

# Research Question 3: Dynamic Behavioral Effects & Usage Patterns

How do different pricing structures influence user behavior patterns, experimentation, lock-in effects, and the development of complementary ecosystems?

## Executive Summary

Per-token pricing creates **powerful behavioral effects** that extend beyond immediate consumption decisions. Evidence reveals that usage-based models systematically influence: (1) **experimentation and innovation** (often inhibiting risk-taking), (2) **lock-in and switching costs** (creating vendor dependencies), (3) **mental accounting and spending behaviors** (generating psychological friction), and (4) **ecosystem development** (affecting third-party innovation). These dynamics often work **against** the stated benefits of usage-based pricing, creating market inefficiencies and welfare losses.

## Lock-In Effects & Switching Costs

### Reputation and Usage Data Lock-In

Research on online labor markets demonstrates that **reputation mechanisms** create profound lock-in effects when ratings are **platform-specific** and non-portable<sup>[1] [2]</sup>. Workers who build reputation on one platform face **high switching costs**—moving to a competitor means losing valuable ratings and starting from scratch.

**Application to AI Token Pricing:** Lock-in manifests through:

1. **Fine-tuned models:** Custom models trained on proprietary data cannot be ported to competitors
2. **Prompt optimization:** Extensive engineering for specific models (GPT-4, Claude) doesn't transfer
3. **Usage history:** Historical data used for cost optimization is provider-specific
4. **Integration depth:** API calls embedded throughout systems create switching friction<sup>[1] [2]</sup>

**Exploitation Through Lock-In:** Once users are locked in, platforms can:

- **Raise prices** (knowing switching costs exceed price differentials)<sup>[1] [3] [2]</sup>
- **Reduce quality** (degraded performance without losing customers)<sup>[1]</sup>
- **Extract surplus** through strategic fee increases<sup>[1] [2]</sup>

Experimental evidence confirms: platforms **capitalize on lock-in more effectively** when reputation/data portability is prevented, and this exploitation is driven by both **monetary motives** and reactions to perceived **unfairness** when fees increase<sup>[1] [2]</sup>.

**Policy Implications:** **Data portability** regulations (allowing export of fine-tuned models, usage patterns, and optimizations) could **mitigate exploitation** by reducing switching costs. Research

shows that portable reputation systems increase worker mobility and wages, suggesting analogous benefits in AI services markets<sup>[1]</sup>.

## Switching Costs in Two-Sided Platforms

Theoretical models of platform competition with switching costs reveal complex dynamics:

### 1. Strategic Pricing Based on Switching Costs

When switching costs are **high** and network externalities **low**, the first-mover platform employs a "**closed strategy**"—maintaining elevated prices in the second period to extract profits from locked-in users<sup>[3]</sup>.

Conversely, when switching costs are **low** and network externalities **high**, platforms use "**open strategies**"—lower prices to expand market share and benefit from network effects<sup>[3]</sup>.

### 2. Temporal Price Dynamics

Research confirms that platforms "**charge lower prices in the first period to gain market share** that will be valuable in the future and therefore charge higher prices later utilizing the market shares they have gained"<sup>[4]</sup>. This creates:

- **Introductory discounting** (attract users before lock-in sets in)
- **Price escalation** (extract surplus after switching costs accumulate)
- **Monopoly power** over existing customers despite competitive market entry<sup>[4]</sup> <sup>[3]</sup>

### 3. Interaction with Network Effects

The interplay between switching costs and network effects determines market structure:

- **High switching costs + weak network effects** → Market fragmentation, local monopolies
- **Low switching costs + strong network effects** → Winner-take-all dynamics
- **Both high** → First-mover advantages, entrenched incumbents<sup>[3]</sup> <sup>[5]</sup> <sup>[6]</sup>

**Application to Token Pricing:** AI LLM markets exhibit:

- **Moderate switching costs** (integration effort, prompt optimization)
- **Weak network effects** (my use doesn't make the service more valuable to you)
- **Strong learning effects** (individual optimization over time creates personal lock-in)

This suggests **fragmented competition** with **sticky customer bases** rather than winner-take-all outcomes, enabling **pricing power** for established providers despite new entrants<sup>[3]</sup> <sup>[6]</sup>.

## Mental Accounting & Consumption Behavior

## Budget Categorization Effects

Thaler's **mental accounting** theory demonstrates that consumers categorize money into distinct "mental accounts" that are treated as **non-fungible** despite economic equivalence<sup>[7] [8] [9] [10]</sup>. Critical findings include:

### 1. Income Source Effects

- **Windfall money** (bonuses, gifts, unexpected income) → Allocated to **hedonic consumption** (entertainment, luxuries)
- **Hard-earned money** (salary, wages) → Allocated to **utilitarian consumption** (necessities, investments)<sup>[8] [9]</sup>

#### Application to Token Pricing:

- **Corporate AI budgets** may be treated as "windfall" → Liberal token consumption
- **Personal/startup budgets** treated as "hard-earned" → Conservative token usage
- **Prepaid credits** (purchased upfront) → Psychological pressure to "use it up" (sunk cost effect)<sup>[11] [7]</sup>

### 2. Scarcity Mindset Moderation

High scarcity mindset **inhibits** the windfall-to-hedonic effect—even unexpected money is conserved when scarcity concerns are salient<sup>[8] [9]</sup>.

**Implication:** During **budget crunches** (economic downturns, startup runway pressure), even users with prepaid tokens may **reduce consumption** to preserve resources, undermining the "use what you pay for" mental model.

## Payment Structure Psychology

Research on subscription payment options reveals **powerful framing effects**:

### 1. Monthly vs. Annual vs. Prepaid

Consider gym membership pricing:

- **Option A:** \$75/month + \$50 joining fee = \$950/year
- **Option B:** \$825 prepaid for 11 months + 12th month free = \$825/year

Despite Option B being **\$125 cheaper**, many consumers choose Option A because:

- **Monthly payments** feel smaller (less painful)
- **Joining fee** is psychologically separated from recurring costs
- **Annual commitment** feels risky (what if I stop using it?)<sup>[7]</sup>

#### Application to Token Pricing:

- **Pure usage-based** → Continuous loss aversion (every API call = money leaving)
- **Subscription with overage** → Prepaid component feels "free," overage feels "extra"

- **Prepaid credits** → Sunk cost creates pressure to consume (even if marginal value is low) <sup>[11]</sup> <sup>[7]</sup>

## 2. Pain of Payment Timing

The **temporal separation** between consumption and payment affects behavior:

- **Immediate payment** (prepaid) → Pain experienced upfront, consumption feels free
- **Delayed payment** (end-of-month invoice) → Consumption feels free, pain concentrated at billing
- **Real-time deduction** (balance visible) → Continuous awareness of cost <sup>[7]</sup> <sup>[10]</sup>

Research shows that **decoupling** consumption from payment (e.g., all-you-can-eat buffets, flat-rate subscriptions) increases consumption because it **reduces pain of payment** at the moment of consumption <sup>[10]</sup>.

**Token Pricing Implication:** Real-time balance tracking (showing remaining credits or monthly spend) creates **continuous payment pain**, potentially **inhibiting valuable consumption** due to loss aversion, even when the marginal cost is justified by marginal value.

## Transaction Utility vs. Acquisition Utility

Thaler distinguishes between two types of utility:

1. **Acquisition utility:** Value of goods received relative to price paid
2. **Transaction utility:** Perceived quality of the "deal" itself <sup>[10]</sup>

**Example:** Paying \$2.50 for a beer generates different transaction utility depending on context:

- At a **luxury resort**: \$2.50 feels like an excellent deal (transaction utility = positive)
- At a **convenience store**: \$2.50 feels overpriced (transaction utility = negative)

Even if acquisition utility is identical (same beer, same thirst quenched), **reference prices** affect satisfaction <sup>[10]</sup>.

**Application to Token Pricing:** Users assess token costs against **reference prices**:

- "I remember when GPT-3 was \$0.02/1K tokens, now GPT-4 is \$0.03/1K—feels expensive"
- "Competitor X offers 'unlimited' for \$20/month, this token-based model feels worse"
- "I'm paying \$100 for a simple task that 'feels' like it should cost \$5"

Even when **acquisition utility** is positive (the AI delivered value exceeding cost), **transaction utility** may be negative (the deal feels unfair), undermining satisfaction and retention <sup>[10]</sup>.

## Experimentation & Innovation Effects

## Risk Aversion & Experimentation

Usage-based pricing creates **financial uncertainty** that inhibits experimentation:

### 1. Unpredictable Costs Deter Exploration

When users cannot forecast the cost of trying new features, models, or use cases, **risk aversion** leads to **status quo bias**—continuing with known, safe approaches even when exploration might yield better outcomes<sup>[12]</sup> <sup>[3]</sup>.

Research on platform pricing dynamics shows that **uncertainty about costs** creates **option value to waiting**—the benefit of deferring decisions until more information is available. This delays adoption and experimentation<sup>[12]</sup>.

### 2. Budget Exhaustion Risk

If experimentation might **exhaust budgets**, users rationally **avoid** trying potentially valuable but cost-uncertain approaches:

- "I have \$500 left this month—I can't risk trying a new prompting technique that might consume it all"
- "We'll stick with the basic model because upgrading to advanced might blow our budget"

This creates **foregone innovation**—valuable discoveries never made because the pricing model penalizes exploration<sup>[13]</sup> <sup>[14]</sup>.

### 3. Conservative Defaults

To protect against cost shocks, users implement **conservative safeguards**:

- **Hard caps** on token consumption (automatically stop when limit reached)
- **Restricted access** (only senior staff can use advanced models)
- **Manual approval** for high-cost queries (friction that deters usage)<sup>[15]</sup> <sup>[16]</sup>

These safeguards prevent **catastrophic costs** but also prevent **beneficial experimentation**.

## Optimization Complexity & Perverse Incentives

Research on token pricing in AI services identifies a critical problem: **token-based pricing creates incentives for technical teams to focus on token efficiency rather than business outcomes**<sup>[13]</sup>.

### 1. Engineering Effort Misallocation

When costs are denominated in tokens:

- Engineers optimize **tokens per task** (technical metric)
- This may conflict with optimizing **value per dollar** (business metric)
- Example: A verbose output consuming 2x tokens might deliver 5x value, but engineers are incentivized to minimize tokens<sup>[13]</sup>

### 2. Hidden Costs of Optimization

The "optimization work represents **hidden costs** not captured in direct pricing" <sup>[13]</sup>. Organizations spend:

- **Developer time** tuning prompts for token efficiency
- **Infrastructure** monitoring and controlling token consumption
- **Opportunity cost** (focus on token optimization instead of feature development) <sup>[15]</sup>

These costs can **exceed** the token savings achieved, creating net losses despite appearing to "optimize" pricing.

### 3. Metric Fixation Problem

The focus on a **legible metric** (tokens) causes neglect of **harder-to-measure outcomes** (user satisfaction, strategic value). This is a form of **Goodhart's Law**: "When a measure becomes a target, it ceases to be a good measure."

**Alternative Approach:** Outcome-based pricing **aligns incentives**—teams optimize for **results delivered** rather than **resources consumed**, better serving business objectives <sup>[13]</sup>.

## Ecosystem Development & Third-Party Innovation

### Platform Effects on Complementor Innovation

Research on two-sided markets demonstrates that **pricing strategies** affect **complementor participation** (third-party developers building on the platform) <sup>[17] [5] [18] [19]</sup>.

#### 1. Access Costs Determine Complementor Viability

If API pricing is **too high**, third-party applications become **non-viable**:

- A developer building a customer service chatbot on OpenAI's API needs **low, predictable costs** to offer competitive pricing to end-users
- If token costs are **volatile** or **high**, the developer cannot maintain margins
- This **reduces platform value** by limiting complementary innovation <sup>[5] [19]</sup>

#### 2. Revenue Sharing & Value Distribution

Platforms must balance **capturing value** (high API prices) against **enabling ecosystems** (low API prices that allow third parties to profit):

- **High API prices** → Platform captures more value per transaction, fewer complementors
- **Low API prices** → More complementors, larger ecosystem, but platform foregoes direct revenue <sup>[5] [20]</sup>

Research on utility tokens and network effects shows that when platforms can **credibly commit** to low access costs (e.g., through blockchain-embedded pricing), **ecosystem participation increases** significantly <sup>[5] [21]</sup>.

#### 3. Pricing Power & Ecosystem Leverage

Network effects can create **pricing power** that platforms can **exploit**:

- As the ecosystem grows, **switching costs** for complementors increase (they've built integrations, accumulated users)
- Platforms can then **raise prices**, extracting surplus from locked-in developers
- This creates **hold-up problem**: complementors under-invest in ecosystem-specific innovations, anticipating future exploitation <sup>[5]</sup> <sup>[22]</sup>

#### Token Pricing Implications:

- **Opaque, unpredictable token costs** deter third-party innovation (developers can't forecast margins)
- **Frequent price changes** create planning uncertainty (business models become non-viable mid-stream)
- **Committed-use requirements** create entry barriers (new developers can't commit to volume) <sup>[11]</sup> <sup>[5]</sup>

**Optimal Strategy: Stable, transparent, volume-discounted pricing** with **graduated tiers** allows complementors to:

- **Start small** (low volume, higher per-token rate, but affordable total cost)
- **Scale up** (volume discounts as business grows)
- **Forecast accurately** (stable pricing enables business planning) <sup>[5]</sup> <sup>[22]</sup>

## Behavioral Pricing Strategies & Manipulation

### Behavioral Pricing in Subscription Models

Research on behavioral economics of subscription pricing reveals systematic exploitation of cognitive biases:

#### 1. Defaults & Inertia

- **Default enrollment** in auto-renewal increases retention dramatically
- **Multi-screen cancellation flows** create friction, deterring churn
- **Guilt-laden prompts** ("Are you SURE you want to lose all these benefits?") exploit loss aversion <sup>[23]</sup>

#### 2. Free Trial Conversion

The **FTC found** that "consumers forget to cancel trials, leading to **billions in unintentional renewals** annually" <sup>[23]</sup>. This is not accidental—platforms **design** payment information capture upfront to create inertia.

#### 3. Symmetric Design as Fairness

Research shows that **symmetric friction** (sign-up and cancellation equally easy) improves **long-term loyalty** even if it increases short-term churn:

- **Fair systems** treat joining and leaving equally
- **Manipulative systems** make leaving harder than joining
- Customers recognize fairness and **reward** it with voluntary retention <sup>[23]</sup>

#### Application to Token Pricing:

- **Transparent monitoring** (easy to see costs in real-time) = Fair
- **Opaque billing** (only see costs at month-end) = Manipulative
- **Easy cap-setting** (users can protect themselves) = Fair
- **Hidden overage charges** (surprise bills) = Manipulative <sup>[16] [24]</sup>

### Dynamic Pricing & Fairness Perceptions

Research on platforms' dynamic pricing strategies reveals that **fairness preferences** create an "Achilles tendon" for dynamic pricing <sup>[25]</sup>.

#### Key Findings:

1. **Consumers' fairness preferences** significantly affect platform pricing decisions
2. **Behavioral elements** are crucial to understanding dynamic pricing strategies
3. **Social welfare** implications depend on how fairness concerns are incorporated <sup>[25]</sup>

**Token Pricing Parallel:** If token prices **vary over time** (e.g., surge pricing during peak demand), fairness concerns may:

- **Deter usage** during high-price periods (even if value justifies cost)
- **Generate backlash** ("I'm being gouged when I need the service most")
- **Undermine trust** (perception of exploitation rather than market clearing) <sup>[25]</sup>

**Alternative: Committed pricing** (guaranteed rates for contract period) sacrifices dynamic optimization but builds trust and encourages predictable consumption patterns.

### Long-Term Behavioral Adaptation

#### Learning & Optimization Over Time

Users **learn** to navigate token-based pricing over time:

##### 1. Prompt Engineering for Efficiency

- Users discover **token-minimizing formulations** ("be concise" prompts)
- **Best practices** spread through communities (forums, guides)
- **Tools emerge** (token counters, cost estimators, optimization libraries) <sup>[15]</sup>



## 2. Strategic Consumption Patterns

- **Batching queries** to reduce overhead tokens (system prompts counted once)
- **Model downgrading** for simple tasks (use cheaper models when sufficient)
- **Cache reuse** (store and reuse common responses) <sup>[15]</sup>

## 3. Platform Switching Strategies

- **Multi-homing**: Use multiple providers to avoid lock-in
- **Arbitrage**: Use cheapest provider for each task type
- **Negotiation leverage**: "Competitor X offers better rates" → Demand discounts <sup>[1]</sup>

### Implications:

- **Sophisticated users** learn to minimize costs → Provider revenue per power-user declines over time
- **Naive users** continue inefficient patterns → Cross-subsidize sophisticated users
- **Inequality increases**: Knowledge gap translates to cost gap <sup>[26]</sup>

## Subscription Cycling Behavior

Research documents emerging "**subscription cycling**" where consumers strategically:

- **Subscribe** for specific content/events
- **Consume** intensively during subscription period
- **Cancel** immediately after
- **Re-subscribe** when next valuable content arrives <sup>[23]</sup>

**Application to Token Pricing**: Users might:

- **Prepay credits** during discount periods
- **Consume heavily** when credits are expiring (use-it-or-lose-it mentality)
- **Pause usage** when budgets are tight (unlike subscriptions, no monthly obligation)

This creates **lumpy revenue** for providers (unpredictable month-to-month) and **inefficient consumption** for users (driven by credit expiry rather than value maximization) <sup>[23] [11]</sup>.

## Policy & Design Implications

### Reducing Lock-In Through Portability

**Data Portability Requirements**:

- **Fine-tuned model weights** exportable in standard formats
- **Prompt libraries and optimizations** transferable across providers
- **Usage analytics** (which queries cost most, optimization opportunities) portable <sup>[1]</sup>

## Standardization Initiatives:

- **Common APIs** reducing integration lock-in
- **Benchmark suites** enabling performance comparison
- **Tokenization standards** (or token-normalized pricing) enabling cost comparison<sup>[27]</sup> <sup>[28]</sup>

## Encouraging Experimentation

### Sandbox Environments:

- **Free tier** for experimentation (limited volume, but genuine access)
- **Discounted or refunded** initial usage (reduce risk of costly mistakes)
- **Cost caps** that prevent runaway experimentation costs without blocking access entirely<sup>[15]</sup> <sup>[16]</sup>

### Transparent Cost Forecasting:

- **Pre-query estimates**: "This query will cost approximately \$0.15-0.25"
- **Interactive sliders**: "Increasing context window from 4K to 16K tokens will add \$0.08"
- **Historical benchmarks**: "Similar queries typically cost \$0.12"<sup>[29]</sup> <sup>[15]</sup>

## Aligning Incentives for Ecosystem Health

### Graduated Pricing for Developers:

- **Startup tier**: Low volume, affordable rates, no commitment
- **Growth tier**: Volume discounts as usage scales
- **Enterprise tier**: Committed use, guaranteed rates, dedicated support<sup>[11]</sup> <sup>[5]</sup>

### Revenue Sharing Models:

- Platforms **share revenue** with high-value complementors
- Creates **aligned incentives** (platform succeeds when ecosystem succeeds)
- Reduces temptation to **exploit** through price increases<sup>[5]</sup> <sup>[22]</sup>

## Conclusion

Per-token pricing creates **complex behavioral dynamics** that often work against its theoretical benefits:

**Lock-In Effects**: Reputation, data, and integration create switching costs that enable **exploitation** through price increases and quality degradation<sup>[1]</sup> <sup>[3]</sup> <sup>[2]</sup>.

**Mental Accounting**: Budget categorization, payment timing, and transaction utility considerations create **psychological friction** that inhibits optimal consumption<sup>[7]</sup> <sup>[8]</sup> <sup>[9]</sup> <sup>[10]</sup>.

**Experimentation Inhibition**: Unpredictable costs deter valuable exploration, while optimization incentives misalign with business objectives<sup>[13]</sup> <sup>[14]</sup>.

**Ecosystem Challenges:** Opaque, volatile pricing discourages third-party innovation, reducing platform value [5] [19] [22].

The most successful models will:

- **Minimize lock-in** through portability and standards [1]
- **Simplify mental accounting** through hybrid structures [11] [7]
- **Encourage experimentation** through sandboxes and forecasting [15] [16]
- **Enable ecosystems** through transparent, stable, graduated pricing [5] [22]

Current token-based approaches largely **fail** these criteria, suggesting substantial opportunity for behavioral-economics-informed pricing innovation.

## References

Citations are embedded throughout using bracketed numbers corresponding to source IDs from the research phase.

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