# CHAPTER 11

# NATIONAL POWER

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Power is an essential concept in international theory, but also an essentially contested and chronically ambiguous one.[1] The word itself, derived from the Old French *pouvoir* (to be able) connotes capacity. As a concept power can be usefully defined as the capacity to impose a desired outcome in the face of resistance. In the words of Robert Dahl: "A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do."[2] This makes power both a dispositional concept and a function of coercive behavior—the purposeful exercise of capacity in order to arrive at a determined end in a context of conflict or goal incompatibility. Power can also be defined more broadly, as the ability to shape the operational environment in such a way as to encourage certain kinds of behavior and discourage or place beyond the pale various alternatives. The scope of what is considered legitimate behavior is thereby reduced—what does not happen is as important as what does. In this framework, power implies securing compliance by leveraging influence and authority.[3] Desired outcomes can be imposed coercively (power to), but also assured by the consensually grounded institutionalization of authority and a corresponding code of values (power over).[4]

Much of the formal literature addressing the concept of power focuses on social systems and domestic political order, in which the institutionalization of authority is placed front and center. Writing in this context, Hannah Arendt anchors the concept of power to popular will: "All political institutions are manifestations and materializations of power; they petrify and decay as soon as the living power of the people ceases to uphold them."[5] Thomas Hobbes's famous evocation of mankind's "perpetual and restless desire for power after power, that ceaseth only in death" describes a proclivity to dominate others grounded in human nature that must be constrained by the power of the state, presumably sanctioned by some kind of hypothetical social contract.[6] On the level of domestic governance, coercive capacity and legitimate authority combine to allow the effective application of political power as an alternative to the unregulated struggle of all against all.

On the international level, different priorities prevail. The classic realist vision of international order rests on the assertion that the modern state system (the so-called Westphalian state system) is defined first of all by the *absence* of any effective supranational authority. It is an anarchic, self-help system in which sovereign states must act without recourse to institutions of world governance to confront "the conflicts of interests that inevitably arise among similar units in a condition of anarchy."[7] Morgenthau accepts Hobbes's tragic vision of the human conditions. He quotes Thucydides's Athenians address to the Melians to the effect that: "Of the gods we know, and of men we believe, that it is a necessary law of their nature that they rule wherever they can."[8] The domestic analogy does not apply—international law and associated norms of state behavior will be ignored when vital interests are at stake, or at best evoked hypocritically as rhetorical justification for the pursuit of selfish goals. No international civil society of sovereign states is possible. In the words of Hobbes's great contemporary Baruch de Spinoza, in interstate competition the strong are bound to "devour" the weak.[9] Power, unmitigated by systemic constraint, becomes the currency of relations between states and the driving force of statecraft, famously capsulated by Morgenthau as "interest defined as power."[10] The strategic image of statecraft that came to dominate both the theory and practice of international relations in the post-World War II era makes the pursuit of

power its most basic premise. Speaking on behalf of the realist camp, Donald Kagan defines power austerely as "the capacity to bring about desired ends," and asserts that "in the world in which we all live, it is essential, and the struggle for it is inevitable."[11]

## STRUCTURAL MODELS OF POWER

Power is the measure of a relationship. It has no objective stature in and of itself and can be manifested in many ways. It is not a fungible commodity. The combination of power resources required to accomplish Task A, can be completely different from the combination required to address Task B. Physical strength, for example, will be a useful facilitator for positive outcomes in some contingencies (a wrestling match) but altogether irrelevant in others (a chess contest). Morgenthau defines power as "man's control over the minds and actions of other men" and "a psychological relation between those who exercise it and those over whom it is exercised,"[12] thus adding a subjective dimension to the calculus of power grounded in personal and cultural considerations. National power is also a dynamic concept, whose components have changed considerably through the modern centuries and which continues to evolve.

Modern policy analysis has been predisposed to emphasize the primacy of national security as a motive for state behavior and the essential role of military power as the guarantor of national survival and state interests. There is no doubt that in the modern centuries military power has been the most important arbiter in relations between states. But superior military capacity has never been a sufficient condition for achieving successful outcomes in international competition. Military strength is only one dimension of what are sometimes referred to as *hard power* assets: the capacity to coerce, including both the threat of and resort to armed force; economic pressure including fiscal and commercial sanctions; subversive techniques; and, various other forms of intimidation. Moreover, the capacity of states to develop and sustain military capacity rests on a more complex combination of power attributes, including economic, organizational and motivational assets.

Military power has always been employed as one of several tools of statecraft. Edward Gullick notes that in the age of the classic European balance of power, the calculus of power rested on the diverse mechanisms of alliance, coalition, and compensation, with resort to arms or warfare as a popular but also last resort.[13] Immanuel Wallerstein describes the constituents of power in the early modern European state system complexly as: (1) *mercantilism,* implying the use of state capacity to promote economic strength; (2) *military power;* (3) *public finance;* (4) *effective bureaucracy;* and, (5) the *hegemonic bloc,* defined as the capacity of dominate social groups to impose their own vision of national priorities.[14] The 19th-century Concert of Europe used consultation between the great powers to prevent systemic conflict on the scale of the Napoleonic era, relying on a series of "rules of the game" defined by Paul Schroeder as "compensation; indemnities; alliances as instruments for accruing power and capability; *raison d'état*; honour and prestige; Europe as a family of states; and finally, the principle or goal of balance of power itself."[15] Among the classic realists, Morgenthau's emphasis on the subtleties of diplomacy and Raymond Aron's identification of prudence as the foundation for statecraft make clear that their image of the role of force in interstate relations is a nuanced one.[16]

During the Cold War, confronting what was consensually identified as the real and present danger of aggressive Soviet power, the United States and its allies made the quest for security their most important national priority. This demanded the cultivation of military power as a balance to the considerable Soviet arsenal. The Cold War was a militarized interstate rivalry, but it was also something more. Military containment was accompanied by a successful diplomacy of alliance, the purposeful use of economic power, and, critically, the moral force provided by the example

of the open society and Free World when contrasted with Soviet totalitarianism. In the end it was the non-material dimensions of power that were decisive. The vulgar realist image of military power as all important has never been reflected in sophisticated political theory or real world state practice.

Beginning with the publication of Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye's *Power and Interdependence* in 1977, there has been an ongoing effort by international relations scholars to develop a more nuanced view of the concept of power in international relations that breaks with some of the core assumptions of the realist paradigm. In the interdependent world of the late-20th century, Keohane and Nye argued, the relative importance of military power as an instrument of statecraft is in decline. Survival remains the primordial national goal, and force is still the ultimate guarantor of security. But in a more interdependent world, relationships of mutual dependence bind countries more closely together, and "in most of them force is irrelevant or unimportant as an instrument of policy."[17] In his subsequent work, Nye has championed the concept of *soft power*, including cultural and ideological assets, transformational diplomacy, information strategies, the power of example, and the like—as an alternative that leverages the power of attraction in place of the coercive strategies of traditional statecraft.[18]

Many analysts have developed variations on this theme. Alvin Toffler's *Powershift* identifies three main sources of power, defined as violence, wealth, and knowledge. The role of violence is exclusively punitive and negative, wealth can be used both to punish and reward, but only the leveraging of knowledge has the potential to be transformational under 21st-century conditions—for Toffler the knowledge sector will be the key to national power looking into the future.[19] In her *States and Markets,* Susan Strange develops a "structural model of power" with four sectors: productive, fiscal, military, and informational. Strange asks how the United States has been able to expand its global influence despite the relative contraction of its productive and fiscal sectors. She finds the answer, in part, in military dominance, but also, and perhaps more importantly, in the attraction of America's open society and "way of life," the unparalleled prestige of U.S. institutions of higher education, cutting-edge scientific and technological innovation, the status of the English language as the *lingua franca* of international communication, effective public diplomacy, and, in general, the capacity to mobilize cultural power in service of U.S. interests.[20] The United States has embraced this kind of more complex image of national power, and a series of formal policy documents have introduced contrasting models of power intended to convey the conclusion that viewed comprehensively national power has multiple and overlapping sources. These models are expressed by the increasingly ambitious acronyms DIME (Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic power); DIMEFIL (Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic, Financial, Intelligence, and Law Enforcement); and MIDLIFE (Military, Intelligence, Diplomacy, Legal, Information, Financial, and Economic power). [21]

The nuances of any one of these models and the degree of appropriateness of this or that particular term being attached to the power equation are less important than what the models share in common. That includes the conclusion that in the globalized world of the 21st-century, conventional military power has indeed lost at least some of its salience as the *ultima ratio* of statecraft. Global interdependence and the democratic peace dynamic have arguably made conventional armed conflict between great powers less likely.[22] Nuclear weapons have made all-out war between nuclear armed states virtually unthinkable. International Law places formal constraints on the institution of war that can and do impact on states' prerogative to opt for a resort to force.[23] Economic competition, on the other hand, has become more important as a driver of international competition. Analysts like Edward Luttwak have coined the notion of "geo-economics" to characterize a world

order in which competition between nations will be based more on economic rivalry than an older vision of geopolitics built on contention by force.[24] Power has become more diffused, and a more diverse palette of instruments of power is required to pursue national interests effectively.

## THE FOUNDATIONS OF NATIONAL POWER

National power is constituted on a number of distinct levels: (1) physical resources and attributes (latent power); (2) the effectiveness of national institutions in mobilizing, sustaining, and applying the instruments of power (applied power); and (3) the structural context (facilitators or constraints on the application of power derived from the international environment). The ultimate measure of effective national power should be outcomes or performance. Measuring outcomes, however, depends on the strategic setting—the ends toward which national power is being directed, or "power over whom, and with respect to what?"[25]

### Latent Power.

The physical attributes of national power include human resources (population), agricultural potential and the endowment of strategic resources, productive capacity, and geostrategic characteristics.

From the military revolution of the early-modern centuries to the present, powerful states have required a population base sufficient to raise and sustain strategically competitive mass armies. Large populations also contribute to greater productive power and a larger gross domestic product (GDP), a basic measure of economic strength. Indeed, it is virtually impossible to imagine a state rising into the ranks of the great world powers without a significant population base. The United States' ability to attract and assimilate large immigrant populations, and to sustain demographic growth, has been a meaningful source of national power. Demographic decline in the European Union (EU) and Russian Federation threaten their capacity to function as great powers in the long term. But large impoverished populations can also place constraints on development and the mobilization of strategic power. Contemporary China presents the example of a rising power that is committed to what some consider a draconian policy of limiting population growth. Size matters, but there is no direct correlation between the size of a country's population and its underlying national strength.

Agricultural potential and the endowment of strategic raw materials can also be critical facilitators of national power. All things being equal, nations with the capacity to feed themselves have a strategic advantage over competitors who are dependent on imports. Historically, its great agricultural potential has been a significant source of U.S. strength. Strategic raw materials can also provide a foundation for economic and military power. Oil-rich states such as Saudi Arabia carry weight beyond their inherent capacity specifically because of the degree to which they control access to a vital strategic resource. The dramatic revival of the Russian Federation over the past decade, driven by a tenfold increase in the price of oil and natural gas on world markets between 1998 and 2008, is a clear example of how a raw material endowment can be translated into strategic power. Conversely, dependence on foreign sources of supply for vital resources can place states at a competitive disadvantage unless compensated for by special diplomatic or commercial arrangements. Like other potential pillars of national power, however, control of vital raw materials does not translate directly into strategic leverage. A raw material endowment can also be squandered due to lack of technological expertise, corruption and disreputable political direction, or insufficient social discipline—the modern world offers many examples. The nature of strategic resources also changes over time in tandem with technological development. Salt and ship timbers were once considered to be strategic raw materials on a par with hydrocarbon reserves today. In

the near future environmental pressures may make access to fresh water resources a vital national interest as well—with considerable implications for the global balance of power.

Industrial capacity was once considered to be the bedrock of national power. It was the foundation of Britain's preeminence as a European great power and global empire all through the 19th century. The stage was set for the First World War by the power transition implicit in the relative decline of France as an industrial power and the rise of Germany as the continent's leading center of industrial production. The United States assumed the mantle of leadership in the productive sector at the same time that it was supplanting the United Kingdom as the leading world power, and its stature as the "arsenal of democracy" was a key to victory in the 20th century's most destructive industrial war.[26] In the wake of the Second World War, the idea of European unification came to life as the European Coal and Steel Community in an effort to promote functional cooperation in key productive sectors as a basis for a lasting peace. Today, however, development has become associated with the rise of post-industrial economies based on the service sector, in which informational assets have become more important than productive power. The extent to which the nature of power itself remains contested is revealed by continuing controversy over whether this trend is salutary and should be encouraged. There is no lack of voices to argue that in allowing its industrial capacity to degrade, the United States, is sacrificing a vital pillar of national power, and to call for a state-directed "industrial policy" to revive domestic production.[27]

A state's geostrategic situation can also either facilitate or retard its ability to mobilize national power. Access to the world's oceans, serviceable harbors, and control over maritime choke points and strategic lines of communication are essential to maritime capacity. Even in the space age, the United States continues to derive benefit from the extent to which it is shielded from strategic threats by the great oceans that flank it east and west, and the absence of predatory neighbors in North America. Russia's strategic situation in the heartland of the Eurasian land mass has always been a source of national strength, but the lack of naturally defensible frontiers has also left it exposed to a series of catastrophic invasions. Strategic exposure can also contribute to state power by reinforcing national will and the commitment to survive—the case of Israel is an excellent illustration. Cultural geography also matters. Ethnic, linguistic, and confessional diversity can be culturally enriching, but also create strategic vulnerabilities. The relative homogeneity of American culture, extended over a vast continental expanse, is commonly and correctly cited as an important source of unity and national strength (which some see as endangered by uncontrolled immigration and increasing cultural diversity). China's powerful and integral cultural legacy, combined with overwhelming Han dominance on the Chinese mainland, is also a facilitator of national power. On the other hand, the Soviet federation fractured along ethnic fault lines and collapsed despite its immense military potential. Europe's rich linguistic and cultural diversity places barriers in the way of efforts to create a more united Europe capable of functioning as a strategic actor in world affairs under the aegis of the EU.

**Applied Power.**

Resources are the raw material of national power. They must be translated into applied power to be relevant to the pursuit of national goals. The degree of efficiency that states bring to the task of converting latent power into applied power is determined by political, social, and organizational interactions. The stability and effectiveness of governing institutions, economic performance, aptitude for innovation, educational standards, social structure, organizational proficiency, and reputation are more difficult to quantify than the resource endowment, but arguably no less important as foundations for national policy.

Military strength is the classic foundation of national power. It can be quantified rather handily using national defense budgets and militarily related expenditures as a comparative measure. Currently the U.S. defense budget represents 46 percent of global military spending—larger than the next 168 countries combined and approximately ten times greater than the nearest competitors (China, Japan, Russia, France, and the United Kingdom, each with between 4 and 5 percent of the global total).[28] At 3.7 percent of GDP, the U.S. budget represents a lesser military burden than that borne by some other states (in Saudi Arabia, for example, defense spending represents over 10 percent of GDP), but globally the U.S. quantitative advantage is overwhelming.[29]

Unfortunately, bean counting has never been a reliable measure of real military capacity. From the campaigns of Alexander the Great to the present, history provides many examples of smaller but more highly motivated, effectively led, and technically proficient armed forces defeating larger rivals. Militaries are social institutions whose performance rests upon a number of criteria outside the control of the uniformed services—including societal levels of educational achievement and standards of physical conditioning, technological capacity, social disciple and motivation, and strategic leadership. Effectiveness will also be a function of the kinds of tasks that military organizations are called on to perform. Traditionally, the U.S. Armed Forces have been configured to engage in conventional and nuclear warfare with major peer competitors. At present and for the foreseeable future the need to counter various kinds of asymmetric threats will arguably require a very different configuration of forces and new approaches to strategic competition. High levels of military spending that exceed the capacity of the national economy can undermine national power in the long run—the fate of the Soviet Union, armed to the teeth but collapsed of its own weight without a shot fired in anger, is a salutary example.

Globalization, understood as a process of enhanced international interdependence and space/time compression driven by technological change, has changed the nature of economic power. GDP and GDP per capita remain valid measures of overall economic strength. The World Bank's categorization of low-, middle-, and high-income countries (representing 60 percent, 25 percent, and 15 percent of the world population, respectively) provides a fair global index of relative economic power.[30] The United States continues to lead the global economy in terms of overall GDP and remains the world's largest national market and most powerful national economy. But raw numbers can also obscure important variables. Is economic performance based on extractive industry, declining manufacturing sectors, or advanced, technologically driven sectors? Are growth models sustainable in the face of resource, environmental, and competitive constraints? Is growth balanced and equitable? In fact, the pressures of globalization seem to have provoked an increase in inequality even in the best performing national economies, a trend with unsettling political implications—societal and class division can undermine national purpose and reduce a state's capacity to leverage national power.[31] In the new world economy, the familiar distinction between domestic and global markets has been obscured if not obliterated. Economic volatility has increased, and the challenge of leadership has become more acute. Market power will be built on different kinds of assets than in the past—efficiency and productivity, educational attainment and the quality of human capital, the ability to adapt, technological creativity, environmental sensitivity, and social stability, among them.[32] Education is critical, and the purposeful developmental of the tertiary educational sector has become a conscious strategy for some emerging states. China now produces more than twice as many university graduates as the United States, which was for many years the world leader. The nineteen countries associated with UNESCO's World Educational Indicators Project (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Jordan, Malaysia, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Russian Federation, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Tunisia, Uruguay, and Zimbabwe) graduate more students from university than the 30 Organization for Economic Co-operation

and Development (OECD) countries combined, and devote 53 percent of GDP to support tertiary education, compared with 40 percent in the OECD.[33] Such trends could culminate in significant shifts in the global balance of power. In the future, qualitative factors may have as much or more to say about overall economic performance than many traditional quantitative indicators.

The strength of governing institutions and effectiveness of the policy process can also enhance or inhibit the application of national power. Different kinds of governments can accomplish these tasks in various ways. Authoritarian regimes usually lack popular legitimacy, but can be adept at imposing coherent national strategies and pursuing them consistently over time. But authoritarian leaders can also become isolated by in-groups of sycophantic courtiers and denied the kind of realistic appraisals that are required for intelligent strategic choices—as seems to have been the case, for example, with Iraq's Saddam Hussein. Democratic polities must construct policy by consensus building and persuasion, and vet it through a complex decisionmaking process, with a certain degree of incoherence an almost inevitable result. It is usually more difficult for democratic states to build and sustain a national consensus on strategic options and to shift course rapidly in the face of changed international circumstances. Nonetheless, a state with respected and legitimate institutions grounded in popular consensus, and capable of mobilizing its population to accept sacrifices in the face of real threats to national well being, will be inherently stronger, often in subtle ways, than an authoritarian polity imposed and sustained by force.

The policy process itself can become an independent variable. Improved strategic education and professional development for civil servants working in the national security sector, better coordination between government agencies, and more adept management can arguably lead toward more effective strategic choices. Coordinating the varied instruments of national power, including diplomatic, intelligence, informational, and legal tools, demands professional insight and an efficient decisionmaking environment within which ideas can be exchanged freely and alternative courses of action considered on their merits.

The ability to apply power effectively also depends on social cohesion and the degree to which a country is regarded as an honorable and trustworthy member of the community of nations. National values, political stability, an active and engaged citizenry and dynamic civil society, and international reputation can all be meaningful sources of national power. If states are convinced that the ideals and priorities of a potential rival are sincere and worthy of respect, they are more likely to opt for policies of accommodation that acknowledge mutual interests. This is the case along a continuum stretching from bilateral relations to systemic competition. Hegemonic powers cannot sustain their position on the basis of coercive strategies alone—they must construct a framework of authority and system of values to which subordinate states accord voluntary acquiescence—the "power over" accorded by non-material sources of national power. Dysfunctional or rogue states that fail to cultivate this kind of cohesion or flout the normative context within which interstate relations are conducted will inevitably pay a price.

In the classic statement of the philosophy that might makes right, Thucydides's Athenians tell their Melian interlocutors that "right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must."[34] Moses Finley remarks that "nothing so marks Thucydides' work as the sense of living in a world where moral sensitiveness and the inherited tradition were…a luxury, and that the very survival of states hung on the skillful use of power and power alone."[35] And yet the Athenian polity that Thucydides so admires was ultimately destroyed by a war in the course of which it gradually abandoned the values and progressive spirit that originally had made it great. The Pope may have no divisions (to paraphrase Joseph Stalin), but moral force and reputation are critical enablers of national power that states ignore at their peril. Faith and morale, remarks Niall Ferguson, are "perhaps as important a component of power as material resources."[36]

**International Context.**

National power is contextual and relational in the sense that it can only be measured in the context of a particular pattern of interstate relations and against the capacities of other national and non-state actors. The constantly evolving nature of threats to national well-being must also be taken into account. These are dynamic variables—the power equation in international relations is never stable, and the substance of national power is constantly changing. What are the most salient characteristics of the current international system, and the most significant trends working to transform it? How is systemic transformation affecting the structure of threats against which states are required to maneuver? These kinds of dynamic factors, embedded in the mechanisms of international society, will affect the ways in which national power is configured, conceptualized, and realized.

Globalization pushes toward the diminution of *de facto* state sovereignty. The diffusion of technology has made the effort to maintain an effective non-proliferation regime appear increasingly quixotic. As access to weapons of mass destruction becomes more widespread, including potentially to terrorist and extremist organizations, even the most comprehensively armed states will find themselves increasingly exposed. The phenomenon of global migration has strained the ability of states to maintain physical control over their borders, once considered the most basic attribute of sovereignty. The revolution in information technology has shattered the state's monopoly over certain kinds of information, and created new and powerful channels of communication across borders. It has also enabled the global market, which can now react to economic stimuli with a speed and flexibility that states cannot rival or control. A variety of non-state actors (multinational corporations; non-governmental organizations [NGO], such as Amnesty International or Oxfam International; multilateral forums, such as the International Monetary Fund [IMF], the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, [NATO], or the Shanghai Cooperation Organization [SCO]; regional economic associations, such as the EU or the Association of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN]) now rival states in an effort to "set the agenda" and impose priorities in world politics. Some argue that the most critical challenges confronting the international community—the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and effects; environmental disintegration; impoverishment and economic marginalization; the threat of pandemic disease; trans-boundary crime, including drug and human trafficking; terrorism; low intensity conflict, sometimes extending to the level of genocidal violence produced by dysfunctional regional orders and failing states; traditional mass casualty events; and, cyberterrorism—can no longer be confronted by nation- states acting in isolation. Global threats that transcend the capacity of individual states, no matter how powerful, have become more important.[37] What is needed, champions of a pluralist image of international relations will argue, is more effective instruments of global governance that look beyond the anarchic and archaic character of the Westphalian state system.[38]

The case for the decline of the state can easily be overstated. States are no doubt more subject to transnational forces than they were in the past, but they remain the building blocks of international society and by far the most significant repositories of the kind of power resources that will have to be mobilized to confront new global challenges. States are the only effective guarantors of popular empowerment and basic social security, and there is no one to replace them. International cooperation is still overwhelmingly generated on the interstate level, whether bilaterally in the legal and normative framework of international regimes, or in international organizations. Nor have traditional threats to national well-being altogether disappeared. The United States, as the world's predominant power, confronts the emergence of potential new peer competitors in the EU and the rising economic challengers of the so-called BRIC group (Brazil, Russia, India, and China). Regional security complexes are still preoccupied by competitive interaction between states and the

very traditional threat of armed aggression. The effort to increase national power, and the security dilemmas to which that effort gives rise, remains a driver of international political competition. But the dynamic of enhanced sensitivity and vulnerability born of globalization cannot be ignored, and the way that we understand national power must be adjusted to take it into account.

## THE CHANGING NATURE OF POWER

How does globalization impact on the configuration of national power? On the international level, power has become more diffused, and states are no longer its unique proprietor. The leverage available to various kinds of non-state actors and their ability to shape and affect the power of states has become more significant. In discrete areas such as human rights and international humanitarian law, environmental policy, and humanitarian assistance, NGOs have been successful in imposing frameworks for international action that on some level states are obliged to respect. The Ottawa Treaty and Kyoto Protocol are only two examples. The diffusion of information through the worldwide net and a proliferation of "virtual networks" tying people together across borders in what some have called a nascent "international civil society" have eroded states' capacity to dominate the dissemination of ideas and sustain control through compliance.

The nature of national security, the fundamental challenge of traditional statecraft, is also changing. The physical attributes of national power, including territory, population, and resources, remain salient. But in an age of increased international interconnectedness and interdependence the Westphalian premise of territoriality has lost some of its force—control over terrain is no longer the kind of driver in international political competition that it once was. Even the largest and inherently most powerful states confront new and unfamiliar kinds of vulnerabilities for which the traditional instruments of national security policy are not always well suited.

Conventional military power has lost at least some of its centrality. Traditional conceptions of the role of military power emphasize the forceful defense of borders and the containment of threats to national integrity posed by "Napoleonic neighbors" and armed adversaries. But traditional military priorities are less well adapted to confront the new threat structure emerging in an age of "sacred terror" and new kinds of existential concerns. The security problem has become more complex and multidimensional. In his seminal *People, States and War*, first published in 1983, Barry Buzan spoke of military, political, economic, societal, and ecological security as diverse facets of a broader security equation.[39] The so-called Copenhagen School has explored the "securitization" of non-military challenges, with particular emphasis on societal security and identity issues.[40] Other analysts argue for a deepening of the security agenda in a Kantian sense, with the referent for security displaced from the sovereign state to the autonomous human subject. In its 1994 *Human Development Report,* the United Nations Development Programme introduced the concept of *human security* manifested in seven issue areas (economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political) and six threats (unchecked population growth, disparities in economic opportunity, migration pressures, environmental degradation, drug trafficking, and international terrorism).[41] Such arguments take us some distance away from the traditional priorities of defense policy, but they point to emerging vulnerabilities that may become increasingly relevant to the calculus of national power under 21st-century conditions.

It is still possible to draw up an approximate index of national power using quantitative measures such as population, territory, resource base, GDP, defense spending, average educational attainment, per capita expenditure on research and development, and the like. A recent study sponsored by the National Security Research Division of the RAND Corporation uses a basket of such metrics to calculate that the U.S. holds about 20 percent of total global power, compared with 14 percent each for the EU and China, and 9 percent for India.[42] This is an interesting exercise that

may have some relevance as a rough measure of overall capacity. It does not effectively address what is ultimately the most basic issue of shaping outcomes by translating latent power into applied power and using it judiciously to promote national interests. This remains the domain of strategy and the art of statecraft, where the instruments of national power must be applied in a dynamic and uncertain international environment and in a context of mutual vulnerabilities that demands careful calculation, prudence, and a healthy dose of strategic restraint.

## ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 11

1. For the notion of "essentially contested concepts," which "inevitably involve endless disputes about their proper uses," see W. B. Gallie, "Essentially Contested Concepts," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,* Vol. 56, 1955-56, pp. 167-198.

2. R. A. Dahl, "The Concept of Power," *Behavioral Science,* No. 2, 1957, pp. 201-215.

3. P. Bachrach and M. S. Baratz, *Power and Poverty: Theory and Practice,* Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1970.

4. These categories correspond to the "two dimensions" of power defined in the seminal work of Steven Lukes, *Power: A Radical View,* Houndsmills, Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, pp. 14-29. Lukes goes on to elaborate a "three dimensional" image of power built on the Gramscian notion of hegemony.

5. Hannah Arendt, *On Violence*, New York: Allen Lane, 1970, p. 41.

6. Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin Books, 1968, p. 161.

7. Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State and War*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1959, p. 238.

8. Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace,* 5th Ed., New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978, p. 38.

9. See Ian Clark, *Reform and Resistance in the International Order,* Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1980, pp. 55-77.

10. Morgenthau, pp. 5-6.

11. Donald Kagan, *On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace,* New York: Doubleday, 1995, p. 7.

12. Morgenthau, p. 30.

13. Edward Vose Gullick, *Europe's Classical Balance of Power: A Case History of the Theory and Practice of One of the Great Concepts of European Statecraft,* Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982, p. 39.

14. Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World System II: Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the European World Economy, 1600-1750,* New York: Academic Press, 1980, pp. 113-114.

15. Paul W. Schroeder, *The Transformation of European Politics, 1763-1848,* Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1994, p. 6.

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17. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition,* Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1977, p. 27.

18. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics,* New York: Public Affairs, 2004.

19. Alvin Toffler, *Powershift: Knowledge, Wealth, and Violence at the Edge of the 21st Century,* New York: Bantam Books, 1990.

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