

# Lecture 25 – Network Defense 2: VPNs & IDS

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
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
ECE 422/CS 461 – Fall 2017

# Security News

- Android adding DNS over TLS
- Stack buffer overflow patched in Chrome
- Equifax was warned of security problems

# Secure Protocols & VPNs





# SSL/TLS

- transport layer security to any TCP-based app using SSL services.
- used between Web browsers, servers for e-commerce (shttp).
- security services:
  - server authentication
  - data encryption
  - client authentication (optional)
- server authentication:
  - SSL-enabled browser includes public keys for trusted CAs.
  - Browser requests server certificate, issued by trusted CA.
  - Browser uses CA's public key to extract server's public key from certificate.
- check your browser's security menu to see its trusted CAs.

# SSL/TLS (continued)

## Encrypted SSL session:

- Browser generates *symmetric session key*, encrypts it with server's public key, sends encrypted key to server.
- Using private key, server decrypts session key.
- Browser, server know session key
  - All data sent into TCP socket (by client or server) encrypted with session key.
- SSL: basis of IETF Transport Layer Security (TLS).
- SSL can be used for non-Web applications, e.g., IMAP.
- Client authentication can be done with client certificates.

# IPsec: Network Layer Security

- **Network-layer secrecy:**
  - sending host encrypts the data in IP datagram
  - TCP and UDP segments; ICMP and SNMP messages
- **Network-layer authentication**
  - destination host can authenticate source IP address
- **Two principle protocols:**
  - authentication header (AH) protocol
  - encapsulation security payload (ESP) protocol
- **For both AH and ESP, source, destination handshake:**
  - create network-layer logical channel called a security association (SA)
- **Each SA is unidirectional**
- **Uniquely determined by:**
  - security protocol (AH or ESP)
  - source IP address
  - 32-bit connection ID



# IPSec Applications

- Establish secure network over internet (e.g. VPN)
  - Remote access, e-commerce
- Transparent to application layer
- Can be implemented by routers
  - Protect user data without their even knowing
- Also secures routing itself
  - Routers themselves are authorized


# Authentication Header (AH) Protocol

- provides source authentication, data integrity, no confidentiality
  - AH header inserted between IP header & data field
  - protocol field: 51
  - intermediate routers process datagrams as usual
- AH header includes:**
- connection identifier
  - authentication data: source-signed message digest calculated over original IP datagram
  - next header field: specifies type of data (e.g., TCP, UDP, ICMP)



# ESP Protocol

- provides secrecy, host authentication, data integrity
- data, ESP trailer encrypted
- next header field is in ESP trailer
- ESP authentication field is similar to AH authentication field
- Protocol = 50.



# Transport vs. Tunneling

- Two IPSec modes of operation:
  1. Transport: encrypt/authenticate payload only
  2. Tunneling: wrap entire IP packet in new IPsec packet
- Tunneling allows for NAT & VPNs

# Virtual Private Networks


- Setting up a private network over a public connection
  - i.e. over the internet
- Secure communication with IPSec or SSL
  - Authentication
  - Confidentiality
- Can be implemented in or behind a firewall

# IP VPN benefits


- IP not really global (private addresses)
  - VPN makes separated IP sites look like one private IP network
- Security
- Bandwidth guarantees across ISP
  - QoS, SLAs
- Simplified network operation
  - ISP can do the routing for you

# End-to-end VPNs

- Solves problem of how to connect remote hosts to a firewalled network




# Customer-based Network VPNs



Customer buys own equipment, configures IPsec tunnels over the global internet, manages addressing and routing. ISP plays no role.



# Provider-based Network VPNs



Provider manages all the complexity of the VPN. Customer simply connects to the provider equipment.

# **NETWORK BASED IDS**

# Intrusion detection

- “Building burglar alarms for the net”
- Idea: make systems sensitive to threatening actions, and make them capable of alerting authorities when they notice anomalies
- Necessarily post-hoc
- Broad types
  - Statistical analyzers (anomaly based)
  - Rules-based systems, Attack-signature detectors (misuse)
  - Others

# Intruder Behavior

1. Target acquisition and information gathering
  - Map network, identify vulnerable services, social engineering
2. Initial access
  - Brute force user's web based password, exploit remote vulnerability, spear-phish browser exploit
3. Privilege escalation
  - Exploit local application with elevated privileges, capture admin password

# Intruder Behavior

4. Gather information or exploit system
  - Scan for other targets or capture sensitive data
5. Maintaining access
  - Install rootkit backdoor, disable anti-virus/IDS
6. Covering tracks
  - Modify logs and remove any trace of intrusion, use rootkit to hide files installed on the system

# Know Your Attacker

- Most attackers run scripts to probe for vulnerabilities, then return later to exploit them
- Probes tend to come in waves as new holes are discovered
- Probes look very different than typical network use
- Actual attack may come long after probe

# Paradigms in Intrusion Detection

- **Misuse Detection Intrusion Detection Systems (MD)**
  - define “*what is abnormal*” using attack signatures
  - traffic that matches an attack signature as attack traffic
- **Anomaly Detection Intrusion Detection Systems (AD)**
  - define “*what is normal*” using profiles
  - traffic that does not match the profile as abnormal

# The world's simplest IDS

```
v=listen(frequently-exploited-unused-port);  
while(1) {  
    s=accept(v, who, howbig);  
    notify_the_authorities(s, who, howbig);  
    close(s);  
}
```

- This won't catch stealth scanners
- Doesn't have a global view
- Can't detect attacks on systems in use
- Surprisingly effective at catching scans nonetheless




# Honeypots

- Decoy systems designed to
  - Divert attacker from critical systems
  - Collect information about attacker's activity
  - Encourage attacker to remain on system so administrators can respond
- Two kinds:
  - Low interaction honeypot - Emulates particular IT service
  - High interaction honeypot - real system with full OS



# Honeypot Deployment



# Statistical analysis


- Constantly capture packets, watch logs, note typical flows
  - I.E. “95% of traffic flows from inside the firewall to outside web services”
  - Set off alarm bells when traffic not matching typical flows is seen
  - Can be a first alert against configuration problems
- Gains a global picture of the system

# Rule-based systems


- Monitor logs and network for behavior violating or matching static rules
- Require some knowledge of attack behaviors
- Less prone to false alarms
- Often combined with anomaly detectors

# Network-Based IDS (NIDS) Sensors

- Inline sensor
  - Monitored traffic passes through the sensor
  - Can be combined with firewall or switch
- Passive sensor
  - Monitors a **copy** of network traffic




# Network-Based IDS (NIDS) Sensors




# Network-Based IDS (NIDS) Sensors

- 1) Inside the firewall
  - See attacks from outside that pass firewall
  - Can identify firewall configuration problems
  - Can detect attacks against web/ftp server
  - Can perform egress monitoring
  - Can't detect attacks inside network



# Network-Based IDS (NIDS) Sensors


- 2) Outside the firewall
  - See *all* attacks targeting your network
  - Much higher processing burden (backscatter, Blaster Worm)






# Network-Based IDS (NIDS) Sensors

- 3) Major internal backbone networks
  - Internal servers/databases
  - View a large amount of internal network traffic
  - Detect unauthorized activity within security perimeter
  - Can monitor specific protocols and attack types



# Network-Based IDS (NIDS) Sensors

- 4) Workstation LANs
  - Can target specific subnetworks
  - Focus limited resources on important assets
  - Detect unauthorized activity within security perimeter
  - Can monitor specific protocols and attack types



# NIDS Signature Detection

- Application layer reconnaissance/attacks
  - Look for known attack patterns in specific protocols
  - e.g. DHCP, IMAP, IRC, NFS, POP, SMTP, Telnet
  - Find buffer overflow, password guessing, malware transmission
- Transport layer reconnaissance/attacks
  - Look at TCP/UDP traffic to identify known attacks
  - Port scans, packet fragmentation, SYN floods
- Network layer reconnaissance/attacks
  - Look at IP, ICMP for spoofed IP addresses/illegal IP headers

# NIDS Signature Detection

- Unexpected application services
  - Look for traffic that indicates an unwanted application
  - IRC/chat clients common for botnets
  - TOR/BitTorrent traffic might not be a good sign
- Policy violations
  - Look for inappropriate website visits
  - Video game/social network use

# NIDS Anomaly Detection

- DoS attacks
  - Look for increased traffic/connection attempts
- Scanning
  - Look for atypical flow patterns at application layer, transport layer, or network layer
- Worms
  - Look for hosts communicating that typically don't
  - Look for ports used that typically aren't


# NIDS Stateful Protocol Analysis (SPA)

- NIDS can also be used to observe state of connections
- Make sure they proceed as normal
- SPA has a high resource cost

# Example: Snort



<http://www.snort.org/>




From: Rafeeq Ur Rehman, *Intrusion Detection Systems with Snort: Advanced IDS Techniques with Snort, Apache, MySQL, PHP, and ACID*.

# Snort components

- Packet Decoder
  - input from Ethernet, SLIP, PPP...
- Preprocessor:
  - detect anomalies in packet headers
  - packet defragmentation
  - decode HTTP URI
  - reassemble TCP streams
- Detection Engine: applies rules to packets
- Logging and Alerting System
- Output Modules: alerts, log, other output



# Snort detection rules



# Additional examples

```
alert tcp any any -> 192.168.1.0/24 111  
(content:"|00 01 86 a5|"; msg: "mountd access");)
```

```
alert tcp !192.168.1.0/24 any -> 192.168.1.0/24 111  
(content: "|00 01 86 a5|"; msg: "external mountd access");)
```

! = negation operator in address

content - match content in packet

192.168.1.0/24 - addr from 192.168.1.1 to 192.168.1.255

<https://www.snort.org/documents/snort-users-manual>

# Using an IDS

- Plan your incident response process well before you install the system
- Know what you're looking for
- Make the system comprehensive
- Don't overreact to alarms
- If using a rules-based system, keep up with vulnerability reports