Theories of Democratic Civil-Military Relations

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The empirical domain of civil-military relations is large. It includes direct and indirect dealings that ordinary people and institutions have with the military, legislative haggling over the funding, regulation, and use of the military, and complex bargaining between civilian and military elites to define and implement national security policy. Moreover, each of these relations varies in form and consequence depending on whether they are found in strong democratic or weak authoritarian states, in economically developed or impoverished states, in states at war or states at peace. Only in the loosest sense can we claim to have overarching theories of civil-military relations that explain the widely divergent patterns of conduct that occur throughout this domain under the whole range of imaginable conditions.[1] What we have instead are limited theories that examine one aspect of the matter and that aspect, most often, is the relation between the government and the military. The question raised is whether (or to what degree) uniformed military elites follow the commands of civilian political elites. The question reflects a normative belief that civilian political control over the military is preferable to military control of the state; and so it seems that the central problem in civil-military theory is to explain how civilian control over the military is established and maintained. This article also narrows the scope of inquiry in an effort to manage the complexities of the topic, but it departs from the beaten path that is singularly concerned with ensuring civilian control.

First, it is most interested in the development of a normative theory of civil-military relations as it applies to mature democracies. It is less interested in theories that explain the historical development of civil-

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military relations. As theories result from systematic reflections on historical experience, the two developments are not unconnected. Still, the emphasis is different.

Second, it is less concerned (though not unconcerned) with an explanation of whether civilian or military elites are in command, making decisions. It is more concerned with elaborating a normative theory that helps us to understand how civil-military relations sustain and protect democratic values. To be sure, democratic values include the idea that those with authority ought to be the elected representatives of the people, and that these representatives ought to exercise ultimate authority over the uniformed military elite. But this issue should not be at the center of a normative theory about civil-military relations in mature democracies. In these countries, there is no realistic expectation that the military will intervene to overthrow civilian rule or even that the military will influence a civilian government to pursue a more aggressive military policy than it otherwise would.[2] In any case, the principle of civilian control—that "civilians have the right to be wrong"[3] —is one that all civilian governments—not only democratic ones—want to follow. To place this problem at the center of attention distracts us from identifying the problems distinctive to civil-military relations in mature democracies.[4]

The important theoretical problem for these countries is how to maintain a military that sustains and protects democratic values. This is a problem because military values and practice are not the same as liberal democratic values and practice and so it is not always clear how their conflicting demands can be met.[5] What values are at risk? One is that reliance on coercion as opposed to reason and persuasion should be minimized as a method for resolving conflicts. Another is that sovereignty of and respect for people who live within a democratic jurisdiction should be institutionalized. This requires establishing rights—civil, political, and social rights—to lower as far as possible barriers that would limit the autonomy of individuals and of the associations they form. It also imposes requirements for transparency and accountability in the development and execution of public policy—including security policy—by political representatives, who are chosen in fair and frequent elections.[6] To the extent possible, these values should be observed in relations with other societies as well as within democratic ones. My assumption is that civil-military relations affect the degree to which these values are observed.

Recent work in civil-military relations theory still reflects the influence of the contending theories first proposed by Samuel P. Hun-

tington and Morris Janowitz almost fifty years ago.[7] Yet there are reasons to doubt whether these two theories, developed in response to the new circumstances of the Cold War, are well applied to the contemporary situation. There is a sense that their value is limited and that new frameworks are required to guide future research. After offering reasons why the Huntington and Janowitz theories need revision, I review new theoretical work (much of it with explanatory ambitions) that bears on questions about the relations between military and political elites, the relation of citizens to the military and the state, and the extension of civil-military relations beyond the sovereign state. I use the review to identify key questions a normative theory of democratic civil-military relations must address to judge whether these relations effectively sustain and protect democratic values. But first, I briefly sketch two different models of the modern democratic state. If the problem is to know how civil-military relations affect democratic values, it is likely that theories of civil-military relations rest (if only implicitly) on some understanding of democracy, and we are wiser to know what that is.

Two Theories of Democracy

Democratic societies are alike in certain general respects, for instance in relying on free and competitive elections to choose political leaders and on a rule of law to protect the civil, political, and social rights of citizens (and other residents) of the state. Yet democratic societies also vary in the ways their states are organized and in their understanding of what the state should do and how it should do it. Correspondingly, theories of democracy vary as they emphasize a particular pattern or interpretation of democratic life that seems important for the purpose at hand. Here we are interested in interpretations of democracy that affect the character of civil-military relations. For this purpose I examine two distinct democratic theories, liberal and civic republican, that underwrite and clarify the different approaches to civil-military relations found in the works of Huntington and Janowitz.

Liberal theory argues that the first priority of the democratic state is to protect the rights and liberties of individual citizens. That priority assumes, of course, that individuals live in a world where such protection is needed, a world of conflict in which one's life and the freedom to pursue the object of one's passions are always in doubt. In Thomas Hobbes's original account of liberal theory, security in the face of conflict could only be provided through a social contract that constituted the state as a sovereign power whose laws were obeyed in exchange for

its protection of the lives of its citizens.[8] Hobbes did not suppose that only a democratic state could do this, but—as Laurence Berns has observed—the first form of government arising from the social contract does constitute "the multitude as a democratic people."[9] A liberal democratic state, according to this theory, fulfills its protective role within the political community by instituting a rule of law enforced by punishment. But it has also to deal with those outside the community who are not party to or bound by the contract. In the international arena, there is still a state of nature in which conflict is uncontrolled. To retain its authority, the state must protect its citizens from these foreign threats, not least of all by means of an effective military establishment.

A key concern for liberal theorists is how to ensure that the power of the sovereign is not abused by overturning the rights and liberties of the citizens. One proposal, made famous by John Stuart Mill, was to follow a policy of toleration, limiting the power of the state to regulate or punish private conduct even if the majority thought the conduct was wrong.[10] But how does this apply to military power? It is crucial that the military be strong to protect the state in a conflict-ridden world. Yet the military cannot be left uncontrolled by the state. Freed from state restraints, the military would pursue the objects of its own passions and pose an internal threat to sovereign power. Neither can the military be wholly dominated by the state—especially not a democratic state representative of civilian society—because then the military would be forced to follow the passions of the civilian majority controlling the state, and following these passions might sap military strength by distracting it from its purpose. Here is a threat to military security. This dilemma is familiar to students of civil-military relations and, posed in this way, it anticipates Huntington's theory of civil-military relations, a theory not usually (but in this case appropriately) branded with the liberal label.[11] Huntington attempts to solve the dilemma by advocating a policy of "objective civilian control." Following this policy, civilians would dictate military security policy, but would leave the military free to determine what military operations were required to secure the policy objectives. For this policy to work, the military requires professional officers who are expert in the management of violence and willing to swap loyalty to civilian authority in return for professional autonomy.

Civic republican theory contests the liberal notion that the first priority of the democratic state is to protect individual rights and liberties. It argues instead that priority should be placed on engaging citizens in the activity of public life. Citizenship is based on participation in the rule and defense of the republic. It is a matter of civic and

martial practice. The results of participation are two-fold. First, participation enlarges the interests of individuals to include those of the community, and it cultivates in individuals a sense of responsibility for the common good; in brief, it constructs civic virtues. Second, participation in public life ensures the continuation of the community as a republic; when citizen participation flags, the republic becomes corrupt. In addition, when citizens serve as soldiers to defend the republic, the interests of the military and the interests of the state overlap, and there is less need to fear a military challenge to the republic. For these reasons, civic republicans are less worried by life in a conflict-ridden world than they are by the possibility that individuals will neglect their duties as citizens to pursue the common good.[12] This fear was symbolized for early republican theorists in their (somewhat distorted) memory of the ancient Roman republic, which, with prosperity, sank slowly into corruption as its citizens were no longer willing to endure the hardship of military service.[13] In fact, early republican theory embraced conflict with foreign powers (or other similar exertions) as a way of maintaining citizens' active participation in public pursuits and, thus, saving the republic from ruin.[14]

The central problem for democracy from a republican point of view is how to preserve the citizens' opportunity and enthusiasm for public service, to include their willingness to soldier well enough to protect the republic from defeat in war. Participation in public life may produce civic virtue and the vitality of the republic, but what secures participation in public life? Machiavelli thought the answer was to promise liberty and personal glory for those who distinguished themselves in public, especially in military service. Rousseau agreed, but also emphasized the role of civic festivals to arouse and sustain the passion for participation in public life.[15]

Janowitz addressed the same question as it affects civil-military relations today. The issue, as he saw it, was how to preserve the ideal of the citizen-soldier in an era when the changing nature of war no longer required mass participation in military service but did require the state to maintain a large standing force of professional soldiers. For Janowitz, as for the early republican theorists, military service was a positive obligation. Service demonstrated and enhanced one's citizenship and fulfilling the obligation improved democratic life. Still, it was a practice that could only be sustained when it was genuinely needed and approximately universal—and it was neither following World War II. To compensate for the loss of mass military service and yet encourage civic participation, Janowitz argued strongly for a national service pro-

gram—including a military component—to provide youth with opportunities to work for a common good.[16] At the same time, it was important that professional soldiers continued to think of themselves as citizen-soldiers rather than as mercenaries or just another politically partisan occupational pressure group. While certain trends in military organization (e.g., shift in authority, broadening base of officer recruitment, and civilianization) assured some convergence between the military and civilian society, Janowitz believed that the citizen-soldier ideal had to be cultivated to endure. To that end, he argued for an explicit program in political education to connect professional military training to national and transnational purposes.[17]

What distinguishes these two theories of democracy as they apply to civil-military relations is their understanding of the key problem the theory has to solve. The liberal theory, underwriting Huntington's work, is primarily concerned that civil-military relations preserve the military's ability to protect democratic values by defeating external threats. The civic republican theory, underwriting Janowitz's work, is primarily concerned that civil-military relations sustain democratic values—especially the value of civic virtue—by bolstering civic participation through the citizen-soldier's role. These are glosses, of course, of subtle and complex theories. Yet they clarify why these two approaches contend but cannot supplant one another. They treat different parts of the problem that a democratic theory of civil-military relations must confront, either how to protect or how to sustain democratic values. Notice that to protect democratic values the military needs to be subordinate to civilian power, but not necessarily to enact democratic values as it goes about its work. To sustain democratic values, the military must in crucial respects identify substantively with and so embody the values of the society it defends. Ideally, one theory would explain how to do both.

Flaws in Both Theories of Civil-Military Relations

The theories of Huntington and Janowitz on democratic civil-military relations are recognized now and were recognized when they appeared to be exemplary accounts of the subject. They have guided research for over a generation.[18] Nevertheless, they are not perfect. While grounded in central if contending traditions of democratic thought, they are both flawed in important respects, as judged by our normative standard that militaries must sustain and protect democratic values and practices. Two flaws are unique to each theory, but two flaws are held in common.[19]

First, Huntington's theory about how to protect a democratic state (the United States) is not persuasive for the period following World War II. He argues that the military professional is to master the functional requirements of war, to organize and train the military to meet them, and to lead the military to fight when commanded by political authorities to do so. This is consistent with the military's aim to protect democratic society from foreign enemies. But it presumes that there is a clearly delineated military sphere defined by war fighting that is independent of the social and political sphere. The presumption is doubtful. In an era still beset by weapons of mass destruction, there can be no clear distinction between the ends and means of war, between the policy decisions of political elites and the operational decisions of military elites. What ends are possible to think about depends to a large extent on the means by which they are to be pursued. As a practical matter, this means that the distinction between the political sphere, where ends are decided on, and the military sphere, where means are deployed in pursuit of ends, is highly misleading. But, if this is so, then Huntington's theory of objective civilian control does not really tell us how democratic values ought to be protected.[20]

Huntington also believed that the United States could protect itself from its Cold War challenge only by turning away from its liberal ideology to embrace a new conservative realism, and he thought such a shift was taking place. In fact, just the opposite was occurring as the United States, since the 1960s, became—in Peter Feaver's words—"even more individualist, more antistatist, than it was when Huntington wrote."[21] Nevertheless, support for the military remained high enough to permit the United States to meet its Cold War security demands until 1989, when the Soviet Union collapsed. Ironically, it is possible that the Soviet Union was able to extract a greater proportion of its resources for military security because it was an autocratic rather than a liberal regime. But in doing so, it bankrupted its economy and dissipated its political capital. The United States was too liberal (too pluralist in outlook and commitment) to permit any similar concentration of political or economic capital.[22] From Huntington's point of view, it was unexpectedly strong and endured over the long run despite its unwillingness to displace liberal standards for the "redemption and security" that military standards had to offer.[23]

Second, Janowitz's theory asserts that democratic values and practice ought to be sustained by cultivating the citizen-soldier ideal.[24] During periods when the democratic state maintains a large standing force, requiring the mass mobilization of citizens, this normative pre-

scription is possible to fulfill. But Janowitz never explains how the ideal can be sustained in the absence of mass mobilization. The point is critical because his empirical work led him (correctly) to believe that mass mobilizations were unlikely after World War II and into the foreseeable future. Instead, a smaller—but still large—and continuously mobilized professional force was required for military security. He hoped that the citizen-soldier ideal would be preserved by embedding military service within a system of voluntary national service and by programs of political education that linked the professional training of soldiers to national and transnational purposes. But this hope was not realistic. There was and is limited political support for national service programs and providing for the political education of soldiers alone cannot preserve the citizen-soldier ideal throughout society.

Third, both Huntington and Janowitz argue as if democratic civil-military relations are confined to relations among soldiers and civilians within a sovereign nation state. That assumption was reasonable in the mid-twentieth century and before. Yet since then it has become increasingly less tenable. Sovereignty, which was never absolute, often must be limited (if only at the margins) as mature democracies participate in transnational military and political alliances, a matter to which we shall return. Such participation poses unique problems that Huntington and Janowitz never consider. As a result the applicability of their theories as a prescriptive guide for conducting democratic civil-military relations under present circumstances is curtailed.

Finally, Huntington and Janowitz each treat only part of the problem that a democratic theory of civil-military relations confronts. Huntington's theory focuses on the matter of protecting democracy, but neglects the problem of sustaining democratic values and practice. Janowitz's theory focuses on the matter of sustaining democratic values, but neglects the problem of protecting the democratic state. Forced to choose between the two, on this ground alone, Janowitz's theory may be the preferable one. Unlike Huntington, Janowitz recognized that the boundaries between the military and political spheres were blurred and as a consequence there would be new forms of tension between military and political elites. Though he never adequately addressed the matter, he knew that one task of a normative theory of civil-military relations was to indicate how these tensions ought to be managed to sustain democratic values.[25] In contrast, Huntington's theory focused more diffusely on the protection or military security of the state whether it was democratic or not—raising an old question about whether our aim is to live (protecting any state at any costs) or to live well (protecting in

particular the values of a democratic state). He answered, as Hobbes would, by choosing to preserve life in the first place, and later to worry about how well one lived. It is a defensible response, but it contributes little to the normative theory we are interested in.

Based on these criticisms of the classic theories we can identify four key questions that normative theories of democratic civil-military relations have to answer: (1) Should the blurring of the military and political spheres alter the way we think about how civil-military relations protect or threaten democratic values? (2) Has the "twilight" of the citizen-soldier ideal rendered unimportant the military's role in sustaining democratic values? (3) How has the evolution of civil-military relations above the level of sovereign nation states affected the task of building a democratic theory of civil-military relations? (4) Can we imagine a unified theory that provides a prescription for civil-military relations, putting equal emphasis on protecting and sustaining democratic values, or must we choose between these two goods?

Current Trends in Theory Building

Although Huntington and Janowitz established a foundation for reflection about civil-military relations in mature democracies, weaknesses in their theories and the new international context created by the end of the Cold War have opened the way for new theoretical treatments. At the risk of making it seem as if no work of importance was published in between, I want now to jump from Huntington and Janowitz to examine some of these new theories to indicate both their continuity and discontinuity with the past.[26] The major continuity is found in the ongoing normative concern that the military should protect and sustain democratic values. This has meant continuing explorations of the nature of civilian control and the relevance of the citizen-soldier ideal, but explorations that have pushed in new directions. The major discontinuity is an extension of the problems of civil-military relations into the international sphere.

Blurring Political and Military Spheres

Those concerned about the military's role in protecting democratic values have carried on Huntington's examination of the nature of civilian control. The issue is how to maintain a strong and effective military that poses no threat to the civilian political elite. But recent theorists have turned away from Huntington's idea that there is inevita-

bly a dichotomous and conflictual confrontation between the military with its "functional imperatives" and civilian political elites with their "societal imperatives." Instead, they begin—as, for theoretical reasons, Huntington would not—by assuming that the military and political spheres are interpenetrating.[27] The differentiation between military and civilian elites is variable, as is the likelihood of conflict or cooperation between the two.[28] Taking for granted that the normative goal is to protect democratic society, their efforts aim primarily at explaining how this blurring of spheres affected the military's accountability to society.

Not surprisingly, social scientists working in this tradition measure accountability in terms of the military's subordination to civilian commands, that is, in terms of the problem of maintaining civilian control. So Michael Desch writes: "The best indicator of the strength of civilian control is who prevails when civilian and military preferences diverge"; meaning of course that civilian control is strong when civilians prevail.[29] But he does not suppose that civilian control is *either* strong *or* weak. He has developed a nuanced structural-cultural model that links variation in the intensity of international and domestic threats to identify conditions under which the strength of civilian control is likely to vary. He thinks that when international and domestic threats are both low, as they are now for western democracies, the situation is "structurally indeterminate" and favors a weakening of civilian control.

Working at a lower level of analysis, Peter Feaver applies a principal-agent model to explain when the military (the agent) is likely to comply or not comply with the commands of the civilian government (the principal).[30] Based on a few parameters that describe how military and civilian leaders bargain about military policy and conduct, he is able to specify conditions under which civil-military relations will be more or less conflicted. Ideally, civilian leaders will feel no need to monitor military compliance and the military will work to implement (not shirk) civilian policies. But Feaver's model tells us when other outcomes are likely. Since the end of the Cold War, he believes, civilian leaders in the United States have had strong incentives to monitor intrusively while military leaders have had strong incentives to shirk. This occurs when civilians believe the costs of monitoring are low, the gap between civilian and military policy preferences is wide, and the military believes their chances for being punished for shirking are low. When this happens, the prediction is that civil-military relations are bound to be in conflict.

Other theorists thinking about the role of military elites in protecting democratic values show how traditional problems of civilian control are

being transformed and expanded. It is no longer adequate to think simply in terms of the military's subordination to civilian authority.

Peter Roman and David Tarr, for instance, examine relations among military and civilian leaders in the United States who are directly involved in the process of formulating national security policies.[31] Military leaders are involved in these discussions because they possess expertise that others lack. But we should not suppose that the relevant expertise at this level is certain technical or scientific knowledge about the consequences of the use of force in foreign affairs. These officers are not military engineers. They are what Roman and Tarr call "national security professionals"—a distinctive form of military professionalism that has evolved since the early 1960s at the behest of civilian leaders. They are valued for their practical wisdom about military affairs, their sensitivity to the political context of foreign-policy decision-making, and their knowledge of how national security institutions work. In this context, Roman and Tarr find that distinctions between military and civilian matter less than might be expected. What matters most, though not exclusively, is what one has to contribute to solving the problem in hand. In brief, in this setting civil-military relations tend to be more collegial than hierarchical. All tensions between civilian and military elites are not avoided. But textbook distinctions about the subordination of military to civilian elites do not apply here. New theory is required to explain what constitutes effective civilian control in a collegial setting and also to consider how an institutional fusion between political and military elites affects the willingness of lower ranking officers to trust that their leaders are defending the military's institutional interests.[32]

Deborah Avant also stretches traditional notions of civilian control with her study of recent trends to privatize missions that had previously been performed within the military.[33] She focuses analysis on the privatizing of military training, noting that the United States military relies on private civilian contractors to provide training in military science for its incoming officers, to support professional military education programs within the military, and to help develop doctrine. The question she raises about these relationships is just the reverse of the question Desch and Feaver raise. Rather than ask whether the military is subordinate to civilian command, she wonders whether the military may be "giving away its capacity to control the profession by having private contractors provide these tasks?" The question may not be answerable at this point, but its importance for developing a theory of democratic civil-military relations is clear: with privatization arrangements, protecting democratic values requires more than securing an

effective military's subordination to civilian commands. In certain circumstances at least, it requires institutional arrangements to ensure subordination of civilian contractors to national military requirements. It takes no imagination to see how much more complex the issue of civilian control becomes when, following Avant, we include new problems of control that might arise from the use of private contractors as military advisors abroad.

The Relevance of the Citizen-Soldier Ideal

Those concerned about the military's role to sustain democratic values have carried on Janowitz's examination of the relevance of the citizen-soldier ideal. But they are less inclined than Janowitz to ask how the identity between the citizen and soldier can be maintained, to encourage citizens actively to participate in public life and to take responsibility for the defense and well-being of their society. Their issue rather is to understand how the historical ties that once bound closely together the roles of citizen and soldier have loosened in our time and what the consequences of that loosening are for civil-military relations.[34] The historical problem has characteristically been treated in terms of the rise of the mass armed force, beginning with the American and French Revolutions at the end of the eighteenth century and the subsequent gradual, but steady decline of that force since the end of World War II. This shift in military organization can be understood in terms of changes in military technology and the logic of war. But doing so fails to consider the relationship between the citizen-soldier and the democratic state.

My own work explores that relationship.[35] I assume that the success of modern democratic revolutions depended on the transformation of subjects into citizens, a transformation effected by mobilizing citizens to fight as soldiers in defense of their new republic. As representatives of a charismatic revolutionary movement, citizen-soldiers were themselves bearers of charisma. This gave them a social and political importance that extended beyond their technical competence as soldiers (which was doubtful) to include a formative role in shaping the democratic state in the aftermath of victory in war. Their civilian status as settled members of the community confirmed their charismatic accomplishment as soldiers: they were living in a democratic order whose being depended on their sacrifice, and they claimed a right to determine its form. This claim was redeemed in the United States after its revolutionary and civil wars and more generally after the world wars in western

democracies, which led to an expansion of the franchise and the creation of welfare programs to reduce social inequality. But since then there has been a gradual erosion of the idea that citizens have an unlimited obligation to bear arms in the defense of their countries. The unlimited obligation still exists as an abstract ideal, but is limited in practice. In the United States, by the late 1970s, the idea that the state could by itself define the scope and content of the military obligation was sharply contested. In general, citizens are now free to decide for themselves whether this is an obligation that they should perform. The roles of citizen and soldier are no longer intertwined—a gap has opened between them. We might say that the charisma of the citizen soldier was routinized and diminished as the choice to perform military service became much like a choice to fill any job.[36]

A recently completed research project, led by Peter Feaver and Richard H. Kohn, examines the nature and consequences of the "gap" separating the civilian and military realms in American society.[37] The findings of this study are too many to summarize here.[38] Yet one is especially relevant and illustrates the problems posed.[39] It questions the often cited poll result that says the public has a great deal of confidence in the military, and certainly much more confidence in the military than in most other social institutions. When the poll data are examined more closely, we learn that confidence in the military varies inversely with one's contact with it; confidence dips well below fifty percent for civilian elites with no military service. Turning the question around, this study shows that military elites evaluate civilian society far more negatively than civilian elites. In general, the more contact one has with the military, the more likely one is to believe that civilian society is in a state of moral crisis that the military might help to reform. The reasons for this evidence of mutual distrust between civilians and the military remain to be established. But it suggests that as the ties between citizens and soldiers are loosened a gap in outlook is created that may have troubling effects on civil-military relations. At the very least it is likely to make military recruitment and retention more difficult. More broadly, it poses questions about how effectively the military will reflect and support the values of contemporary democratic society.

Yet, notice, those questions can also be turned around. How well will civilian political elites protect democratic values by military means if they have never served in the military? In their contribution to the Feaver-Kohn project, William T. Bianco and Jamie Markham show that, as we move into the twenty-first century, veterans most probably will be underrepresented in the United States Congress (where, since 1901 at

least, veterans have been overrepresented).[40] There are reasons to be concerned about such a development. Benjamin O. Fordham, another contributor to the project, documents that support for military spending and attitudes about the value of military service are lower for nonveterans than for veterans. At the moment, Fordham concludes, "there is little evidence that a civil-military gap of this sort has had an impact on peacetime military policy . . . [as] the path between the influences on elite opinion and actual policy outcomes is a complicated one."[41] Nevertheless, these findings suggest that, with the waning of the citizen-soldier ideal, democratic civil-military relations become more difficult to sustain. Without a strong external threat to force civilians and the military to resolve their differences—like the terrorist attack of 11 September 2001—it is difficult to see how such troubles will be resolved.[42] Even then, we may wonder whether resolution under those circumstances guarantees that democratic values will be protected and sustained.

Transnational Civil-Military Relations

The theories of civil-military relations we have reviewed so far assumed that the relations to be explained were contained within particular sovereign states. In recent years, however, the domain of civil-military relations has expanded dramatically to encompass transnational matters. This new domain is still a relative frontier so far as theory is concerned, posing issues that—to my knowledge—have not been thoroughly considered. Yet evidence that the frontier exists is ample. The European Union and NATO are two important contemporary examples of the fact. Both create new layers of civilian-military relations as they anticipate military cooperation and coordinated civilian control of military activities across national borders. Assuming that these activities are not a prelude to forming a larger unified state, they pose novel problems about how militaries work to protect and sustain democratic values in a transnational context.

Some important policy problems deal with the minimum criteria that member states must meet to be included in the community. This is a central issue affecting the expansion of NATO and has spurred many new studies about the nature of democratic civil-military relations in the postcommunist states of eastern and central Europe.[43] Current policies governing NATO expansion presuppose that current member states have well-established democratic civil-military relations and can prescribe for states seeking membership in NATO just what they must do

to establish such relations for themselves.[44] Other policy problems reflect pressures within the European Union to impose homogeneous domestic arrangements affecting civil-military relations among all member states. These have led to decisions requiring, for instance, the integration of homosexuals in the British military and of women in the *Bundeswehr*. The effect is to create and enforce international standards of civil-military relations.

Most critical, decisions about the use of force—in the recent Balkan conflicts and in the war against terrorism—have not been matters that could be planned or decided within the councils of one country's government alone. Transnational military and political consultation and coordination have been required whether we are talking about peacekeeping missions overseen by the United Nations or NATO's war against Serbia in Kosovo.[45] We should not suppose that this occurs without difficulty, as if cooperating states, in coalition with one another, have no important differences in outlook or approach toward international crises. The multinational coordination of policies to wage "war on terrorism" since September 2001 has been impressive, encompassing military activity, peacekeeping and humanitarian missions, and substantial police work to trace al Qeada networks around the world. Yet there are disagreements among the countries united in this fight, about the handling and punishment of prisoners, and, perhaps more important, about the possible expansion of the war to sites outside Afghanistan. There are even indications that the United States is willing "to act alone" if necessary in the war against terrorism.[46] But, given the global scope of the enemy being chased, it is hard to imagine how it could succeed in doing so or to know how costly such success would be, even if it were achieved.

Further complicating matters is the expansion of civil-military relations to include relations with nongovernmental organizations and private security companies. Humanitarian interventions since the end of the Cold War, like the war on terrorism, do not occur or succeed as a result of military activities alone. They require cooperation with civilian organizations, which are often relatively autonomous (sovereignty-free) international organizations.[47] Less well understood are the relations between private security companies and national military forces. Robert Mandel has recently reviewed the nature and extent of private security arrangements.[48] He identified three main trends: the proliferation in private hands of conventional arms, the growth of for-profit security providers and private militias (with varied intentions), and the use of mercenaries in local wars. Some of these developments can be subsumed within a traditional framework of democratic civil-military

relations. Yet, in general, they raise theoretical questions about how private military organizations and their use of force are harnessed to the goals of a democratic polity. This represents another expansion of the domain of civil-military relations, not simply moving up one level of analysis, from the national to transnational, but moving out to encompass relations with civilian organizations that have no particular loyalty to the state or states involved.

These varied transnational activities pose two old problems for a democratic theory of civil-military relations: who regulates national militaries, and who decides when and how to use force? But it poses them in a novel way. At least in some cases, even among mature democracies, military regulation is not a matter solely in the hands of national governments. Nor are decisions to use force matters reserved for sovereign states, restrained only by the customs and requirements of international law. The problem is how to regulate military organization and the use of force to protect and sustain democratic values not only within sovereign states, but also within a variety of transnational security communities and ad hoc coalitions.[49] The assumption implicit in theory to date, that only actions within a sovereign state had to be considered, is no longer valid.

Conclusions

These problems lead us to wonder whether it is possible to imagine a new theory of civil-military relations that pays equal attention to the need for protecting and sustaining democratic values within and beyond the nation state. If a unified theory is possible, it cannot rest on either the liberal or the civic republican models of democracy. As we have seen, the classic theories of civil-military relations based on one or the other of these models necessarily contend with one another. They pay attention to one normative goal or the other, to protect or sustain democratic values, but not both. They are useful, but incomplete, theories. In any case, their usefulness is limited for present purposes because they assume that the problems of civil-military relations are confined to those of the sovereign nation state. The domain of democratic civil-military relations theory is vaster today and demands a more varied and comprehensive treatment than it has yet received.

Looked at in terms of protecting democratic values, we have not only to think about ensuring appropriate civilian control over the military, but also to think about how to ensure appropriate collegial relations between the military and civilian elites *and* appropriate mili-

tary control over civilian contractors. Looked at in terms of sustaining democratic values we have to consider whether the citizen-soldier role, essential for *creating* mature democratic states in Western Europe and North America, is also essential for *enacting* democratic values in the present. If it is, then Janowitz's unsolved problem about how to redefine and revive the citizen-soldier ideal remains a pressing theoretical problem. If it is not, then the pressing theoretical problem is to measure the gap between the civilian and military realms and determine what its consequences are for military effectiveness and for the ability of a democratic society to maintain its political culture. None of this work can be done as if theories of civil-military relations applied solely to relations within a particular sovereign state. Especially when we are thinking about civil-military relations within mature democracies, we must increasingly consider these relations as a transnational phenomenon. A theory is wanted that reconsiders problems of civilian control and civic participation to see how they are changed by the claims of international regulatory regimes and the need to coordinate operations with transnational military and civilian organizations.

On what model of democracy might such a theory rest? A reasonable speculation suggests the possibility of a federal model. A federal model of democracy assumes the division of sovereignty across at least two levels of analysis, cares about protecting the rights of its citizens, and anticipates a complex scheme of representation to ensure that policy decisions are transparent and ultimately subject to approval by the people they affect. Some efforts are already underway to consider how a federal conception of democracy can clarify the problems mature democracies face to include problems of civil-military relations. David Held, for instance, has elaborated a scheme for democratic "cosmopolitan governance."[50] He argues for new forms of military arrangements that are "locked into an international democratic framework" and create the way for a new settlement "between coercive power and accountability."[51] His normative assumption is that legitimate power and authority, traditionally associated exclusively with the nation state, now must be shared within a cluster of international institutions that protect individual rights and are accountable to the people. Unfortunately, the theoretical logic that specifies what (politically possible) institutional arrangements ought to exist to achieve this end remains to be developed. As Held readily admits, his is an exercise—ambitious and intelligent—in "embedded utopianism."[52]

Rather than pierce the veil of the future, we might wisely take a step back, to reflect on the experience and normative insights found in the

Federalist Papers.[53] Like the liberals, the federalists believed it was important to have a military strong enough to protect the democratic state. Yet, unlike Huntington, they thought the only way to ensure military strength was to vest power to determine its size and regulate its conduct with the people in the legislative branch of the central government. Like the civic republicans, the federalists were also concerned about how to sustain democratic values. But, unlike civic republicans, they did not believe that the solution lay with socializing citizens through military or any other kind of public service. They thought instead that sustaining democratic values required a complex division of powers, among the states and in the union, and among the various branches of government. They knew that this would promote conflict. But they counted on the interpenetration of powers to provide the checks and balances—the transparency, we would say—to prevent undue concentration and abuse of power.

To be sure the *Federalist Papers* cannot tell us what a contemporary normative theory of civil-military relations should be. But they pay equal attention to the need to protect and sustain democratic values and they squarely face the problem of coordinating regular, militia, and private military forces across different levels of government. In short, they supply a model of democratic theory that should be useful when constructing such a theory. We may learn from their reflections how to deal with our own revolution in civil-military affairs.

Notes

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1. Among the most ambitious attempts to provide such a theory are Samuel Finer, *The Man on Horseback*, 2nd enlarged ed. (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1976) and Amos Perlmutter, *The Military and Politics in Modern Times* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977).

2. Indeed, in the American case, Deborah Avant observes, "critics complain...that the military is too self-limiting, both in the use of force and in its engagement in activities other than war. The claim that an institution is out of control because it is self-limiting is somewhat different from the claim that an institution aggrandizes itself."

See Deborah Avant, "Conflicting Indicators of 'Crisis' in American Civil-Military Relations," *Armed Forces & Society* 24 (Spring): 375-388, quoted at 381.

3. Peter Feaver, "Civil-Military Relations," *Annual Review of Political Science* 2 (1999): 211-241, quoted at 216.

4. Yehuda Ben Meir warns, "one should not make the mistake of equating democracy or individual liberty with civilian control. True, there can be no democratic government without civilian control of the military, but many totalitarian systems of government are also characterized by a high degree of civilian control—in some instances even much more so than in the Western democracies." See Yehuda Ben Meir, *Civil-Military Relations in Israel* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), quoted at 12. See also the insightful discussion of this matter in Bernard Boëne, "Western-Type Civil-Military Relations Revisited," *Military, State, and Society in Israel*, ed. Daniel Maman, Eyal Ben-Ari, and Zeev Rosenhek (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2001), 43-80, and Daniel N. Nelson, "Civil Armies, Civil Societies and NATO's Enlargement," *Armed Forces & Society* 25 (Fall 1998): 137-160, esp. at 142.

5. See Feaver, "Civil-Military Relations," 214-216.

6. Any list of *the* values that define democratic societies is bound to be arbitrary. I hazard a list as a way of illustrating what I think is at stake in a normative theory of democratic civil-military relations, and hope the list is not controversial. For a similar, though not identical enumeration, see Robert A. Dahl, *On Democracy* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000), esp. at 60-61 and 84-86. For sociologists, the discussion of civil, political, and social rights associated with democratic life begins with T. H. Marshall, "Citizenship and Social Class," *Class, Citizenship, and Social Development* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), 71-134. For a contemporary assessment of Marshall's work, see *Citizenship Today*, ed. Martin Bulmer and Anthony Rees (London: UCL Press, 1996).

7. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957); Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier* (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1960).

8. Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ed. Richard Tuck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

9. Laurence Berns, "Thomas Hobbes," in *History of Political Philosophy*, 3rd ed., ed. Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 396-420, quoted at 411. One critic of liberal theory notes that the premises of liberal democracy are liberal but not "intrinsically democratic"; its democratic values are "prudential" or "conditional"; they are "means to exclusively individualistic and private ends." Benjamin Barber, *Strong Democracy* (Los Angeles and Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 4.

10. John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty*, ed. John Gray and G. W. Smith (London: Routledge, 1991).

11. The problem, of course, is that liberal political philosophy is not a homogeneous tradition of thought, but has many strands, some of which—like the strands running from Hobbes and Edmund Burke—are called "conservative" in political arguments within liberal democracies. Huntington himself prefers what he calls "conservative realism" to what he calls "liberalism." That preference is no warrant for placing

Huntington or his theory outside of (as if opposed to) the tradition of liberal democracy. For a brief history of the range of liberal thought in relation to military affairs, see Michael Howard, *War and the Liberal Conscience* (Newark, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1987).

12. Aristotle noted that when citizens agree about their common interests and policies for achieving them, concord prevails in the state; but when citizens are base, "common interests go to ruin, The result is discord, everybody trying to make others do their duty but refusing to do it themselves." Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. H. Rackham (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1926), IX vi.

13. James Burk, "The Citizen Soldier and Democratic Societies," *Citizenship Studies* 4 (July 2000): 149-165.

14. Sebastian de Grazia, *Machiavelli in Hell* (New York: Vantage, 1994).

15. Everett Carl Dolman, "Obligation and the Citizen-Soldier," *Journal of Political and Military Obligation* 23 (Winter 1995): 191-212; R. Claire Snyder, *Citizen-Soldiers and Manly Warriors* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999).

16. Morris Janowitz, *The Reconstruction of Patriotism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983).

17. Morris Janowitz, "Civic Consciousness and Military Performance," in *The Political Education of Soldiers*, ed. Morris Janowitz and Stephen D. Wesbrook (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1983), 55-80, esp. 74-76.

18. See, for example, Edward M. Coffman, "The Long Shadow of *The Soldier and the State*," *Journal of Military History* 55 (January1991): 69-82; James Burk, "Morris Janowitz and the Origins of Sociological Research on Armed Forces and Society," *Armed Forces & Society* 19 (Winter 1993): 167–185; and Karl W. Haltiner, "The Definite End of the Mass Army in Western Europe?" *Armed Forces & Society* 25 (Fall 1998): 7-36.

19. My purpose here is to consider only those criticisms that are directly relevant to the task in hand. These by no means exhaust the number of criticisms that have been made of the two theories. For more comprehensive, critical discussions of Huntington and Janowitz, see, for example, Finer, *Man on Horseback*, 20-26; Arthur D. Larson, "Military Professionalism and Civil Control: A Comparative Analysis of Two Interpretations," *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 2 (1974): 57-72; Peter Feaver, "The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control," *Armed Forces & Society* 23 (Winter 1997): 149-178; Hew Strachan, *The Politics of the British Army* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), chap. 1; Boëne, "Western-Type Civil Military Relations Revisited," esp. at 63-72; and James Burk, "Expertise, Jurisdiction, and Legitimacy of the Military Profession," in *The Future of the Army Profession*, ed. Don Snider and Gayle Watkins (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2002), 19-38.

20. Note that the issue here has to do with theory, not with empirical questions about the interpenetration of spheres. In *The Soldier and the State,* Huntington recognized that "military policy and political policy were much more closely interrelated in the postwar world than they had been previously" (p. 351). But he thought it was possible and desirable nevertheless to maintain a functional separation of the two

spheres. His theory assumes that theory (military and political policy) can and ought to be distinct and separate from practice (the activities of military and political personnel). My criticism rests on an opposing assumption that theory and practice are necessarily intertwined, so that when military and political policy are more closely related, military practice necessarily becomes more political.

21. Feaver, "The Civil-Military Problematique," 163.

22. Aaron L. Friedberg, "Why Didn't the United States Become a Garrison State?" *International Security* 16 (Spring 1992): 109-142, and Ernest Gellner, *Conditions of Liberty* (New York: Penguin 1994).

23. Huntington, *Soldier and the State*, 466.

24. See, especially, Morris Janowitz, *The Reconstruction of Patriotism.*

25. Janowitz studied this problem not only as it affected mature democracies, but also as it affected emerging democracies in the developing world. See Morris Janowitz, *Military Institutions and Coercion in the Developing Nations* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977).

26. For an overview of the intellectual history of civil-military relations theory from the 1960s to the present see Peter Feaver, "Civil Military Relations"; Bernard Boëne, "How 'unique' should the military be? A review of representative literature and outline of a synthetic formulation," *Archive européenne de sociologie* 31 (1990): 3-59; David R. Segal and Mady Wechsler Segal, "Change in Military Organization," *Annual Review of Sociology* 9 (1983): 151-170; and Charles C. Moskos, "The Military," *Annual Review of Sociology* 2 (1976): 55-77. For a comparative description of civil-military relations in mature democracies from 1945 to the present, see Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams, and David R. Segal, eds., *The Postmodern Military* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).

27. Huntington certainly knew that these two spheres were sometimes blurred in fact, a condition he referred to as "political-military fusion." But, in contrast to theorists who defended the merits of a fusionist approach, Huntington believed it cut loose from "the safe grounds of objective civilian control." His normative prescription was to maintain the functional separation of the military and civilian spheres. See Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, 350-354, 459-460, quoted at 354.

28. See Ben Meir, *Civil-Military Relations in Israel*, and David E. Albright, "Comparative Conceptualization of Civil-Military Relations," *World Politics* 32 (July 1980): 553-576.

29. Michael C. Desch, "Soldiers, States, and Structures: The End of the Cold War and the Weakening of U.S. Civilian Control," *Armed Forces & Society* 24 (Spring 1998): 391.

30. Feaver, "Crisis as Shirking." Deborah Avant has also made important contributions to the development of a principal-agent model of democratic civil-military relations. See Deborah Avant, *Political Institutions and Military Change: Lessons from Peripheral Wars* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994).

31. Peter J. Roman and David W. Tarr, "Military Professionalism and Policy Making," in *Soldiers and Civilians*, ed. Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001).

32. Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn, "Conclusion," in *Soldiers and Civilians*, ed. Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001).

33. Deborah Avant, "Privatizing Military Training: A Challenge to US Army Professionalism?" in Snider and Watkins, eds., *The Future of the Army Profession*, 179-196.

34. It bears repeating that my reference is to those concerned about civil-military relations in mature democracies. Those interested in civil-military relations in emerging or new democratic societies have other concerns. For issues affecting new democracies in Eastern Europe, see, for example, Daniel N. Nelson, "Civil Armies, Civil Societies, and NATO's Enlargement," *Armed Forces & Society* 25 (Fall 1998): 137-160; and for issues affecting emerging democracies, see, for example, Alfred Stepan, "Paths Towards Redemocratization," in *Transitions from Authoritarian Regimes,* ed. Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 64-84.

35. James Burk, "The Citizen Soldier and Democratic Societies: A Comparative Analysis of America's Revolutionary and Civil Wars," *Citizenship Studies* 4 (July 2000): 149-165, "The Military Obligation of Citizens Since Vietnam," *Parameters* 31 (Summer 2001): 48-60, and "From Wars of Independence to Democratic Peace: Comparing the Cases of Israel and the United States," *Military, State and Society in Israel*, ed. Daniel Maman, Eyal Ben-Ari, and Zeev Rosenhek (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2001), 81-104.

36. This last issue is thoroughly explored in Charles C. Moskos and Frank Wood, eds., *The Military: More Than Just a Job?* (Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1988).

37. Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn, eds., *Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001).

38. For a summary of the findings, see Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn, "The Gap: Soldiers, Civilians and their Mutual Misunderstanding," *The National Interest* (Fall 2000): 29-37.

39. Paul Gronke and Peter D. Feaver, "Uncertain Confidence: Civilian and Military Attitudes about Civil-Military Relations," in Feaver and Kohn, *Soldiers and Civilians*, 129-161.

40. William T. Bianco and Jamie Markham, "Vanishing Veterans: The Decline of Military Experience in the U.S. Congress," in Feaver and Kohn, *Soldiers and Citizens*, 275-287.

41. Benjamin O. Fordham, "Military Interests and Civilian Politics," in Feaver and Kohn, *Soldiers and Civilians*, 327-360, quoted at 343.

42. In the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attack, there has been a revival of public support for citizens who volunteer for public service of all kinds, as evidenced in President Bush's State of the Union Address, in which he called on citizens to devote two years of their lives to voluntary public service and asked for the creation of a USA Freedom Corps to coordinate and promote citizen service (President's State of the Union Address, 29 January 2002, at *http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/print/20020129-11.html*). The rhetoric would transform the citizen-soldier ideal into an ideal of the citizen server, a transformation that Charles Moskos, in his

A Call to Civic Service (New York: Free Press, 1988), and Morris Janowitz, in his *Reconstruction of Patriotism*, have long supported. It is too soon to say whether the rhetoric will translate into a large-scale and enduring mobilization of citizens for volunteer service, and much too soon to say what role, if any, the ideal of the citizen-server will play in American political culture or in the political cultures of other mature democracies. If this movement takes root, it would indicate a successful adaptation of the civic republican tradition to contemporary conditions.

43. Timothy Edmunds, Andrew Cottey, and Anthony Forster, "Rethinking Civil-military Relations and Democracy: Lessons from Central and Eastern Europe." Unpublished paper presented at the biennial meetings of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, Baltimore, Maryland, 19-21 October 2001, and Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmunds, and Anthony Forster, eds., *Democratic Control of the Military in Post Communist Europe* (Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Publishers, 2001).

44. The theoretical question—how is it that democratic states can recognize the adequacy of democratic arrangements in other states when building a security community—is dealt with by Michael C. Williams, "The Discipline of the Democratic Peace," *European Journal of International Relations* 7 (2001): 525-553.

45. On the complexities of international decision-making when waging the Kosovo War, see Wesley K. Clark, *Waging Modern War* (New York: Public Affairs, 2001).

46. "Europe's Military Mirage," Stratfor.com (7 February 2002): *http://www.stratfor.com/fib/fib_print.php?ID=203090.*

47. See Thomas G. Weiss, *Military-Civilian Interactions: Intervening in Humanitarian Crises* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), and David M. Last, *Theory, Doctrine and Practice of Conflict De-Escalation in Peacekeeping Operations* (Clementsport, NS: Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 1997).

48. Robert Mandel, "The Privatization of Security," *Armed Forces & Society* 28 (Fall 2001): 129-151.

49. The problem is not confined to civil-military relations. See Joseph S. Nye, "Globalization's Democratic Deficit," *Foreign Affairs* 80 (July/August 2001): 2-6.

50. David Held, *Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995).

51. Ibid., 277.

52. Ibid., 286.

53. *The Federalist*, ed. Jacob E. Cooke (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1961), especially numbers 8, 23-26, 47-48, 51, 69, and 74.