

**Evaluate the extent to which small states  
can influence international security  
outcomes through military and  
non-military means**

**AB03**

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# **STUDENT DECLARATION**

## **MA (LMDS)**

### **Student Declaration**

1. I certify that this thesis does not incorporate without acknowledgement any material previously submitted for a degree or diploma in any university; and that to the best of my knowledge and belief it does not contain any material previously published or written by another person except where due reference is made in the text.
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Gray's 2005 's critique of U.S. post-Cold-War failure highlights another form of small state influence - through chaos. Indeed, unscrupulous leaders could weaponise what a functioning state would consider as a vulnerability. This was warned of by Hirst (2010) regarding Lebanon. The key to such perverse success is the great power's political home front. Such small states could be resistant to coercive diplomacy, perhaps as DPRK today.

While power and influence aren't synonymous, power brings influence while influence may not guarantee power. Typical metrics to assess a state's power include GDP, population, landmass and military spending (Beckley 2018). They are incomplete. Thorhallsson's 2006 paper attempts to (Thorhallsson 2006)

The following figures illustrate a thought-experiment, based upon the author's perceptions. They are intended to motivate the concept that small states' influence cannot be meaningfully represented by the traditional metrics. On material metrics, Ireland's influence is comparable to disfunctional states.




Figure 1: Normalised Thorhallsson scores (scaled to percentages).




Figure 2: Normalised traditional material scores (scaled to percentages).

<b>State</b>	<b>Size (0–10)</b>	<b>Capacity (0–10)</b>	<b>Perception (0–10)</b>	<b>Total (/60)</b>	<b>Category</b>
South Sudan	4	2	3	17	Fragile Small
Somalia	3	2	4	19	Fragile Small
Lebanon	3	3	4	22	Fragile Small
Sudan	7	3	4	24	Fragile Small
Syria	6	4	5	25	Fragile Small
Iraq	6	4	5	25	Fragile Small
Qatar	2	9	8	28	Microstate
Ireland	4	7	8	29	Functional Small
Singapore	2	10	9	29	Microstate
Denmark	4	8	8	30	Functional Small
North Korea	5	7	5	31	Exceptional Small
Israel	4	9	5	32	Exceptional Small
Finland	5	9	9	32	Functional Small
South Africa	7	7	7	36	Middle Power
Nigeria	9	6	6	36	Middle Power
Iran	9	8	8	40	Middle Power
Russia	10	8	9	45	Great Power
Japan	8	10	10	48	Great Power
UK	10	10	10	50	Great Power
Germany	10	10	10	50	Great Power
France	10	10	10	50	Great Power
USA	10	10	10	60	Superpower
China	10	10	10	60	Superpower

Table 1: Thorhallsson's qualitative criteria applied to selected states. Scores reflect size, capacity, perception; categories highlight relative status.

<b>State</b>	<b>Landmass</b>	<b>Population</b>	<b>Military</b>	<b>GDP</b>	<b>Total (/40)</b>
Lebanon	2	3	2	3	10
South Sudan	6	3	2	2	13
Somalia	6	4	2	2	14
Syria	5	5	2	3	15
Qatar	1	2	5	10	18
Ireland	3	3	4	8	18
Iraq	6	6	3	5	20
Sudan	8	6	3	3	20
Singapore	1	2	7	10	20
Denmark	4	3	5	10	22
North Korea	5	6	8	3	22
Finland	7	4	7	8	26
Israel	3	3	9	9	28
South Africa	8	7	5	8	28
Nigeria	9	9	6	5	29
Iran	9	8	7	6	30
Russia	10	9	9	8	36
Germany	6	8	6	10	36
Japan	5	9	6	10	36
France	7	7	9	10	37
UK	6	8	9	10	37
China	10	10	10	10	40
USA	10	10	10	10	40

Table 2: Traditional material criteria (landmass, population, military, GDP) applied to selected states.

# 1 MASTER PARTIALLY-ANALYSED

## SOURCE MATERIAL FOR ESSAY

### Essay Skeleton: Small States and Security Outcomes

#### *Introduction*

This essay addresses the research question: *To what extent can small states influence international security outcomes through military and non-military means?* It employs a five-effects framework—Niche Specialisation, Organisational Agility, Hybrid Leverage, Soft Power Synergy, and Legitimacy—to analyse how small states, and Ireland in particular, navigate structural constraints. The sub-questions interrogate whether innovation, institutions, and legitimacy provide meaningful influence, or whether continuity and great-power dominance render small states peripheral. The analysis draws on both theoretical and policy sources, ranging from Krepinevich (1994) to Irish government documents, to ensure conceptual and practical grounding.

#### *1. Niche Specialisation Effect*

**DIMER.** Krepinevich (1994) contends that military revolutions occur when new technologies are embedded in doctrine and organisations, creating scope for small states to “steal a march” on larger powers. By contrast, Gray (2005) insists that continuity and political context outweigh technological rupture. Ireland’s peacekeeping and cyber niches exemplify attempts at relevance, but their influence depends on political coherence.

**PEEL-C.** Point: Small states gain visibility by cultivating niche roles. Evidence: Irish UN peacekeeping and EU crisis-management training missions. Explain: These projects demonstrate credibility disproportionate to size. Limit: As Gray warns, technological or operational novelty cannot compensate for absent political ends. Consequent: Niche specialisation is viable, but conditional on legitimacy.

**Comparative.** Krepinevich's optimism contrasts with Gray's scepticism. For Ireland, the synthesis suggests niches can amplify voice, but only when embedded in coherent political strategies.

## 2. *Organisational Agility Effect*

**DIMER.** Agility derives from structural reform and relational legitimacy. The HLAP (2022) commits to new command structures and Reserve revitalisation (Department of Defence and Defence Forces 2022), yet the 2019 Defence White Paper update exposes enduring gaps (**WHITE\_2019**). Cohen's concept of an "unequal dialogue" stresses that agility is as much about political–military interaction as about bureaucratic reform (Cohen 2002).

**PEEL-C.** Point: Organisational agility is essential for small-state credibility. Evidence: HLAP's structural reforms, Irish participation in PESCO. Explain: Adaptation demonstrates commitment to multilateral engagement. Limit: Recruitment and retention crises undermine delivery. Consequent: Agility is necessary but insufficient without material credibility.

**Comparative.** Cohen complements Gray: structural reforms are hollow without political dialogue. For Ireland, agility requires both institutional adaptation and genuine civil–military engagement.

## 3. *Hybrid Leverage Effect*

**DIMER.** Farrell and Newman show how interdependence creates both vulnerabilities and coercive opportunities through chokepoint and panopticon effects (Farrell and Newman 2019). For small states, this duality means exposure to great-power coercion but also scope to shape regulatory norms. Gray's scepticism tempers optimism, warning that adversaries adapt to offset hybrid advantages (Gray 2005).

**PEEL-C.** Point: Hybrid tools both constrain and empower small states. Evidence: EU's GDPR illustrates how even small states, through EU platforms, can shape global digital standards. Explain: Ireland's embeddedness in EU networks converts vulnerability into



regulatory leverage. Limit: Agency is collective, not unilateral; dependence on EU structures persists. Consequent: Hybrid leverage functions through institutional coalitions.

**Comparative.** Nye's optimistic account of soft power contrasts with Farrell and Newman's structural pessimism. The synthesis suggests that small states must mitigate coercion through regulatory multilateralism, turning vulnerability into legitimacy.

#### *4. Soft Power Synergy Effect*

**DIMER.** Nye defines soft power as the ability to co-opt through attraction, stressing that credibility is the scarcest resource (Nye 2008). Keohane highlights that institutions provide both rationalist and reflective leverage, multiplying small-state voice (Keohane 1988). Bailes and Thorhallsson argue that EU shelter enhances small-state legitimacy but risks dependence (Bailes, Thorhallsson, and Johnstone 2013).

**PEEL-C.** Point: Soft power amplifies small-state influence when embedded in institutions. Evidence: Ireland's neutrality and peacekeeping framed within UN and EU contexts. Explain: These practices magnify diplomatic visibility and legitimacy. Limit: Institutional shelter can erode autonomy and trigger domestic contestation. Consequent: Soft power synergy is effective but contingent.

**Comparative.** Thorhallsson's optimism about shelter contrasts with Gray's warning that symbolic gestures collapse without coherent ends. For Ireland, synergy requires embedding neutrality in substantive political purpose, avoiding hollow symbolism.

#### *5. Legitimacy Effect*

**DIMER.** Gray insists that strategy is defined by political consequences, not operational brilliance (Gray 2018). Cohen highlights that legitimacy derives from active, frictional civil–military dialogue (Cohen 2002). Irish policy documents (HLAP 2022; Strategy Statement 2025–2028) emphasise cultural reform, oversight, and transparency as responses to legitimacy deficits (Department of Defence and Defence Forces 2025).

**PEEL-C.** Point: Legitimacy is the decisive multiplier for small states. Evidence: Ireland's neutrality and peacekeeping, coupled with cultural reforms in defence. Explain: External legitimacy relies on neutrality; internal legitimacy requires reform and dialogue.

Limit: Neutrality without delivery risks hollowing credibility. Consequent: Legitimacy anchors all other effects.

**Comparative.** Nye links legitimacy to credibility and attraction, while Gray ties it to political coherence. The synthesis underscores that both external credibility and internal political grounding are indispensable.

### *Conclusion*

Small states cannot unilaterally determine international security outcomes, but they can shape norms, institutions, and perceptions in ways disproportionate to material resources. Niche specialisation and hybrid leverage offer tactical openings, while organisational agility ensures adaptability. Yet these effects are fragile without the synergistic power of institutions and, above all, the anchor of legitimacy. For Ireland, neutrality, peacekeeping, and EU membership provide platforms of influence, but credibility hinges on aligning limited means with coherent political ends. Influence is thus conditional, relational, and legitimacy-dependent.

## **Cavalry to Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolutions (Krepinevich, 1994)**

(Krepinevich 1994)Speaks of the changes in military tactics through the use of the “epoch”. This is at odds with Gray (2018), who notes the arbitrary nature of ages during historical studies clouds the evolutionary nature of mankind.

Krepinevich’s assessment following the advent of nuclear weapons, that “here was a shift so radical it convinced nearly all observers that a fundamental change in the character of warfare was at hand,” might actually be in agreement with Gray, who expressly excludes the nuclear sphere from his discussion of grand strategy.

First, and to reiterate a point made earlier, emerging technologies only make military revolutions possible. To realize their full potential, these technologies typically must be incorporated within new processes and executed by new organizational structures. He highlights that the Wehrmacht’s intellectual breakthroughs are what really unlocked the

technological breakthroughs. Gray (2018) discussed this, noting that while Germany was technologically and intellectually superior, its morally bankrupt political system meant no technology could succeed.

His statement that “an American tank designed in the 1920s was adapted by the Soviets in the process of developing the T-34, one of the most effective tanks to emerge during World War II. The U.S. Army, on the other hand, was equipped during the war primarily with the inferior Sherman tank” is a technocentric view. The Sherman was more plentiful and easier to maintain and repair.

But a confirming war is not essential for military organizations to seize opportunities. This is my concern with Ireland and drones and AI. Indeed, this is how I feel: military revolutions may offer major opportunities for relatively small or medium-sized powers to steal a march on greater powers.

## **DIMER Analysis — Krepinevich (1994)**

### **Describe**

Krepinevich argues that military revolutions occur when new technologies are combined with novel operational concepts and organisational adaptation, producing order-of-magnitude gains in combat effectiveness.

### **Interpret**

Relevant to small states: revolutions may offer major opportunities for them to steal a march on greater powers. Aligns with Niche Specialisation and Hybrid Leverage Effects.

Risk: arbitrary epochs overstating discontinuity.

### **Methodology**

Historical/theoretical synthesis, comparative historical sweep, but selection bias.

### **Evaluate**

Contribution: foundational model for RMA debates. Weakness: technocentric, overlooks logistics and legitimacy.

### **(Autho)R**

Andrew F. Krepinevich, U.S. defence analyst, influenced post-Gulf War debates.

### **Limit → Implication**

Limit: ex post epoch framing, technocentric bias. Implication: small states should focus on organisational adaptation and niche exploitation.

## **Mapping Krepinevich into Effects**

- **Niche Specialisation:** small states can steal a march on greater powers.
- **Organisational Agility:** four elements stress doctrine/structure as decisive.
- **Hybrid Leverage:** confirms war not essential; parallels modern cyber/drones.
- **Soft Power Synergy:** minimal, but notes societal roots of revolutions.
- **Legitimacy:** underplays moral context; contrast with Gray.

## **Comparative PEEL-C (Krepinevich vs Gray)**

Point: The literature diverges on whether small states can exploit revolutions or whether continuity/legitimacy dominate. Evidence: Krepinevich highlights organisational breakthroughs; Gray warns innovation cannot overcome illegitimate politics. Explain: For Ireland, innovation (drones) is possible, but risks collapse without legitimacy. Limit: Krepinevich overstates rupture; Gray underplays innovation. Consequent: Balanced approach needed — innovation plus legitimacy.

## **Lecture Notes on New Realism (Ireland)**

Ireland's policy is basically unchanged: good relations with UK, Europe and USA, neutrality as cost-saving and security-enhancing. The Defence Forces exist largely "just to stay alive." Ireland has played the neorealist game well: not taking strong stances, not obstructing, e.g. Bertie Ahern's ambiguity on GWOT while allowing U.S. use of Shannon. Gray (2018) reminds us that Ireland's military is not central to political policy, save for token peacekeeping.

## **Integrating New Realism into Effects**

- **Niche Specialisation:** token peacekeeping sold as valuable.
- **Organisational Agility:** DF survivalist mindset reflects inertia.
- **Hybrid Leverage:** parity matters; hybrid tools more realistic than balancing.
- **Soft Power Synergy:** neutrality and consensus diplomacy amplify influence.
- **Legitimacy:** external legitimacy strong, but domestic questions persist.

## **PEEL-C on Ireland and Legitimacy**

Point: Ireland's influence relies on neutrality and legitimacy rather than effectiveness. Evidence: Neutrality, DF "just staying alive," Shannon ambiguity. Explain: Plays neorealist game effectively. Limit: Gray (2018) warns disconnection between means and ends. Consequent: Overreliance risks hollowing out legitimacy.

## **Comparative Analysis (All Four)**

Keohane (1969) and Thorhallsson (2006) highlight institutions and perceptions as multipliers. Krepinevich (1994) offers optimism about innovation. Gray (2018) stresses legitimacy and continuity. Ireland illustrates the balance: institutions, agility, but constrained by legitimacy gaps.

## **Concluding PEEL-C**

Point: Small states shape outcomes by balancing institutions, innovation, and legitimacy. Evidence: Keohane (institutions), Thorhallsson (perceptions), Krepinevich (innovation), Gray (legitimacy). Explain: Ireland can leverage neutrality, institutions, and innovation, but legitimacy is decisive. Limit: Each incomplete alone. Consequent: Synthesis of all four is most robust.

## **DIMER Analysis — Keohane (1988)**

### **Describe**

Keohane distinguishes between two approaches to analysing international institutions: the *rationalistic*, grounded in rational choice and transaction cost theory, and the *reflective*, focused on norms, intersubjective meanings, and practices such as sovereignty. Rationalists argue that institutions reduce uncertainty and facilitate cooperation by lowering transaction costs, while reflectivists emphasise how institutions constitute actors' identities and preferences. Keohane calls for a synthesis, urging empirical work that integrates rationalist and reflective insights (Keohane 1988).

### **Interpret**

For small states, this distinction matters because it highlights both instrumental and normative dimensions of institutional participation. Rationally, institutions provide low-cost platforms for influence (e.g., UN, EU, NATO). Reflectively, they embed legitimacy and normative credibility (e.g., neutrality, peacekeeping). For Ireland, neutrality functions as both a rational cost-saving and institutionally beneficial strategy, while also serving as a reflective practice reinforcing sovereign identity and legitimacy.

### **Methodology**

This article is a conceptual and theoretical essay (ISA Presidential Address). It synthesises ongoing debates between rationalists (e.g., utility maximisation, regime theory) and reflectivists (e.g., sociological and normative institutionalists). Its strength lies in its typological clarity and influence on subsequent IR theory; its weakness is abstraction and lack of empirical cases.

### **Evaluate**

Contribution: This article bridges rational institutionalism (Keohane's *After Hegemony*, 1984) with emerging reflective critiques, foreshadowing the rationalist–constructivist synthesis of the 1990s. It provides a theoretical rationale for why institutions matter to both powerful and weak states. Weakness: the reflective side is underdeveloped, with little detail on how small states operationalise legitimacy through institutions.citep

### **(Autho)R**

Robert O. Keohane, a leading institutionalist scholar, was at the forefront of debates on regimes and interdependence. His bias is strongly pro-institutionalist, but here he shows openness to reflective critiques. Context: late Cold War, IR theory pluralisation. Influence: highly cited, foundational for rationalist vs. constructivist debates.

### **Limit → Implication**

*Limit:* The article is overly abstract and does not directly address the agency of small states.

*Implication:* For this essay, Keohane provides the theoretical justification for combining rationalist (institutional leverage) and reflective (legitimacy and norms) dimensions. This aligns with the Soft Power Synergy and Legitimacy Effects, showing how Ireland leverages neutrality and peacekeeping both instrumentally and normatively.

## **PEEL-C Paragraph (Application to Soft Power Synergy)**

### **Point**

Small states amplify their influence by embedding themselves in institutions that provide both rational and normative leverage.

### **Evidence**

Keohane (1988) demonstrates that institutions operate as rationalistic mechanisms reducing transaction costs and as reflective practices embedding norms such as sovereignty. He stresses that cooperation always occurs within some institutional context that shapes behaviour and expectations (Keohane 1988).

### **Explain**

For Ireland, neutrality and peacekeeping within UN and EU frameworks illustrate this dual role: rationally, they provide low-cost platforms for voice and security benefits; reflectively, they sustain Ireland's legitimacy as a principled small state.

### **Limit**

However, Keohane's analysis is abstract and does not explain how small states prevent marginalisation within power-dominated institutions.

### **Consequent**

Thus, Ireland's ability to convert neutrality into influence relies not just on rationalist cost–benefit, but also on sustaining reflective legitimacy across institutional contexts, making institutional credibility as important as material capacity.

## **DIMER Analysis — Farrell & Newman (2019)**

### **Describe**

Farrell and Newman (2019) argue that globalisation has produced asymmetric networks of finance and information which can be exploited by powerful states. They identify two mechanisms of “weaponised interdependence”: the *panopticon effect*, whereby states with jurisdiction over central network nodes extract information, and the *chokepoint effect*, whereby those same states exclude adversaries from critical flows. Their cases (SWIFT financial messaging and internet communications) demonstrate how the United States leverages network centrality to coerce others (Farrell and Newman 2019).

### **Interpret**

This framework reframes interdependence from mutual gains (Keohane & , 1977) to asymmetric vulnerabilities. For small states, the analysis is double-edged: embeddedness in global networks amplifies exposure to coercion by great powers, yet it also creates opportunities to participate in collective norm-building around network governance. For Ireland, reliance on EU and US-centric financial and digital networks constrains autonomy, but EU membership provides shelter and a collective platform to influence regulatory standards.

### **Methodology**

The article is a conceptual–theoretical synthesis drawing on network theory and detailed analytic narratives of SWIFT and internet governance. Evidence is qualitative: case histories, policy documents, and elite interviews. Its strength lies in theoretical innovation (structural power via networks); its weakness is reliance on two US-centric cases, with limited generalisability to peripheral or small-state actors.



### **Evaluate**

Contribution: Introduces a novel structuralist account of economic coercion, showing how infrastructures of cooperation double as infrastructures of coercion. It challenges liberal interdependence theory by exposing how globalisation entrenches hierarchies. Weakness: the account privileges great powers, underplaying the agency of middle and small states. Ireland, for instance, is framed mainly as vulnerable rather than as a potential shaper of EU-level regulatory responses.

### **(Autho)R**

Henry Farrell (George Washington University) and Abraham Newman (Georgetown) are leading scholars of international political economy and regulatory politics. Their prior work on privacy and financial regulation situates them as institutionalist–structuralist thinkers. Bias: they foreground US dominance, downplaying middle and small-state adaptation. Influence: considerable — this article is central to contemporary debates on geoeconomics and coercion.

### **Limit → Implication**

*Limit:* The framework privileges US and EU structural dominance, sidelining how small states adapt or resist network coercion.

*Implication:* For this essay, Farrell & Newman provide theoretical depth for the **Hybrid**

**Leverage Effect:** small states such as Ireland can exploit multilateral institutions (EU data regulation, GDPR, financial governance) to constrain weaponisation by great powers and amplify their legitimacy as norm entrepreneurs.

## **PEEL-C Paragraph (Application to Hybrid Leverage)**

### **Point**

Small states are vulnerable in asymmetric networks but can also leverage institutional coalitions to mitigate coercion.

### **Evidence**

Farrell and Newman (2019) argue that states with jurisdiction over network hubs exploit *panopticon* and *chokepoint* effects, turning infrastructures such as SWIFT into instruments

of coercion. They show how US pressure compelled SWIFT to disconnect Iranian banks, crippling Iran's financial system (Farrell and Newman 2019).

### **Explain**

For Ireland, deeply embedded in EU financial and digital networks, this illustrates both vulnerability and opportunity. Vulnerability stems from reliance on US-centric infrastructures (for example, dollar clearing, American cloud providers). Opportunity arises through EU collective regulation: initiatives such as GDPR demonstrate how smaller states, acting through the EU, can set global standards that constrain US or Chinese firms, thereby converting embeddedness into leverage.

### **Limit**

However, Farrell and Newman underplay small-state agency. Their framework assumes structural dominance by great powers, leaving limited space for Ireland's diplomatic entrepreneurship within the EU and UN.

### **Consequent**

Thus, weaponised interdependence highlights constraints on Irish autonomy, but also justifies the Hybrid Leverage Effect: Ireland's influence lies not in counterbalancing great powers directly but in shaping collective regulatory frameworks that discipline network coercion.

## **DIMER Analysis: Thorhallsson (2006)**

### *Describe*

Thorhallsson's article explores how the size of states in the European Union (EU) shapes their political influence and strategic choices. It advances a conceptual framework distinguishing between small, middle, and large states, with small states analysed through dimensions of administrative capacity, bargaining power, and reliance on institutional frameworks. A central claim is that size conditions states' ability to pursue autonomy versus shelter, with small states often leveraging the EU for influence that would be unattainable in bilateral relations (Thorhallsson 2006).

### *Interpret*

The argument directly applies to small EU member states, such as Ireland, Denmark, or the Baltic states, and helps explain how they navigate constraints in international politics. However, the framework is less applicable to small states outside strong institutional settings (e.g., Qatar or Singapore), where shelter is sought through bilateral alignments rather than supranational institutions. Importantly, the article illuminates the “so what” for Irish defence policy: Ireland’s influence in security debates is mediated not by raw power but by institutional access and normative legitimacy. The lacuna lies in the limited treatment of non-EU small states and in insufficient consideration of hybrid threats and new technologies.

### *Methodology*

The study is conceptual-theoretical rather than empirical. Thorhallsson synthesises existing theories of size and applies them to the EU context, drawing on institutionalist and constructivist approaches. While this provides analytical clarity, it sits low on the hierarchy of evidence: it offers a heuristic rather than data-driven validation. Reliability is moderate, but external applicability is limited given its EU-centric scope.

### *Evaluate*

The article contributes a valuable typology of small-state behaviour within multilateral institutions and clarifies how EU structures condition influence. Its strengths are theoretical precision and relevance to European integration studies. However, compared to realist accounts (e.g., Waltz (Waltz 1979)) that stress structural constraints, Thorhallsson arguably overstates institutional empowerment. Similarly, contrasted with Mearsheimer’s scepticism about institutional efficacy (Mearsheimer 1994), Thorhallsson’s optimism appears conditional on EU coherence, which may not hold in crisis situations. The article remains well-cited and continues to shape small-state scholarship, but it underplays hard power limitations.

*(Autho)R*

Baldur Thorhallsson is a leading scholar of small states and European integration, with extensive publications on “shelter theory.” His institutionalist orientation and Icelandic perspective bias him toward highlighting the utility of multilateral institutions for small states. While authentic and credible, his stance may downplay scenarios where institutions fragment or fail to provide real protection.

*Limit → Implication*

Limit: The EU-centric framework excludes small states operating outside strong institutional shelters. Implication: Application to Ireland is strong, but broader conclusions must be adapted when assessing comparative cases like Qatar or Singapore.

## Effects Mapping

- **Niche Specialisation:** Supports the claim that small states can specialise in EU niches (e.g., peacekeeping, norm entrepreneurship) to amplify influence.
- **Organisational Agility:** Implies small states can adapt institutional strategies more quickly than larger powers constrained by consensus-building.
- **Hybrid Leverage:** Underdeveloped in this article; institutionalism underplays asymmetric or hybrid tools.
- **Soft Power Synergy:** Strongly aligned—EU membership enhances small states’ normative appeal and diplomatic credibility.
- **Legitimacy:** Central to Thorhallsson’s thesis: small states gain legitimacy through institutional participation, turning weakness into credibility.

## PEEL-C Paragraph

Thorhallsson argues that small states can amplify their influence through EU institutional mechanisms, leveraging legitimacy and niche specialisation (<empty citation>).

For example, Ireland's engagement in Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions exemplifies how small states convert limited resources into disproportionate diplomatic credibility. This demonstrates that organisational agility and soft power synergy can offset material constraints by embedding national preferences in multilateral decisions. However, Thorhallsson's EU-centric analysis excludes non-European small states, limiting its transferability. Consequently, while legitimacy and institutional shelter provide Ireland with leverage, broader applicability requires integrating perspectives from small states outside the EU framework.

## **DIMER Analysis — Bailes & Thorhallsson (2012/2013)**

### **Describe**

Bailes and Thorhallsson (2012/2013) argue that membership of regional institutions, especially the European Union, is central to small states' security strategies. They contend that the EU provides not just economic shelter but also unique forms of "soft" security, such as resilience against pandemics, environmental degradation, energy vulnerability, cyber threats and terrorism. The EU's supranational features, including the Commission and Court of Justice, provide smaller states with mechanisms of influence and protection that differ from traditional alliance politics (Bailes and Thorhallsson 2013).

### **Interpret**

For small states, the EU represents a strategic protector that allows them to "escape smallness" by pooling sovereignty and aligning national strategies with EU norms. The EU's broad agenda means that small states' declared strategies are often instrumental: signalling harmlessness, projecting loyalty, and importing EU priorities to gain legitimacy. For Ireland, this translates into framing neutrality, peacekeeping and EU membership as part of a coherent legitimacy-seeking strategy that magnifies its international voice despite limited military capability.

### **Methodology**

The article is conceptual and comparative, drawing on qualitative evidence from European small states' security strategies, EU governance structures, and case examples such as the

Nordic states, Cyprus, and the Western Balkans. Its strength lies in providing a systematic framework for linking small-state strategy to EU shelter; its weakness is Eurocentrism and limited applicability beyond the European context.

### **Evaluate**

Contribution: The paper advances small-state studies by integrating EU membership into strategic analysis, shifting attention away from “hard” military threats to the existential and “soft” security concerns shaping small-state behaviour. Weakness: it may exaggerate the EU’s protective role, underestimating the risks of sovereignty loss, identity erosion, and domestic elite–public divides.

### **(Autho)R**

Alyson Bailes, a former British diplomat and visiting professor in Iceland, and Baldur Thorhallsson, founder of the Centre for Small State Studies, are leading authorities on small-state theory. Bias: both are sympathetic to EU integration and institutionalist perspectives, downplaying realist constraints. Influence: the article is widely cited in European small-state literature.

### **Limit → Implication**

*Limit:* The framework is highly Eurocentric and assumes the EU is a benign shelter, neglecting cases where integration amplifies vulnerability or triggers domestic resistance.

*Implication:* For this essay, Bailes & Thorhallsson underpin the **Soft Power Synergy** and **Legitimacy Effects**: they show how small states such as Ireland instrumentalise EU membership to project legitimacy and gain influence, but they also reveal the strategic costs of dependence and loss of autonomy.

## **PEEL-C Paragraph (Application to Soft Power Synergy and Legitimacy)**

### **Point**

Small states amplify their influence by instrumentalising the European Union as both a security shelter and a source of legitimacy.

### **Evidence**

Bailes and Thorhallsson (2012/2013) argue that EU membership allows small states to address vulnerabilities that no bilateral protector could manage, from energy resilience to border management and climate change. They note that declared strategies often import EU norms to signal harmlessness and loyalty, thereby gaining legitimacy and access to collective resources (Bailes and Thorhallsson 2013).

### **Explain**

For Ireland, this analysis explains how neutrality and peacekeeping are embedded in EU frameworks, enabling Dublin to project itself as a responsible and principled actor. The EU provides Ireland with a platform for soft power synergy — enhancing diplomatic visibility and normative credibility — while also reinforcing its legitimacy at home and abroad.

### **Limit**

However, the article underestimates the costs: pooling sovereignty can expose small states to identity erosion, elite–public gaps, and obligations disproportionate to their capabilities. Ireland’s referenda on EU treaties reveal these tensions, where neutrality and sovereignty anxieties limit enthusiasm for deeper integration.

### **Consequent**

Thus, instrumentalising the EU offers Ireland significant legitimacy and visibility, but this influence is contingent and vulnerable to domestic scepticism. For small states, EU shelter enhances voice, yet overreliance risks hollowing out independent strategic agency.

## **DIMER Analysis — Bailes, Thorhallsson & Johnstone (2013)**

### **Describe**

Bailes, Thorhallsson and Johnstone (2013) apply small state theory to Scotland’s possible independence, asking where it might seek “shelter”. They argue that small states require shelter across multiple dimensions: strategic, political, economic and societal. Options include alliances with larger states, regional institutions such as NATO and the EU, and

cultural–societal ties (e.g. Nordic cooperation). The study concludes that an independent Scotland would inevitably need multi-dimensional external shelter, but such protection always comes at a cost in autonomy (Bailes, Thorhallsson, and Johnstone 2013).

### **Interpret**

The article extends the “shelter theory” in small state studies: security is not confined to military alliances but includes economic stability, societal resilience and cultural legitimacy. For Ireland, the implication is clear: neutrality and peacekeeping are not stand-alone strategies but part of a broader need for economic and political shelter, provided primarily through EU membership and close relations with the US and UK. Shelter theory therefore underpins both the Legitimacy and Soft Power Synergy Effects in your framework.

### **Methodology**

The paper is conceptual and comparative, drawing on EU small-state cases, Nordic precedents and Scotland’s contemporary debate. It uses qualitative analysis of policy options and historical analogies. Strength: integrates multi-dimensional notions of shelter. Weakness: Eurocentric and context-specific; limited applicability to small states outside Europe.

### **Evaluate**

Contribution: Advances small-state theory by broadening security to include economic and societal shelter, not just hard power. This makes the framework highly relevant to contemporary non-traditional threats. Weakness: assumes shelter is always attainable through institutions; underestimates the fragility of great-power guarantees or domestic legitimacy.

### **(Autho)R**

Alyson Bailes (diplomat-scholar), Baldur Thorhallsson (Iceland, leading small-state theorist), and Rachael Lorna Johnstone (law scholar). Bias: pro-institutionalist and sympathetic to Nordic/EU integration. Influence: adds to Thorhallsson’s wider “shelter theory” corpus.



### **Limit → Implication**

*Limit:* Eurocentric and institutionalist bias; assumes NATO/EU shelters are accessible and reliable, downplaying autonomy or domestic contestation.

*Implication:* For this essay, the shelter framework clarifies that small states such as Ireland derive security primarily through embedding in multilateral and societal shelters. This reinforces the Soft Power and Legitimacy Effects but warns that influence is contingent on external guarantees and internal legitimacy.

## **PEEL-C Paragraph (Application to Legitimacy and Shelter)**

### **Point**

Small states rely on multi-dimensional shelter to maintain legitimacy and influence, but such protection comes at the cost of autonomy.

### **Evidence**

Bailes, Thorhallsson and Johnstone (2013) argue that an independent Scotland would require strategic, political, economic and societal shelter from NATO, the EU, its neighbours and the US. They stress that shelter reduces vulnerability, absorbs shocks and aids recovery, but always entails concessions of sovereignty and freedom of manoeuvre (Bailes, Thorhallsson, and Johnstone 2013).

### **Explain**

For Ireland, the logic is similar: neutrality and peacekeeping operate only because of EU membership, transatlantic ties and economic integration. Ireland presents these as principled choices, but in practice they are embedded in external shelters that provide resilience and legitimacy.

### **Limit**

However, the framework underplays domestic legitimacy. Irish public scepticism towards EU defence integration, like Scottish divisions on NATO, shows that shelter strategies may trigger internal political costs even if externally beneficial.

### **Consequent**

Thus, shelter theory underpins the Legitimacy Effect: Ireland's international credibility depends on its ability to balance external shelter with internal political acceptance. Over-reliance on institutional shelters without domestic support risks hollowing out legitimacy.

## **DIMER Analysis — Bailes & Thorhallsson (2012/2013)**

### **Describe**

Bailes and Thorhallsson (2012/2013) argue that membership of regional institutions, especially the European Union, is central to small states' security strategies. They contend that the EU provides not just economic shelter but also unique forms of "soft" security, such as resilience against pandemics, environmental degradation, energy vulnerability, cyber threats and terrorism. The EU's supranational features, including the Commission and Court of Justice, provide smaller states with mechanisms of influence and protection that differ from traditional alliance politics (Bailes and Thorhallsson 2013).

### **Interpret**

For small states, the EU represents a strategic protector that allows them to "escape smallness" by pooling sovereignty and aligning national strategies with EU norms. The EU's broad agenda means that small states' declared strategies are often instrumental: signalling harmlessness, projecting loyalty, and importing EU priorities to gain legitimacy. For Ireland, this translates into framing neutrality, peacekeeping and EU membership as part of a coherent legitimacy-seeking strategy that magnifies its international voice despite limited military capability.

### **Methodology**

The article is conceptual and comparative, drawing on qualitative evidence from European small states' security strategies, EU governance structures, and case examples such as the Nordic states, Cyprus, and the Western Balkans. Its strength lies in providing a systematic framework for linking small-state strategy to EU shelter; its weakness is Eurocentrism and limited applicability beyond the European context.

### **Evaluate**

Contribution: The paper advances small-state studies by integrating EU membership into strategic analysis, shifting attention away from “hard” military threats to the existential and “soft” security concerns shaping small-state behaviour. Weakness: it may exaggerate the EU’s protective role, underestimating the risks of sovereignty loss, identity erosion, and domestic elite–public divides.

### **(Autho)R**

Alyson Bailes, a former British diplomat and visiting professor in Iceland, and Baldur Thorhallsson, founder of the Centre for Small State Studies, are leading authorities on small-state theory. Bias: both are sympathetic to EU integration and institutionalist perspectives, downplaying realist constraints. Influence: the article is widely cited in European small-state literature.

### **Limit → Implication**

*Limit:* The framework is highly Eurocentric and assumes the EU is a benign shelter, neglecting cases where integration amplifies vulnerability or triggers domestic resistance.

*Implication:* For this essay, Bailes & Thorhallsson underpin the **Soft Power Synergy** and **Legitimacy Effects**: they show how small states such as Ireland instrumentalise EU membership to project legitimacy and gain influence, but they also reveal the strategic costs of dependence and loss of autonomy.

## **PEEL-C Paragraph (Application to Soft Power Synergy and Legitimacy)**

### **Point**

Small states amplify their influence by instrumentalising the European Union as both a security shelter and a source of legitimacy.

### **Evidence**

Bailes and Thorhallsson (2012/2013) argue that EU membership allows small states to address vulnerabilities that no bilateral protector could manage, from energy resilience to

border management and climate change. They note that declared strategies often import EU norms to signal harmlessness and loyalty, thereby gaining legitimacy and access to collective resources (Bailes and Thorhallsson 2013).

### **Explain**

For Ireland, this analysis explains how neutrality and peacekeeping are embedded in EU frameworks, enabling Dublin to project itself as a responsible and principled actor. The EU provides Ireland with a platform for soft power synergy — enhancing diplomatic visibility and normative credibility — while also reinforcing its legitimacy at home and abroad.

### **Limit**

However, the article underestimates the costs: pooling sovereignty can expose small states to identity erosion, elite–public gaps, and obligations disproportionate to their capabilities. Ireland’s referenda on EU treaties reveal these tensions, where neutrality and sovereignty anxieties limit enthusiasm for deeper integration.

### **Consequent**

Thus, instrumentalising the EU offers Ireland significant legitimacy and visibility, but this influence is contingent and vulnerable to domestic scepticism. For small states, EU shelter enhances voice, yet overreliance risks hollowing out independent strategic agency.

## **DIMER Analysis — EU Global Strategy (2016–2019)**

### **Describe**

The 2016 EU Global Strategy (EUGS) set out a vision of a “stronger Europe” through five priorities: security and defence, resilience of states and societies, cooperative regional orders, support for multilateralism, and an integrated approach to crises (European Union 2016). Annual reports (2017–2019) show progressive institutionalisation: new defence structures (MPCC, PESCO, CARD), stronger EU–UN cooperation, closer NATO complementarity, and investment in strategic communication and public diplomacy (European External Action Service 2017; European External Action Service 2018; European External Action Service 2019). The EUGS positioned the EU as a comprehensive secu-

rity actor, blending military and non-military instruments with development, climate, and migration policies.

### **Interpret**

For small states such as Ireland, the EUGS is highly relevant: it embeds neutrality and peacekeeping within broader EU frameworks and allows niche contributions (training missions, CSDP operations) to gain collective visibility. The emphasis on resilience and multilateralism reinforces Ireland's reliance on institutions rather than unilateral military power. However, the drive towards "strategic autonomy" creates tensions: small states may benefit from EU shelter but also face pressure to align with defence integration beyond their traditional comfort zones.

### **Methodology**

The EUGS and its reports are policy documents—programmatic, declaratory, and integrative. They rely on consensus-building among member states, not empirical testing. Strength: provide authoritative statements of EU collective intent. Weakness: aspirational language may outpace actual implementation, particularly in military capacity.

### **Evaluate**

Contribution: These documents show how the EU institutionalises soft and hard power into a hybrid toolbox, providing small states with platforms for influence. They underpin the **Soft Power Synergy Effect** (public diplomacy, normative leadership), **Organisational Agility Effect** (EU structures enabling niche contributions), and **Legitimacy Effect** (multilateral shelter legitimising small-state choices). Weakness: Eurocentric scope, limited attention to great-power pushback, and potential overreach in claims of strategic autonomy.

### **(Autho)R**

The documents are authored under the EEAS and HR/VP Federica Mogherini, reflecting institutional and political consensus. Bias: aspirational integrationist framing, limited acknowledgement of member state reluctance or EU hard-power weaknesses. Influence: high—EUGS has structured EU foreign and security policy debates since 2016.

### **Limit → Implication**

*Limit:* The EUGS overstates EU capacity to act autonomously, and assumes member state alignment. *Implication:* For this essay, the EUGS illustrates how small states can amplify influence through EU frameworks, but also how vulnerability arises if EU ambitions clash with neutrality traditions or domestic legitimacy.

## **PEEL-C Application**

### **Point**

The EU Global Strategy strengthens the ability of small states like Ireland to project influence by embedding their niche roles in a collective framework.

### **Evidence**

The 2017 report notes that “more has been achieved in the last ten months [in defence] than in the last ten years,” citing PESCO, MPCC, and CARD as mechanisms for pooling capacity (EU\_2017). The 2019 review stresses that the EU acts as a global security provider through sixteen civilian and military missions and is moving towards “strategic autonomy” (European External Action Service 2019).

### **Explain**

For Ireland, these developments offer legitimacy and visibility for peacekeeping, training missions, and crisis-management contributions, allowing small states to “escape smallness” by acting through EU structures. This directly supports the **Soft Power Synergy** and **Organisational Agility Effects**.

### **Limit**

However, deeper defence integration (e.g., PESCO commitments) risks clashing with neutrality narratives, raising domestic legitimacy questions. The EU’s aspirational tone may also mask limited operational capability.

### **Consequent**

Thus, the EUGS illustrates both opportunity and constraint: small states can leverage EU shelter for influence, but must carefully balance external commitments with domestic legitimacy.

## **DIMER Analysis — Gray (2005)**

**Describe** Gray (2005) asks whether war has changed since the Cold War. He argues that while the character of warfare shifts, its nature remains constant: war is always political, shaped by context, and full of danger, uncertainty, and friction. He provides four caveats against futurology: never divorce war from context; beware preparing for the wrong kind of conflict; trend analysis is unreliable; and history shows poor predictive records. He then analyses post-1989 warfare, identifying eight themes: (1) war's nature is unchanging; (2) the US has mainly fought third-rate enemies; (3) so-called "new wars" are not actually new; (4) the US temporarily is the balance of power; (5) military transformation is overhyped; (6) interstate war is down but not out; (7) terrorism has changed but will not endure; and (8) cultural delegitimation of war is fragile. He concludes that Clausewitz endures: war is political behaviour for political ends, and continuity outweighs change (Gray 2005).

**Interpret** For your essay, Gray provides the sceptical counterweight to technological or institutional optimism. Unlike Krepinevich's "military revolutions," Gray insists that continuity, politics, and legitimacy dominate. For small states, this implies caution: neutrality, peacekeeping, or drones will not transform their strategic situation if political purpose and legitimacy are absent. Ireland's tendency to treat neutrality as cost-saving and peacekeeping as symbolic fits Gray's warning: without serious political ends, military means cannot generate lasting influence.

**Methodology** Conceptual-historical analysis rooted in Clausewitzian theory and strategic history. Evidence is interpretive, not empirical: examples range from Germany's failures in 1914/41 to US interventions in Panama, Somalia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Strength: sharp theoretical clarity; Weakness: pessimistic bias and focus on Western cases.

**Evaluate** Contribution: Reinforces the enduring relevance of Clausewitz and warns against overstating novelty in war. Offers a corrective to RMA and "new wars" narratives. Weakness: downplays how innovation or institutions might grant small or medium states

agency. His framework risks pessimism: small states may appear doomed to irrelevance, unless they embed their choices in legitimate political ends.

**(Autho)R** Colin S. Gray was professor at the University of Reading and one of the leading strategic theorists of his generation. Bias: strongly Clausewitzian, sceptical of fads (e.g., RMA, post-heroic warfare). Influence: high — a major figure in debates on continuity vs. change in war.

**Limit → Implication** *Limit:* Gray underestimates the potential of innovation, institutions, and norms to create niches for small states. *Implication:* In your essay, use Gray to ground the **Legitimacy Effect**: Ireland's military posture is strategically hollow unless tied to coherent political purpose. This tempers Krepinevich's optimism and Thorhallsson's institutional agency.

## PEEL-C Paragraph (Application to Legitimacy Effect)

**Point** Gray shows that small states cannot rely on technology, institutions, or symbolic gestures unless their military activity is tied to legitimate political ends.

**Evidence** Gray (2005) insists that “whatever about warfare is changing, it is not, and cannot be, warfare's very nature,” stressing that politics, uncertainty, and legitimacy define outcomes. He critiques overconfidence in “new wars,” military transformation, and US hegemony, concluding that continuity prevails (Gray 2005).

**Explain** For Ireland, this reinforces that neutrality and peacekeeping only matter if they are embedded in political strategy. Otherwise, they risk being symbolic rather than substantive contributions. This complements your lecture note observation that the Defence Forces exist “just to stay alive.”

**Limit** Gray risks excessive pessimism: his dismissal of innovation and institutions leaves little room for small-state agency, which other authors (Krepinevich, Keohane, Thorhallsson) highlight.

**Consequent** Nonetheless, his argument grounds your Legitimacy Effect: Ireland's influence depends less on drones, EU shelters, or peacekeeping symbolism, and more on aligning military means with coherent, legitimate political ends.



## Mapping Gray (2005) into the Five Effects

**Niche Specialisation Effect** Fit: Weak. Gray dismisses the idea that novelty or “new wars” create revolutionary opportunities. He stresses continuity, not rupture, implying that small states cannot “escape smallness” through narrow niches. Use in Essay: Contrast with KREPINEVICH’s optimism about revolutions — Gray shows that niches (e.g., drones) will not matter unless tied to coherent political ends (Gray 2005).

**Organisational Agility Effect** Fit: Moderate. Gray accepts that militaries can adapt operationally (e.g., Germany’s ability to adjust in WWI/WWII), but insists that adaptability cannot overcome flawed political purpose. Use in Essay: Supports your argument that Ireland’s Defence Forces’ “survivalist mindset” limits real agility. Organisational changes are insufficient if unconnected to political legitimacy (Gray 2005).

**Hybrid Leverage Effect** Fit: Indirect. Gray cautions against overhyping transformations like the RMA, warning that adversaries adapt asymmetrically and exploit unintended consequences. Use in Essay: Useful to temper the idea that cyber, AI, or economic coercion grant small states leverage. Hybrid tools only matter within the political context and may provoke counter-adaptation (Gray 2005).

**Soft Power Synergy Effect** Fit: Weak. Gray underplays institutional or normative influence, focusing on the political and strategic logic of war. However, his scepticism can sharpen your use of KEoHANE and THORHALLSSON — by showing that soft power narratives risk being hollow without political-strategic substance (Gray 2005).

**Legitimacy Effect** Fit: Strongest. Gray insists that strategy is about the political consequences of military action, not military action itself. Without legitimate political ends, even operational and technological superiority collapses (e.g., Nazi Germany). Use in Essay: This underpins your Legitimacy Effect: Ireland’s peacekeeping and neutrality only enhance influence if perceived as coherent political strategies, not symbolic survival (Gray 2005).

## Comparative PEEL-C (GRAY 2005 vs THORHALLSSON 2006)

**Point** Debate on small-state influence divides between sceptics who emphasise continuity and constraint, and optimists who highlight institutional and perceptual agency.

**Evidence** GRAY (2005) argues that the nature of war is unchanging and that technological or institutional innovations cannot overcome flawed political purposes; strategy is always about political consequences rather than operational brilliance (Gray 2005). By contrast, THORHALLSSON (2006) contends that small states amplify influence by leveraging perceptual and preference size within institutions such as the EU, showing that legitimacy and reputation can magnify their voice despite limited material capabilities (Thorhallsson 2006).

**Explain** Together, these perspectives illuminate the conditionality of small-state influence. THORHALLSSON shows how Ireland can project legitimacy through neutrality and peacekeeping, but GRAY cautions that without coherent political ends, such strategies risk being symbolic rather than substantive. Influence depends not just on institutions or perception but on the strategic purpose underpinning them.

**Limit** GRAY risks excessive pessimism, underplaying how institutions offer small states real agency, while THORHALLSSON risks over-optimism, assuming perceptions translate automatically into durable influence.

**Consequent** For Ireland, the synthesis implies that neutrality and EU engagement can enhance voice, but only if they are embedded in a legitimate political strategy. Otherwise, institutional participation remains hollow, confirming GRAY's warning that military or diplomatic gestures are meaningless without political ends.

## Comparative PEEL-C (GRAY 2005 vs KEOHANE 1969)

**Point** At the systemic level, sceptics like GRAY emphasise structural continuity in war, while institutionalists such as KEOHANE argue that small states gain influence by embedding themselves in international organisations.

**Evidence** GRAY (2005) insists that the fundamental nature of war is eternal, warning that technological change, military transformation, or “new wars” cannot alter the primacy of politics and legitimacy (Gray 2005). By contrast, KEOHANE (1969) categorises small states as “system-affecting” actors that influence outcomes by shaping norms and behaviours through alliances and international institutions, even if they cannot unilaterally determine systemic outcomes (Keohane 1969).

**Explain** Applied to Ireland, KEOHANE’s framework explains how neutrality and UN/EU membership allow Dublin to “punch above its weight” institutionally, while GRAY’s analysis warns that such influence remains fragile if disconnected from coherent political ends. Ireland’s peacekeeping and EU activism only translate into real security outcomes when embedded in legitimate political strategies, not as stand-alone gestures.

**Limit** GRAY risks excessive determinism by downplaying agency, while KEOHANE risks overestimating institutional voice, neglecting the constraints imposed by great-power dominance and strategic continuity.

**Consequent** For Ireland, the synthesis implies that international institutions can amplify influence, but only if their use is politically coherent and legitimate. Otherwise, symbolic neutrality and peacekeeping risk collapsing into irrelevance, as GRAY cautions.

## **DIMER Analysis — Cohen (2002)**

### **Describe**

Cohen (2002) argues that civil–military relations cannot be understood through the “normal theory,” where civilians set goals and militaries simply execute. Instead, effective supreme command is both a *process* of bureaucratic coordination (committees, staff, NSC) and a *relationship* of “unequal dialogue,” where political leaders constantly probe and challenge military subordinates. This friction, although uncomfortable, produces better strategic outcomes (Cohen 2002).

### **Interpret**

For small states, Cohen’s emphasis underscores that legitimacy and influence are inseparable from political–military integration. Where militaries are excluded from strategy, as

in Ireland, neutrality and peacekeeping risk becoming symbolic rather than strategic. His idea of supreme command as dialogue aligns with the **Legitimacy Effect** in the analytical framework.

### **Methodology**

Conceptual–historical analysis, drawing on memoirs (Hankey, Livy), case studies (WWI, WWII, Kosovo), and theoretical critique. Strength: historically rich and conceptually sharp. Weakness: mostly Western great-power cases, with little on small states.

### **Evaluate**

*Contribution:* Cohen challenges the myth of non-interference, showing that civilian meddling is not only inevitable but desirable for sound strategy.

*Weakness:* focus on US/UK/France makes application to small states indirect. Still, his framing of legitimacy and dialogue complements Gray (2005, 2018) by reinforcing that politics always dominates strategy.

### **(Autho)R**

Eliot A. Cohen, professor at Johns Hopkins SAIS, influential in civil–military debates and US grand strategy. Bias: rooted in American great-power perspective, privileging Western democratic models. Influence: high — the “unequal dialogue” is a widely cited concept.

### **Limit → Implication**

*Limit:* Geared toward great powers with globally relevant militaries.

*Implication:* For this essay, Cohen bolsters the **Legitimacy Effect** — Ireland’s marginalisation of its Defence Forces from political dialogue undermines credible strategy. His framework suggests that legitimacy requires active, even frictional, civil–military engagement.

## **PEEL-C Application (Legitimacy Effect)**

### **Point**

Civil–military legitimacy depends not on harmony but on friction within an unequal dialogue.

### **Evidence**

Cohen (2002) shows that democratic leaders from Churchill to Clemenceau constantly prodded and clashed with generals, producing better strategy. He calls this the “unequal dialogue” at the heart of supreme command (Cohen 2002).

### **Explain**

Applied to Ireland: excluding Defence Forces from strategic debate makes neutrality and peacekeeping symbolic gestures rather than strategic tools.

### **Limit**

Cohen’s model presumes militaries with weight in decision-making, unlike Ireland’s marginalised force.

### **Consequent**

Still, the lesson holds: legitimacy stems from active dialogue, not deference or exclusion. Ireland’s neglect of this dialogue undermines its credibility.

## **Mapping Cohen (2002) into Effects**

- **Niche Specialisation:** Minimal. Cohen’s focus is not on capabilities or innovation, but on the political context in which strategy is shaped.
- **Organisational Agility:** Indirect. By stressing that supreme command is a process of committees and staff structures, Cohen highlights how bureaucratic agility underpins strategy.
- **Hybrid Leverage:** Limited. While not addressing cyber or economic coercion, his emphasis on the political shaping of strategy implies that even hybrid tools require political legitimacy to matter.
- **Soft Power Synergy:** Moderate. Cohen implies that legitimacy in civil–military relations enhances credibility abroad, since friction and probing are necessary for coherent strategy that others respect.
- **Legitimacy Effect:** Strong. This is Cohen’s core contribution: legitimacy comes from frictional, probing dialogue between civilians and the military. Excluding the

military undermines credibility, while over-harmony can mask abdication of responsibility (Cohen 2002).

## **Comparative PEEL-C: Legitimacy Effect (Gray 2005 vs Cohen 2002)**

### **Point**

Both Gray and Cohen argue that legitimacy is central to strategy, but they emphasise different mechanisms: Gray highlights contextual continuity, while Cohen stresses active civil–military dialogue.

### **Evidence**

Gray (2005) insists that the nature of war is unchanging and legitimacy derives from connecting political ends to military means, with context always decisive (Gray 2005). Cohen (2002) rejects the “normal theory” of civil–military separation, arguing that legitimacy comes from frictional engagement—an “unequal dialogue”—between civilians and the military (Cohen 2002).

### **Explain**

Together, these views suggest that small states such as Ireland cannot rely on symbolism alone (neutrality, token peacekeeping). Legitimacy requires both contextual alignment (Gray) and meaningful civil–military dialogue (Cohen). Without this, strategy risks being hollow.

### **Limit**

Gray’s analysis is highly abstract and rooted in great-power geopolitics. Cohen’s cases centre on major wartime leaders, which may not scale to small states with marginal militaries.

### **Consequent**

The synthesis strengthens the Legitimacy Effect: for Ireland, credibility requires grounding neutrality in context (Gray) while also engaging the Defence Forces in active, if un-

equal, dialogue with political leaders (Cohen). Otherwise, legitimacy risks being performative rather than substantive.

## **Comparative PEEL-C: Gray (2005) vs Cohen (2002)**

### *Niche Specialisation Effect*

#### **Point**

Small states can exploit niche roles, but legitimacy and dialogue shape whether those roles endure.

#### **Evidence**

Gray (2005) stresses continuity: technological innovation alone cannot overcome political or contextual weakness (Gray 2005). Cohen (2002) highlights that legitimacy comes from an unequal dialogue where political leaders continually probe military subordinates (Cohen 2002).

#### **Explain**

Niche roles must be politically contextualised (Gray) and legitimised through civil–military dialogue (Cohen), or they risk being tokenistic.

#### **Limit**

Gray is abstract, focused on grand trends; Cohen assumes a large military establishment.

#### **Consequent**

Ireland's niche contributions (peacekeeping, training) can be influential only if embedded in political legitimacy and civil–military dialogue.

### *Organisational Agility Effect*

#### **Point**

Agility requires both adaptation to context and frictional legitimacy between leaders and military organisations.

#### **Evidence**

Gray (2005) warns against rigid adherence to single visions of future war, emphasising

adaptability to uncertainty (Gray 2005). Cohen (2002) shows that probing civilian oversight forces militaries to adapt intellectually and organisationally (Cohen 2002).

**Explain**

Organisational agility is not only structural (Gray) but also relational (Cohen). For small states, this means military survivalist cultures must be challenged by political engagement.

**Limit**

Gray's caveats are at the strategic level; Cohen's evidence comes from great-power war cabinets.

**Consequent**

Ireland's Defence Forces need not just structural agility but political dialogue to ensure relevance in crises.

*Hybrid Leverage Effect*

**Point**

Exploiting hybrid tools requires contextual awareness and legitimate civil–military integration.

**Evidence**

Gray (2005) highlights the enduring uncertainty of war and the limits of technological revolutions (Gray 2005). Cohen (2002) underscores that effective command emerges from the constant questioning of military advice by civilians (Cohen 2002).

**Explain**

Small states adopting hybrid tools (cyber, drones) must adapt to shifting contexts (Gray) and integrate them into legitimate political oversight (Cohen).

**Limit**

Gray downplays the disruptive potential of hybrid innovations; Cohen underplays how small states operate with limited means.

**Consequent**

For Ireland, hybrid tools amplify influence only if embedded in EU frameworks (context) and legitimised by political–military dialogue.



### *Soft Power Synergy Effect*

#### **Point**

Soft power requires contextual continuity and legitimising political oversight.

#### **Evidence**

Gray (2005) notes that political and cultural contexts shape war more than technology (Gray 2005). Cohen (2002) shows legitimacy stems from leaders' ability to question military advice and ensure alignment with political objectives (Cohen 2002).

#### **Explain**

Ireland's soft power (neutrality, peacekeeping) depends on contextual credibility (Gray) and civil–military legitimacy (Cohen). Without both, soft power risks being symbolic.

#### **Limit**

Gray addresses global power shifts; Cohen focuses on high-intensity conflicts.

#### **Consequent**

Ireland's soft power synergy is strongest when both external context (EU, UN) and internal legitimacy are aligned.

### *Legitimacy Effect*

#### **Point**

Civil–military legitimacy requires contextual continuity and active dialogue.

#### **Evidence**

Gray (2005) insists that legitimacy comes from aligning military means with enduring political contexts (Gray 2005). Cohen (2002) demonstrates that legitimacy arises from tension and dialogue between political leaders and the military (Cohen 2002).

#### **Explain**

Together, they show that small states cannot rely on neutrality or peacekeeping as symbolic policies. Legitimacy requires political grounding (Gray) and engagement with the military (Cohen).

#### **Limit**

Gray's framework is overly abstract; Cohen's evidence is drawn from great powers.

### **Consequent**

Ireland's legitimacy effect depends on embedding neutrality in context and ensuring Defence Forces are engaged in political dialogue, avoiding symbolic marginalisation.

## **Concluding PEEL-C**

### **Point**

Small states shape outcomes by balancing institutions, innovation, continuity, and legitimacy.

### **Evidence**

Keohane (1969, 1988) shows that institutions amplify influence through both rationalist and reflective mechanisms (Keohane 1969; Keohane 1988). Thorhallsson (2006) highlights the importance of perceptions and shelter in enhancing credibility (Thorhallsson 2006). Krepinevich (1994) argues that organisational adaptation to revolutions offers opportunities for small states to “steal a march” on great powers (Krepinevich 1994). Gray (2018) stresses legitimacy and the political essence of strategy, while Gray (2005) reminds us that continuity, context and uncertainty limit the transformative promise of technology (Gray 2018; Gray 2005). Cohen (2002) reinforces this by showing that legitimacy stems from active, frictional civil–military dialogue rather than harmony or deference (Cohen 2002).

### **Explain**

Taken together, these perspectives demonstrate that small states cannot rely on any single pathway to influence. Institutions provide shelter and voice (Keohane, Thorhallsson), innovation offers niche advantages (Krepinevich), but only when grounded in continuity and context (Gray 2005, 2018). Above all, legitimacy must be actively produced through both external institutional embedding and internal civil–military dialogue (Cohen).

### **Limit**

Each source is partial: Keohane and Thorhallsson privilege institutions, Krepinevich risks technocentrism, Gray can be overly deterministic, and Cohen focuses on great-power cases.

### **Consequent**

The synthesis supports a multi-dimensional framework: Ireland's strategic influence depends on combining institutional shelter, selective innovation, and above all, legitimacy rooted in context and unequal dialogue. This balanced approach avoids symbolic neutrality and grounds Irish strategy in credible practice.

## **DIMER Analysis — HLAP (2022)**

### **Describe**

The High Level Action Plan (HLAP, 2022) is the Irish Government's official response to the Commission on the Defence Forces. It accepts or evaluates 130 recommendations, structured around five strategic objectives: (1) HR and cultural transformation, (2) new command and control structures, (3) service reform, (4) revitalisation of the Reserve, and (5) joint capability development. It commits Ireland to move to Level of Ambition 2 (LOA2) by 2028, raising the defence budget to €1.5bn and adding 2,000 personnel (Department of Defence and Defence Forces 2022).

### **Interpret**

For small-state strategy, the HLAP highlights a shift from survivalist minimalism to cautious modernisation. It acknowledges chronic legitimacy gaps — cultural issues, weak HR structures, and command ambiguities — while embedding Ireland's Defence Forces in EU/NATO cooperative frameworks. The plan embodies both **organisational agility** (new structures, HR reform) and **legitimacy** (addressing culture, diversity, oversight), but also underscores reliance on external shelter (EU capability development, PESCO).

### **Methodology**

The HLAP is a government policy document — programmatic, not analytical. It aggregates recommendations into an implementation plan with phased timelines and oversight structures. Its strength lies in being an authoritative primary source for Ireland's official strategy. Its weakness is aspirational bias: progress is contingent on funding, political will, and cultural change.

### **Evaluate**

**Contribution:** The HLAP is crucial for grounding theory (Gray's focus on ends–means mismatch; Bailes & Thorhallsson on shelter) in Ireland's contemporary defence policy. It shows institutional reform as the chosen route for small-state resilience, with modest military ambition. **Weakness:** It sidesteps the deeper neutrality debate, and risks repeating Ireland's pattern of under-delivery versus stated policy.

### **(Autho)R**

Department of Defence and Defence Forces, issued under Ministerial authority. Institutional bias: pro-incremental reform, cautious about LOA3. Political context: 2022, amid Russian aggression in Ukraine, EU calls for “strategic autonomy,” and domestic criticism of Defence Forces' crisis.

### **Limit → Implication**

*Limit:* Aspirational, resource-dependent, and avoids revisiting neutrality doctrine. *Implication:* For this essay, the HLAP exemplifies how small states use institutional reform and EU frameworks to bolster legitimacy and niche capability, but also how limited resources and domestic constraints inhibit strategic autonomy.

## **Mapping HLAP into Effects**

- **Niche Specialisation:** Incremental capacity in cyber, naval patrols, and peacekeeping.
- **Organisational Agility:** Structural reform (CHOD, Joint HQ, HR transformation).
- **Hybrid Leverage:** Cyber defence, EU capability initiatives, PESCO.
- **Soft Power Synergy:** EU and UN embedding, diversity and cultural reform for legitimacy.
- **Legitimacy:** Cultural change, oversight mechanisms, stakeholder engagement central.

## PEEL-C Paragraph (Application)

### Point

The HLAP (2022) illustrates Ireland's attempt to balance modest capability growth with legitimacy-driven reform.

### Evidence

The plan commits to LOA2 by 2028, creating a Chief of Defence, Joint HQ, revitalised Reserve, and major HR/cultural reform, while embedding Ireland in EU frameworks such as PESCO and capability development (Department of Defence and Defence Forces 2022).

### Explain

For small-state strategy, this reflects a synthesis of institutional shelter, niche specialisation, and legitimacy-building. Ireland aims to modernise without abandoning neutrality, relying on EU frameworks to amplify influence and cover vulnerabilities.

### Limit

However, implementation depends on resources and political will, and neutrality tensions remain unresolved. The HLAP risks over-promising and under-delivering, repeating past disconnects between ambition and means.

### Consequent

Thus, HLAP (2022) underscores that small states derive influence less from raw capability than from legitimacy, institutional embedding, and carefully managed reforms — but credibility hinges on delivering tangible change.

## 1.1

DIMER Analysis — White Paper on Defence (2015) and Update (2019)

### Describe

The White Paper on Defence (2015) provided Ireland with a ten-year strategic framework up to 2025, reaffirming military neutrality while committing to international engagement through the UN, EU, NATO Partnership for Peace, and OSCE (Government of Ireland 2019). The 2019 Update reviewed implementation, reaffirmed the fundamentals, but highlighted serious challenges in recruitment, retention, and capability gaps (especially in Air

Corps, Naval Service, and cyber). It also noted expanded overseas operations, deeper EU integration through PESCO, and Brexit-related uncertainties (Government of Ireland 2019).

### **Interpret**

The White Paper positions neutrality not as isolation but as active multilateral engagement. For small states like Ireland, this reflects a strategy of “institutional shelter” — embedding in EU and UN frameworks to amplify legitimacy while compensating for weak military means. However, the 2019 Update underscores the fragility of this model: chronic under-staffing and reliance on symbolism (peacekeeping, naval patrols) raise doubts about the Defence Forces’ ability to sustain commitments. Neutrality thus functions as both soft power and cost-saving mechanism, but risks hollowing out substantive capability.

### **Methodology**

These are state policy documents — declaratory, consensus-driven, and programmatic. They reflect government priorities more than independent analysis. Their strength lies in signalling political intent and resource allocation; their weakness is aspirational over-reach and political spin (e.g. neutrality framed as “active” while military underinvestment persists).

### **Evaluate**

Contribution: The White Paper and Update reveal how Ireland instrumentalises neutrality and EU frameworks as part of its security identity, aligning with Bailes and Thorhallsson’s shelter theory. They also show structural constraints: persistent personnel shortages, capability gaps, and dependence on multilateral legitimacy. Weakness: the documents avoid confronting strategic trade-offs — neutrality vs. EU integration, capability vs. symbolism, or autonomy vs. shelter.

### **(Autho)R**

Official documents by the Department of Defence and Government of Ireland. Bias: self-justifying, focused on portraying progress and stability. Influence: high — they are the authoritative framework for Irish defence policy and widely cited in parliamentary debates.

### **Limit → Implication**

*Limit:* Aspirational framing obscures capability shortfalls and strategic incoherence. *Implication:* For this essay, the White Paper is crucial for illustrating the **Legitimacy Effect** (neutrality as soft power) and **Organisational Agility Effect** (institutional adaptation to EU frameworks), but it also demonstrates the limits of symbolic strategies when material gaps persist.

## **1.2**

### **PEEL–C Paragraph (Application to Legitimacy and Organisational Agility)**

#### **Point**

Ireland uses neutrality and EU membership to project legitimacy, but persistent capability shortfalls undermine credibility.

#### **Evidence**

The 2019 Update acknowledges Defence Forces strength at just 8,762, well below the 9,500 target, with critical gaps in air, naval, and cyber roles (Government of Ireland 2019). Yet it highlights Ireland's deepened EU role through PESCO, naval deployments in the Mediterranean, and continued peacekeeping.

#### **Explain**

This duality shows neutrality instrumentalised as legitimacy: internationally, Ireland appears engaged and principled; domestically, neutrality justifies low investment. Organisational agility is evident in adapting to EU frameworks, but operational delivery is constrained by underfunding and retention crises.

#### **Limit**

As a government policy document, the White Paper avoids questioning whether neutrality is sustainable given capability gaps, or whether EU integration erodes traditional non-alignment.

#### **Consequent**

Thus, while the White Paper illustrates how small states leverage legitimacy and insti-

tutional shelter, it also shows that without addressing material shortfalls, neutrality risks becoming symbolic rather than strategic.

## **Mapping White Paper on Defence (2015/2019) into Effects**

- **Niche Specialisation Effect**

The White Paper highlights Ireland's peacekeeping, naval patrols, and training missions as niche contributions. These reinforce Ireland's international visibility despite limited resources, but the 2019 Update shows that overstretch and under-manning threaten sustainability (Government of Ireland 2019).

- **Organisational Agility Effect**

Ireland adapts institutionally by embedding in EU initiatives such as PESCO, MPCC, and CARD, signalling agility in aligning with collective frameworks. However, recruitment and retention crises reveal limited agility at the operational level (Government of Ireland 2019).

- **Hybrid Leverage Effect**

The documents acknowledge non-traditional threats (cyber, pandemics, climate) but offer limited capacity to address them, exposing vulnerability. Reliance on EU frameworks hints at potential leverage through regulatory and multilateral approaches, but agency remains weak (Government of Ireland 2019).

- **Soft Power Synergy Effect**

Neutrality and peacekeeping are consistently framed as Ireland's strategic identity, projecting credibility within UN and EU contexts. The White Paper illustrates how soft power is institutionalised into defence policy as a substitute for hard power (Government of Ireland 2019).

- **Legitimacy Effect**

Neutrality serves as the cornerstone of domestic and international legitimacy. However, the 2019 Update's admission of critical capability shortfalls risks hollowing



out this legitimacy if rhetoric is not matched by credible capability (Government of Ireland 2019).

## **DIMER Analysis — Department of Defence (2025–2028)**

### **Describe**

The 2025–2028 Strategy Statement sets the strategic direction for Ireland’s Department of Defence and Defence Forces. It operationalises the recommendations of the Commission on the Defence Forces (2022), confirming a move towards Level of Ambition 2 (LOA2) by 2028, with the possibility of advancing to LOA3. Priorities include maritime security, integrated monitoring and surveillance (air, land, sea), revitalisation of the Reserve Defence Force, cultural reform, cyber defence, and climate action. The document emphasises neutrality, multilateralism, and whole-of-government resilience (Department of Defence and Defence Forces 2025).

### **Interpret**

For the presentation, this shows Ireland institutionalising transformation after years of under-investment. The focus is dual: building credible national defence (radar, cyber, naval renewal) while sustaining legitimacy through neutrality, peacekeeping, and EU/UN engagement. The explicit link to resilience and climate action illustrates the broadening of defence beyond traditional hard power. However, it also demonstrates that Ireland’s strategy remains one of “shelter” within EU/UN frameworks rather than autonomous power projection.

### **Methodology**

This is a strategic policy document, not empirical research. It sets programmatic goals, funding commitments, and timelines. Strength: authoritative, binding on Defence policy. Weakness: aspirational tone, may outpace actual implementation (notably recruitment/retention and capability gaps).

### **Evaluate**

Contribution: The Strategy Statement institutionalises transformation, providing concrete indicators (funding to €1.5bn, radar, cyber command, naval regeneration). It embeds de-

fence within whole-of-government resilience and EU multilateralism, reinforcing small-state shelter theory. Weakness: neutral framing and resource constraints may limit delivery, risking a gap between rhetoric and capacity.

**(Autho)R**

Produced jointly by the Department of Defence and Defence Forces leadership (civil–military). Bias: strongly pro-reform and pro-institutionalist. Influence: high—this is the official guiding document for Ireland’s defence through 2028.

**Limit → Implication**

*Limit:* Aspirational targets (11,500 personnel, radar, fleet renewal) may exceed Ireland’s fiscal and political capacity. *Implication:* For the presentation, this illustrates the tension between ambition and credibility in small-state strategies: legitimacy is strong on paper, but organisational and resource gaps persist.

## **Mapping into Effects**

- **Niche Specialisation:** Peacekeeping, training missions, maritime surveillance framed as Ireland’s contributions.
- **Organisational Agility:** Major reforms to command, culture, and HR show institutional adaptation.
- **Hybrid Leverage:** Cyber defence strategy, anti-drone, and subsea awareness projects respond to hybrid threats.
- **Soft Power Synergy:** Neutrality, peacekeeping, and EU Presidency (2026) enhance Ireland’s visibility and credibility.
- **Legitimacy:** Neutrality reaffirmed as central; legitimacy reinforced by reforms (tribunal of inquiry, oversight body, IRG implementation).

## **PEEL-C Paragraph (Application to Legitimacy)**

### **Point**

Legitimacy in civil–military affairs requires not only neutrality but demonstrable reform and accountability.

### **Evidence**

The Department of Defence Strategy Statement 2025–2028 reaffirms neutrality while committing to cultural reform, new oversight mechanisms, and implementation of the Commission on the Defence Forces recommendations. It links legitimacy to transparency, diversity, and public trust as well as neutrality’s international resonance (Department of Defence and Defence Forces 2025).

### **Explain**

For Ireland, legitimacy is twofold: externally, neutrality and peacekeeping continue to frame it as a principled small state; internally, reforms to culture, HR, and oversight aim to rebuild public confidence in the Defence Forces. This reflects the shift from symbolic neutrality towards substantive legitimacy rooted in credible reform.

### **Limit**

However, resource constraints and recruitment crises may undermine delivery, exposing a gap between aspirational legitimacy and operational credibility.

### **Consequent**

Thus, the 2025–2028 Strategy Statement illustrates that for small states, legitimacy is a strategic asset, but one that must be matched by organisational delivery to sustain influence.

## **DIMER Analysis — Nye (2008)**

### **Describe**

Nye (2008) defines soft power as the ability to shape others’ preferences through attraction rather than coercion or payment. Its sources lie in culture, political values, and foreign policies that are seen as legitimate. Public diplomacy is a tool of soft power, encompassing communication, strategic messaging, and long-term relationship-building. Nye argues

Table 1.1: Mapping the DoD Strategy Statement 2025–2028 into Framework Effects

Effect	Application from DoD Strategy Statement 2025–2028 (Department of Defence and Defence Forces 2025)
Niche Specialisation	Commitment to UN peacekeeping and crisis-management missions highlights Ireland’s continued use of neutrality and international service as its strategic niche.
Organisational Agility	Reform agenda (culture, HR, oversight) seeks to address recruitment/retention and modernise force structures; agility framed as institutional transformation rather than battlefield manoeuvre.
Hybrid Leverage	Recognition of cyber and emerging security threats; investment in digital resilience and cross-governmental partnerships shows how Ireland leverages networks rather than hard power.
Soft Power Synergy	Emphasis on EU and UN cooperation, climate security, and humanitarian roles enhances Ireland’s visibility and credibility as a principled small state.
Legitimacy	Neutrality reaffirmed externally, while domestic legitimacy targeted through transparency, diversity, and implementation of Commission on the Defence Forces reforms. Gaps remain if resource constraints undermine credibility.

that credibility and consistency are vital: propaganda or contradictory policies can undermine attraction. He introduces the notion of “smart power”—the effective combination of hard and soft power resources (Nye 2008).

### Interpret

For small states, this framework underscores that legitimacy and credibility are as important as resources. While they lack hard power, small states can amplify their voice through values, cultural diplomacy, and principled foreign policies. Ireland’s neutrality, peacekeeping, and EU membership can thus be read as soft power strategies, providing legitimacy and attraction that outweigh material weakness. Nye’s emphasis on “credibility as the scarcest resource” reinforces the essay’s Legitimacy and Soft Power Synergy Effects.

### Methodology

This article is a conceptual essay, rooted in theory and historical examples (e.g., USIA, Cold War broadcasting, cultural diplomacy). Its strength is conceptual clarity and applicability across cases. Weakness: it is US-centric and assumes that values/policies can be credibly projected without deeper structural critique of power hierarchies.

### **Evaluate**

Contribution: Establishes soft power as a central analytical tool for IR, shifting debates from coercion to attraction. Weakness: risks idealising soft power and downplaying how even small states' attraction is mediated by larger institutional or structural contexts. Nonetheless, it provides a normative and empirical rationale for small-state influence strategies.

### **(Autho)R**

Joseph Nye, Harvard professor and former US policymaker, is the originator of soft power theory. His perspective is liberal-institutionalist, favouring cooperative and normative explanations of influence. Bias: US-centric, but influential globally.

### **Limit → Implication**

*Limit:* US-centric; underplays structural constraints faced by small states.

*Implication:* For this essay, Nye clarifies how Ireland's neutrality and peacekeeping constitute resources of attraction, but these only translate into influence if credibility is sustained. This aligns with the Legitimacy and Soft Power Synergy Effects.

## **PEEL-C Paragraph (Application to Soft Power Synergy and Legitimacy)**

### **Point**

Small states extend influence through credibility and attraction rather than coercion, amplifying their limited material means.

### **Evidence**

Nye (2008) shows that public diplomacy and cultural legitimacy can “co-opt rather than coerce” others, provided policies and values are credible. He stresses that credibility, not slick propaganda, is the key resource of soft power (Nye 2008).

### **Explain**

For Ireland, neutrality, peacekeeping, and EU engagement function as credible signals of principled behaviour, attracting support and legitimacy disproportionate to its size. This

explains why Irish influence rests less on material force and more on perceived values and identity.

### **Limit**

Nye's framework overlooks how structural dependencies (e.g., reliance on US-led networks or EU shelters) constrain small states' ability to project soft power autonomously.

### **Consequent**

Thus, Nye underpins the essay's Soft Power Synergy and Legitimacy Effects: Ireland's influence derives from credibility and attraction, but risks erosion if domestic legitimacy falters or external dependencies expose contradictions.

## **Mapping Nye (2008) into Effects**

- **Niche Specialisation:** Limited relevance. Nye does not focus on material military niches, but one can infer that small states can specialise in cultural or normative diplomacy as their "niche" contribution.
- **Organisational Agility:** Indirect. Public diplomacy requires institutions that can adapt quickly to reputational challenges and communicate consistently; small states must develop agile foreign ministries and information services to maintain credibility.
- **Hybrid Leverage:** Minimal direct application. Nye emphasises attraction over coercion, but in practice small states can combine soft power narratives with economic or institutional leverage to offset vulnerabilities.
- **Soft Power Synergy:** Central. Nye (2008) explicitly frames culture, values, and legitimate policies as sources of influence, stressing that credibility is the scarcest resource of soft power. This directly validates the Soft Power Synergy Effect.
- **Legitimacy:** Strong. Nye's insistence that propaganda undermines attraction highlights legitimacy as foundational. For Ireland, neutrality and peacekeeping derive power not from symbolism alone but from their credibility as consistent, legitimate policies (Nye 2008).

## Comparative PEEL-C (Nye vs. Gray)

### Point

Both Nye and Gray highlight that legitimacy is central to the exercise of power, but they frame it differently: Nye (2008) grounds it in attraction and credibility, while Gray (2005) insists it derives from the political context that gives war meaning.

### Evidence

Nye (2008) argues that “credibility is the scarcest resource of soft power,” and that propaganda erodes attraction, weakening a state’s influence. Gray (2005), by contrast, stresses that war and strategy cannot be divorced from their political and cultural contexts; strategic success depends on legitimacy in those domains, not just on military prowess (Nye 2008; Gray 2005).

### Explain

For small states such as Ireland, this convergence underscores that neutrality and peace-keeping only generate influence when they are credible to both domestic and external audiences. Nye provides the normative rationale for credibility as a resource of attraction, while Gray reminds us that without political legitimacy, military or diplomatic gestures collapse into symbolism.

### Limit

Nye underplays the constraints of power asymmetry, while Gray offers little on communicative or reputational dimensions.

### Consequent

Together, they reinforce the **Legitimacy Effect**: Ireland’s ability to project influence rests not only on normative attraction but also on embedding those practices in meaningful political contexts that align ends, ways, and means.

## Comparative PEEL-C (Nye vs. Farrell & Newman)

### Point

Nye (2008) views globalisation as expanding the scope of soft power through attraction

and credibility, whereas Farrell & Newman (2019) reveal its darker side: asymmetric networks weaponised by great powers to coerce others.

### **Evidence**

Nye (2008) argues that legitimacy and credibility generate influence that cannot be coerced, emphasising that attraction often yields more sustainable outcomes than force. Farrell & Newman (2019), however, show how the same interdependence can be exploited through *panopticon* and *chokepoint* effects, citing US pressure on SWIFT to disconnect Iranian banks (Nye 2008; Farrell and Newman 2019).

### **Explain**

For Ireland, this contrast highlights a strategic dilemma: neutrality and peacekeeping rely on soft power credibility, but deep embedding in EU and US-centric financial and digital networks exposes it to coercion. Soft power can amplify Ireland's voice, but weaponised interdependence limits its autonomy.

### **Limit**

Nye is overly optimistic about the benign character of global networks, while Farrell & Newman largely discount the agency of small states in shaping regulatory frameworks.

### **Consequent**

Together, they justify the **Hybrid Leverage Effect**: Ireland's influence depends on using institutional platforms (e.g., GDPR, UN peacekeeping) to convert network vulnerability into opportunities for normative leadership, balancing attraction with regulatory shelter.

## **Synthesis Mapping: Nye (2008) and Farrell & Newman (2019)**

- **Niche Specialisation:** Nye (2008) implies that small states can cultivate distinctive reputations in peacekeeping or mediation as sources of attraction, while Farrell & Newman (2019) warn that such niches remain constrained by structural vulnerabilities in finance and digital networks (Nye 2008; Farrell and Newman 2019).



- **Organisational Agility:** Nye suggests that credibility derives from consistent behaviour, requiring institutions to adapt and maintain reputational capital. Farrell & Newman highlight how small states must adjust organisationally within EU and UN platforms to mitigate exposure to coercive chokepoints.
- **Hybrid Leverage:** Nye stresses persuasion over coercion, but Farrell & Newman show that interdependence can be weaponised. For small states, hybrid leverage means exploiting multilateral regulatory frameworks (e.g., GDPR) to constrain coercion while projecting normative authority.
- **Soft Power Synergy:** Nye places legitimacy and attraction at the heart of influence, aligning directly with the synergy effect. By contrast, Farrell & Newman demonstrate that without structural safeguards, soft power risks being overridden by coercive interdependence. The synergy lies in coupling legitimacy with institutional shelter.
- **Legitimacy:** Nye anchors influence in credibility and attraction, while Farrell & Newman expose how legitimacy can be undermined when great powers dominate networks. For Ireland, legitimacy depends on demonstrating principled neutrality and peacekeeping within EU and UN frameworks, while also shaping norms that discipline coercive practices.

**Synthesis:** Together, Nye (2008) and Farrell & Newman (2019) show that soft power cannot be understood apart from structural vulnerabilities. For small states such as Ireland, the challenge is to translate reputational capital into institutionalised safeguards, ensuring that attraction and legitimacy endure in an environment where interdependence is a source of both influence and coercion.

## Gray C. S, Theory of Strategy, 2018

(Gray 2018) Tactics are always and solely about the actual conduct of military action, on any scale and for any purpose, employing weapons of any character. Operations are always

about the direction, indeed the orchestration, of any military action (tactics). Strategy is about (political) consequences of tactical and operational military behaviour. (because strategy is most profoundly about consequences, there can be no such phenomenon as a strategic action).

Periods of peace are not novelties invented and practiced only in the modern world. It is depressing to recognize that the history of our species has been all but shattered from time to time by great wars.

Gray seems to value the key general less than the system. Clausewitz got it wrong by only using contemporary situations to draw a general theory.

Probably the single most useful navigation aid for the researcher and theorist is the elementary conceptual triad comprising Ends, Ways, and Means. When the ideas of Assumptions and Consequences are added to the core three we have the rather bare basis of a usable method for exploring.

Political ends, served by strategic ways, employ military means with the whole activity largely governed by relevant assumptions.

Grand strategy is understood intelligently as a very occasional aspiration conceived and effected for a particular, extraordinary case of state need.

His general theory does not account for nuclear weapons.

1. Grand strategy is the direction and use made of many or all the assets of a security community including its military instrument for the purposes of policy decided at the political level.
2. Military strategy is the direction and use made of force and the threat of force for the purposes of policy decided at a political level.
3. Strategy is the only bridge that connects policy and its politics with military power.
4. Strategic effect is a concept as essential and elusive as it has become unduly commonplace often in misuse.
5. Strategy is always human.

6. Strategy is not about threat and action; rather, it is about consequence of such behaviour.
7. Strategy needs an enemy.
8. Chaos, adaptability and surprise are persistent features in strategic matters.
9. Strategy's general theory is supplemented by strategies specifically for application in different environments.
10. High intensity of feeling or passion is commonly an accompaniment to, if not always itself a case of, war.
11. Personality can figure positively or negatively in strategy, but the relevance of culture remains controversial. It is possible for culture to play a significant strategic role.
12. All societies as well as many institutions within them claim to hold to an ethical code.
13. Political, including diplomatic engagement, is complement to strategy.
14. Intelligence and deception are permanent features in the character of strategy.
15. The relative challenges differ among policy, strategy, operations and tactics.
16. All strategy is based on some assumptions.
17. Strategy does not change, but implementing operations and tactics certainly does.
18. Strategy always has geographical context with political meaning.
19. Technology for weapons does not win wars but it can usually help significantly.
  - a) Weapons are no more than tactical tools that must have some strategic consequence in use, great or small.
  - b) The strategist in all ages has recognized the potential value of a technical lead over an enemy.

- c) While there is virtue in a quest after the best technical answer to essentially technical problems, strategically focused communities need to recognize that the technology best suited to operation in the field of probable action is that known and trusted by troops to be good enough.
  - d) Technologists always strive to advance system performance because that is what they have been educated to do.
  - e) What the strategist seeks are affordable weapons for both offence and defence that soldiers only average in competence and motivation can use when tired.
  - f) Had military technology alone been sufficient to achieve victory in the land war, then Germany would have been victorious. The truly appalling German political cause was beyond rescue even by the imperiously unmatched quality of the Panther and Tiger tanks in particular. Despite the fact that the Wehrmacht conducted itself with superior operational art, tactics and generalship overall, the war was so far lost politically – and therefore strategically – that no measure of technological superiority could rescue the Reich.
20. All strategy has both temporary and broader historical contexts.
21. Supply and movement are fundamental enablers of strategy.
22. Doctrine expresses what is believed to be best contemporary practice in tactics and operations but not in strategy.

## **DIMER Analysis of Bessner (2015)**

### *Describe*

Bessner and Guilhot (2015) interrogates the trajectory of American grand strategy and the intellectual traditions underpinning it. He contends that realism, liberalism, and their institutional incarnations obscure the persistence of U.S. hegemonic ambitions. The article explores how academic theorists have historically provided justificatory narratives

that legitimate the projection of power. Its central claim is that American strategy is characterised less by coherent doctrine than by intellectual legitimisation serving policy needs.

### *Interpret*

The analysis applies primarily to great powers such as the United States, but its implications matter for small states indirectly. For Ireland and other small states, the piece highlights how dominant powers set the strategic discourse, narrowing the space for alternative narratives. The lacuna is its neglect of small-state agency: Bessner focuses on the intellectual architecture of U.S. hegemony, not on how minor powers can navigate or contest it. This matters because in Irish Defence and Strategic Studies, influence depends not only on material contributions but also on how small states position themselves within hegemonic discourses.

### *Methodology*

This is a theoretical-historical article, drawing on intellectual history and secondary literature. It is best situated as commentary and synthesis rather than empirical research. On the hierarchy of evidence, it ranks as expert opinion informed by historical case references. The method is strong for tracing ideas and narratives but weak in empirical testing, limiting external applicability to small states or policy contexts outside the U.S.

### *Evaluate*

The contribution lies in exposing the link between strategy and intellectual legitimisation. Unlike structural realists (e.g. Waltz), Bessner foregrounds the ideational layer. However, compared to constructivists such as Wendt, his analysis is narrower: he sees ideas primarily as instruments of great-power dominance rather than as intersubjective structures shaping all actors. For Defence Forces analysis, this raises a contrast: while Bessner sees legitimacy as a hegemon's narrative tool, small states rely on legitimacy as their centre of gravity. Thus, the value of the piece lies in offering a foil against which to test small-state frameworks.

*(Autho)R*

Bessner is a historian of U.S. foreign policy at the University of Washington, with a critical approach to American exceptionalism. His institutional background and disciplinary lens bias him toward scepticism of hegemonic strategies. This makes him a useful counterbalance to optimists like Nye or Thorhallsson, but less helpful for understanding small-state agency. His critique of legitimising narratives underlines the importance of recognising how intellectual discourse can constrain Irish strategic autonomy.

*Limit → Implication*

**Limit:** The article focuses exclusively on U.S. hegemonic traditions, ignoring small-state dynamics. **Implication:** For Ireland, the relevance lies not in mirroring the U.S. but in understanding how hegemonic narratives shape the space for small-state legitimacy.

*PEEL-C Application to Framework*

**Point:** Bessner demonstrates that legitimacy is often a narrative tool wielded by great powers to rationalise hegemony. **Evidence:** His critique shows how American academics embedded liberal-internationalist rhetoric into strategic discourse (Bessner and Guilhot 2015). **Explain:** For small states, this indicates that legitimacy cannot be assumed neutral: it is contested terrain defined by stronger actors. **Limit:** The analysis underplays how small states like Ireland use neutrality and peacekeeping to build bottom-up legitimacy. **Consequent:** Within the five-effects framework, Bessner underscores why legitimacy is fragile for small states—it can be co-opted by hegemonic narratives, making strategic clarity and institutional embedding essential.

## **Mapping Bessner (2015) into the Five Effects Framework**

*Niche Specialisation*

Bessner and Guilhot (2015) suggests that great powers monopolise the intellectual space by legitimising their own strategic preferences. For small states, this constrains the scope of niche specialisation: peacekeeping or cyber expertise risks being interpreted as sup-

port for hegemonic agendas rather than independent contributions. Thus, niches are vulnerable to appropriation by dominant narratives. **Limit → Implication:** Limit: Bessner underplays small-state agency. Implication: Ireland must ensure niches are framed as autonomous contributions tied to neutrality, not subordinated to external legitimising projects.

### *Organisational Agility*

Bessner indirectly highlights how intellectual traditions shape reform debates. Small states seeking agility may face structural limits if hegemonic narratives define the parameters of what is considered legitimate reform. For example, agility through EU PESCO participation might be reframed as alignment with U.S. or NATO strategic logics. **Limit → Implication:** Limit: No engagement with small-state reform. Implication: Ireland's agility must include narrative agility, resisting co-option into great-power frames.

### *Hybrid Leverage*

Although hybrid strategies are not Bessner's direct concern, his critique of legitimising narratives has implications. Great powers often delegitimise hybrid tactics (cyber, disinformation) when used by others, while legitimising their own. For small states, this double standard constrains the effectiveness of hybrid leverage. **Limit → Implication:** Limit: Absence of hybrid focus. Implication: Ireland's hybrid posture must prioritise regulatory and normative tools (e.g., GDPR) that maintain legitimacy rather than relying on contested coercive instruments.

### *Soft Power Synergy*

Bessner's argument reveals how liberal rhetoric serves U.S. dominance. For small states, this challenges Nye's assumption that soft power is neutral attraction. Instead, soft power synergy must be carefully managed to avoid co-optation. Irish neutrality and peacekeeping can project attraction, but only if framed independently of hegemonic liberal narratives. **Limit → Implication:** Limit: Focuses only on hegemonic soft power.

Implication: Ireland must deploy soft power as identity-driven rather than derivative of great-power discourse.

### *Legitimacy*

The central lesson from Bessner is that legitimacy is contested and often instrumentalised by dominant actors. For small states, legitimacy is the centre of gravity, but it is fragile if not rooted in coherent policy. Ireland's neutrality, peacekeeping, and reforms gain influence precisely because they resist hegemonic appropriation. **Limit → Implication:** Limit: Legitimacy treated as top-down tool of hegemons. Implication: For Ireland, legitimacy must be bottom-up and embedded in institutions (UN, EU) to insulate against narrative capture.

### *Synthesis*

Bessner's analysis provides a cautionary counterweight to optimists like Nye and Thorhallsson. While he underestimates small-state agency, his emphasis on hegemonic narrative control underscores why legitimacy must anchor the other four effects. For Ireland, success depends on ensuring that niche specialisation, agility, hybrid leverage, and soft power are all framed in ways that reinforce independent legitimacy rather than reproducing great-power discourse.

## **DIMER Analysis of Mearsheimer (1994)**

### *Describe*

Mearsheimer (1994) argues that international institutions have minimal independent effect on state behaviour. They reflect the distribution of power rather than shaping it. Examining liberal institutionalism, collective security, and critical theory, he concludes that each rests on flawed causal logics and lacks empirical support. Institutions may appear influential, but for realists they are arenas where great powers act out underlying power politics.



### *Interpret*

The article's central message is that power, not institutions, determines outcomes. For small states, this is sobering: their strategy of leveraging institutions (UN, EU) to magnify influence appears futile from Mearsheimer's perspective. Yet, indirectly, it underscores why legitimacy and institutional embedding matter so much—without these, small states are even more invisible. In an Irish context, peacekeeping or EU membership may not shift great-power behaviour but still provide platforms to project credibility.

### *Methodology*

Mearsheimer employs theoretical critique and selective historical cases (NATO, the League of Nations, OECD cooperation). His approach is conceptual and polemical rather than empirical. The strength lies in stripping institutionalist theories down to their assumptions. The weakness is a lack of systematic evidence and dismissal of small-state roles.

### *Evaluate*

The article is foundational in the realism–institutionalism debate. Compared with Keohane, who sees institutions as enabling cooperation, Mearsheimer insists they merely mirror power distributions. This pessimism usefully cautions against overstating Irish influence via institutions. However, constructivists such as Wendt challenge his determinism, arguing that identities and norms shape interests. Thus, Mearsheimer is best read as a counterweight: his realist scepticism should temper Irish institutional optimism.

### *(Autho)R*

Mearsheimer, a University of Chicago political scientist, is the leading proponent of offensive realism. His positionality biases him toward viewing institutions as epiphenomena of great-power rivalry. For small states, this means he underplays legitimacy and agency. Nonetheless, his realist scepticism is valuable for exposing vulnerabilities in Irish reliance on multilateral institutions.

*Limit → Implication*

**Limit:** Ignores small-state agency and treats institutions as powerless facades. **Implication:** For Ireland, the challenge is to prove him wrong by using institutions to amplify legitimacy and shape norms, even if they cannot alter material power distributions.

*PEEL-C Application to Framework*

**Point:** Mearsheimer denies institutions shape outcomes, reducing their role to reflections of power. **Evidence:** He argues NATO's effectiveness during the Cold War derived not from institutional rules but from the bipolar balance of power (Mearsheimer 1994). **Explain:** This undermines small states' hopes of leveraging institutions to multiply influence. **Limit:** His framework neglects legitimacy-building functions—precisely where small states can matter. **Consequent:** For Ireland, legitimacy must be anchored in political coherence, with institutions used as platforms for visibility rather than illusions of control.

*Mapping into the Five Effects*

- **Niche Specialisation:** Realism suggests niches only matter when aligned with great-power interests. Irish peacekeeping niches risk marginalisation unless seen as contributing to broader balances of power.
- **Organisational Agility:** Agility is constrained; in a realist world, reforms cannot offset structural weakness. For Ireland, agility matters for credibility, but not for changing outcomes.
- **Hybrid Leverage:** Institutions offer little shield from coercion; small states remain exposed. Ireland's cyber and regulatory tools may have symbolic but not strategic weight.
- **Soft Power Synergy:** Mearsheimer rejects Nye's optimism, seeing attraction as irrelevant beside power. For Ireland, this implies soft power only matters when tied to great-power calculations.

- **Legitimacy:** Legitimacy is downgraded in realism, yet for small states it remains the decisive anchor. The implication is that Irish legitimacy is valuable, but mainly as moral cover for great-power strategies rather than independent influence.

### *Synthesis*

Mearsheimer is sceptical of the very foundations on which small-state influence rests. His realism forces a hard question: can Ireland's reliance on neutrality, peacekeeping, and institutions genuinely shape outcomes, or are they marginal rituals? The answer is that while Mearsheimer's structural logic holds for great-power rivalry, small states retain agency in constructing legitimacy, niches, and regulatory influence. His work thus functions not as a model to emulate, but as a critical foil against which small-state frameworks must justify their relevance.

## **DIMER Analysis of Mearsheimer (2019)**

### *Describe*

Mearsheimer (2019) argues that the liberal international order (LIO) was "bound to fail" because it contained the seeds of its own destruction. The LIO depended on unipolarity and U.S. hegemony, but nationalism, balance-of-power politics, and hyperglobalisation produced fatal contradictions. As multipolarity returned with the rise of China and Russia, the system shifted toward bounded realist orders. The article concludes that realist logic, not liberal ambition, will shape future world politics.

### *Interpret*

For small states, this analysis is a stark warning: liberal institutional platforms such as the EU and UN are unstable when not underwritten by U.S. power. Nationalism and multipolar rivalry constrain small-state strategies of legitimacy and institutional shelter. Yet Mearsheimer implicitly acknowledges that weaker states benefit from rule-based orders—even if created by great powers—as these can provide breathing space. For Ireland, the challenge is whether neutrality and peacekeeping maintain credibility when institutions fragment under great-power rivalry.

### *Methodology*

The article blends structural realist theory with historical analysis of the Cold War, post-Cold War order, and recent crises. It is conceptual and deductive, offering sweeping claims rather than empirical testing. Strength: it clarifies causal mechanisms of order decline. Weakness: it downplays small-state agency and the constructive power of norms.

### *Evaluate*

Compared with Keohane (1988), who sees institutions as enabling cooperation, Mearsheimer sees them as tools of great powers. Where Nye (2008) stresses the persistence of soft power, Mearsheimer dismisses it as irrelevant when faced with nationalism and rivalry. Against Gray (2018), who sees strategy as about political consequences, Mearsheimer focuses narrowly on structural drivers. The piece is useful as a sceptical foil to institutionalist and constructivist optimism in the small-state debate.

### *(Autho)R*

Mearsheimer, a University of Chicago scholar, is the leading proponent of offensive realism. His disciplinary and institutional context biases him toward systemic explanations and scepticism of liberal projects. This makes him a rigorous critic, but one who offers little for understanding the micro-level agency of small states.

### *Limit → Implication*

Limit: Treats small states and legitimacy as epiphenomenal, erasing their influence. Implication: For Ireland, the task is to show that legitimacy and institutional embedding matter even in multipolar realist orders, not for changing power distributions but for sustaining visibility and credibility.

### *Mapping into the Five Effects Framework*

- **Niche Specialisation:** Niches are viable only when tolerated by great powers; otherwise, they are irrelevant. Irish peacekeeping works only insofar as it aligns with major-power interests.

- **Organisational Agility:** Agility cannot overcome structural constraints; reforms enhance credibility but cannot alter outcomes in a multipolar order.
- **Hybrid Leverage:** Hybrid tools are dismissed as secondary—small-state cyber or regulatory initiatives cannot offset systemic rivalry.
- **Soft Power Synergy:** Soft power is marginalised; nationalism trumps liberal attraction. For Ireland, this underlines the fragility of neutrality as soft power.
- **Legitimacy:** Mearsheimer downplays legitimacy as an independent force. Yet this highlights why, for small states, legitimacy is essential: it is the only durable currency when structural power is absent.

### *Synthesis*

Mearsheimer's pessimism challenges the very basis of small-state influence. His structural realism implies that Ireland's reliance on legitimacy, neutrality, and institutions cannot shape systemic outcomes. Yet, as a counterpoint to Keohane, Nye, and constructivists, his work is valuable: it forces a more cautious appraisal of Irish influence. The synthesis suggests legitimacy does not replace power, but in a fragmented multipolar order, it remains the only lever through which small states can achieve recognition and limited voice.

## **DIMER Analysis of Tonra (1999)**

### *Describe*

Tonra (1999) examines the Europeanisation of Irish foreign policy, focusing on how EU membership and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) have transformed the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA). He distinguishes between two models: complex interdependence (institutions as bargaining arenas) and polity-forming (identity and norms shaping interests). Tonra argues that in Ireland's case, the latter is more evident: EU participation has broadened the agenda, socialised diplomats into collective norms,

and redefined neutrality debates. The key finding is that Irish foreign policy has been structurally and normatively reshaped by the EU.

### *Interpret*

The analysis applies directly to small states within the EU, showing how institutions and norms can magnify their voice but also constrain autonomy. For Ireland, EU integration enhances access, information, and influence but erodes traditional independence, particularly around neutrality. The lacuna is Tonra's relative neglect of how great-power dynamics (e.g., U.S. hegemony, Russian resurgence) interact with Europeanisation. For Defence Forces strategy, the "so what" is that small states cannot be understood in isolation: their agency is mediated through institutional embedding and identity change.

### *Methodology*

Tonra uses qualitative case analysis, drawing on institutional theory, interviews with policy actors, and documentary evidence. This is a medium-level evidence source: stronger than opinion pieces but weaker than large-N or systematic empirical studies. The strength is depth of context and insider perspectives; the weakness is possible bias toward elite narratives and limited generalisability beyond Ireland.

### *Evaluate*

Compared with Mearsheimer (1994), who dismisses institutions, Tonra demonstrates their transformative power on small states. Against Gray (2005), who stresses continuity, Tonra shows significant change in norms and structures. Relative to Keohane (1988), Tonra offers empirical backing for institutionalist optimism, but with caution: Europeanisation redefines identity but raises tensions with neutrality. His contribution lies in grounding abstract institutionalism in the lived experience of a small EU member.

### *(Autho)R*

Ben Tonra, a scholar of Irish and EU foreign policy at University College Dublin, writes from a constructivist-institutionalist perspective. His positionality biases him toward highlighting European norms and identity-shaping. Critics might argue this underestimates the

persistence of realist constraints, but his institutional grounding ensures credibility. The article is widely cited as a foundational case study in Europeanisation research.

### *Limit → Implication*

**Limit:** Focuses narrowly on EU dynamics, neglecting systemic great-power constraints.

**Implication:** For Ireland, while Europeanisation empowers diplomacy, legitimacy still depends on reconciling EU commitments with neutrality and global credibility.

## **Mapping into the Five Effects Framework**

- **Niche Specialisation:** EU presidencies and CFSP participation provide Ireland with niches of influence (agenda-setting, mediation). Yet, niches are contingent on EU collective priorities, not independent design.
- **Organisational Agility:** DFA expanded, restructured, and professionalised due to EU demands. Agility is enabled through adaptation but constrained by interdepartmental overlaps and resource limitations.
- **Hybrid Leverage:** Europeanisation enhances Ireland's access to regulatory and normative power (e.g., co-location of missions, EU-wide consular protection). Hybrid leverage is thus collective, not unilateral.
- **Soft Power Synergy:** EU membership amplifies Ireland's neutrality and peace-keeping credentials, reframing them as European values. Yet, soft power risks dilution if perceived as mere EU conformity.
- **Legitimacy:** The EU provides legitimacy platforms, but neutrality debates reveal fragility. Legitimacy depends on balancing Europeanisation with domestic consensus on sovereignty and independence.

### *Synthesis*

Tonra shows that small states like Ireland are not passive: Europeanisation empowers them by reshaping institutions, identities, and diplomatic practices. However, empowerment comes at the cost of autonomy, with neutrality increasingly challenged by CFSP

norms. For the five-effects framework, Tonra provides strong evidence for organisational agility, soft power synergy, and legitimacy as interdependent outcomes of institutional embedding. His work thus supports institutionalist optimism while highlighting the political costs of integration for small-state distinctiveness.

## **DIMER Analysis of Tonra and Christiansen (2011)**

### *Describe*

Tonra and Christiansen (2011) explore how EU foreign policy sits uncomfortably between International Relations (IR) and European Studies. They frame the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as a “problem child”: formally intergovernmental yet increasingly institutionalised, norm-driven, and identity-shaping. The article surveys rationalist accounts (neo-realist and neo-liberal), critiques their limits, and promotes cognitive/constructivist approaches that stress identity, beliefs, and norms as constitutive forces. Key finding: CFSP is more than lowest-common-denominator bargaining—it has transformative effects on member state diplomacy.

### *Interpret*

For small states like Ireland, this analysis matters because it highlights how institutional and normative embedding in the EU magnifies diplomatic capacity. Unlike Mearsheimer’s realism (Mearsheimer 1994), Tonra argues that identities and norms evolve through participation. However, the paradox of CFSP persists: formal unanimity preserves national sovereignty, yet socialisation shifts perceptions of interest. The lacuna is limited attention to power asymmetries—smaller states may be socialised but still face dominance from France, Germany, and the UK. The “so what” for Irish Defence Forces is that influence flows less from coercion and more from norm entrepreneurship and credibility in EU fora.

### *Methodology*

The study is theoretical and meta-analytical. It critiques rationalist IR and European integration theories, offering constructivist lenses (cognitive approaches, identity construc-



tion). Evidence is conceptual rather than empirical, ranking as mid-level in the evidence hierarchy. Strength: clarifies conceptual debates and bridges IR and European Studies. Weakness: limited empirical case testing, over-reliance on theoretical synthesis.

### *Evaluate*

Compared with Keohane's institutionalism (Keohane 1988), which stresses rational bargaining, Tonra extends the analysis to norms and identities. Against Mearsheimer's realist scepticism (Mearsheimer 2019), he shows how institutions do more than reflect power—they shape actor identities. Relative to Nye's soft power (Nye 2008), Tonra offers institutional grounding: attraction is embedded in EU socialisation processes. His contribution lies in offering a constructivist framework to explain why small states persistently invest in EU foreign policy despite sovereignty costs.

### *(Autho)R*

Ben Tonra (University College Dublin) and Thomas Christiansen (LUISS, Rome) are leading European foreign policy scholars, with constructivist-institutionalist leanings. Their disciplinary context biases them toward highlighting EU norms and identity as constitutive, potentially underplaying structural power politics. Still, both are widely cited, making this a credible and influential source in EU foreign policy literature.

### *Limit → Implication*

Limit: Theoretical and constructivist emphasis underplays material constraints and power asymmetry. Implication: For Ireland, while CFSP offers opportunities for legitimacy and influence, structural limits remain; niche diplomacy must be carefully framed within EU norms.

## **Mapping into the Five Effects Framework**

- **Niche Specialisation:** CFSP presidencies and working groups provide opportunities for Ireland to specialise in mediation and consensus-building. Niches are institutionalised rather than unilateral.

- **Organisational Agility:** Irish diplomacy adapts through EU institutional engagement, demonstrating agility by embedding national priorities into collective agendas. Agility is mediated by EU structures.
- **Hybrid Leverage:** Normative and regulatory instruments (humanitarian aid, sanctions, Petersberg Tasks) extend Irish leverage via EU coalitions. Hybrid capacity is collective, not national.
- **Soft Power Synergy:** Participation in CFSP amplifies Ireland's soft power, reframing neutrality and peacekeeping as part of a wider European normative identity. This strengthens credibility abroad.
- **Legitimacy:** EU norms confer legitimacy on small states, but legitimacy becomes conditional on alignment with CFSP consensus. Ireland's neutrality is challenged yet legitimised through EU embedding.

### *Synthesis*

Tonra and Christiansen position CFSP as a laboratory for constructivist theory: small states gain influence not by shifting balances of power but by co-creating norms and identities. For Ireland, this validates investment in EU diplomacy as a multiplier of legitimacy and credibility. However, structural limits remind us that legitimacy remains fragile: niches, agility, hybrid leverage, and soft power only matter if coherently tied to EU norms. The work thus supports institutionalist optimism but highlights sovereignty costs for small states seeking relevance.

GPT Make sure that you Use this qUOTE FROM (Thorhallsson 2006) “ambitious political leaders may form a notion of the size of their state and its capacity for international action based on distinctive national history or myths”. Neorealists say that if you ensure that your objectives do not exceed your capabilities a tiny state can do extraordinarily well on the international stage. I.e., for any state, it's crucial that an accurate view of your position is taken. Thorhallsson's model to analyse a state's power based on six categories is worth noting. Hence, should Ireland or other small states be able to identify an edge

where they could ‘steal the march’, (such as through Estonia’s niche specialisation in cyber warfare), they can increase their influence international security outcomes - becoming the ‘system-affecting’ states which Keohane spoke of. Indeed, the idea of a small state’s influence being linked to its systemic role perception is supported by Keohane’s 1969 paper (Keohane 1969). This adds nuances to realists such as Waltz who dismiss small states’ influence, deeming them to be passive actors (Waltz 1979).

## **DIMER Analysis of Keohane (1969)**

### *Describe*

Keohane (1969) reviews a series of works on alliances and small states, framing what he terms the “Lilliputians’ dilemmas.” He identifies the conspicuousness of small states in an era dominated by great-power disparities, examining how nonalignment, alliance choices, and institutional participation condition their survival and influence. Keohane introduces a typology of systemic roles: system-determining, system-influencing, system-affecting, and system-ineffectual states. His key claim is that small states, unable to act decisively alone, seek influence through institutions, alliances, and norms.

### *Interpret*

The article applies directly to small states navigating Cold War dynamics but remains relevant in today’s multipolar system. For Ireland, it highlights the tension between neutrality and alliance dependence, underscoring why institutional participation is a rational strategy. However, Keohane does not address hybrid threats or regulatory leverage, limiting the direct applicability to contemporary security domains. The “so what” for Defence Forces analysis is that systemic role perception, not just material capacity, shapes small-state behaviour. This widens the scope beyond realists like Waltz (Waltz 1979), who reduce small states to passive actors.

### *Methodology*

The article is conceptual and synthetic, reviewing key texts and deriving typologies. It does not employ empirical case studies, placing it low in the hierarchy of evidence. Its strength is in providing definitional clarity and a heuristic framework for comparative analysis. Its weakness is the lack of systematic testing and reliance on Cold War assumptions.

### *Evaluate*

Keohane's contribution is foundational: by moving beyond vague definitions of "small states," he provides a typology that remains widely used. Compared to Rothstein's psychological-material definition, Keohane's systemic role approach is more flexible. Against Mearsheimer's dismissal of institutions (Mearsheimer 1994), Keohane highlights how small states rationally invest in international organisations to shape norms. However, he underplays the agency of small states in regulatory and hybrid domains, which later scholars like Farrell and Newman (Farrell and Newman 2019) highlight.

### *(Autho)R*

Robert Keohane, then at the Brookings Institution, was an emerging institutionalist voice. His positionality—critical of realist determinism, yet cautious of overstatement—foreshadows his later leadership in neoliberal institutionalism. His disciplinary stance biases him toward highlighting the utility of institutions and alliances as rational strategies for small states, though critics argue this overlooks structural constraints.

### *Limit → Implication*

Limit: Framework developed during the Cold War, with limited attention to hybrid or regulatory power. Implication: For Ireland, the typology still guides analysis but must be adapted to modern contexts such as cyber and EU regulation.

## Effects Mapping

- **Niche Specialisation:** Suggests small states can develop niches within alliances and organisations, but only when systemic roles allow.
- **Organisational Agility:** Implies agility is less about military reform and more about adjusting systemic role perceptions and alliance strategies.
- **Hybrid Leverage:** Absent in Keohane’s 1969 framework; does not anticipate economic or digital interdependence as tools.
- **Soft Power Synergy:** Strongly aligned; stresses institutions and norms as avenues for small-state influence.
- **Legitimacy:** Central; systemic roles and institutional participation confer legitimacy on small states unable to influence outcomes unilaterally.

## PEEL-C Paragraph

Keohane demonstrates that small states cannot alter the system independently but may act as “system-affecting” powers through institutions and alliances (Keohane 1969). For example, Ireland’s participation in the UN and EU allows it to convert systemic weakness into credibility, signalling legitimacy through collective norms. This underscores that small states gain soft power and diplomatic visibility when embedded in rules-based systems. However, Keohane’s Cold War framing does not account for contemporary hybrid threats, limiting applicability to 21st-century challenges. Consequently, while the systemic role typology clarifies Ireland’s position, it must be adapted to include regulatory and cyber dimensions for modern relevance.

## **DIMER and Effects Analysis of *The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300–2050***

### *Describe*

Knox and Murray distinguish between broad **military revolutions (MRs)** and narrower **revolutions in military affairs (RMAs)**. MRs are society-driven transformations (e.g., the 17th-century state/army revolution, the French Revolution, the Industrial Revolution, World War I, and nuclear weapons), while RMAs are narrower innovations combining technology, doctrine, and organisation (e.g., Blitzkrieg, precision strike). The editors warn against technological determinism, stressing that political context and culture shape outcomes (Murray and Knox 2001).

### *Interpret*

The analysis applies to states with robust institutions and industrial bases; it is less transferable to small or resource-poor states who cannot independently generate RMAs. For Defence Forces, the “so what” is that strategic change comes from organisational and political adaptation, not just procurement. The lacuna is the under-emphasis on small-state adaptation pathways, such as niche roles or institutional embedding.

### *Methodology*

The work is a historical-conceptual edited volume. It synthesises cases from 1300 to projections of 2050, using qualitative historical analysis. On the hierarchy of evidence, it is expert opinion and case-study synthesis, not systematic data. Reliability is high in terms of historical description, but predictive claims about information revolutions are speculative. Validity is strong for illustrating patterns but weak for forecasting.

### *Evaluate*

Compared to Krepinevich’s optimism about technological RMAs (Krepinevich 1994), Knox and Murray are more cautious, stressing that without doctrine and organisational adaptation, technology disappoints. Gray concurs, emphasising continuity and cultural

limits (Gray 2005). Against Nye's optimism about information power (Nye 2008), the editors underline that informational revolutions are unpredictable and prone to hubris. The volume's contribution is to clarify the distinction between MR and RMA, and to warn against conflating technology with strategy.

*(Autho)R*

MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray are leading historians and strategists, associated with sceptical readings of military innovation. Their disciplinary stance biases them toward continuity, institutional inertia, and the primacy of politics over technology. Their U.S. defence connections frame their analysis against over-optimism in Pentagon RMA discourse of the 1990s. The source is authentic, authoritative, but not neutral—offering a counterweight to technological determinists.

*Limit → Implication*

Limit: The analysis underplays small-state adaptation and treats revolutions as great-power phenomena. Implication: For Ireland, lessons must be adapted—small states cannot generate MRs, but can exploit niches within RMAs if legitimacy and institutional agility are aligned.

## Effects Mapping

- **Niche Specialisation:** Late adopters cannot leapfrog without state capacity; small states can exploit niches only if doctrines are coherent.
- **Organisational Agility:** RMAs demand cultural and organisational reform; agility determines whether technology yields advantage.
- **Hybrid Leverage:** Information/network revolutions may offer tools, but are double-edged; small states risk overestimating their leverage.
- **Soft Power Synergy:** Mass politics and ideology show that informational and normative domains amplify military effects; small states can harness this through peacekeeping or neutrality narratives.

- **Legitimacy:** Each MR demonstrates that political legitimacy anchors military change: nationalism, industrial mobilisation, deterrence. For small states, legitimacy is the decisive multiplier.

## PEEL-C Paragraph

**Point:** Knox and Murray argue that revolutions in military affairs fail without doctrinal and cultural adaptation (Murray and Knox 2001). **Evidence:** The German Blitzkrieg of 1940 appeared revolutionary but was in fact the culmination of interwar doctrinal evolution. **Explain:** This demonstrates that organisational agility and cultural receptivity, not technology alone, generate strategic advantage. **Limit:** The framework underplays how small states might adapt niches within these revolutions. **Consequent:** For Ireland, the implication is clear—legitimacy and agility, not procurement alone, are the levers through which influence is gained in a revolutionary environment.

### *Summary*

**Key Papers** provide the theoretical and conceptual backbone across the five effects. **Supplementary Papers** anchor the argument in Irish policy and EU context, allowing you to connect theory to practice. Priority should be given to the first ten key sources (Thorhallsson, Keohane, Krepinevich, Gray, Farrell/Newman, Nye, Mearsheimer) before moving to contextual policy documents.

definition of small power “A Small Power is a state which recognizes that it can not obtain security primarily by use of its own capabilities, and that it must rely fundamentally on the aid of other states, institutions, processes, or developments to do so; the Small Power’s belief in its inability to rely on its own means must also be recognized by the other states involved in international politics” from Rothstein. Vital says “f the rough limits of the isolated small power’s strength can be delineated and its characteristic disabilities outlined, something that is typical of all small states will have been shown. For the unaligned state can best be regarded as a limiting case for the class of small states, one from which all other small states shade off, in varying and progressively lessening degrees of politi-



cal and military isolation. What can be said of the limiting case is likely to be applicable *mutatis mutandis* to the others. It is of the unaligned power as the paradigm for all small powers that the present study is conceived”.

Rothstein devotes over 100 pages to the question of what types of alliances are most beneficial to small powers. Contending that (p. 170) “in theory, Small Power alliances are condemned; in practice, they remain popular,” his most novel conclusion is his defense of these arrangements. He concludes (p. 177): Small Powers ought to prefer mixed, multilateral alliances. They provide the most benefits in terms of security and political influence. If unavailable, they probably should choose a Small Power alliance in preference to an unequal, bilateral alliance, particularly if the Small Powers do not fear an immediate threat to their security, and if their goals in allying are primarily political. An alliance with a single Great Power ought to be chosen only if all the other alternatives are proscribed, and if the Small Powers fear an imminent attack and even then only in hopes of improving their deterrent stance.

Gray’s 2018 book on strategy (Gray 2018) notes:

“the primary task of subordinate generals must be to organize and command the timely and appropriate necessities for combat for the purposes established by the most senior level of military command in their negotiation with civilian political authority”.

This aligns with (Cohen 2002)’s discussion on the special friction between the military and civilian actors. Gray further argues:

“strategy is about the purposes of action while tactics are about actually performing the action in question”.

“No matter what the weapon technologies will be in the future decades, we know for certain that nothing fundamentally important and positive in moral terms is going to change”.

K. N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (1979), writes:

“Laws establish relations between variables, variables being concepts that can take different values. If a, then b, where a stands for one or more independent variables and b stands for the dependent variable: In form, this is the statement of a law. If the relation between a and b is invariant, the law would read like this: If a, then b with probability x. A law is based not simply on a relation that has been found, but on one that has been found repeatedly. By definition, theories are collections or sets of laws pertaining to a particular behaviour or phenomenon. [...] Theories are, then, more complex than laws, but only quantitatively so. Between laws and theories no differences of kind appears. A theory is born in conjecture and is viable if the conjecture is confirmed.”

## **DIMER Analysis of Waltz (1969)**

### *Describe*

**WALTZ\_1969** outlines the systemic constraints of an anarchic international order, advancing the idea that states exist in a self-help system where survival is the overriding imperative. He compares state behaviour to oligopolistic firms: cooperation is possible, but always fragile and conditioned by fears of relative gains. Waltz stresses the inevitability of the security dilemma: defensive measures by one state appear threatening to others, driving cycles of competition and mistrust. His central claim is that the distribution of capabilities determines outcomes, not intentions or norms.

### *Interpret*

The argument applies most strongly to great-power competition, where balance-of-power politics dominates. For small states, Waltz implies they are system-takers: their autonomy is constrained by structural forces, and their survival depends on alignment, prudence, or shelter. This undercuts institutionalist optimism (e.g., Keohane (Keohane 1969)) and constructivist accounts (e.g., Tonra (Tonra 1999)) that highlight agency through norms. The “so what” for Ireland is sobering: neutrality, peacekeeping, or EU membership cannot alter systemic dynamics; at best, they provide temporary stability. However,

Waltz does not account for legitimacy as an independent resource or for small states' ability to exploit institutional niches.

### *Methodology*

Waltz employs a theoretical and analogical method, drawing on market oligopoly to model international politics. His analysis is deductive, not empirical, and sits at the level of grand theory. Its strength is parsimony and clarity; its weakness is lack of data and neglect of domestic, normative, or institutional variables. Reliability is strong within realist paradigms, but external applicability to small states is limited.

### *Evaluate*

Waltz's neorealism is foundational, providing a rigorous systemic explanation of state behaviour. Compared with Mearsheimer's offensive realism (Mearsheimer 1994), Waltz is more structural, seeing states as constrained balancers rather than aggressive power-maximisers. In contrast to Keohane's institutionalism (Keohane 1988), Waltz dismisses the ability of institutions to alter systemic incentives. While invaluable as a baseline, his theory underdetermines small-state agency and legitimacy. It remains a critical foil for testing institutionalist and constructivist claims about Ireland and other small states.

### *(Autho)R*

Kenneth Waltz, one of the most influential realist theorists, wrote from a U.S. academic context during the Cold War. His disciplinary stance biases him toward structural determinism, downplaying domestic politics and normative change. His authority makes his theory widely cited, but his scepticism of small-state influence reflects his context rather than universal applicability.

### *Limit → Implication*

**Limit:** Neorealism overstates systemic constraints and neglects the role of institutions, norms, and legitimacy.

**Implication:** For Ireland, Waltz's framework warns of constraints but must be adapted,

recognising that small states can gain conditional influence through legitimacy and institutional niches.

## Effects Mapping

- **Niche Specialisation:** Waltz is sceptical; niches are irrelevant unless tolerated by great powers.
- **Organisational Agility:** Agility is structurally constrained; reforms cannot offset systemic pressures.
- **Hybrid Leverage:** Absent from Waltz's account; interdependence is framed only as vulnerability, not as leverage.
- **Soft Power Synergy:** Dismissed; norms and attraction cannot substitute for power.
- **Legitimacy:** Neglected as an independent force; survival rests on power and balance, not legitimacy.

## PEEL-C Paragraph

Waltz argues that international politics is governed by anarchy, forcing states to prioritise survival in a self-help system (**WALTZ\_1969**). For small states, this means limited scope for independent influence: niches, agility, or soft power are fragile under systemic constraints. This explains why Irish neutrality cannot guarantee security, as it depends on the tolerance of stronger states. However, Waltz neglects how institutions and legitimacy can create conditional space for influence, as later shown by Keohane and Thorhallsson. Consequently, Waltz serves as a critical realist baseline: his scepticism sharpens the need to demonstrate how small states defy structural limits through legitimacy and institutional embedding.

(Waltz 1979) also speaks of the interdependence and integration of states. He allows for specialisation when vulnerability is reduced through interdependence, but stresses that in

an anarchic international system such protection does not exist. Realpolitik therefore dominates. For small states, influence is easily diminished when caught between great powers. De Valera's Ireland during the Second World War illustrates this logic: sovereignty was acutely vulnerable, given British fears that the Free State could be used as a base for attack. His realpolitik required acquiescing on the Treaty Ports and adopting neutrality.

Fanning (2015) shows that neutrality was a neorealist strategy for survival, not an immutable cultural identity. De Valera's refusal to join the Allies, despite Churchill's pressure, affirmed independence as the overriding priority: "*no small nation adjoining a great power could ever hope to ... go its way in peace*". Secrecy and ambiguity, as Fanning notes, enabled both blocs to interpret Ireland's stance favourably. This aligns with Gray's principle 14, that "*intelligence and deception are permanent features of strategy*" (Gray 2018).

Gray further stresses:

"Two factors in particular serve to limit a state's freedom of strategic choice.

The first is geography — location and terrain shape options. The second is the existence, or presumption, of an opponent: strategy presumes enemies."

(Gray 2018)

De Valera embodied this, concealing intentions, managing ambiguity, and understanding geography and great-power proximity. In this sense, Irish neutrality was structural realism concealed beneath performative liberalism.

(Thorhallsson 2006) stresses the importance of both internal and external perceptions of competence and vulnerability — legitimacy as a resource. Similarly, Keohane (1969) and Rothstein (1966) highlight that small powers rely on alliances, but warn against unequal partnerships with great powers, which risk subordination. Fanning (2013) shows that Britain even offered reunification in return for Irish participation in WWII, but De Valera prioritised sovereignty. Realism dictated caution: unequal alliances undercut small-state leverage.

## (Carroll, O'Neill, and Williams 2023)

Carroll, O'Neill, and Williams (2023) argues that like many small nations facing conventional and hybrid threats, Ireland confronts a disconnect between ends, ways, and means. Cleary highlights that the Defence Forces have steadily diminished while commitments expanded. Dan Ayiotis notes that “the stronger the military, the more neutral a state can afford to be,” tracing neutrality’s phases as necessity (1923–39), expediency (1939–55), and convenience (1955–present). This echoes De Valera’s pragmatism: neutrality is always *realpolitik*/neorealism, adapted to circumstance.

## Notes on Realism and Liberalism

- Realism centres on power and geography; security is paramount, unemotional, and the end justifies the means.
- Neorealism stresses an anarchic state system: survival, self-help, balance-of-power.
- Classical realism emphasises human nature (Morgenthau), neoclassical realism blends systemic and domestic factors.
- Neutrality, for Ireland, was always a realist instrument — a means of survival under anarchy.
- Liberalism offers a contrasting paradigm: Kant, Mill, Rousseau, and Smith stress cooperation, trade, and institutions. The EU epitomises liberal institutionalism, while realists remain sceptical.

## DIMERS Analyses of Key Sources

*Andrew Cottey (2022) – A Celtic Zeitenwende? Continuity and Change in Irish National Security Policy*

**D – Describe** Cottey (2022) examines whether the Ukraine war has triggered fundamental change in Irish security policy. He argues that Ireland’s policy is defined by four

enduring traits: very low threat perception, free-riding with minimal defence spending, political resistance to militarisation, and cautious EU cooperation. He concludes that the Ukraine war has not shifted these patterns — continuity prevails (Cottey 2022).

**I – Interpret** This applies directly to small European states with traditions of neutrality and under-investment in defence, but not to heavily militarised small states like Israel. For Ireland, it means legitimacy through neutrality and peacekeeping is unlikely to be replaced by robust hard power. Limit: focuses narrowly on continuity, less on potential shocks. Implication: supports the realist critique that small-state agility is overstated.

**M – Methodology** The paper is conceptual and policy-analytical rather than empirical. It uses case-based reasoning drawn from contemporary events. Limit: absence of data weakens causal claims. Implication: adopt as a framing source, but supplement with empirical studies.

**E – Evaluate** Cottey’s emphasis on continuity challenges more optimistic claims about rapid adaptation in small states. Other scholars (Thorhallsson, Bailes) highlight niches and agility, which Cottey implicitly downplays. Limit: underplays the role of legitimacy. Implication: useful for the “against” section of your essay.

**R – (Autho)R** Cottey is a senior academic at UCC with strong credibility in European security. His background suggests a bias towards cautious, empirically grounded arguments rather than optimistic institutionalist claims. Implication: strengthens the critical balance in your essay.

**S – Synthesis** The article directly challenges the “organisational agility” effect in your framework, reinforcing realist scepticism. It complements Flynn (2019) by providing a counterpoint. Limit: generalises from one case. Implication: Ireland’s legitimacy may be more vulnerable than Flynn’s optimism suggests.

**PEEL Paragraph** *Point:* Cottey (2022) contends that despite Ukraine, Ireland’s security policy remains rooted in continuity. *Evidence:* He identifies persistent features — underfunding, political resistance, and reliance on EU “good citizenship” (Cottey 2022). *Explain:* This undercuts claims that small states can rapidly adapt, showing that political

culture and structural constraints dominate. *Link:* The essay can therefore use Cottey to reinforce the realist limit on small-state agility.

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*John F. Quinn (2018) – Dreaming of things that never were: Irish Soft Power and Peacekeeping in the 21st Century*

**D – Describe** Quinn (2018) explores how peacekeeping has become a central pillar of Irish soft power. He frames peacekeeping as both identity and foreign policy tool, enabling Ireland to sustain legitimacy disproportionate to its material power (Quinn 2018).

**I – Interpret** This applies to small states that use peacekeeping as a reputational strategy (Ireland, Ghana, Nordic states). It does not apply where peacekeeping is minimal or contested. Limit: assumes peacekeeping's prestige remains intact. Implication: Ireland's reliance on peacekeeping may expose vulnerability if missions lose legitimacy.

**M – Methodology** A conceptual-interpretive essay linking soft power theory with Irish practice. Not empirical, but strongly aligned with constructivist approaches. Limit: lacks quantitative evidence. Implication: best used as normative framing.

**E – Evaluate** Quinn's claims align with Nye's theory of soft power, and with Thorhallsson's identity-based model of small states. However, critics (e.g., Minihan 2018) question whether peacekeeping retains relevance. Limit: possibly romanticised view. Implication: valuable but requires counterpoint.

**R – (Autho)R** Quinn is a Defence Forces officer-scholar, with institutional alignment towards highlighting Ireland's constructive global role. This may shape a normative preference for peacekeeping as inherently good. Implication: use with awareness of bias.

**S – Synthesis** The article supports your "soft power synergy" effect directly, providing evidence for how legitimacy is cultivated through peacekeeping. Limit: assumes future continuity. Implication: useful as evidence for the "for" side of your framework.

**PEEL Paragraph Point:** Quinn (2018) argues that peacekeeping underpins Ireland's soft power identity. *Evidence:* He frames it as the primary means through which Ireland gains legitimacy in international security (Quinn 2018). *Explain:* This supports the con-



structivist claim that myths and narratives matter as much as material capacity. *Link:* In the essay, Quinn can illustrate how legitimacy functions as Ireland's centre of gravity.

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*Jonathan Carroll & Neil Richardson (2022) – After the War Ends: Ireland, the Reserve Defence Forces, Peacekeeping, and the Russo-Ukraine War*

**D – Describe** Carroll and Richardson (2022) assess the role of the Reserve Defence Forces in sustaining Ireland's peacekeeping commitments in the aftermath of the Russo-Ukraine war. They argue that Ireland faces structural challenges in maintaining its traditional contributions (Carroll and Richardson 2022).

**I – Interpret** Applies to small states that link legitimacy to continuity in peacekeeping commitments. Does not apply to those disengaged from UN operations. Limit: focuses on Irish reserves, not broader global context. Implication: demonstrates fragility of Ireland's ability to sustain legitimacy.

**M – Methodology** A policy-focused commentary, informed by institutional practice. Not data-heavy, but grounded in Defence Forces context. Limit: narrow scope. Implication: valuable for Irish-specific analysis.

**E – Evaluate** This complements Quinn (2018) by showing that peacekeeping legitimacy faces practical sustainability issues. It diverges from Flynn (2019), who emphasises capability enhancement. Limit: focuses on supply-side issues. Implication: adds nuance to the essay.

**R – (Autho)R** Both authors are connected with Irish military/academic circles; this lends insider insight but may bring institutional bias. Implication: use as grounded but context-specific evidence.

**S – Synthesis** The piece shows how legitimacy grounded in peacekeeping can be undermined by organisational strain. Limit: context-specific. Implication: supports the essay's theme of fragility in small-state influence.

**PEEL Paragraph** *Point:* Carroll and Richardson (2022) argue that Ireland's peacekeeping commitments may be undermined by reserve force fragility. *Evidence:* They stress that sustaining contributions after Ukraine requires structural reform (Carroll and

Richardson 2022). *Explain:* This highlights that legitimacy via peacekeeping is not automatic but contingent on organisational capacity. *Link:* Their work provides evidence for the essay's claim that small-state influence is fragile when domestic resources falter.

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## DIMERS Analysis of COTTEY (2022)

### *Describe*

COTTEY (2022) examines whether the Ukraine war marks a turning point in Irish security policy. He identifies four enduring features of Ireland's strategic posture: (1) a very low-threat environment, (2) systematic free-riding through small forces, minimal combat capacity, and low spending, (3) a domestic political culture hostile to arguments for robust defence, and (4) cautious engagement in EU security and defence, framed as good citizenship but never transformative. His central claim is that, despite the shock of Ukraine, these features have not changed. Ireland continues to prioritise political legitimacy, low exposure, and selective cooperation rather than hard balancing. **Limit:** This description reflects Ireland's historical continuity but does not explain deeper structural drivers. **Implication:** The persistence of these features shows a neo-realist logic at play: Ireland adapts minimally but avoids altering its structural dependence.

### *Interpret*

The article applies most directly to small states like Ireland, but also to neutral states such as Austria or pre-2022 Finland. It does not apply to revisionist or militarised small powers (e.g. Israel, North Korea) that actively shape security outcomes. COTTEY's reading implies that Ireland's posture is not one of idealist neutrality but of pragmatic hedging: remaining formally outside NATO while embedding in EU structures. This aligns with the historical evidence that, since de Valera's realist manoeuvres in WWII, Ireland has been tacitly dependent on British security guarantees. As (Fanning 2015; Ayiotis 2023) elucidate, Ireland's neutrality masked a covert alignment with the UK as the proximate great

power. **Limit:** COTTEY does not interrogate the covert alliance dynamic. **Implication:** Ireland's hedging is understated in his framework but can be substantiated through historical and archival analysis.

### *Methodology*

The paper is conceptual and policy-analytical rather than empirical. It draws on defence-spending data, historical practice, and EU policy frameworks. It is best understood as expert commentary (lower on the evidence hierarchy), but situated within a broader Defence Forces Review tradition. While academically peer-reviewed, its limitations include reliance on secondary evidence and absence of counterfactuals (e.g., what a non-hedging Ireland might look like). **Limit:** Methodologically it cannot demonstrate causality between external shocks and Irish strategic choices. **Implication:** Findings should be read as indicative of structural trends, not as predictive models.

### *Evaluate*

COTTEY's contribution is valuable in highlighting continuity despite systemic shocks. Compared to realist perspectives (Waltz, Mearsheimer), his work complements the claim that small states adapt within constraints but cannot reshape structures. Where scholars such as TONRA emphasise soft power and EU legitimacy, COTTEY undercuts this optimism by showing Ireland's strategic inertia. However, he does not fully situate this in neorealist theory, missing the chance to frame Ireland as a hedging state that seeks cover under EU and UK security umbrellas. **Limit:** The evaluation undervalues theoretical clarity. **Implication:** To be most useful, his analysis should be read through a neo-realist lens of hedging.

### *(Autho)R*

COTTEY is a long-standing authority on European security and neutrality. His background at UCC and within NATO-linked research networks suggests institutional bias towards situating Ireland within broader European frameworks. He hedges in his own argument: acknowledging structural change (Ukraine) but ultimately concluding continu-

ity. This reflects an academic tendency to emphasise caution in Irish policy rather than overtly realist categorisation. **Limit:** Authorial caution may understate the strategic dependence on the UK. **Implication:** His perspective should be balanced with FANNING and AYIOTIS, who explicitly link Ireland's neutrality to tacit alliance with Britain.

### *Synthesis*

COTTEY's account resonates with a broader body of realist scholarship: Ireland continues to hedge by appearing neutral while aligning informally with great powers. The article demonstrates that material weakness and political culture entrench continuity. When read alongside FANNING (2015) and AYIOTIS (2023), the synthesis shows that Ireland's security strategy is less about idealist neutrality and more about neo-realist hedging: leveraging legitimacy for cover while free-riding on British and European security frameworks. **Limit:** Synthesis requires adding external sources not fully integrated by COTTEY. **Implication:** Ireland's case underscores how small states survive through hedging—remaining formally neutral but tacitly dependent.

## **PEEL Paragraph**

Point: Ireland is best understood as a neo-realist state engaged in hedging. Evidence: COTTEY (2022) shows continuity in low defence spending, limited forces, and cautious EU engagement, while (Fanning 2015; Ayiotis 2023) trace a tacit alignment with Britain since WWII. Explain: This demonstrates that Irish neutrality masks a pragmatic strategy of dependence, leveraging legitimacy abroad while avoiding costly commitments. Limit: COTTEY does not fully theorise hedging, leaving the concept implicit. Consequence: Framed through neorealism, Ireland's "neutrality" is revealed as a form of security hedging, balancing autonomy with tacit reliance on the UK and EU.

Ireland's security posture is best interpreted through a neo-realist lens of hedging. COTTEY (2022) underscores that despite the systemic shock of the Ukraine war, Irish national security continues to rest on very low defence spending, limited combat capability, and only cautious EU engagement. This continuity reflects not idealist neutrality

but a pragmatic calculation: small states cannot afford unilateralism and therefore hedge by balancing autonomy with tacit alignment to stronger powers. (Fanning 2015; Ayiotis 2023) demonstrate that this logic is longstanding—since de Valera’s realist manoeuvres in WWII, Ireland has relied upon covert security dependence on Britain, cloaked in the language of neutrality. While COTTEY does not explicitly frame this as hedging, the evidence of structural free-riding and reliance on great power guarantees illustrates precisely that dynamic. The limit is that neutrality remains politically potent at home, constraining acknowledgement of dependence; the implication is that Irish policy is best understood as a form of security hedging, combining symbolic neutrality with material reliance on others.

## **DIMERS Analysis of FLEMING (2015)**

### *Describe*

FLEMING (2015) examines Irish foreign policy during the Free State period (1922–1932), focusing on how neutrality was articulated before de Valera’s leadership. He argues that neutrality served as a convenient “all purpose” policy: symbolically asserting sovereignty, dampening domestic divisions, and signalling independence internationally, while in reality masking Ireland’s material dependence on Britain for security and trade. Fleming shows that Cumann na nGaedheal governments relied on British military guarantees while projecting an image of autonomous neutrality. **Limit:** Descriptive focus is historical rather than theoretical. **Implication:** Neutrality was a façade for hedging, not an idealist principle.

### *Interpret*

The article applies to small states constrained by a dominant neighbour. Fleming demonstrates that Ireland’s proclaimed neutrality was less a rejection of alliances and more a strategic hedge: maximising political autonomy while avoiding costly defence spending and confrontation with Britain. This resonates with broader small-state behaviour in asymmetric relationships. His account therefore reinforces the neo-realist argument that

small states cannot escape structural dependence. **Limit:** He does not explicitly use the language of hedging or neorealism. **Implication:** Readers must supply the theoretical framing to see Ireland's strategy as neo-realist.

### *Methodology*

Fleming draws primarily on historical sources—government documents, parliamentary debates, and contemporaneous commentary—set against the political context of the Free State. His methodology is qualitative and narrative, grounded in archival and secondary sources. The work is interpretive history, not statistical analysis. **Limit:** Absence of theoretical modelling. **Implication:** It is most useful for contextual grounding rather than abstract theorisation.

### *Evaluate*

Fleming's article is valuable because it reveals the pragmatic and tactical use of neutrality in the Free State era. Compared to later analyses (e.g. COTTEY 2022), Fleming shows the origins of Ireland's hedging posture—neutrality as performance, dependence as reality. This complements realist interpretations (Waltz, Mearsheimer) by offering a historical case study of how small states survive through posturing. However, Fleming stops short of explicitly theorising this as hedging or embedding it in IR theory. **Limit:** Lack of explicit theoretical engagement. **Implication:** Its value lies in providing historical depth to current realist interpretations.

### *(Autho)R*

Fleming was a Cadet (later officer) writing in the Defence Forces Review, meaning his perspective combines practitioner insight with historical analysis. His institutional location suggests a concern with the practical implications of neutrality and defence policy. This adds authenticity but also potential bias towards interpreting neutrality as pragmatic rather than ideological. **Limit:** Military-practitioner lens may underplay political-cultural factors. **Implication:** Must be read as a realist-leaning interpretation shaped by Defence Forces perspectives.

## *Synthesis*

Fleming shows that even before de Valera, Ireland's neutrality was less about idealism and more about hedging against Britain. When synthesised with (Fanning 2015; Ayiotis 2023), the pattern becomes clear: Irish foreign policy has consistently involved realist calculation masked by symbolic neutrality. Together with COTTEY (2022), Fleming provides historical evidence that Ireland's posture is best described as small-state hedging—projecting autonomy while relying on the great power next door.

FLEMING (2015) demonstrates that Irish neutrality in the 1920s was not an expression of principled isolationism but rather a pragmatic hedge against dependence on Britain. He shows that Cumann na nGaedheal invoked neutrality as an “all purpose policy” to mask the Free State's reliance on British security guarantees, maintain low military expenditure, and project sovereignty abroad while quietly organising its army along British lines. This strategy illustrates neo-realist logic: faced with structural weakness and treaty restrictions, the Free State adopted hedging—symbolically neutral yet materially reliant. (Fanning 2015; Ayiotis 2023) underscore that since de Valera's realist interventions during the War of Independence, Ireland tacitly accepted a security dependence on Britain, which neutrality conveniently concealed. The limit of Fleming's analysis is that he frames this policy as posturing rather than explicitly theorising it as hedging. The implication, however, is clear: even in its formative years, Ireland behaved as a neo-realist small state, balancing sovereignty claims with covert alignment to the proximate great power.

(Tonra 2006, pp. 125–128) describes the 1958 Fianna Fail government's major economic policy shift towards economic liberalisation. This is of note in the context of its continuation as the bedrock of Irish economic success. Indeed, the existence of large multinational corporations headquartered and manufacturing in Ireland is case and point. This shows an alternative aspect of Ireland's political strategy. De Valera was a realist and focused on independence, eschewing official alliances with the UK while entering into a tacit alliance. Following from Ireland's 1954 entry to the UN, a mechanism arose where Ireland could leverage its military externally to gain international influence. It is of note that much of the evidence (such as (Ayiotis 2023)) indicate that the military was

not trusted for responsibility, authority and action within the state. Hence perhaps the UN deployment of the military was a political win-win.

## **DIMERS Analysis – Tonra (2006)**

**D – Describe** (Tonra 2006) identifies four competing narratives of Irish security and defence policy: the Irish Nation, Global Citizen, European Republic, and Anglo-American State. Each frames neutrality differently: as a violated principle, endangered treasure, modest contribution, or moral obligation. He argues that while Ireland’s UN-based contributions have been broadly honoured, divisions emerge over which institutional framework (UN, EU, NATO) legitimises Irish action.

**I – Interpret** This is directly relevant to small-state legitimacy debates. The Irish Nation and Global Citizen narratives valorise the UN, but only in an idealised form; the Anglo-American perspective dismisses the UN as irrelevant. For Ireland, the choice of framework (UN vs EU vs NATO) determines the legitimacy of its contributions. Limit: written in 2006, it predates the more recent decline of UN peacekeeping. Implication: provides a baseline for understanding the erosion visible today.

**M – Methodology** Tonra employs discourse analysis, mapping how competing identity narratives shape foreign policy. It is interpretive and qualitative, not empirical. Limit: abstract and narrative-driven. Implication: valuable for theoretical framing, less so for hard data.

**E – Evaluate** Tonra’s framing aligns with constructivist IR theory (identity, discourse) but also anticipates realist concerns: the “actually existing UN” is compromised by P5 vetoes, echoing later findings of (DUMAN\_RAKIPOGLU\_2025). Limit: does not anticipate Ireland’s shrinking peacekeeping footprint post-2010s. Implication: useful for linking historical continuity to current decline.

**R – (Autho)R** Ben Tonra is a leading Irish IR scholar (UCD), with credibility in EU and foreign policy analysis. His perspective is academic rather than institutional, giving balance against Defence Forces insiders like (Quinn 2018) or (King 2021).



**S – Synthesis** Tonra provides the theoretical foundation: Ireland’s legitimacy depends on how neutrality is discursively framed within UN/EU/NATO contexts. Combined with Flynn’s operational benchmarks, Quinn’s soft-power romanticism, Cole’s pragmatism, King’s resourcing critique, and Duman’s evidence of UN paralysis, Tonra (2006) anchors your essay in the identity dimension of legitimacy.

**PEEL Paragraph Point:** Tonra (2006) identifies four identity narratives that shape Ireland’s approach to neutrality and security. *Evidence:* He shows that the Irish Nation and Global Citizen frame legitimacy in terms of UN primacy, while the Anglo-American dismisses the UN as irrelevant (Tonra 2006). *Explain:* This highlights how legitimacy is discursively contested, and why Ireland’s choice of institutional framework (UN vs EU vs NATO) is politically fraught. *Link:* In the essay, Tonra’s work situates Ireland’s foreign policy as structurally realist in practice, but cloaked in performative liberalism.

## **DIMERS Analysis of MINIHAN (2018)**

### *Describe*

MINIHAN (2018) asks whether United Nations peacekeeping, in its current form, has a viable future. He highlights structural challenges: the UN Security Council’s paralysis, declining Western troop contributions, reliance on Global South contingents, and mission overstretch. He concludes that UN peacekeeping faces existential questions, as it is increasingly undermined by great-power rivalry, resource constraints, and mandate inflation. For Ireland, traditionally a strong contributor, these developments diminish the strategic value of peacekeeping as a foreign policy tool. **Limit:** The piece focuses on structural fragility but does not map alternatives in detail. **Implication:** Small states like Ireland cannot rely on UN peacekeeping as their primary niche.

### *Interpret*

The analysis applies directly to small states such as Ireland, whose international identity has been built around peacekeeping. MINIHAN shows that if UN peacekeeping declines, Ireland’s strategy of legitimacy through neutrality and UN service is weakened. This is

consistent with a neo-realist reading: small states lose tools of influence when institutions fail. It does not apply to great powers, who can act unilaterally or through ad hoc coalitions.

**Limit:** The argument does not fully explore regional or EU alternatives. **Implication:** Ireland must hedge by seeking legitimacy elsewhere (e.g. EU, UK partnership).

### *Methodology*

The article is conceptual and policy-oriented. It synthesises UN reports, historical case studies, and contemporary mission analysis. Methodologically it sits at the “expert commentary” level rather than empirical research. Its strength lies in practitioner insight; its weakness is lack of systematic data analysis or comparative case method. **Limit:** No quantitative evidence to measure effectiveness or decline. **Implication:** Conclusions are persuasive but not empirically conclusive.

### *Evaluate*

MINIHAN’s pessimism aligns with other realist critiques of peacekeeping effectiveness. Compared with QUINN (2018), who frames Irish peacekeeping as identity-driven, MINIHAN is more structural, arguing that institutional decline undermines that identity. His argument adds to the literature by situating Ireland’s predicament within UN systemic fragility, not just domestic politics. **Limit:** He does not address soft-power or constructivist accounts that stress reputational gains despite institutional weakness. **Implication:** Peacekeeping’s fragility reinforces realist claims that small states must hedge.

### *(Autho)R*

MINIHAN is a former Irish Army officer, writing within the Defence Forces Review context. His institutional lens privileges operational realities and the perspective of contributors. This background biases him towards highlighting operational and political dysfunction rather than constructivist or legitimacy-based optimism. **Limit:** Perspective may underplay non-material dimensions such as reputation, diplomacy, or symbolic legitimacy. **Implication:** His neo-realist framing is credible but must be balanced with other schools.

### *Synthesis*

MINIHAN's article reinforces the view that Ireland's peacekeeping niche is structurally endangered. Synthesised with Cottey (2022) and FLEMING (2015), it shows continuity in Ireland's reliance on hedging: neutrality and peacekeeping project autonomy but mask dependence on external powers and institutions. As peacekeeping falters, Ireland's hedging must adapt, shifting towards EU and bilateral alignments. **Limit:** Synthesis highlights peacekeeping decline but cannot forecast the shape of future niches. **Implication:** Ireland's legitimacy strategy is fragile, demanding diversification beyond the UN.

MINIHAN (2018) argues that United Nations peacekeeping, long the cornerstone of Ireland's foreign policy identity, faces existential decline. He highlights that great-power paralysis within the UN Security Council, coupled with overstretched missions and waning Western troop contributions, has left peacekeeping increasingly ineffective. For small states like Ireland, this erosion undermines neutrality's utility as a source of legitimacy and international influence. While QUINN (2018) frames peacekeeping as central to Irish identity, MINIHAN shows that its structural viability is collapsing. The limit of his analysis is that it downplays reputational or symbolic gains Ireland might still accrue from limited contributions. The implication, however, is stark: if peacekeeping no longer functions as a credible niche, Ireland must hedge by shifting its strategy towards EU and bilateral frameworks, rather than relying solely on the UN.

*Damien Cole (2018) – Pragmatic Evolution? Reflections on the foreign policy motivations, implications and impact of Ireland's experience of peacekeeping in the Middle East*

**D – Describe** Cole (2018) analyses Ireland's peacekeeping experience in the Middle East, reflecting on motivations and implications. He frames it as a pragmatic evolution — not idealism, but a calculated strategy to balance neutrality, legitimacy, and international expectations (Cole 2018).

**I – Interpret** Applies to states that use peacekeeping as both identity and pragmatic strategy. Shows how legitimacy masks realist calculation. Limit: specific to Middle East cases. Implication: supports nuanced reading of Irish neutrality.

**M – Methodology** Historical-interpretive, drawing on case analysis of Middle Eastern missions. Not quantitative. Limit: bounded to regional cases. Implication: valuable for showing tension between rhetoric and practice.

**E – Evaluate** Cole bridges realist and constructivist perspectives: legitimacy is cultivated, but underpinned by survival strategies. This aligns with your argument that legitimacy is both genuine and instrumental. Limit: case-specific. Implication: strengthens essay's theoretical balance.

**R – (Autho)R** Cole is an academic with expertise in Irish foreign policy. His framing suggests caution against idealist narratives. Implication: credible support for realist-informed analysis.

**S – Synthesis** This source is especially useful for showing how neutrality and legitimacy can mask pragmatic hedging. Limit: scope limited to Middle East. Implication: use as a bridge between Quinn's constructivist optimism and Cottey's realist scepticism.

**PEEL Paragraph Point:** Cole (2018) contends that Ireland's peacekeeping in the Middle East reflects pragmatic evolution. *Evidence:* He demonstrates how neutrality and legitimacy were balanced against realist constraints (Cole 2018). *Explain:* This illustrates that peacekeeping was not purely idealist but also a survival strategy. *Link:* In the essay, Cole helps position legitimacy as both a normative and pragmatic asset for small states.

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*Comdt Conor King (2021) – Resourcing the State's National Insurance Policy: The Case for Defence*

**D – Describe** King (2021) frames the Defence Forces as Ireland's "national insurance policy," arguing that underfunding and poor retention undermine resilience. He contends that legitimacy requires credible resourcing (King 2021).

**I – Interpret** Applies to small states where legitimacy is tied to reliability and credibility. Ireland’s underfunding risks reputational damage. Limit: domestic focus. Implication: demonstrates internal-external linkage of legitimacy.

**M – Methodology** Policy-analytical, based on institutional data and comparisons with other neutral small states. Limit: not theoretical. Implication: strong applied evidence.

**E – Evaluate** King’s argument aligns with realist concerns about capability gaps. It complements Cottey (2022), showing continuity in underfunding, and challenges Quinn (2018), which assumes legitimacy without resourcing. Limit: institutionally embedded. Implication: highlights fragility of Ireland’s “insurance policy.”

**R – (Autho)R** As a Defence Forces officer, King speaks with insider authority. Potential bias: institutional advocacy for resourcing. Implication: useful but must be balanced with external academic critique.

**S – Synthesis** King ties legitimacy directly to resources, bridging realist and constructivist positions. Limit: case-specific. Implication: vital for your conclusion that legitimacy is fragile without material backing.

**PEEL Paragraph Point:** King (2021) argues that the Defence Forces act as Ireland’s national insurance policy, but are undermined by underfunding. *Evidence:* He highlights retention crises and capability shortfalls as threats to legitimacy (King 2021). *Explain:* This supports the view that legitimacy requires credible resourcing, not just narratives. *Link:* In the essay, King provides evidence for the conclusion that legitimacy is fragile without material support.

## **DIMERS Analysis: Flynn (2019)**

**D – Describe** Brendan Flynn’s (2019) article, *Small States’ Capability Enhancement for Peacekeeping: What can Ireland learn from other countries?*, examines how small states leverage peacekeeping as a means of influence and legitimacy. The focus is comparative: Ireland’s experience is placed alongside other small states (notably in Scandinavia and Africa) that have sought to maximise visibility through peace operations. The central argument is that while small states cannot project power independently, they can enhance

influence by developing niche expertise and sustaining credible peacekeeping commitments (Flynn 2019).

**I – Interpret** The text applies most clearly to states with a tradition of peacekeeping and a reliance on international legitimacy, such as Ireland, Sweden, or Ghana. It does not apply equally to small states that pursue deterrence through hard military capability (e.g., Israel or North Korea). The article highlights peacekeeping as a legitimacy multiplier, but this may not hold in situations where peacekeeping missions are contested or fail to deliver political results. In the Irish Defence Forces context, the “so what” is clear: legitimacy derived from peacekeeping grants Dublin disproportionate diplomatic visibility, though only insofar as international partners still value UN-led operations. Limit: Flynn assumes UN peacekeeping will remain relevant. Implication: For Ireland, diminishing UN credibility could undermine this niche role.

**M – Methodology** The paper is a policy-oriented comparative analysis, drawing on secondary literature and examples rather than primary data. It falls into the category of expert commentary rather than empirical study. This makes it useful for conceptual framing, but less robust in evidentiary terms. Limit: absence of systematic data weakens claims. Implication: adopt with caution; the arguments are illustrative, not conclusive.

**E – Evaluate** Flynn’s claims align with broader small-state literature (Thorhallsson, Bailes) that stresses niches and legitimacy. Other scholars support the idea that small states benefit from visible international engagement. However, critics might argue that peacekeeping no longer yields the same reputational dividends it once did, particularly after contested missions in Lebanon, Mali, and the DRC. Limit: assumes continuity of peacekeeping’s prestige. Implication: while relevant for illustrating Ireland’s past strategy, the argument is less predictive of future influence.

**R – (Autho)R** Flynn is a recognised scholar of maritime and security studies at NUIG, with a record of publishing on small states and Irish security policy. His institutional background suggests credibility but also a policy-aligned interest in validating peacekeeping as a worthwhile investment. There is no obvious evidence of overstatement, though the framing leans towards legitimising the Irish state’s peacekeeping tradition. Limit: po-

tential normative bias towards peacekeeping as inherently good. Implication: requires balancing against realist critiques of peacekeeping's effectiveness.

**S – Synthesis** Flynn's article fits directly into the "niche specialisation" effect in the five-effects framework of small-state influence. It reinforces the argument that Ireland leveraged peacekeeping as a legitimacy anchor, but also illustrates fragility: niches are only as strong as the institutions that sustain them. Compared with constructivist takes on soft power, Flynn emphasises practice and institutional learning rather than identity. Limit: offers a positive reading but underplays peacekeeping failures. Implication: use as evidence for the case *for* small-state influence, while setting up critique later in the essay.

**PEEL Paragraph** *Point:* Flynn (2019) argues that small states can "punch above their weight" by enhancing peacekeeping capabilities and learning from other countries. *Evidence:* He notes that states such as Ireland have built credibility by consistently deploying forces to UN operations, mirroring how Nordic states leveraged similar commitments (Flynn 2019). *Explain:* This supports the claim that legitimacy is a small state's centre of gravity, as peacekeeping visibility amplifies influence disproportionate to material power. *Link:* However, as peacekeeping's prestige wanes, Flynn's optimism may be time-bound. This strengthens the essay's overall argument that legitimacy remains fragile and contingent for small states.

(Flynn 2019) states that ". If small states want to be relevant and influential in peacekeeping, they need to figure out how to offer force packages that cross a threshold well beyond the tokenistic or niche nor have them burdened by excessive national political caveats that limit their operational flexibility. This implies land units of at least reinforced company size, and credible aerial and maritime assets as well". This is of note in the context of Ireland's shrinking peacekeeping footprint - indeed the possibility that peacekeeping is a dead. Given the impending dissolution of UNSCR 1701, the withdrawal from UNDOF and the withdrawal from Africa (save for a single officer in Uganda), Ireland's peacekeeping footprint has withered significantly from the first decade of the century. This is of note in the context of Ireland identifying its peacekeeping as a legitimate and welcome projection of influence and execution of foreign policy. Does this sound the death knell for a

substantial portion of Ireland's international legitimacy? Does it require a revision of Ireland's ways and means of international influence? Since evolving from a poor small state to a wealthy one (following the Celtic Tiger), Ireland appears to have developed notions of her own self importance on the world stage. In that context, Ireland has long traded on the legitimacy derived through perceived neutrality and virtue through peacekeeping. Ireland's political policies have evolved from the pragmatic realpolitik of Eamon de Valera to the structural-realism of today. Indeed, Ireland's structural realism is concealed behind performative liberalism. Staying rich safe in noble clothes. The public actually believes. Underneath is a state which knows it can't defend itself so it it does the virtuous tokenism of ration-packs and old armoured vehicles. Virtue signaling pragmatism. Ireland's use of peacekeeping (constrained to those with a UN mandate) as a foreign policy tool projecting legitimacy has always been vulnerable to the whims of the UN Security Council and the continued use of peacekeeping in post-conflict areas. During the Cold War, while the bipolar world resulted in many successful UN missions and the prestige/legitimacy which went with them. However, in recent years, the Security Council is increasingly dysfunctional, hamstringing Ireland's 'means' of foreign policy. The imminent dissolution of UNSCR 1701 is case and point. Furthermore, the legitimacy of peacekeeping as an endeavour has been targeted in the hybrid grey zone. For example, there were suggestions of collusion between UNIFIL and Hezbollah, or that UNIFIL is a Hezbollah proxy. The number of new UNSCRs is [GPT find the answer, it's fuck all .give me the source], which evidences the waning of peacekeeping as a tool. The UNSCR can no longer reach a consensus. Hence, it is assessed that peacekeeping is likely in its twilight. Given that assessment, what does it mean for Ireland's foreign policy means? Concurrently, the world appears to be returning to a realist or structural realist approach to policy - with rearmament and cynicism coming to the fore. (Quinn 2018) is of note where he frames peacekeeping as both an Irish identity and foreign policy means, enabling Ireland to sustain legitimacy disproportionate to its material power. However, his commentary has limited generality - applying to small states which use peacekeeping as a reputational means. Peacekeeping is ineffective where it's contested or where its prestige has waned. It appears that Quinn



is offering a romanticised view of peacekeeping, through a liberal rather than a structural-realist lens. By highlighting comments from Obama and Ki Moon, Quinn draws on what Thorhalsson would describe as her ‘perceptual size’. Quinn states that “Tonra ultimately concludes that the purpose of Ireland’s engagement in international peacekeeping, consistent campaigning and lobbying on human rights issue and genuine leadership position with relation to non-proliferation demonstrates that Ireland seeks to increase its security through multilateral security cooperation initiatives rather than by force of arms” (Tonra 2007). I concur in full with Tonra’s analysis and believe that it supports my contention that Ireland’s foreign policy is best viewed through the structural-realist lens which is concealed behind performative liberalism. Quinn further states “In the initial stages of this research the author encountered the idea that Irish peacekeeping is more concerned with the values-based ethical imperatives of peacekeeping: the simple act of contributing and doing good in the interests of international peace and security”. This reminds the author of a familial debate this week following calls by certain celebrities that the Government should escort a shipment of aid to Gaza and provide protection (from the IDF). When it was clear that no military vessel could be supplied, the discussion moved to the Government supplying a civilian ship to observe. When challenged by the author that the IDF are very much a realist state who only understands power, that this symbolic gesture would literally be meaningless to the IDF, the response was that there is a moral imperative to be seen to do something, even if it won’t be successful. GPT can you use this anecdote or something from it>?

## **DIMERS Analysis – Duman & Rakipoğlu (2025)**

“This paper argued that the primary source of the Council’s paralysis is the veto power, which, rather than serving its intended purpose of preventing great-power conflict, has been systematically instrumentalised to advance national interests at the expense of humanitarian imperatives.”

**D – Describe** (Rakipoğlu and Duman 2025) analyse the UN Security Council’s paralysis during the Gaza war (Oct 2023–Jan 2025). They find that the Council voted 13 times;

only 4 resolutions passed while 9 failed, largely due to 6 U.S. vetoes blocking ceasefire language. The article argues that veto use has shifted from a safeguard of consensus to an instrument of obstruction, undermining the UNSC's credibility as a guarantor of collective security.

**I – Interpret** This applies to states like Ireland whose foreign policy legitimacy is bound to UN peacekeeping mandates. If the UNSC cannot generate or sustain credible resolutions, small states lose their primary platform. For Ireland, the potential dissolution of UNSCR 1701 exemplifies how legitimacy rooted in peacekeeping may vanish. Limit: focus is Gaza-specific, but implications extend globally. Implication: peacekeeping as a foreign policy “means” is structurally eroding.

**M – Methodology** Qualitative content analysis of UNSC debates, voting records, and draft resolutions. Robust in terms of primary evidence. Limit: case-specific to Gaza timeframe. Implication: strong empirical backing for claims of institutional paralysis.

**E – Evaluate** The findings align with critiques that UN peacekeeping is in twilight (cf. (Flynn 2019) optimism looks dated; (Quinn 2018)'s soft-power narrative is fragile). Duman adds empirical weight by demonstrating UNSC's dysfunction, reinforcing the realist critique that small states relying on UN legitimacy are increasingly exposed.

**R – (Autho)R** Both are credible academics in Middle East/IR fields. Their perspective is shaped by regional focus on Gaza/Israel but not by Irish institutional bias. Implication: useful external corroboration of Ireland-centric critiques.

**S – Synthesis** Duman & Rakipoğlu (2025) provide the hard evidence that the UNSC is structurally paralysed, reinforcing Cole's (2018) point about realism cloaked in liberal rhetoric and King's (2021) concern that legitimacy without resources is brittle. Together, they show Ireland's peacekeeping legitimacy is tethered to a failing institution.

**PEEL Paragraph** *Point:* Duman & Rakipoğlu (2025) reveal the UNSC's paralysis in Gaza, where 9 of 13 resolutions failed due to vetoes. *Evidence:* They show the U.S. blocked six ceasefire drafts, prioritising alliance politics over humanitarian imperatives (Rakipoğlu and Duman 2025). *Explain:* For Ireland, which anchors its legitimacy in UN mandates, this collapse erodes the very stage on which it projects influence. *Link:*

Combined with Flynn's (2019) insistence on non-tokenism, Quinn's (2018) romanticised soft power, and King's (2021) resourcing critique, Duman underlines that peacekeeping is not just fragile — it may be obsolete.

Rakipoğlu and Duman (2025) demonstrate that the UNSC's structural dysfunction is starkly evident in its handling of the Gaza crisis (2023–2025). Across thirteen draft resolutions, only four were adopted, while nine failed, primarily due to six U.S. vetoes blocking ceasefire initiatives. Even adopted texts were hollowed out, with Washington demanding the removal of terms such as “permanent” ceasefire and recasting Resolution 2728 as “non-binding”. The authors argue that the veto has shifted from a mechanism for consensus to an instrument of strategic obstruction, paralysing the Council's ability to address humanitarian crises. This paralysis has profound implications: it enables Israel to continue projecting military power despite growing international condemnation, because its actions are structurally protected by U.S. vetoes within the Security Council. In realist terms, Israel's capacity to ignore normative pressure is not a function of its own legitimacy but of American shelter. For small states like Ireland, the lesson is sobering: reliance on the UN for legitimacy is increasingly untenable when great-power sponsorship, rather than institutional consensus, dictates outcomes. Rakipoğlu and Duman (2025) The authors suggests peacekeeping's obsolescence, pushing Ireland toward structural-realist adaptation.

(Hirst 2010) descriptions of Israeli conduct towards Lebanon clearly paint a realist perspective, where power was wielded primarily by the military. He states that “a nation born of the sword was forever going to live by it”. Indeed, the suggestion by Ben Gurion that the foreign ministry's job is to explain the actions of the defence ministry to the rest of the world underpins this. (Hirst 2010, p. 53). It is of note that such an aggressive perspective is at odds with considerations that Israel is a small state (read small power).

(Rothstein 1966) notes that “Intervention was also bound to cause trouble between the rest of the nonaligned states and the two superpowers; and as their votes in the UN and their political support on a wide range of issues became increasingly more important than their military contribution, that too became a consideration”. This highlights another aspect of Thorhallsson's “perceptual size”, where a small state may have elevated influence due to

their votes within an international institution such as the UN. It is of note therefore that the increasing logjammed nature of the UNSCR diminishes the influence of small states who leverage that multilateral organisation. Data from (Hellmüller, Tan, and Bara 2024) demonstrate that the *establishment of new UN peace operations has collapsed since the 1990s*. During the immediate post-Cold War decade, the Security Council authorised on average five to six new missions per year (1991–1995). This rate declined to roughly two to three new missions per year through the 2000s. Since 2012, however, the creation of new peacekeeping operations (PKOs) has virtually ceased, with the few new mandates established being overwhelmingly *special political missions* (SPMs) or special envoys/advisors rather than robust peacekeeping deployments. The empirical trend is stark: whereas the 1990s represented the high-water mark of UN activism, the 2010s and 2020s have seen the Security Council *almost entirely abandon the authorisation of new PKOs*. This pattern provides strong evidence for the contention that peacekeeping is in structural decline. For small states such as Ireland, which have historically derived disproportionate legitimacy and influence from participation in UN peacekeeping, the erosion of new mandates signals the waning of a core foreign-policy instrument. Where once Ireland could reliably translate its neutrality and peacekeeping contributions into international credibility, the paralysis of the Security Council now undermines this niche. In strategic terms, the *ends* (influence and legitimacy) no longer align with the available *ways and means* (credible peacekeeping deployments). This decline therefore marks not only the twilight of UN peacekeeping but also the need for small states to reconsider alternative avenues for sustaining international relevance.

Flynn (2019) cautions that small states must avoid tokenism if they wish to remain relevant in peacekeeping: only reinforced company-level contributions, with credible air and maritime assets, cross the threshold of meaningful influence. Ireland's shrinking footprint—complete withdrawal from UNDOF in 2024, near-total exit from African missions (save for minimal support in Uganda), and the planned phaseout of its UNIFIL deployment under UNSCR 1701 by 2027—suggests it has now fallen below that threshold, with only around 300 troops remaining in Lebanon as of August 2025 amid the mission's

final mandate extension to December 2026. The realist implication is stark: peacekeeping, once Ireland's primary niche and source of legitimacy, is entering twilight, exacerbated by UN Security Council dysfunction, with only about 25 resolutions adopted by September 26, 2025, and no new peacekeeping missions established since 2014. Quinn (2018) frames peacekeeping as an expression of Irish identity and a liberal foreign-policy tool, but this is increasingly untenable in a multipolar world where consensus on mandates wanes. As de Valera's wartime neutrality revealed (Fanning 2015; Ayiotis 2023), Ireland's posture has always been realist: a veil of moralism masking strategic hedging. Today, performative liberalism sustains the illusion of influence, but beneath it lies structural realism and material weakness, with defense spending stagnant at around 0.3 percent of GDP. My own experience of recent debates about Gaza illustrates this tension: while public figures argued for symbolic gestures such as escorting aid ships or deploying civilian observers, the reality is that Israel, as a hard realist state, is unmoved by such symbolism. Gestures may satisfy domestic expectations, but they do not alter outcomes. This underscores the risk that Ireland's legitimacy, long derived from peacekeeping, is collapsing into symbolic performance without strategic effect. Quinn reports on perceptions regarding Ireland's participation in peacekeeping as values-based rather than transactional. I suggest that it was naive of him not to consider the realist or neo-realist aspect of Ireland's participation. I assess that while Ireland has a while the performative liberal aspect of peacekeeping is real (and certainly believed by the public), its origins have been realist in nature. Given (Waltz 1979)'s concepts of structural realism, I assess that Ireland's IR engagement is structural-realist in nature.

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## **Reading Priorities for DSS Essay (Mk2 Structure)**

Based on the Mk2 essay framework (**DSS\_STRUCTURE\_MK2**), the bibliography divides into two categories: **Key Papers** (must-read, directly tied to your five effects and central debates) and **Supplementary Papers** (supportive, comparative, or contextual). Within each, sources are ordered by importance.

### *Key Papers*

1. **Thorhallsson (2006)** — foundational on small-state size and shelter theory; frames Niche and Legitimacy (Thorhallsson 2006). Read 24/9/25.
2. **Keohane (1969)** — classic on dilemmas of small states; baseline for institutionalist optimism (Keohane 1969). Read 25/9/25.

3. **Keohane (1988)** — contrasts rationalist vs. reflective institutionalism; crucial for Organisational Agility and Legitimacy (Keohane 1988). read 29/9/25
4. **Krepinevich (1994)** — on military revolutions; core to Niche Specialisation (Krepinevich 1994). read 15/9/25
5. **Gray (2005)** — sceptical of change; anchor for continuity vs. transformation (Gray 2005). read 29/9/25
6. **Gray (2018)** — strategy as political consequence; grounds Legitimacy effect (Gray 2018). read 20/9/25
7. **Farrell & Newman (2019)** — weaponised interdependence; defines Hybrid Leverage (Farrell and Newman 2019).
8. **Nye (2008)** — soft power as credibility; central to Soft Power Synergy (Nye 2008).
9. **Mearsheimer (1994)** — “False Promise”; realist scepticism of institutions (Mearsheimer 1994).
10. **Mearsheimer (2019)** — “Bound to Fail”; critique of liberal order; frames limits on small-state agency (Mearsheimer 2019).
11. **Bessner & Guilhot (2015)** — realism and intellectual legitimation; counterpoint for Legitimacy (Bessner and Guilhot 2015).
12. **Tonra (1999)** — Europeanisation of Irish foreign policy; empirical case study (Tonra 1999).
13. **Tonra & Christiansen (2011)** — theoretical bridge between IR and EU studies; frames constructivist angle (Tonra and Christiansen 2011).
14. **Cohen (2002)** — civil–military dialogue; anchors Legitimacy and Agility (Cohen 2002).
15. **Bailes & Thorhallsson (2013)** — small states and EU shelter; legitimacy and synergy (Bailes, Thorhallsson, and Johnstone 2013).

*Supplementary Papers (Comparative/Contextual)*

1. **Waltz (1979)** — theoretical anchor for neorealism; supports sceptical side (Waltz 1979).
2. **Bailes & Thorhallsson (2012)** — EU as small-state instrument; reinforces institutional case (Bailes and Thorhallsson 2013).
3. **EU Global Strategy documents (2016; 2017; 2018; 2019)** — contextual policy framing for EU role (European Union 2016; European External Action Service 2017; European External Action Service 2018; European External Action Service 2019).
4. **HLAP (2022)** — Irish organisational reform commitments; empirical grounding (Department of Defence and Defence Forces 2022).
5. **Commission on the Defence Forces (2022)** — context for organisational agility debates (Commission on the Defence Forces 2022).
6. **DoD Strategy Statement (2025)** — legitimacy and reform trajectory (Department of Defence and Defence Forces 2025).
7. **White Paper Update (2019)** — policy continuity and limits (Government of Ireland 2019).

GPT: ensure that these are used somewhere. they're my own words "Introduction (Chapter 1) For Colin Gray, strategy is about political ends, not reach or effects. Reach belongs to tactics. Operations are the sequencing of tactics. Strategy exists only when means are aligned to political purpose. From this view, coercive, controlling, or collaborative approaches describe relationships of power, not technical reach. Small states, lacking hard power, can only pursue the collaborative.

Body (For/Against/Discussion) Collaboration can still matter politically: small states gain visibility and legitimacy by aligning their limited means to multilateral ends. However, the absence of coercive or controlling options reveals a structural ceiling. If strategy



is only about political ends, small states face a hard limit. They may contribute tactically or organise operationally, but they cannot set the strategic terms of international security.

For the proposal (collaboration as influence) Point. Small states can exercise influence through collaborative strategies. Evidence. Ireland's long participation in UN peacekeeping shows how modest forces can gain legitimacy and visibility. Explain. This matters because collaboration aligns limited means to political ends, which Gray argues is the essence of strategy. Limit. Such influence depends on multilateral recognition and is easily marginalised. Consequent. Collaboration offers visibility but not decisive power.

Against the proposal (hard ceiling on influence) Point. Small states cannot pursue coercive or controlling strategies. Evidence. Without military mass or economic weight, they cannot compel outcomes or dictate terms. Explain. For Gray, strategy is political ends; tactics and operations deliver reach and effects. Small states cannot translate these into control. Limit. Even strong niche roles remain dependent on larger actors. Consequent. Small states face a structural ceiling on their strategic influence.

Synthesis signpost Taken together, these points show that small states can influence only through collaboration. This influence matters, but it remains conditional and secondary to the power of larger actors."

**DETERRENCE** Deterrence is one power attempting to influence the decision making of another Diplomacy which Aims to resolve a conflict without full scale war. “Coercive diplomacy” is a disruptive form of strategy. Consider North Korea who have resisted coercive diplomacy as an example of where it hasn’t worked. You must understand the society you’re dealing with. Often based on punishment or denial or both Thomas Schelling is the key author for this 1. Threat must be sufficiently potent 2. Threat must be credible in the mind of the adversary 3. Corer must assure adversary that compliance will not lead to more demands 4. Conflict must not be perceived as a zero sum gain Jakobsen’s (1998) 1. Threat to defeat the opponent quickly and with little cost 2. A deadline for compliance 3. Assurance to the adversary against future demands 4. An offer of inducement for compliance

Ayiotis (2023) Joint Irish–British military planning and operations: a historical perspective Historical analysis using Military Archives and secondary sources Irish–UK joint planning recurred since 1922; peaked in WWII; continued via Operation Sandstone (pp. 12–20). Plan W; 18th Military Mission; pragmatic neutrality; elite liaison; post-war Sandstone survey (pp. 14–20). Draws on named letters, mission files, concrete tasks; situates debate after Ukraine shock (pp. 12–20). Scope selective; little dissent analysis; some reliance on press for modern context (pp. 12–13). Aligns with O’Halpin on implicit reliance; Kinsella on reactive capability (pp. 14–16, 20). Contrasts Churchill’s rhetoric with discreet cooperation; jointness shown as norm not exception (pp. 16–18). Irish lens: neutrality as expedience; cross-border planning; memory dulled by Troubles (pp. 18–20). Historically grounded case: structured UK joint planning remains realistic if framed for consent (pp. 12–20).

DIMERS card (LaTeX)

## Source Analysis — *Ayiotis 2023*, Joint Irish–British

### Military Planning and Operations: A Historical

#### Perspective

**Describe:** Explains how Irish–UK joint planning has been recurrent since 1922, peaking under Plan W and the 18th Military Mission, then resuming with Operation Sandstone (pp. 12–20). **Interpret:** Directly relevant to whether contemporary Irish defence should formalise UK alignment; excludes deep public-opinion modelling but notes post-Troubles sensitivities (pp. 19–20). **Methodology:** Archival correspondence, liaison records, OR-BAT notes, plus contextual journalism; valid for historical inference, limited for forecasting (pp. 15–19). **Evaluate:** Contribution is precise granularity on how joint planning worked; it bites by normalising cooperation; contradiction arises against rhetorical neutrality (pp. 16–18). **Author:** Commissioned in Defence Forces Review; institutional lens aims at policy relevance; counter-voices flagged via Kinsella and forum debates (pp. 12–13, 20). **Synthesis:** Aligns with O’Halpin on reliance and with Kinsella on reactivity; diverges from purist neutrality readings by showing cooperation as norm (pp. 14–16, 20). **Limit.** Focuses on planning more than outcomes and public legitimacy. **Implication:** Irish DF can pursue scoped, transparent UK joint planning while protecting political legitimacy through clear mandates.

Method weight

3 — Observational and doctrinal history using archival evidence, not experimental or quasi-experimental.

#### Claims-cluster seeds

**Claim:** Since 1922, Irish–UK joint planning has been the rule rather than the exception.

**Best line (p. 12–13):** Abstract states recurrence from 1922, peaking WWII, extending to Sandstone.

**Rival reading:** Apparent cooperation was episodic and contingent.

**Condition:** Holds when archives show sustained liaison, not ad hoc.

**Irish DF implication:** Build formal mechanisms that acknowledge historic practice.

**Claim:** Plan W and the 18th Military Mission enabled executable joint defence on Irish soil.

**Best line (pp. 14–16):** Plan W scope and mission liaison detailed.

**Rival reading:** Plans were insurance only, never politically saleable.

**Condition:** Triggers defined by invasion or request.

**Irish DF implication:** Pre-agreed triggers and liaison cut delays.

**Claim:** Aligning with Britain could strengthen neutrality credibility against Germany.

**Best line (p. 18):** Col James Flynn memo arguing removal of British aggression risk helps neutrality.

**Rival reading:** Any alignment corrodes neutrality.

**Condition:** Requires diplomatic assurance against UK unilateralism.

**Irish DF implication:** Pair plans with state-to-state assurances.

**Claim:** Post-war Operation Sandstone shows resumed cooperation despite non-NATO stance.

**Best line (p. 19):** Aerial coastal survey 1948–55, purpose and NATO refusal noted.

**Rival reading:** Technical survey, not defence alignment.

**Condition:** Cooperation limited to specific tasks.

**Irish DF implication:** Use task-bounded projects to manage politics.

**Claim:** Public memory dulled the record of cooperation, complicating consent today.

**Best line (pp. 19–20):** Liaison depth unknown for decades; Troubles reframed sensitivities.

**Rival reading:** Current debate is informed enough.

**Condition:** Requires transparent communication.

**Irish DF implication:** Pair policy with civic briefings.

## PEEL-C drafting — Two paragraphs (for and against)

**Point:** Ireland should pre-agree joint defence planning with the UK for constrained contingencies, because the historic record shows it works under pressure.

**Evidence:** Plan W and the 18th Military Mission established practical cross-border tasks, liaison, and even airfield siting for RAF operations (pp. 14–16).

**Explain:** These mechanisms reduce decision latency, align triggers, and translate neutrality into credible defence capacity by removing ambiguity over help on request.

**Limit:** Cooperation must be request-based, time-bounded, and audited to prevent mandate creep.

**Consequent:** The Irish DF should draft trigger matrices and liaison SOPs with UK counterparts to protect subsea cables and airspace within Irish political red lines.

**Point:** Yet formalising UK alignment risks re-politicising neutrality and re-opening post-Troubles sensitivities, so scope must be tightly framed.

**Evidence:** Public acknowledgement of wartime liaison only emerged decades later, and memory of cooperation was dulled, shaping perceptions (pp. 19–20).

**Explain:** Hidden practice undermines consent; today's legitimacy needs transparency and parliamentary oversight, or alignment could erode trust more than it adds security.

**Limit:** A purely domestic posture cannot offset capability gaps in air and sea without partners.

**Consequent:** For a small state, publish a short, specific joint-planning note with triggers, governance, and sunset clauses to reassure the Oireachtas and public.

**Claim** &  
**Best** source  
**(page)** & **Rival**  
**source/reading**  
& **Condition** &  
**Implication** for  
**Irish DF**

hline Joint plan-  
ning recurrent  
since 1922 &  
Ayiotis abstract  
(pp. 12–13) &  
Episodic only &  
Sustained liaison  
exists & Nor-  
malise scoped UK  
planning Plan W  
enabled executable  
defence & Plan  
W, 18th MM (p.  
14–16) & Political  
fiction & Clear  
invasion/request  
triggers & Pre-  
agree triggers,  
SOPs Alignment  
can bolster neu-  
trality & Flynn  
memo (p. 18) &  
Alignment erodes  
neutrality &

### Gaps

Chase: Primary 18th MM files on ROE, command chains, and exact triggers. Park: Broader EU-NATO alignment debate until Irish-UK bilateral guardrails are specified.

Limit. If clustering or method weighting is skipped, prose slides into description. Implication: Enforce clusters and weights or criticality will miss JCSC expectations.

(Bailes and Thorhallsson 2013)

Bailes & Thorhallsson (2013) *Instrumentalizing the European Union in Small State Strategies* (p.99) Conceptual analysis using literature and observed examples; strategy texts as lens (pp.101,105) EU offers soft-security ‘shelter’; existential benefits with sovereignty costs (pp.109–112) Supranationalism; soft-security tools; Europeanization pressure; ‘escape from smallness’ (pp.105,111) Integrates small-state theory with EU governance; clarifies non-military security (pp.105–111) Limited case detail; implementation pathways thin [NO SOURCE] Builds on Katzenstein’s shelter logic; extends beyond economics (pp.100,111) Shifts from alliances to law-based multilateral shelter; existential over military (pp.108–110) Table maps EU coverage; Lisbon clauses relevant to solidarity (pp.105,107) Exploit EU soft-security shelter while managing identity risks through safeguards (pp.110–112)

## Source Analysis — *Bailes & Thorhallsson 2013*,

### **Instrumentalizing the European Union in Small State**

### **Strategies**

**Describe:** Argues the EU gives small European states soft-security options and broader ‘shelter’, altering agendas and discourse (abstract, p.99). **Interpret:** Directly addresses whether small states can instrumentalise EU institutions to offset vulnerabilities relevant to an Irish DSS brief. **Methodology:** Conceptual synthesis using strategy texts, secondary literature, observed examples; no new dataset, doctrinal in tone (pp.101,105). **Evaluate:** Shows EU’s soft-security depth and existential effects; notes costs in sovereignty pooling identity pressures (pp.109–111). **Author:** Small-states scholars in Icelandic context;

stance foregrounds EU institutional logics with balanced caution on costs. [NO SOURCE]

**Synthesis:** Aligns with Katzenstein on shelter effects; diverges from classic alliance views by stressing non-zero-sum, law-based integration (pp.100,108–110). **Limit.** Lacks granular Irish cases or operational guidance for defence actors. [NO SOURCE] **Implication:** Irish DF should treat EU soft-security regimes as primary shelter while guarding autonomy in identity-sensitive areas.

**Method weight:** 3 — Observational/doctrinal synthesis; theory-led, no new empirical dataset.

### Claims-cluster seeds

1. *Claim:* EU membership offers small states existential soft-security shelter. *Best line with page:* “unique soft security features... ‘escape from smallness’” (p.111). *Rival reading:* Shelter overstated where NATO dominates. *Condition:* Low imminent military threat. *Irish DF implication:* Prioritise EU civil protection, health, border regimes. 2. *Claim:* Costs include sovereignty pooling and identity erosion risks. *Best line with page:* “unprecedented degree of pooling... identity erosion” (pp.109–110). *Rival reading:* Europeanisation strengthens resilience. *Condition:* High domestic contestation. *Irish DF implication:* Safeguard niches, maintain consent. 3. *Claim:* Europeanisation pressures alignment even pre-accession. *Best line with page:* Accession “puts pressure... to accept norms and goals” (p.112). *Rival reading:* Opt-outs preserve choice. *Condition:* Treaty flexibility. *Irish DF implication:* Use opt-outs sparingly, shape norms early. 4. *Claim:* Soft-security coordination beats bilateral ‘big-power’ shelter. *Best line with page:* Collective solutions more efficient than ad hoc aid (p.111). *Rival reading:* Bilateralism is faster. *Condition:* Transboundary risks. *Irish DF implication:* Invest in EU mechanisms over one-off deals.

**PEEL-C (for) Point:** The EU functions as Ireland’s principal soft-security shelter, reducing vulnerability across borders, health and economic shocks. *Evidence:* The authors argue EU pooled assets, regulation and emergency aid disproportionately benefit small states, enabling impact on climate and crises (p.111). *Explain:* A rules-based single market, harmonised standards and funds compress transaction costs, amplify voice and sta-



bilise expectations for small actors, improving national resilience. *Limit.* Shelter relies on compliance capacity and domestic legitimacy. *Consequent:* Irish DF should deepen EU civil protection links, stress test interdependencies, and use Brussels to convene partners quickly.

**PEEL-C (against)** *Point:* EU shelter can dilute small-state identity and constrain bespoke responses when crises trigger one-size-fits-all measures. *Evidence:* Sovereignty pooling and exposure to EU-wide policies raise cost–benefit tensions for states without prior experience of certain threats (pp.109–110, 112). *Explain:* Centralised norms may override valued liberties or crowd national bandwidth, reducing agility in niche areas that matter to Dublin. *Limit.* Opt-outs and consensus in strategic areas preserve room for manoeuvre. *Consequent:* Irish DF should ring-fence niche capabilities, pre-negotiate caveats, and pair EU compliance with national red-team reviews.

**Claim &  
Best source  
(page) & Rival  
source/reading  
& Condition &  
Implication for  
Irish DF**

hline EU soft-  
security shelter  
matters most  
& Bailes &  
Thorhallsson  
(p.111) & NATO  
focus downplays  
EU & Low mil-  
itary threat &  
Prioritise EU  
civil protection,  
frontier tech  
Costs: sovereignty  
pooling, identity  
risk & Bailes  
& Thorhallsson  
(pp.109–110) &

**Evidence and Implication Log**

Europeanisation  
as resilience &  
High contesta-  
tion & Maintain  
public consent,  
protect niches  
Europeanisation  
pressures align-

**Gaps** Chase: recent Irish case studies applying EU civil protection, health security, cyber response. Park: deep military integration debates unless mandate widens.

(Bailes, Thorhallsson, and Johnstone 2013)

## Source Analysis — *Bailes, Thorhallsson & Johnstone*

### **2013, Scotland as an Independent Small State: Where would it seek shelter?**

**Describe:** Study argues an independent Scotland would require strategic, political, economic and societal shelter, with options in EU, NATO, rUK, Nordics and the US (p.1).

**Interpret:** Directly relevant to a DSS brief on small-state security by mapping shelter mixes, costs and neighbour dependencies for a proximate case. **Methodology:** IR-led conceptual synthesis; frames options via small-state theory, not advocacy on the referendum; descriptive scenario analysis (pp.3–4).

**Evaluate:** Persuasive on EU/NATO logic, and on rUK/US centrality; Arctic and Nordic lenses add texture; empirical granularity is thin (pp.11–17). **Author:** Senior scholars in Iceland and Akureyri; small-state and Nordic expertise shapes focus on multilevel shelter. **Synthesis:** Aligns with classic claims that small states seek alliances and institutional protection; extends to soft-security and societal shelter (pp.3–6). **Limit.** Lacks post-2014 developments or Irish cases to test transferability. [NO SOURCE]

**Implication:** Ireland should treat EU soft-security and NATO partnerships as core shelter while managing UK interdependence politically and operationally.

**Method weight:** 3 — Observational/doctrinal synthesis without new dataset; comparative but non-experimental.

#### **Claims-cluster seeds**

*Claim:* EU and NATO are logical shelters for a new small state. *Best line with page:* Conclusion stresses EU/NATO as mainstream post-1990 strategy (p.17). *Rival reading:* Neutrality with ad hoc coalitions. *Condition:* Low direct threat; rules-based order. *Irish DF implication:* Prioritise EU civil protection and NATO partnerships.

*Claim:* rUK and US would be pivotal to viability. *Best line with page:* rUK as primary shelter; US underwriting and brokerage (pp.13, 17). *Rival reading:* Diverse partners hedge UK risk. *Condition:* Cooperative London–Edinburgh ties. *Irish DF implication:* Sustain UK interoperability while deepening EU-NATO links.

*Claim:* Shelter has autonomy costs. *Best line with page:* Small states ‘pay’ in reduced freedom of manoeuvre (p.7). *Rival reading:* Europeanisation builds resilience. *Condition:* Domestic consent. *Irish DF implication:* Ring-fence niches, maintain legitimacy.

*Claim:* Nordic ties add soft-security and identity shelter. *Best line with page:* Nordic cooperation offers political cover, soft-security gains, NORDEFECO learning (p.14). *Rival reading:* Limited strategic heft. *Condition:* Shared Arctic and societal agendas. *Irish DF implication:* Build Nordic working groups on SAR and resilience.

**PEEL-C (for)** *Point:* EU and NATO compose the most efficient shelter mix for a small European state seeking continuity and capacity in hard and soft security. *Evidence:* The authors conclude EU/NATO membership is the logical, mainstream path for new small states in Europe since 1990 (p.17). *Explain:* EU rules, funds and operational regimes reduce exposure to shocks, while NATO’s collective defence and specialisation let limited forces contribute credibly. This integrated mix spreads risk and amplifies voice without heavy duplication. *Limit.* Benefits rely on implementation capacity and steady public consent. *Consequent:* Irish DF should deepen EU civil protection and NATO partnership projects to hedge transboundary risks with scarce resources.

**PEEL-C (against)** *Point:* Shelter can constrain bespoke responses and tighten dependence on larger neighbours, creating identity and autonomy frictions in crisis. *Evidence:* Shelter ‘price’ includes reduced freedom of manoeuvre, mirrored in EU and NATO participation costs (p.7). *Explain:* Standardised norms, budget ceilings and pooled capabilities may dull domestic priorities or crowd out niches, especially when London’s preferences dominate the neighbourhood ecosystem. *Limit.* Opt-outs, caveats and niche specialisation maintain space to manoeuvre. *Consequent:* Irish DF should protect niche capabilities, pre-negotiate caveats, and pair EU/NATO commitments with national red-team reviews.

<b>Evidence and Implication Log</b>	<b>Claim &amp; Best source (page) &amp; Rival source/reading &amp; Condition &amp; Implication for Irish DF</b>
	hline EU–NATO shelter is main- stream & Bailes et al. (p.17) & Neutrality plus ad hoc coalitions & Low direct threat & Prioritise EU soft-security, NATO partner- ships rUK/US pivotal & Bailes et al. (p.13) & Diversify partners & Cooperative neighbours & Maintain UK ties, hedge via EU- NATO Shelter has autonomy costs & Bailes et al. (p.7) & Europeanisation builds resilience & Domestic consent & Communicate

**Gaps** Chase: Concrete Irish cases linking EU civil protection, NATO PfP, and UK coordination in recent crises. Park: Deep Arctic Council status debates unless Irish remit widens.

(Bessner and Guilhot 2015)

## Source Analysis — *Bessner & Guilhot 2015*, How Realism Waltzed Off

**Describe:** The article explains why Waltz moved from classical realism to neorealism, arguing that neorealism reconceives realism in liberal form by excluding decisionmaking (p. 88). **Interpret:** It is directly relevant to a question about agency in IR theory, showing how neorealism sidelines policy choice to align with liberal democratic norms (pp. 106–107, 117). **Methodology:** Intellectual history and close reading, situating Waltz among cybernetics & system theory, contrasting him with Morgenthau and Lippmann (pp. 108–109, 104–106). **Evaluate:** Strong on genealogy and concepts; contribution is the cybernetic reading of neorealism; weaker on archival corroboration; the democracy defence is judged thin (p. 117). **Author:** Both authors read Waltz as liberal in outlook; they counter classical realist elitism and highlight U.S. political science context (pp. 88–90, 104–106). **Synthesis:** Aligns with Shklar on decisionism’s tie to systems thinking; diverges from Morgenthau’s decisionist pedagogy centred on statesmen (pp. 107–109, 90–94). **Limit.** The core claims rest on interpretive synthesis more than primary archives. **Implication:** For a small state or the Irish Defence Forces, structural reading helps orientation, but operational doctrine must reinsert decisionmaking.

**Method weight:** 3 — Observational/doctrinal synthesis using textual evidence, no triangulated empirical test.

### Claims–cluster seeds

*Claim:* Neorealism removes decisionmaking to reconcile realism with liberalism. *Best line:* “Waltz ... circumvented entirely the problem of decisionmaking ... a self-contained system” (p. 106). *Rival reading:* Pure theoretical maturation. *Condition:* When sys-

temic adaptation dominates outcomes. *Irish DF implication:* Keep structural scanning, but retain commander's decision doctrine.

*Claim:* Cybernetics & system theory underpin neorealism over rational choice. *Best line:* Systems "moved away from notions of decision and choice ... alternative to rational choice" (p. 109). *Rival reading:* Microeconomics is the model. *Condition:* High organisational complexity. *Implication:* Use systems-informed red-teaming, but preserve decision cells.

*Claim:* Democracies can do foreign policy as effectively as authoritarian regimes. *Best line:* "Democratic governments ... are well able to compete" (p. 106, citing Waltz 1967). *Rival reading:* Classical realist scepticism of publics. *Condition:* Mature bureaucratic routines. *Implication:* Whole-of-government processes can deliver strategic coherence.

*Claim:* Bipolarity stabilises by simplifying balancing. *Best line:* "Bipolar systems ... are more stable ... simplify balancing" (p. 115). *Rival reading:* Multipolar finesse prevents war. *Condition:* Two dominant poles. *Implication:* Small states should anchor in alliances, calibrate autonomy prudently.

**PEEL-C (for)** Point: Neorealism's power is to discipline analysis by treating international outcomes as systemic adaptations, limiting overconfidence in leaders' agency. Evidence: Bessner & Guilhot show Waltz "developed a model ... entirely detached from foreign policy" to bypass decisionmaking (p. 106). Explain: That move renders many policy errors less about individual misjudgement than about positional constraints in the structure, a useful corrective for small states. Limit. System focus can obscure windows where deft decision can bend constraints. Consequent: Irish planners should fuse structural indicators with decision-focused exercises, ensuring commanders rehearse choices within, and occasionally against, structural pressure.

**PEEL-C (against)** Point: Removing decisionmaking risks blinding practitioners to the levers that remain under human control, especially for small states leveraging niches. Evidence: The authors concede neorealism "saved democracy by making it inconsequential ... the system would take care of itself" (p. 117). Explain: If democracy is operationally irrelevant, doctrine may neglect political mobilisation, lawfare, or coalition entrepreneur-

ship that alter payoffs even in tight structures. Limit. The critique targets a stylised neo-realism, not all structural analysis in practice. Consequent: The Irish DF should institutionalise decision wargames alongside structural assessments, preserving agility to exploit fleeting opportunities in alliance politics.



**Claim &  
Best source  
(page) & Rival  
source/reading  
& Condition &  
Implication for  
Irish DF**

hline Neorealism  
removes decision-  
making & Bessner  
& Guilhot (p. 106)  
& Theory matured,  
not ideological &  
System dominates  
& Blend structural  
intel with decision  
drills Cybernetics  
underpins Waltz &  
Bessner & Guilhot  
(p. 109) & Microe-  
conomics model &

**Evidence & Implication Log** High complexity  
& Use systems  
thinking, keep  
command judge-  
ment Democracies  
can perform &  
Bessner & Guil-  
hot (p. 106) &  
Classical realist  
scepticism & Ma-  
ture bureaucracy

**Gaps** Chase: Primary archival evidence on Waltz's adoption of cybernetic sources beyond textual markers. Park: Fine-grained econometric tests of neorealism's systemic predictions for Cold War dyads.

(Betts 1996)

## Source Analysis — *Betts 1996*, The downside of the cutting edge

**Describe:** Betts argues an RMA benefits the United States yet breeds overconfidence, professional complacency and heightens risks of miscalculation and escalation. **Interpret:** This frames how small states should temper tech enthusiasm with strategy, budgeting and escalation control, not gadgeteering alone. **Methodology:** Policy essay using Gulf War imagery, Vietnam learning failures and NATO first-use dilemmas to reason about strategy–technology fit. **Evaluate:** Contribution is a crisp triad—expectations, complacency, instability—and a warning about “tactical clarity, strategic obscurity.” Evidence is illustrative, not systematic. **Author:** Betts, a Columbia security scholar writing in *The National Interest*, brings a U.S. vantage point that prizes strategic prudence. **Synthesis:** Aligns with Cohen's obscurity caution and Krepinevich's critique of the Army Concept, diverging from triumphalist RMA narratives. **Limit.** The piece generalises from cases without triangulated testing. **Implication:** Irish defence should pair precision investment with mass, resilience and escalation management, and retain competence for messy low-tech fights.

**Method weight:** 3 — Observational doctrinal analysis from cases and strategic reasoning, no empirical triangulation.

### Claims–cluster seeds

*Claim:* Public “bloodless war” expectations rise after precision spectacles. *Best line with page:* “Laser-guided bombs... belief that war can be bloodless” [n.p.]. *Rival reading:* RMA deters so expectations don't matter. *Condition:* After highly curated combat imagery. *Irish DF implication:* Manage narratives, protect readiness funding.

*Claim:* RMA can entrench big-war orthodoxy and ill-suit unconventional conflicts. *Best line with page:* “Commitment to high-tech operations may prove unsuitable... unpleasant choices” [n.p.]. *Rival reading:* Tech lifts all missions. *Condition:* Urban, irregular or hybrid contexts. *Implication:* Train low-tech skills alongside precision.

*Claim:* Conventional superiority can push great-power adversaries toward WMD escalation. *Best line with page:* “Decided technical advantage... loser desperate... unconventional weapons” [n.p.]. *Rival reading:* Advantage deters escalation. *Condition:* Adversary sees vital stakes. *Implication:* Embed escalation control in planning.

*Claim:* Adversaries will develop asymmetric counters; last-move fallacy misleads planners. *Best line with page:* “Asymmetrical solutions... counters to American technological prowess” [n.p.]. *Rival reading:* Overmatch nullifies adaptation. *Condition:* Cheap countermeasures proliferate. *Implication:* Invest in deception resilience and rapid adaptation.

**PEEL-C (for)** Point: Treat RMA as a strategic asset only if paired with prudence about adversary incentives and domestic politics. Evidence: Betts warns decisive conventional overmatch can push a weaker great power toward nuclear or biological escalation (n.p.). Explain: Precision dominance raises an opponent’s temptation to escape defeat by upping the ante, which alters thresholds for coercion and compellence. Limit. This logic bites hardest when the adversary’s stakes are local and vital. Consequent: Ireland should privilege escalation control, dispersal and hardened C2 alongside modest precision buys.

**PEEL-C (against)** Point: Overstating RMA downsides risks underinvesting in tools that deter and shorten wars. Evidence: Betts concedes an RMA offers an “important net advantage” if integrated with strategy (n.p.). Explain: Superior ISR–strike can coerce early, limit attrition and avert prolonged contests that favour larger powers. Limit. Capability without readiness, stockpiles and doctrine yields brittle superiority. Consequent: A small state should buy cheap precision enablers, but hedge with magazines, mobilisation and allied interoperability.

**Claim &  
Best source  
(page) & Rival  
source/reading  
& Condition &  
Implication for  
Irish DF**

hline Bloodless-  
war expectations  
follow precision  
imagery & Betts  
1996 [n.p.] &  
RMA deterrence  
makes this moot  
& Post-spectacle  
politics & Protect  
readiness budgets,  
message costs  
RMA can misfit  
irregular wars &  
Betts 1996 [n.p.]  
& Tech applies  
across missions

**Evidence & Implication Log** & Urban/hybrid  
fights & Drill low-  
tech, civil–military  
integration Over-  
match may spur  
WMD escalation  
& Betts 1996 [n.p.]  
& Advantage de-  
ters escalation &

**Gaps** Chase: Cases quantifying RMA-driven escalation risks in great-power crises since 1991. Park: Detailed cost–effectiveness of specific Irish precision platforms pending requirements.

(Commission on the Defence Forces 2022)

## Source Analysis — *Commission on the Defence Forces*

### 2022, Report of the Commission on the Defence Forces

**Describe:** Sets a three-tier LOA framework, finding a gap between ambition and resources, and details capabilities to 2030, notably RAP and a nine-ship, double-crewed fleet. **Interpret:** Directly relevant to selecting Ireland’s 2030 LOA; excludes precise costings, framing recommendations as indicative. **Methodology:** Commission synthesis of submissions and comparative assessment; doctrinal/observational rather than experimental; validity rests on expert triangulation within policy bounds. **Evaluate:** Strong on concrete outputs (2,000 patrol days; 220 days per ship) and RAP urgency; weaker on fiscal phasing. **Author:** Institutional, reformist stance; calls for relentless transformation and external oversight. **Synthesis:** Aligns with White Paper ambition yet exposes resource–capability disconnect; diverges by formalising LOA tiers and specifying RAP/naval outputs. **Limit.** Recommendations are indicative, not prescriptive; delivery routes may vary. **Implication:** A small state should prioritise RAP and double-crewed patrol capacity to uphold sovereignty and safety by 2030.

Method weight: 3 — Doctrinal/observational commission report synthesising evidence; no experimental design or strong quasi-experimental identification.

Claims-cluster seeds

Claim: LOA 2 enables 24/7/365 EEZ policing by 2030 with nine ships and MRV. Best line with page: “by 2030... 24/7/365... nine... MRV... 2,000 patrol days” (p. 36). Rival reading: Output depends on crewing and basing. Condition: Double crewing and support bases. Irish DF implication: Fund fleet renewal and bases now.

Claim: Primary radar to generate a complete RAP is an immediate top priority at LOA 2. Best line with page: “primary radar... immediate and top priority” (p. 39–40). Rival reading: Civil feeds could suffice. Condition: Integrate full civilian inputs. Irish DF implication: Accelerate radar procurement and integration.

Claim: LOA 2 still yields limited conventional maritime warfighting. Best line with page: “limited defensive conventional maritime warfighting capability” (p. 37). Rival reading: Deterrence via presence may suffice. Condition: Joint effects with air/land. Irish DF implication: Manage expectations; invest in deterrent sensors and weapons.

Claim: Recommendations are indicative, not prescriptive on equipment. Best line with page: “indicative rather than prescriptive” (p. 53). Rival reading: Treat list as de facto plan. Condition: Maintain effect-based planning. Irish DF implication: Guard flexibility in capability choices.

Claim: Resource–capability disconnect requires clarified LOA. Best line with page: “disconnect... urgent need for clarification” (p. v). Rival reading: Incremental fixes suffice. Condition: Whole-of-government commitment. Irish DF implication: Anchor budgeting to selected LOA.

PEEL-C (two paragraphs)

Point: CODF 2022 implies Ireland should adopt LOA 2 by 2030, prioritising sovereign surveillance and continuous maritime policing. Evidence: The report states that by 2030 the Naval Service could conduct 24/7/365 EEZ operations with a minimum of nine modern ships and deliver 2,000 patrol days (p. 36). Explain: This output level, paired with RAP, converts presence into persistent awareness and credible deterrence against incursions, while sustaining EU crisis-management contributions. Limit. Delivery hinges on double crewing, support bases, and timely fleet replacement. Consequent: Prioritise radar integration, basing on both coasts, and an accelerated vessel programme to secure Irish sovereignty as a small state.

Point: Yet CODF cautions that LOA 2 confers only limited conventional maritime warfighting, so expectations and posture must be managed. Evidence: The Commission notes LOA 2 would “deliver a limited defensive conventional maritime warfighting ca-

pability” even while enhancing deterrence and situational awareness (p. 37). Explain: Without heavier combatants or air defence, deterrence relies on surveillance, readiness, and joint effects, not sea control. Limit. Recommendations are indicative, allowing alternate means to achieve effects if budgets, technology, or partners shift (p. 53). Consequent: Build layered sensing, ISR RPAS, and limited sea denial assets while planning options to climb to LOA 3 if the threat worsens.

Evidence and Implication Log

**Claim &  
Best source  
(page) & Rival  
source/reading  
& Condition &  
Implication for  
Irish DF**

hline LOA 2  
enables 24/7/365  
EEZ policing &  
CODF 2022, p.  
36 & Presence not  
needed continu-  
ously & Double  
crewing, basing  
& Fund nine-ship  
fleet, MRV, double  
crewing Primary  
radar is top priority  
& CODF 2022,  
p. 39–40 & Civil  
feeds adequate &  
Integrate civilian  
inputs & Accel-  
erate RAP and  
interagency data  
sharing LOA  
2 warfighting is  
limited & CODF  
2022, p. 37 &  
Deterrence via

134patrols suffices



### Gaps

Chase next: Phasing and staffing model to reach 2,000 patrol days and 220 days per ship by 2030 within CODF annexes. Park: External implementation status, funding envelopes, and post-2022 Government decisions [NO SOURCE].

(Cohen 2002)

## Source Analysis — *Cohen 2002*, Supreme Command in the 21st Century

**Describe:** Critiques “normal theory”; argues for active civilian control as an unequal dialogue, guided by Churchill’s “It is always right to probe.” **Interpret:** Frames how Irish ministers should steer CODF delivery—probe plans, tolerate friction, demand candour, insist unity in public. **Methodology:** Analytical essay with historical vignettes; doctrinal not empirical; validity from argument and exemplars. **Evaluate:** Persuasive on leadership behaviours; US-centric, limited small-state tailoring; warns against platitudes of non-interference. **Author:** U.S. strategic studies scholar; emphasises assertive civilian leadership in war and policy. **Synthesis:** Supports rigorous civilian probing of LOA 2 implementation; diverges from CODF by focusing on wartime command rather than peacetime capability planning. **Limit.** Sparse small-state cases and metrics. **Implication:** Irish DF oversight should institutionalise unequal dialogue in capability boards and NSC-style committees.

Method weight: 2 — Descriptive, advocacy-style essay drawing on historical cases.

Claims-cluster seeds — Cohen 2002

Claim: Healthy civil–military relations require unequal dialogue, not hands-off delegation. Best line: “active control entails... unequal dialogue... ‘It is always right to probe’.” Rival: Normal theory separation. Condition: Civilians probe, demand candour. Irish implication: Cabinet leads hard questioning of LOA delivery.

Claim: Process works, relationships are inherently tense. Best line: “process... works well... Supreme command as relationship is always difficult.” Rival: Harmony equals

health. Condition: Accept friction. Irish implication: Normalise disagreement in capability governance.

Claim: Misread lessons of Vietnam and Gulf War distort roles. Best line: Platitudes on “not interfering” harm; friction persists. Rival: Defer to military to avoid error. Condition: Educate both sides. Irish implication: PME embeds oversight practice.

Claim: Personnel at peacetime apex may be unsuited in war. Best line: Politicians must reshuffle senior officers when required. Rival: Seniority equals suitability. Condition: Character assessment. Irish implication: Strengthen performance review mechanisms.

PEEL-C — Cohen 2002 (for)

Point: Cohen implies Irish ministers must actively probe LOA 2 delivery, rejecting a hands-off “let the military get on with it” posture. Evidence: He defines “active control” as an unequal dialogue and endorses Churchill’s dictum “It is always right to probe.” Explain: Probing surfaces trade-offs in fleet tempo, RAP timelines and basing, improving choices and accountability in a small state. Limit. The essay is U.S.-centric with limited small-state specifics. Consequent: Establish minister-led reviews that test crewing, patrol-day assumptions and radar integration before major commitments.

PEEL-C — Cohen 2002 (against)

Point: Over-assertive civilian micro-management can sap trust, confuse command and blur responsibilities during crises. Evidence: Cohen stresses relationships are inherently tense even when processes work, so friction is unavoidable. Explain: In Ireland, excessive intervention could slow procurement and operations, undermining LOA timelines. Limit. He also rejects naïve non-interference, urging balanced, informed probing. Consequent: Train ministers and officers for structured “probe, decide, support” routines to preserve tempo and coherence.

Evidence and Implication Log — Cohen 2002

**Claim &  
Best source  
(page) & Rival  
source/reading  
& Condition &  
Implication for  
Irish DF**

hline Unequal  
dialogue is es-  
sential & Cohen  
2002 & Hands-off  
“normal theory”  
& Educated prob-  
ing & Cabinet  
probes LOA plans  
Process works,  
friction persists  
& Cohen 2002 &  
Harmony equals  
health & Nor-  
malise tension  
& Build routines  
for dissent Be-  
ware platitudes of  
non-interference  
& Cohen 2002  
& Deference pre-  
vents error & PME  
reform & Teach  
oversight prac-  
tice Leaders may  
not fit wartime

Gaps — Cohen 2002

Chase next: Irish small-state adaptations of unequal dialogue in peacetime capability planning. Park: Wider comparative cases beyond U.S. frame [NO SOURCE].

(Cottey 2022)

## Source Analysis — *Cottey 2022, A Celtic Zeitenwende?* –

### Continuity and Change in Irish National Security Policy

**Describe:** Argues that four enduring features—low threat, free-riding, domestic constraints, EU good citizenship—persist; predicts continuity despite LOA2 move to 2028.

**Interpret:** Directly informs whether Ireland should expect a ‘Celtic zeitenwende’ or incrementalism in defence by 2030; relevance is high to DSS posture. **Methodology:** Peer-reviewed analytic essay synthesising official plans, spending data and polls; observational, doctrinal validity rather than experimental identification. **Evaluate:** Persuasive on political economy of free-riding and neutrality; underweights potential external shock effects on policy acceleration. **Author:** Academic voice foregrounding continuity; no disclosed institutional funding in the article. **Synthesis:** Converges with CODF/White Paper on low conventional attack likelihood and cyber vulnerability; diverges by tempering expectations of rapid change. **Limit.** Single-author synthesis anchored in 2022 data; generalises across uncertain politics. **Implication:** Irish DF should sequence LOA2 enablers for steady gains rather than banking on a post-Ukraine transformation.

Method weight: 3 — Observational, doctrinal synthesis using secondary data; no quasi-experimental identification.

Claims-cluster seeds

Claim: Expect more continuity than change in Irish security policy. Best line with page: “We should expect more continuity than change.” (p. 2) Rival reading: War shock triggers step-change. Condition: Major incident or coalition shift. Irish DF implication: Build resilient LOA2 timeline and contingencies.

Claim: Ireland's threat environment is low, arguably very low. Best line with page: "Compared to many countries... low, arguably very low." (p. 3) Rival: Hybrid risks demand rapid militarisation. Condition: Cable or cyber disruption. Irish DF implication: Prioritise cyber and RAP over heavy warfighting.

Claim: Free-riding is entrenched; c.0.3

Claim: Domestic politics militate against radical change; neutrality resilient. Best line with page: Polls sustain neutrality; NATO case muted. (p. 7) Rival: Opinion is volatile. Condition: Security scare or economic slack. Irish DF implication: Frame capability as sovereignty, not alignment.

Claim: EU stance is good citizenship, cautious engagement. Best line with page: Constructive partner, rarely leader; limited CSDP deployments. (p. 8) Rival: EU defence integration compels more. Condition: Treaty change or crisis. Irish DF implication: Target niche, sustainable EU roles.

PEEL-C (two paragraphs)

Point: Ireland should plan for incremental capability uplift, not a sudden 'zeitenwende'. Evidence: Defence spending has been c.0.3 Explain: That baseline and political culture constrain rapid change; credible delivery therefore relies on steady LOA2 enablers—RAP, crewing, and cyber—rather than ambitious leaps. Limit. A major incident or electoral shift could accelerate choices unexpectedly. Consequent: Sequence sensors, crews and support infrastructure first to lock in sovereign awareness at acceptable political cost.

Point: Nonetheless, capacity for meaningful change exists if resourcing holds. Evidence: Government approved moving to LOA2 by 2028, raising defence to €1.5bn—the largest increase in Irish history. Explain: If funding endures through cycles, the DF can convert continuity into tangible outputs without breaching neutrality norms. Limit. Domestic politics and neutrality sentiment still cap ambition. Consequent: Tie milestones to public value—SAR, RAP, cable protection—to maintain consent while improving deterrence.

Evidence and Implication Log

**Claim &  
Best source  
(page) & Rival  
source/reading  
& Condition &  
Implication for  
Irish DF**

hline Continuity  
over change &  
Cottey 2022, p. 2  
& Shock accel-  
erates change &  
Major incident  
or coalition shift  
& Build resilient  
LOA2 road-map  
Low threat envi-  
ronment & Cottey  
2022, p. 3–4 &  
Hybrid risk rising  
& Cable/cyber  
disruption & Pri-  
oritise RAP and  
cyber hardening  
Free-riding en-  
trenched & Cottey  
2022, p. 5–6 &  
Peacekeeping  
offsets & Alliance  
pressure increases  
& Protect funding

### Gaps

Chase next: Post-2022 polling and budget execution to test continuity claims [NO SOURCE]. Park: NATO membership debate scenarios unless a referendum is tabled [NO SOURCE].

## Source Analysis — *Commission on the Defence Forces*

### 2022, Report of the Commission on the Defence Forces

**Describe:** Establishes three Levels of Ambition, identifies a resource–ambition gap, and specifies 2030 outputs: complete RAP, nine ships with double crewing, 2,000 patrol days (pp. 36–40). **Interpret:** Directly frames Ireland’s 2030 choice; lists are indicative, not prescriptive, and omit precise costings (pp. 39–40, 53). **Methodology:** Commission synthesis of submissions and comparative assessment; observational, doctrinal validity within institutional bounds. **Evaluate:** Strong on concrete naval outputs and RAP urgency; weaker on fiscal phasing and conventional sea warfighting at LOA 2 (pp. 36–37). **Author:** Reformist institutional stance seeking persistent capability uplift with external oversight. **Synthesis:** Aligns with White Paper on sovereignty needs; diverges by formalising LOA tiers and quantifying outputs (pp. 36–40). **Limit.** Recommendations are indicative; delivery routes may vary. **Implication:** Sequence RAP, fleet renewal and double crewing to convert presence into persistent awareness by 2030 for a small state.

## Source Analysis — *Cottey 2022, A Celtic Zeitenwende?*

### Continuity and Change in Irish National Security Policy

**Describe:** Argues continuity will dominate despite Ukraine; four drivers persist—low threat, free-riding, domestic constraints, EU good citizenship (pp. 2–3, 7–9). **Interpret:** Sets realistic DSS expectations to 2030; informs pacing for LOA 2 under political caution (pp. 2–3). **Methodology:** Peer-reviewed analytic synthesis using budgets, polls and official texts; observational rather than experimental. **Evaluate:** Persuasive on political economy and neutrality; lighter on small-state comparators and fresh empirical data

(pp. 5–9). **Author:** Academic voice, cautious on prospects for rapid change; no declared funding. **Synthesis:** Converges with CODF on low conventional risk and cyber salience; diverges by tempering expectations of transformation (pp. 2–5, 7–9). **Limit.** Single-author synthesis anchored in 2022 evidence. **Implication:** Prioritise RAP, crewing and cyber first to bank steady gains without breaching neutrality norms.

## Source Analysis — *Cohen 2002*, Supreme Command in the 21st Century

**Describe:** Critiques “normal theory” and advances active civilian control as an unequal dialogue; Churchill’s injunction to probe guides oversight (n.p.). **Interpret:** Provides behavioural rules for ministers to steer capability delivery and test advice during CODF implementation (n.p.). **Methodology:** Doctrinal essay with historical vignettes; argumentative, not empirical. **Evaluate:** Useful for oversight behaviours and candid dialogue; US-centric and light on small-state specifics. **Author:** U.S. strategic studies scholar advocating assertive civilian leadership; no small-state institutional lens. **Synthesis:** Supports probing civilian oversight of LOA 2 delivery; diverges by focusing on wartime command rather than peacetime planning. **Limit.** Sparse small-state tailoring and operational metrics. **Implication:** Institutionalise unequal dialogue in Irish defence governance—probe hard in private, decide, then support in public.

(Rakipoğlu and Duman 2025)

DIMERS LaTeX



## Source Analysis — *Duman & Rakipoğlu 2025*, The Structural Paralysis of the UN Security Council: Great Power Politics and the Gaza Crisis

**Describe:** Examines UNSC response to Gaza, Oct 2023–Jan 2025. Thirteen drafts, four adopted. Core claim: veto power, especially US use, paralysed decisive action and weakened adopted texts (pp. 46, 53–56).

**Interpret:** Relevant to DSS on institutions under strain. Shows humanitarian imperatives subordinated to alliances and P5 narratives; E10 solidarity could not overcome structural veto (pp. 66–68).

**Methodology:** Qualitative content analysis of P5 statements across twelve meetings, coding UN drafts, votes, and transcripts in the Oct 2023–Jan 2025 window; interpretivist, record-based validity with clear scope conditions (pp. 48–49).

**Evaluate:** Contribution: resolution-by-resolution tracing that links veto justifications to outcomes; documents how adopted texts were diluted by negotiation and legal reinterpretation (pp. 46, 62–63).

**Author:** Authors are Turkish academics; the narrative references Ankara’s critique that the world is “bigger than five,” signalling a reformist lens (p. 53).

**Synthesis:** Aligns with long-running calls for curbing veto use in mass atrocity contexts; diverges from great-power management logics that normalise veto as stabiliser (pp. 66–68).

**Limit.** Single case, discourse-heavy evidence, limited assessment of ground effects beyond texts.

**Implication:** Irish DF should coalition with E10 on text-crafting, back veto-restraint codes in atrocity cases, and resource humanitarian access diplomacy.

Method weight

3/5. Solid primary records and clear design, yet single-case scope, interpretivist bias risk, limited outcome validation against field effects.

Claims-cluster seeds

Claim: US vetoes were the principal barrier to decisive Council action. • Best line: “The United States’ veto power stands at the centre of this deadlock” (pp. 46–47). • Rival reading: Veto preserved leverage for hostage diplomacy and de-escalation sequencing. • Condition: Holds when ceasefire text omits language demanded by Washington. • Irish DF implication: Work E10-US bridges early; pre-consult to avoid veto triggers.

Claim: Even adopted resolutions were substantially weakened by negotiation and reinterpretation. • Best line: “Even resolutions that passed were substantially weakened through political compromises and legal reinterpretations” (p. 46). • Rival reading: Dilution was necessary to build minimum consensus for any operational effect. • Condition: Late-stage text where hostage and ceasefire linkages are unresolved. • Irish DF implication: Insert safeguard clauses and reporting mandates that survive dilution.

Claim: E10 agency was limited despite unity, given P5 narrative dominance. • Best line: E10 unity on 2728 could not offset P5 privileges and narrative control (pp. 66–68). • Rival reading: E10 succeeded tactically with 2728; incrementalism is the rational path. • Condition: When a P5’s ally is a direct belligerent. • Irish DF implication: Build cross-regional E10 blocs early; circulate joint interpretive statements.

Claim: Curtailing veto use in mass atrocity cases is central to meaningful reform. • Best line: Reform must curb veto abuse in atrocity situations to restore legitimacy (p. 68). • Rival reading: Veto curtailment is utopian; procedural tweaks and working methods matter more. • Condition: When casualty thresholds and humanitarian access metrics cross agreed triggers. • Irish DF implication: Back veto-restraint code commitments and atrocity-triggered explanations.

#### Two PEEL-C paragraphs

Strongest claim — Point: The US veto sat at the core of Gaza-related paralysis. Evidence: The article states the US “used this power on six ceasefire-related draft resolutions” and emerged the principal obstacle to immediate cessation initiatives (pp. 46–47). Explain: This prioritised alliance maintenance over civilian protection and split the Council’s humanitarian consensus. It also narrowed the space for E10 text-crafting. Limit: The design is discourse-heavy and cannot prove counterfactual outcomes. Consequent: Irish

DF should pre-consult with Washington on red-lines, anchor hostage-ceasefire linkages, and lock in humanitarian access clauses.

Counter-paragraph — Point: Dilution and delay reflected structural bargaining, not only US obstruction. Evidence: Adopted texts followed “protracted and often contentious negotiations,” with language traded to reach minimum consensus, while Russia and China also vetoed US drafts (pp. 54, 62–63). Explain: Veto politics is symmetrical at times and reflects embedded design choices that prioritise great-power assent. Limit: The paper’s Gaza focus limits transferability to conflicts without a tight P5-ally link. Consequent: Irish DF should pursue incremental wins: mandate design, reporting cadences, and corridor access that survive P5 edits.

Evidence & Implication Log

**Claim &  
Best source  
(page) & Rival  
source/reading  
& Condition &  
Implication for  
Irish DF**

hline US veto  
central & Duman  
& Rakipoğlu (pp.  
46–47) & Veto  
preserves negotia-  
tion leverage & US  
red-lines unmet &  
Pre-consult with  
US; sequence text  
to hostage tracks  
Adopted texts  
weakened & Du-  
man & Rakipoğlu  
(p. 46) & Dilution  
as consensus-  
building & Late-  
stage bargaining  
& Insert durable  
humanitarian  
clauses and report-  
ing E10 agency  
constrained & Du-  
man & Rakipoğlu  
(pp. 66–68) &

### Gaps

- What to chase: Triangulate Council discourse with operational impact metrics on aid flows and civilian harm.
- What to park: Broader UN reform literature beyond Gaza until core argument is drafted.

If you want, share your one-line essay question or module learning outcomes and I will tailor the PEEL-C and implications to them directly.

(European Union 2016)

DIMERS LaTeX

## Source Analysis — *European Union 2016, Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe*

**Describe:** Sets the EU’s external-action compass. Five priorities: security of the Union, resilience east and south, integrated approach to conflicts, cooperative regional orders, and global governance. Commits to principled pragmatism and strategic autonomy, with NATO complementarity. Anchors a rules-based order with the UN at its core, and urges UNSC members not to veto credible atrocity-response drafts (pp. 9–10, 16, 18–20, 39–41, 46–48).

**Interpret:** Useful for DSS on institutions under pressure. It couples small-state leverage to multilateral law while building capacity for autonomous EU action. It points Ireland toward UN-first diplomacy, EU–NATO complementarity, and resilience programming as force multipliers.

**Methodology:** Official strategy, not empirical study. Normative design grounded in Treaties and prior policy, with an action plan around a credible, responsive, joined-up Union and defence-industrial instruments.

**Evaluate:** Contribution: codifies strategic autonomy alongside NATO, details defence-cooperation levers via EDA and EU funding, and stakes a UN-centred rules order with explicit atrocity-veto restraint. Concrete for policy; light on measurement.

**Author:** Institutional EU voice, HR/VP framing a stronger Union after the UK referendum; integrationist and pro-UN, with explicit transatlantic partnership language.

**Synthesis:** Aligns with reformist calls to curtail UNSC veto in atrocity cases; complements case-led critiques of veto impunity.

**Limit.** Strategy-level breadth; non-binding; no outcome evaluation beyond intent.

**Implication:** Irish DF should back atrocity-triggered veto restraint, invest in CSDP capabilities and EDA benchmarks, and use resilience plus integrated-approach toolkits within EU–NATO complementarity.

Method weight

3/5. Authoritative strategy with operational levers, but normative and non-empirical; outcomes depend on Member State follow-through.

Claims-cluster seeds

Claim: The EU pursues strategic autonomy while remaining complementary to NATO. • Best line: autonomy “if and when necessary,” with NATO cooperation central; autonomy needs defence-industrial depth. • Rival reading: Capacity gaps make autonomy aspirational. • Condition: Defence cooperation and EU funding mechanisms bite. • Irish DF implication: Prioritise PESCO deliverables and EDA benchmarks.

Claim: The rules-based order places the UN at its core, with explicit atrocity-veto restraint. • Best line: “rules-based... with the United Nations at its core”; Council members urged not to veto credible atrocity drafts. • Rival reading: Great-power politics will still dominate practice. • Condition: Mass-atrocity triggers and coalition backing. • Irish DF implication: Champion veto-restraint codes and accountability language.

Claim: Resilience east and south plus an integrated approach are central to crisis response. • Best line: Invest in resilience of neighbours; act at all conflict-cycle stages, multi-level. • Rival reading: Overstretch without joined-up delivery. • Condition: Joined-up, responsive Union reforms in place. • Irish DF implication: Resource cross-departmental resilience workstreams.

Claim: Defence cooperation and a competitive European defence industry underpin autonomy. • Best line: Cooperation “must translate into real commitment”; industry es-

sential to autonomy. • Rival reading: National preferences block depth. • Condition: Coordinated planning with EDA benchmarks. • Irish DF implication: Target capability gaps that enable EU missions.

Claim: Principled pragmatism frames EU external action. • Best line: “Principled pragmatism will guide our external action.” • Rival reading: Ambiguity masks trade-offs. • Condition: Clear thresholds for restraint and engagement. • Irish DF implication: Tie values to operational triggers in mandates.

#### Two PEEL-C paragraphs

Strongest claim — Point: Strategic autonomy is an EU ambition tethered to NATO cooperation and concrete defence cooperation. Evidence: The Strategy links autonomy “if and when necessary” to acting with NATO in complementarity, and to EU-level defence-industrial measures and cooperation “as the norm.” Explain: Autonomy without depth is rhetoric; autonomy with shared enablers, planning cycles, and EDA benchmarks becomes usable policy. Limit: Delivery depends on Member State will and budgets. Consequent: Ireland should prioritise niche enablers, interoperability, and PESCO projects that unlock EU crisis-response options.

Counter-paragraph — Point: A UN-centred rules-based order with veto restraint is necessary but not sufficient. Evidence: The Strategy elevates the UN’s core role and urges UNSC members not to veto credible atrocity responses. Explain: Norms shape agendas, yet great-power bargains can still stall protection. The Strategy’s integrated approach and resilience agenda are the practical hedge. Limit: Normative calls lack enforcement teeth absent coalitions and capacity. Consequent: Ireland should pair veto-restraint advocacy with funding and staffing for integrated-approach missions and neighbour resilience.

#### Evidence & Implication Log

**Claim &  
Best source  
(page) & Rival  
source/reading  
& Condition &  
Implication for  
Irish DF**

hline Strategic  
autonomy with  
NATO comple-  
mentarity & EU  
Global Strategy  
2016 (pp. 19–20,  
46–48) & Ca-  
pacity gaps make  
autonomy aspira-  
tional & Defence  
cooperation and  
funding bite &  
Focus PESCO  
enablers; EDA  
benchmarks UN at  
core; veto restraint  
in atrocities & EU  
Global Strategy  
2016 (pp. 16, 40)  
& Power politics  
still dominates &  
Credible drafts;  
broad coalition &  
Back veto-restraint



### Gaps

- What to chase: Concrete Irish capability niches that align with EDA benchmarks and PESCO to operationalise autonomy.
- What to park: Wider trade agenda detail until core DSS argument on autonomy–multilateralism balance is drafted.

If you share your one-line DSS essay question or LOs, I'll tune the PEEL-C and implications directly to them.

(European External Action Service 2017)

DIMERS (LaTeX)

## Source Analysis — *EEAS 2017*, From Shared Vision to Common Action: Implementing the EU Global Strategy — Year 1

**Describe:** Year-one implementation report of the EU Global Strategy. It maps concrete advances across resilience, an integrated approach to conflicts, and especially security & defence, including MPCC, CARD, EU–NATO workstreams, and exploration of PESCO (pp. 20–25). **Interpret:** For DSS it evidences a shift from declaratory strategy to institutional capacity-building, positioning the EU as a credible security provider while avoiding hard claims on operational effect. **Methodology:** Institutional narrative drawing on Council conclusions, Commission initiatives, and budget lines; valid for mapping decisions and instruments, weaker on outcomes and counter-evidence. **Evaluate:** Strongest bite is defence integration: MPCC created for non-executive missions, CARD launched, PESCO advanced, with 42 EU–NATO actions tracked. Contribution is speed and scope; contradiction is the scarcity of measured impact. **Author:** HRVP/EEAS vantage with integrative, multilateral, NATO-complementary stance; foreword frames progress as unprecedented. Counter-voices to check: member-state sceptics, NATO burden-sharing critics. **Synthesis:** Aligns with the 2016 EUGS whole-of-EU approach and extends into migration partnerships, External Investment Plan, and trust funds as security levers. **Limit.** One-year window, self-assessment tone, selective metrics. **Implication:** Irish DF planning and ca-

pability choices will be filtered by PESCO projects, CARD cycles, and MPCC tasking, aligning with small-state burden-sharing and DSS learning outcomes.

Method weight

3/5 — Strong for institutional mapping of decisions and instruments; limited external validation, short horizon, sparse outcome data.

Claims-cluster seeds

The EU made a decade's worth of defence integration progress in ten months. • Best line: "more has been achieved in the last ten months than in the last ten years" (p. 06–07). • Rival reading: Rhetorical flourish without comparative baselines. • Condition: Holds if MPCC, CARD, PESCO timelines translate into deployments and capabilities. • Irish DF implication: Join PESCO projects that complement niche capabilities and avoid duplication.

The Integrated Approach operationalises multi-level crisis management across Sahel, Syria, Colombia, Libya. • Best line: "multi-dimensional... multi-phased... multi-level... multilateral approach" with cases (pp. 18–19). • Rival reading: Lists initiatives without demonstrating comparative effectiveness. • Condition: Requires sustained civilian–military coordination and funding continuity. • Irish DF implication: Target CSDP training, stabilisation, and advisory roles matching expeditionary scale.

The internal–external nexus on migration binds security tools to development finance. • Best line: EIP, Trust Fund for Africa (€1.7bn committed), Facility for Refugees in Turkey (€3bn) (pp. 27–28). • Rival reading: Financial inputs do not prove security outcomes. • Condition: Works where partner governance absorbs funds and coordinates border management. • Irish DF implication: Maritime training, ISR, and capacity-building roles within EU operations.

EU–NATO cooperation has deepened through 42 actions and hybrid-threat mechanisms. • Best line: "jointly implementing... 42 action points" and new Hybrid Threats Centre (p. 24–25). • Rival reading: Parallel tracks risk duplication. • Condition: Needs planning coherence between NATO NDPP and EU CDP. • Irish DF implication: Interoperability and standards without eroding non-alignment.

Public diplomacy underpins strategic communication for EUGS priorities. • Best line: Dedicated budget line €50.9m under Partnership Instrument (p. 32–33). • Rival reading: Outputs not tied to behavioural change. • Condition: Targeted campaigns linked to policy milestones. • Irish DF implication: Narrative discipline for missions and resilience messaging.

#### PEEL-C drafting

Paragraph 1 — strongest claim Point. The EU’s defence integration passed a threshold in 2016–17. Evidence. The report records MPCC creation for non-executive missions, the launch of CARD, and Council-led exploration of PESCO, while EU–NATO cooperation accelerated through 42 actions (pp. 21–25). Explain. These instruments lock in planning cycles, command arrangements, and collaborative capability pipelines, shifting the EU from declaratory strategy to structured delivery. Limit. One year of decisions is not yet proof of effect in theatres. Consequent: Irish DF should prioritise PESCO niches and CARD-aligned investments to meet DSS outcomes on capability planning.

Paragraph 2 — counter-line Point. The narrative over-claims impact by leaning on inputs. Evidence. The report highlights budgets, mechanisms, and meetings, and asserts unprecedented progress without external benchmarks or measured outputs (pp. 06–12, 27–30). Explain. Institutional milestones can stall in capability delivery, while partner governance and political will remain variable. Limit. Internal documentation is still necessary to trace formal mandates and timelines. Consequent: Triangulate this source with mission reporting and member-state white papers to satisfy DSS learning aims on evidence-based assessment.

#### Evidence & Implication Log (LaTeX)

**Claim &  
Best source  
(page) & Rival  
source/reading  
& Condition &  
Implication for  
Irish DF**

hline EU defence  
integration leapt  
in 2016–17 &  
MPCC, CARD,  
PESCO advances  
(pp. 21–24) &  
Input-heavy,  
outcome-light nar-  
rative & Decisions  
convert to deploy-  
able capabilities  
& Join selective  
PESCO, align  
plans to CARD In-  
tegrated Approach  
operationalised  
& Framework  
& cases (pp.  
18–19) & Effec-  
tiveness unproven  
v alternatives &  
Civil-military  
coordination  
sustained & Em-

### Gaps

- What to chase: Mission-level output metrics for MPCC-run training missions and PESCO project delivery timelines.
- What to park: Grand claims of transformation without third-party validation pending additional evidence.

(Gray 2005)

DIMERS LaTeX

## Source Analysis — *Gray 2005, Warfare 1989–2004*

**Describe:** Gray argues that war’s nature is constant while its character shifts with context, keeping policy’s primacy at the centre (p.16–17). He opens with four caveats: keep war in political, social, cultural frames; beware solving preferred problems; distrust trend-spotting; expect surprise (p.15–16). **Interpret:** For DSS the piece cautions against platform-led transformation and urges policy-first design, shaping peace as the aim, not battle as an end (p.17, 21). **Methodology:** A conceptual essay using historical exemplars and authorities to infer patterns. Validity rests on theoretical coherence and range, not new data. Bias is US-campaign heavy, with a classical realist lens. **Evaluate:** The continuity claim is well supported, including the warning that transformation may miss strategic marks and that the US has a way of battle, not a way of war (p.21). The terrorism forecast is contestable but framed as probabilistic (p.22). **Author:** Colin S. Gray, Professor of Strategic Studies, writes in *Parameters*. Realist, sceptical of tech determinism, attentive to Clausewitz. **Synthesis:** Aligns with Jeremy Black that fundamentals change slowly; diverges from Kaldor’s “new wars” thesis, predicting the return of interstate war (p.21). **Limit.** US focus and 1989–2004 dataset narrow generalisability; forecasts depend on context shifts. **Implication:** Irish DF should integrate political ends with force design, emphasise scenario planning and coalition leverage.

Method weight: 3/5. Conceptual synthesis with strong theory and breadth, limited by US-centric lens and absence of fresh empirical testing.

Claims-cluster seeds

War's nature is eternal; character varies. • Best line: "the nature of war is eternal" (p.17).

• Rival: New wars alter war's nature. • Condition: Political logic remains dominant. • Irish DF implication: Train for continuity, adapt for changing contexts.

Interstate war is down, not out. • Best line: "decisive war... moving toward history's dustbin... it is a shame that it is wrong" (p.21). • Rival: Most future conflicts are internal. • Condition: Great-power rivalry resumes. • Irish DF implication: Hedge through alliances, readiness for collective defence tasks.

Tech-led transformation will disappoint strategically. • Best line: "way of battle rather than... way of war" (p.21). • Rival: Information-led transformation is decisive. • Condition: Adversaries choose asymmetry, tech diffuses. • Irish DF implication: Invest in integration, intelligence, partners more than exquisite platforms.

Religiously motivated terrorism will be beaten mainly within Islam. • Best line: "al Qaeda will lose... defeated by fellow Muslims" (p.22). • Rival: Western arms decide outcomes. • Condition: Modernising agendas gain traction. • Irish DF implication: Prioritise CT cooperation, resilience, strategic communications.

Trend-spotting misleads; consequences matter. • Best line: "The future is not foreseeable, period." (p.15). • Rival: Robust trends allow precise planning. • Condition: Use scenarios and political logic. • Irish DF implication: Build scenario-led planning and adaptable structures.

PEEL-C (two paragraphs)

Point: War's nature endures while character shifts with context, so policy must lead force design. Evidence: Gray insists that the nature of war is eternal and that policy logic remains primary (p.16–17). Explain: This anchors doctrine and procurement to political aims, with context shaping character, not overturning nature. Limit: The claim is drawn from a US-heavy sample and a short time window. Consequent: Irish DF should prioritise political-military integration, scenario planning, and coalition leverage.

Point: Tech-led transformation alone will disappoint because adversaries choose asymmetry and diffusion narrows edge. Evidence: Gray judges the transformation push impressive yet likely to miss vital marks; adversaries avoid US strengths and tech diffuses

(p.21). Explain: Superiority in sensors and fires cannot deliver strategic outcomes without political design and post-conflict plans. Limit: Some tech yields real gains that this critique may understate. Consequent: Irish DF should privilege interoperability, intelligence, and post-conflict capacity over platform prestige.

Evidence & Implication Log





## Evidence & Implication Log

**Claim**                      &  
**Best**                      source  
 (page) & Rival  
 source/reading  
 & Condition &  
**Implication**    for  
**Irish DF**

hline Nature en-  
 dures, character  
 varies & Gray:  
 “nature of war is  
 eternal” (p.17) &  
 New wars alter na-  
 ture & Policy logic  
 remains primary  
 & Train for con-  
 tinuity, adapt to  
 context. Interstate  
 war will return  
 & Gray rejects  
 “dustbin” claim  
 (p.21) & Inter-  
 state war obsolete  
 & Great-power  
 rivalry reacti-  
 vates & Hedge  
 with alliances,  
 readiness tasks.  
 Transformation  
 disappoints strate-  
 gically & Way

Citations for table lines:

Gaps

- Chase: Post-2005 evidence on great-power rivalry, terrorism trajectories, and transformation payoffs [scope extends beyond USER SOURCE ONLY].
- Park: Fine-grained quantification of DF options until policy priorities set.

If you want me to spin these into an outline for the DSS essay with signposts to module learning outcomes, say the word.

(European External Action Service 2018)

## Source Analysis — *EEAS 2018*, Implementing the EU

### Global Strategy - Year 2

**Describe:** Year-two implementation account of the EUGS. Core claim: concrete delivery on defence, resilience and partnerships, including PESCO, military mobility, EDIDP, EDF and the proposed EPF (pp. 07–08). :contentReference[oaicite:0]index=0 :contentReference[oaicite:1]index=1 **Interpret:** Relevant as evidence of the EU’s tangible shift toward a Security and Defence Union and strategic autonomy. It excludes rigorous outcome evaluation beyond activity and budget lines. :contentReference[oaicite:2]index=2 **Methodology:** Institutional narrative synthesising initiatives, legal acts and budgets; internal validity high on facts, low on independent verification. Examples: military mobility action plan (28 March 2018), EDIDP €500m, EDF €13bn, EPF €10.5bn. :contentReference[oaicite:3]index=3 :contentReference[oaicite:4]index=4 :contentReference[oaicite:5]index=5 **Evaluate:** Major contribution is the consolidation of defence instruments with explicit NATO complementarity and integrated internal–external links; weakness is thin impact data. :contentReference[oaicite:6]index=6 :contentReference[oaicite:7]index=7 **Author:** High Representative and Commission authorship signals an EU institutional lens prioritising multilateralism and rules-based order. :contentReference[oaicite:8]index=8 :contentReference[oaicite:9]index=9 **Synthesis:** Aligns with EUGS priorities, complements NATO on mobility, cyber and WPS, and deepens

UN partnership in Sahel and CAR. :contentReference[oaicite:10]index=10 :contentReference[oaicite:11]index=11 **Limit.** Self-assessment genre with limited independent metrics; Eurocentric framing. **Implication:** Irish DF should prioritise PESCO military mobility, the civilian CSDP compact and pooled procurement to amplify impact.

#### Method weight

3 — Descriptive institutional report with reliable formal facts, limited external triangulation or effect evaluation.

#### Claims—cluster seeds (3–5)

EU defence instruments consolidate strategic autonomy. Best line (p.07–08): EDF “endowed with EUR 13 billion... enhance EU strategic autonomy.” Rival: Budgets signal intent more than capability. Condition: Coherence across PESCO, EDIDP, EDF, EPF. Irish DF implication: Use PESCO mobility and co-fund capability gaps.

Military mobility makes EU–NATO complementarity practical. Best line (p.07): Mobility plan eases cross-border movement and “will also benefit... NATO.” Rival: Legal and infrastructure barriers persist. Condition: National implementation and Schengen–defence coordination. Irish DF implication: Prioritise dual-use infrastructure and movement procedures.

Integrated approach links internal and external for resilience. Best line (pp.06, 16): Joined-up work on migration, cyber, counterterrorism; external budget +30 percent. Rival: Risks securitising development. Condition: Safeguards on rights and humanitarian principles. Irish DF implication: Embed justice and policing linkages in mission design.

Civilian CSDP compact strengthens crisis management. Best line (p.08): Compact parameters due by year-end; focus on police, rule of law, civil admin. Rival: Staffing shortfalls limit delivery. Condition: Member State rosters and training pipelines. Irish DF implication: Expand civilian deployments and training cadres.

External budget reform boosts strategic flexibility (NDICI). Best line (p.16): NDICI proposal to match funding with priorities and react swiftly. Rival: Centralisation may dilute accountability. Condition: Clear conditionality and evaluation. Irish DF implication: Align DF engagement with NDICI windows.

Two PEEL-C paragraphs

Point: EU defence instruments now operationalise strategic autonomy. Evidence: PESCO launched with 25 Member States and 17 projects, backed by EDIDP €500m, EDF €13bn and a proposed EPF €10.5bn. Military mobility enables rapid cross-border movement and benefits NATO. Explain: Instruments, funding and planning coherence shift the Union from declarations to capability pathways. Limit: Reporting lists inputs not outcomes. Consequent: Irish DF should target mobility, pooled procurement and mission enablers.

Point: Without coherence, new tools risk symbolism. Evidence: The report itself warns delivery must follow and initiatives require coherence across pillars. Explain: Dispersed projects can fragment capacity if evaluation, staffing and legal fixes lag. Limit: Some coherence steps are in train via NDICI and internal–external linkages. Consequent: Irish DF should hardwire evaluation, legal clearances and civil–military pipelines into participation.

**Claim &  
Best source  
(page) & Rival  
source/reading  
& Condition &  
Implication for  
Irish DF**

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EU instruments  
drive strategic  
autonomy & EDF  
€13bn; EDIDP  
€500m; EPF  
€10.5bn (pp.07–  
08) :contentRefer-  
ence[oaicite:25]index=25  
:contentRefer-  
ence[oaicite:26]index=26  
:contentRefer-  
ence[oaicite:27]index=27  
& Budgets with-  
out delivery &  
Coherence across  
PESCO–EDF–  
EPF & Focus on  
enablers, pooled  
buys  
Mobility enables  
EU–NATO com-  
plementarity &  
Mobility plan  
aids NATO (p.07)  
:contentRefer-

## Gaps

- Independent effectiveness evaluations of PESCO, EDIDP and EDF outcomes since 2018 [NO SOURCE].
- Irish DF participation detail in specific PESCO projects and mobility corridors [NO SOURCE].

(Fleming 2015)

DIMERS LaTeX (self-contained block)

## Source Analysis — *Fleming 2015*, *Wishbone or Backbone? Neutrality in Irish Foreign Policy Before 1932*

**Describe:** Examines 1922–32 neutrality across Anglo-Irish relations and the League; concludes neutrality was practical, not principled, under Treaty constraints (pp. 13–15).

**Interpret:** Reframes neutrality as a capacity-bounded instrument for small-state consolidation, not creed; the article sidelines detailed Defence Forces capability audits (pp. 12–15). **Methodology:** Qualitative documentary synthesis using DIFP files, cabinet memoranda, and League practice, triangulated by the Manchuria sanctions episode to test claims (pp. 12–14).

**Evaluate:** Most persuasive where it shows League activism without a neutrality reservation and the sanctions threshold that reveals realist restraint (pp. 13–14).

**Author:** DF Review cadet voice; institutional context favours pragmatic readings; cross-references to Fanning and O’Halpin anchor the stance (pp. 12–15). **Synthesis:** Aligns with Fanning on the “outer limit” of policy autonomy and with O’Halpin on defence dependence; diverges from principled-neutrality narratives (pp. 12–14).

**Limit.** Limited costing and capability granularity beyond the Treaty ports multiplier; little on operational readiness pathways (p. 12). **Implication:** Irish DF should pair sovereignty signalling with credible defensive readiness and targeted multilateral leverage.

(Key support: neutrality “all purpose policy,” p. 12 ; no neutrality reservation at the League, p. 13 ; Manchuria sanctions threshold, pp. 13–14 ; conclusion “practical, not principled,” p. 15 .)

Method weight: 4 — Robust documentary synthesis with a live test case; moderate weakness on force-structure specifics (pp. 12–14).

Claims-cluster seeds (3–5)

Claim: Pre-1932 Irish neutrality was practical, not principled. • Best line: “the Irish neutrality policy... was practical, not principled neutrality” (p. 15). • Rival: Ideational neutrality tradition governed choices. • Condition: Treaty constraints and limited capacity persist. • Irish DF implication: Plan neutrality as a capability-backed posture, not a comfort blanket.

Claim: League activism coexisted with realist restraint on sanctions. • Best line: “not... a principled stand concerning collective security... realist outlook” (pp. 13–14). • Rival: Small states must champion norms regardless of burden. • Condition: Only when great powers shoulder enforcement costs. • Irish DF implication: Prioritise contributions where enforcement coalitions are solid.

Claim: Neutrality functioned as an “all purpose policy” to manage Anglo-Irish sensitivities and costs. • Best line: “Neutrality provided an ‘all purpose policy’...” (p. 12). • Rival: Public principle, not expediency, drove the policy. • Condition: When defence costs and domestic politics bite. • Irish DF implication: Use neutrality to signal sovereignty while resourcing credible defence.

Claim: Autonomy from British policy had an “outer limit.” • Best line: Neutrality was “the outer limit of how independent... could become” (p. 14). • Rival: Wider latitude existed through League collective security. • Condition: So long as British military presence and Treaty ports endured. • Irish DF implication: Calibrate policy to geographic realities and dependencies.

PEEL-C drafting

**Paragraph 1 — Strongest claim.** *Point:* Irish neutrality before 1932 was a practical strategy, not an ideology. *Evidence:* Fleming concludes neutrality “was practical, not principled” and shows League engagement lacked a neutrality reservation while sanctions were contingent on great-power backing (pp. 13–15). *Explain:* Pragmatism reconciled sovereignty signalling with dependence and limited means, matching a small-state ca-

capacity reality. *Limit:* The article gives little DF capability detail beyond the ports cost multiplier. *Consequent:* Resource neutrality as a defence-ready posture with selective multilateral engagement.

**Paragraph 2 — Counter.** *Point:* Some will claim Ireland could have taken a principled neutrality line at Geneva. *Evidence:* Yet the Manchuria episode shows Dublin's sanctions stance relied on others bearing the burden, revealing realist restraint (pp. 13–14). *Explain:* Principle buckled where capacity and geography constrained options, and British sensitivities persisted. *Limit:* Normative gains from bolder stands are not weighed in depth. *Consequent:* For DSS outputs, pair norm talk with enforceable commitments and clear capability paths.

Evidence & Implication Log (LaTeX)





## Evidence & Implication Log

**Claim**                      &  
**Best**                      source  
**(page)**   &   **Rival**  
**source/reading**  
&   **Condition**   &  
**Implication**   for  
**Irish DF**

hline      Practical  
not principled &  
Fleming, conclu-  
sion: “practical,  
not principled neu-  
trality” (p. 15) , , ,  
, & Idealised tra-  
dition of neutrality  
& Treaty limits  
and low capacity  
& Treat neutral-  
ity as strategy  
needing resources,  
readiness League  
activism with re-  
straint & Fleming  
on Manchuria  
sanctions thresh-  
old (pp. 13–14) , ,  
, , & Small states  
must defend norms  
& Burden borne  
by great powers &

### Gaps

- What to chase: DF capability and costing detail beyond the Treaty ports multiplier; archival evidence on readiness planning 1922–32.
- What to park: Counterfactual League pathways not grounded in enforcement capacity.

— Key passages used: abstract and scope (pp. 9–10) ; neutrality as “all purpose policy” (p. 12) ; League stance and no neutrality reservation (p. 13) ; Manchuria sanctions threshold (pp. 13–14) ; “outer limit” of autonomy (p. 14) ; conclusion “practical, not principled” (p. 15) ; ports cost multiplier (p. 12) ; Aiken’s wishbone/backbone framing (p. 14) .

(Farrell and Newman 2019) DIMERS Card (LaTeX)

## Source Analysis — *Farrell and Newman 2019*,

### Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion

**Describe:** The authors coin “weaponised interdependence” to show how states with jurisdiction over network hubs extract information (*panopticon*) and cut off flows (*chokepoint*); cases cover SWIFT and the internet, highlighting U.S. practice (pp. 55, 58–66).

**Interpret:** For DSS, the piece reframes coercion under interdependence. It challenges liberal claims of mutual constraint and bilateral focus. It foregrounds structural hubs and domestic institutions as the levers that bite.

**Methodology:** Theory-driven argument with analytic narratives and process-tracing detail from primary and secondary sources on SWIFT, TFTP, NSA upstream access, and internet exchanges. Strong construct validity, limited causal identification.

**Evaluate:** Contribution lands where DSS meets finance. SWIFT demonstrates panopticon and chokepoint in tandem; internet shows panopticon without stable chokepoint given U.S. institutional limits (pp. 65–66, 73).

**Author:** U.S. scholars with a network-institutional lens. The stance privileges structural power over market size or dyads, with policy-adjacent implications for sanctions and surveillance.

**Synthesis:** Extends Strange's structural power to concrete network topologies and regulatory capacity. Diverges from complex interdependence by showing persistent hub asymmetry and lock-in across finance and data.

**Limit.** The article offers a plausibility probe, not tests; non-Western hub evolution and de-risking strategies are under-developed. **Implication:** Irish Defence Forces should assume hubs can be used as levers against small states, organise hedges via EU governance, and diversify mission-critical pathways.

#### Method Weight

4 — Coherent mechanism, rich cases, strong construct validity, but no causal identification or counterfactual testing.

#### Claims-Cluster Seeds (3–5)

Claim: Control of central hubs enables panopticon and chokepoint strategies. • Best line (p. 55): authors define panopticon and chokepoint effects tied to hubs. • Rival: Liberal reciprocity limits coercion. • Condition: Skewed topology with few hubs. • Irish DF implication: Map dependencies on finance and data hubs that could be leveraged.

Claim: In finance, the U.S. achieved both effects through SWIFT and TFTP. • Best line (pp. 65–66): post-9/11 subpoenas, Virginia mirror enabled Treasury access to SWIFT. • Rival: EU privacy and governance prevent sustained access. • Condition: Jurisdictional reach over data centres or allied coordination. • Irish DF implication: Stress compliance and sanctions resilience in procurement and payments.

Claim: On the internet, U.S. panopticon is strong, chokepoint is institutionally constrained. • Best line (p. 73): NSA capacity vs lack of institutions to oblige platforms to cut others out. • Rival: Platform conduct creates de facto chokepoints. • Condition: Domestic legal authority and platform governance alignment. • Irish DF implication: Treat U.S. data access as a given, build sovereign alternatives for critical traffic.

Claim: Physical and organisational centralisation of the internet makes a few nodes critical. • Best line (pp. 61–63): fibre concentration, IXPs carry majority traffic; hub nodes dominate flows. • Rival: Content delivery networks diffuse risk. • Condition: Cable landings and IXP geography remain concentrated. • Irish DF implication: Route diversity and peering strategies for mission traffic.

#### Two PEEL-C Paragraphs

Strongest claim — Point: States that control hubs can surveil or throttle network flows. Evidence: The article defines panopticon and chokepoint tied to hubs, then shows SWIFT enabling both after 9/11, with U.S. Treasury access via the Virginia mirror (pp. 55, 65–66). Explain: Hub centrality and jurisdiction turn efficiency into leverage. Information extraction exposes networks; exclusion compels policy shifts. Limit: The piece probes plausibility rather than testing scope conditions. Consequent: Irish Defence Forces should audit hub exposure in finance and data, then design operational bypasses. Limit. Consequent:.

Counter — Point: Interdependence does not always yield coercion because not all sectors rest on asymmetric networks. Evidence: The authors note broader limits where markets are liquid or not network-centred, reducing control points (e.g., oil) (p. 74). Explain: Without hubs, leverage dissipates. Domestic institutions can also curb chokepoint use online. Limit: Liquidity can change if infrastructure recentralises. Consequent: Treat coercion risk as sector-specific and update routes as topology shifts. Limit. Consequent:.

#### Evidence & Implication Log (LaTeX)



## Evidence & Implication Log

**Claim                      &**  
**Best                      source**  
**(page)   &   Rival**  
**source/reading**  
**&   Condition   &**  
**Implication   for**  
**Irish DF**

hline Hubs enable  
 panopticon   and  
 chokepoint & Far-  
 rell   &   Newman,  
 p.   55   &   Liberal  
 reciprocity   limits  
 coercion   &   Few  
 dominant   hubs  
 &   Map   finance  
 and   data   hub  
 dependencies

U.S.   weaponises  
 SWIFT   for   both  
 effects   &   Farrell  
 &   Newman,   pp.  
 65–66   &   EU  
 privacy   blocks  
 sustained   access  
 &   Jurisdiction   or  
 allied   consent   &  
 Build   sanctions-  
 resilient   payment  
 options   Internet  
 centralisation fuels

### Gaps

- What to chase: Quantify Ireland's exposure to SWIFT nodes, cable landings, and EU IXPs with route diversity options.
- What to park: Historical breadth on non-Western hub formation unless a DSS scenario demands it.

If you want, I can now spin this into a full essay outline keyed to your module learning outcomes.

(European External Action Service 2019)

## Source Analysis — *EEAS 2019*, The European Union's Global Strategy: Three Years On, Looking Forward

**Describe:** The report takes stock of the 2016 EUGS, placing the security of the Union as the first priority, and details delivery on defence initiatives, missions, and multilateral action (p.10–12, 15). **Interpret:** It is directly relevant to questions of small-state defence posture in Europe; it argues multilateralism is an existential interest and links EU credibility to collective capacity to act (p.9–10). **Methodology:** An institutional self-assessment based on stakeholder consultations, programme launches, and operational summaries; validity is constrained by authorial stake and limited external counterfactuals (p.9–10). **Evaluate:** Substantive delivery is evidenced through PESCO, the EDF, and mission data; EU–NATO cooperation is framed as mutually reinforcing, yet impact metrics are uneven across lines of effort (p.11–12). **Author:** Produced under the High Representative/EEAS, it reflects a pro-integration, multilateral lens that favours strategic autonomy. **Synthesis:** It aligns with the EU's commitment to multilateral global governance and cooperative regional orders, positioning the Union as a trusted point of reference (p.15). **Limit.** Internal review with selective indicators and little independent evaluation. **Implication:** Irish DF should leverage PESCO, military mobility, and maritime cooperation to scale effect through the Union. **Limit.** **Implication:**.

**Method weight:** 3 — Credible institutional review with concrete programme evidence, but self-report bias and sparse external validation reduce robustness.



### Claims-cluster seeds

**Claim:** EU has become a credible maritime security provider; piracy incidents fell and cooperation deepened (p.11–12). **Best line:** Atalanta incidents fell from 176 to four failed attacks in 2018. **Rival:** Credibility rests on NATO enablers. **Condition:** Sustained C2, ISR, and logistics. **Irish DF implication:** Prioritise naval interoperability, MSA, and joint training.

**Claim:** PESCO and the EDF operationalise strategic autonomy. **Best line:** PESCO provides a binding framework; EDF incentivises cooperative development (p.11–12). **Rival:** Risk of duplication and fragmentation [NO SOURCE]. **Condition:** Interoperable, deployable capabilities. **Irish DF implication:** Target value-adding PESCO projects.

**Claim:** Multilateralism is an existential interest for the Union. **Best line:** The rules-based order is an existential interest; multilateralism is acutely needed (p.9). **Rival:** Sovereigntist hedging limits EU clout [NO SOURCE]. **Condition:** Coalitions of the willing by issue. **Irish DF implication:** Anchor DF roles in UN/EU frameworks.

**Claim:** EU–NATO cooperation is mutually reinforcing, not zero-sum. **Best line:** 74 common actions and hand-in-hand posture (p.12). **Rival:** Autonomy weakens NATO [NO SOURCE]. **Condition:** Mobility, cyber, maritime deliverables. **Irish DF implication:** Plan for dual-use mobility upgrades.

**PEEL-C paragraphs** *Point.* The EU has converted the EUGS into tangible defence delivery that small states can leverage. *Evidence.* PESCO offers a binding framework for joint investment and readiness, while the EDF stimulates cooperative capability development (p.11–12). *Explain.* For Ireland, pooling in PESCO and tapping EDF lowers cost, raises interoperability, and channels influence. *Limit.* Institutional self-reporting and uneven metrics warrant caution. *Consequent:* Use PESCO and EDF selectively to amplify DF capability without strategic overreach.

*Point.* EU credibility as a maritime security provider strengthens collective sea-lane security relevant to a trading island state. *Evidence.* Atalanta correlates with a drop from 176 piracy incidents to four failed attacks in 2018 and deeper EU–NATO maritime cooperation (p.11–12). *Explain.* Irish DF gains by focusing on maritime situational awareness,

ISR sharing, and exercises. *Limit.* Capability gaps persist without sustained investment and mobility fixes. *Consequent:* Back EU maritime and mobility initiatives to secure trade routes at scale.



## Evidence & Implication Log

**Claim** &  
**Best** source  
**(page)** & **Rival**  
**source/reading**  
& **Condition** &  
**Implication** for  
**Irish DF**

hline EU maritime  
provider & Ata-  
lanta incidents  
fell to four (p.11–  
12) & NATO  
enablers central  
[NO SOURCE]  
& Sustained  
C2/ISR/logistics  
& Invest in MSA  
and naval in-  
teroperability.

PESCO/EDF  
build autonomy  
& PESCO bind-  
ing framework;  
EDF incentives  
(p.11–12, 15) &  
Duplication risk  
[NO SOURCE] &  
Interoperable, de-  
ployable outputs &  
Select high-value

**Gaps** • Independent evaluations of EU missions’ impact and cost-effectiveness; external audits [NO SOURCE]. • Park detailed annex metrics beyond immediate DF relevance.

(HELLMUELLER\_2014)

Step 2 — DIMERS Card (LaTeX)

## Source Analysis — *Hellmüller et al. 2024*, What is in a Mandate? Introducing the UN Peace Mission Mandates Dataset

**Describe:** UNPMM codes 41 mandate tasks for 113 UN missions, 1991–2020, including political missions (pp.170–172). **Interpret:** Disaggregation shows shifting mission types and objectives; excludes implementation performance. **Methodology:** Inductive coding of UNSC/UN texts, double-coding, validation; mission-year format; UCDP-linked (pp.171–173). **Evaluate:** Political missions now outnumber PKOs; coordination tops tasks; robust mandates peaked in 2000s (pp.175–179). **Author:** IHEID and Uppsala researchers; supported by Swiss National Science Foundation; empiricist lens. **Synthesis:** Confirms UNPI’s macro trend to political missions; advances granularity beyond PEMA and TAMM. **Limit.** Mandates reflect intent, not delivery; task categories have judgement calls. **Implication:** Irish DF should weight political engagement, coordination expertise, and rights-centred capacities.

Step 3 — Method Weight

4 — Large, recent dataset with transparent coding and checks; validity limited by mandate–outcome gap and categorisation choices.

Step 4 — Claims-Cluster Seeds (3–5)

**Claim:** Political missions surpass PKOs since 2000 (pp.175–176). **Best line:** Annual counts show SPMs/SE,/SAs outnumber PKOs. **Rival:** PKOs remain indispensable for protection. **Condition:** P5 division and cost pressures. **Irish DF implication:** Invest in civilian liaison, mediation, political analysis.

**Claim:** Coordination of donors, partners, and UN agencies is most mandated (p.179).

**Rival:** POC is the true core. **Condition:** Crowded intervention landscapes. **Irish DF implication:** Lead inter-agency planning and information management.

**Claim:** Robust use-of-force authorisations peaked in the War on Terror (90); now lower (pp.178). **Rival:** Robust mandates remain necessary where threats persist. **Condition:** UNSC convergence on counter-terrorism. **Irish DF implication:** Maintain POC readiness, but plan for political missions' civilian tasks.

**Claim:** Objectives polarised 2011–2020: minimalist or maximalist, few moderates (pp.177–178). **Rival:** Moderate mandates still fit many contexts. **Condition:** Geopolitical tension and mandate bargaining. **Irish DF implication:** Hedge with flexible, modular force packages and civilian skillsets.

**Claim:** Task taxonomy adds analytic leverage (41 tasks; split POC) (pp.171–172, 174). **Rival:** Categories are subjective. **Condition:** Clear codebook and inter-coder checks. **Irish DF implication:** Map DF roles to specific tasks rather than mission labels.

#### Step 5 — PEEL-C Drafting (two paragraphs)

*Point.* Since 2000 the UN has authorised more political missions than PKOs, and coordination has become the modal mandate task. *Evidence.* Annual series show SPMs/SE,/SAs surpass PKOs, while coordination heads the task frequency list (pp.175–179). *Explain.* This reflects cost pressures, UNSC divisions, and a shift towards political conflict management. For a small state, effectiveness flows from mediation, rights promotion, and orchestration. *Limit.* Mandates reveal intended scope, not field delivery. *Consequent:* The DF should prioritise deployable civilian-military teams for mediation support, inter-agency coordination, and human rights monitoring.

*Point.* Robust mandates spiked during the War on Terror but eased in an era of emerging multipolarity, while objectives polarised. *Evidence.* Use-of-force authorisations hit c.90 then dropped; minimalist and maximalist mandates crowded out moderates (pp.177–179). *Explain.* Consensus around counter-terrorism enabled “Christmas” mandates, later pared back as P5 splits deepened. This shifts opportunity towards tailored, less kinetic roles for contributors like Ireland. *Limit.* Authorisation trends may not predict threat environ-

ments. *Consequent:* Keep POC competence, but design contributions around political engagement, SSR support, and institution-building tasks when appropriate.

#### Step 6 — Evidence & Implication Log (LaTeX)

Add to a LaTeX document that loads





## Evidence & Implication Log

**Claim** &

**Best** source

**(page)** & **Rival**

**source/reading**

**& Condition** &

**Implication** for

**Irish DF**

hline Political

missions sur-

pass PKOs &

Hellmüller et al.,

pp.175–176 &

PKOs essential

for POC & P5

division; cost

control & Build

mediation and

liaison capability

Coordination is

most mandated

& Hellmüller et

al., p.179 & POC

central to man-

dates & Crowded

actor landscape &

Lead planning and

information flows

Robust mandates

peaked in 2000s

& Hellmüller et

al., p.178 & Ro-

Step 7 — Gaps

• **Chase:** UNPMM codebook detail on task coding; Irish-specific case mapping to UNPMM tasks; test alternative aggregation to best-shot. • **Park:** Implementation effectiveness beyond mandates; mission ethnographies. •

(Keohane 1969)

## Source Analysis — *Keohane 1969, Lilliputians'*

### Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics

**Describe:** Review essay of Rothstein, Vital, Liska, and Osgood. Core claim: a systemic-role typology clarifies small-state behaviour; mixed multilateral alliances usually outperform unequal bilateral ties; international organisations let small states shape norms; informal penetration lets small powers constrain great powers; nuclear proliferation offers illusory gains; great powers face a choice between control and restraint in local conflicts (pp. 295–297, 301–303, 297, 307, 308–309, 309). :contentReference[oaicite:0]index=0 :contentReference[oaicite:1]index=1

:contentReference[oaicite:2]index=2 :contentReference[oaicite:3]index=3 :contentReference[oaicite:4]index=4 :contentReference[oaicite:5]index=5 **Interpret:** Relevant to DSS because it recasts small-state strategy as role choice rather than capacity ceiling and shows how alliances and IOs expand influence without overreach. It omits systematic quantitative testing and is framed by late-1960s cases. :contentReference[oaicite:6]index=6

**Methodology:** Comparative review and conceptual synthesis with historical examples; validity rests on typology coherence, triangulation across four authors, and policy logic rather than datasets. Author affiliation indicates a Brookings lens (p. 291). :contentReference[oaicite:7]index=7

**Evaluate:** Strong contribution on role categories and alliance guidance; persuasive account of IOs as norm venues; sharp insight on informal penetration; weaker on measurement of effects and generalisability beyond the Cold War (pp. 296–303, 307). :contentReference[oaicite:8]index=8 :contentReference[oaicite:9]index=9 :contentReference[oaicite:10]index=10 :contentRefer-

ence[oaicite:11]index=11 **Author:** Keohane writes as a systems-minded analyst, sceptical of clichés, attentive to alliance functions and to how small states leverage IOs and penetration to shape outcomes (pp. 300–303, 297, 307). :contentReference[oaicite:12]index=12 :contentReference[oaicite:13]index=13 :contentReference[oaicite:14]index=14 **Synthesis:** Aligns with Rothstein that mixed multilateral alliances serve small states; qualifies Vital’s material thresholds with role perception; echoes Liska and Osgood on alliance functions of aggregation, restraint, order, and internal security (pp. 302, 295–297, 301). :contentReference[oaicite:15]index=15 :contentReference[oaicite:16]index=16 :contentReference[oaicite:17]index=17 **Limit.** Conceptual review with few metrics; period-bound examples. **Implication:** Ireland should act as a system-affecting state through EU–UN coalitions, prefer mixed multilateral alignments, and use informal penetration carefully to avoid dependence. Method weight

3 — Conceptual review with strong typology and policy logic, moderate validity, limited empirical testing and Cold War context.

Claims–cluster seeds (with best line, rival, condition, Irish DF implication)

Systemic role, not raw capacity, predicts small-state strategy. Best line (p.296): four roles — system-determining, influencing, affecting, ineffectual. Rival: Material thresholds and geography suffice. Condition: Leaders internalise role and align instruments. Irish DF implication: Frame Ireland as system-affecting via coalitions and IO committees.

Mixed multilateral alliances beat unequal bilateral ties for small states. Best line (p.302): “Small Powers ought to prefer mixed, multilateral alliances... unequal, bilateral alliance only if other alternatives are proscribed.” Rival: Patron guarantees deliver deterrence faster. Condition: Credible small-power blocs or secondary-power partners exist. Irish DF implication: Prioritise EU-centred, secondary-power partnerships over single-patron bargains.

IOs are venues to shape norms and expectations. Best line (p.297): Small and middle powers use IOs to promote an “international political culture” they help shape. Rival: IOs

rarely restrain great powers. Condition: Coalition discipline and agenda control. Irish DF implication: Lead on doctrinal agendas in UN and EU councils.

Informal penetration lets small states restrain great powers. Best line (p.307): Small states can penetrate open great-power systems and exercise interallied control. Rival: Backlash and dependency risks dominate. Condition: Open polity, low core interest for great power. Irish DF implication: Use networks to widen access without locking into asymmetric ties.

Nuclear proliferation offers illusory advantage to small states. Best line (p.309): Vital and Rothstein judge nuclear capability limited or dependency-increasing for small powers. Rival: Rudimentary forces can still deter regionally. Condition: Superpower tolerance and clear guarantees. Irish DF implication: Double down on non-proliferation diplomacy and assurance mechanisms.

#### Two PEEL-C paragraphs

Point: Small states gain most by adopting a system-affecting role through coalitions and IOs. Evidence: Keohane's schema distinguishes system-affecting states that work via alliances and organisations, with IOs enabling small powers to shape an international political culture. Explain: Role clarity turns limited assets into coordinated influence and reduces exposure to bilateral leverage. Limit: Conceptual, not measured across cases. Consequent: Irish DF should target chairs, drafting roles, and coalition leadership in EU–UN formats.

Point: Single-patron alliances promise speed but risk constraint and backlash. Evidence: Keohane highlights Rothstein's preference for mixed multilateral alliances and warns how informal penetration can overconstrain great-power policy when interests are high. Explain: Bilateral dependence narrows options and invites politicisation at home and abroad. Limit: In acute threat, unequal alliances may be unavoidable. Consequent: Irish DF should keep bilateral ties supplementary, build secondary-power groupings, and prioritise mobility and standards through EU frameworks.

**Claim &  
Best source  
(page) & Rival  
source/reading  
& Condition &  
Implication for  
Irish DF**

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System-affecting  
role drives strategy  
& Role typol-  
ogy (p. 296)  
:contentRefer-  
ence[oaicite:28]index=28  
& Material metrics  
suffice & Role in-  
ternalised in policy  
& Lead coalitions  
in EU–UN  
Mixed multi-  
lateral alliances  
preferables &  
Rothstein’s con-  
clusion (p. 302)  
:contentRefer-  
ence[oaicite:29]index=29  
& Patron guar-  
antees dominate  
& Viable blocs  
or partners &  
Prefer EU-centred  
groupings  
IOs shape norms

(Department of Defence and Defence Forces 2022)

## **Source Analysis — *Department of Defence and Defence Forces 2022, High Level Action Plan for the Report of the Commission on the Defence Forces***

**Describe:** Government decides to move to LOA2 over six years to 2028, with the defence budget rising to €1.5 billion in 2022 prices and an extra 2,000 personnel above 9,500. Early actions run for six months, and a detailed implementation plan is due within six months of the decision. Oversight comprises a High-Level Steering Board, an independently chaired Implementation Oversight Group, and a civil-military Implementation Management Office. Five core areas become five strategic objectives for transformation.

**Interpret:** The plan closes the ambition–resource gap identified by the Commission by sequencing HR, culture, governance, and joint capability ahead of platform choices, with measurable early actions. Risk sits in accept-in-principle and revert items which imply slippage potential. **Methodology:** Official policy response with annexed recommendation statuses, defined governance, and task lists; validity stems from mandate, transparency of statuses, and specified timelines, not from new empirical data. **Evaluate:** Strengths are the oversight triad, the six-month implementation-plan deadline, and concrete early actions across HR, legal, and capability lines. Constraints include legal dependencies for high-level command reform and delivery risk where items revert to Government. **Author:** Department of Defence and Defence Forces as joint issuers; state policy lens, anchored in White Paper 2015 and 2019 update. **Synthesis:** Implements the Commission’s framework of three LOA tiers while addressing the documented disconnect between policy, resources, and capabilities through five strategic objectives and enabling themes. **Limit.** High-level commitments with many accept-in-principle and revert statuses; success depends on sustained funding, legal change, recruitment. **Implication:** Prioritise HR, governance, radar, cyber, Reserve regeneration, and interoperability to make LOA2 real.

Method weight: 4/5. Authoritative policy plan with explicit governance and timelines, limited by legal dependencies and accept-in-principle items.

#### Claims-cluster seeds

LOA2 by 2028 is state policy with budget and headcount uplift. • Best line: “move to Level of Ambition 2 (LOA2) ... budget rising to €1.5 billion ... additional 2,000 personnel.” (p.6). • Rival: Delivery slips or scales back in real terms. • Condition: Funding protected in real terms, recruitment and retention improve. • Irish DF implication: Sequence radar, cyber, naval readiness inside an LOA2 envelope.

Governance and HR transformation are the primary levers of change. • Best line: “urgent need for HR and cultural transformation ... Head of Transformation and Head of Strategic HR” (p.7). • Rival: Platform-first procurement delivers change on its own. • Condition: Oversight bodies function and posts are filled. • Irish DF implication: Resource HR, change management, and organisational design ahead of platform buys.

Annex statuses signal staged, pragmatic implementation with risk gates. • Best line: “48 accepted, 55 accepted in principle, 17 further evaluation, 10 revert.” (p.11–12). • Rival: All priority recommendations are fully greenlit. • Condition: Further evaluation concludes quickly with legal clarity. • Irish DF implication: Build contingencies for slip in revert and accept-in-principle items.

Legal dependencies may delay command reform and CHOD creation. • Best line: “legal advice ... CHOD ... Minister to revert to Government.” (p.7). • Rival: Purely administrative re-organisation suffices. • Condition: Attorney General confirms constitutionality, enabling legislation passes. • Irish DF implication: Use interim joint structures while legislating.

Early actions create tangible momentum within six months. • Best line: Working Time Directive heads of bill, Office of Reserve Affairs, radar planning. (p.16–18). • Rival: Momentum depends on long-term capital only. • Condition: Oversight tracks quarterly, annual publication sustains pressure. • Irish DF implication: Lock quick wins, publicise delivery, then scale.

#### PEEL-C (two paragraphs)

Point: Governance and HR transformation drive capability more than platform buys under LOA2. Evidence: The plan prioritises HR and cultural reform, creates Head of Transformation and Head of Strategic HR, and stands up a Steering Board, Oversight Group, and an Implementation Management Office with a six-month planning deadline. Explain: People, governance, and joint processes let Ireland convert budget into deployable effect and meet DSS outcomes on policy-led design. Limit: Many items are accept-in-principle or revert, so timelines can slip. Consequent: Resource HR and governance first, then phase platforms to protect delivery.

Point: The LOA2 ambition to 2028 is exposed to real-terms budget and manpower risk. Evidence: €1.5 billion is stated in 2022 prices and requires +2,000 personnel; several priority reforms need legal clearance. Explain: Inflation, recruitment, and legal processes can undercut scope and tempo unless sequenced with interim arrangements. Limit: Early actions on WTD, Reserve, and radar show momentum that can mitigate delay. Consequent: Stage capability choices, preserve interoperability and readiness, align to DSS outcomes on credible planning.

Evidence & Implication Log





## Evidence & Implication Log

**Claim** &  
**Best** source  
**(page)** & **Rival**  
**source/reading**  
& **Condition** &  
**Implication** for  
**Irish DF**

hline LOA2 by  
2028 with €1.5bn  
and +2,000 &  
Government re-  
sponse (p.6) &  
Scope slips in real  
terms & Budget  
protected, recruit-  
ment improves &  
Phase radar, cyber,  
naval readiness.

Governance and  
HR drive change  
& HR priority,  
new posts (p.7) &  
Platforms alone  
deliver & Over-  
sight functions,  
roles filled &  
Fund HR, change  
management, gov-  
ernance. Oversight  
triad and 6-month

Citations for table lines:

Gaps

- What to chase: Legal pathway and timelines for CHOD reforms, sustainment of €1.5bn in real terms, recruitment pipelines.
- What to park: LOA3 capabilities until LOA2 consolidated and Strategic Defence Review progresses.

If you want me to merge this with the Gray (2005) analysis into a cross-source synthesis and essay outline, I can produce that next.

(Mearsheimer 1994)

## Source Analysis — *Mearsheimer 1994*, The false promise of international institutions

**Describe:** Argues that institutions, defined as rule-sets, rarely move states away from war; realism sets the logic; liberal institutionalism, collective security, and critical theory each fail on causal or empirical grounds (p. [NO SOURCE]).

**Interpret:** Cautions policymakers against placing security bets on institutional design. Useful to frame small-state choices where reputational gains tempt overreach. Omits post-1994 EU deepening and later NATO practice.

**Methodology:** Theory-led critique with targeted cases and secondary evidence. Validity comes from precise definitions and direct engagement with rival logics. Limited new empirical testing.

**Evaluate:** Strongest bite is the relative-gains objection that collapses the economics–security divide and undercuts liberal optimism. Collective security is shown to rest on demanding trust that seldom obtains. Critical theory offers little operational guidance.

**Author:** John J. Mearsheimer, US realist, University of Chicago. Article in *International Security*. A project-linked paper with an American strategic studies lens.

**Synthesis:** Aligns with Waltz on structural constraint and with regime sceptics on power reflection. Diverges from Keohane and Ruggie on the pacifying capacity of rules and norms.

**Limit.** Evidence is pre-1995 and Western-centric; weak on conditions under which institutions may bite for non-security issues.

**Implication:** Irish DF should treat institutions as instruments, not insurance; prioritise credible capabilities and coalition leverage under UN mandates.

Method weight: 4 — Rigorous theory critique with clear definitions and adversarial testing, but thin original empirics.

Claims—cluster seeds

Institutions reflect power more than they shape it. • Best line (p. [NO SOURCE]). • Rival reading: Institutions socialise preferences and reduce uncertainty [NO SOURCE]. • Condition: Relative gains loom large. • Irish DF implication: Treat alliances and EU frameworks as tools to organise capability, not substitutes for it.

Relative gains blunt institutional cooperation, even in economics. • Best line (p. [NO SOURCE]). • Rival reading: With iteration and information, absolute gains dominate [NO SOURCE]. • Condition: When economic heft maps to military potential. • Irish DF implication: Focus on niches that convert resources to influence under UN or EU missions.

Collective security fails without deep trust and onerous conditions. • Best line (p. [NO SOURCE]). • Rival reading: Trust can be built incrementally through successes [NO SOURCE]. • Condition: Lonely aggressor, rapid preponderance, clear attribution. • Irish DF implication: Maintain bilateral ties and readiness alongside UN commitments.

Critical theory offers aspiration, not operational guidance. • Best line (p. [NO SOURCE]). • Rival reading: Norm entrepreneurship can lock in peaceful identities [NO SOURCE]. • Condition: Elite consensus and low threat environment [NO SOURCE]. • Irish DF implication: Use norms to amplify legitimacy, yet budget for hard constraints.

PEEL-C drafting

Paragraph 1 — strongest claim: **Point.** Institutions rarely cause peace because they mirror underlying power. **Evidence.** Mearsheimer defines institutions as negotiated rule-sets and concludes they have minimal independent effect on state behaviour. **Explain.** If rules arise from great-power bargains, stability comes from the distribution of capabilities, not institutional design. **Limit.** Some regimes may still bite where verification is cheap.

**Consequent.** Irish DF should prioritise credible niche forces and coalition interoperability over institutional faith.

Paragraph 2 — counter: **Point.** Institutional design can still matter when trust exists and attribution is clear. **Evidence.** Mearsheimer shows collective security collapses without trust, but that exposes a conditional rather than absolute limit. **Explain.** Where a lonely aggressor is identifiable and preponderant power can mobilise quickly, institutions may coordinate action that deterrence alone would not. **Limit.** Such conditions are rare and fragile. **Consequent.** Irish DF should engage institutions to coordinate legitimacy, yet keep national readiness for gaps.



## Evidence & Implication Log

**Claim**                      &  
**Best**                      source  
**(page)**   &   **Rival**  
**source/reading**  
**& Condition**   &  
**Implication**   for  
**Irish DF**

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Institutions   mir-  
ror   power   more  
than they shape it  
&   Mearsheimer  
1994   (p.   [NO  
SOURCE])   &  
Institutionalist  
reading   [NO  
SOURCE] & High  
relative-gains  
salience & Build  
capability   then  
use institutions to  
coordinate  
Relative   gains  
blunt cooperation  
&   Mearsheimer  
1994   (p.   [NO  
SOURCE])   &  
Iteration   lowers  
cheating   fears  
[NO   SOURCE]  
& Economic heft  
maps to military

Two PEEL-C paragraphs

**Point:** Institutions mainly mirror power, so peace depends on capabilities and coalitions, not IO membership. **Evidence:** He defines institutions as rules yet concludes they have “minimal influence on state behavior,” reflecting distributions of power. **Explain:** If rules track power, then policy should weight state interests and relative capability over regime density. **Limit:** Discrete institutional effects short of “causing peace” may still cumulate. **Consequent:** Irish DF should use IOs to organise and legitimise efforts while investing in movement, lift and C3I enablers.

**Point:** Cooperation falters on relative gains more than cheating, so distributive safeguards beat surveillance fixes. **Evidence:** The neat economy–security divide collapses under relative gains; OECD cases show distribution, not defection, driving outcomes. **Explain:** Where gains translate to power, partners measure splits, not just totals, limiting deep commitments. **Limit:** In low-threat settings, iteration and linkage can still unlock deals. **Consequent:** Irish DF should hard-code fair-share formulas and capability-for-access swaps into EU–UN engagements. • Verify original page numbers from *International Security* pagination; add precise cites. • Park broader post-1994 EU–NATO practice until scoping DSS learning outcomes. Exact page ranges for quoted sections in *International Security* print pagination [NO SOURCE]. • Post-1994 empirical tests of incremental institutional effects relevant to EU–UN missions [NO SOURCE].

(Mearsheimer 2019)

## **Source Analysis — *Mearsheimer 2019*, Bound to Fail: The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order**

**Describe:** Mearsheimer explains why the post–Cold War liberal order faltered then failed, arguing it was structurally doomed and would give way to realist orders in a multipolar system (pp. 7–8, 42–44).

**Interpret:** The piece matters for DSS because it frames strategy for small states in renewed great-power rivalry and decoupling. It sidelines granular EU defence policy and



Irish instruments, which we must supply.

**Methodology:** A conceptual typology distinguishes international, bounded, agnostic, and ideological orders, supported by historical illustrations, not formal tests (pp. 11–15). Validity rests on parsimonious structure rather than exhaustive data.

**Evaluate:** Strongest contribution is the clear distinction between bounded and international orders and why liberal orders require unipolarity (pp. 11–15). This clarifies policy claims that otherwise blur institutions with power.

**Author:** A leading US realist at Chicago, sceptical of liberal hegemony's feasibility and desirability, writing within the American strategic debate.

**Synthesis:** Aligns with Walt's caution on liberal overreach and Rosato's power-politics reading of European integration, diverges from Ikenberry on liberal order durability and restraint (pp. 21–23).

**Limit:** Assumes nationalism invariably trumps liberalism and that NATO enlargement was chiefly liberal integration, a contested reading (pp. 23–24).

**Implication:** For Ireland, plan for dual bounded orders led by the US and China, use EU capability and UN legitimacy pragmatically, and avoid democratisation wars (pp. 42–44, 24). This aligns with module outcomes on assessing structure and evaluating policy.

**Method weight:** 3 — Conceptual typology with illustrative cases offers clarity, yet limited falsifiability and small-state agency under-specification.

## Claims-cluster seeds

**Claim:** Nationalism and balance of power doom liberal orders.

Best line: liberal order “destined to fail” as nationalism trumps liberalism (pp. 7–8, 12–15).

Rival: Institutions and interdependence socialise states, sustaining liberal bargains.

Condition: Where domestic nationalism is muted and payoffs are symmetric.

Irish DF implication: Emphasise legitimacy and burden-sharing to dampen nationalist

backlash.

**Claim:** China's rise ended unipolarity; multipolarity kills the liberal order.

Best line: rise of China and Russian comeback made the system multipolar, a "death knell" (p. 42).

Rival: US technological edge and allied network preserve de facto unipolarity.

Condition: If relative US primacy persists across critical technologies.

Irish DF implication: Hedge within EU, prioritise resilience and access to US enablers.

**Claim:** New order = thin international cooperation plus two thick bounded blocs.

Best line: expect one thin international order and two thick bounded orders led by US and China (pp. 44–46).

Rival: Fragmented minilateralism without coherent blocs.

Condition: If alliance cohesion falters.

Irish DF implication: Build EU coherence, keep UN peacekeeping to preserve thin-order gains.

**Claim:** Hyperglobalisation fuelled inequality, delegitimising the order.

Best line: lost jobs, stagnant wages, rising inequality under hyperglobalisation (pp. 39–40).

Rival: Domestic policy failure, not openness, drove inequality.

Condition: Where redistribution and skills policies are weak.

Irish DF implication: Anticipate fiscal pressure on defence; justify capability through public-value framing.

## PEEL-C drafting

**Point:** Ireland should plan for multipolar competition where a thin international order coexists with two thick bounded blocs.

**Evidence:** Mearsheimer predicts a thin cooperation layer for arms control and the economy, alongside US- and China-led bounded orders (pp. 44–46).

**Explain:** This shape explains simultaneous decoupling and selective cooperation. It fits Irish interests in UN peacekeeping and EU capability while preserving US access.

**Limit:** Bloc cohesion may fragment under domestic shocks.

**Consequent:** Prioritise EU force-multipliers, maintain UN credibility, keep US interoperability pathways open.

**Point:** An institutionalist counter argues liberal bargains can still restrain rivalry and sustain openness.

**Evidence:** Even as the order frayed, EU and WTO fixes, though imperfect, stabilised crises (Eurozone backstops) (p. 40).

**Explain:** If institutions adapt, small states gain breathing space without hard balancing. Ireland could double down on rules and coalitions.

**Limit:** Adaptation lags power shifts; thin order may not shield supply chains.

**Consequent:** Use institutions, but budget for denial capabilities and resilience against shocks.



## Evidence & Implication Log

**Claim** &  
**Best** source  
 (page) & Rival  
 source/reading  
 & **Condition** &  
**Implication** for  
**Irish DF**

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Liberal order  
 doomed by na-  
 tionalism &  
 Mearsheimer

(pp. 7–8, 12–15)  
 & Liberal institu-  
 tional resilience  
 & Low salience  
 of nationalism &  
 Emphasise legiti-  
 macy, multilateral  
 cover

Multipolarity  
 ends liberal order  
 & Mearsheimer  
 (p. 42) & US  
 primacy persists &  
 Tech dominance  
 remains US-led  
 & Hedge; EU  
 capability, US  
 interoperability

Thin international  
 + thick bounded

## Gaps

- Test small-state agency within bounded orders; map Irish leverage in tech, maritime, cyber.
- Park micro-detail on Irish budget lines until claims and capability logic are settled.

s • Test small-state agency within bounded orders; map Irish leverage in tech, maritime, cyber. • Park micro-detail on Irish budget lines until claims and capability logic are settled.  
(Metz 2000)

## Source Analysis — *Metz 2000, The Next Twist of the RMA*

**Describe:** Metz argues that the first, conservative phase of the revolution in military affairs is giving way to a more radical second phase that could alter the nature of war, including the relevance of the operational level, and elevate infrastructure and information attacks alongside robotics and precision targeting (p. 40).

**Interpret:** The claims matter for my question because small states must navigate coercion under cyber risk, dispersed sensing and coalition dependencies; the piece excludes non-Western strategic traditions and sustained empirical testing.

**Methodology:** Conceptual synthesis of doctrine, policy programmes and futurist literature, drawing inferential links from observed socio-technical trends; validity is moderate given breadth and absence of systematic case analysis; bias reflects a US institutional lens and assumptions of allied tolerance for American leadership.

**Evaluate:** The contribution is clarity on how infrastructure war, robotics and distributed meshes could shift advantage to the small and many; it bites where it warns that operational art may erode and that legal-ethical frames lag technology; contradictions arise where precision is sought yet cascading cyber effects remain imprecise.

**Author:** A US Army War College scholar writing for a professional military audience; institutional incentives favour continuity of US leadership and qualitative over quantitative advantage; counter-voices to check include non-aligned small-state strategists and postcolonial critiques.

**Synthesis:** Aligns with Libicki on the mesh and swarming advantage of small and many; diverges from conservative Joint Vision assumptions that exquisite stealth and speed alone offset proliferated precision; complements van Creveld on elite targeting and changing constituencies of war.

**Limit.** Speculative US-centric outlook without systematic evidence and with uncertain timelines.

**Implication:** Ireland's Defence Forces should prioritise critical infrastructure resilience, federated sensors and cyber-enabled coalition readiness.





## Evidence & Implication Log

**Claim                      &**  
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**(page)   &   Rival**  
**source/reading**  
**&   Condition   &**  
**Implication   for**  
**Irish DF**

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Second-phase

RMA alters war's  
nature   &   Metz  
2000 (p.   40)  
&   Conservative  
JV2020   reading  
that   change   is  
incremental   &  
Tech   precision  
and   dispersion  
mature   &   Invest  
in resilience, rapid  
reconstitution

Small   and   many  
beat   large   and  
few   &   Metz 2000  
[NO SOURCE] &  
Stealth-dominance  
thesis   &   Sensor  
saturation   and  
redundancy   &  
Fund   swarming  
UAVs   and   cheap  
sensors

Method weight: 3 — coherent conceptual synthesis with clear foresight, but speculative and without systematic empirical validation.

Claims—cluster seeds

RMA second phase transforms war

Best line (with page): “The RMA may be moving into a second, more radical, phase.”

(p. 40)

Rival reading: Conservative, incremental change within existing operational art.

Condition: Precision robotics, cyber tools and dispersion become reliable.

Irish DF implication: Prioritise national infrastructure resilience and rapid reconstitution capacity.

Advantage shifts to small and many

Best line (with page): Swarming meshes of small systems outlast exquisite platforms [NO SOURCE].

Rival reading: Stealthy, large platforms sustain dominance.

Condition: Affordable redundancy and sensor saturation.

Irish DF implication: Procure low-cost sensors and swarming UAV mini-fleets.

Infrastructure war challenges deterrence

Best line (with page): Strategic information warfare may be less lethal yet politically usable [NO SOURCE].

Rival reading: Cyber cannot achieve decisive effects.

Condition: Cascading failures can be induced and attributed.

Irish DF implication: Build cross-sector cyber drills and legal response frameworks.

Operational level risks erosion

Best line (with page): Virtual staffs and global tempo compress phasing into national security operations [NO SOURCE].

Rival reading: Regional commands remain central to campaigning.

Condition: Global C2 with persistent ISR becomes standard.

Irish DF implication: Train joint civil-military teams for integrated operations.

PEEL-C drafting

Strongest claim paragraph. **Point:** The second phase of the RMA reshapes war by coupling cyber, robotics and precision against elites. **Evidence:** Metz argues that future conflict will target infrastructure and leadership while mass forces recede (p. 40). **Explain:** This shifts advantage to agile actors that fuse sensors, autonomy and legal framing, altering campaign design. **Limit:** The timeline for reliable precision and attribution is uncertain. **Consequent:** The DF should invest first in resilience and federated sensing to avoid strategic paralysis. *Limit. Consequent:*

Counter paragraph. **Point:** Conservative continuity may prevail, with exquisite platforms and classic phasing enduring. **Evidence:** Joint Vision era planning assumes technology enhances, rather than replaces, manoeuvre and fires. **Explain:** If stealth and speed outpace proliferation, small swarms remain ancillary and the operational level persists. **Limit:** This discounts adversary adaptation and infrastructure vulnerabilities. **Consequent:** The DF should hedge by pairing traditional readiness with low-cost cyber and drone capabilities. *Limit. Consequent:*

Gaps

- Check precise pagination and key lines in Metz 2000 for quotation accuracy.
- Park deeper comparative testing against post-2000 case studies until scoping approves

SOURCES=VERIFY.

(MINIHAN\_2018)

## Source Analysis — *Minihan 2018*, Is there a future for United Nations Peacekeeping as presently constituted?

**Describe:** Minihan surveys UN peacekeeping's trajectory and argues for time-bounded, evaluated missions, clearer mandates, and institutional reform, including Security Council veto discipline and Irish parliamentary oversight; he highlights UNIFIL's constrained mandate and endorses a two–three-year horizon (pp. 121, 125, 128–129).  
:contentReference[oaicite:0]index=0 :contentReference[oaicite:1]index=1 :contentReference[oaicite:2]index=2 :contentReference[oaicite:3]index=3

**Interpret:** For Irish Defence Forces, this frames a pragmatic test: deploy where political strategy is credible, mandate is executable, and exit metrics exist; it brackets hard budget lines and legal constraints on reform.

**Methodology:** Policy essay drawing on secondary sources and practitioner judgement; validity rests on transparent proposals, cited UN statements, and mission vignettes rather than systematic data (pp. 122–129). :contentReference[oaicite:4]index=4 :contentReference[oaicite:5]index=5

**Evaluate:** Most persuasive where he targets mission “shelf life,” lack of basic evaluation, and Guterres’ limit claim that peacekeeping only creates space for political solutions, justifying exit criteria (p. 128). Less developed are costs, force design, and law–policy frictions. :contentReference[oaicite:6]index=6

**Author:** Capt (Retd) John Minihan, Irish practitioner voice in *Defence Forces Review* (p. 121). :contentReference[oaicite:7]index=7

**Synthesis:** Converges with standing critiques of vague mandates and Security Council paralysis; his UNIFIL reading complements “tripwire stability” but warns of mandate–means gaps (pp. 125, 129). :contentReference[oaicite:8]index=8 :contentReference[oaicite:9]index=9

**Limit.** Opinion-led, limited original empirics, Irish-centric focus.

**Implication:** Ireland should codify two–three-year exit metrics, formalise Oireachtas oversight, and champion veto-discipline norms to match mandates with means.

Method weight: 3 — Reasoned practitioner policy critique with cited UN positions, but limited original evidence and quantification.

Claims–cluster seeds

Missions need two–three-year horizons with basic evaluation. • Best line: “Peacekeeping... should... depart... all in a timeframe of two to three years” (p. 128). • Rival reading: Longer deployments embed stability and learning (p. 125). • Condition: Clear political strategy underpins mandate execution (p. 128). • Irish DF implication: Build mission exit metrics into planning and cabinet submissions.

Security Council veto misuse hollows mandates; reform is required. • **Best line:** Veto produces stalemate; reform menu offered (p. 129). • **Rival reading:** Veto stabilises crises by forcing consensus. • **Condition:** Code of conduct for veto in atrocity/mandate-setting cases (p. 129). • **Irish DF implication:** Use UNSC bids to press veto-discipline tied to executable mandates.

UNIFIL demonstrates ‘tripwire’ stability but mandate–means gaps persist. • **Best line:** No capability or will to confront armed actors; mandates ‘interpreted’ (p. 125). • **Rival reading:** Relative calm evidences success of stabilisation (p. 125). • **Condition:** External distractions reduce spoiler activity (p. 125). • **Irish DF implication:** Prioritise force protection and liaison while advocating mandate clarity.

Political-military oversight must be strengthened at home. • **Best line:** Need for competent, politically astute General Staff; routine Oireachtas debate (pp. 127–128). • **Rival reading:** Existing structures suffice; risks politicisation. • **Condition:** Bi-annual committee hearings with expert input (p. 128). • **Irish DF implication:** Institutionalise pre-deployment scrutiny and after-action reviews.

#### PEEL-C drafting

Paragraph 1 — strongest claim **Point.** UN missions should be time-bounded and routinely evaluated. **Evidence.** Minihan argues that peacekeeping must set clear objectives and “depart... in a timeframe of two to three years,” noting a “lack of basic evaluation” (p. 128). **Explain.** Exit metrics align military activity with political strategy and guard against mandate drift. **Limit.** Some theatres require longer stabilisation. **Consequent.** Irish DF should embed exit criteria and evaluation baselines in all mission plans.

Paragraph 2 — counter **Point.** Durable stability can emerge even under long, imperfect mandates. **Evidence.** Minihan concedes UNIFIL’s presence provides “tripwire” stability and a peaceful environment despite mandate constraints (p. 125). **Explain.** Extended presence can deter escalation while political tracks mature. **Limit.** Calm may rely on exogenous factors, not institutional design (p. 125). **Consequent.** Irish DF should balance time limits with conditions-based reviews rather than rigid deadlines.



## Evidence & Implication Log

**Claim**                      &  
**Best**                      source  
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**& Condition**   &  
**Implication**   for  
**Irish DF**

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Time-bounded

missions           with

evaluation           &

Minihan           2018

(p. 128) — two—

three-year horizon.

:contentRefer-

ence[oaicite:26]index=26

&   Long   de-

ploysments   em-

bed           stability

(UNIFIL   calm).

:contentRefer-

ence[oaicite:27]index=27

&   Clear   political

strategy           and

exit           metrics.

:contentRefer-

ence[oaicite:28]index=28

&   Tie   deployment

to measurable po-

litical milestones.

Veto   reform   for

executable   man-

### Gaps

- Chase empirical tests for two–three-year horizon and evaluation effects; map costs and force design trade-offs.
- Park detailed China trajectory post-2018 and deep UNSC reform pathways for a separate brief.

(NYE\_2008 )

## Source Analysis — *Nye 2008, Public Diplomacy and Soft Power*

**Describe:** Nye defines soft power as getting outcomes through attraction grounded in culture, values and policies, and argues that effective public diplomacy in the information age requires credibility, listening and alignment of words with deeds (pp. 94–96, 100–103). **Interpret:** This frames DSS choices for a small state: build influence through legitimacy, narrative skill and durable relationships while avoiding propaganda traps. It brackets structural constraints from great-power rivalry that shape room for manoeuvre. **Methodology:** Conceptual synthesis with historical and policy illustrations rather than tests; validity rests on clear typology, actionable dimensions of practice and consistency with information-age dynamics (pp. 94–105). **Evaluate:** Strongest contribution is the operational triad of public diplomacy—daily communication, strategic communication and long-term relationship-building—and the insistence that actions must match messages to convert cultural assets into attraction (pp. 101–103). **Author:** US liberal scholar-practitioner with government experience; institutional lens foregrounds norms, credibility and civil society as power multipliers. **Synthesis:** Complements institutionalist arguments on legitimacy and audience costs; counterpoints realist pessimism by showing how credibility shifts outcomes without coercion. **Limit.** Attraction can be swamped by coercive shocks, identity threat and security crises; measurement of impact remains difficult. **Implication:** For Ireland, invest in credible messaging, exchanges and diaspora ties, ensure policy–values alignment, and use EU and UN platforms to turn limited mass into influence (pp. 101–105, 108). **Limit.** **Implication:**



Method weight: 3 — Conceptual, well-scoped and policy-relevant, but lightly evidenced and difficult to falsify under rivalry constraints.

Claims-cluster seeds (3–5):

Claim: Credibility is the decisive soft-power resource; propaganda backfires. • Best line: credibility wins attention in the paradox of plenty; propaganda is counterproductive (pp. 100–101). • Rival: Hard power success alone generates deference regardless of credibility. • Condition: Open media ecosystems with plural referees. • Irish DF implication: Prioritise transparency, listening and independent validators.

Claim: Three dimensions—daily comms, strategic comms, long-term relationships—are necessary for durable influence. • Best line: layered practice outlined for modern public diplomacy (pp. 101–103). • Rival: Short, high-visibility campaigns suffice. • Condition: Stable resourcing and consistent themes. • Irish DF implication: Fund exchanges and alumni networks; plan thematic calendars.

Claim: Actions must match words; values–policy alignment creates attraction. • Best line: actions speak louder than words; policy hypocrisy destroys soft power (pp. 101–102). • Rival: Skilled framing can offset policy costs. • Condition: Visible adherence to legal and human-rights standards. • Irish DF implication: Embed compliance checks in operations and communications.

Claim: Small states can carve niches through consistent identity signalling. • Best line: Norway’s peace niche shows outsized influence via targeted actions (pp. 104–105). • Rival: Niche branding cannot overcome hard constraints. • Condition: Narrow focus and credible follow-through. • Irish DF implication: Maritime safety, peacekeeping and cyber norms as Irish niches.

PEEL-C paragraphs

**Point:** Credibility and policy–values alignment are prerequisites for effective Irish public diplomacy. **Evidence:** Nye shows credibility is the scarce asset in an attention-scarce environment, and that propaganda or hypocrisy undercuts attraction (pp. 100–103). **Explain:** If audiences trust our voice, messaging, exchanges and partnerships convert into access and agenda-setting. This fits Irish aims to influence EU debates and UN man-

dates with limited hard power. **Limit:** Severe security shocks can drown out credibility gains. **Consequent:** Build independent validators, publish after-action reviews and align defence policy with stated values. Limit. Consequent:.

**Point:** A sceptic argues hard power success alone can yield soft-power spillovers. **Evidence:** Demonstrations of competence sometimes attract emulation even with mixed credibility. **Explain:** Spectacular capability may temporarily command attention, but without alignment it decays and can reverse. **Limit:** Lacks durability where media are plural and civil society is vocal. **Consequent:** Pair competence displays with transparent practice and long-term relationships to sustain attraction. Limit. Consequent:.



## Evidence & Implication Log

**Claim**                      &  
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**& Condition**   &  
**Implication**   **for**  
**Irish DF**

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Credibility      de-  
cides   soft-power  
outcomes   &   Nye  
(pp.      100–101)  
&   Hard   power  
primacy      view  
&   Open,   plural  
media   &   Invest in  
transparency   and  
listening  
Three-tier   public  
diplomacy   works  
&   Nye (pp. 101–  
103)   &   Short-term  
campaigns   suf-  
fice   &   Stable  
resources   &   Build  
exchanges      and  
alumni networks  
Actions      must  
match   words   &  
Nye (pp. 101–102)  
&   Framing offsets

Gaps • Chase measurement strategies for Irish soft-power effects and credible third-party validators. • Park econometric testing until case selection and indicators are agreed.

(KREPINEVICH\_1994 )

DIMERS LaTeX

## Source Analysis — *Krepinevich 1994, Cavalry to Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolutions*

**Describe:** Defines military revolutions as the fusion of technology, systems, operational concepts, and organisational adaptation. Surveys ten historical shifts and argues the present change is in an early information-led phase that increases detection, precision, and tempo (p.30–41). **Interpret:** Relevant to DSS as it reframes change as an organisational contest. It warns small states to specialise and to value agility over platforms. It excludes detailed small-state cases. **Methodology:** Historical, conceptual essay drawing on emblematic episodes. Validity is moderate given breadth, clear logic, and limited external testing. Perspective is US strategic studies. **Evaluate:** The strongest contribution is the emphasis on organisational innovation and transient advantage. Caution against declaring the Gulf War a completed revolution adds prudence. Generality limits falsification. **Author:** Director-level US defence analyst in 1994, policy-adjacent, innovation-friendly stance. **Synthesis:** Aligns with continuity views that ideas and organisations mediate technology. Diverges from tech determinism and early victory narratives. **Limit.** Dated pre-digital nuance and quantitative testing are thin; Western lens narrows transfer. **Implication:** Irish DF should prioritise ISR, simulation-led training, and doctrine that exploits niches in coalitions. Limit. Implication:.

**Method weight:** 3 — Coherent cross-century synthesis with practical lessons, yet self-selected cases and age reduce evidential strength.

### Claims-cluster seeds

**Claim:** Organisational innovation decides who benefits from new technology. **Best line:** 1940 shows similar kit, different concepts, different outcomes (p.36–37). **Rival:**

Technology alone drives outcomes. **Condition:** Competitive adversary. **Irish DF implication:** Invest in doctrine, C2, and force design agility.

**Claim:** Competitive advantages are brief. **Best line:** Dreadnought's lead evaporated as rivals copied quickly (p.36–37). **Rival:** First movers retain superiority. **Condition:** Technology diffusion. **Irish DF implication:** Hedge with adaptability and rapid learning.

**Claim:** The current shift raises ISR, precision, and simulation-enabled effectiveness. **Best line:** Forces will detect, identify, track, and engage many targets faster; simulations matter (p.40–41). **Rival:** Attrition remains dominant. **Condition:** Integrated sensors and C2. **Irish DF implication:** Prioritise MSA, data sharing, and sims.

**Claim:** Small or medium powers can steal a march via innovation. **Best line:** Revolutions let smaller powers substitute ideas for mass (p.38–39). **Rival:** Scale always wins. **Condition:** Focused niche and doctrine. **Irish DF implication:** Build specialist capabilities for EU missions.

**PEEL-C paragraphs** *Point.* Organisational innovation, not kit alone, determines who gains from a military revolution. *Evidence.* Krepinevich shows that similar platforms in 1940 produced divergent outcomes because Germany integrated doctrine, C2, and organisation coherently (p.36–37). *Explain.* For Ireland, investing in doctrine, mission command, and joint training will yield disproportionate returns in coalitions. *Limit.* The cases are historical and Western. *Consequent:* Prioritise doctrinal agility and C2 experimentation over platform counting.

*Point.* Advantages from new military systems are brief, so small states must design for rapid adaptation. *Evidence.* The British Dreadnought lead vanished as rivals built copy fleets; monopolies proved fleeting (p.36–37). *Explain.* Irish DF should treat capability as a learning pipeline, not a one-off purchase. *Limit.* Naval arms-race dynamics may not map perfectly to land or cyber. *Consequent:* Build fast-learning, upgradeable capabilities with coalition pathways.



## Evidence & Implication Log

**Claim**                      &  
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**source/reading**  
**& Condition**   &  
**Implication**   for  
**Irish DF**

hline Org. inno-  
vation       decides  
gains & 1940 con-  
cepts beat similar  
kit (p.36–37) &  
Technology alone  
suffices & Com-  
petitive adversary  
& Invest in doc-  
trine, C2, design  
agility. Advan-  
tages are brief &  
Dreadnought lead  
evaporated (p.36–  
37) & First-mover  
retains edge &  
Rapid diffusion &  
Build adaptability  
and rapid learning.  
ISR–precision rise  
& Detect, track,  
engage faster; sims  
matter (p.40–41)



**Gaps** • Fresh small-state cases applying ISR–simulation niches in EU missions. • Park deep cost data; date-bound US-centric debates.

Notes on evidence: Definition and four-element framework; Gulf War not a completed revolution; and ISR–precision–simulation trajectory are drawn directly from the uploaded article.

(KEOHANE\_1988 )

## Source Analysis — *Keohane 1988, International*

### Institutions: Two Approaches

**Describe:** Keohane clarifies what institutions are and how they work, contrasting rationalist accounts that stress rules and transaction costs with reflective perspectives that stress practices, norms, and constitutive effects. He defines institutions as persistent, connected rules that prescribe roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations (pp. 383–384). He argues regimes reduce uncertainty and enable cooperation by lowering transaction costs (p. 387) and treats sovereignty as a practice that structures possibilities (pp. 385–386). He concludes that reflective critiques are telling yet under-specified as research, urging a synthesis grounded in empirical work (pp. 393–394).

**Interpret:** For our question, the piece explains why institutional design and embedded practices matter for cooperation, deterrence, and legitimacy. It excludes operational tests and concrete cases that a policy actor needs.

**Methodology:** Conceptual comparison plus literature synthesis. Evidence is definitional clarity, canonical references, and theory-led propositions. Validity stems from precise distinctions between specific institutions and practices, and from testable hypotheses about costs, monitoring, and compliance. Bias risk is liberal institutionalist optimism tempered by recognition of power and discord.

**Evaluate:** The contribution bites where it sharpens definitions and links cost structures to institutional effects (pp. 383–387). It also foregrounds sovereignty as constitutive prac-

tice (pp. 385–386). The weakness is limited operationalisation and an underdeveloped programme for the reflective camp (p. 393).

**Author:** Liberal institutionalist, ISA president, Harvard-affiliated, normatively committed to human progress and justice, seeking cumulative but context-specific knowledge.

**Synthesis:** Aligns with North and Williamson on rules and transaction costs; complements game-theoretic insights on reputation and monitoring; diverges from realist determinism by admitting space for cooperation under anarchy and institutional path dependence.

**Limit.** No systematic case testing, weak guidance on measuring constitutive effects.

**Implication:** For a small state such as Ireland, institutional leverage comes from lowering costs via regimes and widening legitimacy via practices and norms; procurement and posture should route through multilateral fora while cultivating reputational compliance standards.

Method Weight: 4 — Conceptual synthesis with clear definitions and testable hypotheses; lacks systematic empirical testing.

#### Claims-Cluster Seeds

Institutions lower uncertainty and transaction costs, enabling cooperation (p. 387). • Best line (p. 387). • Rival: Outcomes track power, not rules. • Condition: Repeated interaction with monitoring and reciprocity. • Irish DF implication: Prioritise regime channels to cut bilateral bargaining costs and lock in standards.

Sovereignty as practice shapes institutional design and behaviour (pp. 385–386). • Best line (pp. 385–386). • Rival: Preferences are fixed, exogenous to norms. • Condition: Practice remains uncontested in issue-area. • Irish DF implication: Use reciprocity and legal status to protect niche contributions.

Reflective critiques expose gaps yet lack a coherent research programme (p. 393). • Best line (p. 393). • Rival: Reflective work already operational in case studies. • Condition: Absent explicit measurement strategies. • Irish DF implication: Demand operational indicators when adopting norm-centred frameworks.

Both approaches neglect domestic politics; two-level games matter (p. 393). • Best line (p. 393). • Rival: International structure dominates. • Condition: Salient veto players at home. • Irish DF implication: Align Oireachtas, EU, and partner constraints before committing assets.

#### PEEL-C Drafting

Paragraph 1 — Strongest claim (institutions cut costs, enable cooperation). **Point:** Institutions enable small states to cooperate effectively by lowering uncertainty and transaction costs. **Evidence:** Keohane argues regimes provide information, stabilise expectations, and make decentralised enforcement feasible, allowing mutually beneficial bargains to materialise (p. 387). **Explain:** For Ireland, predictable monitoring and shared standards shrink negotiation time and reduce capability mismatches in coalitions. **Limit:** Effects vary with power distributions and monitoring quality. **Consequent:** Route DF commitments through regimes with strong verification to maximise influence at low cost.

Paragraph 2 — Counter (practices and norms constitute actors). **Point:** Practices like sovereignty and reciprocity constitute roles, shaping what institutions can achieve. **Evidence:** Keohane treats sovereign statehood as a practice that defines roles and corrective rules, structuring behaviour beyond instrumentality (pp. 385–386). **Explain:** Irish legitimacy and reciprocal expectations can amplify contributions even with modest force structure. **Limit:** Constitutive effects are hard to measure and may shift with crises. **Consequent:** Invest in reputational capital, legal clarity, and diplomatic practice alongside material readiness.



## Evidence & Implication Log

**Claim &  
Best source  
(page) & Rival  
source/reading  
& Condition &  
Implication for  
Irish DF**

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Institutions reduce  
uncertainty and  
costs & Keohane  
(p. 387) & Power  
determines out-  
comes & Repeated  
interaction with  
monitoring & Use  
regime fora to lock  
standards and cut  
bargaining costs  
Sovereignty as  
practice struc-  
tures behaviour &  
Keohane (pp. 385–  
386) & Interests  
exogenous to  
norms & Practice  
stable in issue-area  
& Leverage reci-  
procity and legal  
status for niche  
roles

Reflective cri-

### Gaps

- Chase empirical tests of reputational enforcement and monitoring effects in EU and UN missions.
- Park broad epistemology debates; prioritise operational indicators for DF planning.

(THORHALLSSON\_2006)

## Source Analysis: *Thorhallsson 2006*, The Size of States in the European Union: Theoretical and Conceptual Perspectives

**Describe:** The article links definitions of state size to behaviour and influence in the EU, arguing the four traditional variables are too narrow and proposing a six-category framework where action capacity and vulnerability, internally and externally, shape outcomes (pp. 8–9). :contentReference[oaicite:7]index=7 :contentReference[oaicite:8]index=8

**Interpret:** This matters because analysis of small states must move beyond population and GDP to administrative competence, perceptual standing and elite preferences in EU decision processes; what is omitted are systematic tests and a weighting scheme for categories (pp. 8–9, 28). :contentReference[oaicite:9]index=9 :contentReference[oaicite:10]index=10

**Methodology:** Conceptual synthesis drawing on small-state literature and simple comparative indicators, introducing internal and external continuums for action competence and vulnerability; validity is moderate as evidence is illustrative rather than tested across cases (p. 15). :contentReference[oaicite:11]index=11

**Evaluate:** The contribution reframes size as multi-dimensional and decision-maker-centred, integrating objective measures with perceptions and preferences; it bites in EU contexts where administrative capacity and foreign-service depth condition influence, though the framework needs operationalisation and weighting (pp. 24–26, 28). :contentReference[oaicite:12]index=12 :contentReference[oaicite:13]index=13

**Author:** Thorhallsson writes from the University of Iceland’s Centre for Small State Studies, bringing a small–state lens attentive to administrative capacity and elite choice (title page). :contentReference[oaicite:14]index=14

**Synthesis:** Aligns with Katzenstein on domestic structures and vulnerability and with Väyrynen on subjective measures; diverges from material–only metrics by elevating perceptual and preference size and by specifying action competence and vulnerability continua (pp. 10, 25, 28). :contentReference[oaicite:15]index=15 :contentReference[oaicite:16]index=16 :contentReference[oaicite:17]index=17

**Limit.** Lacks weighting and broad empirical testing, risks subjectivity in perception coding.

**Implication:** Irish Defence Forces should assess and build administrative capacity, cohesive preferences and perceptual standing alongside material indices when planning for EU engagement.





## Evidence & Implication Log

**Claim**                      &  
**Best**                      source  
 (page) & Rival  
 source/reading  
 & **Condition** &  
**Implication** for  
**Irish DF**

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Size is multi-  
 dimensional &  
 Thorhallsson 2006  
 (pp. 8–9) & Mate-  
 rial metrics suffice  
 & Categories oper-  
 ationalised & Add  
 admin, perceptual,  
 preference metrics  
 :contentRefer-  
 ence[oaicite:18]index=18

Action capacity  
 and vulnerability  
 shape outcomes &  
 Thorhallsson 2006  
 (p. 15) & Objec-  
 tive metrics alone  
 & Perceptions  
 measured & Build  
 foreign service  
 depth, cohesion

:contentRefer-  
 ence[oaicite:19]index=19

Traditional four

Method weight: 3 — strong conceptual reframing with EU relevance, but limited testing and unclear weighting of categories.

Claims—cluster seeds

Size is multi-dimensional in the EU

Best line (with page): Six categories define size and influence (pp. 8–9).

Rival reading: The four traditional variables suffice for explanation.

Condition: Clear indicators and coding for each category.

Irish DF implication: Integrate administrative, perceptual and preference metrics into planning and capability reviews.

Action capacity and vulnerability shape behaviour

Best line (with page): Internal and external action competence and vulnerability determine behaviour (p. 15).

Rival reading: Objective material metrics alone capture influence.

Condition: Decision-maker perceptions and administrative capacity measured.

Irish DF implication: Invest in diplomatic corps depth, interdepartmental cohesion and narrative management.

PEEL-C drafting

Strongest claim paragraph. **Point:** Size in the EU is multi-dimensional and best captured by six categories. **Evidence:** Thorhallsson specifies fixed, sovereignty, political, economic, perceptual and preference size and ties them to behaviour (pp. 8–9). **Explain:** This reframes influence as contingent on administrative capacity, elite cohesion and perceived standing, not just GDP. **Limit:** Indicators and weights are not fully specified. **Consequent:** The DF should audit capacities across the six categories before setting EU aims.

*Limit. Consequent:*

Counter paragraph. **Point:** Material metrics may still dominate outcomes, making multi-category coding marginal. **Evidence:** Traditional variables anchored European power and still signal resources and constraints. **Explain:** If GDP and military strength remain principal, perceptual and preference factors refine rather than redefine size. **Limit:** This underestimates how administrative depth and elite priorities channel material power

in EU procedures. **Consequent:** The DF should pair material benchmarks with measures of administrative competence and elite cohesion. *Limit. Consequent:*

Gaps

- Operational indicators and weights for each category; test on recent EU cases.
- Park deep comparative coding until scoping approves SOURCES=VERIFY.

(TONRA\_1999 )

## Source Analysis — *Tonra 1999, The Europeanisation of Irish Foreign Affairs*

**Describe:** Tonra sets a two-model test of Europeanisation and shows Ireland’s Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) strengthened rather than marginalised, with internalised EU norms and CFSP shaping the agenda (pp. 160–165). :contentReference[oaicite:0]index=0 :contentReference[oaicite:1]index=1

**Interpret:** For the essay, this reframes small-state choice: EU is the central framework and a vector of identity and practice, not a mere bargaining forum (p. 155). :contentReference[oaicite:2]index=2

**Methodology:** Conceptual contrast of complex interdependence and polity-forming, applied to Irish structures, documents, and elite testimony; validity rests on clear constructs and triangulated policy detail rather than new data (pp. 150–152, 160). :contentReference[oaicite:3]index=3 :contentReference[oaicite:4]index=4

**Evaluate:** Most persuasive where he evidences a “habit of thinking in terms of [an EU] consensus” and re-tasked embassies to influence host EU stances (pp. 160, 162). :contentReference[oaicite:5]index=5 :contentReference[oaicite:6]index=6 Less convincing on breadth beyond Ireland and on quantification.

**Author:** Peer-reviewed piece in *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, grounded in Irish policy practice and EU scholarship (metadata pp. 149–150). :contentReference[oaicite:7]index=7

**Synthesis:** Aligns with Wessels' fusion and Milward's state rescue; challenges balance-of-power readings that predict small-state marginalisation (pp. 163–165). :contentReference[oaicite:8]index=8 :contentReference[oaicite:9]index=9

**Limit.** Pre-1999 scope and elite-centric perspective constrain generalisation.

**Implication:** Irish DF should use CFSP as force multiplier for values and influence while guarding veto prudence and neutrality narratives.

Method weight: 3 — Strong conceptual frame and credible institutional evidence, but limited original data and pre-2000 scope.

Claims—cluster seeds

Europeanisation empowers DFA and embeds EU norms. • Best line: “there is an identifiable process... DFA not marginalised... effectiveness not diminished” (pp. 163–164). • Rival reading: Intergovernmental bargaining with lowest-common-denominator outcomes. • Condition: Informal consensus norms are internalised (p. 160). • Irish DF implication: Invest in shaping CFSP consensus and presidency coalitions.

A “consensus reflex” shows norm internalisation. • Best line: Habit of thinking in EU consensus terms (p. 160). • Rival reading: Socialisation is superficial; national interest still decisive. • Condition: Repeated working-group interaction and credible collective capacity. • Irish DF implication: Train cadres for consensus-craft and norm entrepreneurship.

Embassies must influence host countries' EU stance. • Best line: “Embassies now have an important additional function...” (p. 162). • Rival reading: Classic bilateralism suffices. • Condition: CFSP/Single Market set the salient agenda. • Irish DF implication: Measure missions by EU leverage, not just bilateral outputs.

Neutrality is under transformatory pressure from CFSP. • Best line: Neutrality challenged in the EU reform forge (p. 165). • Rival reading: Neutrality remains untouched; veto insulates. • Condition: Mandate evolution and attribution clarity. • Irish DF implication: Tie neutrality to credible EU crisis management roles.

PEEL-C drafting

Paragraph 1 — strongest claim **Point.** Europeanisation has empowered the DFA and embedded EU norms in practice. **Evidence.** Tonra concludes that Irish effectiveness is not diminished and the DFA is not marginalised, while officials display a “habit” of EU consensus (pp. 163–164, 160). **Explain.** Internalised norms make CFSP the working context, so small states scale influence by crafting coalitions and texts. **Limit.** The evidence is pre-2000 and elite-centric. **Consequent.** Irish DF should professionalise consensus-craft, target working groups, and plan presidencies around norm gains.

Paragraph 2 — counter **Point.** Complex interdependence still predicts overload and coordination risks that can hollow diplomatic niches. **Evidence.** Tonra notes agenda overload, duplication, loss of mystique, and a potential “post box” dynamic under EU pressures (pp. 151–152). **Explain.** If domestic ministries internationalise faster than DFA adapts, capacity strains can blunt influence. **Limit.** Tonra also shows DFA retained comparative advantages and specialisation (p. 164). **Consequent.** Balance EU-leverage missions with core political analysis and coordination skill to avoid mere relay status.



## Evidence & Implication Log

**Claim &  
Best source  
(page) & Rival  
source/reading  
& Condition &  
Implication for  
Irish DF**

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Europeanisation  
empowers DFA  
& Tonra 1999  
(pp. 163–164).  
:contentRefer-  
ence[oaicite:23]index=23  
& Bargain-  
ing dominates;  
LDC outcomes.  
:contentRefer-  
ence[oaicite:24]index=24  
& Consensus  
norms persist &  
Build presidency  
coalitions and  
drafting capacity.  
Consensus re-  
flex evidences  
norm internali-  
sation & Tonra  
1999 (p. 160).  
:contentRefer-  
ence[oaicite:25]index=25  
& Veto preserves

### Gaps

- Chase post-2004 and post-Lisbon evidence on embassy EU-leverage metrics and neutrality practice.
- Park broader cross-state comparators; keep focus on DSS learning outcomes and Irish DF doctrine.

(TONRA\_2011 )

## Source Analysis — *Tonra and Christiansen 2011*, The Study of EU Foreign Policy: Between International Relations and European Studies

**Describe:** The chapter frames EU foreign policy as a puzzle of ambition and sovereignty, then traces CFSP's development along three axes: policy-making structures, substantive remit, and decision procedures, citing TEU Article 11 and Article 17 to mark scope and ambition. **Interpret:** It bridges IR and European Studies, arguing that communication, argumentation, and identity formation are central to EU foreign policy, offering a corrective to rationalist readings that see only median-interest bargains. **Methodology:** A conceptual synthesis with illustrative institutional detail and literature mapping; validity is moderate given breadth, clarity, and reliance on secondary sources. **Evaluate:** The strongest contribution is the three-axes framework and the cognitive turn that highlights identity and ideas; measurement and external testing are limited. **Author:** Irish and European scholars write from an EU studies vantage that is friendly to constructivist analysis and attentive to institutional evolution. **Synthesis:** Aligns with constructivist work on a European diplomatic republic and with broader claims that EU foreign policy is more than intergovernmental bargaining. Diverges from realist or purely rationalist frames. **Limit.** Sparse metrics and pre-Lisbon context constrain inference; intergovernmental realities persist. **Implication:** Irish DF should work EU committees, planning cells, and narratives to shape outcomes despite unanimity limits. Limit. Implication:.

**Method weight:** 3 — Strong theoretical mapping with concrete institutional examples, but limited empirical testing and metrics reduce robustness.



### Claims-cluster seeds

**Claim:** CFSP has significantly institutionalised across structures, remit, and procedures. **Best line:** Complex committees, High Representative, and broadened Petersberg tasks show scope. **Rival:** Minimal change, ritual intergovernmentalism. **Condition:** Willingness to use QMV and constructive abstention. **Irish DF implication:** Shape outcomes via committees and planning cells.

**Claim:** Communication and argumentation are essential to CFSP practice. **Best line:** Deliberation and shared language underpin decision formation. **Rival:** Outputs are just declaratory diplomacy. **Condition:** Dense socialisation in Brussels fora. **Irish DF implication:** Invest in representation and narrative craft.

**Claim:** A cognitive–constructivist lens explains EU foreign policy better than fixed-interest models. **Best line:** Interests and identities evolve through interaction. **Rival:** Exogenous interests, median bargains. **Condition:** Ongoing interaction in EU venues. **Irish DF implication:** Use identity cues to build coalitions.

**Claim:** Without a collective identity, pillar–fusion yields limited coherence. **Best line:** Joining first and second pillars without shared interests exposes inadequacy. **Rival:** Functional spillover suffices. **Condition:** Identity–building across portfolios. **Irish DF implication:** Support EU strategic communication and public engagement.

**PEEL-C paragraphs** *Point.* CFSP has matured institutionally and procedurally in ways small states can exploit. *Evidence.* The chapter shows strengthened structures, broader remit under Petersberg tasks, and evolved decision tools including QMV and constructive abstention. *Explain.* For Ireland, committee work, policy-planning, and early drafting offer leverage disproportionate to size. *Limit.* Institutionalisation does not erase unanimity constraints. *Consequent:* Build DF capacity in Brussels committees and planning cells to bend outcomes.

*Point.* Ideas and identity formation shape EU foreign policy choices, not just fixed interests. *Evidence.* Communication and argumentation are essential features, while cognitive approaches explain how identities shift through interaction. *Explain.* Ireland can frame missions and priorities through sustained narrative work and coalition-building. *Limit.*

Effects are diffuse and hard to measure. *Consequent:* Pair narrative craft with tangible proposals to convert deliberation into policy.



## **Evidence & Implication Log**

**Claim** &  
**Best** source  
**(page)** & **Rival**  
**source/reading**  
& **Condition** &  
**Implication** for  
**Irish DF**

hline CFSP in-  
stitutionalised  
& TEU 11, 17;  
committees, HR,  
Petersberg tasks  
& Ritual inter-  
governmentalism  
& Use of QMV  
and abstention &  
Work committees  
and planning  
cells. Deliber-  
ation central &  
Communication  
and argumentation  
essential & Just  
declaratory diplo-  
macy & Dense  
Brussels sociali-  
sation & Invest in  
representation and  
narrative. Cogni-  
tive lens explains

**Gaps** • Page-specific anchors for quoted treaty passages within this edition; quantitative checks on institutional effects. • Park exhaustive literature taxonomy beyond constructs needed for DF argument.

(Rothstein 1966)

DIMERS LaTeX block

## Source Analysis — *Rothstein 1966*, Alignment, Nonalignment, and Small Powers: 1945–1965

**Describe:** Rothstein argues that a functioning balance of power still constrains small powers yet offers security; in the nuclear era conflict shifts below war, making nonalignment a tactical device and the UN a venue that amplifies small-state influence (pp. 397–398, 407–408).

**Interpret:** For DSS, the piece recasts leverage: Ireland’s influence rises when super-powers avoid escalation and must court votes; leverage dips when a great power threatens directly.

**Methodology:** Conceptual synthesis with illustrative cases and secondary sources; validity moderate, shaped by mid-1960s bipolar context and UN practice.

**Evaluate:** Strong on specifying when nonalignment works and why UN voting empowers small states; thinner on systematic case evidence; anticipates China’s disruptive role.

**Author:** US academic; balance-of-power frame; attentive to nuclear constraints and institutional channels.

**Synthesis:** Aligns with Keohane’s note that alliances serve nonmilitary aims; diverges from Vital’s view of nonalignment as paradigm by treating it as contingent tactic.

**Limit.** Claims are tied to 1960s bipolarity and UN arithmetic; generalisability to multipolarity is uncertain. **Implication:** Irish DF should maximise UN peace operations, legal instruments, and minilateral formats while hedging for shock threats via selective mixed alliances.

Method weight

3/5. Conceptually rigorous with clear conditions; limited systematic empirics and era-bound context.

Claims-cluster seeds (3–5)

Claim: Nonalignment is viable in cold peace, not under direct great-power threat. • Best line: “Nonalignment is... nonviable... where the Great Powers primarily seek the support of their peers...; viable in ‘cold war’ periods” (p. 405). • Rival: Nonalignment has become an enduring institution. • Condition: Superpower competition balanced; escalation risk high. • Irish DF implication: Invest in UN mediation, sanctions design, and niche capabilities.

Claim: UN voting and restraint structures amplify small-state influence. • Best line: UN “enhances the influence of the non-aligned... voting system... disproportionately weighted in favor of the weaker members” (pp. 407–408). • Rival: Votes are symbolic, not substantive. • Condition: Great powers seek legitimacy, avoid overt violation. • Irish DF implication: Prioritise UN coalitions, resolutions, and leadership slots.

Claim: Mixed multilateral alliances outperform unequal bilateral ties unless danger is acute. • Best line: Multilateral gives bargaining leverage, lower prestige costs; bilateral preferred only if danger high (p. 416). • Rival: Bilateral clarity deters better. • Condition: No imminent attack; political aims dominate. • Irish DF implication: Prefer EU–UN–NATO partnership formats over sole-patron ties.

Claim: Nuclear weapons expand small-power room for manoeuvre yet bound escalation freedom. • Best line: Freedom to manoeuvre is high; freedom to start world war is low (p. 417). • Rival: Nuclear umbrellas mute small-state agency. • Condition: Major powers deter each other below war threshold. • Irish DF implication: Build influence in sub-kinetic domains and crisis management.

Two PEEL-C paragraphs

Strongest claim — Point: Nonalignment benefits small states during cold peace but fails when a great power threatens directly. Evidence: Rothstein shows viability tracks superpower balance and is “nonviable... where the Great Powers primarily seek the sup-

port of their peers,” with effectiveness highest when conflict stays below war (p. 405). Explain: When escalation is risky, courting votes and legitimacy grants leverage; when a great power threatens, alignment choices narrow. Limit: Era-bound to UN arithmetic and nuclear caution. Consequent: Irish DF should treat nonalignment as a tactic alongside UN leadership and restrained minilateralism.

Counter — Point: Some argue bilateral alignment with a patron is always superior for deterrence clarity. Evidence: Rothstein cautions that unequal bilateral deals raise prestige costs and dilute bargaining power; multilateral forms lower domestic and external costs, with bilateral preferable only under acute danger (p. 416). Explain: Mixed alliances create more levers without deep dependence; deterrence still available through collective frameworks. Limit: In immediate threat windows, bilateral speed and clarity may dominate. Consequent: Irish DF should default to EU–UN–NATO mesh, reserving bilateral depth for near-term, named threats.

Evidence & Implication Log (LaTeX)

**Claim                      &**  
**Best                      source**  
**(page)   &   Rival**  
**source/reading**  
**&   Condition   &**  
**Implication   for**  
**Irish DF**

hline   Nonalign-  
ment works in cold  
peace & Rothstein  
1966, p.   405 &  
Nonalignment as  
institution & Bal-  
anced superpower  
competition & Re-  
source UN crisis  
tools,   mediation  
UN voting boosts  
leverage & Roth-  
stein 1966, pp.  
407–408 & Votes  
are symbolic &  
Great powers seek  
legitimacy & Lead  
on   resolutions,  
committees Mixed  
multilateral   over  
unequal   bilateral  
& Rothstein 1966,  
p. 416 & Bilateral  
clarity best & No



### Gaps

- Chase contemporary multipolar tests of the UN-vote leverage mechanism.
- Park deep archival case studies unless needed to distinguish Vital's paradigm claim.

If you want, I can now fold this into a 4–8 paper synthesis for the DSS essay with Keohane and Mearsheimer already in your set.

(WHITE\_2019)

## Source Analysis — *Department of Defence 2019, White*

### Paper on Defence Update 2019

**Describe:** Government affirms the 2015 framework, introduces a fixed cycle of three-year defence reviews, and notes rising cyber and espionage threats while maintaining overall policy continuity (pp. 1–3, 72–79). :contentReference[oaicite:0]index=0 :contentReference[oaicite:1]index=1 :contentReference[oaicite:2]index=2 **Interpret:** For DSS, the Update frames small-state posture under constrained budgets: stay neutral yet engaged, leverage EU and UN, and build credible capabilities. It leaves granular capability trade-offs to later plans. **Methodology:** A cross-government review updates the security assessment and audits 95 projects; evidence is administrative and programmatic rather than hypothesis-testing (pp. 1–3, 50–51). :contentReference[oaicite:3]index=3 :contentReference[oaicite:4]index=4 **Evaluate:** Strongest where it links funding envelopes to capability sequencing and where it institutionalises security management through NSAC and fixed reviews (pp. 72–79). :contentReference[oaicite:5]index=5 :contentReference[oaicite:6]index=6 **Author:** An Irish Government policy text, led by the Minister, supported by a civil-military steering group; institutional lens and pragmatic tone (p. 1). :contentReference[oaicite:7]index=7 **Synthesis:** It underwrites active international engagement through the UN, EU, PfP and OSCE, aligning with institutional practice and giving small states avenues to shape outcomes (p. 6). :contentReference[oaicite:8]index=8 **Limit.** Funding limits force sequential platform replacement and leave explicit costed alternatives under-specified

until plans mature (pp. 76–79). :contentReference[oaicite:9]index=9 **Implication:** Ireland should deepen EU-UN roles, accelerate capability planning and retention efforts, and treat neutrality as active engagement rather than insulation (pp. 6, 77–79). :contentReference[oaicite:10]index=10 :contentReference[oaicite:11]index=11 Limit. Implication:

Method weight: 3 — High policy relevance and official data, but non-falsifiable claims and limited analytical testing.

Claims-cluster seeds (3–5):

Claim: Neutrality is active; engagement through UN, EU, PfP, OSCE is essential. • Best line: neutrality “is not isolationist” and active international engagement is necessary (p. 6). • Rival reading: Strict non-alignment reduces exposure. • Condition: Hybrid threats and interdependence persist. • Irish DF implication: Keep UN peacekeeping, deepen EU CSDP, retain PfP interoperability.

Claim: Funding constraints require sequencing and stronger capability planning. • Best line: platforms replaced “only sequentially,” with continuing potential for additional capital (pp. 76–78). • Rival reading: One-off capital spikes can close gaps. • Condition: Stable medium-term envelope. • Irish DF implication: Prioritise radar, cyber, ISTAR, force protection.

Claim: Fixed three-year reviews and NSAC strengthen foresight and coordination. • Best line: fixed cycle reviews to assure preparedness; NSAC to evolve national security management (pp. 50, 73). • Rival reading: Reviews add process without capability. • Condition: Outputs inform resourcing choices. • Irish DF implication: Tie project sequencing to review milestones.

Claim: Capital plan advances APC upgrades, MRV, PC-12, CASA replacement. • Best line: €541m to 2022 with APC upgrades, MRV planning, aircraft programmes (pp. 44–46, 68–69). • Rival reading: Procurement breadth dilutes depth. • Condition: Delivery schedules and manning kept. • Irish DF implication: Align training and infrastructure to platforms.

PEEL-C paragraphs

**Point:** Neutrality must be active, with international engagement as necessity. **Evidence:** The Update states neutrality “is not isolationist” and underscores active engagement via UN, EU, PfP and OSCE (p. 6). **Explain:** Engagement buys influence, interoperability and early warning that small states cannot generate alone. **Limit:** Engagement can outpace personnel and funding capacity. **Consequent:** Focus on EU-UN roles where return on effort is highest and sustain PfP interoperability. Limit. Consequent:.

**Point:** A restraint-first view claims Ireland should narrow deployments until capabilities recover. **Evidence:** The Update records sequential replacements and unmet priorities, signalling binding constraints (pp. 76–79). **Explain:** Scarcity can force delay in commitments, yet engagement also underpins capability through partners. **Limit:** Cutting presence risks loss of networks and training pathways. **Consequent:** Hedge by pacing rotations, protecting training pipelines and linking deployments to capability milestones. Limit. Consequent:.



## Evidence & Implication Log

**Claim &  
Best source  
(page) & Rival  
source/reading  
& Condition &  
Implication for  
Irish DF**

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Neutrality is  
active engage-  
ment & Exec.  
Summary p. 6  
:contentReference[oaicite:21]index=21

& Strict non-  
alignment buffers  
risk & Persistent  
hybrid threats  
& Keep UN,  
EU, PfP, OSCE  
pathways

Funding forces se-  
quencing & Con-  
clusions pp. 76–78  
:contentReference[oaicite:22]index=22

& One-off cash  
fixes gaps & Sta-  
ble envelope &  
Prioritise radar,  
cyber, ISTAR

Fixed reviews  
improve fore-  
sight & pp. 50, 73

Gaps • Chase costed alternatives for radar, air defence and force protection with delivery timelines. • Park deep programme evaluation until Capability and Equipment Plans are final.

(WALTZ\_1969)

## Source Analysis — *Waltz 1969, Anarchy, self-help, and balance of power*

**Describe:** Waltz models international politics as an anarchic system that compels self-help and relative gains sensitivity. He explains recurrent balance-of-power behaviour and the permanent possibility of conflict, with institutions moderating uncertainty but not transforming anarchy (pp. 107–114).

**Interpret:** The piece sets ceilings on what cooperation can deliver for a small state and where prudence must anchor planning. It excludes operational measurement and domestic constraints central to Irish policy.

**Methodology:** Structural theory with market analogies to oligopoly. Evidence rests on parsimony and recurrent patterns, not systematic tests. Validity cues come from internal coherence and historical recurrence rather than explicit causal identification.

**Evaluate:** The contribution bites in specifying systemic constraints and why relative gains curb deep cooperation (pp. 107–110). It is weaker on institutional mechanisms and on linking structure to policy instruments.

**Author:** Neorealist US academic lens, sceptical that institutional design can remake anarchy, attentive to power distributions.

**Synthesis:** Counters Keohane's optimism on institutional effects yet admits moderation by rules and norms. Both accept discord under anarchy, but differ on the scope for institutionalised gains.

**Limit.** Underplays domestic politics and learning effects, offers sparse operationalisation.

**Implication:** Ireland should hedge, balance, and use verifiable regimes to lower risk while avoiding dependence on promises alone.

Method Weight: 4 — Strong structural logic with clear predictions about constraints; weak empirical testing and limited institutional specification.

#### Claims-Cluster Seeds

Self-help and relative gains curb deep cooperation. • Best line: “The system of self-help means that each state must take care of itself” (p. 107). • Rival: Institutions transform interests and lock in absolute gains. • Condition: High uncertainty and thin enforcement. • Irish DF implication: Hedge and balance within alliances with credible verification.

Institutions moderate but cannot remove the security dilemma. • Best line: “They cannot eliminate the security dilemma because they do not alter the fundamental condition of anarchy” (p. 109). • Rival: Regimes reconstitute preferences, reducing fear. • Condition: Monitoring weak or interests diverge. • Irish DF implication: Prefer regimes with strong inspection and graduated reciprocity.

Balance-of-power politics is a systemic tendency. • Best line: “Balance-of-power politics is not a deliberate choice but a systemic tendency” (pp. 111–112). • Rival: Hegemonic stability suspends balancing. • Condition: Significant power shifts. • Irish DF implication: Keep coalition options flexible and reversible.

Conflict is not inevitable, but always possible. • Best line: “The conclusion... is not that conflict is inevitable, but that it is always possible” (p. 114). • Rival: Dense interdependence secures peace. • Condition: Deterrence credibility maintained. • Irish DF implication: Maintain readiness for rapid posture shifts.

#### PEEL-C Drafting

Paragraph 1 — Strongest claim (self-help, relative gains). **Point:** In anarchy, self-help and relative gains considerations limit the depth of cooperation. **Evidence:** Waltz grounds behaviour in a self-help system where survival concerns curb specialisation and deepen sensitivity to distributional outcomes (pp. 107–110). **Explain:** For Ireland, deep pooling without robust verification risks lock-in to partners’ priorities. **Limit:** Strong regimes can

still reduce uncertainty. **Consequent:** Enter coalitions with clear exit options and tested inspection regimes.

Paragraph 2 — Counter (institutions moderate behaviour). **Point:** Institutions and norms can temper uncertainty though they cannot erase self-help. **Evidence:** Waltz concedes rules and norms moderate behaviour by providing information and reducing uncertainty, yet leave anarchy intact (pp. 111–113). **Explain:** Irish participation in regimes can lower bargaining costs while retaining capability hedges. **Limit:** Mitigation fails if monitoring weakens or power shifts. **Consequent:** Pair regime commitments with credible capabilities and routine readiness tests.





## Evidence & Implication Log

**Claim**                      &  
**Best**                      **source**  
**(page)**   &   **Rival**  
**source/reading**  
**& Condition**   &  
**Implication**   **for**  
**Irish DF**

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Self-help              and  
relative gains curb  
deep   cooperation  
& Waltz (p. 107) &  
Institutions   trans-  
form   interests   &  
High   uncertainty,  
thin   enforcement  
&   Hedge   and  
balance              within  
verified alliances  
Institutions   mod-  
erate   but   cannot  
remove   dilemma  
& Waltz (p. 109) &  
Regimes   reconsti-  
tute preferences &  
Monitoring   weak  
or interests diverge   Gaps  
& Choose regimes  
with              inspection  
and reciprocity

Balancing   is   a

- Chase exact page spans for each quoted line in a clean edition; OCR noise suggests minor pagination drift.
- Park epistemology disputes; prioritise measurable indicators linking verification strength to cooperation depth for DF planning.

(Beckley 2018)

## Source Analysis — *Beckley 2018, The Power of Nations:*

### Measuring What Matters

**Describe:** Beckley argues that power should be measured as net resources, not gross stocks, and proposes a proxy multiplying GDP by GDP per capita to capture size and efficiency. He shows this proxy tracks great power rise and predicts disputes and wars better than GDP or CINC (pp. 18–19, 38–40). :contentReference[oaicite:0]index=0 :contentReference[oaicite:1]index=1 :contentReference[oaicite:2]index=2

**Interpret:** This reframes DSS capability assessments: efficiency, logistics, and welfare burdens shape usable power. It sidelines institutional soft power and qualitative readiness beyond what GDP per capita can proxy (pp. 18–19). :contentReference[oaicite:3]index=3 **Methodology:** Mixed methods. Case studies of extended rivalries, large-N tests of dispute and war outcomes, plus replications using AIC; the proxy is primitive yet transparent (pp. 18–21, 38–40). :contentReference[oaicite:4]index=4 :contentReference[oaicite:5]index=5 :contentReference[oaicite:6]index=6

**Evaluate:** Contribution bites where CINC and GDP mislead, notably China versus Japan historically and contemporary U.S.–China comparisons; the proxy outperforms on predictive fit, though selection and omitted-variable concerns remain (pp. 22–28, 38–40, 43–44). :contentReference[oaicite:7]index=7 :contentReference[oaicite:8]index=8 :contentReference[oaicite:9]index=9 **Author:** Tufts academic affiliated with Belfer; mainstream security studies framing with policy salience (p. 7). :contentReference[oaicite:10]index=10 **Synthesis:** Aligns with Bairoch’s intuition on combining GDP totals and per capita output, and with work linking development to military effectiveness; diverges from gross-indicator realism reliant on CINC (p. 18; pp. 8–9). :con-

tentReference[oaicite:11]index=11 :contentReference[oaicite:12]index=12 **Limit.** Proxy is crude, penalises population mechanically, and net-stock datasets begin only in 1990, constraining historic validity (pp. 18–19). **Implication:** For a small state, prioritise efficiency, niche technology, and multilateral roles over force mass. :contentReference[oaicite:13]index=13

Method weight: 4 — Triangulated design and replications give credibility, but the proxy is primitive and datasets are constrained.

Claims-cluster seeds (4):

Claim: Power depends on net resources. Best line: gross indicators are “logically unsound and empirically unreliable” (pp. 8–9). Rival: Gross capacity suffices. Condition: Efficiency differentials persist. Irish DF implication: Weight readiness, logistics, and training over mass.

Claim: GDP×GDP per capita predicts conflict outcomes better than GDP or CINC. Best line: proxy performs 8–10 points better for wars, 6 for disputes (p. 38). Rival: Resolve and strategy dominate. Condition: Bilateral contests with comparable resolve. Irish DF implication: Invest in skill-intensive enablers.

Claim: Many CINC-based findings need retesting. Best line: “more than 1,000 studies have used CINC” (p. 9). Rival: Robustness checks already adjust. Condition: When CINC drove identification. Irish DF implication: Revisit partner-selection models.

Claim: U.S. retains a net-resource lead over China. Best line: China lags on net resources and likely will continue to (pp. 43–44). Rival: Scale overcomes costs. Condition: Production, welfare, and security costs remain high. Irish DF implication: Bet on transatlantic depth.

PEEL-C paragraphs

Strongest claim. *Point* Net resources, not gross stocks, determine usable power. *Evidence* Beckley shows that GDP×GDP per capita predicts war outcomes 8–10 points better than GDP or CINC, and dispute outcomes 6 points better (p. 38). *Explain* Efficiency and burdens shape what states can actually mobilise. *Limit* Proxy is primitive and risks penal-

ising population mechanically (pp. 18–19). *Consequent* For DSS, prioritise efficiency, logistics, and training in capability planning. *Limit*. *Consequent*:

Counter. *Point* Gross capacity still correlates with influence, so GDP or CINC may suffice for broad trends. *Evidence* Some replicated models still favour GDP or equal CINC fit (pp. 39–40). *Explain* Scale enables sustained presence and redundancy. *Limit* Gross indicators mischaracterise key rivalries and contemporary U.S.–China comparisons (pp. 22–28, 43–44). *Consequent* DSS should treat mass as a baseline, then adjust by efficiency and costs. *Limit*. *Consequent*:

Claim	Best source (page)	Rival source/reading	Condition	Im	DF
Net resources determine usable power	Beckley, proxy predicts wars and disputes better (p. 38)	Gross capacity correlates with influence	Comparable solve, bilateral contests	re-	Pri
GDP×GDP per capita is a better single indicator than CINC	Beckley, AIC gains in 17/24 replications (pp. 39–40)	GDP or CINC fit equals or exceeds in some models	Similar measure-ment windows	Us	els
CINC-based findings need retesting	Beckley, “more than 1,000 studies” used CINC (p. 9)	Existing robustness already sufficient	Where drives identifica-tion	CINC	Re
U.S. retains net-resource lead over China	Beckley, China lags on net resources (pp. 43–44)	Scale will close gap	Costs remain asymmetric	Ali	dep

Gaps • Chase: precise page locations of Table 2 and online appendix cases to anchor quantitative percentages and rivalries. • Park: soft-power and qualitative readiness metrics until scoping confirms relevance for this ESSAY.

Beckley’s critique of conventional power measures reinforces the claim that small states can matter through efficiency rather than mass. He shows that net resources, captured by GDP multiplied by GDP per capita, predict conflict outcomes more effectively than gross measures such as GDP or CINC (Beckley 2018). This finding aligns with the logic

of niche specialisation and organisational agility: small states that concentrate resources on high-skill, efficiency-driven roles can achieve influence disproportionate to their size. Yet Beckley's model sidelines legitimacy and institutions, treating power only in material terms. Limit. His proxy cannot capture the political credibility on which small states depend. Implication: For Ireland, efficiency in logistics, training, and technology is essential, but without institutional legitimacy such advantages would remain incomplete.

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## List of Acronyms

**CLEM** Command, Leadership, Ethics and Management.

**EDA** European Defence Agency.

**EOD** Explosive Ordnance Disposal.

**IED** Improvised Explosive Device.

**IEDD** Improvised Explosive Device Disposal.

**JCSC** Joint Command and Staff Course.

