music and art schools along with another 38 state technical colleges. Minaria, like Gorgas, also contains few natural resources to produce income.

ETHNIC DIVERSITY

In the region, Minaria represents the most ethnically homogeneous society, as 97.9% of the population declare themselves as ethnic Minarians. The Yezidi, a Kurdish group, comprise 1.3% of the population, and Donovians make up another 0.5%. All other ethnic groups account for only 0.3% of the populace. Minarians trace their history to the 6th century BC and speak an Indo-European language. They combined Arianian, Hellenic, and Christian traditions to form a unique culture. Almost all Minarians, wherever they live, consider themselves Minarians first and citizens of the country where they reside second. This ethnic tension between Christian Minarians and their Muslim neighbors dates back almost to the founding of Islam. Minarians will continue to fight to ensure their survival.

RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY

Like its ethnicity, Minaria possesses a homogeneous religion, as 94.7% of the population claim to belong to the Minarian Apostolic Church. In 301 AD, Minaria became the first country to adopt Christianity as its official religion. Other Christian faiths compose 4% of the population and another 1.3% practice Yezidi, a form of Yazdanism that blends Kurdish and Sufi beliefs. Minaria draws great pride from being the first country to establish Christianity as its faith and feels that it must defend itself against Muslims who wish to impose Islam upon others.

COMMON LANGUAGES

Another cultural factor for the Minarian people's homogeneity is their language, as 97.7% speak Minarian. About 1% of Minarians speak Yezidi and less than 1% speak Donovian as their first language. All other languages only make up 0.4% of the Minarian population. For communication with the local population, US personnel will need to speak Minarian or use an interpreter.

CRIMINAL ACTIVITY

While Minaria's high level of criminal activity reflects that of many other countries—human trafficking, domestic violence, murder, tax evasion, corruption, extortion, money laundering, clan or gang violence, and organized crime—it's level does not reach that of other more wealthy and more modern nations. Crime continues to escalate, however, while crime detection continues to drop. Criminal clans known as *akhperutyuns* (brotherhoods) operate in Minaria, especially Yerevan, and control much of the country's economy. The major akhperutyuns include Minarian United Labor, the Minarian Democratic Socialist Party, and Abgar Bozian's Bozian akhperutyun.

HUMAN RIGHTS

Minaria's record on human rights usually reaches a higher standard than many of the other countries in the region, and it appears that the country continues to move toward the Western standard. Freedom House rates Minaria as "partly free" in regard to its human rights policies. Political freedom continues to improve. Freedom of the press still does not reach Western standards; the government declared a 20-day "state of emergency" after the 2008 Minarian presidential elections to ban public gatherings, censor Internet and print media, and block external radio transmissions. The Minarian government continues to harass or imprison Jehovah's Witnesses. Minarians, in general, harass the small Yezidi population by hazing in the military and slow response to crimes committed against them.

CENTERS OF SOCIAL POWER

The family serves as the basic social element of Minaria's population. Minarians celebrate any and all occasions with big family gatherings. The church is also a major element in Minarian life, as almost everyone adheres to the same faith. As the first country to establish Christianity as its state religion, Minarians feel a connection to their faith that people in many other countries do not.

BASIC CULTURAL NORMS AND VALUES

Minaria, primarily a Christian nation, is hemmed in by Muslim nations on three of its four borders. Minaria's defense of the quasi-independent Artzak region is due to the large number of ethnic Minarians who reside in the area. While Minaria fought Atropia to a stalemate in their 1990s war over the disputed territory, the current political situation demonstrates Minarian success. While the Minarians renounced force as a way to settle the Artzak question, Minaria will do whatever it believes necessary to ensure the Artzak area remains an autonomous republic.

CUSTOMS AND PRACTICES

Meeting & Greeting	Will often arrive at meetings late and blame it on “Minarian Timing.” Shaking hands is common, but females are less likely to shake hands than males. Strangers greet each other in the country, but not in urban areas. Minarians enjoy telling foreigners about the richness of their culture.
Visiting/ Hospitality	Will often throw a large party for relatives, friends, or colleagues to celebrate any happy occasion. Based on the knowledge that many people will arrive late, the activity will probably not start on time. Minarians spare no expense when they celebrate, especially at weddings. It is one's social duty to attend weddings and funerals of relatives.
Manners	Minarians are very polite and hospitable people. In interactions with other Minarians, arguments often get loud, but less so with foreigners.
Cultural Dos & Don'ts	Black is the primary clothing color, especially in the winter months. Smoking is much more prevalent than it is in the US and some other Western countries.
Gifts	Minarians enjoy receiving anything free.
Taboos	Do not make fun of or play down the seriousness of the Minarian Genocide. Women do not stare at strangers. Women do not smoke on the street.
Personal Space	Much less than that of the US. Minarians will stand very close while talking to a person.
Marriage Rituals	Weddings are a major event that includes a betrothal, engagement, and wedding. Godfathers must bring the most expensive gift. Brides wear a red silk wedding gown with headpiece shaped into wings and covered with feathers. The couple walks through an arch of flowers formed by the bridesmaids and groomsmen. The couple releases a pair of white doves symbolizing love and happiness. Guests throw coins at the bride during the reception. The morning after the wedding, the women related to the groom bring a red apple to the bride's home. While couples prefer to make a new home, a housing shortage may force them to live with the groom's family.
Work Week/ Work Hours	Monday to Friday, 40 hours per week with a Saturday-Sunday weekend.
Concept Of Time	Like most of the area, most Minarians remain more relaxed about time than European or Western countries.
Dispute Resolution	There are no specific cultural methods for resolution of disputes.
Birth Rituals	On the church holidays after the birth, the house is decorated with green branches & music is played. Only relatives can see the baby for 40 days after its birth.
Death Rituals	Special ceremonies occur on the day of the funeral, the day after, the 7th day after, the 40th day after, and the anniversary of the person's death. In households that make wine, they make a special wine for the funeral. Food and brandy are served to the dead. Minarians celebrate the birthdays of their dead loved ones.

Summary

Minaria has the most homogenous population in the region, with nearly 95% of the population belonging to the same ethnic group, practicing the same religion, and speaking the same language. As the first Christian state, Minaria was invaded several times over the last 1,500 years. The Minarian genocide by the Ottoman Empire fostered a national belief that other nations want to destroy the Minarian culture. Minarians now look at every event, political or otherwise, through this lens of persecution when they make decisions. For that reason, Minaria will always support the Artzak Autonomous Republic.

TRADOC G-2

TRISA-THREATS

CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND THREAT INTEGRATION

DIRECTORATE (CTID)

INFORMATION: MINARIA

Information: Minaria

The information variable describes the nature, scope, characteristics, and effects of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, manipulate, disseminate, or act on information.

KEY FACTS:

REGION

- All states of the Caucasus maintain some level of direct government control or influence on their information environments.
- Television operates as the most readily available and important communications medium.

MINARIA

- Minaria will likely continue to leverage its relationship with both Donovia and NATO to increase its INFOWAR capabilities.
- The Minarian government is generally repressive and practices soft censorship.
- Minarian Internet is relatively free.

OPERATIONAL IMPACTS OF THE INFORMATION VARIABLE IN THE OE:

REGION

- While language barriers persist, English continues to rapidly displace Donovian as a *lingua franca*, or common language, for trans-border communication. Mobile phones serve as the most effective means to reach the educated and urban populations.
- Television is the most effective medium for information dissemination.

MINARIA

- Minarian media will likely continue to follow the general Minarian government line on issues like liberalizing Arianian relations, Kemalian border issues, and Artzak.
- Minaria is integrated with Donovia for critical INFOWAR capabilities and training.
- Minaria computer-related competency is high.

INFORMATION OVERVIEW:

The information environment in Minaria suffers from a combination of lack of investment and stifling government censorship. Minaria rulers view mass media as a tool of the state, and a means for mobilizing the population. The Minarian INFOWAR effort is a competent one overall, borrowing from extensive links with the Donovian military and deployed experience with NATO and US forces.

PUBLIC COMMUNICATIONS MEDIA

Minaria generally controls the public communication media, though the Internet has relative freedom. Ownership of media is incestuous—multiple outlets are often owned ultimately by a single entity. The government does not engage in obvious censorship, but broadcasters do not wish to test the boundaries of permissible reporting.

INTERNET

Minaria boasts that over 47% of its population can access the Internet. While the number is likely inflated, the Internet serves as a significant communications media within the country. Minarian Internet operates more slowly than in the other regional countries, primarily due to a dependency on dial-up connectivity. The economic value of the Internet to Minaria will increase as mobile phone data throughput and cheaper, faster landline-based connectivity reaches a more reasonable price point. Social media, generally free from government intrusion, is growing in popularity.

TELEVISION

Television serves as the most important electronic communications medium in Minaria. Minaria boasts a highly dynamic television environment with over 35 domestic stations, along with two public television broadcasters. In addition, Minarian viewers can receive broadcasts from Donovia and Ariana. Of the foreign broadcasters, the Donovian broadcasts are most popular. Also, satellite and local rebroadcasts of European and American programming are gaining in popularity, especially among the young.

RADIO

Minarian radio broadcasts a total of nine stations, both public and private, on AM, FM, and short wave. Listeners can choose between programs in either Minarian or Donovian languages. The Minarians also receive foreign broadcasts from European and North American sources through satellite and local rebroadcast, both of which are highly popular.

PRINT MEDIA

In 2010, 24 magazines, 25 press agencies, and 232 newspapers operated in Minaria. Several national newspapers represent a variety of political stances. The media includes both government-controlled or -sponsored outlets and independent publications.

TELEPHONE

Three major telephone companies comprise the Minarian telecommunications industry. Beeline, the major player, operates all Minarian landline telephones and 30% of the mobile subscribers. MinarCell serves as the largest cellular telephone provider in Minaria, with over 50% of the subscribers. A third company, Orange, holds about 15-20% of the cellular market. Beeline recently converted or plans to convert all landline connections to digital fibers, with more modern and robust trunk lines to connect Minaria internationally through Kemalia.

POSTAL/COURIER

Users find the Minarian postal network available, reasonably priced, and generally reliable. Combined with international courier services, Minaria serves as the transfer point for most mail and packages to and from Artzak. Minaria also functions as an import-export hub for courier services to Ariana.

WORD OF MOUTH

Minaria maintains a distinct rural/urban, youth/age divide with respect to communications. Minarian urban dwellers and youths will typically communicate via mobile phone technology as opposed to their older and rural countrymen, who prefer traditional face-to-face conversation.

INFORMATION CONTROL

Minarian messages focus on the continual Atropian and Kemalian motives and threats along with the country's historical isolation from its natural allies. Minarian information control is expected to play up Minaria's "Western-ness" and "Christianity" for foreign audiences in the West, while the Minarians pursue relations and create friendly perceptions with Arianian and Donovanian audiences. Minaria also uses its large diaspora, especially in the US, to present its message.

INFOWAR

INFOWAR in the Caucasus region contains a mixture of old and new technology. While older Donovanian equipment forms the backbone for much of the region's INFOWAR warfighting capability, the countries conduct advanced operations with dedicated INFOWAR units. For example, regional perception management activities, often web-based, form the current global state-of-the-art. Internet operations are frequently used as an adjunct to major combat operations. Most countries in the Caucasus focus their INFOWAR on their likely adversaries.

ELECTRONIC WARFARE

Donovanian electronic warfare (EW) capabilities continue to strongly influence Minarian EW equipment, plans, training, and operations. Minaria maintains a diverse set of defense ties with NATO and Donovia. NATO's influence supplements but does not replace Donovanian-made core capability. Tactics are Donovanian-derived.

COMPUTER ATTACK

Minaria maintains a large body of computer experts and possesses the third most-competent computer attack capability in the Caucasus, after Donovia and Ariana. Minaria uses computer attack for both intelligence collection and cyber attacks. Combined with expected Donovan assistance, Minarian computer attack capabilities could probably threaten even nation-state actors with severe cyber space damage, if not militarily decisive attacks.

INFORMATION ATTACK

Minaria possesses limited information attack (IA) capabilities and probably at a level below that fielded by either its Kemalian or Atropian adversaries. Minarians are apt to request Donovanian and sympathetic non-state actors to provide hackers to increase Minarian capability in times of increased tension or conflict.

DECEPTION

Minarian deception operations involve an amalgamation of Donovanian and Western operational conceptions, with a heavy Donovanian-style emphasis on deception as a basis for operations. Deception operations will be based on decoys, extensive camouflage, and use of derelict equipment.

PHYSICAL DESTRUCTION

Minarians consider physical destruction a prime element of INFOWAR. Minarian forces will view the destruction of Atropian sensors as a main effort and could target them through a combination of special operations forces, artillery, rockets, and air strikes.

PROTECTION AND SECURITY MEASURES

Due to close relations with Donovia, Minarian protection and security measures (PSM) resemble Donovian PSM, along with additional capabilities derived from experience with NATO/US forces and some home-grown capability. Minaria historically has a high-technology capability from its expatriate Minarians working abroad and, combined with significant foreign education among the population, Minaria should find the ability to mobilize a significant and effective war-time PSM effort.

PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT

Minaria can craft a variety of excellent messages, especially for external audiences, due to the large number of Minarians who reside in foreign countries. Minaria will either attempt to appear neutral in any regional conflict or to be a victim of Atropian or Kemalian aggression. The Minarians, however, are expected to downplay their links with Donovia or Ariana.

INTELLIGENCE

Minaria maintains an intelligence service, the Military National Bureau (MNB), with considerable links to Donovian intelligence services. Minarian targets focus on Atropia, with Kemalia and Ariana as major secondary targets. The MNB monitors terrorists who transit Minarian territory and maintains special operations forces capable of direct action, training, or collection programs. It is likely that Minarian operations are coordinated with Donovian intelligence, and Minarian analysts and collectors are trained by Donovian intelligence.

HUMAN INTELLIGENCE

Donovia probably supports Minarian human intelligence (HUMINT) efforts since the Donovians maintain a significant presence in Minaria. Minarian HUMINT directs its efforts at Atropian targets, with the highest priority to operations in Artzak. Minaria's additional targets are presumably Ariana and Kemalia, as well as other major countries with influence operations.

OPEN SOURCE INTELLIGENCE

Minaria probably maintains a significant open source intelligence (OSINT) collection focused on Atropian public pronouncements and Arianian atmospherics. Minaria also collects on Kemalia and other NATO nations. Minarian intelligence receives a large amount of OSINT information from the large number of Minarians who reside in Donovia, the West, and the Middle East.

SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE

Minarian signals intelligence (SIGINT) synchronizes its efforts with the Donovian forces stationed in its country, especially for Air Defense early warning. Minaria likely maintains a significant collection apparatus, though the level of coordination and intelligence-sharing with Donovian forces remains unknown.

IMAGERY INTELLIGENCE

Internal Minarian imagery intelligence (IMINT) capabilities remain limited to air-breathing assets like helicopters, but an imagery-sharing relationship with Donovia is probable. Minarian IMINT targets include its borders with Atropia and Kemalia. Donovia may also use Minarian bases to collect against regional targets, especially Gorgas.

MEASUREMENT AND SIGNATURES INTELLIGENCE

Donovia probably supplies Minaria with most of its measurement and signatures intelligence (MASINT), as Minaria possesses little internal MASINT capability. Minarian MASINT operations might focus on border control, security, and counterintelligence support.

Summary

Minaria is a competent INFOWAR operator, backed by a significant economic services sector focused on high technology. Its civilian information environment is stunted due to fear of government reaction, though the Internet is widespread and growing in popularity. It is likely that Minaria will continue to develop its INFOWAR capability, especially in computer-related fields. The government will allow the Internet to be a relatively free medium of exchange, while keeping a close eye on TV and other mass media.

TRADOC G-2

TRISA-THREATS

CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND THREAT INTEGRATION

DIRECTORATE (CTID)

INFRASTRUCTURE: MINARIA

Infrastructure: Minaria

Infrastructure is composed of the basic facilities, services, and installations needed for the functioning of a community or society.

KEY FACTS:

REGION

- A country's prosperity in this region of the world depends on its hydrocarbon resources. Ariana's, Atropia's, and to a lesser extent, Donovia's oil and natural gas resources fund their infrastructure construction. Gorgas and Minaria, because of their lack of hydrocarbon deposits, lag behind their neighbors in infrastructure modernization.

MINARIA

- Over one-third of Minarians live in Yerevan, even though 46.2% work in farm-related occupations.
- The Atropian blockade of goods and electricity forced Minaria to reduce its industrial output and caused a number of Minarians to return to farming to prevent starvation.

OPERATIONAL IMPACTS OF THE INFRASTRUCTURE VARIABLE IN THE OE:

REGION

- Most of the region, especially in rural areas, cannot access modern utilities such as potable water, electricity, and modern sewage systems.
- Due to the lack of potable water in much of the region, military forces will need to test local water sources before use and likely treat local water to avoid medical problems.

MINARIA

- The Atropian blockade places a severe strain on Minaria to provide essential services to its people. Any additional disruptions to the transportation of goods throughout the country could hamper military operations, as the military may need to redirect resources to prevent civilian starvation or riots.
- The lack of modern utilities throughout Minaria will increase the logistical requirements for any military operations in the country.

INFRASTRUCTURE OVERVIEW:

While the region's five countries have a significant number of rural residents, the majority of each country's population lives in urban areas. About two-thirds of the Arianian (68%), Donovian (67%), and Minarian populace (64%) and just over half of the Gorgan (53%) and Atropian (52%) populace live in urban areas. All five countries contain a mixture of modern urban cities and almost pre-modern rural villages. Modern utilities can be found in most major cities but not in the rural villages and countryside.

Nearly two-thirds of Minarians live in cities, with over one-third of them located in the capital city, Yerevan. Minaria remains an urban country still surviving on the infrastructure built between 1950 and 1990. With little natural resources, the country does not possess the economic means to maintain its current infrastructure, let alone build new infrastructure. Most rural and many urban Minarians cannot access the three basic utilities—electricity, potable water, and sewage disposal. With limited funds, it remains likely that Minaria will continue to struggle with the maintenance of its current infrastructure. Due to problems in the infrastructure and other reasons, Minaria faces a negative urbanization rate as some of the people chose to return to the country to become subsistence farmers. Even though rural people may not possess the same standard of living as those in the urban areas, the farmers will not starve. Minaria would like to become involved in the hydrocarbon pipeline distribution system that surrounds its country, but the possibility of potential conflicts keeps investors at bay.

CONSTRUCTION PATTERNS

As previously mentioned, the majority of residents in all five countries live in urban areas. Most urban cities contain a mixture of old neighborhoods with roughshod construction, while buildings in newer neighborhoods were made with modern construction methods. In rural villages and areas, residents use whatever materials they can obtain to build their houses.

Like Gorgas and Atropia, Minarian urban construction patterns reflect mostly Donovian influenced architecture except for their inner city core. Dense random construction built up since the city's formation shapes each city's original neighborhoods. Minaria's largest cities built multi-family buildings to house the urban residents in a closed orderly block construction. In areas near factories, apartment buildings create strip area neighborhoods. Newer construction shows more signs of Western influence.

With only three cities over 100,000 people, most Minarians live in medium or small cities where 46.2% of the population support themselves in a job related to the agricultural industry. Except for Yerevan, military operations in Minaria will likely not require extensive urban operations. This will probably reduce the numbers of displaced civilians in most military operations and will also likely mitigate the possibility that the military will need to support large numbers of civilians with food. The major exception would occur in the Yerevan metropolitan area.



Block-Style Apartment Building

MAJOR MINARIAN CITIES AND URBAN ZONES

Almost two-thirds of Minarians live in urban areas, but 46.2% of the people work in agriculture-related fields. Over one-third of Minarians live in its capital city, Yerevan. Minaria only has five cities with over 50,000 residents, and only three of them contain over 100,000 residents.

YEREVAN

With over 1.1 million in Yerevan and another 200,000 in the metropolitan area, over one-third of all Minarians live in the vicinity of Minaria's capital city. Yerevan possesses two airports, 46 bus lines, 24 trolley lines, and a subway system with 10 stations. The only train line operates to Gorgas to the north due to Kemalian and Atropian blockades in the other directions. Besides serving as Minaria's financial center, other major businesses include

chemicals, metals, machinery, textiles, alcoholic beverages, and processed food. Seventy-one of Minaria's 90 institutes of higher learning are in Yerevan. Yerevan contains a dense, randomly constructed old city that creates a city core urban zone with its adjacent core periphery urban zone. While Yerevan contains many new buildings because of a building boom in the 1990s, the blocks do not conform to a typical Western grid pattern, but spring up haphazardly based on the terrain and the builders' preferences. Yerevan also contains many low-rise residential areas and commercial areas. A large number of industrial areas surround the city. The Minarian military locates several of its key military units not in support of the Artzak region in the Yerevan metropolitan area.

GYUMRI

Minaria's second-largest city, Gyumri, only contains about 160,000 people and lies approximately 80 road miles northwest of Yerevan. Located along the Akhuryan River, Gyumri suffers from very cold winters and warm summers as a result of its elevation. Gyumri contains an old city with dense random construction, and organized block areas with large apartments built from the 1950s to the 1980s that form the city core and core periphery urban zones. Gyumri shows signs of Western-style grid block construction that creates both high-rise and low-rise residential areas. Some industrial areas exist, along with the expected number of commercial areas for a city of its size.

VANADZOR

At 109,640 people, Vanadzor claims the distinction as Minaria's third-largest city. Vanadzor lies approximately 55 road miles directly north of Yerevan, and many consider it Minaria's most picturesque city. The chemical industry serves as Vanadzor's primary business and creates a large



Minaria's Largest Cities

industrial area for a city of its population. Commercial areas exist that support the residents and the city's two schools of higher learning. Unlike many other old cities, Vanadzor's downtown does not contain dense random construction, but relatively wide streets built in the 1950s and 1960s to create only a core periphery urban zone.

NAKHCHIVAN

Nakhchivan (population 70,400) ranks as Minaria's fourth-largest city and lies approximately 100 miles southeast of Yerevan. Nakhchivan contains all six civilian urban zones: city core, core periphery, high-rise residential, low-rise residential, commercial, and industrial areas in the typical three-ring pattern—core, residential/commercial, and industrial—from the city center.

Military operations in Nakhchivan may require extensive urban operations to support house-to-house fighting found in dense inner city cores. The city also contains a number of large apartment buildings that the military may need to clear room by room. Nakhchivan may provide some limited logistical support to foreign military.

EJMIATSIN

Ejmiatsin, Minaria's fifth-largest city, lies fewer than 15 miles due west of Yerevan. The city contains about 57,000 people and primarily supports the agriculture industry, as it is totally surrounded by farms. Ejmiatsin contains a small city core urban zone, a smaller core periphery urban zone, and mostly low-rise residential area. Limited commercial areas exist, with only a small number of industrial areas and almost no high-rise residential areas.

POPULATION DENSITY

Yerevan: 12,681 people per square mile
Gyumri: 8,425 people per square mile
Vanadzor: 10,857 people per square mile
Nakhchivan: 12,816 people per square mile
Ejmiatsin: 3,354 people per square mile

UTILITIES PRESENT

The Caucasus area faces a dichotomy when it comes to utilities such as electricity, water, and sewage treatment. Most urban households can access modern utilities, but rural areas cannot. Many rural residents who cannot access modern utilities live similarly to their ancestors generations ago.

POWER

Another dichotomy in the Caucasus region is that countries like Ariana, Atropia, and Donovia export hydrocarbons, coal, or electrical power to other countries while Gorgas and Minaria must import the same resources to meet their requirements. The countries that can export hydrocarbon products or electricity become richer while those that must import significant quantities of power become poorer. At least 75% of all structures in the five countries can access power because they are located in urban areas.

Minaria is another country with a dearth of hydrocarbon resources in the Caucasus region, as it produces no crude oil or natural gas and does not export any oil, natural gas, or coal. In the previous five years, Minaria increased its natural gas imports almost 25% (60 to 73 billion cubic feet), but it dropped during the last calendar year to 68 billion cubic feet. Coal consumption demonstrates a similar graph, as it increased from 88,000 short tons for five consecutive years to 110,000 short tons before a drop to 66,000 short tons in the last calendar year. In the five years previous to that,

Minaria's electricity generation dropped slightly (5.977 to 5.584 billion kilowatt hours), while increased electricity imports/decreased exports covered the rise in electrical usage during the time period. Over the last six years, Minaria shows a general trend with a slight increase in power production imports each year.

Minaria contains no known hydrocarbon resources and few coal deposits, so it will always remain reliant on other countries for a large portion of its energy needs. The country generates 24% of its electricity from three thermal power plants located at Vanadzor, Hrazdan, and Yerevan. Minaria receives another 33% of its electricity from nine hydroelectric power plants located throughout the country. Most of Minaria's other electricity comes from 313 small hydroelectric plants scattered throughout the country. The country currently possesses only one wind power plant, but plans for additional plants exist. Unless Minaria finds a way to produce more electricity from hydropower, the country will not possess the necessary financial resources for modernization. Without electricity, Minaria's rural areas will continue to obtain their power from inefficient generators or the burning of fossil fuels.

WATER

The majority of the Caucasus region's urban population has access to potable water. As areas become more rural, people must rely on local sources—rivers, streams, and wells—to obtain water for cooking, drinking, and washing.

While a majority of the residents in Minaria's three largest cities—Yerevan, Gyumri, and Vanadzor—can access a modern water system, the numbers do not reach those of their neighboring countries. In Yerevan, about 85% of the residents can access safe drinking water. This number drops to 66% in Gyumri and 61% in Vanadzor. The more rural the area, the lower the percent of Minarians with access to potable water through modern means. As a result, Minarians suffer the effects of contamination found in rivers, streams, wells, and other ground water. Overall, approximately 70% of all Minarians can access a modern water system. Military personnel will need to check all water to determine its cleanliness before use, especially away from the very largest cities.

SEWAGE

The vast majority of Ariana, Atropia, Gorgas, and Donovia urban residents use modern sewage disposal methods to get rid of waste, but most Minarians do not. Urban residents have greater access to modern sewage treatment than rural residents. The more remote a person, the less likely he/she will use modern sewage treatment techniques. Poor disposal methods in rural areas contaminate ground water that other residents rely on for drinking and cooking.

Like water, many Minarians cannot access a modern sewage system. In Yerevan, where almost one-third of the populace lives, only 24% can access a modern sewage system. The numbers appear better in Gyumri and Vanadzor where 66% and 51%, respectively, dispose of their waste through a modern sewage system. Rural Minarians have even fewer opportunities to access a modern sewage system than those in the urban areas, so the entire country's overall access rate to a modern sewage system remains below 25%.


TRANSPORTATION ARCHITECTURE

Roads are the primary transportation method throughout the Caucasus region. Train and especially air travel remain too expensive for many residents of Ariana, Atropia, Gorgas, and Minaria. Most roads, especially the unpaved ones, suffer from a lack of maintenance. Ariana and Donovia maintain a complex transportation architectural system while the other three countries operate a moderate one due to railway system limitations.

ROAD SYSTEMS

Overall, roads in this part of the world do not meet US or Western Europe standards. Driving is hazardous, especially in the winter months or in bad weather. Generally, drivers do not obey all traffic laws, and vehicle owners often fail to maintain their vehicles properly.

Unlike most countries in the region, Minaria contains more paved than unpaved roads. Of the country's 5,523 miles of road, paved roads account for 80% or 4,399 of the miles. Most of the roads, however, do not receive proper maintenance. While most roads remain passable, many need considerable repair work to meet Western standards.



Minaria's main road, called the Kajaran Highway, links Minaria to Ariana. Minaria also contains two major roads that link it to Gorgas, but these roads attract bandits who rob vehicles traversing them.

BUS

All five countries maintain some sort of bus system, but its quality depends on the country and location. The larger the city, the more likely it will operate a public bus system. Usually, intercity buses run between the larger cities, and "private" buses may also operate in some areas. Due to the relatively cheap cost of public transportation, buses remain a favorite method for local civilians to travel long distances within their country.

Minaria operates its bus system on a hub and spoke design. Each city operates buses that travel to smaller villages in the local area and also to other large cities. Mini-buses also operate in the same method except they do not sell tickets, as riders just pay the driver for the price negotiated.

Minaria's largest bus system operates in its capital, Yerevan. Yerevan contains over 350 buses that move an estimated 150 million customers each year. The city also operates a large trolley fleet of 320

vehicles that moves 100 million riders each year. Yerevan's public transportation system also runs a tram system with 150 cars.

Any military operation in Minaria will require an inspection of the buses for weapons and contraband. Additionally, any military activities in the Yerevan area will need to ensure the continued operation of the bus, trolley, and tram system. A major disruption to Yerevan's public transportation system could drastically affect the local civilian populace due to its importance for civilian travel.

RAIL

All five Caucasus countries operate a railroad system, but they suffer many problems due to maintenance issues, non-standard equipment, criminal activity, and high cost.

Minaria operates approximately 525 miles of railway track; most of it powered by electricity. Only one international train route operates, to Tbilisi, Gorgas, and it only runs every other day. The Minarian railroad system suffers from poor maintenance and crime, which deter passengers from its use. Talks about improving the railroad system, however, recently occurred between Minaria and neighboring countries.



Yerevan operates a single subway line of about 8.5 miles and 10 stations. Discussions about an additional two lines recently stalled due to the construction cost. Over 50,000 people use the Yerevan metro system every day. Any military activities in the Yerevan area that disrupt the subway system could hurt the city economically. As with all subway systems, civilians could use the underground stations as air raid shelters.

AIR TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS

All five countries maintain both paved and unpaved runways of varying distances. Many of the unpaved runways resemble nothing more than a cleared dirt path only suitable for the sturdiest of planes.


Minaria contains 11 runways throughout the entire country; all but one has a paved surface. The only unpaved runway in Minaria does not exceed 3,000 feet. The map indicates the location of the major Minarian hard surface runways, and the chart provides runway data (not all runways are shown on either the map or in the chart).

Paved Runways

- Over 10,000 feet: 2
- 8,000 to 10,000 feet: 2
- 5,000 to 8,000 feet: 0
- 3,000 to 5,000 feet: 4
- Under 3,000 feet: 2

Unpaved Runways

- Over 10,000 feet: 0
- 8,000 to 10,000 feet: 0
- 5,000 to 8,000 feet: 0
- 3,000 to 5,000 feet: 0
- Under 3,000 feet: 1



Major Runways

Map #	Elevation (Feet)	Latitude (D, M, S)	Longitude (D, M, S)	Length (Feet)	Width (Feet)	Surface Type
401	5000	40 45 06.00 N	43 51 36.00 E	10564	147	Asphalt
402	4846	41 02 59.04 N	44 20 41.00 E	6546	110	Asphalt
403-1	2863	39 11 19.70 N	45 27 30.39 E	10826	148	Asphalt
403-2	2863	39 11 19.70 N	45 27 30.39 E	10826	138	Asphalt
404	4836	41 02 54.42 N	44 20 13.82 E	6555	92	Asphalt
405	UNK	40 07 19.17 N	44 27 54.33 E	8694	UNK	UNK
406-1	4501	40 17 30.56 N	44 34 06.74 E	3295	250	Concrete
406-2	4501	40 17 30.56 N	44 34 06.74 E	3252	250	Concrete
407	2838	40 08 50.19 N	44 23 45.17 E	12629	184	Asphalt

Airlines

Minarian Airlines is Minaria's national carrier and operates a fleet of 25 planes. The only Minarian Airlines plane that meets Western European standards to land is a leased Airbus A310. Minarian Airlines operates international flights from Zvartnots International Airport outside of Yerevan to Amsterdam, Frankfurt, and Paris. Anyone who flies Minarian Airlines should expect frequent delays, unexpected refueling stops, and poor service due primarily to insufficient maintenance practices.

POR TS/SEA/RIVER TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS

The five Caucasus countries share a diverse maritime culture. Ariana has a significant coastline and a large oceangoing fleet to export its oil. Atropia maintains ports on the Caspian Sea. Gorgas has three ports on the Black Sea that are accessible through the straits at Istanbul, Kemalia. Minaria is completely landlocked, with no direct access to any ocean or sea. Due to its location, Donovia has several seaports on the Black and Caspian Seas. (*See map on page 2D-6-7 for port locations.*)

Without access to open sea, Minaria operates no ports and conducts very little transportation of goods on its rivers. Minaria must rely on its neighbors to export its products to other countries.

PIPELINES

The security of hydrocarbon pipelines will be paramount in any military operations in the Caucasus region. Any disruption to the flow of crude oil and natural gas to the Western world could cause economic problems, as many modern countries rely on hydrocarbons to fuel their industries.

Since Minaria possesses no hydrocarbon resources, Donovia provides the bulk of Minaria's natural gas through a pipeline that passes through Gorgas. Gorgas takes 10% of the natural gas bound for Minaria as a transit fee. Construction continues on a 122-mile-long pipeline that will carry natural gas from Tabriz, Ariana, to Sardarian, Minaria, where it will connect with the current distribution network. In exchange for the natural gas, Minaria will provide Ariana electricity produced by its hydropower plants.



Currently, no pipelines that export hydrocarbon products to Europe from the three oil- and gas-rich countries—Ariana, Atropia, and Donovia—cross Minaria, so the country receives no transit fees. Even though Minaria offers a shorter direct route to Kemalia than Gorgas, the unstable military situation in Minaria discourages companies from construction through a potential war zone. The European consortiums decided a safer option would be to construct additional gas and oil pipelines that will follow the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline through Ariana, Gorgas, and Kemalia before reaching the European markets. These new pipelines will double the capacity of the current pipelines.

If military activities in Minaria interrupt the hydrocarbon transportation network, Minaria's economy will come to a complete halt. Without its own oil and natural gas resources, Minaria remains reliant on its hydrocarbon-rich neighbors to supply its needs.

TELECOMMUNICATIONS ARCHITECTURE

For the most part, Caucasus-region residents use cellular telephones to communicate with each other due to the lack of landline telephone infrastructure. Many residents never owned any type of telephone until they received their first cellular phone. Most can access news from either television or radio, but some rural residents have no information access via modern methods. (*See Information variable for additional details.*)

Minaria contains sufficient telephones for almost every citizen, but the country does not show as much advancement in Internet connections as its neighboring countries. With about three million people, Minaria contains 650,000 landline telephones and 2.336 million cellular phones. The privatization and recent modernization of the old telephone system, built in the 1950s, caused the increase—with the result that now almost every Minarian can use a telephone. Only 36,354 Internet hosts operate in Minaria, and only about 191,000, or less than 7% of the citizens, access the Internet on a regular basis. That differs from Minarian governmental claims that 47% of its residents can access the Internet. Two public and over 35 private television stations operate in Minaria, providing almost total coverage to the entire country. Nine radio stations, both public and private, also operate throughout Minaria. The military will find that television serves as the best medium to reach the largest audience in Minaria.

AGRICULTURE

Agriculture production still dominates the labor forces of Gorgas (55.6%) and Minaria (46.2%), but not Ariana (25%), Atropia (38.3%), or Donovia (20%). Even in the Caucasus region's predominately agricultural countries, farming creates less than one-fourth of the country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Except for Atropia, the region relies on food imports to feed its people. Any food import disruption may increase the military's burden to feed civilians and prevent starvation.

Due to a lack of industrialization and hydrocarbon resources, Minaria finds itself as a primarily agricultural country. Approximately 46.2% of the people work in farming-related occupations that produce 22% of Minaria's GDP. Despite the large number of Minarian farmers, the country still needs to import 65% of its food. In 1989, the Minarian government privatized 63% of cultivated fields, 80% of orchards, and 91% of vineyards. The country contains 300,000 small farms that range from one to five hectares in size. Some agriculture-related businesses such as food processing plants and hothouse operations remain under government control. With the assistance of massive irrigation projects between the 1920s and the 1960s, Minaria increased its food production and the amount of arable land to 17% of the entire country. The fertile volcanic soil provides an excellent environment to grow wheat, barley, figs, pomegranates, cotton, apricots, olives, peaches, walnuts, quince, potatoes, grapes, berries, sugar beets, and tobacco. Minaria also contains abundant pastureland for sheep, goats, and horses. Any military that operates in the country will likely not find any excess fruits and vegetables to supplement its soldiers' rations, because Minaria already needs to import so much food to feed its own people.

INDUSTRY

Because of their hydrocarbon resources, Ariana, Atropia, and Donovia are more industrialized than Gorgas and Minaria. Industry GDP ranges from a low of 27.1% in Gorgas to a high of 61.4% in Atropia. Minaria produces 46.6% of its GDP from industry. The protection of the hydrocarbon infrastructure remains paramount for any military operations in the area, and the military should

refrain from any unnecessary damage to the industrial sector to facilitate economic recovery after the end of hostilities.

Since the end of major Donovian influence, industries have become less important to Minaria, as many people returned to farming to prevent their family from starving. Lack of fuel and electricity decreased industrial production by 40% between 1992 and 1993, primarily caused by the Atropian blockade. Before 1992, Minaria produced chemicals, petrochemicals, fertilizers, and building materials. Now, Minaria's major products included knitted clothing and hosiery, canned goods, aluminum foil, and shoes. The country mines copper, zinc, gold, and lead, and contains small deposits of coal, gas, and petroleum, but delays plague their development. Minaria still possesses a large amount of toxic industrial chemicals from a couple of decades ago when manufacturing plants began to close and many of the industrial plants just boarded the windows when raw materials ran out.

While Minaria does not operate any nuclear power plants or contain all the components necessary to master the nuclear fuel cycle, reports indicate that the country possesses two to five functional nuclear weapons despite the government's denial.

POLLUTION

All five Caucasus-region countries face significant pollution problems stemming from poor industrial practices. The governments cared more about natural resource extraction and product production than the stewardship of the planet. This lack of concern for the environment occurred regardless of which government controlled the various countries. The region's military operations will need to address pollution, with soldiers taking precautions due to high-level air pollution and units considering any local water source not potable until tested.

Minaria became one of the first Caucasus countries to adopt anti-pollution laws in 1994, but circumstances prevented their actual execution. Owing to the Atropian blockade of supplies and electricity in the winters of the early 1990s, Minarians increased the burning of wood to provide heat, and this worsened air pollution. The country also closed several chemical plants for environmental reasons, but reopened them later for economic reasons without any changes to the air and water pollution they caused. Minaria also suffers soil pollution from toxic chemicals such as DDT. Until alternative economic avenues and electrical production methods present themselves, Minarians must continue to use old technology with high levels of pollution production.

Summary

Minaria has the worst infrastructure of the five countries in this region. Much of its population, even in the urban areas, cannot access modern utilities—water, electricity, and sewage disposal. To prevent starvation, many people left the urban areas over the last decade to return to their historical family farms, which created additional abandoned buildings in the cities. Without any natural resources for Minaria to exploit, the country will find it difficult to build new infrastructure except through the generosity of its allies, Ariana and Donovia.

TRADOC G-2

TRISA-THREATS

CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND THREAT INTEGRATION

DIRECTORATE (CTID)

PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT: MINARIA

Physical Environment: Minaria

The physical environment variable includes the geography and man-made structures as well as the climate and weather in the area of operations. This variable defines the physical circumstances and conditions that influence the execution of operations throughout the domains of air, land, and sea.



KEY FACTS:

REGION

- The Caucasus region covers the northern and southern portions of the Caucasus Mountains and its lowlands, and lies between Europe and Asia.

MINARIA

- Minaria, as a landlocked country, possesses no access to the Black or Caspian Seas.
- Lake Sevan, in the eastern part of Minaria, is the largest lake in the Caucasus Mountains.

OPERATIONAL IMPACTS OF THE PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT VARIABLE IN THE OE:

REGION

- All countries in the region contain rugged mountain ranges that will hamper ground movement.
- The Black and Caspian Seas play an important role in regional movement of persons and goods.

MINARIA

- Mountainous terrain, limited arable land, and lack of sea access limit Minaria's economic options.
- Minaria's landlocked status will always make it vulnerable to its neighbors, who control access for any exports or imports.

PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT OVERVIEW:

Over 200,000 square miles comprise the Caucasus, a mountainous region located between the Black Sea and Caspian Sea. The Caucasus includes Atropia, Minaria, and Gorgas, as well as parts of Ariana, Donovia, and Kemalia. The Caucasus Mountains, consisting of the Greater and Lesser Caucasus ranges, traditionally form the separation between Europe and Asia. The Caucasus region contains two major parts—the North Caucasus and the South Caucasus—that are divided by the Greater Caucasus Mountains. The North Caucasus region is contained entirely within Donovia, while the South Caucasus contains Gorgas, Minaria, Atropia, and parts of Ariana and Kemalia.

TERRAIN

The Lesser Caucasus Mountains dominate Minaria's topography. With approximately 70% of the country considered mountainous, Minaria averages an altitude of 5,900 feet above sea level. Mt. Aragats, with an elevation of 13,420 feet above sea level, reigns as Minaria's highest peak. The mountains run horizontally across northern Minaria and then turn southeast into Ariana. Southwest of the Lesser Caucasus Mountains, a plateau that gradually slopes downward to the Aras River Valley forms much of central Minaria.

BODIES OF WATER

Many Minarian rivers travel only short distances and contain high turbulence due to numerous rapids and waterfalls. River water levels experience seasonal fluctuation, with their highest levels after the snow melts in the spring and in the fall rainy season. Most Minarian rivers belong to the Aras River drainage area. The Aras' main left-bank tributaries—the Akhuryan (130 miles), the Hrazdan (90 miles), the Arpa (80 miles), and the Vorotan (111 miles)—irrigate most of the country. Lake Sevan is located in the northern part of the country and occupies one-tenth of Minaria's total territory; it constitutes one of the greatest freshwater high mountain lakes in Eurasia. The lake plays a key role in Minaria as it serves as the country's main strategic supply of drinking water and is used extensively for irrigation.



MOBILITY CLASSIFICATION

Rugged mountainous areas in parts of the north, east, and southwest parts of Minaria make off-road travel very difficult. These mountains serve as hideouts and facilitate smugglers of people, weapons, and goods. Heavy winter snow will cause some mountain passes to close for three to six months each year. Most roads, although improved, remain in poor condition. Night and winter travel remains hazardous due to unlit, narrow, or unpaved roads. Landmines remain omnipresent in and around conflict zones.

NATURAL HAZARDS

Approximately 60% of Minaria is susceptible to earthquakes, landslides, flooding, or mudflows, and it is one of the world's most disaster-prone countries. Earthquakes in Minaria generally occur in the mountainous regions of the country. The 1988 Spitak earthquake, the most recent significant quake, measured 6.8 on the Richter scale and heavily damaged the town of Gyumri in northern Minaria. This quake killed at least 25,000 people, injured 19,000 more, and left 500,000 homeless. The earthquake completely destroyed 58 towns and villages, and affected 304 more throughout the region.

VEGETATION


LAND COVER

Forests account for only 7.8% of Minaria's total land area with uneven distribution throughout the country. The largest forested region occurs in the northeast section of the country, with small "islands" of trees throughout the rest of Minaria. The country's central part remains almost without forests.



AGRICULTURE

The agriculture sector employs 46.2% of the Minarian people and accounts for 22% of the country's GDP. Water shortages and a dearth of arable land adversely affect Minarian agricultural production. Agriculture takes place primarily in the valleys of mountainous regions where fertile volcanic soil and arable land account for 17% of Minaria's total land. Minaria's main agricultural products include wheat and barley, with potatoes, vegetables, and fruits to a lesser extent.



CLIMATE

The region's altitudes greatly influence Minaria's temperatures and cause considerable variety in the country's climate. Mountain ranges in Minaria generally block the moderation normally associated with the Mediterranean and Black Seas, resulting in a wide seasonal temperature variation throughout the country. Minaria normally experiences dry, hot summers from June through September, and cold winters from November through March.

SEASONS

Country/Season	Winter	Spring	Summer	Fall
Ariana	Dec – Feb	Mar – May	Jun – Aug	Sep – Nov
Atropia	Jan – Mar	Mar – End May	Jun – Oct	Mid Oct – Dec
Gorgas	Dec – Feb	Mar – May	Jun – Aug	Sep – Nov
Minaria	Nov – Mar	Mar – May	Jun – Sep	End Sep – Nov
North Caucasus (Donovia)	Dec – Mar	Apr – May	Jun – Sep	Oct – Nov

Seasons for Ariana, Atropia, Gorgas, Minaria, and North Caucasus (Donovia)

WEATHER

PRECIPITATION

Precipitation in Minaria varies across the highlands, but some mountain slopes receive heavy rainfall that can reach 315 inches annually. Interior plains receive approximately 80-160 inches annually. The Aras River basin represents Minaria's driest region with only 8-12 inches of precipitation per year. Yerevan, the capital, only totals around 10 inches of precipitation per year. Higher elevations experience some of their precipitation as snow with accumulations of up to 7 feet. The Minarian rainy season occurs twice a year; the first rains last from spring to early summer, while the months of October and November experience the second round. Occasional thunderstorms can accompany the spring rains.

TEMPERATURE-HEAT INDEX

Minarian summers, except in high-altitude areas, usually consist of dry and hot weather. Average temperatures in the plains reach 77°F in June-August and can occasionally reach as high as 108°F. Low humidity in these very hot summer days, however, makes the temperatures bearable. Cool refreshing breezes often blow from the mountains in the evening hours during the summer.

TEMPERATURE-WIND CHILL INDEX

Minaria can experience rather cold winters with heavy snow, especially from January to March. In January, the mean daily temperature in the foothills and plains averages 23°F, although sometimes the Arctic air can cause temperatures to drop as low as -22°F. Minaria has a record low of -51°F. In winter, visibility becomes limited in parts of Minaria due to snowstorms and fog.

RELATIVE HUMIDITY

Relative humidity ranges from humid to arid, and usually varies with elevation. The Lesser Caucasus Mountains in the east experience moderate to high relative humidity, while the high plains are semi-humid to semi-arid and the Aras river basin is dry. Humidity is higher during the rainy seasons in the spring and fall, and lessens during the summer and winter.

Summary

The Caucasus region, containing the Greater and Lesser Caucasus Mountains, forms the traditional division between Europe and Asia. All countries contain different weather and terrain, and soldiers must prepare for seasonal extremes—winter and summer. Areas with flat plains and valleys, such as coastal plains, will favor troop mechanized movement. The mountainous regions, especially in the Greater and Lesser Caucasus Mountains, will compound vehicle and equipment breakdowns. Numerous roads, already in poor condition in most of the countries, will become inaccessible for vehicular traffic because of winter snow. Military planners will need to anticipate the closure of mountain passes for up to six months a year due to snow.

TRADOC G-2

TRISA-THREATS

CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND THREAT INTEGRATION

DIRECTORATE (CTID)

TIME: MINARIA

Time: Minaria

The time variable describes the timing and duration of activities, events, or conditions within an OE, as well as how the timing and duration of events are perceived by various actors in the OE.

KEY FACTS:

REGION

- All five countries have ancient cultures, and rivalries generated over that time between different ethnic groups still exist.
- Most people in the region do not view time as a resource, but as something that people cannot control.

MINARIA

- Minaria uses the Gregorian calendar to determine its holidays.
- Most Minarians do not believe in punctuality for appointments, meetings, or other events.

OPERATIONAL IMPACTS OF THE TIME VARIABLE IN THE OE:

REGION

- The lack of a sense of urgency for most people will frustrate the US as it deals with allied militaries in the Caucasus region.
- The US will most likely find opportunities to exploit the lackadaisical attitude about time to get inside the enemy military's decision cycle.

MINARIA

- Most Minarians exhibit a lack of punctuality, especially when they interact internally with each other.
- To successfully interact with the Minarians, it is critical to understand the extreme hatred developed over the centuries that most Minarians possess for the Kemalians and the Atropians.

TIME OVERVIEW:

The Caucasus countries, for the most part, do not believe in the sensitivity of time, and do not view punctuality or the importance of time as the US and most other Western countries do. Most of the people in the region do not view time as a resource and do not feel any compulsion to effectively manage their time. The people in the Caucasus region do not make the connection between effective use of their time and production. This lack of time consciousness will likely frustrate US soldiers as they work with their allies, but it will also give the US a battlefield advantage against its enemies.

KEY DATES, TIME PERIODS OR EVENTS

The entire region's recorded history extends back at least 3,000 years, but people populated the area long before that time as indicated by archaeological objects discovered in caves and at other long-inhabited sites.

Minarians trace their ancestry back to 2492 BC. Between 1915 and 1917, the Ottomans conducted genocide against Minarian Christians. In 1991, Minaria became involved in an armed conflict with Atropia over the Artzak region that lasted until a Donovian-brokered ceasefire in 1994. Ethnic Minarians took control of 14% of Atropia's internationally recognized territory; there is no permanent resolution to this day.

ROUTINE, CYCLICAL KEY DATES

TRADITIONAL WEDDING SEASONS

Traditionally, Minarians married either in the spring before they planted their crops or in the fall after the harvest. Present-day Minarians choose whatever date suits their need.

NATIONAL AND RELIGIOUS HOLIDAYS

Minaria uses the Gregorian calendar to determine holidays. Minarians practice the Orthodox Christian faith and their Easter, dependent upon the year, may or may not coincide with the Roman Catholic Easter.

Holiday	Date	Description	Military Implications
New Year's Day	01 January	Celebrates the new year according to the Gregorian calendar.	NA
Orthodox Christmas	06 January	Uses the Julian calendar.	NA
Army Day	28 January	Celebrates the formation of the Minarian Army.	NA
Genocide Remembrance Day	24 April	Honors those who died in the Minarian genocide in 1915.	NA
Republic Day	28 May	Commemorates the establishment of the Democratic Republic of Minaria.	NA
Constitution Day	05 July	Commemorates the adoption of the Minarian Constitution in 1995.	NA
Spitak Remembrance Day	07 December	Honors the victims of the 1988 earthquake that killed thousands.	NA

HARVEST CYCLES

The Minarian mountainous terrain affects the harvest cycle, as some places can grow food year-round, including citrus fruit, while other places remain snow-covered all year long. For the most part, Minarians plant their crops in the spring and harvest them in the fall. Some areas receive more than 2,700 hours of sun annually—more sunlight than Alexandria, Egypt. The diverse weather patterns and soil allow Minarians to grow grapes, citrus fruits, and some grains. (*See the Physical Environment variable for additional information on Minaria's agriculture and the country's seasons.*)

ELECTIONS

Minarians elect their public officials for five-year terms, with no term limits. Minarians elect 56 parliament members through single-seat constituencies, and 75 additional representatives receive

their seat based on their party's proportion of popular votes. For a party to receive a proportional representative seat, the party must receive at least 5% of the total number of votes.

CULTURAL PERCEPTION OF TIME

Most of the Caucasus area does not perceive the importance of time as the Western world does, especially as it relates to business. The more a country interacts with Western nations, however, the more the country accepts the Western idea of the importance of time.

While Westerners take time commitments such as deadlines and schedules very seriously, in the Caucasus, time commitments are seen more as an objective to be achieved, if possible, rather than a requirement. Promptness is based on relationships. In the West, time is money. In the Caucasus, there is no problem with making people wait all day, and then telling them to come back the next day. A person from the Caucasus will be much more likely to be on time if the person who set the time commitment is close to him, such as a friend or family member. Business is conducted more on the basis of personal relationships than on respect for time.

For the most part, Minarians do not believe in punctuality in their daily lives when dealing within their own society. Many Minarians live by the adage, "Better late than never." Minarians typically do not make it to church or a party at the appointed time. Sometimes, Minarians will arrive 10 minutes before the end of a two-hour Badarak (church service) on Sunday morning. Even Minarian concerts delay their start 15 minutes to give the audience a chance to arrive and avoid noise during the music. The Minarians even coined a phrase for their lack of punctuality: Minarian timing. When Minarians deal with Westerners, however, they often attempt to please the outsiders and will become more punctual in their interactions.

TACTICAL EXPLOITATION OF TIME

CAUCASUS PERCEPTION OF TIME

For the most part, people in the Caucasus perceive time as an unimportant resource in their lives. They believe that things will occur whether they take proactive action or not. Each country in the region possesses a long history and people believe their country will continue well into the future. Most of the people in the region look back to times when their ethnic group held the upper hand in interactions with their neighbors and hope that one day their country can become the dominant power again. The people do not look at time in the short term, but look forward to the long term when conditions will again allow them to take their rightful place among the world's leaders. For Ariana and Atropia, their hydrocarbon resources may provide them the impetus to become a regional—if not world—power. For Gorgas and Minaria, their lack of natural resources will continue to plague their ability to improve their situation in the short term. Donovia wishes to regain the dominant regional influence it once commanded.

US PERCEPTION OF TIME

The time perception of allies in the region will frustrate the US, but the US can also take advantage of the lack of urgency of any enemies in the area. With its regional allies, the US will need to help them understand that time is a precious resource that once wasted can never be recovered. Punctuality and a sense of urgency remain essential for a military to defeat the enemy on the battlefield. Due to the enemy's lack of a time table and its apathetic regard for punctuality, US forces and their allies will most likely find opportunities to get inside the enemy leaders' decision cycles. Rapid US and allied action will cause the enemy to react to their actions instead of the enemy taking the initiative.

Summary

For the most part, the Caucasus countries view time differently than the US. Time is relatively unimportant to the people of Ariana, Atropia, Gorgas, and Minaria in almost every aspect of their lives. They lack a sense of urgency to accomplish tasks, in complete contrast to the Western world where almost everyone wants to accomplish as much as possible in as little time as possible. While the Donovian view of time is closer to that of the US than the other nations of the Caucasus, it is still notably different. All five cultures have extensive histories dating back centuries, and they feel that whatever they do, their country will continue into the future. The area's perception of time will cause the US to become frustrated with its allies, but will provide opportunities for exploitation of US enemies. To do so, however, the US will need to understand the nuances as each country perceives the relative importance of time somewhat differently.

TRADOC G-2

TRISA-THREATS

CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND THREAT INTEGRATION

DIRECTORATE (CTID)


ORDER OF BATTLE: MINARIA


Introduction to the Minaria Order of Battle


ORDERS OF BATTLE


All five countries have an administrative force structure (AFS) to manage their military forces in peacetime. This AFS is the aggregate of various military headquarters, facilities, and installations designed to man, train, equip, and sustain the forces. In peacetime, forces are commonly grouped into divisions, corps, or armies for administrative purposes. The AFS includes all components of the armed forces—not only regular, standing forces (active component), but also reserve and militia forces (reserve component). Normally, these administrative groupings differ from the country's order of battle (OB), which is its go-to-war (fighting) force structure that is task-organized to meet the combat situation.

The following pages outline the Minarian AFS. For information on how to use the AFS to obtain an OB, see Appendix B: OPFOR Task-Organizing for Combat on page 4-B-1.


Minaria Supreme High Command

389th Mechanized Infantry Brigade (IFV)

391st Mechanized Infantry Brigade (SEP) (APC)


393rd & 395th Motorized Infantry Brigade

397th & 399th Tank Brigade (124-Tank)





Minaria

401st Antitank Brigade




951st Special-Purpose Forces (SPF) Battalion




4171st Reconnaissance Brigade


419th Materiel Support Brigade




403rd Combat Aviation Brigade




405th Air Defense Brigade




415th Engineer Brigade



417th Signal Brigade




5th Information Warfare Battalion




Minaria

4173rd UAV Battalion





407th SP Artillery Command




Minaria

411th Chemical Protection Battalion




Militia Brigade

Internal Security Forces



Minaria Air Force



TRADOC G-2

TRISA-THREATS

CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND THREAT INTEGRATION

DIRECTORATE (CTID)

OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

ASSESSMENT: DONOVIA

TRADOC G-2

TRISA-THREATS

CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND THREAT INTEGRATION

DIRECTORATE (CTID)

POLITICAL: DONOVIA

Political: Donovia

The political variable describes the distribution of responsibility and power at all levels of governance—formally constituted authorities, as well as informal or covert political powers.

KEY FACTS:

REGION

- Every country in the region possesses a center of political power wildly dissimilar from its neighbor.
- Ethnic nationalism and identity politics generate most conflicts in the region.

DONOVARIA

- Donovia is functionally an authoritarian single-party state, where a small political and economic elite is decisively in control of the national and component governments.
- The United Donovia Party is firmly in control; almost no meaningful political opposition exists.

OPERATIONAL IMPACTS OF THE POLITICAL VARIABLE IN THE OE:

REGION

- Despite Western influence, political maneuvering is frequently seen as a natural precursor to brutal purges.
- Any negotiations will need to include very intrusive verification methods.

DONOVARIA

- Almost all state actions are designed to increase the power and wealth of the nation and, by extension, the elite.
- Donovians view all political and diplomatic interaction as a zero-sum game.
- Donovians will integrate political, military, diplomatic, and economic power in all decision-making.

POLITICAL OVERVIEW:

Donovia is nominally a republic, but in reality operates as an authoritarian state. Despite outward moves toward democracy, the small political/economic elite maintain power through control of the dominant political party, the United Donovia Party (UD). The UD, in turn, dominates the political and economic landscapes. Despite a tumultuous past, the Donovian political structure remains generally stable. The United Donovia Party arose from the aftermath of the Four Traitors incident in 1991, with a mandate to clean up the corruption within Donovia that had collapsed the nation and arrested nearly 70 years of Donovian power and development. While the UD has managed to put the Donovian economy on a sounder footing and has been able to increase national prestige through assertive military and diplomatic maneuver, it has done so via highly-centralizing state political control. It has also attempted to centralize political control while retaining the veneer of democracy and an economic free market. Massive corruption exists despite the high level of integration between the UD and the government. While this corruption was tolerated by the majority of the population as

the economy rebounded and international prestige increased, overall tolerance for corruption is starting to lessen.



CENTERS OF POLITICAL POWER

Real power within Donovia rests with a small group of elites. These elites distribute political power in a self-dealing fashion, using their political sway to ensure the success of economic allies, and using the proceeds of economic dealings to reinforce their political position through patronage and corruption. These elites arose from the elements of the law enforcement, military, and intelligence communities that immediately coalesced to contain the damage of the Four Traitors and the resultant decline of the Donovian state.

The collapse was precipitated by discovery of a massive embezzlement scheme perpetrated against the Donovian government by four very high-level individuals: a politician, Yassar Akbari; a military commander, Ibrahim al-Fatem; an organized crime boss, Ismail Jinat; and an industrial leader, Viaprom CFO Muhammad Hafiz. These four men embezzled huge amounts of cash from the

Donovian government over a period of several years, and fled the country when other government officials discovered their malfeasance. The Donovian government refers to both the group of men and the incident as the “Four Traitors.”

The Donovian government responded with the selection of a group of three men who now serve as the core of the elite that governs Donovia. Granted wide-ranging legal and political powers to root out graft and corruption in the wake of the Four Traitors outrage, the three men rapidly became allies and a force unto themselves in Donovian politics. The first, Abdul Batin Muhammad, was a colonel in the military, renowned for his bravery and as a widely-published international relations academic. The second, Naaqid Tarraz Tabiah, was a longtime member of the intelligence services who focused on international organized crime and drug trafficking. The third, Sabiq Noordin, was a former prosecutor and functionary in the diplomatic service. The three still control the Donovian elite. Abdul Muhammad is in control of the UD and has served as defense minister, while Tabiah controls the intelligence apparatus. Noordin is highly engaged in selecting members of the bureaucracy, and controls and appoints most non-defense and non-intelligence related posts.

The current president of Donovia is Jahangir Jaheer, who while famed as a very handsome man, is reputed to be somewhat dim-witted. Jaheer previously served in a number of diplomatic posts, thus he has little in the way of a domestic political constituency.

MILITARY AUTHORITY

The military is loyal to the political leadership and generally prides itself on its professionalism. The UD is wary of the military as possibly the only force in Donovia capable of ousting the existing civilian leadership, and is quick to buy off influential elements of the military with weapons outlays and post-military civilian employment to ensure continued loyalty. Additionally, the Donovian officer corps generally supports the UD’s military and international policy that stresses Donovian independence and power.

RELIGIOUS/CLERICAL AUTHORITY

Like the military, the UD also co-opted religious authority within Donovia, generally favoring religious leaders who support the UD, or at the very least do not challenge its authority. The nation, while officially secularized, continues to receive complaints from non-Arabs and non-Hanafi Muslims regarding discrimination against minority religious adherents. Donovian governmental authorities generally ignore any discrimination claims. The government often uses non-profit social and religious organizations as fronts to limit the authority and actions of religious authorities that are not supportive of the current political power structure. For example, the government will fund an ostensibly private organization and entrust it with the role of approving applications for new mosques, thus allowing the government to claim non-interference in religious matters while preventing the spread of views contrary to its goals.

ATTITUDES TOWARD THE US

Donovia wishes to view itself as independent of the US, and sees its power and culture as equal to or superior to that of the US. Therefore, Donovians tend to view with disdain any attempt by the US to appear to dictate terms of international engagement or of Donovian policies. This requirement to appear to have the last word politically is most notable in Donovian engagement with its immediate regional neighbors.

ATTITUDE TOWARD US TRADE

Donovia generally views US trade positively as the trade relationship may serve as a means to generate leverage over the US in other matters. Donovia maintains a generally mercantilist trade

policy, where trade goals are closely linked with political/diplomatic goals with an eye to advancing the combined economic and political interests of Donovia.

TYPE OF GOVERNMENT

The Donovian government, on paper, is constructed in a way familiar to Western observers. The executive branch contains a popularly elected president, who in turn appoints the judiciary. The bicameral legislature possesses the right to review judiciary appointments like judges and national prosecutors, and maintains the power of the purse to determine and approve government spending. In reality, the Donovian government's representative template serves as a public façade for a greatly incestuous single-party state. Overall, the Donovian government operates in a highly centralized manner, with little in the way of federal structures or local governance familiar to Western observers. Even at the most local levels, bureaucrats and officials are federal appointees, often not even from the areas they are assigned to serve. This ensures that the government operates in a top-down fashion and that independent elements of political power do not form.

BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT

Legislative Authority

Donovia maintains a bi-cameral legislature with an Upper House of 150 deputies and a Lower House of 300 deputies. Elections for both houses occur every four years, with direct proportional representation. In the case of ties, the president can cast the tie-breaking vote. In practice, the legislature's independence does not exist as almost all deputies consist of party loyalists or functionaries. The few independent legislators possess almost no legislative power such as to propose or block legislation or investigate government malfeasance.

Executive Authority

The constitution and political practice of Donovia ensures an almost dictatorial level of power in the executive branch. Presidents can only serve two consecutive terms of six years, but after a six-year hiatus, a former president can run again. The president is usually a member or trusted agent of the Donovian elite, and can be absolutely guaranteed to defend the elite's interests. The president possesses the ability to appoint officials at local and republic levels, guaranteeing large numbers of patronage positions and the overall loyalty of the bulk of the Donovian government.

Judicial Authority

Generally speaking, the judiciary functions as a tool of the executive. While occurrences of petty crime or minor civil matters like divorces are generally competently and fairly handled, political or economically important matters are decided almost uniformly in the fashion that the ruling elite would like them to be decided. Often, this might be directly against the interests of other elites, as the ruling elite of Donovia recognize the international political and economic value of the appearance of an independent judiciary.

GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESS AND LEGITIMACY

Internationally, most other countries view the Donovian government as effective, though its high levels of corruption reduce the legitimacy the current regime once held as the savior from the sleaze of the Four Traitors. Increasing use of social media and other information age technologies continue to break the Donovian state's near-monopoly on information, and the more blatant issues of corruption and self-dealing by the economic/political elite in Donovia now sometimes leak out to the country as a whole. The government's usual response is to stifle such outbursts by the arrest of the whistle-blower, counter-accusations, and an occasional indictment for corruption or graft. The

Donovian government intends for indictments to prove that the state is “doing something” to stop corruption. Arresting the whistle-blower is especially prevalent when it involves the military or intelligence services, usually on charges of espionage.

DOMESTIC POLITICAL ISSUES

Corruption dominates as the prime domestic political issue, though the authorities go to extensive lengths to ensure their complicity remains hidden from the public. The structure of the Donovian state, especially after the Four Traitors, allowed a small group with inordinate power to “root out corruption” despite their actual role in the corruption prevalent throughout Donovia. The electoral process serves to reinforce the power of the elite, and the state maintains its power over citizens with the citizen having little recourse. The participation of ethnic or religious minorities is minimal, with a few showpiece individuals who operate as little more than ethnic functionaries.



Elections

Donovian elections usually allow the voter to select between two or more UD-approved candidates, even if no candidate runs under the UD banner. The UD and the government will functionally only allow politicians to run if they support the UD, or more usually, UD loyalists who make a show of defecting to an opposition political party.

Rule of Law

The concept of “rule of law” in a Western liberal context is functionally unknown within Donovia. The power of the state, combined with its highly incestuous relationship with dominant economic entities, means the likelihood of the individual receiving a fair hearing from an impartial judiciary or independent media forum remains nearly zero. The judiciary is seen by the Donovian populace as widely compliant with political demands, even in the case of high-profile issues. Once charged, the defendant pleads guilty or the court finds in favor of the government’s case with little chance of meaningful appeal by the defendant.

Corruption

Corruption exists across all levels of political life within Donovia. From the policeman to the highest officials, most Donovians consider self-enrichment a hallmark of public life. The relationships between the largest businesses within Donovia and the UD are extensive, and during elections the resources of both the state and private business are used to ensure the political success of the UD.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS

Donovia attempts to remain typically neutral in regard to US power and forces. The government wants to preserve its regional power position and avoid any perception of Donovian subordination to the US or US interests. While generally adversarial with Atropia, a number of trade and economic links exist, as the Donovians view such links as a method to maintain leverage over Atropia.

Donovia will also aggressively provide diplomatic and material support to Donovian ethnic populations and allied minorities living outside of Donovia. For example, the Donovian government unilaterally issued passports to Gorgans of Donovian ethnicity prior to their most recent conflict. The Donovians then partially defended their actions as justified self-defense of a persecuted minority. Donovia's nuclear program has also made it the object of targeted international sanctions.

REGIONAL ACTORS

Donovia consistently attempts to leverage or intimidate its regional neighbors into relationships that prove advantageous to Donovia or Donovian economic interests. As a long-term goal, the Donovian government wants to create a web of political, diplomatic, military, and economic interests with all of its neighbors that will make it functionally impossible for any of these nations to present a security threat to the country, or allow any of these nations to initiate an independent, let alone Western-leaning, political stance. In addition to this diplomatic leverage, Donovian support for militants has created tension in regional bilateral relationships.

Donovia's relationships with its neighbors are varying and complex. Ariana and Donovia enjoy positive, though unofficial, political and economic relations despite the fact that the two countries are competing for the role of regional强man. Relations with Gorgas are frosty at best, as Gorgas wants to insulate itself from Donovian influence and considers the Donovian-backed breakaway republics of South Ostremek and Zabzimek as its territory. Minaria receives considerable assistance from Donovia on both economic and military levels, including natural gas imports and support regarding the autonomous Artzak region.

Donovia's aforementioned support for Minaria in the Artzak conflict and its aid to the enclave exemplifies the division between Donovia and Atropia. Donovian-sourced support for the Bilasuvar Freedom Brigade (BFB) operating in the northern Atropian provinces of Veltia and Erdabil has also created significant tension in the bilateral relationship. Despite these considerations and the mutual distrust between them, strong economic considerations—mainly related to trade—tie the two countries together.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Donovia views its participation in international organizations as a prime means to extend its influence and such participation as a zero-sum game, with Donovian goals as its prime interest. Thus, Donovia contains a mixed bag of associations and allies in such venues as the UN General Assembly, where it aggressively supports peacekeeping operations and other UN activities. Donovia also participates actively in the work of intergovernmental organizations (like the International Red Crescent) everywhere in the world except within or on its own borders, where such activity is considered an affront to Donovian sovereignty. Less than 30 foreign and domestic non-governmental

organizations (NGOs) operate within Donovia, and face significant monitoring and limitations on their activities by the Donovian government.

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ASSOCIATIONS

Even though not part of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), Donovia participates extensively in international economic associations, especially those that involve oil and gas discussions. Thus, it follows a somewhat independent pricing model from OPEC, and is quick to play up the independence of Donovian pricing and its ability to secure its oil and gas exports in an effort to gain supplier contracts. Once both sides agree to a contract, the Donovians will use the leverage to gain political and economic concessions in other areas, such as support for Donovian diplomatic initiatives or Donovian corporations' access to foreign markets.

MILITARY ALLIANCES

Where possible, Donovia continues to develop military alliances, initiate agreements, and distribute influence around the world, especially with its close neighbors. Donovia attempts to leverage economic relationships into military and diplomatic ones, and vice versa. Donovia couples military sales with offers of training and military advising, using the presence of Donovian "boots on the ground" to grant itself equities. Donovia then uses this equity to justify further political/military access and control in foreign countries, or at least accommodation of Donovian economic concerns. The Donovian government often uses military sales as a loss-leader in order to get its foot in the door to further the overall Donovian political/military/economic strategy.

INFLUENTIAL POLITICAL GROUPS

The United Donovia Party serves as the country's prime political party. While three of the other four main parties (Donovian League, Freedom and Justice, and the Scarlet Party) are nominally independent, they are actually outgrowths of the UD's attempt to portray Donovia as a Western-style democracy. The New Donovia Party (NDP) is the only true opposition party, but its political power is highly truncated by the actions of the UD.

OFFICIAL POLITICAL PARTIES

The UD serves as the country's major domestic political party. It directs three other parties, which while they claim their independence, in reality are staffed with former UD loyalists, and in many cases funded covertly by the UD, to present the façade of a multiparty system. The NDP serves as the country's prime opposition political party, operating completely unaffiliated from the UD and attempting to shed light on UD abuses and corruption. Recently, the NDP started to receive some significant support from elements within the military and additional support through social media and the Internet. Some proof of UD or government corruption and graft now reaches the Internet, which forces the government to either disavow the corruption or face the argument of its connivance in corrupt practices. At the national level, the UD's leaders demonstrate a willingness to throw those caught to the political wolves if necessary to prevent the allegations from coming upon themselves. At the local level, the UD often acts with a much more heavy-handed response, with reports of suspicious deaths for those who report governmental misconduct.

As indicated previously, three additional political parties (Donovian League, Freedom and Justice, and the Scarlet Party) participate in the government and operate officially unaligned. All three parties contain small numbers of elected positions at the national legislative level, with members often appointed to positions in the several Republics. These three parties, however, remain window-dressing for the UD, which they actually support.

OTHER DOMESTIC INFLUENTIAL GROUPS

Outside of the UD, the most influential domestic political groups include the National Veterans Association (NVA), the Environmental Donovia Association, and Human Rights of Donovia Campaign. All of these organizations lobby the legislature and attempt to raise public awareness for their projects. The Donovian government often uses the NVA to “test the waters” for potential changes in foreign policy and military affairs, as the NVA maintains significant links to the active Donovian military.

There is broad political support for a wide range of Donovian Arab nationalist organizations, such as youth leagues, language clubs that support Donovian language education, and the like. The UD often uses these organizations to support its political goals and broadcast the overall political message that merges UD and Donovian state agendas. Indeed, UD party personnel often man many of these organizations, which are funded by state or UD money despite their status as single-issue or advocacy organizations.

Summary

The Donovian state mostly resembles something like a family-owned business. A small group of elites remain firmly in control, and despite the history of the Four Traitors, continue to use their political power to enrich and empower themselves. Currently, voices of opposition speak out against the corruption, and the fact that events of 20 years ago are potentially repeating themselves does develop some resonance with an increasingly larger percentage of the population. Despite this, the Donovian elite maintain impressive control of the levers of state power, both domestically and internationally. This control, and the resultant positive effects of the mercantilist focus of total integration of political and economic policies, creates considerable popularity for the UD, and thus political stability inside Donovia.

TRADOC G-2

TRISA-THREATS

CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND THREAT
INTEGRATION DIRECTORATE (CTID)

MILITARY: DONOVIA

Military

The military variable explores the military and/or paramilitary capabilities of all relevant actors (enemy, friendly, and neutral) in a given OE. Relevant actors may include terrorists, militias, criminals, gangs, and insurgents.

KEY FACTS:

REGION

- Donovia has the dominant military of the five countries.
- Atropia and Minaria possess roughly the same size military and previously fought each other over disputed territory.
- Four of the five countries maintain tier 2 military capabilities, except that Donovia predominantly fields tier 1 capabilities.
- Gorgas fields the smallest military of the five countries.

DONOVARIA

- Donovia maintains the dominant military in the region with a large ground force consisting primarily of three mechanized armies capable of conducting combined arms operations.
- The ground force is supported by modern, agile air and naval forces.
- Donovia's conventional military is capable of conducting a range of operations, including conventional operations, peace enforcement, and irregular warfare.
- Donovia maintains a tier 1 military (weapons and equipment) capability along with elements of tier 2 capabilities.
- The Donovian military also possesses robust and modern chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) capabilities.
- Donovia is well protected by a state-of-the-art (tier 1) integrated air defense system (IADS) complemented with tactical all-arms air defense capabilities.

OPERATIONAL IMPACTS OF THE MILITARY VARIABLE IN THE OE:

REGION

- Four of the countries in the region operate a pervasively authoritarian National Command Authority (NCA), which makes military decisions that are passed down to subordinate units. The exception, Gorgas, utilizes a National Council that is similar but not quite as authoritarian in nature.
- Gorgas would most likely assist US forces if conflict started within the region.

DONOVARIA

- If US forces engaged the Donovian military, they could expect to face a well-trained and -equipped opponent using a wide range of strategies including conventional and adaptive operations.
- Donovia monitors any US military operations both in the area and prior to their arrival.
- Due to corruption within Donovia, the sale of CBRN material to terrorist groups is a lingering possibility.

MILITARY OVERVIEW:

Donovia maintains a strong military, partially as an inheritance from its pre-1991 strength and partially through economic wealth being used to transform the pre-1991 military remnants into a modern force. Donovian doctrine and tactics are complex, supple, and competent, making it a capable opponent. The country's military capability ranges from irregular forces to nuclear weapons and anti-space capability. This strong military, combined with its assertive political agenda, make Donovia a strong player in the region.

MILITARY FORCES


The Donovian military's history has long been marred by regional conflict and conquest with both irregular and regular warfare. Donovia's military power dominates the region and significantly influences the military forces of the other four countries—Ariana, Atropia, Gorgas, and Minaria. The major military branches of the Donovian Army Command consist of ground forces, navy, and air force elements. These elements possess technologically advanced weapons and equipment consistent with tier 1 capabilities. The Donovian military maintains approximately 1.4 million troops (active and reserve) within the country at any given time. Like many of the other countries in the region, Donovia has a similar national command and control construct known as the National Command Authority (NCA).

MILITARY STRATEGY

NATIONAL COMMAND AUTHORITY

All countries share a similar National Command Authority (NCA) construct including Gorgas, who refers to it as a National Council. The president appoints the Minister of National Security, who exercises responsibility for the NCA's Strategic Integration Department (SID). The SID serves as the overarching agency responsible to integrate all the instruments of national power under one cohesive national security strategy. The SID coordinates the plans and actions of all Donovia's ministries, but particularly those associated with the instruments of national power. (*See TC 7-100.2: Opposing Force Tactics, chapter 1, Strategic and Operational Framework.*)

The NCA includes the president and all functions of government within the appropriate ministries. The ministry of defense (MOD) controls the armed forces. The general staff is tasked with developing, maintaining, and training the armed forces for combat. In times of conflict or war, the MOD and general staff form the supreme high command in order to work in close coordination with the other ministries of the NCA. (*See the chart on the following page.*)



STRATEGIC OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK

The strategic operational framework for all countries in the Caucasus region is similar in construct and application, primarily the result of historic influences.

The NCAs and the NC for all five countries exercise command and control (C2) of the Armed Forces via the Supreme High Command (SHC), which includes the MOD and a General Staff drawn from all the service components. In peacetime, the MOD and General Staff operate closely but separately. The MOD assumes responsibility for policy, acquisitions, and financing the Armed Forces. The General Staff promulgates policy and supervises the service components while its functional directorates are responsible for key aspects of defense planning. In wartime, the MOD and General Staff merge to form the SHC, which functions as a unified headquarters. (*See the chart on the following page.*)


All five countries currently configure their militaries using an administrative force structure (AFS) for managing military forces in peacetime. This administrative force contains the aggregate of various military headquarters, facilities, and installations designed to man, train, and equip the forces. In peacetime, the various militaries group their forces into corps and armies for administrative purposes. In some cases, the militaries may group their forces administratively under geographical commands designated as military regions or military districts. If the SHC elects to create more than one theater headquarters, it may allocate parts of the administrative force structure to each of the theaters, normally along geographic lines. Typically, these administrative groupings differ from the country's go-to-war (fighting) force structure. Other parts of the

administrative force structure consist of assets centrally controlled at the national level. (See FM 7-100.4 *Opposing Force Organizational Guide: Chapter 3, Task Organizing*.)

The Headquarters of the Donovan Ground Force is in Moscow, as is the Headquarters of the Air Force and its subordinate Air Defence.

Defense Command. There are three military districts comprised of elements from the ground forces, the air force, and the internal security forces. The navy is primarily located in the southern parts of the country. Donovia can also mobilize a large number of personnel from the civilian population to act as a reserve force if needed.

Defense spending has increased over the last several years and




accounts for approximately eight percent of Donovian GDP. This increase is critical to building and maintaining the country's modern, highly capable force. The need to upgrade key military capabilities, especially information warfare (INFOWAR), the navy, and air force accounts for the increase in defense expenditures despite an economic downturn over the last several years.

Donovia organizes its armed forces into five service components: ground forces (army), navy, air force (which includes national-level air defense forces), strategic forces (with long-range rockets and missiles), special purpose forces (SPF) command, and the internal security forces. The ground forces are the largest of the five services, and have the capability to mobilize the reserve and militia forces to conduct sustained operations. The internal security forces are subordinate to the Ministry of the Interior in peacetime, but can be subordinated to the SHC as the sixth service in time of war.

Donovia traditionally maintains a large military industrial complex and normally finds itself with the capacity to produce its own military equipment and supplies. Recently, however, Donovia began to participate in a number of technology transfers with other countries in order to obtain advanced military capabilities. Donovia continually pursues foreign technology related to firepower technology, target acquisition, surveillance platforms, and INFOWAR capabilities as well as improvements in command and control capabilities.

The Donovian military reflects a major military force with fielded state-of-the-art technology across all functional areas. It also maintains links to regional (and possibly transnational) criminal and terror groups that further extend its potential, and capability, as a global threat. (For additional information on equipment tier tables, see Section 4: Appendix C, OPFOR Equipment Tier Tables, and the Worldwide Equipment Guide (WEG): Volume I, Chapter 1, COE Tier Tables.)



NATIONAL STRATEGIC GOALS

- Defense of Donovia's sovereignty
- Economic expansion
- Preclusion or elimination of outside intervention

IMPLEMENTING NATIONAL SECURITY GOALS


Donovia operates under a sophisticated, comprehensive, and multi-dimensional strategy derived from its comparative strength in the region. The Donovian military normally operates from a position of strength due to its position within the global strategic environment and may seek to exploit regional opportunities. In the event of intervention by extra-regional powers, Donovia assumes a strategy that must include not only internal and regional threats, but also extra-regional opponents.

In pursuit of its strategic goals, Donovia plans to conduct four basic types of strategic-level courses of action (COAs): strategic operations, regional operations, transition operations, and adaptive operations. Each COA involves the use of all four instruments of power (military and/or paramilitary, diplomatic-political, informational, and economic). Donovia will apply each element of power to a different degree and in different ways, dependent on the COA.

Donovia believes that its national security strategy must include all the instruments of national power, not just the military. Power is a combination of many elements, and the State can use them

in varying combinations as components of its overall national security strategy. Military, economic, and political matters are interdependent with the informational instruments cutting across the other three.

- **Strategic operations** use all instruments of power in peace and war to achieve a country's national security strategy goals through attacks against the enemy's strategic centers of gravity.
- **Regional operations** include conventional, force-on-force military operations against overmatched opponents, such as regional adversaries and internal threats.
- **Transition operations** bridge the gap between regional and adaptive operations and contain some elements of both. The country continues to pursue its regional goals while dealing with developing outside intervention that has the potential to overmatch its military.
- **Adaptive operations** preserve the country's power and apply it in adaptive ways against opponents that overmatch the country's military.



MILITARY FORCES OVERVIEW

MILITARY STRATEGY

Donovia conducts regional operations in primarily offensive actions. Donovian operations will be joint and include elements from all components in order to reduce the opponent's capability, capacity, and will to resist. The Donovian military does not limit its attacks on military and security forces, but seeks opportunities to dominate across the opponent's collective elements of national power. Donovian strategy seeks to erode any advantage the regional/extra-regional opponent may possess in its ability to contest the country's national interests. This includes many of the variables of the OE: political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure.

Donovia engages in transition operations as a pivotal point between regional and adaptive operations. Flexibility during the transition phase allows Donovian forces to pursue both regional operations and adaptive operations concurrently at least for a limited time. The decision to begin transition operations is not prescriptive, in that it does not necessarily mean that the military will complete the transition from regional to adaptive operations (or vice versa). Transition operations, however, allow the military to pursue a conditions-based strategy leading to an end state that can include any of the strategic COAs mentioned previously.

Donovian forces will conduct adaptive operations if it is deemed that an extra-regional force which intervenes against them contains sufficient power to overmatch the Donovian conventional military power. Donovian military history presents examples of Donovian resolve to fight to the end for a cause it believes in and is celebrated as a key component of the Donovian military tradition. As such, Donovia developed its techniques, organizations, capabilities, and strategy to deal with both regional

and extra-regional opponents. Donovia already knows how it will adapt to these new and changing threats and adjusts its methods accordingly.

The Donovian armed forces will engage in a wide range of activities short of war to ensure stability in the region and to pursue their national interests. Besides military operations, Donovian political and defense officials can mount a number of strategic operations designed to undermine confidence in the opponent's support and to establish Donovian policy as the best alternative to a potential conflict. Examples of these short-of-war actions may include:

- Perception Management: Strategic communications designed to influence domestic and international audiences will be used to Donovia's advantage. An example is to deceive by disseminating half-truths on important issues in order to cloud the distinction between fact and fiction.
- Information Attack: This activity is especially effective against financial institutions, media outlets, and telecommunications companies.
- Economic Warfare: This activity includes bans, blockades, and boycotts against goods, transportation, freight, currencies, and visas. One element of economic warfare is computer warfare, performed by hacking financial systems for the purpose of manipulating and exploiting industrial information.

ARMY OVERVIEW

The AFS of Donovia's ground forces manages a combination of armored, mechanized, and light infantry forces in peacetime. The AFS regional-level commands have standard organizational structures based on three military districts: Southern, Western, and Eastern (as depicted in the order of battle). These AFS organizations normally differ from the Donovian wartime fighting force structure.

Three armies compose the regular ground forces, with elements from other services in specialized or support roles. The ground forces possess the specific functions of military offensive and defensive capabilities in legitimate service to the state. Traditional missions of the Donovian ground forces are designed to accomplish one or more of the following objectives:

- Defeat an adversary's ground forces
- Destroy an adversary's war-making capacity
- Seize or retain territory
- Maintain stability both internally and regionally

Other functions of regular military forces can include a wide range of stability and support missions in concert with Donovia's policies and programs. These can include national disaster response, or assistance to provincial or district governments to counter lawlessness, riot, or insurrection.

The ground forces include tank, mechanized infantry, motorized infantry, and a significant number of airborne and special purpose forces (ground forces SPF). The ground forces field both rocket and tube artillery to support ground operations. The ground forces also have some long-range rockets and surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs). Fire support capability includes attack helicopters. The ground forces possess large numbers of shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), while mobile air defense units provide additional support. Donovia also fields a robust all-arms air defense capability at all levels.

Maneuver divisions and brigades are designed as the basis for forming either a division tactical group (DTG) or a brigade tactical group (BTG), if necessary. However, a brigade, with or without becoming a BTG, can fight as part of a division or DTG, or as a separate unit in an operational strategic command (OSC).




ARMY SIZE AND STRUCTURE


Donovia maintains a large army, with approximately 600,000 personnel between the active duty and reserve units. Donovia is one of the last modern countries using conscripts to maintain troop strength. Annually, approximately 795,500 people reach eligibility for one-year of compulsory service. The number of conscripts that enter service continues to decline and now only makes up about 25% of new recruits. An increasing number of volunteers or contract soldiers now join the military for three-year enlistments, but the recruits' quality pales when compared with Western volunteer soldiers. The Ground Forces Command serves as a force provider to the military district commands.

The AFS consists of the aggregate of various military headquarters, facilities, and installations designed to man, train, and equip the Donovian military. The Ground Forces Command normally groups its forces into armies, divisions, or brigades for administrative purposes within three geographical commands designated as military districts. The AFS is structured to easily transform

military districts into theater or operational-strategic commands (OSCs) for combat and can be task-organized with additional assets from throughout the military, including reserve personnel.



The Donovian district-level commands maintain standard organizational structures (as depicted in the AFS order of battle). Normally these administrative groupings differ from Donovia's go-to-war (fighting) force structure. If the SHC elects to create more than one theater headquarters, however, it may allocate parts of the AFS to each of the theaters, normally along geographic lines. Other parts of the AFS consist of assets centrally controlled at the national level such as the strategic force, SPF command, and the internal security forces. (See TC 7-100.2: *Opposing Force Tactics, chapter 3 on Task-Organizing.*)



ARMY DOCTRINE AND TACTICS

The Donovian ground forces assume the distinct possibility of intervention by a major extra-regional power in any regional conflict. Consequently, they will apply the following principles against any extra-regional threat:

- Control access into the region

- Employ operational shielding
- Control the tempo
- Cause politically unacceptable casualties to the enemy
- Neutralize technological overmatch

The Donovian ground forces' and other troops' primary tasks in wartime are to defeat aggression against Donovia and its allies. In order to defeat any opponent seen as a threat to the stability of the region, the ground forces use adaptive resistance and pursue objectives designed to force the enemy to cease hostilities on Donovian terms. Pursuit of comprehensive military objectives will bring to bear the full capabilities of the Donovian military across all elements of the operational environment.

At all levels of command, this doctrine provides the basis for Donovian policy against regional and extra-regional forces that represent a theoretical threat. Adaptive resistance also includes operations designed to combat drivers of instability such as rogue regimes, non-state terrorist organizations, and various criminal elements. The Donovian ground forces pursue an integrated combined arms approach to operations that relies on speed, surprise, and momentum; force and firepower; maneuverability, agility, and minimal footprint; and dynamic coordination carried out across all domains of the battlefield.

Traditionally, the Donovian ground forces design themselves to respond to crises through the policy of mass mobility, whereby the government mobilizes many large divisions and regiments to deal with a threat. The division remains the main organizational construct for the Donovian ground forces, but requirements to reduce the number of personnel in the Donovian military caused officials to reassess these principles. Recent Donovian military reforms generated the development of small, rapidly-deployable brigade-size elements designed to limit the number of personnel and assets through more effective and flexible deployment.

Advances in new technology and conventional firepower technology allow numerically small forces to inflict the same military effects against an opponent as larger forces previously caused. While many regard these changes as positive in terms of military capability and reduced bureaucratic overhead, others regard the former brigade/divisional structure as superior.

The Donovian ground forces organize the battlefield in such a way that they can rapidly transition between offensive and defensive operations and between linear and nonlinear operations. This flexibility can help the military adapt and change the nature of the conflict to something for which the enemy is not prepared. One of the most lethal aspects of Donovian ground forces is the ability of components to transition into various forms. For example, special purpose forces can change uniforms and insignia and other indicators of status to mask their capabilities and intentions while they successfully adapt to a variety of situations. Another example is the ability to rapidly task-organize units to maximize mission effectiveness.

Donovian forces often exploit the difficulties of positive identification of an enemy's appearance and intent. The Donovian forces will intentionally disguise themselves to appear similar to enemy forces or neutral actors. Donovian troops may present themselves in many ways, but will always maintain the ability to mass at the time and place of their choosing.

The Donovian military is expert at organizing for mission success and in the use of deception. It is very adept at determining the appropriate composition of its combat organization. It is common for Donovian forces to shift between performing regular and irregular military operations. At some times, uniformed military forces can best perform the functions while at other times irregular forces may perform the action best. Both types of forces will often act together.

The Donovian ground forces leadership recognizes the complexity of the modern battlefield. This will often lead to situations where part of the military may operate most effectively in a linear fashion,

while other parts may need to conduct nonlinear operations. The Donovian military understands what constitutes a linear or nonlinear battlefield based on general military theory accepted by many countries' armed forces. Battlefield geometry contains two dimensions: the relationship of units to each other, the enemy, and their support base; and the expected effects of that relationship. (*For more information on tactics, see TC 7-100.2: Opposing Force Tactics.*)

Donovia sees offensive operations as the decisive form of combat and the ultimate means of imposing its will on the enemy. While conditions at a particular time or place may require Donovia to defend, defeating an enemy force ultimately requires shifting to the offense. Even within the context of defense, victory normally requires offensive action. Therefore, Donovian commanders at all levels seek to create and exploit opportunities to take offensive action, whenever possible.


The aim of offense at the tactical level is to achieve the tactical mission in support of an operation. A tactical command ensures that its subordinate commands thoroughly understand both the overall goals of the operation and the specific purpose of a particular mission they are about to execute. In this way, subordinate commands may continue to execute the mission without direct control by a higher headquarters, if necessary.

ARMY TRAINING AND READINESS

The Donovian military fields a well-trained and professional army with a 98% operational readiness rate, which is considerably higher than most other countries worldwide. The average individual in the Donovian military falls into one of four distinct groups: conscripts, contract troops, noncommissioned officers (NCOs), and officers. Both the enlisted and officers in the Donovian military attend professional development schools that start from the time they begin service and follow them throughout their careers.

ARMY EQUIPMENT AND WEAPONS

Donovian military equipment and weapons reflect primarily tier 1 capabilities, but the military forces also possess random tier 2 capabilities throughout the force structure. The Donovian military can operate in all terrain types and can conduct 24-hour operations. (*For further information see Section 4: Appendix C or the WEG: VOL 1, Chapter 1, COE and Tier Tables.*)




NAVAL FORCES OVERVIEW

The Navy Command serves as a force provider to Donovia. Its area of responsibility includes the Black and Azov Seas on the western side of the country and the Caspian Sea to the east. The Donovian West Fleet in the Black Sea is the most modern and the strongest regional naval force.

The Donovian Navy maintains a regional force-projection navy with significant access-control capability built on surface combatants, submarines, surface- and ground-based anti-ship missile units, and anti-ship mines. The Navy also possesses an amphibious capability along with its naval infantry division. Together they are capable of forced entry operations against any regional opponent. The Navy also fields organic SPF. (*For further information, see Section 4: Appendix C or the WEG: Volume 3.*)

NAVY SIZE AND STRUCTURE

The Donovian Navy consists primarily of its Naval Headquarters, a West and East Fleet, a Naval Infantry Division, several modern and well-developed port facilities, and organizations providing support to the two fleets. The Naval Headquarters is based out of Novorossiysk on the Black Sea and is colocated with the Headquarters of the West Fleet. The Headquarters of the Eastern Fleet is based on the Caspian Sea at Makhachkala. (*See the OB at the end of this country's variable.*)



NAVY DOCTRINE AND TACTICS

The Donovian navy operates in support of the ground forces. The Donovian navy missions include:

- Mine laying, particularly in narrow channels and coastal areas
- Insertion/extraction of SPF
- Naval gun fire support
- Defensive patrolling of coastal areas
- Counterdrug search and seizure
- Anti-smuggling and piracy operations

NAVY TRAINING AND READINESS

The navy maintains an educated, well-trained, and highly motivated force with a 95% operational readiness rate. It conducts training year-round at the fleet level and participates in two semi-annual


joint training events. Bi-annually it participates in international training to repel extra-regional forces.

NAVY EQUIPMENT AND WEAPONS

The Donovian navy's equipment and weapons consist primarily of tier 1, modern competitive military systems capability (with some tier 2 elements) throughout the navy's force structure. This equipment allows the Donovian navy to conduct sustained all-weather, day/night operations. (*See Section 4: Appendix C or the WEG: Volume 3.*)

AIR FORCE OVERVIEW

The air force, like the navy, primarily supports the ground forces in a combined operations role. Each of the military districts is assigned an air force division in order to reduce the delay of waiting for aviation support from higher headquarters. The Donovian Air Force operates a number of different aircraft to include fighters, bombers, tactical transport, tankers, airborne early warning aircraft, electronic warfare (EW) aircraft, reconnaissance aircraft, and auxiliaries that can support a variety of different missions. The national-level air defense command (ADC) is subordinate to the air force. The ADC provides a modern integrated air defense system (IADS) throughout the country. Similar to other services, the air force fields its own organic air force SPF.



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graph TD
    AF[AIR FORCE] --> AFHQ[AIR FORCE HQ  
MOSCOW]
    AF --> MDAD[MILITARY DISTRICT AIR DIVISION]
    AF --> NAD[NATIONAL AIR DIVISION]
    AF --> ADC[AIR DEFENSE COMMAND  
MOSCOW]
    MDAD --> BD[BOMBER DIVISION]
    MDAD --> FD[FIGHTER DIVISION]
    NAD --> TR[TRANSPORT REGIMENT]
    NAD --> JR[JAMMING REGIMENT]
    BD --> TAC[TACTICAL AIR CONTROL]
    BD --> ISC[INTEGRATED SUPPORT COMMAND]
    FD --> R[REFUELING REGIMENT]
    FD --> IWB[INFORMATION WARFARE BATTALION]
    ISC --> MED[BMEDICAL BRIGADE]
    ISC --> ENG[ENGINEER COMMAND]
  
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Donovian Air Force

An air division can have fixed-wing aviation regiments of fighter, fighter-bomber, bomber, reconnaissance aircraft and possibly regiments of ground-attack or airborne jamming aircraft. It can also include medium transport, heavy transport, and air ambulance helicopters, and a heliborne jamming squadron.

AIR FORCE SIZE AND STRUCTURE

The Donovian air force maintains the largest, best-equipped, and best-trained air force in the region. Most fixed-wing assets belong to the air force, while some of the rotary-wing aircraft also belong to the army. The capabilities of the air force's fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft far exceed those of its neighbors, allowing Donovia to generate regional air superiority in any localized combat operations.

The Donovian air force structures its units as regional divisions, regiments, and squadrons under the control of the military districts. This structure provides timely and effective use of assets at all levels of combat, from the strategic campaign to the tactical ground maneuver plan.

As with the ground forces, the administrative force structure is a system in peacetime that mans, trains, and equips units to deploy for war. In times of conflict, the air force's peacetime divisions may be utilized in whole or may be parceled to provide units to a theater- or operational-level command. (See *Section 4: Appendix C or the WEG: Volume 3.*)

AIR FORCE DOCTRINE AND TACTICS

As air and ground forces are introduced into an area of operations, the air forces (primarily the regional air divisions) must concentrate missions to gain airspace control. This is determined by the operational situation and the number of aircraft dedicated to the attainment of air superiority versus support of ground forces. In many cases, additional support is required by the national level air force assets.

Initially, most air division assets conduct strategic- and operational-level missions. Examples of these higher-level missions are strategic bombing, long-range fire strikes, counter air, air interdiction, theater air reconnaissance, electronic warfare, and CBNR delivery.

Early operational and tactical aviation missions (such as air interdiction, air strikes, and ground missions including attacks on enemy airfields, or defense of friendly airfields) allow Donovian forces to attain air superiority from the outset. The airspace condition dictates aircraft employment throughout the theater of operations at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

Since aviation assets are only found at the operational levels of the force, Donovia will reinforce tactical maneuver units by allocating aviation assets, either through attachment or assignment as supporting aviation. An attached aviation unit is under the control of the maneuver unit commander; an aviation unit assigned to support a maneuver force remains subordinate to its parent squadron or regiment but carries out missions in support of the maneuver commander.

The Donovian Air Force has the following capabilities:

- Fighter aviation
- Bomber aviation
- Reconnaissance aviation
- In-air refueling
- Mixed aviation (fixed- and rotary-wing)
- Long-range fixed- and rotary-wing transport
- Heliborne jamming
- Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) under Air Defense Command


Donovian air divisions contain:

- Fighter-bombers
- Combat helicopters
- Fighter-interceptors
- Fixed- and rotary-wing transport
- Ground-attack aviation
- Airborne jamming aviation
- Air ambulance

AIR FORCE TRAINING AND READINESS

The operational readiness rate (OR rate), or “ready to fly rate,” refers to the capability of a unit, equipment, or weapon system to perform the mission or function for which it was organized or designed. Factors such as on-hand major-end items, spare part availability, scheduled aircraft maintenance, logistical and resupply procedures, transportation capabilities, and aircraft cannibalization and/or transfer procedures are considered. Initially, an OR rate in excess of 85 to 90 percent is considered normal. As hostilities continue, this rate can diminish considerably.

The Donovan air force trains its personnel for a variety of combat and combat support missions. The air force strives to maintain an 88% equipment OR rate. The air force fields a well-trained and highly motivated force with an OR rate estimated at around 88%. The air force maintains maintenance and launch facilities, early warning and C2 sites, and ground-based air defense sites throughout Donovia and has the capability to expedite these capabilities when required. (*See Section 4: Appendix C and FM 7-100.4.*)




AIR FORCE EQUIPMENT AND WEAPONS

The Donovian air force has largely tier 1 level equipment and aircraft (with some tier 2 elements) to meet mission requirements. It also possesses the potential for niche and emerging technologies. The Donovian air force fields domestically manufactured advanced aircraft including long-range bombers, intercept/fighters, and multi-role aircraft. These capabilities allow Donovia to project power both regionally and globally.

Although these elements are not normally found at the tactical level, they are often tasked to provide support to ground force divisions. The primary function for tactical aviation is to provide continuous fire support to ground forces by serving as “flying artillery” and to quickly respond to changes in the battlefield situation. They can be used to strike targets out of artillery range and provide maneuver support to the tactical and operational depth of the enemy. The fixed-wing assets available to the ground commander are found at the military district level in the administrative force structure. However, the majority of aerial support that the ground commander receives is in the form of helicopters at the army level in the combat aviation brigades. (*See Section 4: Appendix C or the WEG: Volume 3.*)

STRATEGIC FORCES

In addition to the ground forces, navy, and air forces, Donovia has a Strategic Forces Command that provides strategic-level functional capabilities.



GOVERNMENT PARAMILITARY FORCES

The police, border patrol, militia, and internal security brigades constitute the majority of Donovian paramilitary forces. All of these forces are tasked with keeping the peace within Donovian borders. The Security Directorate operates throughout Donovia in peacetime. Many of these elements operate as paramilitary units equipped for combat. They include border guard forces, national security forces, and special purpose forces. Together with the regular armed forces, they maintain control over the population in peace and war.

In wartime, some or all of the Ministry of the Interior's (MOI) internal security forces become subordinate to the SHC. Thus, they become the armed forces' sixth service component. At that time, the formal designation “internal security forces” applies to all MOI forces subordinated to the SHC,


which with the general staff controls and supervises their activities. The most likely forces subordinated to the SHC will come from the Security Directorate, the General Police Directorate, or the Civil Defense Directorate.

INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES

The internal security brigades, subordinate to the State Security Directorate, are tasked with keeping the peace within the Donovian borders and often work directly with the General Police Directorate. They also provide security and assistance during catastrophic events. In peacetime, an internal security brigade is directly subordinate to each military district. The Donovian government also maintains control of the internal security forces to deal with various internal threats to the regime. In peacetime, the chief of internal security heads the forces within the MOI. Most of the internal security forces wear uniforms and use military ranks and insignia similar to those of the Donovian military forces. The Donovian military districts field an internal security brigade, which consists of approximately 7,721 personnel. This number includes between three and four internal security battalions and intelligence assets.

The border guard forces consist of a professional cadre of officers and NCOs supplemented by conscripts and civilian auxiliaries. In wartime, the SHC/military may assign border guard forces to guard a newly gained territory or to conduct actions against the enemy. These constitute a paramilitary force of personnel trained in counterterrorism and border security.

The internal security brigades organize themselves along military lines and usually equip their personnel with light weapons. Sometimes, the internal security brigades may use heavy weapons and operate from armored vehicles. The internal security brigades conduct liaison with other internal security forces and with other services of the armed forces and may combine with them to conduct certain actions.



An operational-level command of the Donovian armed forces may include one or more internal security brigades to augment its military capability. This type of brigade not only increases the military combat power, but also offers a very effective and experienced force to control the local population. Security battalions, companies, and platoons operate similarly to equivalent regular army units.

The Security Directorate maintains its SPF units as a strategic reserve for emergency use in any part of the country or even outside of the country's borders. The commando-type SPF forces can conduct covert missions in support of other internal security forces or regular military forces. SPF activities may include the formation and training of an insurgent force in a neighboring country. In wartime, the SHC may use them to secure occupied territory or to operate as combat troops in conjunction with other services of the armed forces.

RESERVES AND MILITIA

Although all six Donovian military services can field some reserve forces, most reserve forces support the army. All militia forces belong to the army component. Overall planning and responsibility for reserve and militia mobilization belong to the Ground Forces Command. Each service component headquarters maintains a similar function responsible for mobilization of forces within that service. In peacetime the military districts provide the framework for mobilization of reserve and militia forces, in response to tasking from the Ministry of Defense.

NON-STATE PARAMILITARY FORCES

INSURGENT/GUERRILLA FORCES

One insurgent group that operates in southern Donovia and northern Atropia is the Bilasuvar Freedom Brigade (BFB). The Donovian government supports this group as its intent is not to overthrow the Donovian government, but the current Atopian government. Donovia's support for the BFB creates political tension between the countries.

There are a number of smaller anti-government groups that tend to remain underground due to potential backlash from government forces. Attacks or violence tends to be minimal and, unless these groups were to join forces, they will remain an insignificant threat to the Donovian government. None of the groups has more than 50 individuals, and the names of these groups change randomly as members come and go.

CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS

There is growing concern with regard to national and transnational criminal organizations within Donovia. Reports indicate a number of entities dealing in the weapons and drug trade. Reports also indicate the presence of SPF and elements of Donovian intelligence related to black market operations, human trafficking, drug trafficking, and weapons trade. The Al Iksir Cartel, a local criminal gang, operates primarily in southern Donovia and northern Atropia.

PRIVATE SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS

Numerous private security firms help guard the Donovian hydrocarbon infrastructure and maintain loose ties to the Donovian military.

NONMILITARY ARMED COMBATANTS

Most nonmilitary armed combatants (insurgent forces, guerrilla forces, criminal organizations, and private security organizations) in Donovia range from predominately neutral to predominately

hostile in their view of the US. Most Donovians view US activity in the Caucasus negatively as they feel that as the most powerful state in the region, their country should take the lead role in influencing events in the other countries in the area.

MILITARY FUNCTIONS

A military function is a group of related tasks, activities, capabilities, operations, processes, and organizations that fulfill the specific military purpose for which they all exist. When integrated with other such functions, they contribute to the accomplishment of larger missions.

JOINT CAPABILITIES

Donovia and its armed forces may act independently or as part of a multinational alliance or coalition, and may engage in regular, irregular, or hybrid warfare. When conducting hybrid warfare, Donovia's regular forces will act in concert with irregular forces and/or criminal elements to achieve mutually benefitting effects. In such cases, the national-level strategy, operational designs, and courses of action of the Donovian military constitute a wide range of capabilities and motives.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Central to the Donovian military's command and control (C2) system is the assumption that all modern communications remain susceptible to attack and/or monitoring by the enemy. Accordingly, the Donovian military operates from the view that centralized planning defines the means for assuring both *command* (establishing the aim) and *control* (sustaining the aim), leading to strategic and operational directions. Necessarily, then, Donovia relies on the loyalty of its forces and accords far-ranging authority to act within the aim while foregoing rigorous control as both unproductive and unlikely in the modern environment.

Donovia defines *command and control* as the actions of commanders, command groups, and staffs of military headquarters to maintain continual combat readiness and combat efficiency of forces, to plan and prepare for combat operations, and to provide leadership and direction during the execution of assigned missions. Donovia's tactical C2 concept is based on the following key principles: (*See TC 7-100.2: Opposing Force Tactics, Chapter 2, Command and Control.*)

- Mission tactics
- Flexibility through battle drill
- Accounting for mission dynamics

Donovian military battalions are characterized by headquarters composed of a command section including the commander, deputy commander, and a small staff element. It also includes a staff section with the chief of staff and the remainder of the battalion staff. The battalion staff consists of the operations officer, the assistant operations officer, the intelligence officer, and the resources officer. The signal platoon leader also serves as the battalion communications officer, the reconnaissance platoon leader acts as the chief of reconnaissance, while the materiel support platoon leader serves as the battalion resources officer. (*See TC 7-100.2: Opposing Force Tactics, Chapter 2, Command and Control.*)

C2 at the tactical level of command is designed with emphasis on survivability through mobility, redundancy, and security. Command posts (CPs) and procedures are streamlined at the operational level, and great reliance is placed on the use of common procedures for important recurring tactical tasks. (*For information on command and support relationships, see TC 7-100.2: Opposing Force Tactics, Chapter 2, Command and Control.*)

MANEUVER

The Donovian military has a robust capability to conduct combined arms operations; the basic combined arms unit is the maneuver brigade. In the administrative force structure, maneuver brigades are typically constituent to divisions, referred to as divisional brigades. However, some are organized as separate brigades, designed to have greater ability to accomplish independent missions without further allocation of forces from higher-level tactical headquarters.

The Donovian military views the offensive as the decisive form of operations and the ultimate means to impose its will on the enemy. While conditions at a particular time or place may require the Donovian military forces to defend, defeat of an enemy force ultimately requires offensive operations. Even within the context of defense, Donovian doctrine believes tactical victory normally requires offensive action. Whenever possible, Donovian commanders at all levels seek to create and exploit opportunities to take offensive action. In the context of strategic or operational levels of war, offensive operations are often “conventional” in nature. (*See TC 7-100.2: Opposing Force Tactics, Chapter 3, Offense.*)

AIR DEFENSE

The Donovian Air Defense Command (ADC) is subordinate to the air force, which provides air defense coverage for Donovian units. It also supports combined arms combat by the comprehensive integration of a large number and variety of weapons and associated equipment into an effective, redundant air defense system. Employment of this system pursues the basic objectives of air defense by employing certain concepts and principles. This is best accomplished by establishing an integrated air defense system (IADS). Air defense weapons and surveillance systems at all levels of command are part of an IADS. This ability provides a continuous, unbroken (usually overlapping) umbrella of air defense coverage and presents a significant threat to any potential enemy air activity.

Donovia recognizes that air defense is an *all-arms* effort. Thus, all ground units possess some type of organic air defense capability to differing degrees, depending on the type and size of the unit. The ADC continuously looks for new and adaptive ways to employ not only air defense systems but also systems not traditionally associated with air defense. Many weapons not designed as air defense weapons will also damage and/or destroy tactical aircraft when within range.

Throughout maneuver units, there are a number of systems designed for air defense and other systems that can be used in an air defense role. The heavy antiaircraft machineguns on tanks are specifically designed for air defense. Machineguns on armored personnel carriers and automatic cannon on infantry fighting vehicles can engage both ground and air targets. Most antitank guided missiles (ATGMs) are extremely effective against low-flying helicopters. Several ATGM manufacturers offer antihelicopter missiles and compatible fire control, which are especially effective against low-flying rotary-wing aircraft. Field artillery and small arms can also be integral parts of the air defense scheme. All these weapons can be extremely lethal when used in this role.

Donovia considers every soldier with a man-portable air defense system (MANPADS) to be an air defense firing unit. These weapons are readily available at a relatively low cost and are widely proliferated. Therefore, Donovian ground forces are acquiring as many MANPADS as possible and issuing them in large numbers to a wide variety of units. The military can also disseminate them to selected affiliated forces. The small size and easy portability of these systems provides the opportunity for ambush of enemy airframes operating in any area near Donovian units. Ground units also employ them to set ambushes for enemy helicopters, especially those on routine logistics missions. (*For more information, see TC 7-100.2, chapter 11, air defense.*)

INFOWAR

Donovia is constantly increasing the levels of technology used in its communications, automation, reconnaissance, and target acquisition systems. In order to ensure the successful use of information technologies and to deny the enemy the advantage afforded by such systems, Donovia has continued to refine its doctrine and capabilities for information warfare (INFOWAR). (*For more information, see TC 7-100.2, chapter 7, INFOWAR.*)

Donovia's INFOWAR capability is highly developed, can attack a US unit throughout the range of operations, and presents a credible peer-level threat. As the Donovian conventional and nuclear capability receded after the Four Traitors, Donovian military theorists looked to INFOWAR to level the conventional disparity between itself and the West and provide a means of national deterrence as an alternative to nuclear weapons. This includes anti-satellite capabilities throughout the entire kill-chain. (*See the Information variable for more information on Donovian INFOWAR capabilities.*)

RISTA

Donovia believes that reconnaissance is a mission and not a force or unit, so reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition (RISTA) receives high priority throughout its military forces. For the Donovian military, reconnaissance operates as an integrated combined arms effort, not solely the business of reconnaissance troops. Besides reconnaissance units, the Donovian military will use other units for reconnaissance missions as necessary. It will use paramilitary forces, affiliated forces, and/or friendly civilians to collect information. Reconnaissance and intelligence collection are critical to Donovian military operations. Commanders and planners place significant emphasis on the destruction of enemy precision weapons and on conducting high-speed, continuous combined arms operations throughout the depth of the theater.

Reconnaissance and intelligence collection operates on three distinct levels: strategic, operational, and tactical. These three categories overlap, mutually support, and differ primarily by the level of command and the commander's area of responsibility (AOR). Commanders require continuous, timely, and accurate intelligence on the enemy, terrain, and meteorological situation. Thus, the Donovian military devotes substantial effort to all forms of reconnaissance. Commanders prefer to confirm their plan only after thorough reconnaissance.

The Donovian military uses six principles to guide its reconnaissance activities: focus; continuity; aggressiveness; timeliness; camouflage, concealment, cover, and deception; and accuracy and reliability. For the greatest likelihood of a successful operation, Donovian military reconnaissance must satisfy all of these principles simultaneously and continuously. Reconnaissance must serve the commander's needs and focus on elements and objectives critical to the execution of combat operations.

Each level of command, from theater to battalion, develops a comprehensive reconnaissance plan in accordance with the organization's mission. Reconnaissance resources are always scarce. The commander must carefully define and limit ground reconnaissance objectives and concentrate reconnaissance assets on the critical areas of the battlefield. To use reconnaissance assets effectively, the commander must remain flexible. If the situation changes, the commander must redirect the reconnaissance effort or even alter the plan. The reconnaissance plan must coordinate all available assets into an integrated plan.

FIRE SUPPORT

The goal of Donovian fire support is to synchronize all available fire support systems to achieve the most effective results, thereby maximizing combat power. Effective fire support enables ground

forces to attack successfully and quickly to exploit weaknesses. Commanders try to accomplish their missions using a combination of maneuver, fires, and INFOWAR.

Donovian fire support doctrine stresses that fire support should combine air assets, surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs), and artillery into an integrated attack against enemy defenses. The combined arms commander always seeks to increase the effectiveness of air and missile strikes and artillery fire to destroy enemy formations, weapon systems, or key components of an enemy combat system. This ensures continuous fire support for maneuver units throughout the AOR.

Donovia believes that fire support must be integrated with INFOWAR. INFOWAR provides a nonlethal alternative or supplement to attack by fire and maneuver. It is integrated into the overall concept of the battle to confuse, deceive, delay, disrupt, disable, and disorganize the enemy at all levels. Fire support can play a role in the physical destruction element of INFOWAR. (*For more information, see TC 7-100.2, chapter 7, INFOWAR.*)

The integration of air, artillery, SSM, and nonlethal assets into a unified fire support plan is a major task for the combined arms commander. Integration is a decisive element, fundamental to the success of any tactical action on the modern battlefield. Donovia does not consider itself to be an artillery-centric force. Rather, it views itself as using various forms of fire support to achieve success during offensive and defensive combat. In the offense, fire support is important to the success of any attack. It can destroy key enemy systems; disrupt, immobilize, or destroy enemy groupings; and repel counterattacks. Fire support is also the cornerstone of any defense, blunting attacks at the crucial point in the battle. It disrupts enemy preparations for the attack and repels forces. (*For more information, see TC 7-100.2, chapter 9, Indirect Fire Support.*)

PROTECTION

The Donovian military will attempt to minimize civilian casualties in military operations, either defensive or offensive, but the Donovian military is not casualty-adverse for military or civilian personnel as long as the units complete their objectives. The military does possess a robust infrastructure with air defense assets, engineer, and field artillery (with target acquisition) that should lower the possibility of “friendly fire” and the threat of a regional enemy that is not as technologically advanced. (*See TC 7-100.2: Opposing Force Tactics, chapter 12, Engineer, and chapter 7, INFOWAR.*)

LOGISTICS

Fundamental to the Donovian military’s logistics concept are the country’s twin notions of total war and all means necessary to win any war. As a consequence, Donovia fully integrates civilian and military components of both its materiel and service industries. Thus, Donovia’s strategic logistics complex includes the national industrial base with its supply points, distribution centers, arsenals, plants, manufacturing facilities, medical support, and personnel support centers. The national industrial base can build everything from small arms to nuclear-capable missiles.

While Donovia possesses the ability to design, produce, and field weapon systems, the country faces some serious qualitative shortcomings in industrial production and integration. The Donovian military plans for its logistics system to provide continuous support to the civilian populace while it simultaneously supports its military forces. Donovia’s national security strategy requires that the military and the entire population be constantly prepared for the sudden outbreak of war or natural disasters. Donovia continues to make major improvements in all aspects of its logistics system, including an increased emphasis on support zone security and plans for stockpiling war materiel throughout the country.

For the Donovian military, the MOD coordinates logistics at the national level through its Chief of Logistics. The Chief of Logistics’ responsibilities remain the same in peace or war, and include:

-
- Procuring personnel, materiel, and services required by the military
 - Preparing the economy and the people to provide sustained support in case of war
 - Ensuring an uninterrupted flow of personnel, materiel, and equipment reaches the individual fighting unit at the proper place and time

Organizations within the national-level military logistics establishment include materiel support and maintenance units, as well as mobilized civilian resources, to include medical personnel and facilities. The SHC may allocate some national-level logistics units to subordinate commands to augment the units while the SHC centralizes the other units' logistics support under general staff control. (*For more information, see TC 7-100.2: Opposing Force Tactics, chapter 14, Logistics.*)

CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOPHYSICAL, AND NUCLEAR

Donovia possesses a robust and modern chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) capability. Donovian strategic policy supports a CBRN first strike in the event it believes its national security is in jeopardy. National policy also supports the use of preemptive CBRN strikes against a neighbor either to deter aggression or as a response to an enemy attack. It may also use, or threaten to use, CBRN weapons as a way of applying political, economic, or psychological pressure.

Donovia has a wide variety of CBRN delivery means organic to its military forces. In addition to surface-to-surface missiles capable of carrying CBRN warheads, most Donovian artillery systems are capable of delivering chemical munitions. Artillery systems that are 152-mm or larger are also capable of firing nuclear rounds. The Donovian air force can also use its aircraft to deliver a CBRN attack. Trained Donovian SPF may also be used as alternate means of delivering CBRN munitions packages. Donovia is also well-prepared to employ civilian and military CBRN protection measures and has chemical defense units organic to all division and brigade maneuver units.

Donovia has a substantial industrial base that produces large quantities of toxic industrial chemicals (TIC), which are chemical substances possessing acute toxicity. An adjunct to chemical weapons is use of TIC, which can easily be exploited as improvised (or converted into) chemical weapons by military and civilians alike. (*For a listing of possible high- and moderate-risk toxic TIC possibly available to Donovia see the Worldwide Equipment Guide, Volume I, Chapter 16, Improvised Military Systems.*)

For additional information on the capabilities, release authority (NCA), and employment of CBRN, see TC 7-100.2, *OPFOR Tactics*, Chapter 13, *CBRN and Smoke*. For specific technical information, delivery means, agents, and effects of CBRN, see the *Worldwide Equipment Guide*, Volume I, Chapter 10, *CBRN*.

Summary

Donovia maintains the dominant military within the region, which is consistent with a tier 1 military in weapons and equipment. The Donovian military, however, possesses a few tier 2 elements scattered throughout its force structure. The military consists of three armies with a modern, well-trained, and capable air force and navy. The Donovians have a very modern and effective C2 and can conduct large-scale operations. The Donovian military possesses a strategic first strike policy and large elements of CBRN capabilities, including nuclear weapons. The CBRN weapons are also susceptible to being sold on the open and/or black market to terrorist groups and others.

TRADOC G-2

TRISA-THREATS

CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND THREAT INTEGRATION

DIRECTORATE (CTID)

ECONOMIC: DONOVIA

Economic: Donovia

The economic variable encompasses individual and group behaviors related to producing, distributing, and consuming resources.

KEY FACTS:

REGION

- Hydrocarbon resources drive the Caucasus economy, and its uneven geographic disposition creates an unequal distribution of wealth and leads to regional conflicts.
- While economies continue to develop, insufficient large-scale industrial production limits overall economic growth.
- All economies in the region have high levels of corruption, heavy government involvement, and lack of developed non-hydrocarbon export industries.

DONOVARIA

- Donovia's current economic structure and situation stem from an internal financial collapse brought on by the 1991 Four Traitors incident.
- GDP is heavily skewed toward energy-related industry and services, with exports being primarily hydrocarbon-based.

OPERATIONAL IMPACTS OF THE ECONOMIC VARIABLE IN THE OE:

REGION

- All Caucasus countries consider critical economic infrastructure defense as a primary military effort.
- Hydrocarbon infrastructure will serve as a critical center of gravity in nearly all military operations in the region.
- Agriculture provides the majority of the jobs in the Caucasus, but not the bulk of its economic activity.

DONOVARIA

- Corruption is integral to the Donovian economic system, permeating all levels, and must be considered when either in or dealing with the country.
- Donovia continues to rely on the healthy revenue stream produced by hydrocarbon exports to stabilize the country economically.

ECONOMIC OVERVIEW:

The Caucasus countries that possess hydrocarbon resources will continue to depend on the oil and gas industries to drive their economies, while those that do not possess such resources will attempt to tie themselves to hydrocarbon-rich nations. Both Ariana and Atropia face geopolitical difficulties in exporting their oil and natural gas. Bordered by adversaries, the Arianians and Atropians must rely on tenuous routes to export their resources. For Gorgas and Minaria, which lack extractive or mature industries, transshipment of hydrocarbon products or providing other services to oil-wealthy countries will be their primary short- to medium-term means to achieve economic development.

Donovia continues to recover from a collapse two decades ago that crippled its economy. All nations of the Caucasus have relatively high inefficiency due to corruption, government involvement in the economy, and/or lack of export industry development.

Donovia's current economic structure and situation stem from a sudden internal financial collapse that occurred in 1991. The Donovian government instituted major changes at that time, liberalizing the banking, tax, and private enterprise systems to assist recovery. These reforms, coupled with vast natural resources, enabled the country to stabilize economically and gradually recover.

TABLE OF ECONOMIC DATA

Measure	Data	Rank in World	Remarks (if applicable)
GDP	1.78 trillion USD	10	
Labor Force	69.14 million	8	
Unemployment	8.3%	94	Increasing
Poverty	12%		Percent below poverty line
Investment	19.4% of GDP	104	
Budget	\$210 billion revenue \$273 billion expenditures		
Public Debt	12.3% of GDP	122	
Inflation	10%	198	

PARTICIPATION IN THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM

Over the past decade, the Caucasus nations made considerable efforts to integrate themselves into the global financial system. While focused on local conflicts, the Caucasus region opened to other countries to increase global markets for its products, especially petroleum, and looked to the West for economic developmental aid, usually in the form of loans and grants.

IMF/WORLD BANK/INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AID

In the past 20 years Donovia has transformed itself from an aid recipient to a donor country. Struggling in the decade after its financial collapse, Donovia took advantage of its membership in the IMF to receive several loans, all of which have since been repaid. The World Bank (WB) has provided over \$11 billion in financing for more than 65 projects in the country since the collapse, including 14 that are currently active for a combined \$1.4 billion. The vast majority of the current projects focus on improvements in governance issues such as judicial reform and customs development, while others pertain to economic development and natural resource management. At present, Donovia is working to position itself as a major donor country, with a foreign aid budget of \$450 million and a \$7 billion fund created specifically to assist struggling neighbors.

FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT

Donovia has implemented considerable economic reforms in recent years, including large-scale privatization and price liberalization, in order to attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Still lacking, however, is a legal and regulatory environment based on rules and applied consistently throughout the country. Property rights need to be revised in particular, including contractual rights, dispute resolution, and acceptable accounting practices. Donovia currently possesses total FDI of \$238 billion, with \$34 billion of that amount being added last year. This is expected to increase to \$50-60 billion annually within the foreseeable future. Sectors that have recently seen significant FDI include energy, high-tech, transportation and infrastructure, and food and beverage.

ECONOMIC ACTIVITY

Donovia's current economic structure and situation directly results from the Four Traitors incident of 1991. Prior to this, the country made extensive use of profits from its vast natural resources to heavily influence neighboring countries through political and economic means (aid, grants, industrial projects, etc.). This ended abruptly when Donovia experienced a major economic collapse precipitated by discovery of a massive embezzlement scheme perpetrated against the government.

Member of Parliament Yassar Akbari, General Ibrahim al-Fatem, Ismail Jinat of the Jinat crime family, and Viaprom CFO Muhammad Hafiz, conspiring together, embezzled tremendous amounts of money from the Donovian government over a period of eight years. Referred to as the Four Traitors, these men fled the country when the situation was discovered in the fall of 1991. The Donovian government spent considerable time and effort in attempts to recover both the Traitors and the lost funds—around 20% of government revenue for the years in question—but met with no appreciable success.

The effect of the Four Traitors on the Donovian economy was instantaneous and enormous. Massive government spending cuts and layoffs were instituted, as well as an immediate curtailing of all foreign aid and the abrupt dissolution of many economic agreements with neighboring countries. Unemployment tripled overnight, while government aid became all but impossible to obtain. Considerable social unrest resulted, and the military had to be called out to maintain order.

In an attempt to recover from this crisis, Donovia decided to base its economy on free-market principles. The country has made considerable progress in the past two decades, but much remains to be done. Laws and business regulations remain complex and contradictory, and implementation is both inconsistent and heavily influenced by politics and corruption. The situation is gradually improving, though, with a noticeable decrease in difficulties during the past 10 years and an increased number of businesses both seeking and receiving redress through the courts.

The Donovian economy focuses primarily on industry (54% of GDP) and the service sector (42%), with agriculture playing a minimal role (4%). Unlike its southern neighbors, the country's labor pool is distributed fairly proportionally to its influence, with 42% of personnel working in industry, 38% in services, and 20% in agriculture. Donovia maintains trade relations with Minaria, Atropia, and Ariana, while its economic interactions with Gorgas are limited at best.

ECONOMIC ACTORS

In many ways, Donovia's economy continues to operate in the same way it has for decades. Prior to the Four Traitors, state-run enterprises such as Viaprom (oil) and Vianeft (natural gas) played a large political role, with those in charge both giving and receiving the benefits of tight relations with the political elite. Despite considerable economic reforms, these relationships have remained largely intact and unchanged. Companies that were privatized after the Four Traitors were almost always sold to the same individuals that ran them while under State control. These corporate heads continue to work within the system to maintain their mutually beneficial relationship with top politicians and prevent economic reforms that would challenge their position by introducing genuine competition at the corporate level.

TRADE

A net exporter, international trade contributes significantly to the Donovian economy. Hydrocarbons constitute a major portion of the trade, as oil and natural gas account for 82% of Donovia's total exports. Other export commodities include metals, manufactures, military hardware, and electricity. Imports are machinery, pharmaceuticals, plastics and plastic products, iron, and medical equipment. Major trade partners include China, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, the Ukraine, the United

States, and Japan. Regionally, Donovia has strong relations with Minaria and maintains trade with Ariana and Atropia, but has almost no economic relations with Gorgas. In addition, Donovia is subject to targeted international sanctions due to its active nuclear program, which influences both trading partners and products imported/exported.

COMMERCIAL TRADE

Donovia presents a strong commercial trade sector, with exports totaling \$400 billion per year and \$250 billion of annual imports. Oil accounts for 51% of the country's exports, while natural gas claims an additional 31%. Manufactures, such as vehicles, and industrial equipment also play important export roles. Imports such as pharmaceuticals and plastics fill the demand that domestic capacity is unable to fully supply.

MILITARY EXPORTS/IMPORTS

Last year Donovia exported \$20 billion in military hardware to other countries, including China, Ariana, India, Minaria, Vietnam, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, and Algeria. Equipment sold and leased includes ships, submarines, airplanes, tanks and conveyance vehicles, weaponry, and ammunition. Donovia also provided equipment maintenance and force training to foreign countries.

ECONOMIC DIVERSITY

Donovia possesses an industrial-based economy coupled with a relatively strong services sector and a weak agricultural sector. Significant industrial areas include energy, manufacturing, and mining. Industry accounts for 54% of the country's GDP, services claim 42%, and agriculture produces the remainder (4%). Exports are nearly all industrial in nature, with energy claiming 82% of the total. Large deposits of gold and rare earths promise to increase a strong mining sector, and manufacturing rounds out the country's varied industries.

ENERGY SECTOR

The energy sector dominates the industrial segment of Donovia's economy. Vast oil and natural gas deposits exist in central and southern Donovia, as well as large oil fields in the Caspian Sea. Profits from these resources were the basis for Donovia's strong regional influence prior to the uncovering of the Four Traitors. Afterward, continued exploitation of oil and natural gas provided the government with a reliable revenue stream during the economic collapse and subsequent reforms.

Oil

Donovia operates 72 oil production fields—61 onshore and 11 offshore, in the central and southern parts of the country and in the Caspian Sea. Last year the country exported 5.4 million billion barrels per day (bbl/d), accounting for just over half of its total exports. The remaining 2.7 million bbl/d (of a total daily production of 8.1 million bbl/d) went to domestic use. Donovia produces about 8.9% of all global oil.

Natural Gas

Donovia possesses massive onshore natural gas resources in the southern part of the country. Consisting of five developed and three undeveloped fields, Donovia boasts the largest proven reserves of any country worldwide. The country exports 179 billion cubic meters of natural gas per year, accounting for 31% of its total exports.

AGRICULTURE

Donovia has only 12% arable land and possesses only a small agricultural sector. Agriculture accounts for 4% of GDP, but employs 20% of the country's labor force. Grains such as wheat, corn, and barley are the primary crop, and are grown throughout the country. Sugar beets, sunflower seeds, tea, and potatoes round out the major agricultural products grown. Animal products include dairy and meat, the latter mainly consisting of beef and poultry. Hogs are rarely raised, as they are considered unclean by the majority Muslim population. Small family farms and private gardens provide approximately one-third of the country's food supply.

FORESTRY

Forests are prevalent in the far south, and mainly consist of oak, birch, pine, and spruce. The area enjoys small but profitable timber and paper industries, despite rather onerous governmental regulations. These regulations, coupled with lack of real government oversight at the federal level, have resulted in both considerable local corruption and sizeable illegal movement of Donovian timber across national borders.

MINING

Mining plays a considerable role in Donovia's economy, both domestically and through exports. The country possesses some of the world's largest deposits of gold, nickel, coal, potash, iron, uranium, diamonds, phosphates, and copper, among others. Only a few years ago, vast deposits of rare earths were discovered in the East, with quantities second only to those found in China. Donovia produces metals, minerals, and mineral oils in great quantities and exports them to numerous countries, including the United States and China.

MANUFACTURING

Manufacturing makes up a sizeable portion of Donovia's industrial capacity, with large metal, food, transportation, medical, industrial, and military equipment sectors. The first five industries were privatized following the Four Traitors incident and, after struggling for the first few years, recovered almost completely. The military equipment sector continues to be state-owned and state-run. All manufacturing sectors—especially those for steel, aluminum, and military hardware—enjoy significant export markets.

SERVICES

With economic reforms and the privatization of substantial portions of the economy, the service industry has grown considerably. It currently employs 38% of the work force and contributes 42% of the nation's GDP. One main sector is services related to energy, such as machining. Business-related services, including financial, advertising, marketing, and retail, saw an explosion after the reforms. Tourism is the final contributing sector, and mainly focuses on the cultural attractions in and around Moscow.

BANKING AND FINANCE

PUBLIC FINANCE

Donovia has gone through considerable growing pains during the past decade as it continued to move into a free marketplace. First to come was a major overhaul of the tax structure, decreasing and simplifying taxes and rates in order to increase voluntary participation and reduce fraud. Then the country experienced a slowly improving economy, with inflation decreasing from a high of 60% in 1999 to single digits only seven years later. Oil revenues increased at the same time, allowing the

government to run on a surplus. Donovia's monetary unit, the lela, grew in strength, and foreign currency holdings increased as well. Public debt decreased, and the government paid off the last of its post-Four Traitors external debt. Inflation began to increase again in 2007, and the recent global financial crisis hit the country hard. The combination of dropping oil prices and economic stabilization measures forced the government to run a deficit starting two years ago. The only positive result of the crisis was a reduction in the inflation rate, which once again reached single digits.

Taxation

Donovia passed major tax reform in 1992 in an effort to decrease tax avoidance and support private industry. Federal taxes include corporate (15%), flat income (20%), and national sales (10%), as well as tariffs and levies on specific items. Various taxes exist at the republic and local level, including personal property, real estate, and additional sales tax. While these reforms helped fuel economic growth, the existence of both national and regional sales taxes that can reach a combined 21% has encouraged both illegal barter and under-the-counter (black market) transactions of goods and services.

Financial Policy

The Donovian government has taken a relatively conservative approach to fiscal policy during the past two decades. In addition to major tax reform, the government saved a considerable portion of the revenues generated by the petroleum and mining industries, allowing it to run surpluses for several years. However, the recent financial crisis combined with decreasing commodity prices during the same period had considerable adverse effects. Donovia was forced into deficit spending two years ago, and may well run deficits for the next five years.

The Central Bank of Donovia handles the country's monetary policy, which is limited to managing the value of the Donovian lela against other currencies. This is accomplished by pegging the value of the lela to a basket of euros and US dollars, with the euro/dollar ratio determined by the bank. Changes to the basket are performed through buying and/or selling each foreign currency.

Inflation

Inflation has been a major problem in Donovia, with the country experiencing double-digit numbers for most of the past two decades. While inflation was rampant after the Four Traitors, reaching a high of 60% in 1999, increases in global energy prices and a revised tax structure led to a reasonable 9% rate in 2006. It began to climb again four years ago with rising food costs and increased borrowing by domestic banks and companies, again hitting double digits until the recent financial crisis. At the present time, the Donovian inflation rate stands at 8.3% and increasing.

Currency Reserves

Foreign currency reserves for Donovia total \$179 billion, with holdings of 43% US dollars, 43% euros, 8% British pounds, and the remainder in Japanese yen, Swiss francs, Canadian dollars, Australian dollars, and Norwegian kroner. The latter five were added in the past two years due to the weakening of both the US dollar and euro. These reserves, which are managed by the Central Bank of Donovia, are used to control the Donovian lela.

Public Liabilities/Debt

Public debt for Donovia currently stands at 12.3% of GDP. However, the country has considerable stock in domestic banks and corporations, including the largely state-owned natural gas company Viaprom, that have considerable external debt. When this is included in the calculation, Donovia's public debt increases to 16.2% of GDP.

PRIVATE BANKING

Though growing, the private banking sector is not without problems. Large state banks located primarily in the Moscow region dominate the market, resulting in little competition. These banks are unskilled at assessing credit risk and favor loans to large corporations, viewing small to mid-size businesses as high-risk. In addition, bank books are riddled with non-performing loans. Finally, most banks do not enjoy a high level of trust by the general public. Weak governance and a lack of transparency combine with reporting deficiencies and a strong perception of corruption to reinforce this tendency.

Banking System

Donovia's banking sector remains small but growing, with deposits and demand for loans on the increase. Despite the country's secular orientation, the number of sharia-compliant banks is approximately equal to the number that charge interest. Most Donovians keep their savings in bank accounts, which are federally insured for up to 50,000 lela (around \$25,000). Around eight years ago, loan demand was so high that banks were forced to borrow significant amounts from foreign lenders. As much as half of current Donovian banking assets take the form of loans despite continued double-digit annual increases in deposit amounts.

Stock/Capital

The Donovian Stock Exchange (DSE) opened in 1992 as a method to encourage foreign investment. Business lines include stocks, bonds, corporate securities, and futures trading, and the DSE index is published globally. The DSE currently has 817 different companies listed for a total value of \$583 billion.

Informal Finance

The *hawala* system, an informal trust-based money transfer system commonly found in Muslim countries, serves as an alternative to the Donovian formal banking system for loans and monetary transfer. These transactions work on an honor system, without paper transactions or promissory notes. Few Donovians make use of this system outside of a small percentage of the country's conservative Muslims and those associated with terrorist/criminal groups.

EMPLOYMENT STATUS

Employment status is high in Donovia, with relatively stable unemployment for the past decade. The current low birth rate and short male life expectancy allow for both reduced competition and increased upward mobility in employment, thus opening up more entry-level positions for younger Donovians. While this grants the individual worker more employment opportunities, it harms the economy through a lack of workers. There is a considerable foreign labor market, but most of these positions are black market in nature due to official government favoritism toward Donovian Arabs.

ILLEGAL ECONOMIC ACTIVITY

A part of the Donovian political system for decades, corruption is integral to the Donovian economic system and only continues to expand and increase. It can be as small as bribing a traffic officer to avoid getting a ticket, or as large as paying off government officials to prevent false criminal charges or physical destruction of a business location. Some activities that would be normal business activities in other countries are either illegal or considered suspect by the Donovian security services. There are particular risks involved in any commercial activity with the Donovian military-industrial complex. Any misunderstanding or dispute in such transactions can attract the involvement of the security services and lead to investigation or prosecution for espionage. Rules

governing the treatment of information remain poorly defined. Foreign businesses, including some major international corporations, have either limited expansion in the country or considered pulling out entirely due to the pervasiveness of these problems and their associated uncertainties.

Incidents of unprovoked, violent harassment against racial and ethnic minorities regularly occur throughout Donovia. People most at risk are those of African or Asian descent. These same groups of people are also at risk for harassment by police authorities. It is not uncommon for foreigners in general to become victims of harassment, mistreatment, and extortion by law enforcement and other officials. Police do not need to show probable cause in order to stop, question, or detain individuals.

Organized crime has made itself an increasingly pervasive part of the Donovian system since the Four Traitors. It is inextricably linked to government corruption, with non-governmental persons and government employees working hand-in-hand for both power and profit. It is highly probable that criminal organizations approve, if not directly sanction, all medium- and large-scale illegal activity in the country.

The Donovian Mafia is well-organized and has branches and contacts in many nations, including the United States and the European Union. With former security service and military personnel among its members, the Donovian Mafia possesses a wide range of capabilities, including electronic surveillance, human intelligence networks, explosives and firearms expertise, and associations with government officials in Donovia and neighboring countries.

Illegal activities in Donovia take many forms. Those that are usually associated with organized crime include trafficking in humans, drugs, and small arm; money laundering; extortion; and fraud. Criminal groups may also engage in corruption, terrorism, abduction, export of contraband, and smuggling of radioactive substances. The mining, oil, gas, and timber industries see their share of illegal activities and heavy influence by organized crime groups. All of these areas see participation by both organized crime and government officials. The Jinat crime family, which produced the infamous Traitor Ismail Jinat, is heavily invested in the mining trade. Another organized crime group is the Al Iksir Cartel, which operates in northern Atropia and southern Donovia.

Summary

Complex economic interplay between the Caucasus countries binds them together. Minaria, Gorgas, and Atropia were strongly affected by the reduction of Donovian influence two decades ago. The oil-rich countries of Ariana and Atropia must use their Minarian and Gorgan neighbors to transship hydrocarbon resources to other countries. Minaria and Gorgas must develop a free-standing economy despite significant corruption, lack of developed industries, and natural resource shortages. Over all of this, Donovia seeks to limit Arianian influence and return to its former position as unquestioned regional hegemon. This economic interdependence will likely drive regional conflicts as the nations struggle amongst themselves to exploit riches created by oil and natural gas.

TRADOC G-2

TRISA-THREATS

CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND THREAT INTEGRATION

DIRECTORATE (CTID)

S O C I A L : D O N O V I A

Social: Donovia

The social variable describes the cultural, religious, and ethnic makeup within an OE and the beliefs, values, customs, and behaviors.

KEY FACTS:

REGION

- All five countries have ancient cultures, and rivalries between different ethnic groups still exist.
- Each country possesses a dominant ethnic group and language. Discrimination against minority ethnic groups occurs in each country.

DONOVARIA

- Although Donovia is a Muslim-majority country, it is secular.

OPERATIONAL IMPACTS OF THE SOCIAL VARIABLE IN THE OE:

REGION

- Combat in the region will allow one ethnic or religious group to seek revenge against another ethnic or religious group for past wrongs or perceived wrongs.

DONOVARIA

- While it remains a strong regional power, Donovia is struggling with severe social issues such as a disparity in the number of men to women and population decline.

SOCIAL OVERVIEW:

Arabs make up 70% of Donovia's total population, with Minarians, Gorgans, and Atropians being the predominant minorities. Small populations of multiple ethnic groups account for the remaining 10% of the total population. Donovian Arabs view themselves as superior to other cultures and are often discriminatory when interacting with others. Donovia has a long history of military prowess and nationalistic fervor. In the past few decades, Donovia's influence over neighboring countries was reduced by financial collapse due to embezzlement by the notorious Four Traitors and aggravated by a negative population growth rate. This perceived weakening of Donovia resulted in an increase in militarism and nationalism amongst much of the Donovian Arab population.

Donovian is the official language of Donovia and is the sole language of public administration, the armed forces, and the scientific and technical communities. The literacy rate in Donovia is 98% except in some areas dominated by ethnic minorities, where the rate may be considerably lower.

Donovians are predominately Muslim in faith, with 80% being Sunnis, nearly all of whom follow the Hanafi *madhab*, or school, of Islamic jurisprudence. The Hanafi school is the oldest and most liberal madhab. Donovian Hanafi scholars do not believe in human control of religious or spiritual destiny, and refuse to give that right to any human institution. Due to the Hanafi influence, the majority of Donovians do not believe the state should be involved in deciding relationships between

humans and God. Donovia's government is secular, but many of its laws, policies, and officials discriminate against those who are not Donovian Arab Sunnis.

SOCIAL STATISTICS FOR ARIANA, ATROPIA, GORGAS, MINARIA, AND DONOVIA:

Statistic	Ariana	Atropia	Gorgas	Minaria	Donovia
Age distribution (%)	0-14 years: 21.7 15-64 years: 72.9 65 years and over: 5.4	0-14 years: 23.9 15-64 years: 69.4 65 years and over: 6.7	0-14 years: 16.1 15-64 years: 67.6 65 years and over: 16.4	0-14 years: 18.2 15-64 years: 71.1 65 years and over: 10.6	0-14 years: 15.2 15-64 years: 71.8 65 years and over: 13
Median age	Total: 26.3 Male: 26 Female: 26.5	Total: 28.5 Male: 26.9 Female: 30.3	Total: 38.8 Male: 36.3 Female: 41.3	Total: 31.9 Male: 29.1 Female: 34.7	Total: 38.7 Male: 35.5 Female: 41.9
Population Growth rate (Rank)	77,891,220 1.248% (94)	8,372,373 0.846% (129)	4,585,874 -0.326% (217)	2,967,975 0.063% (188)	82,008,765 -0.47% (223)
Birth rate per 1,000 (Rank)	17.17 (120)	17.62 (117)	10.66 (181)	12.65 (161)	11.05 (174)
Death rate per 1,000 (Rank)	5.72 (171)	8.30 (101)	9.65 (68)	8.39 (97)	16.04 (5)
Net Migration rate per 1,000 (Rank)	-2.62 (141)	-1.69 (129)	-4.26 (157)	-4.56 (159)	0.29 (68)
Urban population Annual urbanization rate	68% 2.1%	52% 1.0%	53% -0.6%	64% -0.3%	67% -0.2%
Infant mortality rate (Rank)	35.78 (71)	54.6 (46)	16.22 (121)	20.21 (104)	10.08 (147)
Life expectancy at birth in years (Rank)	Total: 71.14 Male: 69.65 Female: 72.72 (132)	Total: 66.66 Male: 62.53 Female: 71.34 (157)	Total: 76.72 Male: 73.41 Female: 80.45 (62)	Total: 72.68 Male: 69.06 Female: 76.81 (118)	Total: 66.29 Male: 59.8 Female: 73.17 (162)
Fertility rate (Children per woman) (Rank)	1.70 (171)	2.03 (127)	1.44 (190)	1.36 (201)	1.42 (197)

Statistic	Ariana	Atropia	Gorgas	Minaria	Donovia
Major diseases in the OE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ Diarrheal diseases ◦ Hepatitis A ◦ Malaria ◦ Crimean-Congo ◦ Hemorrhagic fever ◦ Cutaneous Leishmaniasis ◦ Leptospirosis ◦ Schistosomiasis ◦ Hepatitis ◦ Tuberculosis ◦ Q Fever 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ Diarrheal diseases ◦ Hepatitis A ◦ Hepatitis E ◦ Typhoid ◦ Cholera ◦ Malaria ◦ Crimean-Congo ◦ Hemorrhagic fever ◦ Gonorrhea ◦ Chlamydia ◦ Tuberculosis ◦ Leptospirosis ◦ Hantavirus ◦ Hemorrhagic fever ◦ Anthrax ◦ Rabies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ Diarrheal diseases ◦ Typhoid ◦ Hepatitis A ◦ Malaria ◦ West Nile Fever ◦ Crimean-Congo ◦ Hemorrhagic fever ◦ Meningococcal ◦ Meningitis ◦ Gonorrhea ◦ Syphilis ◦ Hantaviral fevers ◦ Leptospirosis ◦ Rabies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ Diarrheal diseases ◦ Typhoid ◦ Hepatitis A ◦ West Nile fever ◦ Crimean-Congo ◦ Hemorrhagic fever ◦ Meningococcal ◦ Meningitis ◦ Tuberculosis 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ Diarrheal diseases ◦ Typhoid ◦ Hepatitis A ◦ Cholera ◦ Salmonella ◦ Tuberculosis ◦ HIV/AIDS ◦ Encephalitis ◦ H5N1 avian influenza
Ethnic groups (%)	Persian: 51.0 Atropian: 24.0 Gilaki or Mazandarani: 8.0 Kurd: 7.0 Arab: 3.0 Lur: 2.0 Baluch: 2.0 Turkmen: 2.0 Other: 1.0	Atropian: 90.6 Gilani: 2.2 Arianian: 3.0 Donovian: 1.8 Minarian: 1.5 Other 0.9	Gorgan: 83.8 Atropian: 6.5 Minarian: 5.7 Donovian: 1.5 Other: 2.5	Minarian: 97.9 Yezidi (Kurd): 1.3 Donovian: 5.0 Other: 0.3	Arab: 70.0 Gorgan: 5.0 Atropian: 5.0 Minarian: 10.0 Other: 10.0
Religions in OE (%)	Shia Muslim: 89.0 Sunni Muslim: 9.0 Other: 2.0	Muslim: 93.4 Donovian Orthodox: 2.5 Minarian Orthodox: 2.3 Other: 1.8	Orthodox Christian: 83.9 Muslim: 9.9 Minarian-Gregorian: 3.9 Catholic: 0.8 Other: 0.8 None: 0.7	Minarian Orthodox: 94.7 Other Christian: 4.0 Yezidi: 1.3	Sunni Hanafi Muslim: 80.0 Shia Sufi Muslim: 5.0 National Orthodox Christian: 15.0
Languages	Persian Dialects: 58.0 Turkic Dialects: 26.0 Kurdish: 9.0 Luri: 2.0 Baluchi: 1.0 Arabic: 1.0 Kemalian: 1.0 Other: 2.0	Atropian (Atropian): 90.3 Lezgi: 2.2 Donovian: 1.8 Minarian: 1.5 Other: 3.3 Unspecified: 1.0	Gorgan: 71.0 Donovian: 9.0 Minarian: 7.0 Atropian: 6.0 Other: 7.0	Minarian: 97.7 Yezidi: 1.0 Donovian: 0.9 Other: 0.4	Donovian (official) Many minority languages
Literacy rate (older than 15) (%)	Total: 77.0 Male: 83.5 Female: 70.4	Total: 98.8 Male: 99.5 Female: 98.2	Total: 100 Male: 100 Female: 100	Total: 99.4 Male: 99.7 Female: 99.2	Total: 98.0 Male: 98.0 Female: 98.0

POPULATION MOVEMENT (MIGRATION/IDPs/REFUGEES)

International migration in Donovia is composed of the inflow of immigrants from other countries with a lower standard of living than Donovia and an outflow of emigrants into more economically developed countries, such as the US and the European Union. Oftentimes, such transit migrants end up staying in Donovia instead of moving on as planned. The majority of irregular migrants in Donovia are labor migrants from neighboring countries. Donovia does not have an IDP population.

The main refugee population consists of persons displaced by the continuing conflict between Donovia and Gorgas over the latter's breakaway republics of Zabzimek and South Ostremek. Refugee levels have varied greatly, reaching as high as 40,000 during peak fighting periods. Current refugees number approximately 10,000 and consist mainly of ethnic Zabzimeks and Ostremeks, with small numbers of ethnic Gorgans.

The Donovian government attempts to keep track of its population by requiring all Donovian citizens to register at the local police department. There are two kinds of registration for Donovian citizens: permanent and temporary. Permanent registration is obligatory for all Donovian citizens, and is completed in their home cities or towns. If Donovian citizens leave their place of permanent residence and stay in another Donovian city/town/village for more than 14 days, temporary registration is required. The procedure of temporary registration is complicated, and Donovian citizens prefer to avoid it, making them officially irregular internal migrants.

All foreign citizens must register in regional branches of the Donovian Immigration Service (DIS) within three working days after their arrival in Donovia. The registration procedure is complicated for many types of migrants. Donovian Arabs view themselves as superior to others and have enacted laws to discourage all other racial and ethnic groups from living in Donovia. As a result, the majority of labor migrants work in the shadow economy.

POPULATION DISTRIBUTION

Sixty-seven percent of Donovia's population is urban. The annual urbanization rate is -0.2%. A number of factors contribute to the negative urbanization rate, with Donovia's negative population growth rate being perhaps the main factor.

DEMOGRAPHIC MIX

Arabs make up 70% of the total population, with Minarians (10%), Gorgans (5%), and Atropians (5%) being the predominant minorities. Small populations of multiple ethnic groups account for the remaining 10%. Most of the smaller ethnic groups live in their own neighborhoods or communities, as Arab Donovians are openly prejudiced against others.

Gender disparity is a problem for Donovia, with 53.7% of the population being females. This disproportion is primarily caused by the high rate of premature death among men. Cardiovascular diseases, cancer, traffic accidents, and violence are major causes of death among working-age men. Many premature deaths are attributed to excessive smoking rates, and Donovian men are known for their almost non-stop smoking. The culture of honor often leads to violence by Donovian Arabs over perceived slights.

Donovia has 20,174,157 males and 20,666,209 females age 16-49 available for military service, with 12,055,288 males and 15,581,665 females fit for military service. Annually, 410,043 Donovian males and 385,441 Donovian females reach military age.

SOCIAL VOLATILITY

Widespread ethnic and religious discrimination contributes to the Donovian social stratification. Governmental bodies systematically discriminate or encourage discrimination against certain categories of the population. Despite a secular government, most of the Sunni majority does not care for Shia or Christians. Donovian Arabs see themselves as a distinct group, superior to others, and as the "true" Donovians. Ethnic minorities are subjected to restriction of rights throughout the entire country. Discriminatory treatment of ethnic minorities by law-enforcement agencies is a significant problem.

The residence registration system is a major tool of discrimination. Additionally, the government provides for direct support and a number of privileges to extreme nationalist organizations. Some of these groups are responsible for violent actions against ethnic minorities.

The most significant social disruption in modern Donovian history was the economic crisis resulting from the actions of the Four Traitors. In a well-coordinated operation, MP Yassar Akbari, General Ibrahim al-Fatem, Ismail Jinat of the Jinat crime family, and Viaprom CFO Muhammad Hafiz embezzled approximately 20% of the Donovian government's total annual revenue from 1983 to 1991, funneling the money into various financial institutions and assets outside Donovia while maintaining false financial records to cover the theft. When the massive siphoning of funds was discovered in the fall of 1991, the conspirators fled the country. The Donovian government spent considerable time and effort in attempts to apprehend the Four Traitors and to recover the stolen funds, but the results of these efforts have been negligible.

When the Four Traitors' conspiracy was finally revealed, the effect on the Donovian population was enormous. Massive government spending cuts and layoffs were instituted, unemployment tripled overnight, and government aid became all but impossible to obtain. Considerable social unrest resulted, with the military being utilized to maintain order.

Donovia's government turned to free-market principles to recover from the economic collapse. While significant progress occurred in the past two decades, the crisis still resonates through Donovian society in the form of unemployment, poverty, distrust of officials, and increased criminal activity.

EDUCATION LEVEL

Education plays a crucial role in determining social status in Donovia. People who complete no more than eight years of school can usually find only unskilled jobs. Those who complete secondary school often rise no higher than skilled labor or low-level white-collar work. Higher education is necessary for most professional and bureaucratic positions and is desirable for positions of political power.

The literacy rate in Donovia is 98%. However, in some areas dominated by ethnic minorities, the rate may be considerably lower. Wide variations in education level exist between urban and rural areas, with two-thirds of Donovia's urban population age fifteen and older finishing secondary school as compared to slightly less than half of the rural population.

Until relatively recently, Donovian schools stressed the primacy of the state over the interests of the individual. Teachers taught standardized materials to the students and the students memorized those materials, all of which were put in the context of nationalist ethics. Creativity and individualism were discouraged for both teachers and students. In 1992 a reform philosophy was set forth in the Law on Education. Current educational policy stresses teaching objectively, thus discarding the narrow, institutional views that had dominated the previous era.

The current philosophy also seeks to integrate education with the economic processes into which graduates will pass in adult life. New systems of education for farmers and various types of on-the-job training for adults have been introduced, and new curricula in economics stress understanding of market economies. Universities place great emphasis on science and technology education. Donovian medical, mathematical, scientific, and space and aviation research is generally high-quality.

ETHNIC DIVERSITY

Arabs constitute 70% of the population of Donovia. The next largest groups are Minarians (10%), followed by Atropians (5%) and Gorgans (5%). The remaining 10% of the population is made up of dozens of various ethnicities.

RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY

Eighty percent of Donovians identify themselves as Sunni Muslim. The Donovian constitution provides for freedom of religion, the equality of all religions before the law, and the separation of church and state. Christians and Shia, however, often encounter prejudice and discrimination. While it might seem to the casual observer that this prejudicial attitude is based on religion, it is in fact a symptom of Donovian nationalist culture. The Arab Donovians believe their culture is superior, and they discriminate against Christians and Shia on cultural, rather than religious, grounds. Some local officials prevent certain religious minority groups from registering locally or acquiring property. Jews, Jehovah's Witnesses, and Scientologists traveling to Donovia have reported the uncooperative attitude of authorities and even harassment by public officials.

COMMON LANGUAGES

The Donovian language has dominated cultural and official life throughout the nation's history. Donovification campaigns in past centuries suppressed the languages and cultures of all minorities. The government of Donovia attempts to use the Donovian language as a means to promote the superiority of Arab Donovian culture throughout the country's population.

The Donovian language remains a compulsory subject in the primary and secondary schools. Nevertheless, many minority peoples continue to use their own languages. Donovian remains the sole language of public administration, the armed forces, and the scientific and technical communities.

CRIMINAL ACTIVITY

Crime occurs in various forms in Donovia, such as arms trafficking, drug trafficking, human trafficking, money laundering, extortion, fraud, and black marketeering. Criminal groups may also engage in corruption, terrorism, abduction, export of contraband, and smuggling of radioactive substances.

Incidents of unprovoked, violent harassment against racial and ethnic minorities regularly occur throughout Donovia. People of African or Asian descent find themselves most at risk. Police often harass these same minority groups. It is not uncommon for foreigners, in general, to become victims of harassment, mistreatment, and extortion by law enforcement and other officials. Police do not need to show probable cause in order to stop, question, or detain individuals.

Extortion and corruption commonly occur in the Donovian business environment. The economic crisis precipitated by the actions of the Four Traitors serves as the prime example of the detrimental effects of Donovia's systemic corruption. Business disputes may involve threats of violence and even acts of violence. Organized criminal groups and sometimes local police target foreign businesses in many cities and have been known to demand protection money. Small businesses find themselves particularly vulnerable to extortion demands.

Some activities that would be normal business activities in the United States and other countries are either illegal under the Donovian legal code or are considered suspect by the Donovian security services. There are particular risks involved in any commercial activity with the Donovian military-industrial complex, including research institutes, design bureaus, production facilities, or other high-technology government-related institutions. Any misunderstanding or dispute in such transactions

can attract the involvement of the security services and lead to investigation or prosecution for espionage. Rules governing the treatment of information remain poorly defined.

The Donovian Mafia is well-organized and has branches and contacts in many nations, including the United States and the European Union. With former security service and military personnel amongst its members, the Donovian Mafia possesses a wide range of capabilities, including electronic surveillance, human intelligence networks, explosives and firearms expertise, and associations with government officials in Donovia and neighboring countries.

HUMAN RIGHTS

Donovia's human rights record remains uneven and poor in some areas. Although the government has recognized the legitimacy of international human rights standards, the institutionalization of procedures to safeguard these rights lags behind. There are some indications, however, that use of the law to protect human rights is increasing. Recent well-publicized arrests and trials of police and correctional officers for assault on suspects and prisoners demonstrate Donovia's resolve to curtail abuses.

The judiciary is not independent, is often subject to manipulation by political authorities, and is plagued by large case backlogs and trial delays. Lengthy pretrial detention remains a serious problem. There are credible reports of abuse of inmates and detainees by law enforcement and correctional officials, and brutality perpetrated by the prisoners themselves, some of whom are informally granted authority to enforce order within the prisons. Prison conditions fall well below international standards, and extreme overcrowding is common.

There are legitimate allegations of violations of international human rights and humanitarian law committed by both government and nongovernment forces. Donovian authorities have introduced some improvements, such as requiring the presence of civilian investigators during all large-scale military operations and targeted search and seizure operations. Human rights groups and nongovernmental organization (NGO) leaders, however, claim that most abuses remain uninvestigated and unpunished.

A law on NGOs, introduced five years ago, created a burdensome registration process with stricter requirements for foreign-funded NGOs. Authorities have used a separate law against extremism as a pretext for closing opposition NGOs and media entities.

The constitution provides for freedom of speech and of the press; in practice, however, the government exerts pressure on the media. The government uses direct ownership (or ownership by large private companies with links to the government) to control or influence the major media outlets, especially television, through direct control and through self-censorship by editors and journalists. This influence results in restricted access to information about issues deemed sensitive, such as coverage of opposition political parties and movements. Unsolved murders and beatings of journalists have caused significant international concern and increased the reluctance of journalists to cover controversial subjects.

The constitution guarantees citizens the right to choose their place of residence and to travel abroad. The freedom to travel abroad and emigrate is respected, although restrictions may apply to those who have had access to state secrets, or who have court orders against them for default on debts.

CENTERS OF SOCIAL POWER

Donovia enjoys a privileged ruling class, which consists of key personnel in the government and other important sectors such as industry. Many members of the ruling class use their connections with industry and finance to enhance their own financial situation. A subclass of young bankers and stockbrokers has arisen that runs trading and investment markets in Moscow. Members of the working class live a meager existence. Although there is no rigid class structure, social stratification based on wealth is evident and growing.

BASIC CULTURAL NORMS AND VALUES

Donovia is a proud nation with a militaristic and nationalist tradition. Donovia was once the unquestioned dominant military power in the region. Subsequent to the economic damage caused by the Four Traitors, however, Ariana emerged as a major Donovian rival. Many among the Arab Donovian majority feel threatened by the perceived weakening of their nation. This has fueled an increase in Donovian nationalism.

Donovian culture encourages aggressive behavior. A leading cause of the gender disparity in Donovia is the many men who meet violent deaths over matters of personal or family honor. Care must be taken not to offend Donovian men, as the common reaction to offense is to utilize aggressive force. Donovian Arabs wish to be treated as superior or at least equal to other parties in any affair. Donovian culture will not tolerate the appearance of weakness in its government or leaders. The aggressive culture influences international relations and government policy. The Donovian military actions against Gorgas in support of Zabzimek and South Ostremek serve as prime examples of Donovia's willingness to use military force as a show of strength.

CUSTOMS AND PRACTICES

Cultural Dos & Don'ts	<p>Do not expect to find smoke-free areas anywhere. Do not take a Donovian's friendship lightly. It is an honor for a Donovian to consider you his friend. Donovians greatly appreciate any attempt by foreigners to speak their language. Do not stare at or make prolonged eye contact with a Donovian woman. Do not engage a woman in conversation unless you have been formally introduced. Do not ask a Donovian questions about his wife or other female members of his family.</p>
Gifts	<p>A small gift is appropriate, but the value of the gift should correspond with the status of the person receiving it. A gift to a Donovian woman can spark a violent reaction from male members of her family.</p>
Taboos	<p>Putting your thumb through your index and middle fingers and making the "OK" sign are both considered very rude gestures. Men should not approach women they are not related to unless they have been formally introduced. Some Donovians disregard this custom while others are extremely offended by infringement of it and may respond with violence to perceived affronts of family honor. Some Donovians drink alcohol while others consider it sinful. Do not drink alcohol unless it is offered to you. If it is offered, refusal is considered very rude.</p>
Personal Space	<p>Donovians stand close when talking. Do not move away from a Donovian if he enters your personal space while speaking to you. Donovian men may place their arm around your shoulder and lean in very close while speaking. This is a positive gesture and indicates fondness.</p>

Displays of Affection	Public displays of affection are discouraged. Same genders may kiss each other on the cheek. A foreign man alone in the company of a Donovian woman is an invitation to violence.
Meeting & Greeting	Initial greetings may come across as cool. Do not expect friendly smiles. Remove your gloves before shaking hands. Unless you are a woman, do not shake hands with a Donovian woman without her offering her hand first and do not make physical contact with Donovian women.
Visiting/ Hospitality	At formal functions, guests do not usually start eating until the host has begun. No one should leave until the guest of honor has left. If you are the guest of honor, do not stay too late. Donovians often put more food on the table than can be eaten to indicate there is an abundance of food (whether there is or not). Guests who leave food on their plates honor their host. Do not turn down offers of food or drink; to decline such offers is considered rude.
Manners	In public, Donovians can seem brusque and discourteous. “No” is the most common first response to any request; often flattery, money, or a gift is required to obtain a “yes” answer. It is important to convey that you appreciate the effort the person must make to fulfill your request. Do not eat with your left hand.
Concept Of Time	Donovians appreciate punctuality when you meet them at their home or office. Donovians are notoriously not on time, but do not necessarily consider themselves late. When they arrive, there are a number of rituals before a meeting: First the small talk, then tea or drink, then talk of family and personal problems, then finally the business of the day.
Dispute Resolution	Donovians regard compromise as a sign of weakness. They will often out-wait impatient people to gain more concessions from them. A Donovian man must perceive that he gained some concession before he will consider a matter resolved.
Birth Rituals	Birth rituals are determined by the individuals' religion and the degree to which they adhere to their religion's doctrine and customs. These rituals range from elaborate among fundamentalist Muslims to informal among the secular Donovian population.
Death Rituals	Ethnic and religious groups will have varying death rituals.
Marriage Rituals	Donovian marriage rituals are primarily determined by the individuals' religion and the degree to which they adhere to their religion's doctrine and customs. These rituals may be as formal as Arianian rituals among fundamentalist Muslims or quite informal among the secular Donovian population.
Work Week/ Work Hours	By Donovian law, the work week is Monday to Friday; 40 hours per week for men and 35 hours for women.

Summary

Donovia's nationalist culture serves to unify the Arab majority, but also alienates minorities whom the majority of the population views as second-class citizens. The dominance of Sunni Islam further unites the Arab majority, but due to the influence of Donovian Hanafi scholars, the nation remains secular. While those not of the Sunni faith may experience prejudice, it is more due to cultural rather than religious reasons. The economic turmoil created by the embezzlement scheme of the Four Traitors still resonates throughout Donovian society.

TRADOC G-2

TRISA-THREATS

CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND THREAT INTEGRATION

DIRECTORATE (CTID)

INFORMATION: DONOVIA

Information: Donovia

The information variable describes the nature, scope, characteristics, and effects of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, manipulate, disseminate, or act on information.

KEY FACTS:

REGION

- All states of the Caucasus maintain some level of direct government control or influence on their information environments.
- Television operates as the most readily available and important communications medium.

DONOVARIA

- The Donovian information warfare (INFOWAR) capability, internal media environment, and physical information structure are among the most developed in the world.
- The Donovian government maintains a high level of, but not total, control over the content within the Donovian information environment.

OPERATIONAL IMPACTS OF THE INFORMATION VARIABLE IN THE OE:

REGION

- While language barriers persist, English continues to rapidly displace Donovian as a *lingua franca*, or common language, for trans-border communication. Mobile phones serve as the most effective means to reach the educated and urban populations.
- Television is the most effective medium for information dissemination.

DONOVARIA

- The Donovians are very likely to be effective INFOWAR actors.
- The Donovian government invests heavily in INFOWAR capability, maintains robust doctrine on INFOWAR employment, and integrates all facets of INFOWAR into combat, non-combat, and peacetime operations.

INFORMATION OVERVIEW:

Donovia maintains a large information environment, with its Internet industries counted among the world's most active. However, censorship, while unofficial, is pervasive regarding corruption and other government malfeasance. Donovian INFOWAR capability is highly developed and world-leading in a number of critical areas.

PUBLIC COMMUNICATIONS MEDIA

Donovia's public communications sector is dominated by TV, though the Internet is making considerable inroads into this area, especially among more urban, young, and educated populations. Television, radio, and print media are developed and mature, though completely beholden to political and economic elites and only in rare cases willing to publish information derogatory to the government. The Internet is the freest of spaces, and social media is the preferred outlet for reporting of uncensored news, along with interpersonal communication.

INTERNET

Since the outrage over the Four Traitors, the Donovian Internet has blossomed in economic and social terms. Economically, the Internet is of growing importance in Donovia, and Donovian Internet security providers are among the world's best. Perhaps not coincidentally, Donovia is a world leader in malware, virus protection, and security circumvention tools. Twenty-five percent of Donovians access the Internet monthly, with this number skewed upward in urban areas, and downward in rural areas and the southern tier of the country. The Donovian government is heavily involved in the Internet in Donovia, engaging in soft censorship of topics sensitive to its interests. It does this through the mobilization of large numbers of loyalists engaging in a wide range of harassment tactics, likely through the direct but hidden sponsorship of the Donovian security services.

TELEVISION

Television in Donovia is the most mature and pervasive media, but is increasingly centralized under either the government or corporate concerns allied directly with the highest government circles. Ninety-five percent of all Donovians have access to a television. Twelve channels broadcast nationally, and a number of private channels are broadcast either over the air or via satellite. These private entities are often specific content oriented, like children's, sports, or cultural programming.

RADIO

Donovia maintains a number of public and private radio broadcasters. Broadcasting is done over AM, FM, and High Frequency (HF) bands, though the latter is radically decreasing in importance as the Internet penetrates into more rural areas. The Donovian government also maintains a foreign broadcast presence throughout the region, which while ostensibly aimed at Donovian citizens residing in other countries, includes programming in other regional languages. These broadcasts are generally heavily-slanted propaganda.

PRINT MEDIA

The Donovian print media has exploded and is less robustly controlled than Donovian TV, but more so than the Internet. The media does operate within bounds of "soft censorship," avoiding topics that are too sensitive for the government to ignore, especially regarding corruption or other malfeasance of high officials. However, reporting on general government missteps, especially those of the bureaucracy or military, is allowed. Donovia has a robust scientific and engineering print establishment as well.

TELEPHONE

Donovian telephone services are increasingly robust, depending primarily on satellite for long-haul transmission and integrating cellular services at an increasing rate. Every major city maintains a significant local phone capability by regional standards. Cellular services are generally available and relatively cheap. In the major areas, 3G coverage is available, while GSM is the standard for the rest

of the country. Coverage areas are maintained within most major cities and along most major routes of travel.

POSTAL/COURIER

Donovian postal and courier systems are generally well-established, reliable, and capable of moving significant amounts of freight throughout the nation. Along with the Donovian national postal system, international freight providers and local freight forwarders are well entrenched in the nation. Donovia is the home to many specialty freight movement providers, like aircraft heavy lift.

WORD OF MOUTH

Donovian word-of-mouth communication is among the least important modes, similar to other advanced nations. A combination of the rise of the Internet, mature TV and radio, and widely available print media makes more traditional forms of communication increasingly obsolete. As with much of the Caucasus, the rise of text messaging first among youth, and increasingly among much of the rest of the population, is changing the dynamics of personal interaction. Social media is becoming the preferred means of communication, not just for personal use but for political opposition as well.

INFORMATION CONTROL

Donovian information control is unique and pervasive, though not as obvious as in Ariana or other repressive nations. However, most mass media that is not government-controlled is monitored and ultimately controlled by a variety government and government-allied and -sponsored entities. Donovian authorities and broadcasters are also aware of the power of patriotic messages, and will often dress up unpalatable news or announcements in patriotic/historical boilerplate.

INFOWAR

Donovia's information warfare (INFOWAR) capability is highly developed, and can attack a US unit throughout the range of operations and present a credible peer-level threat. As the Donovian conventional and nuclear capability receded after the Four Traitors, Donovian military theorists looked to INFOWAR to level the conventional disparity between itself and the West and provide a means of national deterrence as an alternative to nuclear weapons.

ELECTRONIC WARFARE

Donovia maintains an extensive electronic warfare (EW) capability, especially in comparison with regional opponents. While Donovian capabilities are not up to those of Western countries, they are well integrated into the Donovian force structure and are a key enabler for combat forces. Donovia maintains a wide variety of sensors and jammers on ground, air, and naval platforms. The largest Donovian EW weakness is a shortage of trained operators for its EW capacity.

COMPUTER ATTACK

Donovia sustains one of the three most advanced computer attack (CA) capabilities in the world. Donovian CA is a core capability of its intelligence apparatus, and is backed by a significant civilian R&D effort. Thus the Donovians maintain the ability to conduct CA along a spectrum of ability ranging from small, deniable probes to massive, overwhelming onslaught. Donovian CA actors are often supple and subtle, and will attempt to use other INFOWAR capability such as deception and protection to enable computer attack.

INFORMATION ATTACK

Donovian capability for information attack (IA) has increased over the past 10 years to the point where, along with much of Donovian cyber capability, it ranks globally as one of the top three actors. The Donovians are expert at integrating this capability with other INFOWAR elements, and will rely on IA in conflict against enemies with technological overmatch. Indeed, recent Donovian INFOWAR theory states that IA is the core of any attack, from the tactical to the strategic.

DECEPTION

Donovian deception operations are excellent, although not the absolute cutting-edge quality of other Donovian INFOWAR capabilities. While deception is a hallmark of Donovian doctrine operationally, the Donovians will often default to either ignoring their deception plan or using a relatively simple one. Donovians also have a robust manufacturing capability to make high-fidelity decoys and will make great attempts when deployed out of their garrisons to avoid or confuse enemy collection assets.

PHYSICAL DESTRUCTION

Traditional Donovian TTP maintains the importance of destroying enemy INFOWAR capability to give friendly Donovian elements maximum freedom of maneuver and protection from enemy targeting. Donovian deep strike elements such as short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, strike aircraft, and special operations forces will aggressively target enemy INFOWAR assets and capabilities. Donovian doctrine stresses the eventual destruction of enemy INFOWAR assets after their neutralization by non-strike means. Among these assets is a growing anti-satellite (ASAT) capability. This ASAT effort includes mastery of the entire kill-chain, with a variety of ground-based radar and visual sensors cueing air-launched missiles carried by specially-equipped interceptor aircraft. It is likely that ASAT efforts would attempt to neutralize enemy space-based surveillance and communications efforts early in any potential conflict.

PROTECTION AND SECURITY MEASURES

Donovian protection and security measures (PSM) are good, though not as advanced as the best US, NATO, or Israeli capability. Donovian PSM focus on the destruction of enemy systems, either through physical destruction or corruption of their information systems. Thus, Donovian doctrine stresses that PSM should not be so robust as to prevent other sensors and INFOWAR systems from operating; rather, such measures should allow a degree of protection before the offense is taken.

PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT

Donovian perception management operations are likely the weakest of the Donovian INFOWAR capabilities. Between language, cultural, and political barriers, the ability of the Donovians to effectively target any population save their own is limited. Donovians will likely use perception management most aggressively on their own population as a mechanism to generate support for Donovian government operations.

INTELLIGENCE

Donovia possesses the second- or third-largest intelligence complex in the world. The Donovians have a foreign intelligence service, the Organization of External Information, a domestic intelligence service, known as the Federal Protective Service, and a military intelligence wing, the General Service Organization. All three organizations are very involved in operations globally and are highly capable. Much of that capability is focused on the Caucasus region, as Donovian security challenges

with terrorism, economic rivalry, and local competitors to Donovian influence are all highly active in the area. Donovians perceive the other countries in the Caucasus region as the “Near Abroad” and believe that they have a unique and dominant historical role in the area.

HUMAN INTELLIGENCE

Donovian human intelligence (HUMINT) capabilities are among the best in the world. Considering the high level of interest that the Caucasus region maintains in Donovian defense and diplomatic circles, it is reasonable to assess high activity of Donovian HUMINT collection in the area. Donovian HUMINT is aided by high levels of Donovian economic, government, and military activity in the area. Additionally, Donovian relationships dating back decades exist with many locally-influential political, economic, military, and social actors. The Donovian HUMINT services are aggressive and able, in exploiting these relationships and other enablers, to effectively service HUMINT targets.

OPEN SOURCE INTELLIGENCE

Open source intelligence (OSINT) efforts within Donovia generally focus on Western rivals as opposed to other Caucasus nations. Donovian intelligence likely uses OSINT for strategic analysis efforts, versus those at operational or tactical levels.

SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE

Donovian signals intelligence (SIGINT) assets include ground, ship/sub, aircraft, and satellite collection capability. Donovian SIGINT is robust and well-connected to shooter platforms, often providing the early warning and target discrimination capability for hard-kill capable platforms. Donovian collection likely uses the poor discipline and obsolete equipment of regional targets to gain significant insight into regional actors’ intentions and capabilities. Donovia also maintains SIGINT collection stations around the world.

IMAGERY INTELLIGENCE

Donovian imagery intelligence (IMINT) collection capability is second only to the US. Donovia maintains a fleet of air-breathing manned and UAV platforms for tactical collection, and an overhead space collection capability. Donovia maintains a constellation of electro-optical (EO) and synthetic aperture radar satellites. Its newest EO collector is panchromatic capable, with a 13-inch resolution at nadir.

MEASUREMENT AND SIGNATURES INTELLIGENCE

Donovia maintains a large and capable measurement and signatures intelligence (MASINT) collection program. Backed by a highly-capable national scientific intelligence apparatus, Donovian MASINT is probably the most capable of any non-Western nation in the world. MASINT operations typically support all other intelligence collection efforts, and can provide direct support to combat operation through space-based collectors such as IR imagers.

Summary

Donovia is a large dynamic information environment. A world-class source of various Internet and INFOWAR technology and tactics, the Donovians are likely to leverage their capability to the utmost during a crisis. Donovia’s mass media operates under a regime of significant government interest in

adverse reporting, so the Internet is the most free information sphere within Donovia with the social media being the heart of Donovian political opposition.

TRADOC G-2

TRISA-THREATS

CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND THREAT INTEGRATION

DIRECTORATE (CTID)

INFRASTRUCTURE: DONOVIA

Infrastructure: Donovia

Infrastructure is composed of the basic facilities, services, and installations needed for the functioning of a community or society.

KEY FACTS:

REGION

- A country's prosperity in this region of the world depends on its hydrocarbon resources. Ariana's, Atropia's, and to a lesser extent, Donovia's oil and natural gas resources fund their infrastructure construction. Gorgas and Minaria, because of their lack of hydrocarbon deposits, lag behind their neighbors in infrastructure modernization.

DONO VIA

- Most Caucasus infrastructure does not reach the "average" for Moscow or the other largest cities in Donovia.
- Donovian infrastructure in the Caucasus more closely resembles that of Atropia, Gorgas, and Minaria than that of the infrastructure in Moscow and other northern parts of the country.

OPERATIONAL IMPACTS OF THE INFRASTRUCTURE VARIABLE IN THE OE:

REGION

- Most of the region, especially in rural areas, cannot access modern utilities such as potable water, electricity, and modern sewage systems.
- Due to the lack of potable water in much of the region, military forces will need to test local water sources before use and likely treat local water to avoid medical problems.

DONO VIA

- Most Donovian infrastructure suffers from a lack of maintenance due to insufficient government funds. Any attempt to use local infrastructure will often prove futile.
- Security of any pipelines in the Caucasus remains vital to the Western countries that rely on the oil or natural gas produced by Donovia.

INFRASTRUCTURE OVERVIEW:

While the region's five countries have a significant number of rural residents, the majority of each country's population lives in urban areas. About two-thirds of the Arianian (68%), Donovian (67%), and Minarian populace (64%) and just over half of the Gorgan (53%) and Atropian (52%) populace live in urban areas. All five countries contain a mixture of modern urban cities and almost pre-modern rural villages. Modern utilities can be found in most major cities but not in the rural villages and countryside.

While Donovia contains the second-highest urban population rate among the five countries, it also faced an urbanization rate of -0.2% over the last decade with no change in the foreseeable future.

The North Caucasus region contains three of Donovia's largest cities—Makhachkala, Grozny, and Nalchik. Due to policies enacted at the national level that limit social services to current distribution models, many Donovians moved from smaller cities to larger cities to obtain desired social services while others returned to their rural roots to create the negative urbanization rate. While most of the Donovian people who inhabit the urban areas can obtain basic modern utilities, they operate with infrastructure built between World War II and 1991 and suffering from a lack of preventive maintenance. As such, many Donovians experience power outages, intermittent water flow, and sewage backup. Many Donovian buildings, especially the governmental ones, attempt to express greatness by their sheer size. Many buildings use block architecture that appears immense, but usually perform their functions without much appeal to the eye.

CONSTRUCTION PATTERNS

As previously mentioned, the majority of residents in all five countries live in urban areas. Most urban cities contain a mixture of old neighborhoods with roughshod construction, while buildings in newer neighborhoods are made with modern construction methods. In rural villages and areas, residents use whatever materials they can obtain to build their houses.

Donovia remains a land of contrast, with large modern cities and rural areas largely unaffected by the modern world. Most of the large Donovian cities contain an old city with dense, random construction completed without any plan. In areas built from the 1950s to the late 1980s, the buildings come in closed orderly block construction, usually with large high-rises for use as multi-family dwellings. Most older Donovian cities feature a strip area, usually along the river or sea where the city began. For the most part, shantytowns remain limited to rural areas or only the outskirts of any large Donovian urban center. The Caucasus, however, may possess more shantytowns than cities farther north and closer to Moscow.



Block-Style Apartment Building


MAJOR DONOVIAN CITIES AND URBAN ZONES

Donovia's largest two cities lie outside the Caucasus region. These large metropolitan areas provide the population necessary to support the large Donovian military.

MOSCOW

Moscow, the largest European city and the world's sixth most populous city, serves as the political, economic, cultural, scientific, religious, financial, educational, and transportation center for Donovia. With over 10 million residents, Moscow continues to grow steadily while many other smaller Donovian cities continue to shrink. Moscow's history dates back to the 12th century and owes its

prominence to its strategic location on the Moscow River. Due to its position as the country's capital city, Moscow contains all the urban zones—city core, core periphery, high-rise residential areas, low-rise residential areas, commerical areas, industrial areas, and strictly military areas. The Donovian central government, however, razed many of the older buildings in the oldest parts of town and replaced them with more modern structures. While some small areas with dense random construction do occur in older parts of the cities, most of Moscow features closed, orderly block construction that may not always conform to square blocks. Strip areas occur along the Moscow River with limited shantytowns, as the Donovian government attempts to make Moscow appear attractive to the outside visitor. Even though Moscow serves as Donovia's largest urban area, residents and visitors can partake in the city's 170 square miles of green space. Moscow contains four botanical gardens, 18 smaller gardens, and 96 parks along with 39 square miles of forest in the metropolitan area. While Moscow could provide ample support to any military with its large number of resources, control of the city by the military may prove impossible through force alone.



NIZHNY NOVGOROD

At 1,251,000 people and located in the extreme north central Donovia, Nizhny Novgorod serves as the economic, transportation, and cultural center for its region. The city feels much more rural than other European cities of similar size due to its construction on the hills and abundant green spaces. Nizhny Novgorod's history dates back to the late 14th century, and its strategic location on the Oka River always made it an important location to hold against any raiders to the east. The city contains more dense, random construction than closed, orderly block construction due to the city's age and the necessity to build around the river and hills. Strip areas exist along the Oka River, where considerable industry occurs with limited shantytown construction, but more than that located in Moscow. Nizhny Novgorod contains six of the seven types of urban zones—city core, core periphery, high-rise residential areas, low-rise residential areas, commercial areas, and industrial areas. The city does not contain any major military-only areas. For its size, however, Nizhny Novgorod contains more industrial area due to a history of aircraft, shipyard, and automobile production over the last century. If large materials and workers remain available to continue production, Nizhny Novgorod could assist in the support of any military that operates in the general area.

MAKHACHKALA

Makhachkala, with a population of approximately 578,000 people, ranks as Donovia's third-largest city and serves as the capital city of the Badgir republic. Due to the city's occupation by outside forces in World War I and an earthquake in 1970, Makhachkala features a large amount of relatively new construction when compared to other Donovian cities. While a small number of areas with dense, random construction do occur, the city primarily features closed, orderly block construction built between 1970 and 1990. Some strip areas occur along the Caspian Sea, with a large number of shantytowns scattered throughout the city. Makhachkala's city core features large skyscrapers and planned construction built after 1970. The city also contains a core periphery with a mixture of newer buildings and older buildings that survived the earthquake. High- and low-rise residential areas spring up in a helter-skelter manner throughout the city without any apparent reasoning. Makhachkala contains limited commercial and industrial areas, as much of the area relies upon agriculture for its livelihood instead of industrial pursuits.

GROZNY

Grozny, located on the Sunsha River, serves as the capital of Gamrun and ranks as Donovia's fourth-largest city. While about 272,000 people currently live in Grozny, an increase from 211,000 in 2002, this does not compare to the almost 400,000 people that lived in the city in 1989. The conflict in the area between the Donovians and separatist groups account for Grozny's population fluctuation over the last two decades. While Grozny contains all four construction patterns in the seven urban zones, the wars over the last 20 years ruined many buildings and made them uninhabitable. Rectangular block-style buildings dot the newer high-rise residential areas while single-family dwellings dominate the older residential areas. Grozny also contains an old city core, and a core periphery surrounds the old city. The industrial area is concentrated along the Sunsha River while commercial areas appear in many parts of the city. Due to the years of warfare, many people now live in shantytowns without basic utilities.

NALCHIK

Nalchik, located in the foothills of the Caucasus Mountains, contains approximately 235,000 residents to make it Donovia's fifth-largest city and the capital of the North Ostremek Republic. Modern Nalchik's history dates back to 1818 when Donovia built a fort there to defend the country from outside invaders as it expanded to the south. Nalchik is positioned on its namesake river, where a potable spring also provided ample water to the early settlers. Only small boats can navigate the Nalchik River. In World War II, the city received so much damage that much of the architecture

dates to the second half of the 20th century. The area's natural springs made it a place where many rich Donovians would go to "take the waters," and a resort economy sprung up along with several sanatoriums. The city contains four institutes of higher learning including liberal arts, business, arts, and agricultural schools. Nalchik contains all four construction patterns—with closed, orderly block construction built after World War II to replace the destroyed buildings and dense, random construction in small isolated pockets because the city features large number of parks to create green spaces for the city's residents. A strip area occurs along the river, but Nalchik has few shantytown areas due to its history as a place for the wealthy to visit. Nalchik also contains six of the urban zones and is only missing major military bases. Due to the construction boom after World War II, the city core features high-rise residential and business buildings. Farther from the city core, Nalchik has core periphery and low-rise residential areas. Commercial areas flourish throughout the city, while the industrial area confines itself to areas along the river primarily focused on non-ferrous metallurgy, light industry, construction materials manufacturing, and machine building.

POPULATION DENSITY

Moscow: 25,080 people per square mile
Nizhny Novgorod: 7,890 people per square mile
Makhachkala: 3,200 people per square mile
Grozny: 2,500 people per square mile
Nalchik: 2,234 people per square mile

UTILITIES PRESENT

The Caucasus area faces a dichotomy when it comes to utilities such as electricity, water, and sewage treatment. Most urban households can access modern utilities, but rural areas cannot. Many rural residents who cannot access modern utilities live similarly to their ancestors generations ago.

POWER

Another dichotomy in the Caucasus region is that countries like Ariana, Atropia, and Donovia export hydrocarbons, coal, or electrical power to other countries while Gorgas and Minaria must import the same resources to meet their requirements. The countries that can export hydrocarbon products or electricity become richer while those that must import significant quantities of power become poorer. At least 75% of all structures in the five countries can access power because they are located in urban areas.

Even within Donovia, a dichotomy exists in regard to power. Donovia contains some of the world's largest natural coal, gas, and oil reserves, but most natural resources occur in the southern half of the country. Approximately 60% of Donovia's oil, or 4.9 million bbl/day, comes from the country's Caucasus area.

Donovia operates four regional electrical grids that connect the entire country. The "South Grid" provides power to the North Caucasus region. Thermal power (oil, natural gas, and coal) provides 68% of all Donovian electricity while hydropower and nuclear power evenly split the other 32%. Donovia operates 31 nuclear power reactors in 10 locations. A reactor normally last 30 years, and half of Donovia's nuclear reactors have already passed their halfway mark. Donovia currently has 10 additional nuclear reactors under construction. Due to the relative lack of industrialization compared to other parts of Donovia, the North Caucasus region through the South Grid comes close to electrical power self-sufficiency. Five hydroelectric power plants on the Sulak River provide the majority of the electricity for the region. What electricity the North Caucasus area lacks, the republics receive from other parts of Donovia.

WATER

The majority of the Caucasus region's urban population has access to potable water. As areas become more rural, people must rely on local sources—rivers, streams, and wells—to obtain water for cooking, drinking, and washing.

Reports claim 100% of urban and 88% of rural Donovians can access safe drinking water. While 97% of Donovians may access potable water, those who live in the Caucasus more closely resemble their neighbors to the south than the rest of their own country. Donovian households use about 20% of all water in the country and agriculture uses about 14%, but the lion's share of over 60% goes for industrial purposes. Even though most Donovian towns possess a water system, only 38% of the systems produce drinking water that meets international sanitary requirements. In rural areas, 59% of Donovians draw water from common wells affected by polluted groundwater. While both the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea abut the Caucasus region, pollution limits the ability to use either one to provide fresh water for the republics in the area.

SEWAGE

The vast majority of Ariana, Atropia, Gorgas, and Donovia urban residents use modern sewage disposal methods to get rid of waste, but most Minarians do not. Urban residents have greater access to modern sewage treatment than rural residents. The more remote a person, the less likely he/she will use modern sewage treatment techniques. Poor disposal methods in rural areas contaminate ground water that other residents rely on for drinking and cooking.

The Donovian Caucasus region does not possess the same modern sewage disposal access as those in the northern part of the country—Moscow and Nizhny Novgorod. The exception is Nalchik, where rich Donovians continue to take advantage of the local spas. While the overall Donovian percentage for improved sanitation facilities surpasses 93% in urban areas and 70% in rural areas, the numbers for the Donovian republics in the Caucasus remain significantly less. Only 75% of Donovians who live in urban Caucasian cities can access modern sewage systems compared to about 60% of rural Donovians in the region. Even with “modern” sewage systems used in Donovia, only 8% of all waste water receives treatment before it reenters the country’s waterways.

TRANSPORTATION ARCHITECTURE

Roads are the primary transportation method throughout the Caucasus region. Train and especially air travel remain too expensive for many residents of Ariana, Atropia, Gorgas, and Minaria. Most roads, especially the unpaved ones, suffer from a lack of maintenance. Ariana and Donovia maintain a complex transportation architectural system while the other three countries operate a moderate one due to railway system limitations.

ROAD SYSTEMS

Overall, roads in this part of the world do not meet US or Western Europe standards. Driving is hazardous, especially in the winter months or in bad weather. Generally, drivers do not obey all traffic laws, and vehicle owners often fail to maintain their vehicles properly.

For a country its size, Donovia does not possess a large number of roads. In the past, the government did not emphasize privately owned vehicles, so the requirement for roads remained relatively low. The Donovians did not design most of their roads for heavy trucks, and extensive travel by semi-trailers or other large trucks has significantly damaged the road system. The entire country contains approximately 510,186 miles of road broken down into 462,184 miles of paved roads and 108,002 miles of unpaved road. The paved roads include approximately 18,641 miles of expressways. Donovia built few expressways or paved roads in the Caucasus region, as most roads supported the large

number of people who always lived in the northern part of the country. Donovia, for the most part, fails to maintain the roads in the Caucasus area, and vehicles travel at their own risk. Experts estimate that roads will gain importance in the Donovian economy from their 13% share of goods transported 10 years ago to 41% a decade into the future. To meet these requirements, the Donovian government allotted \$10 billion for road construction, repair, and preventive maintenance last year, with subsequent annual increases. To pay for the roads, Donovia uses a combination of automobile taxes, a tariff on foreign-made car sales, and a charge for advertising alongside the roads.


BUS

All five countries maintain some sort of bus system, but its quality depends on the country and location. The larger the city, the more likely it will operate a public bus system. Usually, intercity buses run between the larger cities, and "private" buses may also operate in some areas. Due to the relatively cheap cost of public transportation, buses remain a favorite method for local civilians to travel long distances within their country.

Buses operate in almost every Donovian city of any size and provide means for poor people to travel to other cities and towns outside the large cities. In large cities, the vehicles may include buses, trolleybuses, or *Marshrutkas*. Marshrutkas, or private buses, operate in many parts of Donovia, especially the Caucasus area. Most buses operate above normal capacity, especially during morning or afternoon rush hours. Sometimes a rider needs to purchase a ticket before boarding the bus while other times the rider purchases the ticket directly from the driver. If purchased from a driver, make sure to use the correct change or the driver may feign that he cannot make change or does not possess the proper change for the transaction. Do not purchase return tickets, because it does not save any money and a misunderstanding due to the language barrier may result in the purchase of the wrong return ticket.

RAIL

All five Caucasus countries operate a railroad system, but they suffer many problems due to maintenance issues, non-standard equipment, criminal activity, and high cost.



Unlike many other European countries, Donovia uses its railroad system primarily to haul cargo and not passengers. Approximately 45,562 miles of broad gauge track (60 inch) railroads cover Donovia from its western border east to Magnitogorsk and south through the Caucasus. Electricity runs 47% or 21,014 miles of this track. Donovian industries operate an additional 18,641 miles of non-common carrier tracks to support their businesses, but this represents a 45% decline from a high of 41,632

miles in 1991 due to reduced economic activity. While the most famous railway line remains the Trans-Donovian Railroad that links western Donovia with eastern Donovia, railroad lines also spread to the Donovian ports on the Caspian and Black Seas.

Donovian Railways serves as the primary operator of the railroads in the country. Donovian Railways' 950,000 employees operate 19,700 locomotives, 24,200 passenger cars, and 526,900 freight cars. Other private companies own an additional 270,000 freight cars. In 2006, Donovian Railways bought 1,250 new locomotives while they phased out old train engines. In the early 2000's, the Donovian government subsidized travel so that passengers only paid 15% of the actual cost. In 2006, the government began a multi-year plan to phase out passenger subsidies that concluded earlier this year, much to the consternation of the people.

AIR TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS

All five countries maintain both paved and unpaved runways of varying distances. Many of the unpaved runways resemble nothing more than a cleared dirt path only suitable for the sturdiest of planes.

Donovia enjoys 330 paved runways, with 17 over 10,000 feet in length. Of the 391 unpaved runways, only one reaches 10,000 feet in length.





Paved Runways

- Over 10,000 feet: 17
- 8,000 to 10,000 feet: 86
- 5,000 to 8,000 feet: 113
- 3,000 to 5,000 feet: 39
- Under 3,000 feet: 75

Unpaved Runways

- Over 10,000 feet: 1
- 8,000 to 10,000 feet: 6
- 5,000 to 8,000 feet: 61
- 3,000 to 5,000 feet: 34
- Under 3,000 feet: 289

Major Runways

- GRE= Graded Rolled Earth
- GRS=Non-graded Rolled Earth
- PEM=Porous European Mix

Map #	Elevation (Feet)	Latitude (D, M, S)	Longitude (D, M, S)	Length (Feet)	Width (Feet)	Surface Type
501	174	45 00 07.55 N	37 20 50.18 E	8202	138	Concrete
502	-6	46 17 00.00 N	48 00 22.60 E	8202	138	Concrete
503	735	50 38 37.55 N	36 35 24.45 E	7546	138	Asphalt
504	663	53 12 51.10 N	34 10 35.21 E	7874	138	Concrete
505-1	558	56 05 24.97 N	47 20 50.10 E	8241	161	Asphalt
505-2	558	56 05 24.97 N	47 20 50.10 E	4950	270	GRE
506	742	55 18 21.01 N	61 30 12.00 E	10440	215	Concrete
507-1	499	46 22 26.16 N	44 19 51.14 E	7555	280	GRE
507-2	499	46 22 26.16 N	44 19 51.14 E	6930	148	Asphalt
507-3	499	46 22 26.16 N	44 19 51.14 E	6930	148	Asphalt
508-1	118	45 02 04.88 N	39 10 13.94 E	9835	145	Concrete
508-2	118	45 02 04.88 N	39 10 13.94 E	7218	160	Asphalt
509	686	51 45 02.21 N	31 17 44.11 E	8202	131	Concrete
510-1	13	42 49 00.56 N	47 39 08.26 E	8688	230	GRS
510-2	13	42 49 00.56 N	47 39 08.26 E	8661	138	Concrete
511	UNK	44 39 12.00 N	40 05 24.00 E	8579	UNK	Dirt
512	1054	44 13 30.26 N	43 04 54.80 E	12795	197	Concrete
513-1	587	55 24 31.63 N	37 54 22.73 E	12447	197	Concrete
513-2	587	55 24 31.63 N	37 54 22.73 E	11483	230	Concrete
514-1	630	55 58 21.51 N	37 24 52.52 E	12139	197	Concrete
514-2	630	55 58 21.51 N	37 24 52.52 E	11647	197	Concrete
515-1	686	55 35 45.09 N	37 16 03.49 E	10039	197	Concrete
515-2	686	55 35 45.09 N	37 16 03.49 E	9842	197	Concrete
516	1461	43 30 46.28 N	43 38 11.70 E	7218	138	Asphalt
517-1	643	55 33 52.87 N	52 05 33.04 E	8165	148	Asphalt
517-2	643	55 33 52.87 N	52 05 33.04 E	5620	190	GRS
518-1	256	56 13 48.43 N	43 47 02.55 E	9203	148	Asphalt
518-2	256	56 13 48.43 N	43 47 02.55 E	8232	148	Asphalt
518-3	256	56 13 48.43 N	43 47 02.55 E	1969	72	Asphalt
518-4	256	56 13 48.43 N	43 47 02.55 E	1640	72	Asphalt
519	387	51 47 44.83 N	55 27 24.28 E	8212	138	Concrete
520-1	909	51 04 22.13 N	58 35 45.71 E	9514	138	Asphalt
520-2	909	51 04 22.13 N	58 35 45.71 E	5813	345	GRS
520-3	909	51 04 22.13 N	58 35 45.71 E	2311	172	GRS
520-4	909	51 04 22.13 N	58 35 45.71 E	2018	195	GRS
522	250	62 09 30.86 N	77 19 44.05 E	8925	195	PEM
523-1	280	47 15 29.51 N	39 49 04.79 E	8202	148	Concrete
523-2	280	47 15 29.51 N	39 49 04.79 E	6381	205	GRS
523-3	280	47 15 29.51 N	39 49 04.79 E	4321	300	GRS
524-1	477	53 30 17.49 N	50 09 51.61 E	9846	148	Concrete
524-2	477	53 30 17.49 N	50 09 51.61 E	8505	197	Asphalt

Map #	Elevation (Feet)	Latitude (D, M, S)	Longitude (D, M, S)	Length (Feet)	Width (Feet)	Surface Type
525	499	51 33 54.00 N	46 02 48.00 E	7485	138	Asphalt
526-1	89	43 26 59.74 N	39 57 23.72 E	9482	164	Concrete
526-2	89	43 26 59.74 N	39 57 23.72 E	7218	161	Concrete
528	1486	45 06 32.99 N	42 06 46.00 E	8645	157	Asphalt
529	469	54 49 29.05 N	35 45 27.64 E	8202	160	Concrete
530-1	449	54 33 27.04 N	55 52 27.90 E	12339	197	Concrete
530-2	449	54 33 27.04 N	55 52 27.90 E	8245	164	Concrete
530-3	449	54 33 27.04 N	55 52 27.90 E	2360	325	GRE
530-4	449	54 33 27.04 N	55 52 27.90 E	2150	350	GRE
531	246	54 24 03.66 N	48 48 09.56 E	16490	310	Concrete
532	1673	43 12 18.41 N	44 36 23.91 E	9828	148	Concrete
533-1	482	48 46 56.57 N	44 20 41.04 E	8202	161	Asphalt
533-2	482	48 46 56.57 N	44 20 41.04 E	5575	295	GRS
534	514	51 48 51.16 N	39 13 46.52 E	7546	161	Concrete
535	287	57 33 38.40 N	40 09 26.53 E	9870	135	Concrete

Airports/Airlines

Donovia possesses over 650 airports, with the runways spread throughout the country. Most of the runways in the Caucasus serve dual purposes, as both civilian and military airplanes operate from them. Donovia operates nine major airports within 200 miles of its borders with Gorgas and Atropia.

Donovian Airlines, the national airline, split up into a number of smaller airlines due to reforms enacted after the 1991 Four Traitors incident. The Donovian government does not regulate the airlines, which leads to poor maintenance and some of the world's worst airline safety records. Ground-based navigational aids remain limited and often inoperable due to maintenance issues. Airlines that fly to international designations, however, must meet specific safety regulations and remain the best travel option. When traveling within Donovia, the best choice remains an airplane headed afterward to an international destination. At least 163 different airlines operate in Donovia, and this includes Sophia Airlines and Anton Airlines, both headquartered in a Donovian Caucasus republic.

PORTS/SEA/RIVER TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS

The five Caucasus countries share a diverse maritime culture. Ariana has a significant coastline and a large oceangoing fleet to export its oil. Atropia maintains ports on the Caspian Sea. Gorgas has three ports on the Black Sea that are accessible through the straits at Istanbul, Kemalia. Minaria is completely landlocked, with no direct access to any ocean or sea. Due to its location, Donovia has several seaports on the Black and Caspian Seas.

Donovia operates ports on the Caspian Sea, the Black Sea, and the Azov Sea. Ships can also negotiate many of Donovia's rivers, especially in the non-winter months. Major Donovian Black and Azov Sea seaports include Rostov, Novorossiysk, and Sochi. Major Caspian Sea seaports include Makhachkala and Astrakhan, at the mouth of the Volga River. (See map on page 2E-6-8.)

Donovia operates the 15th largest merchant marine fleet in the world, with almost 900 vessels. This includes 507 cargo, 189 petroleum tanker, and 62 refrigerated cargo ships. Foreign corporations own 116 of the ships, led by Kemalia with 83. Donovia registers almost 360 ships in foreign countries, with over 20% flagged in Liberia.

PIPELINES

The security of hydrocarbon pipelines will be paramount in any military operations in the Caucasus region. Any disruption to the flow of crude oil and natural gas to the Western world could cause economic problems, as many modern countries rely on hydrocarbons to fuel their industries.

Due to its great hydrocarbon resources, Donovia uses a large number of pipelines throughout the country to include some that pass through the Caucasus to ports on the Black Sea. Due to their past relationship, Atropia can export natural gas and oil through pipelines that connect Baku with the Donovian pipeline system. The vast network of pipelines means that the destruction of any one line would not likely damage Donovia's ability to export hydrocarbon resources to Western nations. While the cost may go up because a tanker or natural gas ship may need to travel a different route, Donovia possesses the means to divert its hydrocarbon resources through its pipeline system to where it needs to go.



European consortiums are constructing new hydrocarbon pipelines that will allow the Central Asian countries to avoid Donovia; these could threaten Donovia financially with a massive loss of transit fees. New oil and gas pipelines will originate in Central Asia, cross the Caspian Sea, and then follow the current Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline through Atropia, Gorgas, and Kemalia before reaching the European market. These new pipelines will double the export capacity of the BTC pipeline to help satisfy the increased demand for oil and natural gas by Western Europe.

TELECOMMUNICATIONS ARCHITECTURE

For the most part, Caucasus-region residents use cellular telephones to communicate with each other due to the lack of landline telephone infrastructure. Many residents never owned any type of telephone until they received their first cellular phone. Most can access news from either television or radio, but some rural residents have no information access via modern methods. (*See Information variable for additional details.*)

Donovians use over five times as many cellular telephones as landlines, and the number of cellular telephones continues to increase as it becomes the primary means of communication throughout the country. Donovians possess over 155 million cellular telephones, but only 30 million landlines. The Donovian government licenses over 700 companies to offer communications services. In the Caucasus area, like the rest of Donovia, cellular telephones provide the primary means for the residents to communicate with each other.

Approximately 32% or 26.5 million of the 82 million Donovians can access the Internet on a regular basis. The actual percent for Donovians in the Caucasus, however, hovers closer to 15%. Approximately 670,000 Internet hosts operate in Donovia, but most of them work out of Moscow and other Donovian cities north of the Caucasus.

Over 2,200 national, regional, and local television stations operate in Donovia, with approximately two-thirds under control or partial control by the government. Of the 12 national television stations, the federal government owns one and holds the majority of shares in a second while a bank owns two more, the major hydrocarbon company the fifth, and the Moscow city government the sixth. Within Donovia, around 1,400 public and commercial radio stations operate. Due to the number of television and radio stations under its control, the Donovian government stills attempts to control what information the Donovian people receive. Despite these attempts, all Donovians to include those in the Caucasus now receive more information due to the inability of the government to control information via the Internet or telephone systems.

AGRICULTURE

Agriculture production still dominates the labor forces of Gorgas (55.6%) and Minaria (46.2%), but not Ariana (25%), Atropia (38.3%), or Donovia (20%). Even in the Caucasus region's predominately agricultural countries, farming creates less than one-fourth of the country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Except for Atropia, the region relies on food imports to feed its people. Any food import disruption may increase the military's burden to feed civilians and prevent starvation.

Due primarily to its vast natural resources and poor climate in many parts of the vast country, agriculture plays a lesser role in Donovia. Approximately 20% of Donovians farm or work in farm-related occupations, but agriculture creates only 4% of the country's GDP.

Only about 12% of Donovia's land possesses topography, soil, and climate to make it suitable for agricultural use. Donovian farmers use about 60% of their fields for crops with the remainder for pasture and meadows. Major Donovian agricultural crops include grains, sugar beets, sunflower seeds, vegetables, fruits, beef, and milk. Wheat accounts for 50% of all Donovian grain production, while corn accounts for 20% and barley with just a slightly higher total. Donovia uses 70% of its wheat in products for people while 30% goes to feed animals. Almost all barley goes for animal feed

or to make beer. The Donovian farmers use over 60% of their corn for animal feed. Due to its low production cost relative to wheat and a high demand, sunflowers to make into oil usually turn the highest profit for Donovian farmers. In the Caucasus, the most important agricultural products include grain, sunflowers, tea, dairy products, cattle, poultry, and wine production.

The Caucasus, like the other parts of Donovia, uses a winter-crop planting system. Farmers sow their crops beginning in August in the north and, moving southward, conclude in the Caucasus in late October. In April, farmers plant their summer crops such as corn and sunflowers, with completion not later than early June. Harvest for winter crops begins in late June in the Caucasus and moves northward to finish not later than the end of August. These farmers then harvest their corn and sunflower crops in September and finish by October. Many farmers in the Caucasus employ a six-year crop rotation with two years of winter wheat, one year of sunflowers, one year of spring barley, one year of corn, and a fallow year. Other farmers use a seven-year crop rotation plan with two years of winter wheat, four years of perennial forage such as alfalfa, and a fallow year. Farmers can usually get four cuttings of alfalfa in any given year and sometimes five in an irrigated field. Wheat always follows a fallow year due to the need for additional moisture for the crop. In some parts of the Caucasus, farmers omit the fallow year and use an eight-year crop rotation plan with winter wheat, winter barley, sugar beets, winter wheat, winter barley, sunflowers, corn, and finally sugar beets and/or sunflowers.

Donovia operates three different types of farms: large corporate farms, small household farms that provide subsistence to rural families, and cooperative farms. After the Four Traitors incident, peasant farms began to increase as economic conditions worsened. Donovian agricultural output declined annually by 5% in crops and 11% in livestock through 1995, the worst grain harvest since 1963. Since then, farm production has begun to rise again under the free market system. Recent data concludes that household and cooperative farms produce 59% of all Donovian agricultural output, but only use 20% of all land under cultivation.

INDUSTRY

Because of their hydrocarbon resources, Ariana, Atropia, and Donovia are more industrialized than Gorgas and Minaria. Industry GDP ranges from a low of 27.1% in Gorgas to a high of 61.4% in Atropia. The protection of the hydrocarbon infrastructure remains paramount for any military operations in the area, and the military should refrain from unnecessary damage to the industrial sector to facilitate economic recovery after the end of hostilities.

While Donovia possesses a large industrial base—with 42% of the population generating 54% of the country's GDP, this industrial production does not carry over the Caucasus. While some industrialization took place in the Caucasus after World War II, the area did not modernize as much as other parts of Donovia to the north. Because of this lack of industrialization, the Donovian Caucasus region has much more in common with its neighbors to the south than with its own country.

Each of the Donovian Caucasus republics relies on different industrial products. Gilan produces natural gas for domestic consumption, oil, chemicals, textiles, and some metalworking industries. Barbodrag relies on the timber industry, heavy engineering plants, and metalworking. Armavir primary products include chemicals, timber, and processed foods. North Ostremek relies mainly on timber, mining, and agricultural food processing. Before war in Gamrun, oil served as the country's primary industry. Badgir industry focuses on oil, gas, mining, and to a lesser extent on mineral water. Overall, Donovia produces a large amount of toxic industrial chemicals for multiple purposes, including hydrocarbon production activities, water purification, and fertilizer to increase agricultural output.

POLLUTION

All five Caucasus-region countries face significant pollution problems stemming from poor industrial practices. The governments cared more about natural resource extraction and product production than the stewardship of the planet. This lack of concern for the environment occurred regardless of which government controlled the various countries. The region's military operations will need to address pollution, with soldiers taking precautions due to high-level air pollution and units considering any local water source not potable until tested.

Donovia faces pollution issues throughout the entire country, and the Caucasus region does not differ from the country's norm. Pollution contaminates over 75% of all Donovian surface water and 30% of all groundwater. Donovia's worst problems include much of the Caucasus region and the Republic of Gamrun. Because it lacks facilities, Donovia only treats 8% of its sewage before it rejoins the country's streams and rivers. Poor industrial methods produce chemicals that contaminate many areas. Cases of cholera, salmonella, typhoid fever, dysentery, and viral hepatitis break out due to poor sanitation methods. Water runoff from fields and industrial plants continues to kill much of the aquatic life in Donovia. The pollution allows only five species of fish to survive in the Black Sea where once 26 different species thrived. Pollution has wiped out the fishing industry in the Black Sea, with fish yields dropping 93% in less than a decade during the 1990s. To clean up all of Donovia's pollution from years of neglect is too expensive to even consider. Even if Donovia began to clean up the pollution, the Caucasus would likely receive a low priority compared to other parts of the country that the Donovian government deems most important.

Summary

Donovia and Ariana contain the best infrastructure of the five countries in this OEA. The modern infrastructure, however, exists in Donovia's larger cities that mainly occur outside the Caucasus area. For the Donovian Caucasus area, the infrastructure resembles that of Atropia, Gorgas, and Minaria more than that of Donovia's largest cities in the northern part of the country. Much of the infrastructure in the Donovian Caucasus area receives little maintenance or is neglected and subjects the people living there to intermittent interruptions of power, water, and sewage disposal. For all the wealth generated by Donovia's natural resources, the Donovian government in Moscow continues to spend its resources in areas of the country other than the Caucasus.

TRADOC G-2

TRISA-THREATS


CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND THREAT INTEGRATION

DIRECTORATE (CTID)

PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT: DONOVIA

Physical Environment: Donovia

The physical environment variable includes the geography and man-made structures as well as the climate and weather in the area of operations. This variable defines the physical circumstances and conditions that influence the execution of operations throughout the domains of air, land, and sea.



KEY FACTS:

REGION

- The Caucasus region covers the northern and southern portions of the Caucasus Mountains and its lowlands, and lies between Europe and Asia.

DONOVIA

- Donovia's North Caucasus area is separated from the rest of the Caucasus region by the Greater Caucasus Mountains, creating a formidable barrier to ground movement between Donovia and its southern neighbors.

OPERATIONAL IMPACTS OF THE PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT VARIABLE IN THE OE:

REGION

- All countries in the region contain rugged mountain ranges that will hamper ground movement.
- The Black and Caspian Seas play an important role in regional movement of persons and goods.

DONOVARIA

- Ground and air movement in the northern plains and steppes of Donovaria's North Caucasus is not without difficulty, but movement is considerably harder in the southern mountains.
- Coastal borders on both the Black and Caspian Seas allow Donovaria maritime access to all countries in the region save landlocked Minaria.

PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT OVERVIEW:

Over 200,000 square miles comprise the Caucasus, a mountainous region located between the Black Sea and Caspian Sea. The Caucasus includes Atropia, Minaria, and Gorgas, as well as parts of Ariana, Donovaria, and Kemalia. The Caucasus Mountains, consisting of the Greater and Lesser Caucasus ranges, traditionally form the separation between Europe and Asia. The Caucasus region contains two major parts—the North Caucasus and the South Caucasus—that are divided by the Greater Caucasus Mountains. The North Caucasus region is contained entirely within Donovaria, while the South Caucasus contains Gorgas, Minaria, Atropia, and parts of Ariana and Kemalia.

TERRAIN

Donovaria possesses 604,200 square miles of territory and lies in the very easternmost part of Europe. It shares 5,980 miles of border with six different countries, including both Gorgas (449 miles) and Atropia (176 miles) to the south, and three bodies of water. The country contains varied terrain to include mountains, hills, plains, forests, and uplands. As the country's physical environment is large and varied, this variable focuses on its North Caucasus region.

The republics of Keldrag, Barbodrag, Armavir, North Ostremek, Gamrun, Badgir, Failaq, and Gilan make up Donovaria's North Caucasus region. The region contains 107,765 square miles of land area and shares the aforementioned borders with Gorgas and Atropia to the south. The Caspian Sea borders the region to the east, the Black Sea and the Azov Sea to the west, and the rest of Donovaria stretches to the north. The Greater Caucasus Mountains run along the North Caucasus' southern border and give way to the steppes and plains of the Kuban-Azov lowland (west), the Barbodrag upland (central), and the Ostremek plain (east) as one moves northward, finally ending at the Kum-Manich depression. The Caspian lowland lies in the far northeast portion of the region and borders the Caspian Sea. While the greater part of the region lies below 1,640 feet, the North Caucasus also holds Mount Elbrus, which lies 18,510 feet above sea level and is the highest point in both Donovaria and all of Europe.



BODIES OF WATER

The North Caucasus possesses multiple rivers that mainly originate in the Greater Caucasus Mountains and run almost without exception to the bordering Azov, Black, or Caspian Seas. Major rivers include the navigable Don, Manich, and Kuban in the west, and the Kuma, Terek, and Sulak – the latter used for hydroelectric power – in the east. The mountains and Azov seacoast contain many small lakes, but the region's only sizeable lake is the Krasnodar Reservoir on the Kuban River in the west. The Barbodrag canal system also supplies water to the central part of the country.

MOBILITY CLASSIFICATION

Movement in the North Caucasus region is less restricted in the northern steppes and plains than in the southern mountains. Heavy snows and icy conditions seriously hamper troop movement in the mountains during winter months, while flooding causes mobility problems in spring and summer. The presence of dense forests in and near the mountains increases difficulties and provides cover for enemy forces and smugglers, while multiple rivers and streams challenge mechanized and motorized movement. Air operation impediments include tall mountains, thick forests, steep valleys and gorges, strong winds and sudden wind direction changes, low clouds, dense mist and fog, and dust

storms. Donovia actively uses landmines in the region, especially in the Gamrun Republic and in the Greater Caucasus Mountains along the border with Gorgas.

NATURAL HAZARDS

Similar to its southern neighbors, Donovia's North Caucasus region experiences natural disasters that include floods, land/mudslides, and earthquakes. Record heavy rains created flooding and landslides in the region in 1993, leaving more than 230 people dead and totally destroying over 20,000 homes, with the total number of people affected in the hundreds of thousands. The region has also experienced major earthquakes, including one in 2008 that measured 5.8 on the Richter scale and left 13 people dead. Lower-magnitude events are frequent, with over 35 magnitude 3.0-3.9 earthquakes occurring last year.




VEGETATION

LAND COVER

In the North Caucasus region, forests cover a considerable portion of the mountainous area in the south. Lower-elevation forests normally have broadleaf trees—namely oak, beech, hornbeam, maple, and ash—while those at higher elevations usually consist of conifers such as spruce, pine, and fir. These give way to subalpine and alpine meadows as elevation increases. Great portions of the steppes and plains are devoted to agriculture. Those that are not and the dryer, semi-desert areas in the northeast are covered by cereal vegetation, flowering plants, grasses, and sagebrush. (*See map on the previous page.*)

AGRICULTURE

Donovian agricultural pursuits employ 20% of the labor force and produce 4% of the national GDP, with the North Caucasus region playing a very important role in this sector. While the country possesses only 12% arable land overall, half to two-thirds of the North Caucasus is arable and most of the remainder is either used for pasture or covered with forests. Crops produced in the region include wheat, corn, millet, barley, oats, sunflowers, sugar beets, hemp, tea, potatoes, vegetables,



melons, and other fruit and vines. The vast majority (70-90%) of available land is used for cereal or fodder crops, with the remainder dedicated to potatoes, vegetables, melons, and industrial crops such as sunflower and hemp. In addition to the presence of many rivers and reasonable rainfall—20-28 inches annually in agricultural areas—a canal system that provides irrigation is present in the north central part of the region.

CLIMATE

The North Caucasus region mainly experiences a continental climate, while the Black Sea coastal region is subtropical and the far northeast, near the Caspian Sea, is subarid. Summers are long and warm, while temperatures in winter are subfreezing. The mountains experience cooler temperatures year-round as compared to the steppes and plains, as well as heavy snow in the winter. Precipitation levels peak in June, are higher in the mountains than in the plains, and decrease from west to east.

SEASONS

Country/Season	Winter	Spring	Summer	Fall
Ariana	Dec – Feb	Mar – May	Jun – Aug	Sep – Nov
Atropia	Jan – Mar	Mar – End May	Jun – Oct	Mid Oct – Dec
Gorgas	Dec – Feb	Mar – May	Jun – Aug	Sep – Nov
Minaria	Nov – Mar	Mar – May	Jun – Sep	End Sep – Nov
North Caucasus (Donovia)	Dec – Mar	Apr – May	Jun – Sep	Oct – Nov

Seasons for Ariana, Atropia, Gorgas, Minaria, and North Caucasus (Donovia)

WEATHER

PRECIPITATION

Precipitation in the North Caucasus region varies by location and elevation, with amounts usually decreasing as one moves north and east. The mountainous areas receive up to 125 inches annually in the sub-tropical west, but only 24-31 inches in the east. The plains and steppes average from 14 to 28 inches of precipitation per year, and the semi-arid regions in the northeast receive 8-16 inches annually. Rains usually peak in the summer, and snow falls heavily in the mountains during winter. Flooding can occur in the lower elevations in spring and summer due to both rain and snow runoff from the mountains.

TEMPERATURE-HEAT INDEX

Temperatures vary with elevation in the North Caucasus region, with July and August being the hottest months. Average highs in the mountains reach only 70-75°F in July as compared to 87°F in the plains/steppes and 82°F on the coasts.

TEMPERATURE-WIND CHILL INDEX

Donovia's North Caucasus region has cold winters, with all areas experiencing sub-freezing average temperatures. January is the coldest month, with averages as low as 20°F on the coasts, 18°F on the plains and steppes, and 10°F in the mountains. Higher elevations also experience significant snowfall, especially in the western areas, which can be coupled with mist and fog.

RELATIVE HUMIDITY

As with other elements of weather in the North Caucasus, relative humidity varies by elevation and location. The southern and western parts of the region experience high humidity, which decreases as one moves north and east. The central part of the North Caucasus has low humidity, while the driest areas lie to the far northeast.

WIND

One of the winds the North Caucasus region experiences is *bora*, meaning a very strong gust of cold wind. More common in the winter, cold air trapped in the western Greater Caucasus foothills reaches sufficient altitude to flow through the mountain pass and northwest along the Black Sea coast. Lasting several days at a time, temperatures can drop 35°F while wind speed may exceed 130mph.

On the opposite side of the spectrum are the *fens*, or warm, dry winds. These winds may raise temperatures 25°F, reach 45 mph, and can change direction twice within a 24-hour period. They usually occur in the mountains and foothills, and their effects are exacerbated in valleys and gorges.

Dust storms also occur in the region. They peak in May and August, and are more common during droughts. One such storm, in 1970, lasted for 200 hours and blew away several inches of topsoil.

Threats to operations from these wind types are multiple. In addition to sudden extreme temperature and wind speed changes, ice presents a serious danger to operations during boras. Wind direction changes endanger airborne operations during fens, and dust storms can damage both machinery and equipment as well as limit visibility.

Summary

The Caucasus region, containing the Greater and Lesser Caucasus Mountains, forms the traditional division between Europe and Asia. All countries contain different weather and terrain, and soldiers must prepare for seasonal extremes—winter and summer. Areas with flat plains and valleys, such as coastal plains, will favor troop mechanized movement. The mountainous regions, especially in the Greater and Lesser Caucasus Mountains, will compound vehicle and equipment breakdowns. Numerous roads, already in poor conditions in most of the countries, will become inaccessible for vehicular traffic because of winter snow. Military planners will need to anticipate the closure of mountain passes for up to six months a year due to snow.

TRADOC G-2

TRISA-THREATS

CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND THREAT INTEGRATION

DIRECTORATE (CTID)

TIME: DONOVIA

Time: Donovia

The time variable describes the timing and duration of activities, events, or conditions within an OE, as well as how the timing and duration of events are perceived by various actors in the OE.

KEY FACTS:

REGION

- All five countries have ancient cultures, and rivalries generated over that time between different ethnic groups still exist.
- Most people in the region do not view time as a resource, but as something that people cannot control.

DONOVARIA

- Donovia uses the Gregorian calendar to determine its holidays.
- Donovians expect punctuality for appointments, meetings, and other events but may not be punctual themselves.

OPERATIONAL IMPACTS OF THE TIME VARIABLE IN THE OE:

REGION

- The lack of a sense of urgency for most people will frustrate the US as it deals with allied militaries in the Caucasus region.
- The US will most likely find opportunities to exploit the lackadaisical attitude about time to get inside the enemy military's decision cycle.

DONOVARIA

- Personal relationships are the key to improving adherence to time commitments.
- The US must be knowledgeable of Donovia's historic role in the region in order to understand current Donovian actions.

TIME OVERVIEW:

The Caucasus countries, for the most part, do not believe in the sensitivity of time, and do not view punctuality or the importance of time as the US and most other Western countries do. Most of the people in the region do not view time as a resource and do not feel any compulsion to effectively manage their time. The people in the Caucasus region do not make the connection between effective use of their time and production. This lack of time consciousness will likely frustrate US soldiers as they work with their allies, but it will also give the US a battlefield advantage against its enemies.

KEY DATES, TIME PERIODS OR EVENTS

The entire region's recorded history extends back at least 3,000 years, but people populated the area long before that time as indicated by the archaeological objects discovered in caves and at other long-inhabited sites.

ROUTINE, CYCLICAL KEY DATES

TRADITIONAL WEDDING SEASONS

Donovia does not have a standard wedding season. More weddings, however, occur in the summer than the winter. Due to the heavy Muslim influence, most people will not marry in the month of Ramadan. Some areas extend the time for prohibition against marriage to even longer periods, but it usually depends on the devoutness of the individuals concerned.

NATIONAL AND RELIGIOUS HOLIDAYS

Donovia uses the Gregorian calendar and designates over 100 days to remember, recognize, or honor various professions, military victories, significant events, etc. Additionally, various ethnic and religious groups within Donovia observe their own significant dates. Only the official Donovian national holidays are listed below.

Holiday	Date	Description	Military Implications
New Year's Day	01 January		NA
Donovia Defender's Day	23 February	Honors the Armed Forces	NA
International Women's Day	08 March	Equivalent to a combination of Mother's Day and Valentine's Day	NA
Spring and Labor Day	01 May		NA

HARVEST CYCLES

Grains are among Donovia's most important crops, occupying more than 50% of cropland. Wheat is dominant in most grain-producing areas. Winter wheat is cultivated in the North Caucasus and spring wheat in the Don River Basin and the middle Volga River region. Corn is only suitable for growth in the North Caucasus, and production levels have remained low compared with other grains. Barley, second to wheat in gross yield, is grown mainly for animal feed and beer production in colder regions. Production of oats, which once ranked third among Donovia's grains, has declined as machines have replaced horses in farming operations.

Legumes became a common crop in the 1980s. Potatoes are grown in colder regions. Sugar beet production has expanded in recent years; the beets are grown mainly in the rich black-earth districts of Donovia. Flax is Donovia's most important raw material for textiles. Flax also yields linseed oil, which together with sunflowers and soybeans is an important source of vegetable oil.

With the exception of certain crops, such as winter wheat, planting occurs in the spring and harvesting in the fall. Exact times vary with location, with planting occurring later in the northern portions of the country than in the North Caucasus region. Harvest time comes earlier in the north, and later in the southern areas.

ELECTIONS

Donovia's president and the parliament are elected on the federal level. The president serves a six-year term and is limited to a maximum of two consecutive terms in office. The parliament has 450 members, elected for four-year terms, all of them elected by proportional representation.

CULTURAL PERCEPTION OF TIME

Most of the Caucasus area does not perceive the importance of time as the Western world does, especially as it relates to business. The more a country interacts with Western nations, however, the more the country accepts the Western idea of the importance of time.

While Westerners take time commitments such as deadlines and schedules very seriously, in the Caucasus region, time commitments are seen more as an objective to be achieved, if possible, rather than a requirement. Promptness is based on relationships. In the West, time is money. In the Caucasus, there is no problem with making people wait all day, and then telling them to come back the next day. A person from the Caucasus will be much more likely to be on time if the person who set the time commitment is close to him, such as a friend or family member. Business is conducted more on the basis of personal relationships than on respect for time.

The structure of the concepts of “day” and “night” in Donovian and American cultures is quite different: the night in English is not only the night, but also the evening, and it actually lasts until midnight. The Donovian night lasts until 4 o’clock in the morning.

Americans put “time” first (time and tide wait for no man) and Donovians put “people” first (seven people do not wait for one) in proverbs expressing the same idea. In Western culture the focus is on time; in Donovian culture it is on people.

Personal relationships are the key to business in Donovia. A Donovian might arrive late for a meeting with someone he does not know well but will not necessarily acknowledge being late. Ironically, Donovians will often expect Westerners to be on time and will even be offended by a Westerner’s tardiness. Developing a close personal relationship is the best way to improve Donovian adherence to time commitments.

TACTICAL EXPLOITATION OF TIME

CAUCASUS PERCEPTION OF TIME

For the most part, people in the Caucasus perceive time as an unimportant resource in their lives. They believe that things will occur whether they take proactive action or not. Each country in the region possesses a long history, and the people believe their country will continue well into the future. Most of the people in the region look back to times when their ethnic group held the upper hand in interactions with their neighbors and hope that one day their country can become the dominant power again. The people do not look at time in the short term, but look forward to the long term when conditions will again allow them to take their rightful place among the world’s leaders. For Ariana and Atropia, their hydrocarbon resources may provide them the impetus to become a regional—if not world—power. For Gorgas and Minaria, their lack of natural resources will continue to plague their countries’ ability to improve their situation in the short term. Donovia wishes to regain the dominant regional influence it once commanded.

US PERCEPTION OF TIME

The time perception of allies in the region will frustrate the US, but the US can also take advantage of the lack of urgency of any enemies in the area. With its regional allies, the US will need to help them understand that time is a precious resource that once wasted can never be recovered. Punctuality and a sense of urgency remain essential for a military to defeat the enemy on the battlefield. Due to the enemy’s lack of a time table and its apathetic regard for punctuality, US forces and their allies will most likely find opportunities to get inside the enemy leaders’ decision cycles. Rapid US and allied action will cause the enemy to react to their actions instead of the enemy taking the initiative.

Summary

For the most part, the Caucasus countries view time differently than the US. Time remains relatively unimportant to the people of Ariana, Atropia, Gorgas, and Minaria in almost every aspect of their lives. They lack a sense of urgency to accomplish tasks, in complete contrast to the Western world where almost everyone wants to accomplish as much as possible in as little time as possible. While the Donovian view of time is closer to that of the US than the other nations of the Caucasus region, it is still notably different. All five cultures have extensive histories dating back centuries and the people feel that whatever they do, their country will continue into the future. The area's perception of time will cause the US to become frustrated with its allies, but will provide opportunities for exploitation of US enemies. To do so, however, the US will need to understand the nuances as each country perceives the relative importance of time somewhat differently.

TRADOC G-2

TRISA-THREATS

CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND THREAT INTEGRATION

DIRECTORATE (CTID)

ORDER OF BATTLE: DONOVIA


Introduction to the Donovia Order of Battle


ORDERS OF BATTLE

All five countries have an administrative force structure (AFS) to manage their military forces in peacetime. This AFS is the aggregate of various military headquarters, facilities, and installations designed to man, train, equip, and sustain the forces. In peacetime, forces are commonly grouped into divisions, corps, or armies for administrative purposes. The AFS includes all components of the armed forces—not only regular, standing forces (active component), but also reserve and militia forces (reserve component). Normally, these administrative groupings differ from the country's order of battle (OB), which is its go-to-war (fighting) force structure that is task-organized to meet the combat situation.


The following pages outline the Donovian AFS. For information on how to use the AFS to obtain an OB, see Appendix B: OPFOR Task-Organizing for Combat on page 4-B-1.


Supreme High Command





Ground Forces Command


Southern Military District





Southern Army


80th Mechanized Infantry Division (IFV), Southern Army


81st Mechanized Infantry Division (APC), Southern Army


84th Motorized Infantry Division, Southern Army


86th Motorized Infantry Division, Southern Army

850th Separate Mechanized Infantry Brigade (IFV), Southern Army


820th Separate Motorized Infantry Brigade, Southern Army

83rd Separate Airborne Infantry Brigade, Southern Army


840th Separate Tank Brigade (124-Tank), Southern Army

844th Reconnaissance Brigade, Southern Army


3283rd Special-Purpose Forces (SPF) Brigade (Abn), Southern Army




82nd Combat Helicopter Brigade, Southern Army




187th Air Defense Brigade (Short-Range), Southern Army




188th Antitank Brigade, Southern Army




382nd Self-Propelled Artillery Brigade, Southern Army




384th Self-Propelled Artillery Brigade, Southern Army




386th SSM Brigade (SCUD), Southern Army




388th Multiple Rocket Launcher Brigade, (18-Launcher), Southern Army




800th Engineer Brigade (CBT), Southern Army




879th Information Warfare Brigade, Southern Army




880th UAV Battalion, Southern Army




876th Signal Brigade, Southern Army




378th Maintenance Battalion, Southern Army




380th Materiel Support Brigade, Southern Army




877th Medical Battalion, Southern Army




818th Chemical Protection Battalion, Southern Army




Southern Air Division, Southern Military District





87th Internal Security Brigade, Southern Army





Western Military District





Western Army


60th Mechanized Infantry Division (IFV), Western Army


61st Mechanized Infantry Division (APC), Western Army


64th Motorized Infantry Division, Western Army


66th Motorized Infantry Division, Western Army

650th Separate Mechanized Infantry Brigade (IFV), Western Army


620th Separate Motorized Infantry Brigade, Western Army

63rd Separate Airborne Infantry Brigade, Western Army


640th Separate Tank Brigade (124-Tank), Western Army

644th Reconnaissance Brigade, Western Army


3263rd Special-Purpose Forces (SPF) Brigade (Abn), Western Army




62nd Combat Helicopter Brigade, Western Army




167th Air Defense Brigade (Short-Range), Western Army




166th Antitank Brigade, Western Army




362nd Self-Propelled Artillery Brigade, Western Army




364th Self-Propelled Artillery Brigade, Western Army




366th SSM Brigade (SCUD), Western Army




368th Multiple Rocket Launcher Brigade, (18-Launcher), Western Army




600th Engineer Brigade (CBT), Western Army




679th Information Warfare Brigade, Western Army




680th UAV Battalion, Western Army




676th Signal Brigade, Western Army




376th Maintenance Battalion, Western Army




360th Materiel Support Brigade, Western Army




677th Medical Battalion, Western Army




616th Chemical Protection Battalion, Western Army





Western Air Division, Western Military District





Eastern Military District





Eastern Army


90th Mechanized Infantry Division (IFV), Eastern Army


91st Mechanized Infantry Division (APC), Eastern Army


94th Motorized Infantry Division, Eastern Army


96th Motorized Infantry Division, Eastern Army

950th Separate Mechanized Infantry Brigade (IFV), Eastern Army


920th Separate Motorized Infantry Brigade, Eastern Army

93rd Separate Airborne Infantry Brigade, Eastern Army


940th Separate Tank Brigade (124-Tank), Eastern Army

944th Reconnaissance Brigade, Eastern Army


3293rd Special-Purpose Forces (SPF) Brigade (Abn), Eastern Army




92nd Combat Helicopter Brigade, Eastern Army




197th Air Defense Brigade (Short-Range), Eastern Army




199th Antitank Brigade, Eastern Army




392nd Self-Propelled Artillery Brigade, Eastern Army




394th Self-Propelled Artillery Brigade, Eastern Army




396th SSM Brigade (SCUD), Eastern Army




398th Multiple Rocket Launcher Brigade, (18-Launcher), Eastern Army




900th Engineer Brigade (CBT), Eastern Army




979th Information Warfare Brigade, Eastern Army




980th UAV Battalion, Eastern Army




976th Signal Brigade, Eastern Army




379th Maintenance Battalion, Eastern Army




390th Materiel Support Brigade, Eastern Army




977th Medical Battalion, Eastern Army





919th Chemical Protection Battalion, Eastern Army




Eastern Air Division, Eastern Military District


Internal Security Brigade, Eastern Army



Navy


Western Fleet

Total number of Surface Craft ----- 38
 Total number of Submarines ----- 6
 Total number of SSM Launchers ----- 12
 (includes coastal defense launchers)


Eastern Fleet

Total number of Surface Craft ----- 17


Total number of SSM Launchers ----- 6
(includes coastal defense launchers)

Air Force Command


Air Defense Command




Strategic Forces Command



Special-Purpose Forces Command



Internal Security Forces



TRADOC G-2

TRISA-THREATS

CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND THREAT
INTEGRATION DIRECTORATE (CTID)

SECTION 3: EVENTS

Introduction to Section 3: Events

What follows are tables of 77 fictional events set in the year 2016 in various areas throughout the countries of Ariana, Atropia, Gorgas, Minaria, and Donovia in the Caucasus region. These events demonstrate possible ways the conditions of the OE described in Section 2 might play out on the ground. Each event is tied to the Mission Essential Task List (METL) to clearly show the tactical-level connection between the event, its related activities, and possible OE variable conditions.

Analysts derived these events from realistic yet fictional potential activities that could easily take place in any of the countries in the Caucasus region. Many of the events could apply to more than one country within the region. Additionally, the events collectively have effects for all variables in the OE: political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time.

Each event is listed at the top of the table, with three to four potential related activities, and their likely OE variable conditions, following. The bottom of each table lists the linked METL tasks. The chart was designed to be clear, yet thorough. Events were analyzed to ensure that the details of each variable in Section 2 supported the possibility of the event, and that each event required a tactical intervention, making it useful to units in training.

Event	Insurgents Demands UN Dismissal		
1. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Aid workers are abducted in a refugee camp near the capital. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Social 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Kidnappers issue a message to the government to release its members in prison in exchange for the workers' safe return. ➤ Insurgents start attacking refugee camp, creating fear among refugees and residents in nearby towns. 	
2. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ A convoy carrying aid workers back to the capital is ambushed and all workers are killed. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Social 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ US and its allied are forced to provide assistance with security for aid workers. ➤ The population wants the government to drive insurgents out of their villages so they can continue to receive aid. 	
3. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Numerous aid agencies leave the country. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Social ○ Political ○ Political & Military 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ IDPs and refugees will suffer greatly because they depended on the agencies' aid for survival. ➤ The government is scrutinized for not protecting aid workers. ➤ Insurgents will continue to attack and kill aid workers in order to send all their agencies home. They will try to use the same tactic with US forces and its allies in hopes to drive them out of the country. 	
Possible Related MTEL Tasks	<p>Conduct Command and Control (ART 5.0)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Execute the Operations Process (ART 5.1) ○ Integrate Information Engagement Capabilities (ART 5.3.1) <p>Conduct Offensive Operations (ART 7.1)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct an Attack (ART 7.1.2) ➤ Conduct Air Assault (ART 1.2.1.1.2) <p>Conduct Security Operations (ART 6.7.3)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Area Security Operations (ART 6.5.3) <p>Conduct Stability Operations (ART 7.3)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Provide Essential Civil Service (Immediate Response) (ART 7.3.3.1) ➤ Coordinate Public Order and Safety (Immediate Response) (ART 7.3.2.1) 		

Event	Insurgents Forces Target Civilian Population while in US Uniforms		
1. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ International media widely publicizes civilian casualties. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ US Forces blamed. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Enemy perception management operations are effective in portraying American "crimes" through immediate release of "evidence."
2. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ US Forces are required to pair with host nation forces. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Military ○ Military 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Commander must support host nation forces. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ US Forces must be supported by host nation forces due to revised SOFA.
3. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Deconfliction and monitoring of US Forces limits mobility and reaction time. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Military ○ Information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ US Forces unable to proactively patrol and operate. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Threat forces capable to predicting US movement.
Possible Related MTEL Tasks	<p>Execute the Operations Process (ART 5.1)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Integrate Information Engagement Capabilities (ART 5.3.1) <p>Conduct Defensive Operations (ART 7.2)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct an Area Defense (ART 7.2.2) <p>Conduct Security Operations (ART 6.7.3)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Security Operations (ART 6.7.3) ➤ Conduct Area Security Operations (ART 6.5.3) <p>Provide Support to Targeting & Info Superiority (ART 2.4)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Provide Intelligence to Targeting (ART 2.4.1) ➤ Provides Intelligence Support to Army Info Ops (ART 2.4.2) ➤ Provide Intel Support to Combat Assessment (ART 2.4.3) ➤ Support Sensitive Site Exploitation (ART 2.3.5.3) ➤ Conduct Technical Intelligence on UXO, IED, CBRNE (ART 6.12.6.5) 		

Event	Avalanche Bisects Main Supply Route in the North		
1. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Hundreds of people are buried under the snow after an avalanche near the main mountain pass at the northern border. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Infrastructure 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Government is putting a response team together and asking help from its northern neighbor. ➤ The pass (including the long tunnel) is completely destroyed and has to be rebuilt. 	
2. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Military US assistance is requested. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Military ○ Social 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ The local military will bring medical assistance and food and water to those stranded on the road. ➤ Local governments are helping the military and local population identify those in the accident and alert their loved ones. 	
3. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The rescue team may take time to arrive, leading to more deaths. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Social ○ Political & Infrastructure 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ The local is blaming the population for not getting the rescue team in the area sooner. ➤ The government is blamed for not putting more money into the roads infrastructure and providing better roads to the population. 	
4. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ US military forces will have to find other routes. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Military 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ The US military may be forced to rely on the local government and military while it finds other safe supply route. 	
Possible Related MTEL Tasks	<p>Provide Potable Water in the JOA (ART 4.1.3.11)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Produce Potable Water (ART 4.1.3.11.1) ➤ Distribute Potable Water (ART 4.1.3.11) ➤ Manage Water Quality Surveillance Program (ART 4.1.3.11) 		
	<p>Conduct Civil Affairs Operations (ART 5.4.6)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Populace and Resource Control (PRC) (ART 7.3.3.4) ➤ Conduct Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA) (ART 7.6.2.5) ➤ Conduct Civil Information Management (CIM) (ART 5.4.6) 		
	<p>Provide Health Service Support (ART 4.3.1)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Provide Combat Casualty Care (ART 4.3.1) ➤ Provide Medical Evacuation (Air and Ground) (ART 4.3.2) ➤ Provide Medical Logistics (ART 4.3.4) 		
	<p>Conduct Civil Support Operations (ART 7.4)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Provide Disaster Relief (ART 7.4.1.1) ➤ Provide Humanitarian Relief (ART 7.4.1.2) 		

Event	Biological Attack on Agriculture		
1. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Receive reports of total crop failure throughout host nation. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Economic ○ Social 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Food shortages, no longer able to export agricultural goods. Shipping industry affected. ➤ Criminal elements take over food storage, charge inflated prices to population. 	
2. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Host national isolates areas affected, no movement in or out. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Infrastructure & Economic ○ Social 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Roads throughout country closed, shuts down interstate commerce. ➤ Travelers are stranded. Families gather outside roadblocks looking for family members from affected areas. 	
3. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Influx of NGOs in area. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Social 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Government unable to sustain displaced personnel; loses legitimacy. ➤ Criminal elements see NGOs as competition, attack and rob NGO supply. 	
Possible Related MTEL Tasks	<p>Conduct Command and Control (ART 5.0)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Execute the Operations Process (ART 5.1) ○ Integrate Information Engagement Capabilities (ART 5.3.1) <p>Conduct Consequence Management (ART 6.9.5.)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Respond to CBRNE Incident (ART 6.9.5.5) ➤ Provide Support to Law Enforcement (ART 7.4.2) ➤ Conduct Post Incident Response Operations (ART 1.6.1) <p>Conduct Security Operations (ART 6.7.3)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Area Security Operations (ART 6.5.3) <p>Conduct Stability Operations (ART 7.3)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Provide Essential Civil Service (Immediate Response) (ART 7.3.3.1) ➤ Coordinate Public Order and Safety (Immediate Response) (ART 7.3.2.1) 		

Event	Border Incidents Cause a Resumption of Hostilities Between Two Countries		
1. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Long simmering problems between two countries along a mutual border erupt into a full scale war because of the border incidents that occur between the two sides. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Information ○ Military 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Both sides will generate Information Operations (IO) messages that place the blame for the resumption of hostilities on the other side. ➤ Both sides will use their militaries to resolve the conflict that will create massive property damage, death, and more IDPs/refugees. 	
2. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ One or both will appeal to foreign countries for assistance. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Military 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Both sides will appeal for support to gain an advantage over the other side. ➤ Both sides will request and receive assistance from some foreign country. As a minimum, each country will likely receive arms from their allies. 	
3. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conflict causes property damage. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Infrastructure ○ Economic 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Extensive property damage will occur that the country where the war takes place will need to repair in the future. ➤ The war will reduce economic activity as citizens serve in the military and the war prevents cultivation. 	
4. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Combat generates IDPs/refugees. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Information ○ Social 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Rumors cause panic in the civilian population and this only increases the IDPs and forces some people to become refugees in neighboring countries. ➤ Many people will not care what side wins the Civil War just as long as the conflict ends and they can return to a "normal" life. 	
Possible Related MTEL Tasks	<p>Conduct Command and Control (ART 5.0)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Execute the Operations Process (ART 5.1) ○ Integrate Information Engagement Capabilities (ART 5.3.1) <p>Conduct Offensive Operations (ART 7.1)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct a Movement to Contact (ART 7.1.1) ➤ Conduct an Attack (ART 7.1.2) ➤ Conduct a Pursuit (ART 7.1.4) ➤ Conduct Air Assault (ART 1.2.1.1.2) ➤ Conduct Forcible Entry Operations (ART 1.2.1.1) <p>Conduct Defensive Operations (ART 7.2)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct an Area Defense (ART 7.2.2) <p>Conduct Internment and Resettlement (I/R) Operations (ART 4.4)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct US Military Prisoner Corrections (ART 5.5.1.2.4) ➤ Conduct Detainee Internment (ART 4.4.1) ➤ Conduct Dislocated Civilian Resettlement (ART 4.4.3) 		

Event	Influential Businessman Arrested		
1. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ His factories are shut down. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Economic ○ Social ○ Political 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Local unemployment rises. ➤ Illegal economic activity increases with a thriving black market. Criminal and gang elements profit from the situation and begin selling product that factory had produced to the population. ➤ Number of IDP rise as unemployed lose homes and migrate to find new jobs. ➤ Unemployed resentful of government for losing jobs. 	
2. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Looting occurs in shut down factories. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Social ○ Political ○ Information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Local criminal and gang elements move in to take over situation and profit from items looted. ➤ Government unwilling to stop looting. Dissatisfaction with government rises in area, and government loses legitimacy. ➤ Groups benefiting from the unrest execute a well-developed perception management campaign highlighting the "atrocities" committed by government against businessmen. 	
3. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Local population riots, demanding release of businessman. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Social/Time ○ Infrastructure/Time 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Government unable to quell riots quickly, bystanders and protestors become causalities. Government loses legitimacy. ➤ Social unrest increases, rumors of assassination attempts on key leaders are widespread. Hospitals at capacity with malnourished and injured. ➤ Roads around factories and riots become clogged. Trash service stops, risk of disease rises over time. 	
Possible Related METL Tasks	<p>Conduct Command and Control (ART 5.0)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Execute the Operations Process (ART 5.1) ➤ Integrate Information Engagement Capabilities (ART 5.3.1) <p>Provide Force Health Protection (ART 6.8)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Provide Preventive Medicine Support (ART 6.8.1) <p>Conduct Law and Order Operations (ART 5.5.1.2.1)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Restore Order (ART 7.3.2.1) <p>Conduct Stability Operations (ART 7.3)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Provide Essential Civil Service (Immediate Response) (ART 7.3.3.1) ➤ Coordinate Public Order and Safety (Immediate Response) (ART 7.3.2.1) 		

Event	Country Attacks Ethnic Minority/Enemy with Chemical Weapons		
1. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Country attacks an ethnic minority/enemy with chemical weapons. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Military ○ Information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Country must justify to the international community why they broke treaties that they signed that ban first use of chemical weapons. ➤ US/Coalition must decide whether to retaliate with their own chemical weapons. ➤ Aggressive IO campaigns. The side that will attempt to justify their actions. The recipient will portray the users of chemical weapons as inhumane. 	
2. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Chemical weapons damage the environment. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Physical Environment ○ Economic 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Persistent chemical agents make the use of some parts of the country uninhabitable for long lengths of time. ➤ Persistent chemical agents on hydrocarbon infrastructure hurt the targeted country financially as it cannot export oil or natural gas. Generates additional unemployment. 	
3. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Damage due to chemicals will need remediation. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Infrastructure ○ Social/Economic 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Attacked country cannot use infrastructure until the persistent agent becomes inert. ➤ Unemployed workers will need a means of support and may protest the government's inability to support them financially. 	
4. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ International environmental groups will protest use of chemical weapons. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Military 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Attacked country may not allow known environmentalists to enter the country to protest. ➤ Environmentalists that get into the country to protest chemical warfare may encumber military operations. 	
Possible Related METL Tasks	<p>Conduct CBRN (ART 6.9)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct WMD Interdiction Operations (ART 6.9.6) ➤ Conduct WMD Elimination Operations (ART 6.9.7) ➤ Provide CBRN Passive Defense (ART 6.9.4) ➤ Conduct CBRN Consequence Management (ART 6.9.5) 		
	<p>Perform Tactical Actions Associated With Force Project and Deployment (ART 1.1)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Support Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Active Defense (ART 6.9.3) 		
	<p>Conduct Consequence Management (ART 6.9.5)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Respond to CBRNE Incident (ART 6.9.5.5) ➤ Conduct Post Incident Response Operations (ART 1.6.1) 		

Event	Civil War					
1. Related Activity	➤ Civil War breaks out in a country.					
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Military ○ Political 	➤ Government forces fight for control against the anti-government foes.	➤ Both sides seek legitimacy from the people in the country.			
2. Related Activity	➤ One side seeks foreign assistance in the Civil War.					
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Information 	➤ The other side will need to decide if they want to also request outside assistance.	➤ If one side does not seek outside assistance, they will craft an IO message that makes the conflict appear more than a Civil War and the other side as a proxy.			
3. Related Activity	➤ Conflict causes property damage.					
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Infrastructure ○ Economic 	➤ The Civil War causes extensive property damage that the “winners” will need to repair.	➤ The Civil War will make normal commerce difficult.			
4. Related Activity	○ Combat generates IDPs/refugees.					
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Information ○ Social 	➤ Rumors about the invaders success cause panic in the civilian population and these only increases the IDPs and some people to become refugees in neighboring countries.	➤ People may not care what side wins the Civil War, as long as the conflict ends and they can return to a “normal” life.			
Possible Related MTEL Tasks	Conduct Command and Control (ART 5.0)					
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Execute the Operations Process (ART 5.1) ○ Integrate Information Engagement Capabilities (ART 5.3.1) 					
	Conduct Offensive Operations (ART 7.1)					
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct a Movement to Contact (ART 7.1.1) ➤ Conduct an Attack (ART 7.1.2) ➤ Conduct a Pursuit (ART 7.1.4) ➤ Conduct Air Assault (ART 1.2.1.1.2) ➤ Conduct Forcible Entry Operations (ART 1.2.1.1) 					
	Conduct Defensive Operations (ART 7.2)					
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct an Area Defense (ART 7.2.2) 						
Conduct Internment and Resettlement (I/R) Operations (ART 4.4)						
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct US Military Prisoner Corrections (ART 5.5.1.2.4) ➤ Conduct Detainee Internment (ART 4.4.1) ➤ Conduct Dislocated Civilian Resettlement (ART 4.4.3) 						

Event	Counterfeiting Causes Massive Local Inflation		
1. Related Activity	➤ Local unrest causes US forces to intervene.		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ US Forces blamed for price hikes. ➤ Enemy perception management operations are effective in portraying American as causing price crisis. 	
2. Related Activity	➤ Costs for US forces rise significantly.		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Economic ○ Military 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Commander must support host nation forces wages. ➤ Changes to cost of local support require more discretionary funding. 	
3. Related Activity	➤ Demonstrations result in civilian casualties.		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Military ○ Information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ US Forces must physically control crowds. ➤ US Commander must control information environment. 	
Possible Related METL Tasks	<p>Conduct Criminal Investigations (ART 5.5.1.2.3)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Manage General, Drug, and Economic Crimes Investigations (ART 5.5.1.2.3) ○ Manage Special Investigative Support Functions (ART 5.5.1.2.3) <p>Conduct Command and Control (ART 5.0)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Execute the Operations Process (ART 5.1) ➤ Integrate Information Engagement Capabilities (ART 5.3.1) <p>Conduct Law and Order Operations (ART 5.5.1.2.1)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Restore Order (ART 7.3.2.1) ➤ Perform Law Enforcement (ART 5.5.1.2.2) ➤ Conduct HN Police Training and Support (ART 7.3.2.3) 		

Event	Country Closes Border and Disallows Muslims to Travel for the Hajj		
1. Related Activity	➤ Government chooses to close their borders.		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Military ○ Information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ The country's government uses their military to enforce the ban. ➤ The country conducts an IO campaign to explain why their citizens should not travel to Mecca using the pretense of problems with the safety of tourists. 	
2. Related Activity	➤ Muslims protest the ban on travel to Mecca.		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Social ○ Military ○ Economic 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Muslims protest the decision to ban travel to Mecca. ➤ The government calls in military to counter any protest violence. ➤ Long protests may affect the country's economy in a negative manner. 	
3. Related Activity	➤ Muslims choose to ignore the ban against travel to Mecca and go anyway.		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political Military 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Countries that the traveler crosses must deal with the Muslims without passports or with passports from the country that ban travel to Mecca. ➤ US/Coalition forces must decide what to do with Muslims that are found sneaking out of the country to attend the Hajj. 	
4. Related Activity	○ Due to the decision to ban travel to Mecca, Muslim insurgents increase their attacks against government buildings and/or governmental leaders/workers.		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Infrastructure ○ Military ○ Physical Environment 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Military personnel will need to provide additional security to key infrastructure. ➤ Attacks may cause temporary damage to the physical environment that will need mitigation. 	
Possible Related MTEL Tasks	<p>Perform Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ART 2.3)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Perform ISR Synchronization (ART 2.3.1) ➤ Perform ISR Integration (ART 2.3.2) ➤ Conduct Surveillance (ART 2.3.4) <p>Coordinate Law and Order Operations (ART 5.5.1.2.1)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Integrate Law Enforcement (ART 5.5.1.22) ➤ Integrate Civil Control (ART 7.3.2) <p>Conduct Police Intelligence Operations (ART 2.2.5)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Analyze Police Information (ART 2.2.5.2) ➤ Disseminate Police Information and Intelligence Products (ART 2.2.5.3) <p>Manage Protective Services (ART 6.5.4)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct personal Security Vulnerability Assessments (ART 6.5.4) ➤ Provide High-risk Personnel Protection (ART 6.5.4) <p>Integrate Area Security Operations (ART 6.5)</p>		

Event	Country Nationalizes Foreign Companies/Assets		
1. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Country decides to nationalize a company's assets within their borders without any compensation or under market compensation for the assets. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Military ○ Economic 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Foreign governments attempt to change the decision through non-military means. ➤ If non-military means do not work, institute a regime change unilaterally or within the directions of the UN, NATO, or other organization. ➤ Loss of assets pushes international companies close to bankruptcy or to close down. 	
2. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ US uses military force to create a regime change. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Military ○ Information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ US military helps install a government that will reverse the previous decision or at least compensate the company's owner for their losses. ➤ The US initiates an IO campaign on why they need to take military action to countermand the nationalization. 	
3. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ A number of splinter groups in opposition to the US intervention in their country. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Social ○ Economic 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Dependent upon the effect of the intervention, local citizens will join organizations against the US involvement or support the US intervention. ➤ Dependent on the length and damage of the intervention, the people in the country could suffer huge economic losses. 	
4. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ US may find the need to depart the country earlier than expected. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Economic 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Protection of the country's hydrocarbon resources remains important. The incident may cause the country to stop selling hydrocarbon resources to the US. 	
Possible Related METL Tasks	<p>Conduct Command and Control (ART 5.0)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Execute the Operations Process (ART 5.1) ➤ Integrate Information Engagement Capabilities (ART 5.3.1) <p>Conduct Offensive Operations (ART 7.1)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct a Movement to Contact (ART 7.1.1) ➤ Conduct an Attack (ART 7.1.2) ➤ Conduct Forcible Entry Operations (ART 1.2.1.1) <p>Conduct Internment and Resettlement (I/R) Operations (ART 4.4)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Detainee Internment (ART 4.4.1) ➤ Conduct Dislocated Civilian Resettlement (ART 4.4.3) <p>Conduct Security Operations (ART 6.7.3)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Provide a Screen (ART 1.2.2.4) ➤ Conduct Guard Operations (ART 1.2.2.5) ➤ Conduct Area Security Operations (ART 6.5.1) 		

Event	Government Crackdown on Criminal Elements		
1. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Police forces arrest criminal elements. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Social ○ Political 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Crime as mainstay of society is threatened by government, causing equilibrium shift. ➤ Government authorities challenged by criminal group, tensions increase. Assassination attempts likely. 	
2. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Black market operations cease. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Economic ○ Social 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Shortage of fuel. Lower level criminals left vying for themselves. ➤ Criminal and insurgent elements begin compete for gap left in criminal network. Violence escalates as the groups attack each other. 	
3. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Criminal and insurgent elements begin compete for gap left in criminal network. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Social 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Government unable to quell violence quickly; loses legitimacy. ➤ Violence escalates as the groups attack each other. 	
4. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Civilians lock themselves away in homes to avoid violence on streets. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Time ○ Economic ○ Information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Lack water/food-riots as civilians won't come out, starvation and disease set in if left too long. ➤ Markets shut down, workers will not report to work, including basic necessities such as garbage pick up. ➤ Groups benefiting from the unrest execute perception management campaign highlighting the "atrocities" occurring in the prisons. 	
Possible Related METL Tasks	Conduct Command and Control (ART 5.0) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Execute the Operations Process (ART 5.1) ○ Integrate Information Engagement Capabilities (ART 5.3.1) 		
	Conduct Law and Order Operations (ART 5.5.1.2.1) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Restore Order (ART 7.3.2.1) ➤ Perform Law Enforcement (ART 5.5.1.2.2) 		
	Conduct Security Operations (ART 6.7.3) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Area Security Operations (ART 6.5.3) 		
	Conduct Stability Operations (ART 7.3) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Provide Essential Civil Service (Immediate Response) (ART 7.3.3.1) ➤ Coordinate Public Order and Safety (Immediate Response) (ART 7.3.2.1) 		

Event	Government Crackdown on Dissidents		
1. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ International community puts pressure on US to intervene. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Social ○ Political 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ High intergroup conflict. Civil unrest is significant. ➤ US leaders attempt negotiations with local government. 	
2. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Demonstrations outside prisons and government buildings demanding release of dissidents. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Infrastructure ○ Information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ City roads are blocked with demonstrators. Vehicle traffic comes to a halt. ➤ Groups benefiting from the unrest execute perception management campaign highlighting the "atrocities" occurring in the prisons. 	
3. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Large contingent of International reporters, UN personnel and NGOs arrive to report on condition of detainees. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Social 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Agencies request US assistance in gaining access to local government and dissidents being held. ➤ Social unrest increases, government facilities are targeted with VBIEDs. Rumors of assassination attempts on key leaders are widespread. 	
Possible Related METL Tasks	<p>Conduct Command and Control (ART 5.0)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Execute the Operations Process (ART 5.1) ○ Integrate Information Engagement Capabilities (ART 5.3.1) <p>Conduct Maneuver and Mobility Support (MMS) Operations (ART 1.0)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Support Mobility (ART 1.0) <p>Conduct Law and Order Operations (ART 5.5.1.2.1)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Restore Order (ART 7.3.2.1) <p>Conduct Civil Affairs Operations (ART 5.4.6)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Populace and Resource Control (PRC) (ART 7.3.3.4) ➤ Conduct Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA) (ART 7.6.2.5) 		

Event	Cyber Attack		
1. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ One country launches a cyber attack on a neighboring country. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Information ○ Social ○ Political 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Outside cyber attack shuts down the country's servers and limits their citizens' access to the Internet. ➤ Those citizens that normally communicate over the Internet become upset and accuse the government of a lack of action. ➤ Attacked country's government must decide how to respond to the outside cyber attack. Their response may also affect other countries. 	
2. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Cyber attack affects commerce. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Economic ○ Social 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Cyber attack negatively affects enterprises that rely upon computers as they must find alternate means or wait until resolution to resume business. ➤ Many people will support either the new or old governments, but many others will remain fence-sitters as not to antagonize either side. 	
3. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Cyber attack affects military operations. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Military ○ Military 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Cyber attack negatively affects modern military equipment that relies upon computers to operate. ➤ The attacked country may respond with military action against the supposed attacker. 	
4. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Mediation requires a large amount of resources. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Infrastructure ○ Information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Attacked country will need to spend resources to clean up their computer networks to include computer hardware infrastructure. ➤ Attacked county may need to request assistance from computer experts outside their country to mediate the cyber attack's effects. 	
Possible Related MTEL Tasks	Conduct Command and Control (ART 5.0) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Execute the Operations Process (ART 5.1) ○ Integrate Information Engagement Capabilities (ART 5.3.1) 		
	Conduct Information Protection (ART 6.3) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Perform Information Assurance (ART 6.3.1) ➤ Perform Computer Network Defense (ART 6.3.2) 		
	Conduct Stability Operations (Initial Support) (ART 7.3) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Support Host Nation Telecommunications Infrastructure Reconstruction Programs (ART 7.3.5.4) 		
	Integrate Information Superiority Contributors (ART 5.3) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Manage Tactical Information and Data (ART 5.3.4) ➤ Store Relevant Information (ART 5.3.5.2.6) ➤ Conduct Electromagnetic Spectrum Management Operations (ART 5.3.6) 		

Event	Group Blows Up Dam		
1. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Rain and/or snow melt causes severe floods that devastate an area. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Military ○ Infrastructure ○ Political 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Government will need to demonstrate that they are in control and will secure other dams with military personnel to prevent similar incidents. ➤ Government will need to replace dam or at least the power generated by the dam. ➤ Government may need to obtain power from other countries in the region. 	
2. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Any factories that received power will need to find a substitute. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Economic ○ Social 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Until the factory or factories find an alternate power source, the factory will need to close down. This will generate a loss of income and increase unemployment. ➤ Out of work factory workers protest to demand additional unemployment benefits, another job, or the immediate reopening of the business. 	
3. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Water from dam causes severe flooding. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Physical Environment ○ Information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Floods damage farmlands and destroy crops. People cannot feed themselves, yet alone sell crops to live. ➤ Government must launch an IO campaign to mitigate rumors about the government's role in the prevention and/or remediation of the floods. 	
4. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Floods damage oil rigs on land and cause massive pollution. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Physical Environment ○ Social/Political 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Oil Company must plug oil leak. Oil Company and government must clean up damage caused by the oil spill. ➤ International environmental protests the pollution and rallies the people against the damage due to the government's speed in cleaning up the damage. 	
Possible Related MELT Tasks	<p>Conduct Command and Control (ART 5.0)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Execute the Operations Process (ART 5.1) ➤ Integrate Information Engagement Capabilities (ART 5.3.1) <p>Conduct Security Operations (ART 6.7.3)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Security Operations (ART 6.7.3) ➤ Conduct Area Security Operations (ART 6.5.3) <p>Provide Engineer Support to Sustainment (ART 4.0)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct General Engineering Support to Sustainment (ART 4.1.7) ➤ Provide Medical Evacuation (Air and Ground) (ART 4.3.2) <p>Conduct Civil Affairs Operations (ART 7.4)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA) (ART 7.6.2.5) ➤ Conduct Nation Assistance (NA) (ART 5.4.6) ➤ Conduct Civil Information Management (CIM) (ART 5.4.6) 		

Event	Dangerous Detainees (Insurgents) Escape from Maximum Security Prison		
1. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ It is suspected that the escape was an inside job. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Military ○ Political ○ Political 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Government asks assistance from the military in search of the detainees. ➤ Some government officials are accused of working with the insurgents and placing their own people to work in the prison. ➤ The director of jail and some other workers are fired. 	
2. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Stores, schools and government are vandalized. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Infrastructure & Social ○ Social 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ The population must use their own savings for the repairs. ➤ Fear running among residents in capital and the situation prompts the government to issue curfews in some area of the capital. 	
3. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Military forces are brought in to provide more security and help with the investigation. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ The government is being criticized for the lack of security and there are talks of giving control of the maximum security prison back to US forces. 	
4. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ One of the detainees is captured when his suicide vest failed to go off. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Time & Political 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ The government with military assistance is working with the local and doing everything in its power to find the rest of the escapes before they regroup and try to commit suicide attacks. 	
Possible Related MELT Tasks	Conduct Command and Control (ART 5.0) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Execute the Operations Process (ART 5.1) ○ Integrate Information Engagement Capabilities (ART 5.3.1) 		
	Conduct Internment and Resettlement (I/R) Operations (ART 4.4) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Detainee Internment (ART 4.4.1) ➤ Conduct Police Intelligence (ART 2.2.5) 		
	Conduct Security Operations (ART 6.7.3) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Security Operations (ART 6.7.3) ➤ Conduct Area Security Operations (ART 6.5.3) 		

Event	Dirty Bomb Detonates in Market Area		
1. Related Activity	➤ Ethnic insurgent group claims responsibility.		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Social ○ Political 	➤ High intergroup conflict. Civil unrest is significant.	➤ Government authorities challenged by insurgent group, tensions increase.
2. Related Activity	➤ Market area closed.		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Economics ○ Social ○ Infrastructure 	➤ Market area closed, population unable to go to work, trade or purchase goods.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Anxiety levels of population go up, large numbers flee the city raising number of IDPs in rural area. ➤ Hospitals overrun with exposed population, water shut down for fear of contamination.
3. Related Activity	➤ Host nation requests assistance from US for decontamination operations.		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Social 	➤ Government unable to clean up quickly; loses legitimacy.	➤ IDP/refugees lack water/food, criminal and insurgent groups begin selling water and food to the population.
4. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Messages broadcast that it will happen again if current government does not step down. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Social ○ Information 	➤ IDPs riot, demanding government step down.	➤ Groups benefiting from the unrest execute perception management campaign highlighting the incompetence of the current regime and the damage that will occur if they do not release power.
Possible Related MELT Tasks	<p>Conduct Command and Control (ART 5.0)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Execute the Operations Process (ART 5.1) ○ Integrate Information Engagement Capabilities (ART 5.3.1) <p>Conduct Consequence Management (ART 6.9.5)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Respond to CBRNE Incident (ART 6.9.5.5) ➤ Provide Support to Law Enforcement (ART 7.4.2) ➤ Conduct Post Incident Response Operations (ART 1.6.1) <p>Conduct Security Operations (ART 6.7.3)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Area Security Operations (ART 6.5.3) <p>Conduct Stability Operations (ART 7.3)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Provide Essential Civil Service (Immediate Response) (ART 7.3.3.1) ➤ Coordinate Public Order and Safety (Immediate Response) (ART 7.3.2.1) 		

Event	US Embassy Seized by Dissidents		
1. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Dissident group overruns foreign Embassy and takes personnel hostage. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Social ○ Political ○ Military 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ High intergroup conflict. Civil unrest is significant. ➤ Government authorities challenged by dissident group, tensions increase. ➤ Evacuates all other personnel and facilities related to foreign embassy. 	
2. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ US Military put on standby for rescue mission if diplomatic means fail. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Military ○ Time 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ US Military on ground coordinate/advise HN security forces. ➤ HN Government unable to quickly react. The longer they take, the more complex a rescue becomes. 	
3. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Crowds gather outside embassy. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Government unable to quell riots quickly; loses legitimacy. ➤ Dissident group executes a well-developed perception management campaign highlighting the “atrocities” committed by the US and HN. 	
Possible Related MTEL Tasks	<p>Conduct Command and Control (ART 5.0)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Execute the Operations Process (ART 5.1) ○ Integrate Information Engagement Capabilities (ART 5.3.1) <p>Conduct Tactical Mission (ART 7.5)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Secure a Unit, Facility or Location (ART 7.5.24) ➤ Follow and Support the Actions of a Friendly Force (ART 7.5.17) <p>Operational Theme (ART 7.6)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Perform Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (7.6.2.1) <p>Conduct Stability Operations (ART 7.3)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Provide Essential Civil Service (Immediate Response) (ART 7.3.3.1) ➤ Coordinate Public Order and Safety (Immediate Response) (ART 7.3.2.1) ➤ Perform Host Nation Police Training and Support (ART 7.3.3.3) 		

Event	Drought Causes Food Shortage in Friendly Country		
1. Related Activity	➤ A country or countries crops fail.		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Infrastructure 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Due to famine conditions, country or countries begin to petition neighboring country for food products. ➤ Rail system has been damaged by insurgency, making bulk food deliveries impossible without repairs. ➤ Alternate transportation for bulk goods is heavily influenced by organized crime. 	
2. Related Activity	➤ Food shortage may lead to starvation.		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Social ○ Economic 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ As the people get more desperate for food, they will pressure their government with increasing violence. ➤ People will turn more to the black market to feed their families. ➤ Organized crime will experience a boost in profits and influence. 	
3. Related Activity	➤ More people will grow their own food to deal with the shortages.		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Physical Environment ○ Infrastructure ○ Physical Environment 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Some people will attempt to move to rural areas as a means to find food. ➤ In the cities, people will plant small gardens to provide their own food, may cause added pollution. ➤ Long-term damage to arable land may occur ➤ Water access may be barricaded, impromptu irrigation attempts may divert rivers and streams. 	
Possible Related METL Tasks	<p>Conduct Command and Control (ART 5.0)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Execute the Operations Process (ART 5.1) ○ Integrate Information Engagement Capabilities (ART 5.3.1) <p>Conduct Civil Affairs Operations (ART 5.4.6)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA) (ART 7.6.2.5) ➤ Conduct Civil Information Management (CIM) (ART 5.4.6) ➤ Conduct National Assistance (NA) (ART 5.4.6) ➤ Support Civil Administration (SCA) (ART 5.4.6) <p>Provide Health Service Support (ART 4.3.1)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Provide Medical Evacuation (Air and Ground) (ART 4.3.2) ➤ Provide Medical Logistics (ART 4.3.4) <p>Conduct Civil Support Operations (ART 7.4)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Provide Disaster Relief (ART 7.4.1.1) ➤ Provide Humanitarian Relief (ART 7.4.1.2) 		

Event	Earthquake		
1. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Massive earthquake hits area and causes massive destruction and large loss of life. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Social ○ Infrastructure 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Government will need to respond to the situation and decide whether to request foreign aid. ➤ Citizens will want their government to take care of their immediate needs and to rebuild their homes. ➤ Damaged infrastructure will need replacement. Cleanup remains necessary to avoid the outbreak of disease. 	
2. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Local military and/or NGOs will respond with assistance. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Social ○ Military 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Victims will require minimum standard of living in regards to food, water, and shelter. ➤ Military will provide rescue teams, medical assistance, temporary shelter, and food/water to victims. 	
3. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Economy will suffer due to the earthquake's effects. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Economy ○ Information & Infrastructure 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ The economy will not return to a resemblance of normalcy until the people can obtain permanent housing and businesses reopen. ➤ As most rural areas rely upon cell phones for communication, people will lose means of communication outside the local area. 	
4. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Earthquake may overextend the government's limited financial resources. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Information ○ Political 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ For some countries, the governments will craft a message that will play to foreign audiences to attract both governmental and individual financial aid to recover from the earthquake. ➤ The government's response to the disaster may play a major role in whether the current regime stays in power. 	
Possible Related MTEL Tasks	<p>Conduct Civil Affairs Operations (ART 5.4.6)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Populace and Resource Control (PRC) (ART 7.3.3.4) ➤ Conduct Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA) (ART 7.6.2.5) ○ Conduct Civil Information Management (CIM) (ART 5.4.6) <p>Provide Potable Water in the JOA (ART 4.1.3.11)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Produce Potable Water (ART 4.1.3.11.1) ➤ Distribute Potable Water (ART 4.1.3.11) ➤ Manage Water Quality Surveillance Program (ART 4.1.3.11) <p>Provide Health Service Support (ART 4.3.1)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Provide Medical Evacuation (Air and Ground) (ART 4.3.2) ➤ Provide Medical Logistics (ART 4.3.4) <p>Conduct Civil Support Operations (ART 7.4)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Provide Disaster Relief (ART 7.4.1.1) ➤ Provide Humanitarian Relief (ART 7.4.1.2) 		

Event	Countries Conduct a Food Embargo Against another Country		
1. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ A country or countries decide to embargo food products to another country. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Due to the political situation, country or countries decide to embargo a neighboring country of all products to include food. ➤ The government(s) will need to craft a message to the rest of the world of the embargo's legitimacy and that all nations should join the embargo. 	
2. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Food shortage may lead to starvation. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Social ○ Economic 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ As the people get more desperate for food, they will pressure their government to give in to the countries that enacted the embargo so they will not starve to death. ➤ People will turn more to the black market to feed their families. 	
3. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ More people will grow their own food to deal with the shortages. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Physical Environment ○ Infrastructure ○ Physical Environment 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Some people will return to their rural roots as a means to stave off starvation. ➤ In the cities, people will plant small gardens to provide their own vegetables. ➤ Violent riots may cause environmental damage that the government will need to address. 	
4. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The affected government will appeal to other countries for support and call for an end to the embargo. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Information ○ Military 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ The affected country will produce a message of unfairness and that other countries should provide food for humanitarian purposes. ➤ If the affected country becomes desperate enough, they may choose to use military action against their neighbors that enacted the embargo against them. 	
Possible Related METL Tasks	Conduct Command and Control (ART 5.0) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Execute the Operations Process (ART 5.1) ○ Integrate Information Engagement Capabilities (ART 5.3.1) 		
	Conduct Civil Affairs Operations (ART 5.4.6) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA) (ART 7.6.2.5) ➤ Conduct Civil Information Management (CIM) (ART 5.4.6) ➤ Conduct National Assistance (NA) (ART 5.4.6) ➤ Support Civil Administration (SCA) (ART 5.4.6) 		
	Provide Health Service Support (ART 4.3.1) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Provide Medical Evacuation (Air and Ground) (ART 4.3.2) ➤ Provide Medical Logistics (ART 4.3.4) 		
	Conduct Civil Support Operations (ART 7.4) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Provide Disaster Relief (ART 7.4.1.1) ➤ Provide Humanitarian Relief (ART 7.4.1.2) 		

Event	Country Stops Energy/Power Exports		
1. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Country bands the export of crude oil, natural gas, or electricity to other countries. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Economic ○ Information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ The boycott creates an energy shortage for countries that cannot produce enough energy from their own resources. ➤ Country launches an information operations campaign that places the blame for their boycott on the actions of an outside country and not themselves. 	
2. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ In consumer countries, people face energy shortages that become especially difficult in winter months. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Social ○ Physical Environment 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Citizens in user countries demand that their government acquiesce to the producer country's demands so they will start the flow of energy again. ➤ Without electricity or natural gas to heat their houses in the winter, people will burn whatever they can find. This will lead to deforestation in the effected countries. 	
3. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Consumer countries may consider military action before they run out of petroleum for their military. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Military 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Consumer countries will need to consider their options and military action could result. ➤ Consumer countries may mobilize their forces as a threat to make the producer country with a weaker military to restart energy exportation. 	
4. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Lack of energy causes industries in consumer countries to shut down. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Economic ○ Infrastructure 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Consumer country cannot produce goods for either internal consumption or export that effect the economy negatively. ➤ Lack of electricity means consumer countries must mothball plants and when power does return, it may require additional resources to bring them back on line. 	
Possible Related METL Tasks	Conduct Command and Control (ART 5.0) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Execute the Operations Process (ART 5.1) ○ Integrate Information Engagement Capabilities (ART 5.3.1) 		
	Build Engineer Capacity (ART 4.1) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Combat Engineering Support to Building Capacity (ART 6.7.1.7) ➤ Conduct General Engineering Support to Building Capacity (ART 4.1.7) 		
	Conduct Civil Affairs Operations (ART 5.4.6) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Populace and Resource Control (PRC) (ART 7.3.3.4) ➤ Conduct Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA) (ART 7.6.2.5) ➤ Conduct Civil Information Management (CIM) (ART 5.4.6) 		
	Conduct Internment and Resettlement (I/R) Operations (ART 4.4) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Detainee Internment (ART 4.4.1) ➤ Conduct Dislocated Civilian Resettlement (ART 4.4.3) 		

Event	Insurgent Group has Seized Control of Key Urban Area Requiring U.S. Army Response		
1. Related Activity	➤ Ethnic insurgent group with local support has seized “ethnically pure” district of a major port city.		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Social ○ Political 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ High intergroup conflict. Civil unrest is significant. ➤ Government authorities challenged by insurgent group, tensions increase. Assassination attempts likely. 	
2. Related Activity	➤ Insurgent group has cut off power to the city (including U.S.-utilized port) from electricity transfer station located in seized district. Other utilities begin cascade failure.		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Infrastructure ○ Time 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Widespread power outages lead to increased criminal activities and social unrest. ➤ Government unable to quickly recover from the outage. Criminal and insurgent elements begin to work in concert, claiming they will soon be able to supply electricity and other utilities to the population. 	
3. Related Activity	➤ Riots break out due to lack of utilities. Host nation requests support from U.S. forces.		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Social 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Government unable to quell riots quickly; loses legitimacy. ➤ Social unrest increases, government facilities are targeted with VBIEDs. Rumors of assassination attempts on key leaders are widespread. 	
4. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Already-present IDPs and refugees aggravate over-stressed basic services. Lack of access to water and food increases tension and previously quiet groups begin to demand assistance from the government. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Social ○ Economic ○ Information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ IDP/refugees lack water/food-riots increase. ➤ Illegal economic activity increases with a thriving black market. Criminal and gang elements attempt to profit from the situation and begin selling water and food to the population. ➤ Groups benefiting from the unrest execute a well-developed perception management campaign highlighting the “atrocities” occurring in the IDP camps. 	
Possible Related METL Tasks	<p>Conduct Command and Control (ART 5.0)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Execute the Operations Process (ART 5.1) ○ Integrate Information Engagement Capabilities (ART 5.3.1) <p>Conduct Offensive Operations (ART 7.1)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct an Attack (ART 7.1.2) ➤ Conduct Air Assault (ART 1.2.1.1.2) <p>Conduct Security Operations (ART 6.7.3)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Area Security Operations (ART 6.5.3) <p>Conduct Stability Operations (ART 7.3)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Provide Essential Civil Service (Immediate Response) (ART 7.3.3.1) ➤ Coordinate Public Order and Safety (Immediate Response) (ART 7.3.2.1) 		

Event	IRBM Attack on US Forces		
1. Related Activity	➤ Destruction of critical infrastructure.		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Infrastructure 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Host nation support evaporates. ➤ Irreplaceable infrastructure unavailable. 	
2. Related Activity	➤ Fear within population creates movement.		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Infrastructure ○ Information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Population movement renders MSR impassable. ➤ Government appears incapable of handling situation. 	
3. Related Activity	➤ Survival dispersion and attack remediation limits host nation support.		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Military ○ Economic 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ US Forces required for remediation. ➤ Population movement renders critical industries inoperative. 	
4. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Destruction or Degradation of host nation and US critical command and control assets. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Economic ○ Military 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ US will be required to remediate attack's impacts on country. ○ US Forces will be required to relocate away from civilian areas. 	
Possible Related METL Tasks	<p>Conduct Command and Control (ART 5.0)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Execute the Operations Process (ART 5.1) ○ Integrate Information Engagement Capabilities (ART 5.3.1) <p>Conduct CBRN Operations (ART 6.9)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct WMD Interdiction Operations (ART 6.9.6) ➤ Support WMD Offensive Operations (ART 6.9.2) ➤ Conduct WMD Elimination Operations (ART 6.9.7) <p>Provide Theater Aerospace and Missile defense (Joint ST 6.1)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Organize and Coordinate Theater Air Defense (Joint ST 6.1.4) ➤ Organize and Coordinate Theater Missile Defense (Joint ST 6.1.5) ➤ Conduct Ballistic Missile Defense Operations (Joint ST 6.1.7) <p>Conduct Stability Operations (ART 7.3)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Provide Essential Civil Service (Immediate Response) (ART 7.3.3.1) ➤ Coordinate Public Order and Safety (Immediate Response) (ART 7.3.2.1) 		

Event	Violence Creates Additional IDPS or Refugees		
1. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Any type of armed conflict, whether from a Civil War, an insurgency, or due to a foreign invasion will create additional IDPs or refugees. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Social ○ Political 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Civilians will flee the combat zone for safer places away from combat either inside the country or to a neighboring country. ➤ Government must determine solutions to deal with the IDPS and neighboring countries must find solutions to the refugees that cross into their country. 	
2. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ IDPs and refugees will require resources to prevent excess suffering. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Infrastructure ○ Economic 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Governments or NGOs must provide temporary shelter (tents or buildings) to house IDPs/refugees created by the conflict. ➤ The government/NGOs must provide food and water to take care of the IDPs/refugees immediate needs and reduce dependency on outside agencies for support. 	
3. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Movement of large numbers of IDPs/refugees may interfere with military operations. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Military ○ Information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ The military will need to provide resources to divert IDPs/refugees from the Main Supply Routes (MSR) that support the units. ➤ The military will need to inform the IDPs/refugees of routes and camps where they can receive assistance. 	
4. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The time of the conflict could increase or decrease resources needed to take care of the IDPs/refugees. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Physical Environment ○ Physical Environment ○ Social 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ In winter months, the IDPs/refugees will require better shelter than in the warmer months. ➤ In summer months in very hot climates, IDPs/refugees will require greater amounts of potable water. ➤ Once the IDPs/refugees possess the basic necessities they will begin to demand more and many will want to return to their homes. 	
Possible Related MTEL Tasks	<p>Conduct Command and Control (ART 5.0)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Execute the Operations Process (ART 5.1) ○ Integrate Information Engagement Capabilities (ART 5.3.1) <p>Conduct Civil Affairs Operations (ART 5.4.6)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Populace and Resource Control (PRC) (ART 7.3.3.4) ➤ Conduct Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA) (ART 7.6.2.5) ➤ Conduct Civil Information Management (CIM) (ART 5.4.6) <p>Provide Potable Water in the JOA (ART 4.1.3.11)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Produce Potable Water (ART 4.1.3.11.1) ➤ Distribute Potable Water (ART 4.1.3.11) ➤ Manage Water Quality Surveillance Program (ART 4.1.3.11) <p>Conduct Internment and Resettlement (I/R) Operations (ART 4.4)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Dislocated Civilian Resettlement (ART 4.4.3) 		

Event	Thwarted Assassination Attempt by Insurgents on a Local Governor		
1. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Insurgents angered by the failure when security forces spotted the bomber and captured him. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political & Information ○ Military 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Host nation government must capitalize on their success by touting it to the masses. ➤ Military must post continued presence around the governor until further threat passes. 	
2. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Host nation government asks for aid from the US and NGOs. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political & Social ○ Information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Host nation government loses the confidence of the population for failing to prepare for or adequately handle the crisis on its own. ➤ Host nation government must inform populace of its efforts to provide care. 	
3. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Rural populations in particular suffer due to limited access to health care services compared to the urban population. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Social ○ Political & Economic 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Rural citizens plead for health care services to be brought to them. ➤ The government must consider options to improve health care services. 	
4. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ So many deaths draw international attention to the region; distraught citizens flood hospitals and protest the government. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ The government must work with the US and others to receive health care assistance and initiate vaccination programs to prevent future epidemics. 	
Possible Related MELT Tasks	<p>Conduct Civil Support Operations (ART 7.4)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Provide Disaster Relief (ART 7.4.1.1) ○ Provide Humanitarian Relief (ART 7.4.1.2) <p>Conduct Stability Operations (ART 7.3)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Provide Essential Civil Services (Immediate Response) (ART 7.3.3.1) ➤ Coordinate Public Order and Safety (Immediate Response) (ART 7.3.2.1) <p>Conduct Security Operations (ART 6.7.3)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Security Operations (ART 6.7.3) ➤ Conduct Area Security Operations (ART 6.5.3) 		

Event	Floods Wash Away Homes		
1. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Floods caused by heavy rains in spring wash away homes and refugees' shelters. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Social ○ Military ○ Physical Environment 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Those living in and around the refugee camps are left homeless. ➤ Military working with the government to evacuate those stranded in remote areas. ➤ The rising waters have caused extensive damage to farmland. 	
2. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Potential disease outbreak. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Social ○ Social 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Worsening sanitary condition may lead to disease outbreak, causing more death and spreading fear. ➤ The shortage of clean water, food, and shelters has left many at risk of lethal water borne diseases such as cholera. 	
3. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Survivors' frustration increasing. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political & Infrastructure ○ Political 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ People are frustrated because of the government slow response to restore public service and shelter. ➤ Insurgents will use the frustration in their favor by explaining that the government is unable to take care of its citizens. 	
Possible Related METL Tasks	<p>Provide Potable Water in the JOA (ART 4.1.3.11)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Produce Potable Water (ART 4.1.3.11.1) ➤ Distribute Potable Water (ART 4.1.3.11) ➤ Manage Water Quality Surveillance Program (ART 4.1.3.11) <p>Conduct Civil Support Operations (ART 7.4)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Provide Disaster Relief (ART 7.4.1.1) ➤ Provide Humanitarian Relief (ART 7.4.1.2) <p>Conduct Civil Affairs Operations (ART 5.4.6)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Populace and Resource Control (PRC) (ART 7.3.3.4) ➤ Conduct Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA) (ART 7.6.2.5) ➤ Conduct Civil Information Management (CIM) (ART 5.4.6) <p>Provide Health Service Support (ART 4.3.1)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Provide Combat Casualty Care (ART 4.3.1) ➤ Provide Medical Evacuation (Air and Ground) (ART 4.3.2) ➤ Provide Medical Logistics (ART 4.3.4) 		

Event	H1N1 Spreads Throughout the Caucasus Region		
1. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Thousands of people become infected with the virus and fall ill. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Economic ○ Infrastructure ○ Social 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Health care budgets are overextended to provide care to sick patients. ➤ Hospitals and clinics are overcrowded, causing many patients to be turned away. ➤ The elderly and infants die. 	
2. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Host nation government asks for aid from the US and NGOs. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political & Social ○ Information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Host nation government loses the confidence of the population for failing to prepare for or adequately handle the crisis on its own. ➤ Host nation government must inform populace of its efforts to provide care. 	
3. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Rural populations in particular suffer due to limited access to health care services compared to the urban population. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Social ○ Political & Economic 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Rural citizens plead for health care services to be brought to them. ➤ The government must consider options to improve health care services. 	
4. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ So many deaths draw international attention to the region; distraught citizens flood hospitals and protest the government. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ The government must work with the US and others to receive health care assistance and initiate vaccination programs to prevent future epidemics. 	
Possible Related METL Tasks	<p>Conduct Civil Support Operations (ART 7.4)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Provide Disaster Relief (ART 7.4.1.1) ○ Provide Humanitarian Relief (ART 7.4.1.2) <p>Conduct Stability Operations (ART 7.3)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Provide Essential Civil Services (Immediate Response) (ART 7.3.3.1) ○ Coordinate Public Order and Safety (Immediate Response) (ART 7.3.2.1) <p>Conduct Security Operations (ART 6.7.3)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Security Operations (ART 6.7.3) ➤ Conduct Area Security Operations (ART 6.5.3) 		

Event	Ethnic Group Attempts Genocide Against Another Ethnic Group		
1. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Ethnic groups attempt to ethnic cleanse a village, town, city, or area of a minority. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Social ○ Political 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Targeted group fears persecution and becomes upset with the government's failure to protect them. ➤ Government must arrive at a solution that keeps outside countries from intervention unless requested. 	
2. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Related diaspora along with civil rights activists will pressure the UN, NATO, or other countries to intervene to stop the ethnic cleansing. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Military 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Foreign governments must determine their courses of action and whether to become involved in another's country's internal situation. ➤ The government and other countries must determine how much force to use to prevent future ethnic cleansing by the dominant ethnic group. 	
3. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Ethnic cleansing destroys the homes and businesses of the minority. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Economic ○ Infrastructure 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ The destruction of their businesses may drive minorities out of business. ➤ The ethnic cleansing will destroy houses and businesses owned by the oppressed minority group that will require additional resources to rebuild. 	
4. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Ethnic cleansing will generate additional IDPs. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Social ○ Infrastructure ○ Information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Many of the oppressed minority will flee their homes and go to safer locations inside their own country or a neighboring country creating IDPs or refugees. ➤ The IDPs and refugees will need places to live and will need resources to survive. ➤ Lack of a government's action will cause condemnation by other countries and by civil rights activists that will put pressure on the government to end the ethnic cleansing. 	
Possible Related METL Tasks	Conduct Command and Control (ART 5.0) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Execute the Operations Process (ART 5.1) ○ Integrate Information Engagement Capabilities (ART 5.3.1) 		
	Conduct Offensive Operations (ART 7.1) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct an Attack (ART 7.1.2) ➤ Conduct a Pursuit (ART 7.1.4) ➤ Conduct Air Assault (ART 1.2.1.1.2) 		
	Conduct Civil Affairs Operations (ART 5.4.6) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Populace and Resource Control (PRC) (ART 7.3.3.4) ➤ Conduct Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA) (ART 7.6.2.5) ➤ Conduct Civil Information Management (CIM) (ART 5.4.6) 		
	Conduct Internment and Resettlement (I/R) Operations (ART 4.4) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Detainee Internment (ART 4.4.1) ➤ Conduct Dislocated Civilian Resettlement (ART 4.4.3) 		

Event	Organized Crime Group has Hijacked Airplane of Government Officials, Threatened Host Nation Government		
1. Related Activity	➤ Air defense units put on alert.		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Social ○ Political 	➤ High intergroup conflict. Civil unrest is significant.	➤ Government authorities challenged by criminal group, tensions increase.
2. Related Activity	➤ Neighborhoods around government buildings put on alert.		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Economic ○ Political 	➤ Business shuts down in cities.	➤ Government shuts down, evacuates personnel.
3. Related Activity	➤ Host nation requests US military assistance.		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Social 	➤ Government unable to protect its officials; loses legitimacy.	➤ Social unrest increases, fear and panic, blame placed on perceived supporters of insurgent group.
Possible Related METL Tasks	Conduct Command and Control (ART 5.0) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Execute the Operations Process (ART 5.1) ○ Integrate Information Engagement Capabilities (ART 5.3.1) 		
	Conduct Law and Order Operations (ART 5.5.1.2.1) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Restore Order (ART 7.3.2.1) ○ Perform Law Enforcement (ART 5.5.1.2.2) 		
	Conduct Security Operations (ART 6.7.3) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Area Security Operations (ART 6.5.3) ➤ Conduct Critical Installations and Facilities Security (ART 6.5.2) 		
	Conduct Stability Operations (ART 7.3) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Provide Essential Civil Service (Immediate Response) (ART 7.3.3.1) ➤ Coordinate Public Order and Safety (Immediate Response) (ART 7.3.2.1) 		

Event	Local Army Helicopter Shot Down By Insurgents		
1. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Host nation army responds with air support. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Military ○ Political 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Host nation military is able to scare off the insurgents. ➤ Government authorities challenged by insurgent group, tensions increase. Assassination attempts likely. 	
2. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Insurgent group uses this as a threat. Uses INFOWAR to tell the locals that their government and military are weak. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Social 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ HN government must counter the insurgent's message and show the people that they insurgent is wrong. ➤ Locals are frightened by the show of power by the insurgents and begin to question their government's ability to protect them and keep the peace. 	
3. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Host nation government request assistance from US to stage a defense against insurgents against further attacks. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political & Military ○ Social 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Government unable to amass enough troops throughout the area due to low numbers; requests assistance from US forces. ➤ Social unrest increases. Locals are made uneasy by the troops throughout the area. 	
4. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Insurgents capitalize on social unrest through continued use of INFOWAR tactics, reminding the people that their government can't handle the situation on its own, and as soon as US troops leave, the insurgents threaten to strike again. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Social ○ Political & Information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Locals are frightened by the threats from the insurgents, begin questioning their government. ➤ The government attempts to quell the anxiety and to ensure the people that they are safe. Messages are sent through TV and radio messages, primarily. 	
Possible Related METL Tasks	<p>Conduct Command and Control (ART 5.0)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Execute the Operations Process (ART 5.1) ○ Integrate Information Engagement Capabilities (ART 5.3.1) <p>Conduct Offensive Operations (ART 7.1)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct an Attack (ART 7.1.2) ➤ Conduct Air Assault (ART 1.2.1.1.2) <p>Conduct Security Operations (ART 6.7.3)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Area Security Operations (ART 6.5.3) <p>Conduct Stability Operations (ART 7.3)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Provide Essential Civil Service (Immediate Response) (ART 7.3.3.1) ➤ Coordinate Public Order and Safety (Immediate Response) (ART 7.3.2.1) 		

Event	High Gas Prices Cause Civilian Unrest		
1. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Due to a political or military situation, there is a drastic increase in gasoline prices that make it impossible for the average person to survive. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Economic ○ Social ○ Social/Political 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ High gas prices cause the products of all goods to increase as transportation and production costs rise. ➤ People begin to conduct protests against the government due to the high cost of gasoline and the inability of the average person to purchase it. ➤ People will pressure the government to subsidize gasoline, but this will only cause additional economic pressure on the government. 	
2. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ The lack of gasoline will hurt the economy. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Physical Environment ○ Economic 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Some city dwellers will not use their vehicles and that could lead to a short-term improvement in local air quality. ➤ The lack of gasoline may reduce crop yields. It will become more difficult for farmers to get their crops to the market. 	
3. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ People stage protests against high gasoline prices. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Information ○ Social 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Both sides use all media outlets to distribute their key talking points. ➤ People may lose faith in the current government for their inability to keep gasoline prices affordable. 	
4. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Protests against high gasoline prices may become violent. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Military ○ Political ○ Infrastructure 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ The government may use the military to quell the protests. ➤ The protests may lead to the fall of the current government or to a Civil War. ➤ Violent protests lead to property damage that the government or private person must eventually repair. 	
Possible Related MTEL Tasks	<p>Conduct Command and Control (ART 5.0)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Execute the Operations Process (ART 5.1) ○ Integrate Information Engagement Capabilities (ART 5.3.1) <p>Conduct Law and Order Operations (ART 5.5.1.2.1)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Restore Order (ART 7.3.2.1) ➤ Perform law Enforcement (ART 5.5.1.2.2) <p>Conduct Police Intelligence Operations (ART 2.2.5)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Collect Police Intelligence (ART 2.2.5.1) ➤ Analyze Police Information (ART 2.2.5.2) ➤ Disseminate Police Information and Intelligence Products (ART 2.2.5.3) <p>Counter the Threat (ART 6.11.3)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Counterintelligence Operations (ART 6.11.3.1) ➤ Perform Counterintelligence (ART 6.11.3.3) 		

Event	Dissidents Attack Government Information Systems		
1. Related Activity	➤ Dissidents hacked into government systems, including infrastructure.		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Social ○ Political 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ High intergroup conflict. Civil unrest is significant. ➤ Government authorities challenged by dissidents, tensions increase. 	
2. Related Activity	➤ Dissidents seize TV broadcast studio.		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Time 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Dissident messages degrade government legitimacy. ➤ Government unable to quickly recover studio. Dissident broadcasts incite population against government. 	
3. Related Activity	➤ Host national requests US assistance in regaining control of missile C2.		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Political 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Government potentially loses legitimacy, if word gets out that it has lost control of missile systems. ➤ Dissidents make demands in exchange for releasing control back to government. 	
4. Related Activity	○ Dissidents jam all radio transmissions.		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Government loses credibility when cannot maintain communication with population. ➤ Dissidents execute a well-developed perception management campaign highlighting the "atrocities" occurring in the IDP camps. 	
Possible Related MTEL Tasks	<p>Conduct Command and Control (ART 5.0)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Execute the Operations Process (ART 5.1) ○ Integrate Information Engagement Capabilities (ART 5.3.1) <p>Conduct Information Protection (ART 6.3)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Perform Information Assurance (ART 6.3.1) ➤ Perform Computer Network Defense (ART 6.3.2) <p>Conduct Critical Installations and Facilities Security (ART 6.5.2)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Critical Installations and Facilities Security (ART 6.5.2) <p>Conduct Stability Operations (ART 7.3)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Provide Essential Civil Service (Immediate Response) (ART 7.3.3.1) ➤ Coordinate Public Order and Safety (Immediate Response) (ART 7.3.2.1) ➤ Support Host Nation Telecommunications Infrastructure Reconstruction Programs (ART 7.3.5.4) 		

Event	Host Nation Requests Border Security Assistance		
1. Related Activity	➤ Border police duties bring US Forces into direct contact with criminal elements.		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Economic ○ Information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ US Forces blamed decrease in smuggling revenues. ➤ Enemy perception management operations are effective in portraying American "crimes" through immediate release of "evidence." 	
2. Related Activity	➤ US Forces are forced into manpower intensive operations.		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Military ○ Military 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Commander must support host nation forces. ➤ US Forces must be supported by host nation forces due to revises SOFA. 	
3. Related Activity	➤ Deconfliction and monitoring of US Forces limits mobility and reaction time.		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Military ○ Information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ US Forces unable to proactively patrol and operate. ➤ Threat forces capable to predicting US movement. 	
Possible Related MELT Tasks	<p>Coordinate Law and Order Operations (ART 5.5.1.2.1)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Integrate Law Enforcement (ART 5.5.1.2.2) ○ Integrate Civil Control (ART 7.3.2) <p>Plan Civil Affairs Operations (CAO) / Civil-Military Operations (CMO) (ART 5.4.8)</p> <p>Conduct Security Operations (ART 6.7.3)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Security Operations (ART 6.7.3) ➤ Conduct Area Security Operations (ART 6.5.3) <p>Conduct Command and Control (ART 5.0)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Execute the Operations Process (ART 5.1) ➤ Integrate Information Engagement Capabilities (ART 5.3.1) 		

Event	US Troops Find Evidence of Human Rights Violations		
1. Related Activity	➤ US Leaders meet with local authorities.		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Social ○ Political 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ US leaders' cultural awareness will affect results of meetings. ➤ Government authorities challenged by ethnic minorities. 	
2. Related Activity	➤ International press, Red Cross and UN authorities arrive in area in large numbers.		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Infrastructure ○ Economic 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Extra foreigners with money take over taxi, truck and bus system, stranding day-to-day users. Frustration rises. ➤ Illegal economic activity increases with a thriving black market. Criminal and gang elements attempt to profit from the situation and begin to cater to foreign press. ➤ Legitimate industry suffers due to loss of transportation. 	
3. Related Activity	➤ IDPs and refugees riot in protest of government.		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Social ➤ Information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Government unable to quell riots quickly; loses legitimacy. ➤ Social unrest increases, government facilities are targeted with VBIEDs. Rumors of assassination attempts on key leaders are widespread. ➤ Groups benefiting from the unrest execute a well-developed perception management campaign highlighting the "atrocities" occurring in the IDP camps 	
4. Related Activity	○ SAF and IED attacks on foreigners.		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Social ○ Political 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Population resents outsiders. ➤ Government loses international standing for lack of security in area. 	
Possible Related MTEL Tasks	<p>Conduct Command and Control (ART 5.0)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Execute the Operations Process (ART 5.1) ○ Integrate Information Engagement Capabilities (ART 5.3.1) <p>Conduct Civil Affairs Operations (ART 5.4.6)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Support Civil Administration (SCA) (ART 5.4.6) <p>Conduct Security Operations (ART 6.7.3)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Area Security Operations (ART 6.5.3) <p>Conduct Stability Operations (ART 7.3)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Provide Essential Civil Service (Immediate Response) (ART 7.3.3.1) ➤ Coordinate Public Order and Safety (Immediate Response) (ART 7.3.2.1) ➤ Support Human Rights Initiatives (ART 7.3.2.6) ➤ Support War Crimes Courts and Tribunals (ART 7.3.2.7) 		

Event	Drug Trafficking Increases to Epidemic Proportions		
1. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Drug trafficking increases in a country due to a rise in the number of users. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Information ○ Social 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Government decides if the costs of drug law enforcement outweigh the positive results of reduced drug use. ➤ The government launches an Information Operations (IO) campaign against illegal drugs. ➤ Lack of access to medical care cause people to turn to illegal drugs to dull their pain. 	
2. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Criminal activity increases due to drug use. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Economic ○ Social ○ Military 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ The drug trade funds many criminal organizations' activities. ➤ People turn to petty crime to pay for their drug habits. ➤ The government may use the military to assist in drug eradication programs. 	
3. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ More people become involved in the drug trade. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Physical Environment ○ Infrastructure 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ More farmers will stop producing food crops to grow the illegal substances. ➤ To finance their habit, drug users will cannibalize anything of value that they can sell (pipes, wire, etc.). This reduces the efficiency of the country's utilities. 	
4. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Other countries become involved in the anti-drug trafficking efforts. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Economic 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Due to the effects on their own country, other countries may assist in anti-drug eradication efforts to eliminate the drugs at the source instead of to interdict the drugs in transit. ➤ As drug trafficking provides much income to many people, governments fear extreme efforts to end the drug trade will cause more problems than it solves. 	
Possible Related MTEL Tasks	<p>Conduct Command and Control (ART 5.0)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Execute the Operations Process (ART 5.1) ○ Integrate Information Engagement Capabilities (ART 5.3.1) <p>Conduct Law and Order Operations (ART 5.5.1.2.1)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Restore Order (ART 7.3.2.1) ➤ Perform law Enforcement (ART 5.5.1.2.2) ➤ Conduct HN Police Training and Support (ART ART 7.3.2.3) <p>Conduct Police Intelligence Operations (ART 2.2.5)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Collect Police Intelligence (ART 2.2.5.1) ➤ Analyze Police Information (ART 2.2.5.2) ➤ Disseminate Police Information and Intelligence Products (ART 2.2.5.3) <p>Counter the Threat (ART 6.11.3)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Counterintelligence Operations (ART 6.11.3.1) ➤ Perform Counterintelligence (ART 6.11.3.3) 		

Event	Insurgents Take Over Main Local Radio		
1. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Insurgent group takes journalist hostages and forces the radio to broadcast its messages. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Military ○ Information & Political ○ Social 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ The local military is mobilized and a rescue team is put in place. ➤ The radio is forced to broadcast insurgent messages and warns the population to not trust the government. ➤ The population is in fear after the insurgents warn of harsh punishment if their rules are not followed. 	
2. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Journalists who refuse to comply with insurgents are killed. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Social and Information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Fearing for their workers' lives, other local radios close and send everyone home, leaving everyone in the dark about the current situation. 	
3. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Fire fight breaks out between insurgents and rescue team. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Military ○ Time 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Rescue mission takes few hours to be executed as the local government had to bring in teams with experience in hostage situations. ➤ Finding themselves outnumbered and out of time, the insurgents killed all their hostages and themselves in a suicide attack. 	
Possible Related MELT Tasks	<p>Conduct Command and Control (ART 5.0)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Execute the Operations Process (ART 5.1) ○ Integrate Information Engagement Capabilities (ART 5.3.1) <p>Conduct Information Protection (ART 6.3)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Perform Information Assurance (ART 6.3.1) <p>Conduct Critical Installations and Facilities Security (ART 6.5.2)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Critical Installations and Facilities Security (ART 6.5.2) <p>Conduct Stability Operations (ART 7.3)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Provide Essential Civil Service (Immediate Response) (ART 7.3.3.1) ➤ Coordinate Public Order and Safety (Immediate Response) (ART 7.3.2.1) ➤ Support Host Nation Telecommunications Infrastructure Reconstruction Programs (ART 7.3.5.4) 		

Event	Belligerent Country Invades Another Country to Seize Hydrocarbon Assets		
1. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Aggressor country invades neighboring country to seize their petroleum or natural gas assets. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Military ○ Political 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Invaded country mobilizes their military forces to defend themselves from the invaders. ➤ Invaded country requests support from their allies to defeat the invaders. 	
2. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ The belligerent country's military physically seizes the other country's hydrocarbon assets and the conflict reduces the worldwide availability of hydrocarbon resources. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Economic ○ Political 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Western nations face crude oil and natural gas shortages and an increase in prices for hydrocarbon resources from other countries. ➤ The UN, NATO, and other Western defense alliances must decide how to respond to the situation. 	
3. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conflict causes food shortages. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Social ○ Economic 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ People protest the lack of food and its high cost. ➤ People increase the use of the black market to feed their families. 	
4. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Combat generates IDPs as the people in the path of the invaders flee to safer sections of the country. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Information ○ Infrastructure ○ Physical Environment 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Rumors about the invaders success cause panic in the civilian population and these only increases the IDPs and some people even flee to neighboring countries. ➤ Conflict damages infrastructure that will require replacement. ➤ Conflict has environment damage requiring mitigation. 	
Possible Related METL Tasks	Conduct Command and Control (ART 5.0) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Execute the Operations Process (ART 5.1) ○ Integrate Information Engagement Capabilities (ART 5.3.1) 		
	Conduct Offensive Operations (ART 7.1) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct an Attack (ART 7.1.2) ➤ Conduct a Pursuit (ART 7.1.4) ➤ Conduct Air Assault (ART 1.2.1.1.2) ➤ Conduct Forcible Entry Operations (ART 1.2.1.1) 		
	Provide Lethal Fires (ART 3.3.1) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Execute Fires and Precision Strike (ART 3.3.1) ➤ Conduct Fires and Target Acquisition Integration (ART 3.3.1) ➤ Conduct Counterfire (ART 6.1.8) 		
	Conduct Internment and Resettlement (I/R) Operations (ART 4.4) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct US Military Prisoner Corrections (ART 5.5.1.2.4) ➤ Conduct Detainee Internment (ART 4.4.1) ➤ Conduct Dislocated Civilian Resettlement (ART 4.4.3) 		

Event	Belligerent Country Invades Another Country to Seize Water Resources		
1. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ An aggressor country invades another country to seize control of the vast quantities of water located there. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Military ○ Political 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Invaded country mobilizes their military forces to defend themselves from the invaders. ➤ Invaded country requests support from their allies to defeat the invaders. 	
2. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ The belligerent country's military physically seizes the other country's main water sources. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Economic ○ Political 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Local civilians suffer due to a lack of water as the belligerent country diverts the water resources back to their home country. ➤ The UN, NATO, and other Western defense alliances must decide how to respond to the situation. 	
3. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conflict causes water and food shortages. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Social ○ Economic 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ People protest the water shortage and the failure of their government to find solutions to the problem. ➤ People increase black market use to obtain water for personal use, but farms suffer due to a water shortage. 	
4. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Combat generates IDPs as the people in the path of the invaders flee to safer sections of the country. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Information ○ Infrastructure ○ Physical Environment 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Rumors about the invaders success cause panic in the civilian population and these only increases the IDPs and some people even flee to neighboring countries. ➤ Conflict damages water transportation infrastructure and irrigation systems that will require replacement. ➤ Conflict causes environmental damage that will require future mitigation. 	
Possible Related MELT Tasks	<p>Conduct Command and Control (ART 5.0)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Execute the Operations Process (ART 5.1) ○ Integrate Information Engagement Capabilities (ART 5.3.1) <p>Conduct Offensive Operations (ART 7.1)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct an Attack (ART 7.1.2) ➤ Conduct a Pursuit (ART 7.1.4) ➤ Conduct Air Assault (ART 1.2.1.1.2) ➤ Conduct Forcible Entry Operations (ART 1.2.1.1) <p>Provide Potable Water in the JOA (ART 4.1.3.11)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Produce Potable Water (ART 4.1.3.11.1) ➤ Distribute Potable Water (ART 4.1.3.11) ➤ Manage Water Quality Surveillance Program (ART 4.1.3.11) <p>Conduct Internment and Resettlement (I/R) Operations (ART 4.4)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct US Military Prisoner Corrections (ART 5.5.1.2.4) ➤ Conduct Detainee Internment (ART 4.4.1) ➤ Conduct Dislocated Civilian Resettlement (ART 4.4.3) 		

Event	Journalists Arrested		
1. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Journalist critical of the government are arrested after they publish information connecting government officials and drug lords. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ The population riots and asks for the officials' resignation. ➤ Other journalists, also critical of the government start to receive threatening phone calls and emails. 	
2. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ A prominent journalist, a supporter of the opposition is killed in a suspicious car accident. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Political & Social 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ The US urges the government to open an investigation and bring those responsible to justice. ➤ The residents of the town are in a state of fear and blame the drug cartels and the government for the accident. 	
3. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Drug cartels warning the media and locals to stay out of their business or suffer the ultimate consequences. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Social & Political ○ Information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ The government is blamed for not being able to protect its citizen and allowing corruption to continue. ➤ More journalists unite and publish more on the connection between drug cartels and the government. 	
Possible Related MELT Tasks	<p>Conduct Command and Control (ART 5.0)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Execute the Operations Process (ART 5.1) ○ Integrate Information Engagement Capabilities (ART 5.3.1) <p>Conduct Law and Order Operations (ART 5.5.1.2.1)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Restore Order (ART 7.3.2.1) <p>Conduct Stability Operations (ART 7.3)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Provide Essential Civil Service (Immediate Response) (ART 7.3.3.1) ➤ Coordinate Public Order and Safety (Immediate Response) (ART 7.3.2.1) 		

Event	Journalists/Publishers are Jailed for Publishing Material with Alleged "Anti-Government" Sentiments		
1. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Community members protest outside of the office of the major newspaper in violation. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Social ○ Political 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ News of the arrests and protests bring the matter to the attention of the general public. ➤ Government authorities remain firm in their decision; give the people the message that such actions will not be tolerated. 	
2. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ One publication (a daily newspaper) writes an op-ed stating the arrests were unfair; the government then threatens to shut down the publication. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Social ○ Military 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ More protests ensue, causing public disturbances. ➤ Troops are brought in to quell the public demonstrations. 	
3. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Newspaper is shut down. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Social 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Government establishes its authority, making it clear that everyone must publicly support the government. ➤ The opposite affect is achieved, as people aren't supportive of being told what to think and say. So, the government actually created more anti-government sentiment. 	
4. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Anti-government sentiment grows and people begin to protest through other mediums. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Information ○ Political & Economic ○ Military 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Radio shows, TV shows, and internet sites decry the government's actions. ➤ The government reconsiders how to handle the situation, as shutting down all media will cause job losses and create a negative economic impact on society. ➤ Government decides to call upon US military for assistance in a show of force to deter protesters. 	
Possible Related METL Tasks	Conduct Command and Control (ART 5.0) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Execute the Operations Process (ART 5.1) ○ Integrate Information Engagement Capabilities (ART 5.3.1) 		
	Conduct Security Operations (ART 6.7.3) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Area Security Operations (ART 6.5.3) 		
	Conduct Stability Operations (ART 7.3) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Coordinate Public Order and Safety (Immediate Response) (ART 7.3.2.1) 		

Event	A Small Group of Residents of a Rural Town Begin a Nonreligious School for their Children Against The Norm For Rural Areas		
1. Related Activity	➤ Insurgents kidnap young students walking to non-religious schools.		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Social ○ Political ○ Military 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conflict erupts among religious and nonreligious sectors of town. Residents begin to threaten each other. ➤ Government authorities in more urban areas are contacted for assistance, as local government is too small to wield any power. ➤ Troops are sent to the area for security and to search for the kidnapped children. 	
2. Related Activity	➤ Insurgents send threatening letters to local parents to keep their kids from attending this school or they also will be kidnapped.		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Social ○ Time 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Parents are scared to the point that they send their kids back to the religious school. ➤ Although more urban areas show Western leanings in their education systems, the more outwardly religious rural population is not ready for those ways of life. 	
3. Related Activity	➤ Military troops locate kidnapped children, but the insurgents demand negotiations before returning them.		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Information ○ Social 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Because this rural insurgent group has limited access to technology, communication is restricted to phone calls. ➤ Families of kidnapped children are terrified that their children were harmed, and place a lot of pressure on the military to return their children safely. 	
4. Related Activity	○ Children are returned safely after the parents promise to discontinue the school.		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Social ○ Social/Economic 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Parents are disheartened that they cannot give their children the same education as available in more urban areas. ➤ Many of the children were ill from dehydration and other minor illnesses, requiring the parents to seek medical care. 	
Possible Related MELT Tasks	<p>Conduct Command and Control (ART 5.0)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Execute the Operations Process (ART 5.1) ○ Integrate Information Engagement Capabilities (ART 5.3.1) <p>Conduct Security Operations (ART 6.7.3)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Area Security Operations (ART 6.5.3) <p>Conduct Stability Operations (ART 7.3)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Provide Essential Civil Service (Immediate Response) (ART 7.3.3.1) ➤ Coordinate Public Order and Safety (Immediate Response) (ART 7.3.2.1) 		

Event	Drug Bust on Border		
1. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ A few thousand pounds of cocaine stored in multiple containers near the border are found by border police after a yearlong investigation. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Physical Environment 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Government is praised for the successful operation as this was a multi-agencies effort. ➤ Due to harsh terrain in the region, drug traffickers are able to smuggle drugs through the area because security is low. 	
2. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ More operations are planned to reduce violence around the border and seize more drugs. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Social & Economic ○ Political 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Those who depended on the drug trade for survival will turn to other means to make money and support their families. ➤ The government must allocate money to fund the operations. 	
3. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Regional effort to reduce drug trade. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Military 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Regional countries have joined to fight the drug trade and have put together teams in charge of enforcement. ➤ The government will use the military in the operations. 	
Possible Related MTEL Tasks	<p>Conduct Command and Control (ART 5.0)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Execute the Operations Process (ART 5.1) ○ Integrate Information Engagement Capabilities (ART 5.3.1) <p>Conduct Law and Order Operations (ART 5.5.1.2.1)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Restore Order (ART 7.3.2.1) ➤ Perform law Enforcement (ART 5.5.1.2.2) ➤ Conduct HN Police Training and Support (ART ART 7.3.2.3) <p>Counter the Threat (ART 6.11.3)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Counterintelligence Operations (ART 6.11.3.1) ➤ Perform Counterintelligence (ART 6.11.3.3) <p>Conduct Police Intelligence Operations (ART 2.2.5)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Collect Police Intelligence (ART 2.2.5.1) ➤ Analyze Police Information (ART 2.2.5.2) ➤ Disseminate Police Information and Intelligence Products (ART 2.2.5.3) 		

Event	General(s) Launch Coup and Seize Control of Government		
1. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Military leaders conduct a coup and seize control of the primary government. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Citizens may or may not consider the new government legitimate. ➤ New government will use all media to convince their people that the new government is legitimate. 	
2. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Civil War may break out within the country. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Military ○ Social 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Military forces loyal to both the old regime and the new government may fight to control the country. ➤ Many people will support either the new or old governments, many others will remain fence-sitters. 	
3. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Movement of large numbers of IDPs/refugees may interfere with military operations. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Military ○ Information ○ Economy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ The military will need to provide resources to divert IDPs/refugees from the Main Supply Routes (MSR) that support the units. ➤ The military will need to find methods to inform the IDPs/refugees of the routes they should take and camps where they can receive assistance. ➤ IDPs/refugees cannot perform their normal occupations and will affect the economy negatively. 	
4. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Foreign countries may decide to intervene in the conflict on one side or the other. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Physical Environment ○ Social 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Foreign countries, the UN, and other defense organizations such as NATO will decide whether they need to become involved in the conflict. ➤ In summer months in very hot climates, IDPs/refugees will require greater amounts of potable water. ➤ Once the IDPs/refugees possess the basic necessities (food, water, and shelter), they will demand to return to their homes once the conflict ends. 	
Possible Related MTEL Tasks	Conduct Command and Control (ART 5.0) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Execute the Operations Process (ART 5.1) ○ Integrate Information Engagement Capabilities (ART 5.3.1) 		
	Conduct Civil Affairs Operations (ART 5.4.6) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Populace and Resource Control (PRC) (ART 7.3.3.4) ➤ Conduct Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA) (ART 7.6.2.5) ➤ Conduct Civil Information Management (CIM) (ART 5.4.6) 		
	Provide Potable Water in the JOA (ART 4.1.3.11) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Produce Potable Water (ART 4.1.3.11.1) ➤ Distribute Potable Water (ART 4.1.3.11) ➤ Manage Water Quality Surveillance Program (ART 4.1.3.11) 		
	Conduct Internment and Resettlement (I/R) Operations (ART 4.4) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Detainee Internment (ART 4.4.1) ➤ Conduct Dislocated Civilian Resettlement (ART 4.4.3) 		

Event	Neighboring Country Shuts Down Border to Commercial Traffic		
1. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ International community puts pressure on US to intervene. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Social/Time ○ Political 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Population appeals to local government and aid organizations for help with heating fuel as winter approaches. ➤ US leaders attempt negotiations with local governments. 	
2. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Commercial traffic and Fuel trucks stopped at border. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Economic ○ Information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Markets and gas stations close, due to shortage of goods and fuel. ➤ Prices skyrocket. ➤ Illegal economic activity increases with a thriving black market. Criminal and gang elements attempt to profit from the situation and begin selling fuel and other commodities to the population. ➤ Neighboring country executes a well-developed perception management campaign highlighting that goods were going to NATO forces. 	
Possible Related MTEL Tasks	<p>Conduct Command and Control (ART 5.0)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Execute the Operations Process (ART 5.1) ○ Integrate Information Engagement Capabilities (ART 5.3.1) <p>Conduct Police Intelligence Operations (ART 2.2.5)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Collect Police Information (ART 2.2.5.1) ➤ Analyze Police Information (ART 2.2.5.2) <p>Conduct Law and Order Operations (ART 5.5.1.2.1)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Restore Order (ART 7.3.2.1) ➤ Conduct HN Police Training and Support (ART 7.3.2.3) <p>Conduct Civil Affairs Operations (ART 5.4.6)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Populace and Resource Control (PRC) (ART 7.3.3.4) ➤ Conduct Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA) (ART 7.6.2.5) ➤ Conduct Nation Assistance (NA) (ART 5.4.6) 		

Event	Non-Muslims (Mainly Christians) are Targeted		
1. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Christian homes and churches are set on fire. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Infrastructure ○ Social ○ Military 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Churches that have been in the country for centuries are burned to the ground. ➤ Christians live in fear and begin to protest and ask the government to provide protection. ➤ The military is brought in to assist the police and stop the chaos. 	
2. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Non-Muslims begin to flee the country in large numbers. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Economy ○ Social & Political 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ The country's economy may suffer as the Christian community brought in a lot of business. ➤ Those fleeing the country are forced to go to neighboring countries, which in turn could lead to political complications with the refugee situation. 	
3. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The government intervenes to persecute. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ If the government decides to intervene, the majority (Muslims) will continue their actions in order to show that the government cannot protect all its citizens. 	
Possible Related MTEL Tasks	<p>Conduct Command and Control (ART 5.0)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Execute the Operations Process (ART 5.1) ○ Integrate Information Engagement Capabilities (ART 5.3.1) 		
	<p>Conduct Law and Order Operations (ART 5.5.1.2.1)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Restore Order (ART 7.3.2.1) ➤ Perform Law Enforcement (ART 5.5.1.2.2) 		
	<p>Conduct Security Operations (ART 6.7.3)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Area Security Operations (ART 6.5.3) 		
	<p>Conduct Stability Operations (ART 7.3)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Provide Essential Civil Service (Immediate Response) (ART 7.3.3.1) ➤ Coordinate Public Order and Safety (Immediate Response) (ART 7.3.2.1) 		

Event	Nuclear Power Plant Computer Virus Causes Failure		
1. Related Activity	➤ Power outages begin.		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Infrastructure ○ Political 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Widespread power outages lead to increased criminal activities and social unrest. ➤ Government authorities challenged by rival political groups, tensions increase. 	
2. Related Activity	➤ Downwind radiation plume spreads.		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Infrastructure ○ Time ○ Social 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Hospitals increase admissions to point of overload ➤ Government unable to quickly recover from the outage. Criminal and insurgent elements begin to work in concert, claiming they will soon be able to supply electricity and other utilities to the population. ➤ Number of IDP swells. 	
3. Related Activity	➤ Riots break out due to lack of utilities and fear. Host nation requests support from U.S. forces.		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Social 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Government unable to quell fears; loses legitimacy. ➤ Social unrest increases, government facilities are targeted with VBIEDs. Rumors of assassination attempts on key leaders are widespread. 	
4. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Already-present IDPs and refugees aggravate over-stressed basic services. Lack of access to water and food increases tension and previously quiet groups begin to demand assistance from the government. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Social ○ Economic ○ Information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ IDP/refugees lack water/food-riots increase. ➤ Illegal economic activity increases with a thriving black market. Criminal and gang elements attempt to profit from the situation and begin selling water and food to the population. ➤ Groups benefiting from the unrest execute a well-developed perception management campaign highlighting the "atrocities" occurring in the IDP camps. 	
Possible Related MTEL Tasks	<p>Conduct Command and Control (ART 5.0)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Execute the Operations Process (ART 5.1) ○ Integrate Information Engagement Capabilities (ART 5.3.1) <p>Provide General Engineer Support (ART 4.1.7)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Supply Mobile Electric Power (ART 4.1.7.4) <p>Conduct Civil Support Operations (ART 7.4)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Provide Disaster Relief (ART 7.4.1.1) ➤ Provide Humanitarian Relief (ART 7.4.1.2) <p>Conduct Stability Operations (ART 7.3)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Provide Essential Civil Service (Immediate Response) (ART 7.3.3.1) ➤ Coordinate Public Order and Safety (Immediate Response) (ART 7.3.2.1) 		

Event	Nuclear Power Plant Attacked and Damaged		
1. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Foreign military SOF attacks, damages production and containment of fission plant and successfully exfiltrates. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Social ○ Political ○ Military 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Ethnically-centered demand for conflict. Civil unrest is significant. ➤ Government authorities initially claim no threat to neighboring areas. ➤ Attacked country begins mobilization of forces. 	
2. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Third-nation detects radiation plume crossing into territory, demands immediate shut-down of plant. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Infrastructure ○ Time ○ Political 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Intermittent power outages lead to increased criminal activities and social unrest. ➤ Leak continues to move, more detections of radiation in more neighboring countries. ➤ Cascade of nations to call for action. 	
3. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Third-nation mobilizes military, threatening force to shut down leaking plant. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Military ○ Political 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Cross-border RSTA begins. ➤ International organizations become involved on behalf of both attacked country and contaminated countries 	
4. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Fear of conflict causes people in border regions to displace. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Social ○ Economic ○ Information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ IDP/refugees lack water/food-riots increase. ➤ Illegal economic activity increases with a thriving black market. Criminal and gang elements attempt to profit from the situation and begin selling water and food to the population. ➤ Groups benefiting from the unrest execute a well-developed perception management campaign highlighting the “atrocities” occurring in the IDP camps. 	
Possible Related METL Tasks	Conduct Command and Control (ART 5.0) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Execute the Operations Process (ART 5.1) ○ Integrate Information Engagement Capabilities (ART 5.3.1) 		
	Conduct Defensive Operations (ART 7.2) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct an Area Defense (ART 7.2.2) 		
	Conduct Security Operations (ART 6.7.3) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Area Security Operations (ART 6.5.3) 		
	Conduct Stability Operations (ART 7.3) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Provide Essential Civil Service (Immediate Response) (ART 7.3.3.1) ➤ Coordinate Public Order and Safety (Immediate Response) (ART 7.3.2.1) 		
	Conduct CBRN Operations (ART 6.9) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct CBRN Consequence Management (ART 6.9.5) 		

Event	Terrorists or Soldiers Attack a Caspian Sea Oil Platform		
1. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Terrorists or soldiers attack a Caspian Sea oil platform and forces it to shut down for an extended period of time. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Economic ○ Infrastructure 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Damage interrupts hydrocarbon exports that generate revenue for the country. ➤ Government and/or oil/natural gas company must allocate funds to repair pipeline. 	
2. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Pipeline destruction causes massive oil spill in the Caspian Sea. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Physical Environment ○ Economic 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Massive oil spill requires international assistance to cleanup and mitigate damage from pollution. ➤ Oil contaminates fish in the Caspian Sea and puts most fishermen out of business. 	
3. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Oil futures market instability reduces revenue that the country uses to purchase food and the interruption in the Caspian Sea fish production causes people to face food shortages. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Social ○ Economic 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ People protest the lack of food and its high cost. ➤ People increase the use of the black market to feed their families. 	
4. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Government resources stretched as they attempt to repair pipeline and remediate damage caused by oil spill. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Information ○ Political ○ Military 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Government uses all communications available to emphasize their control; reduce fear, and reassure that the government is mitigating the incident. ➤ Government responds to complaints by the other Caspian Sea countries about environmental damage and the harming the Caspian Sea fishing industry. ➤ Government increase maritime patrols and hydrocarbon platform security in the Caspian Sea. 	
Possible Related MTEL Tasks	<p>Conduct Command and Control (ART 5.0)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Execute the Operations Process (ART 5.1) ○ Integrate Information Engagement Capabilities (ART 5.3.1) <p>Provide Area Security (ART 6.5)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Installations and Facilities Security (ART 6.5.2) <p>Conduct Stability Operations (ART 7.3)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Provide Essential Civil Service (Immediate Response (ART 7.3.3.1)) ➤ Coordinate Public Order and Safety (Immediate Response (ART 7.3.2.1)) <p>Conduct Civil Support Operations (ART 7.4)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Provide Support in Response to Disaster of Terrorist Attack (ART 7.4.1) <p>Conduct Civil Affairs Operations (ART 5.4.6)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA) (ART 7.6.2.5) ➤ Conduct Civil Information Management (CIM) (ART 5.4.6) <p>Develop Theater Petroleum and Water Infrastructure (ART 4.1.7.2.6)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Coordinate Construction and Engineer Support (ART 4.1.7.3) 		

Event	Main Opposition Group Boycotts Presidential Elections		
1. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ The boycott might force new elections. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Political 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ The boycott might lead to new elections with a new electoral commission to calm the population. ➤ Outside assistance is requested to oversee the new elections. 	
2. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Riots erupt in the capital from opposition supporters accusing the leading party of fraud and claiming elections will not be transparent. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Economic 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ The opposition asks for the elections to be postponed. ➤ Most store owners close their stores due to fear of their stores being vandalized. 	
3. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Police forces sent in to stop the chaos. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ social 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ As the police force try to disperse the demonstrators, the riot might escalate, leading to more violence. 	
Possible Related MELT Tasks	<p>Conduct Command and Control (ART 5.0)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Execute the Operations Process (ART 5.1) ○ Integrate Information Engagement Capabilities (ART 5.3.1) <p>Conduct Offensive Operations (ART 7.1)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct an Attack (ART 7.1.2) ➤ Conduct Air Assault (ART 1.2.1.1.2) <p>Conduct Security Operations (ART 6.7.3)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Area Security Operations (ART 6.5.3) <p>Conduct Stability Operations (ART 7.3)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Provide Essential Civil Service (Immediate Response) (ART 7.3.3.1) ➤ Coordinate Public Order and Safety (Immediate Response) (ART 7.3.2.1) 		

Event	Terrorists Attack Hydrocarbon Pipeline		
1. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Terrorists use explosives to destroy a section of a crude oil pipeline and force it to shut down for an extended period of time. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Economic ○ Infrastructure 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Damage interrupts hydrocarbon exports that generate revenue for the country. ➤ Government and/or oil/natural gas company must allocate funds to repair pipeline. 	
2. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Pipeline destruction causes massive oil spill. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Physical Environment ○ Social 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Pipeline destruction causes pollution as it seeps through the ground to contaminate ground water that feeds water wells. ➤ Environmentalist groups protest against the damage caused by the oil spill. 	
3. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Lack of oil exports reduces the ability of the country to purchase imports from other countries. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Social ○ Political 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ People begin to lack basic necessities including food that lead to protests against the government. ➤ Citizens begin to lose faith in the current government and call for new leadership during protests. 	
4. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Government resources stretched as they attempt to repair pipeline and remediate damage caused by oil spill. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Information ○ Economic ○ Military 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Government uses all communication means available to emphasize their control; reduce fear from possible future terrorist attacks; and the government is doing all they can to mitigate the incident. ➤ Black market increases as people must find food to feed their families. ➤ Government increases their security of their hydrocarbon pipelines. 	
Possible Related MTEL Tasks	Conduct Command and Control (ART 5.0) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Execute the Operations Process (ART 5.1) ○ Integrate Information Engagement Capabilities (ART 5.3.1) 		
	Conduct Offensive Operations (ART 7.1) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Air Assault (ART 1.2.1.1.2) 		
	Conduct Security Operations (ART 6.7.3) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Area Security Operations (ART 6.5.3) 		
	Conduct Stability Operations (ART 7.3) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Provide Essential Civil Service (Immediate Response (ART 7.3.3.1)) ➤ Coordinate Public Order and Safety (Immediate Response) (ART 7.3.2.1) 		
	Conduct Civil Affairs Operations (ART 5.4.6) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA) (ART 7.6.2.5) ➤ Conduct Civil Information Management (CIM) (ART 5.4.6) 		
	Develop Theater Petroleum and Water Infrastructure (ART 4.1.7.2.6) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Coordinate Construction and Engineer Support (ART 4.1.7.3) 		

Event	Pirate Radio Broadcasting Anti-US Messages		
1. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Messages provide anti-US forces with actionable intelligence. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Military ○ Military 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ US Forces must increase FP posture. ➤ US Forces plans require modification or cancellation. 	
2. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Messages mobilize nascent anti-US sentiment. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Information ○ Information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Host nations shift away from US Forces. ➤ Government crackdown on illegal broadcasters increases pirate broadcasters credibility. 	
3. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Messages provide anti-US forces with command and control. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Military ○ Social 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Government unable to quell riots quickly; loses legitimacy. ➤ Social unrest increases, government facilities are targeted with VBIEDs. Rumors of assassination attempts on key leaders are widespread. 	
Possible Related MTEL Tasks	<p>Perform Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ART 2.3)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Perform ISR Synchronization (ART 2.3.1) ○ Perform ISR Integration (ART 2.3.2) ○ Conduct Surveillance (ART 2.3.4) 		
	<p>Conduct Stability Operations (Initial Support) (ART 7.3)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Support Host Nation Telecommunications Infrastructure Reconstruction Programs (ART 7.3.5.4) 		
	<p>Integrate Information Superiority Contributors (ART 5.3)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Manage Tactical Information and Data (ART 5.3.4) ➤ Conduct Electromagnetic Spectrum Management Operations (ART 5.3.6) ➤ Provide Visual Information Support (ART 5.3.1.3) 		

Event	Port Attacked		
1. Related Activity	➤ Ethnic insurgent group with local support has attacked port facilities.		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Economic ○ Political 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ All shipping operations halt. ➤ Government authorities challenged by insurgent group, tensions increase. Assassination attempts likely. 	
2. Related Activity	➤ Civilian population flees attacks.		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Social ○ Time 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ New IDP group is created with basic unmet needs. ➤ Government unable to quickly recover from the outage. Criminal and insurgent elements begin to work in concert, claiming they will soon be able to supply food, water and shelter to the population. 	
3. Related Activity	➤ NGOs request access to area to help population. Host nation requests support from U.S. forces.		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Social ○ Economic 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Government unable to quell riots quickly; loses legitimacy. ➤ Criminal elements prey upon NGOs, take their supplies to resell to population. 	
4. Related Activity	○ Traps left for first responders.		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Time ○ Political ○ Information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Slows or stops rescue and recovery efforts. ➤ Government legitimacy questioned when cannot quickly respond to rescue and recovery needs. ➤ Groups benefiting from the unrest execute a well-developed perception management campaign highlighting the "atrocities" occurring in the IDP camps. 	
Possible Related MELT Tasks	<p>Conduct Command and Control (ART 5.0)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Execute the Operations Process (ART 5.1) ○ Integrate Information Engagement Capabilities (ART 5.3.1) <p>Conduct Civil Affairs Operations (ART 5.4.6)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA) (ART 7.6.2.5) <p>Conduct Security Operations (ART 6.7.3)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Area Security Operations (ART 6.5.3) <p>Conduct Stability Operations (ART 7.3)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Provide Essential Civil Service (Immediate Response) (ART 7.3.3.1) ➤ Coordinate Public Order and Safety (Immediate Response) (ART 7.3.2.1) 		

Event	Country Leadership Assassinated		
1. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Political leader(s) of US-friendly country assassinated. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Rival political parties vie for control in disorderly fashion. ➤ Number of leadership layers lost determines size of political vacuum. ➤ Insurgent groups declare similar fate for non-aligned leadership. 	
2. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ National law enforcement reaction. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Military ○ Social 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Military forces loyal to both the old regime may put US operations on hold. ➤ Many people will support either new or old leaders, but many others will blame US presence as the root cause of the problems. 	
3. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Insurgent groups capitalize on chaos to attack US presence. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Military ○ Information ○ Economy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ As local security forces are re-missioned to deal with insurgency, US LOC's are left unsecured. ➤ Insurgency blames US presence for violence and indirectly for assassinations. ➤ Steep drop in local markets and EU/NATO engagement put on hold. 	
Possible Related METL Tasks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Conduct Command and Control (ART 5.0) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Execute the Operations Process (ART 5.1) ○ Integrate Information Engagement Capabilities (ART 5.3.1) Conduct Information Protection (ART 6.3) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Perform Information Assurance (ART 6.3.1) ➤ Perform Computer Network Defense (ART 6.3.2) Conduct Critical Installations and Facilities Security (ART 6.5.2) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Critical Installations and Facilities Security (ART 6.5.2) Conduct Civil Affairs Operations (ART 5.4.6) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Support Civil Administration (SCA) (ART 5.4.6) 		

Event	Rape Used as a Weapon		
1. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Rape is used by militia as a weapon. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Social ○ Political & Social ○ Military 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ The population fears that rape is becoming a norm and asks the government to deal with the situation. ➤ The government is criticized as more reports of rape are published and more women are coming forward. ➤ Some military forces have also been accused of using rape. 	
2. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Numerous NGOs offer their assistance and pledge aid to clinics working with rape victims. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Social ○ Social ○ Social & Economic 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ NGOS set up camps and clinics throughout the country and bring in more doctors. ➤ Women that come forward for treatment are excluded from their community and lose everything they have. ➤ Those who have been raped and not able to marry or abandoned by their husbands will become socially and economically vulnerable. 	
3. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Attacks still occurring in most villages. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Social & Political ○ Infrastructure 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Villages not in support of militias are being attacked daily, and women are the primary targets. ➤ Many villages are being destroyed and the government will have to provide shelters for IDPs. 	
Possible Related METL Tasks	<p>Conduct Command and Control (ART 5.0)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Execute the Operations Process (ART 5.1) ○ Integrate Information Engagement Capabilities (ART 5.3.1) <p>Conduct Civil Affairs Operations (ART 5.4.6)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Support Civil Administration (SCA) (ART 5.4.6) <p>Conduct Stability Operations (ART 7.3)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Provide Essential Civil Service (Immediate Response) (ART 7.3.3.1) ➤ Coordinate Public Order and Safety (Immediate Response) (ART 7.3.2.1) <p>Conduct Security Operations (ART 6.7.3)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Area Security Operations (ART 6.5.3) 		

Event	Territory Declares Itself Independent of the Central Government		
1. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ A part of a country declares itself independent from the internationally recognized legitimate government. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Military 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ The breakaway republic will attempt to use their ethnic or other connections to a more powerful ally to keep the legitimate government from using military force to regain control of the area. ➤ If political means fails, the legitimate government will seek to bring the breakaway republic back under control by military force. 	
2. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ The leaders of the breakaway movement conduct ethnic cleansing of their region. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Social/Political ○ Information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ The attacked ethnic group will appeal to the legitimate government for protection. ➤ Both sides will craft Information Operations (IO) messages to appeal to foreign audiences. 	
3. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conflict causes property damage. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Infrastructure ○ Economic 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ If the split becomes an actual war, extensive property damage will occur. ➤ The economic situation may improve or regress dependent on the importance of the breakaway region to the rest of the country or the breakaway republic's relationship with foreign countries. 	
4. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Combat generates IDPs/refugees. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Information ○ Social 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Rumors about the invaders success cause panic in the civilian population and these only increase the IDPs and some people to become refugees in neighboring countries. ➤ Many people will not care what side wins the Civil War just as long as the conflict ends and they can return to a "normal" life. 	
Possible Related MELT Tasks	<p>Conduct Command and Control (ART 5.0)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Execute the Operations Process (ART 5.1) ○ Integrate Information Engagement Capabilities (ART 5.3.1) <p>Conduct Offensive Operations (ART 7.1)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct a Movement to Contact (ART 7.1.1) ➤ Conduct an Attack (ART 7.1.2) ➤ Conduct a Pursuit (ART 7.1.4) ➤ Conduct Air Assault (ART 1.2.1.1.2) ➤ Conduct Forcible Entry Operations (ART 1.2.1.1) <p>Conduct Defensive Operations (ART 7.2)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct an Area Defense (ART 7.2.2) <p>Conduct Internment and Resettlement (I/R) Operations (ART 4.4)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct US Military Prisoner Corrections (ART 5.5.1.2.4) ➤ Conduct Detainee Internment (ART 4.4.1) ➤ Conduct Dislocated Civilian Resettlement (ART 4.4.3) 		

Event	Religious Shrines Targeted		
1. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Suicide bomber attacks shrine on holy day. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Economic ○ Political ○ Military 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ High intergroup conflict. Civil unrest is significant. ➤ Government authorities challenged by insurgent group, tensions increase. Assassination attempts likely. ➤ Security provided for engineer repair teams. 	
2. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Hospitals overwhelmed. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Infrastructure ○ Military ○ Time 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Ambulances and civilian transportation clog streets around hospitals. Local police struggle to control traffic. ➤ Government unable to quickly react. Other regional governments apply to have citizens and bodies returned. 	
3. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Military US assistance is requested. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Military ○ Social 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Military brings medical assistance to local hospitals and sets up mobile hospital in area. ➤ Local and International governments must work with military to identify those killed and wounded. 	
4. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Stranded travelers aggravate over-stressed basic services. Lack of access to water and food increases tension and previously quiet groups begin to demand assistance from the government. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Social ○ Economic ○ Information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ IDP/refugees lack water/food-riots increase. ➤ Groups benefiting from the unrest execute a well-developed perception management campaign highlighting the "atrocities" that occurred during pilgrimage. 	
Possible Related METL Tasks	<p>Conduct Command and Control (ART 5.0)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Execute the Operations Process (ART 5.1) ○ Integrate Information Engagement Capabilities (ART 5.3.1) <p>Provide Health Service Support (ART 4.3.1)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Provide Combat Casualty Care (ART 4.3.1) ➤ Provide Medical Evacuation (Air and Ground) (ART 4.3.2) ➤ Provide Medical Logistics (ART 4.3.4) <p>Conduct Security Operations (ART 6.7.3)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Area Security Operations (ART 6.5.3) <p>Conduct Stability Operations (ART 7.3)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Provide Essential Civil Service (Immediate Response) (ART 7.3.3.1) ➤ Coordinate Public Order and Safety (Immediate Response) (ART 7.3.2.1) 		

Event	People Riot Against the Government Due to Rigged Elections		
1. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Due to the perception of rigged elections, the people begin to riot in the large cities. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Government will decide on their response to the situation, but will try to maintain control in the interim. ➤ Government will use all controlled media to message that the current regime won their elections legitimately. 	
2. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Government sends in police and soldiers to stop the protests. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Social ○ Military 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ If the police/soldiers handle the protesters too harshly, more people will feel sympathetic and government support will drop. ➤ Local military may augment the police to quell the violent protests. 	
3. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ The riots may damage businesses, houses, and other infrastructure. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Economic ○ Infrastructure ○ Physical Environment 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ If riots become too violent and spills over to the destruction of businesses, the riots may negatively affect the economy. ➤ The government or private citizens will need to spend resources to repair the damage caused by the riots. ➤ Violent riots may cause environmental damage that the government will need to address. 	
4. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The riots may lead to a change in government. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Political 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ In some countries, the riots may cause the resignation of the current government or new elections. ➤ The government's response to the disaster may play a major role in whether the current regime stays in power. 	
Possible Related MELT Tasks	<p>Conduct Command and Control (ART 5.0)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Execute the Operations Process (ART 5.1) ○ Integrate Information Engagement Capabilities (ART 5.3.1) <p>Conduct Law and Order Operations (ART 5.5.1.2.1)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Restore Order (ART 7.3.2.1) ➤ Perform law Enforcement (ART 5.5.1.2.2) ➤ Conduct HN Police Training and Support (ART ART 7.3.2.3) <p>Conduct Police Intelligence Operations (ART 2.2.5)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Collect Police Intelligence (ART 2.2.5.1) ➤ Analyze Police Information (ART 2.2.5.2) ➤ Disseminate Police Information and Intelligence Products (ART 2.2.5.3) <p>Counter the Threat (ART 6.11.3)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Counterintelligence Operations (ART 6.11.3.1) ➤ Perform Counterintelligence (ART 6.11.3.3) 		

Event	Run on the Banks							
1. Related Activity	➤ Local nationals form lines at banks to withdraw their money.							
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Information ○ Economic 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Groups benefiting from unrest execute a well-developed perception management campaign highlighting the uncertainty of the country's banking system. ➤ Markets close in response to panic. 						
2. Related Activity	➤ Long lines form into mobs.							
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Infrastructure ○ Time/Social 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Road systems in towns are clogged with people. ➤ As time passes, social unrest increases and mobs start getting angry. 						
3. Related Activity	➤ Large mobs targeted by suicide bombers.							
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Infrastructure 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Government unable to quell mobs quickly; loses legitimacy. ➤ Hospitals become over crowded with injuries from mobs and suicide bomber attacks. 						
Possible Related MTEL Tasks	Conduct Command and Control (ART 5.0)							
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Execute the Operations Process (ART 5.1) ○ Integrate Information Engagement Capabilities (ART 5.3.1) 							
	Conduct Civil Affairs Operations (ART 5.4.6)							
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Support Civil Administration (SCA) (ART 5.4.6) ➤ Conduct Civil Information Management (CIM) (ART 5.4.6) ➤ Conduct Nation Assistance (NA) (ART 5.4.6) 							
Provide Health Service Support (ART 4.3)								
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Provide Combat Casualty Care (ART 4.3.1) ➤ Provide Medical Evacuation (Air and Ground) (ART 4.3.2) 								
Conduct Stability Operations (ART 7.3)								
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Restore Order (ART 7.3.2.1) ➤ Provide Essential Civil Service (Immediate Response) (ART 7.3.3.1) ➤ Coordinate Public Order and Safety (Immediate Response) (ART 7.3.2.1) 								

Event	Meetings Between US and Opposition Forces		
1. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Secret meetings between US forces and opposition leaders. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Political 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Distrust between the current government and the opposition continue as presidential elections are approaching. ➤ Tensions rising in the opposition because all leaders were not invited. 	
2. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Government cancels upcoming important meeting with US representatives regarding peace process. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Political 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Government believes US forces and opposition are working together to overthrow the current regime. ➤ The revelation will likely sever the already fragile diplomatic relations between the US and the government. 	
3. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The opposition has been receiving large amount of money after the secret meetings. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Social 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ The population is outraged that the US provides money to the opposition instead of using it to help the country by building more public services. 	
Possible Related MTEL Tasks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Conduct Command and Control (ART 5.0) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Execute the Operations Process (ART 5.1) ○ Integrate Information Engagement Capabilities (ART 5.3.1) Conduct Offensive Operations (ART 7.1) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct an Attack (ART 7.1.2) ➤ Conduct Air Assault (ART 1.2.1.1.2) Conduct Security Operations (ART 6.7.3) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Security Operations (ART 6.7.3) ➤ Conduct Area Security Operations (ART 6.5.3) Conduct Stability Operations (ART 7.3) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Provide Essential Civil Service (Immediate Response) (ART 7.3.3.1) ➤ Coordinate Public Order and Safety (Immediate Response) (ART 7.3.2.1) 		

Event	Severe Floods		
1. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Rain and/or snow melt causes severe floods that devastate an area. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Social ○ Infrastructure 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Government will respond to the situation and decide whether to request foreign aid. ➤ Citizens will want their government to take care of their immediate needs and to rebuild their homes. ➤ Damaged infrastructure will need replacement. Cleanup remains necessary for even buildings that the government does not decide to rebuild to avoid the outbreak of disease. 	
2. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Local military and/or NGOs will respond with assistance. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Social ○ Military 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Victims will require minimum standard of living in regards to food, water, and shelter. ➤ Military will provide rescue teams, medical assistance, temporary shelter, and food/water to victims. 	
3. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Economy will suffer due to the earthquake's effects. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Economy ○ Information & Infrastructure 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ The economy will not return to a resemblance of normalcy until the people can obtain permanent housing and businesses reopen. ➤ Most rural areas rely upon cell phones, the people will not possess a means of communication outside the local area. 	
4. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Earthquake may overextend the government's limited financial resources. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Information ○ Political 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ For some countries, the governments will craft a message that will play to foreign audiences to attract both governmental and individual financial aid to recover from the floods. ➤ The government's response to the disaster may play a major role in whether the current regime stays in power. 	
Possible Related MELT Tasks	Conduct Civil Affairs Operations (ART 5.4.6) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Populace and Resource Control (PRC) (ART 7.3.3.4) ➤ Conduct Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA) (ART 7.6.2.5) ○ Conduct Civil Information Management (CIM) (ART 5.4.6) 		
	Provide Potable Water in the JOA (ART 4.1.3.11) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Produce Potable Water (ART 4.1.3.11.1) ➤ Distribute Potable Water (ART 4.1.3.11) 		
	Provide Health Service Support (ART 4.3.1) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Provide Combat Casualty Care (ART 4.3.1) ➤ Provide Medical Evacuation (Air and Ground) (ART 4.3.2) ➤ Provide Medical Logistics (ART 4.3.4) 		
	Conduct Civil Support Operations (ART 7.4) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Provide Disaster Relief (ART 7.4.1.1) ➤ Provide Humanitarian Relief (ART 7.4.1.2) 		

Event	Rogue Element Detonates a Suitcase Nuclear Weapon		
1. Related Activity	➤ Country, individual, or group obtains & detonates a nuclear weapon against US or Coalition Forces.		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Military 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ US/Coalition must decide whether to retaliate with their own nuclear weapon if the attacker can be determined. ➤ US/Coalition must decide whether to replace and/or escalate the number of Soldiers deployed to the area. 	
2. Related Activity	➤ Nuclear blast destroys country's infrastructure.		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Infrastructure ○ Physical Environment 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ US/Coalition must decide whether to clean up the nuclear damage or just declare the nuclear zone off-limits. ➤ Fallout from the nuclear blast could make areas inhabitable to live or to use for agricultural pursuits. 	
3. Related Activity	➤ Nuclear blast destroys hydrocarbon pipelines and/or drilling platforms.		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Economic ○ Social/Economic 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Attacked country will not be able to export hydrocarbon products. This could bankrupt the country, cause massive unemployment, and internationally raise the price of crude oil and/or natural gas. ➤ The unemployed citizens may conduct protests demanding better care of the nuclear blast victims and/or to assist those displaced. 	
4. Related Activity	○ The country where the nuclear blast takes place may not possess the financial means or technology to mitigate the disaster.		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Military 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Attacked country may request foreign government aid to assist in the clean up and to support the people displaced by the nuclear attack. ➤ The US military may be the only organization capable of operating in the nuclear areas to assist those injured by the nuclear blast. 	
Possible Related MTEL Tasks	<p>Counter CBRNE Weapons and Threats in the Operational Area (OP 7)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct CBRN Operations (ART 6.9) ➤ Provide EOD Protection Support (ART 6.12) <p>Conduct CBRN Operations (ART 6.9)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct WMD Interdiction Operations (ART 6.9.6) ➤ Conduct WMD Elimination Operations (ART 6.9.7) ➤ Conduct CBRN Consequence Management (ART 6.9.5) <p>Provide Health Service Support (ART 4.3)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Provide Combat Casualty Care (ART 4.3.1) ➤ Provide Medical Evacuation (Air and Ground) (ART 4.3.2) <p>Conduct Civil Support Operations (ART 7.4)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Provide Disaster Relief (ART 7.4.1.1) ➤ Provide Humanitarian Relief (ART 7.4.1.2) <p>Conduct Civil Affairs Operations (ART 5.4.6)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Populace and Resource Control (PRC) (ART 7.3.3.4) ➤ Conduct Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA) (ART 7.6.2.5) ➤ Conduct National Assistance (NA) (ART 5.4.6) 		

Event	School Teachers and University Professors Targeted		
1. Related Activity	➤ Kidnapping and assassination of university professors in city.		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Social ○ Political ○ Information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Parents afraid to send children to school. Many teachers and professors do not report to work. ➤ Government unable to protect its citizens- loses legitimacy. ➤ Insurgents execute a well-developed perception management campaign focused on “foreign influence” coming through schools 	
2. Related Activity	➤ Heavy security placed around schools and universities.		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Social ○ Time 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Criminal elements offer their protection services to parents and teachers, challenge faith in government. ➤ The longer children stay away from schools, the more schools shut permanently. 	
3. Related Activity	➤ Abandoned schools looted, books burned.		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Social ○ Economic 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Government unable to quell looting quickly; loses legitimacy. ➤ Social unrest increases. ➤ School and university employees now unemployed, appeal to government for aid. 	
Possible Related MELT Tasks	<p>Conduct Command and Control (ART 5.0)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Execute the Operations Process (ART 5.1) ○ Integrate Information Engagement Capabilities (ART 5.3.1) <p>Conduct Law and Order Operations (ART 5.5.1.2.1)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Restore Order (ART 7.3.2.1) ➤ Perform Law Enforcement (ART 5.5.1.2.2) <p>Conduct Security Operations (ART 6.7.3)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Area Security Operations (ART 6.5.3) <p>Conduct Stability Operations (ART 7.3)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Provide Essential Civil Service (Immediate Response) (ART 7.3.3.1) ➤ Coordinate Public Order and Safety (Immediate Response) (ART 7.3.2.1) 		

Event	Train Carrying Food to City from Rural Area Is Hijacked		
1. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Train is damaged by shooting from hijackers. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Economic ○ Political ○ Military 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Damage to train will cost significant money to repair, and will result in down time until the repairs can be made. ➤ Government authorities challenged by hijackers, tensions increase. ➤ The military sends in troops to secure the area, but the hijackers have already stolen significant amounts of food. 	
2. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Farmers are not paid for the food they shipped to the city. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Economic ○ Social 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Farmers aren't paid for the shipments that didn't arrive. This is a significant blow for the farmers and their families. ➤ Farmers are hesitant to trust the system and send off their next shipment of food. 	
3. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Local shops do not receive their shipment, causing local citizens to have a lower food supply. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Social ○ Economic 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Local citizens are angered by the low food supply; they are unable to purchase satisfactory amounts of food staples for their families. ➤ Local shops lose money as they are unable to sell the quantity of food they normally would. 	
4. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ People demand safer routes for food transportation from their government. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ All three groups –farmers, shop owners, and local citizens—turn to the government to provide better security for transport routes. ➤ The government must develop a plan and disseminate such information to the people to retain their trust for a safe, economically viable society. 	
Possible Related MELT Tasks	<p>Conduct Command and Control (ART 5.0)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Execute the Operations Process (ART 5.1) ○ Integrate Information Engagement Capabilities (ART 5.3.1) <p>Conduct Defensive Operations (ART 7.2)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct an Area Defense (ART 7.2.2) <p>Conduct Security Operations (ART 6.7.3)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Area Security Operations (ART 6.5.3) <p>Conduct Stability Operations (ART 7.3)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Provide Essential Civil Service (Immediate Response) (ART 7.3.3.1) ➤ Coordinate Public Order and Safety (Immediate Response) (ART 7.3.2.1) 		

Event	Trucks Being Stopped and Robbed Along Major Highway		
1. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Truck drivers appeal to host nation for protection. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Political 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Host nation requests assistance from US military. ➤ Government unable to stop robberies quickly; loses legitimacy. 	
2. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Insurgent and criminal groups offer protection. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Economic ○ Time 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Illegal economic activity increases with a thriving black market. Criminal and gang elements attempt to profit from the situation and begin selling hijacked goods to the population. ➤ Government unable to quickly recover from the stoppage. Criminal and insurgent elements begin to work in concert, claiming they will soon be able to supply goods to the population. 	
3. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Shortages of goods in urban areas, population takes to the street to demand assistance from the government. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Social 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Government unable to quell riots quickly; loses legitimacy. ➤ Social unrest increases, government facilities are targeted with VBIEDs. Rumors of assassination attempts on key leaders are widespread. 	
Possible Related MELT Tasks	<p>Conduct Command and Control (ART 5.0)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Execute the Operations Process (ART 5.1) ○ Integrate Information Engagement Capabilities (ART 5.3.1) <p>Conduct Offensive Operations (ART 7.1)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct an Attack (ART 7.1.2) ➤ Conduct Air Assault (ART 1.2.1.1.2) <p>Conduct Security Operations (ART 6.7.3)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Area Security Operations (ART 6.5.3) ➤ Conduct Convoy Security Operations (ART 6.5.6.1) <p>Conduct Stability Operations (ART 7.3)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Provide Essential Civil Service (Immediate Response) (ART 7.3.3.1) ➤ Coordinate Public Order and Safety (Immediate Response) (ART 7.3.2.1) 		

Event	US Tourists and Journalists Seized by Insurgents		
1. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Insurgent group kidnaps cable TV crew and archaeologists in the vicinity of Mt. Ararat. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Social ○ Political ○ Military 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ High sympathy for local insurgent group. ➤ High visibility of event spurs regional national leaders to call for resolution. ➤ Due to location, four separate militaries are alerted. 	
2. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ US Military put on standby for rescue mission if diplomatic means fail. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Military ○ Time 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Hostages are citizens of over a dozen countries, all wanting a role in any rescue attempt. ➤ HN Government unable to quickly react. The longer they take, the more complex a rescue becomes. 	
3. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Religious leaders rally supporters under the theory of suppression of archaeological discoveries. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political, Social ○ Information, Time 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ State churches begin exercising their influence over political leaders. ➤ Initially a military situation, time will cause transformation to a political, then religious, and ultimately an ethnic conflict. 	
Possible Related MTEL Tasks	<p>Conduct Command and Control (ART 5.0)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Execute the Operations Process (ART 5.1) ○ Integrate Information Engagement Capabilities (ART 5.3.1) <p>Conduct Tactical Mission (ART 7.5)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Secure a Unit, Facility or Location (ART 7.5.24) ➤ Follow and Support the Actions of a Friendly Force (ART 7.5.17) <p>Operational Theme (ART 7.6)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Perform Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (7.6.2.1) <p>Conduct Offensive Operations (ART 7.1)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Forcible Entry Operations (ART 1.2.1.1) 		

Event	Unknown UAV/Aircraft Overflies US Position				
1. Related Activity	➤ Overflight provides Threat forces with targeting data.				
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Military ○ Political 	➤ American D&D efforts are negated.	➤ Host nation demands American efforts against "aggression."		
2. Related Activity	➤ Overflight provides Threat and adversary nations with propaganda victory.				
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Information ○ Information 	➤ Non-affiliated media entities play up US incompetence.	➤ Local anti-US elements will use event to show why host nation should split from US.		
3. Related Activity	➤ Overflight tests response of US Forces.				
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Social 	➤ Host Government request more robust US response.	➤ Fear of US Forces declines as US military is viewed as a paper tiger.		
4. Related Activity	➤ Overflight forces redeployment of host nation ADA assets.				
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Military 	➤ US forces responsible for strategic ADA.			
Possible Related METL Tasks	Conduct Command and Control (ART 5.0) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Execute the Operations Process (ART 5.1) ○ Integrate Information Engagement Capabilities (ART 5.3.1) 				
	Employ Air and Missile Defense (ART 6.1) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Plan Ballistic Missile Defense (ART 6.1.5) ➤ Conduct Ballistic Missile Defense (ART 6.1.6) ➤ Process/Destory Aerial Tactical Platforms (ART 6.1.1/2) ➤ Conduct Rocket, Artillery and Mortar Defense (ART 6.1.9) 				
	Conduct Command and Control (ART 5.0) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Execute the Operations Process (ART 5.1) ➤ Integrate Information Engagement Capabilities (ART 5.3.1) 				
	Conduct Defensive Operations (ART 7.2) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct an Area Defense (ART 7.2.2) 				

Event	US Forces Conduct a Local Election Via UN Mandate		
1. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ US Forces are required to design and build electoral process. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ US Forces must create local political constitution and process. ➤ US Forces must publicize and defend election as free and fair. 	
2. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ US Forces defend and monitor polling places. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Military ○ Military 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Commander must support host nation forces. ➤ US Forces dispersed to operate. 	
3. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ US Forces install newly elected leader. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Social 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ US Forces protect and advise leadership. ➤ US forces present positive face of political change. 	
Possible Related MTEL Tasks	<p>Conduct Command and Control (ART 5.0)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Execute the Operations Process (ART 5.1) ○ Integrate Information Engagement Capabilities (ART 5.3.1) 		
	<p>Conduct Stability Operations (ART 7.3)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Provide Essential Civil Services (Immediate Response) (ART 7.3.3.1) ➤ Coordinate Public Order and Safety (Immediate Response) (ART 7.3.2.1) 		
	<p>Conduct Security Operations (ART 6.7.3)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Security Operations (ART 6.7.3) ➤ Conduct Area Security Operations (ART 6.5.3) 		
	<p>Plan Civil Affairs Operations (CAO) / Civil-Military Operations (CMO) (ART 5.4.8)</p>		

Event	US Forces Conduct Police Training Operations		
1. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Border police duties bring US Forces into direct contact with criminal elements. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ US Forces blamed deaths in custody. ➤ US Operations are purported to engage in criminal activities along with corrupt local police. 	
2. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ US Forces are required to engage in training operations. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Military ○ Military 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Commander must support host nation forces. ➤ US Forces must be supported by host nation forces due to revised SOFA. 	
3. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Deconfliction and monitoring of US Forces limits mobility and reaction time. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Military ○ Information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ US Forces unable to proactively patrol and operate. ➤ Threat forces capable of predicting US movement. 	
Possible Related MELT Tasks	<p>Conduct Criminal Investigations (ART 5.5.1.2.3)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Manage General, Drug, and Economic Crimes Investigations (ART 5.5.1.2.3) ○ Manage Special Investigative Support Functions (ART 5.5.1.2.3) <p>Coordinate Law and Order Operations (ART 5.5.1.2.1)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Integrate Law Enforcement (ART 5.5.1.2.2) ➤ Integrate Civil Control (ART 7.3.2) <p>Conduct Internment and Resettlement (I/R) Operations (ART 4.4)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Detainee Internment (ART 4.4.1) ➤ Conduct Dislocated Civilian Resettlement (ART 4.4.3) ➤ Conduct U.S. Military Prisoner Corrections (ART 5.5.1.2.4) ➤ Conduct Police Intelligence (ART 2.2.5) <p>Conduct Stability Operations (ART 7.3)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Provide Essential Civil Services (Immediate Response) (ART 7.3.3.1) ➤ Coordinate Public Order and Safety (Immediate Response) (ART 7.3.2.1) 		

Event	US Forces Discover Abandoned Cesium137 and Cobalt60 Along MSR		
1. Related Activity	➤ MSR blocked to movement.		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Locals blame US for evacuating them. ➤ Enemy perception management operations are effective in portraying American “nuclear weapons” to local population. 	
2. Related Activity	➤ US Forces are required to remediate damage.		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Military ○ Economic 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Commander must support host nation forces in CBRNE due to lack of host nation CBRNE capability. ➤ US Forces are requested to fix “economic damage” to local villages. 	
3. Related Activity	➤ Local villagers panic and leave area.		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Military ○ Information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ US Forces required to control movement and stop looting. ➤ Threat forces blame US for “ethnic cleansing.” 	
Possible Related METL Tasks	<p>Conduct Mobility Operations (ART 1.0)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Conduct Combat Engineering Support to Assure Mobility (ART 1.6) ○ Conduct General Engineering Support to Assure Mobility (ART 1.6.2) ○ Conduct Geospatial Engineering Support to Assure Mobility (ART 2.2.1.5) <p>Counter CBRNE Weapons and Threats in the Operational Area (OP 7)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct CBRN Operations (ART 6.9) ➤ Provide EOD Protection Support (ART 6.12) <p>Conduct Internment and Resettlement (I/R) Operations (ART 4.4)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Detainee Internment (ART 4.4.1) ➤ Conduct Dislocated Civilian Resettlement (ART 4.4.3) 		

Event	US Forces Engage and Detain Third Country SOF		
1. Related Activity	➤ Host nation will attempt to gain control of detainees.		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Military 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ US Forces maintain control of detainees with creating an international incident. ➤ US Forces plans require modification or cancellation. 	
2. Related Activity	➤ HUMINT exploitation of detainees reveals attack planning.		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Information ○ Military 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Possibility of enemy Deception operation. ➤ Military planning and force deployment schedules and locations affected. 	
3. Related Activity	➤ Detainees reveal third state control of local opposition forces.		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Social 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Government unwilling to crack down on opposition. ➤ Social unrest increases as local opposition forces create chaos. 	
Possible Related MTEL Tasks	<p>Manage Protective Services (ART 6.5.4)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Personal Security Vulnerability Assessments (ART 6.5.4) ➤ Provide High-risk Personnel Protection (ART 6.5.4) <p>Conduct Area and Base Security Operations (ART 6.5.1)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Critical Installations and Facilities Security (ART6.5.2) <p>Conduct Security Operations (ART 6.7.3)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Security Operations (ART 6.7.3) ➤ Conduct Area Security Operations (ART 6.5.3) <p>Counter the Threat (ART 6.11.3)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Counterintelligence Operations (ART 6.11.3.1) ➤ Perform Counterintelligence (ART 6.11.3.3) 		

Event	US Forces Face Advanced Anti-Armor Capabilities		
1. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Advanced anti-armor capabilities defeat US Armor. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Military ○ Military 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ US Forces must plan on avoiding or destroying unanticipated anti-armor capability. ➤ US Forces available are restricted. 	
2. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Advanced anti-armor capabilities force partner nations to pull of US operations or restrict their participation to “safer” operations. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Military 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Commander must manage public fallout. ➤ Military planning and force deployment schedules and locations affected. 	
3. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Detainees reveal third state control of local opposition forces. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Social 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Host Government unwilling to acknowledge foreign troop presence. ➤ US losses encourage anti US sentiment. 	
Possible Related MTEL Tasks	<p>Conduct Defensive Operations (ART 7.2)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Conduct an Area Defense (ART 7.2.2) 		
	<p>Support to Situational Understanding (ART 2.2)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Perform Situation Development (ART 2.2.2) ➤ Provide Tactical Intelligence Overwatch (ART 2.2.4) 		
	<p>Provide Support to Targeting & Info Superiority (ART 2.4)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Provide Intelligence to Targeting (ART 2.4.1) ➤ Provides Intelligence Support to Army Info Ops (ART 2.4.2) ➤ Provide Intel Support to Combat Assessment (ART 2.4.3) ➤ Support Sensitive Site Exploitation (ART 2.3.5.3) ➤ Conduct Technical Intelligence on UXO, IED, CBRNE (ART 6.12.6.5) 		

Event	US Forces Face Influenza Outbreak		
1. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Outbreak causes US forces to break contact with civilian populations. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ US Forces blamed. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Enemy perception management operations are effective in portraying American "crimes" through immediate release of "evidence."
2. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ US Forces face limitations on host nation support. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Military ○ Military 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Commander must support host nation forces. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ US Forces must be supported by host nation forces due to revises SOFA.
3. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ US Forces asked to assist local health authorities. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Military ○ Information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ US Forces unable to proactively patrol and operate. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Threat forces capable to predicting US movement.
Possible Related MELT Tasks	<p>Provide Health Service Support (ART 4.3)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Provide Combat Casualty Care (ART 4.3.1) ○ Provide Medical Evacuation (Air and Ground) (ART 4.3.2) ○ Provide Medical Regulating Support (ART 4.3.3) ○ Provide Medical Logistics (ART 4.3.4) 		
	<p>Provide Force Health Protection (ART 6.8)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Provide Preventive Medicine Support (ART 6.8.1) ➤ Provide Veterinary Services (ART 6.8.2) ➤ Provide Combat and Operational Stress Control (ART 6.8.3) ➤ Provide Preventive Dentistry Support (ART 6.8.4) ➤ Provide Area Medical Laboratory Services (ART 6.8.5) 		
	<p>Conduct Civil Support Operations (ART 7.4)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Provide Disaster Relief (ART 7.4.1.1) ➤ Provide Humanitarian Relief (ART 7.4.1.2) 		

Event	US Forces Mistakenly Engage Civilian Airliner		
1. Related Activity	➤ Threat nation civilian casualties are widely publicized.		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ US Forces directed to lessen aggressive posture. ➤ US Forces targeted by widespread INFOWAR perception management operations. 	
2. Related Activity	➤ US Forces are required to adopt a lessened protective posture.		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Military ○ Military 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Commander must manage protective posture. ➤ Military planning and force deployment schedules and locations affected. 	
3. Related Activity	➤ Threat forces use civilian aircraft as ISR assets.		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Information ○ Information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ US Forces unable to stop collection. ➤ US Force must adopt denial and deception techniques. 	
Possible Related METL Tasks	<p>Employ Air and Missile Defense (ART 6.1)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Plan Ballistic Missile Defense (ART 6.1.5) ○ Conduct Ballistic Missile Defense (ART 6.1.6) ○ Process/Destroy Aerial Tactical Platforms (ART 6.1.1/2) ○ Conduct Rocket, Artillery and Mortar Defense (ART 6.1.9) <p>Counter the Threat (ART 6.11.3)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Counterintelligence Operations (ART 6.11.3.1) ➤ Perform Counterintelligence (ART 6.11.3.3) <p>Conduct Area and Base Security Operations (ART 6.5.1)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Critical Installations and Facilities Security (ART6.5.2) <p>Conduct Command and Control (ART 5.0)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Execute the Operations Process (ART 5.1) ➤ Integrate Information Engagement Capabilities (ART 5.3.1) 		

Event	US Soldier Uses Koran For Target Practice		
1. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ US Soldier decides to zero weapon using a Koran or other Muslim holy object. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Information ○ Social 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ US Government through their most senior civilian and military leaders both in country and in the US must mitigate the situation by a public apology. ➤ US IO Officers must mitigate the incident at the tactical level by apologies to local Muslim leaders. ➤ Local people engage in protests outside US and coalition military bases that disrupt military operations. 	
2. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Muslim leaders demand for the ouster of US troops. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Military 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ US civilian and military leaders must coordinate with the host nation's government to ensure that the US military departs on their schedule not one dictated by others. ➤ The incident may cause a temporary increase in the ability for the insurgent forces to recruit soldiers for their cause as they use the incident for their benefit. 	
3. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Insurgent group uses incident in their own IO campaign against the US. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Information ○ Information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ If video exists of the incident, the insurgents will use it in their IO campaign on the internet. ➤ US IO Officers must generate their own IO campaign and also educate all Soldiers coming into the country on the proper manners to deal with the host nation, in regards to not attacking the dominant religion. 	
4. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ US may find the need to depart the country earlier than expected. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Economic 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Protection of the country's hydrocarbon resources remains important, but the US cannot do so if they cannot remain in the country. 	
Possible Related METL Tasks	Conduct Command and Control (ART 5.0) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Execute the Operations Process (ART 5.1) ➤ Integrate Information Engagement Capabilities (ART 5.3.1) 		
	Execute Theater Opening and Reception, Staging and Onward Movement of Forces (ART 1.1.2.2) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Coordinate Deployment/Redeployment Operations (ART 4.1.6) ➤ Conduct Onward Movement Support Operations (ART 1.1.2.2) 		
	Conduct Civil Affairs Operations (ART 7.4) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Nation Assistance (NA) (ART 5.4.6) ➤ Conduct Civil Information Management (CIM) (ART 5.4.6) 		
	Provide Base Camp Sustainment (ART 4.1.4.3) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Provide Contracting Support (ART 4.1.5) ➤ Provide Human Resources Support (ART 4.2.1) 		
	Perform Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ART 2.3) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Perform ISR Synchronization (ART 2.3.1) ➤ Perform Surveillance (ART 2.3.4) 		

Event	US Soldiers Are Killed When a Local Resident Blows Himself Up in a Suicide Attack On Base		
1. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Base commander begin an investigation into the attack and have soldiers go door to door to gather information. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Military 	➤ Investigators looking for what type of material were used to make the bomb and where it came from.	
2. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Negotiations between the main militia group and the US are put to a halt 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political 	➤ The peace process in the region will come to a halt as the US suspects the militia group.	
3. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Base closed to locals. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Economy ○ Social 	➤ The local economy and the locals are affected as many of them conduct business on base.	
➤ Trust between local population and US soldiers is compromised.			
4. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ An insurgent group claim responsibility and vows to do it again. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Military 	➤ Security on base is tightened and only those on patrol/essential mission are allowed outside the wire.	
Possible Related METL Tasks	Conduct Command and Control (ART 5.0) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Execute the Operations Process (ART 5.1) ○ Integrate Information Engagement Capabilities (ART 5.3.1) 		
	Conduct Offensive Operations (ART 7.1) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct an Attack (ART 7.1.2) ➤ Conduct Air Assault (ART 1.2.1.1.2) 		
	Conduct Security Operations (ART 6.7.3) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Area Security Operations (ART 6.5.3) 		
	Conduct Area Security Operations (ART 6.5.1) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Reconnaissance and Surveillance (ART 2.3) ➤ Conduct Area and Critical Asset Security (ART 6.5.2) 		

Event	USAF Fighter Crash Kills Friendly Civilians		
1. Related Activity	➤ Low altitude jet hits powerlines and crashes in urban terrain.		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Information ○ Social 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ US Government through senior civilian and military leaders both in country and in the US attempt to mitigate the situation by a public apology. ➤ Opponents to US presence portray incident as “price” of Western involvement. ➤ Local ethnic group engages in protests outside US and coalition military bases that disrupt the coalition’s military operations. 	
2. Related Activity	➤ Ethnic group leaders demand for the withdrawal of US troops.		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Military ○ Information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ US civilian and military leaders negotiate with the host nation’s government to maintain military freedom of action. ➤ The incident may cause increased recruitment for insurgents. ➤ Captured video of incident or aftermath, and taped testimony of survivors released on internet will increase standing of effected group 	
3. Related Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Host nation accelerates US timeline. 		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Economic 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Host nation government succumbs to internal pressure to move US out of country. ➤ Hydrocarbon workers protesting US presence may affect nation’s economy. 	
Possible Related METL Tasks	Conduct Command and Control (ART 5.0) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Execute the Operations Process (ART 5.1) ➤ Integrate Information Superiority Contributors (ART 5.3) ➤ Integrate Information Engagement Capabilities (ART 5.3.1) 		
	Execute Theater Opening and Reception, Staging and Onward Movement of Forces (ART 1.1.2.2) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Coordinate Deployment/Redeployment Operations (ART 4.1.6) ➤ Conduct Onward Movement Support Operations (ART 1.1.2.2) 		
	Conduct Civil Affairs Operations (ART 7.4) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA) (ART 7.6.2.5) ➤ Conduct Nation Assistance (NA) (ART 5.4.6) ➤ Conduct Civil Information Management (CIM) (ART 5.4.6) 		
	Provide Base Camp Sustainment (ART 4.1.4.3) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Provide Contracting Support (ART 4.1.5) ➤ Provide Human Resources Support (ART 4.2.1) 		

TRADOC G-2

TRISA-THREATS

CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND THREAT INTEGRATION

DIRECTORATE (CTID)

SECTION 4:

ORDER OF BATTLE APPENDICES

Introduction to Section 4: Order of Battle Appendices

Section 4, Order of Battle Appendices, is comprised of three parts. An online version of Appendix A, located at <https://www.us.army.mil/suite/files/26501220>, provides organizational equipment tables of selected units. Appendix B provides instructions on how to task organize OPFOR units for combat. Appendix C consists of the OPFOR equipment tier tables from the Worldwide Equipment Guide (WEG).

Organizations and equipment tables not contained in either the Orders of Battle or Appendix A, or those units lower than brigade level, can be found in FM 7-100.4, *Opposing Force Organization Guide*, Administrative Force Structure, Volumes I through IV. Due to size limitations, the complete OPFOR AFS (over 8,000 pages) cannot be included in the DATE. For easy access to FM 7-100.4, *Opposing Force Organization Guide*, go to: <https://www.us.army.mil/suite/files/19296257>.

Note. All of the OPFOR organizations listed in the AFS organizational directories are constructed using Microsoft Office® software (MS Word®, MS PowerPoint®, and MS Excel®). The use of these commonly available tools should allow trainers and planners to tailor and/or task-organize units individually or collectively to meet specific training and/or simulation requirements.



Appendix A, Organizational Equipment Tables, contains select tables of equipment by type and echelon of organization. Each unit contains a comprehensive detailed listing of organizations, personnel (by officer, NCO, and enlisted), and equipment (by nomenclature) of its subordinate units in an MS Excel® chart. Totals are also provided by parent and subordinate unit. Equipment in FM 7-100.4 is tier 2, however it can be easily modified to represent any tier necessary for training. Detailed information on individual items of equipment can be found in the WEG, Volumes I thru III.

Note: OPFOR equipment is broken into four tiers in order to portray systems for adversaries with varying levels of ability. The tier tables provide a convenient means for military trainers to replicate the OPFOR's equipment capability. Tier 2 (default OPFOR level) reflects modern competitive systems fielded in significant numbers for the last 10 to 20 years. See Appendix C and the WEG Vol 1, Chap 1, and Vol II, Chap 1 for additional information.

Appendix B, Task-Organization for Combat, describes how each of the five countries must task-organize its forces from its AFS into the appropriate war-fighting orders of battle (ground, air, and naval). In order to properly task-organize, senior OPFOR commanders of each country will analyze their own strengths and weaknesses, as well as those of their enemy. They will also consider how best to counter or mitigate what the enemy has (or its capabilities) and/or how to best exploit their own advantage(s).

The mitigation or exploitation may be by means of equipment, tactics, or organization—or more likely all of these. However, the process generally starts with the proper task organization of forces with the proper equipment to facilitate appropriate tactics, techniques, and procedures. OPFOR commanders must consider where the assets required for a particular task organization are located within the AFS and how to get them allocated to the task organization that needs them, when and where it needs them.

The following examples illustrate the conversion of the 301st Separate Motorized Infantry Brigade, 1st Army of Ariana (AFS) into the 301st Separate Motorized Infantry Brigade Tactical Group (BTG) (task-organized for combat). The red in the highlights AFS units in the 301st that are not applicable to impending combat operations and are therefore either removed or replaced in the conversion to the BTG. The yellow in the BTG shows gained organizations/capabilities needed to successfully complete the combat mission.

Admin Force Structure***Task-Organized for Combat***

Detailed information on task-organizing OPFOR units to meet US training requirements and METL can be found in FM 7-100.4, Chapter Two and FM 7-100.4, Appendix B. Also see TC 7-101, *Exercise Design*, for assistance in designing and executing a training exercise and producing an OE that achieves desired unit training objectives while fielding a challenging OPFOR consistent with Hybrid Threat OPFOR doctrine as described in the TC 7-100 series.

Appendix C divides the OPFOR's equipment into four "tiers" in order to portray threat systems for adversaries with varying levels of ability. The tier tables provide a convenient means for military trainers to replicate the OPFOR's equipment capability. The tables also provide the US military's training community with an instrument to create a flexible and challenging technological threat in an ever-changing operational environment.

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APPENDIX A: ORGANIZATIONAL EQUIPMENT TABLES

Appendix A: Organizational Equipment Tables

For detailed examples of OPFOR Organizational equipment, see the tables at
<https://www.us.army.mil/suite/files/26501220>.

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APPENDIX B:

OPFOR TASK-ORGANIZING FOR COMBAT

Appendix B: OPFOR Task-Organizing for Combat

OPFOR TASK-ORGANIZING FOR COMBAT

The concept of task-organizing for combat is not unique to the OPFOR. It is universal, performed at all levels, and has been around as long as combat. The US Army defines a *task organization* as “A temporary grouping of forces designed to accomplish a particular mission” and defines *task-organizing* as “The process of allocating available assets to subordinate commanders and establishing their command and support relationships” (FM 1-02). Task-organizing of the OPFOR must follow OPFOR doctrine (see 7-100 series of FM and TC), reflect requirements for stressing US units’ mission essential task list (METL) in training, and also follow the guidance set forth in TC 7-101 *Exercise Design*.

The process of task-organizing for combat and its role in matching the appropriate OPFOR task organization to the training objectives of the unit to be trained is discussed in Chapter 3 of FM 7-100.4 *OPFOR Organization Guide*. This appendix explains in more detail how trainers and training planners modify an OPFOR organization from the administrative force structure (AFS) listed in the Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE) Order of Battle (OB) and the organizational directories in FM 7-100.4 into an OPFOR task organization for countering the tasks listed in FM 7-15, *Army Universal Task List (AUTL)*. For illustrative purposes, this appendix describes a particular example based on hypothetical tasks and OPFOR countertasks. Then, it provides detailed guidance on how to task-organize OPFOR units from the bottom up.

Note. All of the OPFOR organizations listed in the AFS organizational directories are constructed using Microsoft Office® software (MS Word®, MS PowerPoint®, and MS Excel®). The use of these commonly available tools should allow trainers and planners to tailor and/or task-organize units individually or collectively to meet specific training and/or simulation requirements.

ADMINISTRATIVE FORCE STRUCTURE

As stated earlier in the Introduction to Section 4, Orders of Battle, the countries of Ariana, Atropia, Minaria, Gorgas, and Donovia all have their militaries organized into individual AFS to manage their respective military forces in peacetime. The AFS of each country is the aggregate of various military headquarters, facilities, and installations designed to man, train, equip, and sustain the forces.

In peacetime, forces are commonly grouped into divisions, corps, or armies for administrative purposes. The AFS includes all components of the armed forces—not only regular, standing forces (active component), but also reserve and militia forces (reserve component).

BASELINE EQUIPMENT

The AFS organizational directories provide example equipment types and the numbers of each type typically found in specific organizations. The purpose is to give trainers and training planners a good idea of what an OPFOR structure should look like. Training requirements, however, may dictate some modifications to this equipment baseline. Therefore, training planners have several options by which they can modify equipment holdings to meet particular training requirements. Often this is effected by simply changing an equipment tier from one level to another.

For each organization in the OPFOR AFS, the online organizational directories list “Principal Items of Equipment” in the basic MS Word® document and/or list “Personnel and Items of Equipment” in an MS Excel® chart. This equipment corresponds to tier 2 in the tier tables of the Worldwide

Equipment Guide (WEG). However, some elite units, such as Special-Purpose Forces (SPF), may have tier 1 equipment while insurgents or guerrillas may have tier 3 or 4.

Note: OPFOR equipment is broken into four “tiers” in order to portray systems for adversaries with differing levels of force capabilities for use as representative examples of a rational force developer’s systems mix. Equipment is listed into convenient tier tables for use as a tool for trainers to reflect different levels of modernity. Tier 2 (default OPFOR level) reflects modern competitive systems fielded in significant numbers for the last 10 to 20 years. See WEG Vol 1, Chap 1, and Vol II, Chap 1 for additional information.

TASK-ORGANIZING

Task-organizing is simply the process used to convert peacetime AFS units into their warfighting structure. This appendix describes how each of the five countries must task-organize its forces from its AFS into the appropriate war-fighting orders of battle (ground, air, and naval). In order to properly task-organize, the OPFOR trainers representing each country will analyze their own strengths and weaknesses, as well as those of their enemy. They will also consider how best to counter or mitigate the enemy’s weapons systems (or its capabilities) and/or how to best exploit them to their own advantage. More importantly, however, task-organization ensures the OPFOR meets the training objective. The mitigation or exploitation may be by means of equipment, tactics, or organization—or more likely all of these. However, the process generally starts with the proper task-organization of forces with the proper equipment to facilitate appropriate tactics, techniques, and procedures. The OPFOR trainers must consider where the assets required for a particular task organization are located within the AFS and how to get them allocated to the task organization that needs them, when and where it needs them.

The purpose of task-organizing the OPFOR is to build an OPFOR OB that is appropriate for, and meets all, US training requirements. The OPFOR AFS in Ariana, Atropia, Gorgas, Minaria, and Donovia are **not** the OPFOR OB. However, once these structures are task-organized, the resulting OB will then become the OPFOR’s go-to-war, fighting force structure.

The last part of chapter 3 in FM 7-100.4 delineates the specific process of creating the properly task-organized OPFOR for an exercise. This appendix provides a summary of the nine-step task-organization process as it is discussed in FM 7-100.4.

STEPS 1-3: SELECT TRAINING UNITS AND TASKS

The nine-step task-organization process begins and ends with the senior commander (commander of the unit to be trained). For training purposes the senior commander will identify what units he wants trained in which selected tasks. For example, if the training units consist of a lightly armored force of two brigade-size units, the commander’s primary training objective may be to conduct an assault and sustained combat to destroy an OPFOR brigade defending in complex terrain. His secondary training objective could be to restore and maintain civil order. Once the senior commander has determined what tasks he wants to train, the lead trainer will develop the countertasks for the OPFOR and its task organization based on the nine-step process. The senior commander then reviews the OPFOR task organization and the countertasks to ensure that his requirements have been met.

The US commander (senior trainer) also reviews FM 7-15 AUTL and determines the specific tactical collective tasks on which he wants to train his unit. The specific Army Tactical Tasks (ARTs) selected from the AUTL for the above example are:

- ART 5.1.1 Overcome Barriers/Obstacles/Mines
- ART 8.1.2 Conduct an Attack

- ART 8.1.3 Exploitation
- ART 8.3.1.2 Conduct Peace Enforcement Operations
- ART 8.3.2.3 Conduct Combat Operations in Support of Foreign Internal Defense (Counter Insurgents and Terrorists)
- ART 8.3.7 Combat Terrorism

Thus, the US commander (senior trainer) has completed Steps 1 through 3 of the process outlined at the end of chapter 3 in FM 7-100.4, which define the scope and purpose of the training exercise. Now the training planners know that the enemy of the OPFOR (the training unit) is lightly armored, mobile, and lethal, and consists of at least two or more brigade-level units. The training commander has determined the level and types of units he wants trained and the specific tasks on which he wants them trained. This sets the stage for Steps 4 through 9, which determine the kind of OPFOR needed to produce the desired training. The entire process results in building the appropriate OPFOR OB that must provide appropriate organizations capable of countering (stressing) those tasks selected from the AUTL.

STEP 4: SELECT OPFOR COUNTERTASKS

The mission of the OPFOR is to counter the training unit, with capabilities that challenge the training unit's ability to accomplish its tasks. The OPFOR Tactical Task List in TC 7-101 *Exercise Design*, serves as the primary source for most tasks the OPFOR must perform. Exercise planners reference this list first when conducting countertask analysis. Only if the OPFOR Tactical Task List does not contain an appropriate task is one selected for the OPFOR from the AUTL. In this case, the training unit's mission is to attack and destroy the OPFOR. Therefore, the OPFOR's mission is to prevent the training unit (enemy) from destroying the OPFOR and, if possible, destroy the attacking enemy. The OPFOR could accomplish this by defending with light, mobile forces in complex terrain and perhaps employing guerrilla warfare tactics. In the example, the training commander has also selected a task to restore civil order. One way of countering this task is for the OPFOR to possess an organization capable of providing or instigating civil disorder to stress this training. The commander also wants to train against ART 8.3.7 (Combat Terrorism). One way to counter this task is for the OPFOR to include insurgents using terror tactics.

STEP 5: DETERMINE THE TYPE AND SIZE OF OPFOR UNITS

Next, trainers and planners determine the appropriate type and size of OPFOR units capable of performing the OPFOR countertasks and conducting persistent fights on several levels. For the maneuver fight, defending against two brigade-size US units, the OPFOR needs a brigade-size organization. The optimal OPFOR organization for conducting such a defense in complex terrain would include relatively light, motorized infantry, perhaps some even lighter guerrilla forces, and preferably some mechanized infantry, combined with an antiaarmor capability against lightly armored US forces. Such a mix of forces would entail the use of a brigade tactical group (BTG) task organization. In addition, a local insurgent force can provide the training unit with an opportunity to combat terrorism.

Motorized Infantry Forces

The OPFOR organization determined to best counter (stress) the ARTs mentioned above consists of a BTG based on a motorized infantry brigade, with an antiaarmor capability against lightly armored forces to counter the maneuver fight, and an affiliated local insurgent organization to counter ART 8.3.7, Combat Terrorism. The BTG also can have guerrilla and special-purposes forces subordinate to it.

Guerrilla Forces

The BTG could include a guerrilla battalion to provide a wider training spectrum and a realistic training experience. Guerrilla warfare is one of many threats, but it does not necessarily occur in isolation from other threats. While guerrilla organizations can be completely independent of a parent insurgent organization, they are often either a part of the overall insurgency or affiliated with the insurgent groups. Guerrilla units can also be subordinate to a larger, more conventional force. For purposes of illustration and simplicity, in this example the guerrilla battalion is subordinated to the larger conventional maneuver force, the BTG. The guerrillas are a tier 3 and 4 organization. (Equipment tiering is discussed in chapter 4 of FM 7-100.4.) The inclusion of guerrillas provides countertasks to the following ARTs:

- ART 8.3.1.2 Conduct Peace Enforcement Operations
- ART 8.3.2.3 Conduct Combat Operations in Support of Foreign Internal Defense (Counter Insurgents and Terrorists)

When the guerilla battalion is organized for combat with guerrilla hunter-killer companies (H/K) it also fights unconventionally, but with H/K groups, sections, and teams. The task-organized, lethal H/K team structure is ideal for dispersed combat such as fighting in built-up areas, especially urban combat. Complete battalions and brigades—or any part thereof—can be organized for combat as H/K units.

Special-Purpose Forces

Special-purpose forces (SPF) can bring another dimension to the training environment. Therefore, the BTG could integrate an SPF company and an SPF deep attack/reconnaissance platoon into its task organization. The SPF units are a tier 1 (modern) force multiplier providing a completely different level and style of OPFOR countertasks to the fight. While SPF units can also be independent of maneuver forces on the battlefield, and generally are, they can also be subordinate to a maneuver organization. For simplicity, this example has the SPF units subordinate to a parent maneuver organization—the BTG. The inclusion of the SPF provides countertasks to the following ARTs:

- ART 8.3.1.2 Conduct Peace Enforcement Operations
- ART 8.3.2.3 Conduct Combat Operations in support of Foreign Internal Defense (Counter Insurgents and Terrorists)


Note. Force structures for SPF units can be found in FM 7-100.4 *OPFOR Organizational Guide*, Administrative Force Structure, Volume II under Combat Brigades.

Insurgent Forces

Insurgent forces can provide an OPFOR countertask capability to ART 8.3.7 (Combat Terrorism). A typical insurgent organization also provides the OPFOR with an information warfare (INFOWAR) capability to stress ART 7.10.3 (Maintain Community Relations), which is an implied task inherent to several selected ARTs. Even a local insurgent organization provides a wide spectrum of insurgent capabilities. It is complete with direct action cells, INFOWAR cells, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), IED factories, suicide bombers, and even weapons of mass destruction. The relationship between the BTG and the local insurgent organization, in this example, is one of loose affiliation rather than subordination.

Overall OPFOR Organization

In this example case, the appropriate OPFOR required to meet the commander's training requirements consists of two parts: the **Brigade Tactical Group (Motorized) (Antiarmor-Light)** and an **affiliated Local Insurgent Organization**.



STEP 6: REVIEW THE AFS

The trainers and planners review the list of units in the DATE OB for that particular country and the OPFOR organizational directories in FM 7-100.4 to determine what kinds and sizes of units are available in the AFS. At this point, the purpose is only to review the menu of options available.

STEP 7: COMPILE THE INITIAL LISTING OF OPFOR UNITS FOR THE TASK ORGANIZATION

From the AFS menu, trainers and planners compile an initial listing of OPFOR units for the task organization. At this point, the purpose is only to identify the units available, without concern for any higher-level command to which they are subordinate in the AFS.

BTG Headquarters	SPF Deep Attack/Recon Platoon
Motorized Infantry Battalion (x2)	Air Defense Battalion (Motorized)
Mechanized Infantry Battalion (APC)	Engineer Battalion
Guerrilla Battalion (Hunter/Killer)	Materiel Support Battalion
Antitank Battalion	Maintenance Battalion (APC/Motorized)
Artillery Battalion	Signal Company
Reconnaissance Battalion (Motorized)	Chemical Defense Company
SPF Company	Medical Company
Sniper Company	

Initial Listing of OPFOR Units Required for Task Organization

STEP 8: IDENTIFY THE BASE UNIT

Trainers and planners again review the OPFOR organizational directories to determine which standard OPFOR unit most closely matches the OPFOR units in the initial task-organization list. This OPFOR unit will become the "base" unit to which modifications are made, converting it into a task organization.


Sepate Motorized Infantry Brigade

For the main maneuver force in the above example, the leading candidate seems to be a motorized infantry brigade, of which the organizational directories show two types: divisional and separate. Of

the two, the separate motorized infantry brigade has a much more robust antiarmor capability, with an antitank battalion of the type normally found in a division. The separate brigade also has more robust logistics support, which provides better combat sustainability. As a base unit, this brigade can easily accommodate guerrillas and SPF into its task organization to meet training requirements.

To prepare for the task-organizing process, the separate motorized infantry brigade is extracted, exactly as posted, from the AFS organizational directories (see figure below). This AFS brigade will serve as the base (core) that will be modified and built upon to create the task-organized Brigade Tactical Group (Motorized) (Antiarmor-Light) seen on page 4-B-9.

Some units originally subordinate to the separate motorized brigade will be transferred out of the base structure, since they are not needed. Meanwhile, other units that were not part of the base unit will be added in order to provide additional capabilities that are required. From the OPFOR perspective, higher headquarters determines where these units are allocated to or from. If the next higher headquarters does not have a subordinate unit that it can allocate for the task organization, it passes the requirement to (or through) its next higher headquarters until the appropriate unit can be allocated.



The separate motorized infantry brigade already contains many of the units required for the BTG (Mtzd) (Antiarmor-Lt) task organization. The task-organizing process has determined that the BTG consists of the specific units listed below.

BTG Headquarters (based on Bde HQ)	SPF Deep Attack/Recon Platoon
Motorized Infantry Battalion (x2)	Air Defense Battalion (Motorized)
Mechanized Infantry Battalion (APC)	Engineer Battalion (Sep)
Guerrilla Battalion (Hunter/Killer)	Materiel Support Battalion
Antitank Battalion (Div)	Maintenance Battalion (APC/Motorized)
Composite Artillery Battalion (Sep)	Signal Company (Sep)
Reconnaissance Battalion (Motorized) (Sep)	Chemical Defense Company (Sep)
SPF Company	Medical Company (Sep)
Sniper Company	


Specific Units Required for BTG Task Organization

Note. For simplicity, all of the units forming the BTG task organization in this example are constituent to the BTG. The local insurgent group is affiliated with the BTG, but it is not part of the BTG. For additional information on command relationships see chapter 3 of FM 7-100.4. Also see chapter 2 FM 7-100.4 for an explanation of the “(Div)” and “(Sep)” designations following the names of some units (usually battalions or companies) in the AFS.

Note. In this example, again for the sake of simplicity, none of the battalions or companies in the BTG have been task-organized into detachments. In reality, such task-organizing of subordinate units could very well be required in order to produce the right challenge to the training unit’s METL. In that case, training planners creating the OPFOR OB would have to start from the bottom up—first creating the necessary task organizations at the lowest levels of organization and then rolling them up into the personnel and equipment totals for the overall task organization. For example, rather than exchanging its original sniper platoon for a sniper company, the brigade becoming a BTG could have received a standard sniper company and then added its own sniper platoon to that company to create an augmented company-size detachment (CDET). See the Building from the Bottom Up section later in this appendix.

Local Insurgent Organization

The AFS organizational directories include a “typical” local insurgent organization (see figure on the following page). This baseline organization shows the various types of cells often found in insurgent organizations. However, the dashed boxes in the organizational chart indicate possible variations in the numbers of cells of each type that might be present in a particular insurgent organization. These cell types represent the various functions that can contribute to the OPFOR countertasks in this example.



STEP 9: CONSTRUCT THE TASK-ORGANIZED BTG


There are several differences between the final task-organized BTG (Mtzd) (Antiarmor-Lt) and the AFS separate motorized infantry brigade. Not all units originally subordinate to a standard separate motorized infantry brigade will be needed to complete the task organization, while additional units will be added to provide countertasks to the selected ARTs. Higher headquarters will allocate or re-allocate units depending on its need in the task-organized unit. In this task-organizing process, the AFS separate motorized infantry brigade:

- Loses the two tank battalions, which are transferred back to higher headquarters and possibly allocated to another task organization.
- Loses one motorized infantry battalion, which is transferred back to higher headquarters and possibly allocated to another task organization.

The task-organized BTG:

- Gains a mechanized infantry battalion (APC) in lieu of the one motorized infantry battalion. This battalion was allocated from a mechanized infantry brigade subordinate to the same higher headquarters.

- Gains a guerrilla battalion (hunter/killer). This battalion was probably subordinate to an insurgent organization operating in the area but, by mutual agreement between the higher headquarters of the guerrilla battalion and that of the BTG, has been made subordinate to the BTG only for the duration of the mission for which this task organization was created.
- Gains an SPF company. This company, originally part of a larger SPF organization, was allocated through higher headquarters.
- Upgrades from a sniper platoon to a sniper company. The upgrade was allocated by higher headquarters from a division that is also subordinate to the same higher headquarters. In turn, that division might receive the sniper platoon that was originally part of the separate motorized infantry brigade.
- Gains an SPF deep attack/reconnaissance platoon. This platoon was originally part of a larger SPF organization and was allocated through higher headquarters.



STEP 10: CONSTRUCT THE LOCAL INSURGENT ORGANIZATION

One key difference is that insurgent organizations are irregular forces, meaning that there is no “regular” table of organization and equipment. There is no “standard” structure for an insurgent organization. Thus, the baseline insurgent organizations in the AFS organizational directories

represent only the “default setting” for a “typical” insurgent organization. The organizational graphic for a “typical” local insurgent organization (see figure on page 4-B-8) therefore includes several dashed boxes indicating the possibility of different multiples of the basic cell types. The baseline organizational charts and lists of personnel and equipment include many “notes” on possible variations in organization or in numbers of people or equipment within a given organization.

When developing an OB for a specific insurgent organization for use in training, training planners need to take several things into consideration:

- What functions the insurgents need to be able to perform
- What equipment is needed to perform those functions
- How many people are required to employ the required equipment
- The number of vehicles in relation to the people needed to drive them or the people and equipment that must be transported
- Equipment associated with other equipment (for example, an aiming circle/goniometer used with a mortar or a day/night observation scope used with a sniper rifle)

When task-organizing insurgent organizations, guerrilla units might be subordinate to a larger insurgent organization, or they might be loosely affiliated with an insurgent organization of which they are not a part. A guerrilla unit or other insurgent organization might be temporarily subordinated to or affiliated with a regular military organization.

BUILDING FROM THE BOTTOM UP

For the sake of simplicity, the BTG (Mtzd) (Antiarmor-Lt) example above did not include any task organizations below the BTG level. In reality, however, it may be necessary to task-organize at lower levels in order to achieve the desired challenges to the training unit. If all units in an OB come straight out of the AFS organizational directories with no modifications, that OB probably does not portray adequately the OPFOR’s ability to organize its forces adaptively to achieve the optimal effect. (See FM 7-100.4 chapter 3.)

Training planners need to start at the very bottom to look for places where task-organizing is appropriate to the training requirements. At whatever organizational level the need for a task organization is identified, they must make the appropriate modifications to personnel, equipment, and organization charts. Then they must roll up the personnel and equipment to the place in the OB where the higher-level headquarters has received no assets from outside its own original organization—thus, it is not a detachment or a tactical group, but has the same name given to it in the AFS.

STEP 9: CONSTRUCT TASK-ORGANIZED BTG SUBORDINATES

The same basic procedures used in the BTG example in the first part of this appendix also apply to the creation of lower-level task organizations. One difference is that many organizations below brigade level do not have an MS Excel® chart in the AFS organizational directories. Instead, they list personnel and equipment numbers as part of the basic MS Word® document for the organization in question. If training planners task-organize any of these lower-level units, however, it is recommended to use Excel® charts as a tool to keep things straight when rolling up modified personnel and equipment numbers into each successive higher organization.

Adjustments, and/or modification, to the existing organizations and equipment charts are uncomplicated and easy to make, as long as they are accomplished one at a time and remain bite-size. Otherwise, the trainer making the changes might easily become completely overwhelmed and lost in the process.

STEP 10: REVIEW AND CONSTRUCT OTHER TASK ORGANIZATIONS IF NECESSARY

Training planners then review the completed task organizations to ensure they are sufficient to meet training requirements. If they do not, the building process begins again. The training planners start again at the lowest level in any other part of the OB that requires a task organization. Again, they build up to the place where the higher headquarters has received no assets from outside its own original organization and would still have the same name as in the AFS. They repeat this process for as many “branches” of the organizational “tree” as needed to complete the task organization.

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CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND THREAT INTEGRATION

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APPENDIX C: OPFOR EQUIPMENT TIERS

Appendix C: OPFOR Equipment Tiers

OPFOR equipment is broken into four “tiers” in order to portray systems for adversaries with differing levels of force capabilities for use as representative examples of a rational force developer’s systems mix. Equipment is listed in convenient tier tables for use as a tool for trainers to reflect different levels of modernity. The tier tables listed below reflect these differing levels of capability. Tier 2 (default OPFOR level) reflects modern competitive systems fielded in significant numbers for the last 10 to 20 years.

Systems reflect specific capability mixes that require specific systems data for portrayal in all US training (live, virtual, and constructive). The OPFOR administrative force structure contains a mix of systems in each tier and functional area that realistically vary in fielded age and generation. The tiers are less about the age of the system than they are about realistically reflecting capabilities to be mirrored in training. Systems and functional areas are not modernized equally and simultaneously. Forces have systems and materiel varying 10 to 30 years in age in a functional area. Often military forces emphasize upgrades in one functional area while neglecting upgrades in other functional areas. Force designers may also draw systems from other organization echelons by employing them at higher or lower echelons to supplement those organizations. Below is the general guidance concerning OPFOR equipment tiers (capability):

- **Tier 1** reflects a major military force with fielded state-of-the-art technology across functional areas in 2011. At tier 1, new or upgraded systems are robust systems with at least limited fielding in military forces and marketed for sale, with capabilities and vulnerabilities of respective systems to be portrayed in training.
- **Tier 2** reflects modern competitive systems fielded in significant numbers for the last 10 to 20 years, with limitations or vulnerabilities being diminished by available upgrades. Although tier 2 forces are equipped for operations in all terrains and can fight day and night, their capability in range and speed for several key systems may be marginally inferior to US capability.
- **Tier 3** systems date back generally 30 to 40 years. They have limitations in all three subsystems categories: mobility, survivability, and lethality. Systems and force integration are inferior. However, guns, missiles, and munitions can still challenge vulnerabilities of US forces. Niche upgrades can provide synergistic and adaptive increases in force effectiveness.
- **Tier 4** systems reflect 40 to 50 year-old systems, some of which have been upgraded numerous times. These represent Third World or less developed countries’ forces. Use of effective strategy, adaptive tactics, niche technologies, and terrain limitations could enable a Tier 4 OPFOR to challenge US force effectiveness in achieving its goals. The tier includes militia, guerrillas, special police, and other forces, possibly to include some regular forces.

Note. No force in the world has all systems at the most modern tier. Even the best force in the world has a mix of state-of-the-art (tier 1) systems, as well as mature (tier 2), and somewhat dated (tier 3) legacy systems. Modern systems recently purchased may be considerably less than state-of-the-art, due to budget constraints and limited user training and maintenance capabilities. Thus, even new systems may not exhibit tier 1 or tier 2 capabilities. As later forces field systems with emerging technologies, legacy systems may be employed to be more suitable, may be upgraded, and continue to be competitive. **Adversaries with lower tier systems will use adaptive technologies and tactics, or obtain niche technology systems to challenge advantages of a modern force.**

The tier tables below are listed by their respective volume. Volume I includes Ground Systems while Volume II includes Airspace and Air Defense Systems. These tiers were extracted from the December 2010 Worldwide Equipment Guide (WEG). For additional information and specifics on OPFOR tiers see the 2010 WEG Volume 1, Chapter 1, and Volume II, Chapter 1.

Volume I: Ground Forces

	Tier 1	Tier 2	Tier 3	Tier 4
Dismounted Infantry				
<i>Infantry Flame Launcher</i>	Shmel-M	RPO-A	RPO	LPO-50
<i>Lt AT Disposable Launcher</i>	Armbrust	Armbrust	Armbrust	RPG-22
<i>AT Disposable Launcher</i>	RPG-27	RPG-27	RPG-27	RPG-22
<i>AT Grenade Lcher (ATGL)</i>	Panzerfaust 3-IT600	Panzerfaust 3 T-600	Carl Gustaf M3	RPG-7V
<i>Long-Range ATGL</i>	PF-98 Mounted/Tripod (@ Bn)	RPG-29/Mounted/Tripod	SPG-9 Imp	SPG-9
<i>Heavy ATGM Man-Portable</i>	Eryx SR-ATGM	Eryx SR-ATGM	M79/Type 65-1 Recoilless	M67 Recoilless Rifle
<i>Light Auto Grenade Launcher</i>	QLZ-87	W-87	W-87	W-87
<i>Auto Grenade Launcher</i>	CIS-40 w/Air-Burst Munition	CIS-40	AGS-17	AGS-17
<i>Heavy Machine Gun</i>	NSV	NSV	NSV	DShk
<i>General Purpose MG</i>	PKM	PKM	PKM	PKM
<i>Anti-Materiel Rifle</i>	M82A1 .50 Cal	M82A1	M82A1	M82A1
<i>Sniper Rifle</i>	SVD	SVD	SVD	Mosin-Nagant
<i>Assault Rifle</i>	AK-74M	AK-74M	AKM	AKM
<i>Carbine</i>	AKS-74U	AKS-74U	AK-47 Krinkov	AK-47 Krinkov
<i>Company-Dismount ATGM</i>	Spike-LR ATGM Launcher	Spike-MR ATGM Launcher	AT-13	AT-7
<i>Battalion-Dismount ATGMs</i>	Kornet-E Launcher (1 team) Starstreak-SL AD/AT (1 team)	Kornet-E ATGM Lchr	AT-5B	AT-5
Infantry Fighting Vehicle	BMP-2M Berezhok	BMP-2M	AMX-10P	BMP-1PG
<i>Infantry IFSV for IFV</i>	BMP-2M Berezhok	BMP-2M Kornet/SA-18	AMX-10/AT-5B/SA-16	BMP-1PG w/ AT-5/SA-16
<i>Amphibious IFV</i>	BMP-3UAE/AT-10B	BMP-3UAE/AT-10B	BMD-2/AT-5B	BMP-1PG/AT-5
<i>Amphibious IFV IFSV</i>	BMP-3UAE/AT-10B	BMP-3UAE/AT-10B	BMD-2/AT-5B	BMD-1PG w/AT-5/SA-16
Armored Personnel Carrier	BTR-3E1	BTR-80A	BTR-80	M113A1
<i>Amphibious APC</i>	BTR-90	BTR-80A	WZ-551	VTT-323
<i>Amphibious APC IFSV</i>	BTR-90/AT-5B/SA-24	BTR-80A/Kornet-E/SA-18	WZ-551/AT-5B/SA-16	VTT-323/AT-3C/SA-14

Volume I: Ground Forces (continued)

	Tier 1	Tier 2	Tier 3	Tier 4
Airborne IFV	BMD-3	BMD-3	BMD-2	BMD-1P
Airborne APC	BTR-D	BTR-D	BTR-D	BTR-D
Airborne APC IFSV	BTR-D/ w Kornet-E, SA-24	BTR-D/ w Kornet-E/SA-18	BTR-D/w AT-5B/SA-16	BTR-D/w AT-5, SA-14
Heavy IFV/Heavy IFSV	BMP-3M/w Kornet-E, SA-24	BMP-3UAE/Kornet-E, SA-18	Marder 1A1/MILAN 2, SA-16	BMP-1PG/w SA-14
Main Battle Tank	T-90A	T-90S	Chieftain	T-55AM
Amphibious Tank	Type 63A Modernized (AM)	Type 63AM	M1985	PT-76B
Tracked Heavy ACV	2S25	AMX-10 PAC 90	AMX-13	M41A3
Wheeled Heavy ACV	AMX-10RC Desert Storm	AMX-10RC	EE-9	EE-9
Combat Recon Vehicle	BRM-3K/Kredo M1	BRM-3K	BRM-1K	EE-9
Abn/Amphib Recon CRV	BMD-3/Kredo M1	BMD-3K	BMD-1PK	BMD-1K
Armored Scout Car	BRDM-2 M98/Zbik-A	BRDM-2 M97/Zbik-B	Fox	BRDM-2
Sensor Recon Vehicle	HJ-62C	HJ-62C	BRM-1K	BRM-1K
AT Recon Vehicle	PRP-4MU (w/Kredo-M1)	PRP-4M (w/PSNR-5M)	PRP-4 (w/PSNR-5K)	PRP-3 (w/SMALL FRED)
Armored Command Vehicle	BMP-1KshM	BMP-1KShM	BMP-1KSh	BMP-1KSh
Abn/Amphib ACV	BMD-1KShM	BMD-1KShM	BMD-1KShM	1KShM
Wheeled ACV	BTR-80/Kushetka-B	BTR-80/Kushetka-B	BTR-60PU/BTR-145BM	BTR-60PU/BTR-145BM
Command APC	BTR-80AK	BTR-80AK	BTR-60PBK	M113A1
Motorcycle	Gear-Up (2-man)	Gear-Up (2-man)	Motorcycle (2-man)	Motorcycle (2-man)
Tactical Utility Vehicle	VBL MK2	VBL	UAZ-469	UAZ-469
Armored Multi-purpose	MT-LB6MB	MT-LB6MA	MT-LBu	MT-LB
All Terrain-Vehicle	Supacat	Supacat	LUAZ-967M	LUAZ-967M
Div ATGM Launcher Vehicle	9P157-2/Krizantema-S	9P149 w/AT-9 Ataka	9P149 w/AT-6	9P148/AT-5
Bde ATGM Veh Tracked	9P162 w/Kornet	AMX-10 HOT 3	AMX-10 HOT 2	Type 85/Red Arrow-8A
ATGM Lchr Veh Wheeled	VBL MK2 w/Kvartet, Kornet	VBL w/Kvartet, Kornet	9P148/AT-5B	Jeep/Red Arrow-8A
Hvy ATGM Launcher Veh	Mokopa	9P149 w/Ataka	9P149 w/AT-6	9P148/AT-5

Volume I: Ground Forces (continued)

	Tier 1	Tier 2	Tier 3	Tier 4
<i>NLOS ATGM</i>	Nimrod-3	Nimrod	Mirach-150	--
<i>Amph ATGM Launcher Veh</i>	9P157-2/Krizantema-S	9P149 w/Ataka	AMX-10 HOT 2	BTR-RD/AT-5
<i>Abn ATGM Launcher Veh</i>	VBL MK2 w/Kvartet, Kornet	VBL w/Kvartet, Kornet	BMD-2 with AT-5B	BMD-1P with AT-5
<i>Div Towed AT Gun</i>	2A45MR	2A45M	MT-12	MT-12
<i>Bde Towed AT Gun</i>	2A45MR	MT-12R	MT-12	M40A1
Artillery				
<i>Mortar/Combo Gun Tracked</i>	2S9-1	2S9-1	2S9-1	M106A2
<i>Mortar/Combo Gun Wheeled</i>	2S23	2S23	2S12	M-1943
<i>Towed Mortar or Combo Gun</i>	Type 86 or 2B16	Type 86 or 2B16	M75 or MO-120-RT	M-1943
<i>82-mm Mortar</i>	Type 84	Type 84	Type 69	M-1937
<i>82-mm Auto Mortar</i>	2B9	2B9	2B9	2B14-1
<i>60-mm Mortar</i>	Type 90	Type 90	Type 63-1	Type 63-1
<i>Towed Light Howitzer</i>	D-30	D-30	D-30	D-30
<i>Towed Medium How/Gun</i>	G5	2A65	2A36	D-20
<i>Self-Propelled Howitzer</i>	2S19M1-155, G6, AU-F1T	G6, 2S19M1	2S3M1	2S3M
<i>Multiple Rocket Launcher</i>	9A51/Prima	9A51/Prima	BM-21-1	BM-21
<i>Light MRL/Vehicle Mount</i>	Type 63-1	Type 63-1	Type 63-1	Type 63
<i>Heavy MRL</i>	9A52-2 and 9P140	9A52-2 and 9P140	9P140	Fadjr-3
<i>Amphibious SP How</i>	2S1M	2S1M	2S1	2S1
<i>Arty Cmd Recon Veh</i>	1V13M w/1D15, 1V119	1V13M w/1D15, 1V119	1V13, 1V119	1V18/19, 1V110
<i>ACRV, Wheeled</i>	1V152, 1V110	1V152, 1V119, 1V110	1V119, 1V110	1V18/19, 1V110
<i>Mobile Recon Vehicle</i>	PRP-4MU (w/Kredo-M1)	PRP-4M (w/PSNR-5M)	PRP-4 (w/PSNR-5K)	PRP-3 (w/SMALL FRED)
<i>Arty Locating Radar</i>	1L-220U, 1L-219	1L-220U, 1L-219	ARK-1M	Cymbeline
<i>Sound Ranging System</i>	SORAS 6	SORAS 6	AZK-7	AZK-5
<i>Flame Weapon</i>	TOS-1	TOS-1	Type 762 MRL	OT-55 Flame Tank

Volume I: Ground Forces (continued)

	Tier 1	Tier 2	Tier 3	Tier 4
<i>1-Round Rocket Launcher</i>	9P132	9P132	9P132	9P132
<i>Ground Surveillance Radar</i>	Kredo-1E	Kredo-M1	PSNR-5M	TALL MIKE/PSNR-5
<i>Man-portable Radar</i>	FARA-1E	FARA-1E	N/A	N/A
<i>Unattended Ground Sensors</i>	BSA Digital Net	BSA Digital Net	N/A	N/A
<i>Remote TV/IR Monitor</i>	Sirene IR	Sosna	N/A	N/A
<i>Thermal Night Viewer</i>	Sophie LR	Sophie/NVG 2 Gen II	NVG 2 Gen II	NVG 1Gen II
<i>Laser Target Designator</i>	DHY-307	DHY-307	1D15	
<i>Laser Rangefinder/Gonio-meter Fire Control System</i>	Vector/SG12 with Sophie-LR	Vector/SG12 with Sophie	PAB-2M	PAB-2
<i>Communications</i>				
<i>Radio VHF, Hand-Held</i>	Panther-P	TRC5102	ACH42	R31K
<i>Radio, SPF</i>	Scimitar-H	PRC138	PVS5300	PRC104
<i>Radio VHF, Veh Medium Pwr</i>	Panther	Jaguar-V	R163-50U	R173M
<i>Radio HF/VHF, Veh Med Pwr</i>	M3TR	RF5000	XK2000	R123M
<i>SATCOM</i>	Syracuse-III	Feng Huo-1	Mayak	Moliniya 1
<i>Operational Comms</i>	RL402A	R423-1	KSR8	R161-5
<i>Tac Wide Area Network</i>	EriTac	RITA	N/A	N/A
<i>IBMS Network</i>	Pakistani IBMS	Pakistani IBMS	N/A	N/A
<i>Electronic Warfare</i>				
<i>Ground-Based ESM</i>	Meerkat-S	Weasel 2000	MCS90 Tamara	R-703/709
<i>Ground-Based EA</i>	CICADA-C	TRC 274	GSY 1800	R-330 T/B
<i>TACSAT EA</i>	CICADA-R	TRC 274	Liman P2	R-934B
<i>Radar EA</i>	BOQ-X300	CBJ-40 Bome	Pelena-1	SPN-2/4
<i>GPS EA</i>	Aviaconversia TDS	Optima III	Aviaconversia	
<i>UAV-Based EA</i>	Fox TX/Barrage	ASN-207/JN-1102	Yastreb-2MB/AJ-045A	Muecke/Hummel

Volume II: Airspace and Air Defense Systems

	Tier 1	Tier 2	Tier 3	Tier 4
<i>Fixed Wing Aircraft</i>				
<i>Fighter/Interceptor</i>	Su-35	Su-30	Mirage III, MiG-23M	J-7/FISHBED
<i>High Altitude Interceptor</i>	MiG-31BS	MiG-25PD	MiG-25	
<i>Ground Attack</i>	Su-39	Su-25TM	Q-5/FANTAN	Su-17
<i>Multi-Role Aircraft</i>	Su-30MKK	Su-27SM, Mirage 2000, Tornado IDS	Mirage F1, SU-24	MiG-21M
<i>Bomber Aircraft</i>	Tu-22M3/BACKFIRE-C	Tu-22M3/BACKFIRE-C	Tu-95MS6/BEAR-H	Tu-95S/BEAR-A
<i>Command & Control</i>	IL-76/MAINSTAY	IL-76/MAINSTAY	IL-22/COOT-B	IL-22/COOT-B
<i>Heavy Transport</i>	IL-76	IL-76	IL-18	IL-18
<i>Medium Transport</i>	AN-12	AN-12	AN-12	AN-12
<i>Short Haul Transport</i>	AN-26	AN-26	AN-26	AN-26
<i>RW Aircraft</i>				
<i>Attack Helicopter</i>	AH-1W/Supercobra	Mi-35M2	HIND-F	HIND-D
<i>Multi-role Helicopter</i>	Z-9/WZ-9	Battlefield Lynx	Lynx AH.Mk 1	Mi-2/HOPLITE
<i>Light Helicopter</i>	GAZELLE/SA 342M	GAZELLE/SA 342M	BO-105	MD-500M
<i>Medium Helicopter</i>	Mi-17-V7	Mi-171V/Mi-171Sh	Mi-8(Trans/HIP-E Aslt)	Mi-8T/HIP-C
<i>Transport Helicopter</i>	Mi-26	Mi-26	Mi-6	Mi-6
<i>Other Aircraft</i>				
<i>Wide Area Recon Helicopter</i>	Horizon (Cougar heli)	Horizon (Cougar heli)		
<i>NBC Recon Heli</i>	HIND-G1	HIND-G1	HIND-G1	
<i>Jamming Helicopter</i>	HIP-J/K	HIP-J/K	HIP-J/K	HIP-J/K
<i>Naval Helicopter</i>	Z-9C	Ka-27/HELIX	Ka-27/HELIX	
<i>Op-Tactical Recon FW</i>	Su-24MR/FENCER-E	Su-24MR/FENCER-E	IL-20M/COOT	
<i>EW Intel/Jam FM</i>	Su-24MP/FENCER-E	Su-24MP/FENCER-E	IL-20RT and M/COOT	
<i>Long Range Recon</i>	Tu-22MR/BACKFIRE	Tu-95MR/BEAR-E	Tu-95MR/BEAR-E	IL-20M/COOT
<i>Long Range EW</i>	Tu-22MP/BACKFIRE	Tu-95KM/BEAR-C	Tu-95KM/BEAR-C	

Volume II: Airspace and Air Defense Systems (continued)

	Tier 1	Tier 2	Tier 3	Tier 4
Air Defense				
Operational-Strategic Systems				
Long-Range SAM/ABM	Triumf/SA-21, SA-24	SA-20a w/SA-18	SA-5b w/SA-16	SA-5a w/S-60
LR Tracked SAM/ABM	Antey-2500, SA-24	SA-12a/SA-12b	SA-12a/SA-12b	SA-4b w/S-60
LR Wheeled SAM/ABM	Favorit/SA-20b, SA-24	SA-20a w/SA-18	SA-10c w/SA-16	SA-5a w/S-60
Mobile Tracked SAM	Buk-M1-2 (SA-11 FO)	Buk-M1-2(SA-11 FO)	SA-6b w/ZSU-23-4	SA-6a w/ZSU-23-4
Towed Gun/Missile System	Skyguard III/Aspide2000	Skyguard II/Aspide2000	SA-3, S-60 w/radar	SA-3, S-60 w/radar
Tactical Short-Range Systems				
SR Tracked System (Div)	Pantsir S-1-0	SA-15b w/SA-18	SA-6b w/Gepard B2L	SA-6a w/ZSU-23-4
SR Wheeled System (Div)	Crotale-NG w/SA-24	FM-90 w/SA-18	SA-8b w/ZSU-23-4	SA-8a w/ZSU-23-4
SR Gun/Missile System (Bde)	2S6M1	2S6M1	SA-13b w/ZSU-23-4	SA-9 w/ZSU-23-4
Man-portable SAM Launcher	SA-24 (Igla-S)	SA-24 (Igla-S)	SA-16	SA-14, SA-7b
Airborne/Amphibious AA Gun	BTR-ZD Imp (w/-23M1)	BTR-ZD with ZU-23M	BTR-ZD/SA-16	BTR-D/SA-16, ZPU-4
Air Defense/Antitank				
Inf ADAT Vehicle-IFV	BMP-2M Berezhok/SA-24	BMP-2M w/SA-24	AMX-10 w/SA-16	VTT-323 w/SA-14
Inf ADAT Vehicle-APC	BTR-3E1/AT-5B/SA-24	BTR-80A w/SA-24	WZ-551 w/SA-16	BTR-60PB w/SA-14
ADAT Missile/Rocket Lchr	Starstreak II	Starstreak	C-5K	RPG-7V
Air Defense ATGM	9P157-2/AT-15 and AD missile	9P149/Ataka and AD missile	9P149/AT-6	9P148/AT
Anti-Aircraft Guns				
Medium-Heavy Towed Gun	Skyguard III	S-60 with radar/1L15-1	S-60 with radar/1L15-1	KS-19
Medium Towed Gun	Skyguard III	GDF-005 in Skyguard II	GDF-003/Skyguard	Type 65
Light Towed Gun	ZU-23-2M1/SA-24	ZU-23-2M	ZU-23	ZPU-4
Anti-Helicopter Mine	Temp-20	Helkir	MON-200	MON-100

Volume II: Airspace and Air Defense Systems (continued)

	Tier 1	Tier 2	Tier 3	Tier 4
<i>AD Spt (C2/Recon/EW)</i>				
<i>EW/TA Radar Strategic</i>	Protivnik-GE and 96L6E	64N6E and 96L6E	TALL KING-C	SPOON REST
<i>EW/TA Rdr Anti-stealth</i>	Nebo-SVU	Nebo-SVU	Nebo-SV	BOX SPRING
<i>EW/TA Radar Op/Tac</i>	Kasta-2E2/Giraffe-AMB	Kasta-2E2/Giraffe AMB	Giraffe 50	LONG TRACK
<i>Radar/C2 for SHORAD</i>	Sborka PPRU-M1	Sborka-M1/ PPRU-M1	PPRU-M (DOG EAR)	PU-12
<i>ELINT System</i>	Orion/85V6E	Tamara-M	Tamara	Romona
<i>Unmanned Aerial Vehicles</i>				
<i>High Altitude Long Range</i>	Hermes 900	Hermes 450	Tu-143	Tu-141
<i>Med Altitude Long Range</i>	ASN-207	ASN-207		
<i>Tactical</i>	Skylark II	Skylark II	Fox AT2	ASN-104
<i>Vertical Take Off/ Landing</i>	Camcopter S-100	Camcopter S-100		--
<i>Vehicle/Man-Portable</i>	Skylite-B	Skylite-A	--	--
<i>Man-Portable</i>	Skylark-IV	Skylark	--	--
<i>Hand-Launch</i>	Zala 421-12	Zala 421-08	Pustelga	
<i>Artillery Launch</i>	R-90 rocket	R-90 rocket		
<i>Attack UAVs/UCAVs</i>	Hermes 450S	Hermes 450	Mirach-150	--
<i>Theater Missiles</i>				
<i>Medium Range (MRBM)</i>	Shahab-3B	Shahab-3A	Nodong-1	SS-1C/SCUD-B
<i>Short-Range (SRBM)</i>	SS-26 Iskander-M	SS-26 Iskander-E	SCUD-C	SS-1C/SCUD-B
<i>SRBM/Hvy Rkt < 300 km</i>	Lynx w/EXTRA missile	Tochka-U/SS-21 Mod 3	M7/CSS-8	FROG-7
<i>Cruise Missile</i>	Delilah grd, air, sea	Harpy programmed/piloted	Mirach-150 programmed	--
<i>Anti-ship CM</i>	BrahMos grd, air, sea	Harpy programmed/radar	Exocet	Styx
<i>Anti-radiation</i>	Harpy programmed/ARM	Harpy programmed/ARM	--	--

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