CHAPTER 8

International Alliances and Military Effectiveness: Fighting Alongside Allies and Partners

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THROUGHOUT HISTORY, most countries have chosen to conduct their wars alongside partners and allies instead of fighting unilaterally. Starting with the Greek city-states, and continuing through the Thirty Years' War, the Napoleonic Wars, and the two World Wars, great powers have often chosen to conduct warfare multilaterally rather than unilaterally.[1] This holds particularly true for the United States: from the Revolutionary War through the recent interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States has fought almost all of its wars alongside other countries.[2] The complexities of the current strategic environment suggest that the preference for multinational warfare will continue into the future. In fact, some countries explicitly incorporate multinational requirements into their training and doctrine. Both the British and Australian militaries, for example, have made alliance interoperability one of their highest strategic priorities, and they expect that virtually all of their future military operations will involve international partners.[3]

How does the process of collaborating with foreign militaries affect military effectiveness? Do international partners enhance military effectiveness, by bringing additional capabilities and resources to bear? Or do they undermine military effectiveness, by imposing significant transaction costs to overcome differences in equipment, training, and doctrine?

Although much depends on the specific institutional arrangements that are established, generally speaking, multilateral military operations create a trade-off. Gaining the benefits of international cooperation and keeping the participating states focused on a common set of political objectives may require military activities that sacrifice technical proficiency. The

mechanisms required to retain political-strategic integration may reduce integration, skill, and responsiveness at the operational and tactical levels. Thus operations involving two or more countries may suffer from reduced effectiveness in particular areas. However, these battlefield costs of international cooperation may be worth paying because of the strategic benefits that can be gained by enhancing the legitimacy of a military operation.

This chapter starts by defining alliances and reviewing the widespread assumption that these institutions can effectively aggregate the capabilities of their members. The next section examines three of the independent variables specified in this study, to see how each of the aspects of military activity identified in Chapter 1 of this volume affect military operations involving two or more countries. The chapter concludes by examining how these independent variables affect the dependent variable of military effectiveness, clustering the findings according to the categories of skill and quality, integration, and responsiveness that form the framework of this volume.

Alliance Theory: The Capability Aggregation Model

Alliances are generally defined as an agreement among two or more states to cooperate in particular military contingencies.[4] The degree of formalization can vary considerably across alliances: some are highly institutionalized, such as NATO; others result from verbal agreements among state leaders.[5] Nevertheless, some sort of agreement must be reached, even if it is not written down, about the types of contingencies that will involve the alliance and the extent of cooperation that the allies can expect from each other. For example, members must agree as to whether their alliance is primarily defensive, with members expected to assist each other in the event of an external attack, or whether it is an offensive alliance, intended to assist its members to defeat their enemies and capture territory. Such decisions shape the purpose, scope, and form of the institution that the allies create.

Most theoretical work assumes that alliance operations are just as effective as unilateral military operations. It assumes that alliances aggregate the capabilities of their individual members, without discussing the processes through which that aggregation occurs. However, the causal mechanisms identified in Chapter 1 of this volume suggest that alliances do not always aggregate the power of their individual members effectively and may suffer from reduced operational and tactical proficiency as a result.

Building on the realist tradition, most of the literature on alliances starts from the premise that in an anarchic international system, states must

ensure their own survival. When power imbalances emerge, states naturally form balances of power to counter the growing threat.[6] States can balance in one of two ways: they can balance *internally*, by increasing their military capabilities, or *externally*, by seeking allies.[7] Internal balancing is often preferable because states retain full autonomous control of their military forces. Waltz writes that internal balancing is "more reliable and precise than external balancing" because it reduces uncertainty and the potential for miscalculation.[8] However, internal balancing is not always desirable or possible: it takes a lot of time and money to build and train a military force. Not all states choose to allocate their resources in this manner, and some states simply do not possess enough resources to compete in arms races.

It is usually cheaper and faster to form an alliance than to develop a national defense force. Of course, the choice between internal and external balancing is almost never mutually exclusive, and states usually pursue a mixed strategy.[9] When states choose to balance externally, realist theories predict that states will seek allies whose military capabilities complement the weaknesses of their own military forces. Alliances can therefore be seen as capability aggregators, which combine their members' strengths in order to counter threats to their security.

This capability aggregation model dominates the theoretical literature on alliances. George Liska explicitly argues that "states enter into alliances with one another in order to supplement each other's capability," and most subsequent scholars have not challenged this assertion.[10] In their survey of the alliance literature, Ole Holsti, Terrence Hopmann, and John Sullivan found that one of the most common assumptions was that "alliances exist to provide institutions within which nations may combine their capabilities in defense against an external common enemy."[11] More recently, James Morrow has argued that "capability aggregation is the central theme of most work on alliances."[12] In his influential work on the origins of alliances, Steven Walt states, "the primary purpose of most alliances is to combine the members' capabilities in a way that furthers their respective interests. . . . Most great-power alliances have arisen in order to aggregate power."[13]

Although the capability aggregation model dominates the theoretical literature on alliances, it suffers from a very serious weakness: it treats alliances as black boxes, paying little attention to the mechanisms through which alliances function. It simply assumes that alliance members can transform a verbal or written alliance agreement into a militarily effective fighting force. Holsti and colleagues note that most authors assume that "the strength of an alliance may be determined by summing the contributions of each nation."[14] Michael Ward argues that the conventional

wisdom about alliances is based on "the *presumed* power of aggregated scale effects," and that "through aggregating individual military might, total power is *assumed* to be enhanced."[15] After surveying realist views on alliances, including those of Hans Morgenthau, Allan Stam concludes that realists assume military power "follows the rules of classical mechanics" and alliance power can be measured by adding up the military resources of the alliance members.[16] This may well be true under certain circumstances, but it must be demonstrated rather than assumed.

Some scholars do challenge this capability aggregation assumption. Holsti and colleagues, for example, note that the power of an alliance may not be equal to the sum of its parts. Economies of scale may increase the alliance capabilities, but:

> the more usual case is that for various reasons alliance capabilities are less—perhaps substantially less—than that of the individual nations combined, resulting from poor staff coordination, mistrust, incompatible goals, logistical difficulties, dissimilar military equipment and organization, and other problems.[17]

Steven Miller makes a similar point when he argues that the logic of collective security "ignores the diseconomies associated with coalition warfare. While the advantages of an international coalition are obvious, the difficulties of creating effective multinational forces are often overlooked."[18] Robert Powell also states that the process of aggregating military capabilities may involve increasing, constant, or decreasing returns to scale, which means that the alliance may have more power, equal power, or less power than its constituent members, respectively.[19] Glenn Snyder develops a theory of alliance management that emphasizes bargaining as the glue that holds alliances together, but his theory focuses on bargaining strategies and outcomes rather than the effects of those outcomes on capability aggregation.[20] Ronald Krebs and Patricia Weitsman both challenge the capability aggregation model by arguing that alliances can have perverse consequences, causing adversaries to ally with each other even though that may actually intensify their conflict.[21] However, none of these authors addresses the implications for military effectiveness. They acknowledge that the capability aggregation process does not always proceed smoothly, but they do not offer many insights about the conditions under which alliances are likely to aggregate power effectively and when they are not.

The remainder of this chapter seeks to fill this gap in the literature, using the framework developed in Chapter 1 of this volume. Each of the next three sections explores the way that alliance operations affect a different intervening variable—strategic command and control, tactical command and control, and intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination—and

how each one affects some of the attributes of military effectiveness. The fourth section offers several hypotheses about the conditions under which these variables will have the greatest impact on military effectiveness. The final section concludes by examining multinational operations in a broader strategic context, where some of the political benefits of operating as part of an alliance may outweigh the cost of sacrificing some degree of integration, skill, and responsiveness.

Strategic Command and Control

When two or more states conduct military operations together, they must develop strategic command and control structures that translate political guidance from civilian leaders into military orders. In a multinational environment, such structures are usually designed more to maximize political cohesion among the contributing states than to maximize operational and tactical proficiency. Political cohesion is often a weakness of alliance operations; adversaries often seek to break the alliance by dividing its members over questions of strategy, tactics, and willingness to bear costs. To minimize the chances that an adversary can successfully adopt such a strategy, alliance members often create strategic command and control structures that emphasize deliberation, national control, and consensus rather than speed, integration, and decisiveness. Maintaining political and strategic integration within a multinational operation can harm operational and tactical integration and responsiveness, two of the key properties of an effective military identified in Chapter 1.

REDUCED INTEGRATION: MULTIPLE CHAINS OF COMMAND

Integration is "the degree to which different military activities are internally consistent and mutually reinforcing" and it "means the achievement of consistency within and across levels and areas of all military activity."[22] This is not easy to achieve in a unilateral operation, as the other chapters in this volume demonstrate, but it becomes even more challenging when military forces from two or more countries are involved. Achieving consistency becomes difficult when two or more commanders are involved, no matter how closely they work together. This problem is often exacerbated by the fact that alliance members often develop strategic command and control structures that involve multiple or overlapping chains of command as alliance members seek to preserve authority over their own forces. Such structures, however, make integration even more difficult to achieve. They violate the key military principle of unity of command and often the less restrictive principle of unity of effort as well.[23]

The 1991 Gulf War, for example, involved a parallel command structure. The Saudis did not want to place their forces under U.S. command, so they agreed that the operation would have two separate but technically equal commanders: U.S. general Norman Schwarzkopf commanded Western military forces and Saudi general Khalid bin Sultan commanded all Arab forces. This arrangement worked well in practice because Khalid understood that his role was mostly symbolic, and ground operations against Iraq were much easier than military planners had anticipated. Yet such a parallel command might have become extremely problematic if a more challenging military operation had led the Saudi commander to disagree seriously with the U.S. commander at any point because there was no higher military authority to reconcile their differences.[24] Parallel chains of command within an alliance operation can reduce the degree of integration because multiple commanders may not coordinate their actions into a coherent strategy, which in turn can undermine military effectiveness.

The international intervention in Somalia further illustrates the problems that can be caused by parallel chains of command.[25] The United States commanded all military forces when the operation started in December 1992, but it sought to transfer command to the United Nations as quickly as possible. The UN, however, did not believe it had enough forces available to run the operation effectively. By May 1993, they reached a compromise that involved three chains of command. The UN commanded two of the chains: one containing all non-U.S. forces in Somalia and a second containing some U.S. support troops. The United States commanded a third chain, which included a U.S. Quick Reaction Force (QRF) based offshore that would assist the UN if necessary. The QRF became increasingly involved in the fighting as the military situation deteriorated during the summer of 1993. The QRF did not coordinate its actions with the UN forces because they reported through different chains of command, which caused considerable confusion when these forces ran into each other on the battlefield.

The situation became even more complicated in August 1993 when the United States sent Task Force Ranger, comprising U.S. Army Rangers and other special operations forces, to capture one of the Somali warlords. This added a fourth chain of command: U.S. special forces report through different channels than conventional U.S. forces. The coordination and integration problems that this arrangement posed were demonstrated all too vividly on October 3, 1993, when a Black Hawk helicopter was shot down after Task Force Ranger raided the Olympic Hotel.[26] The Pakistani and Malaysian armored units that were then called to assist had no idea that Task Force Ranger was conducting such an operation at the hotel. It

took them more than seven hours to assemble a rescue convoy, by which time night had fallen, complicating matters further. The confusion sown by the command arrangements was one of the factors that turned an operation scheduled for 90 minutes into an 18-hour firefight in which 18 U.S. soldiers perished. The lack of integration among the multiple chains of command meant that the Pakistani and Malaysian units could not effectively support Task Force Ranger when it encountered resistance, and it contributed directly to the large number of fatalities.

A third example is the dual-key structure in Bosnia between 1993 and 1995.[27] In August 1993, after months of disagreement over whether NATO should fulfill a UN mandate to protect the safe areas in Bosnia,[28] the United States and its allies reached a compromise agreement. NATO would provide close air support to the safe areas, but France, Canada, and, to a lesser extent, the United Kingdom insisted that the UN retain the right to veto specific NATO air operations. These three countries had significant numbers of troops on the ground as part of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), and they argued that such a veto was the only way to protect their forces. Whereas NATO's political authorities delegated their authority over air strikes down through the alliance's integrated military command structure, UN secretary-general Boutros Boutros-Ghali initially chose not to delegate any such authority, meaning that every decision to use air power had to be relayed to New York and personally approved by Boutros-Ghali. After a few weeks, the inevitable delays caused by this arrangement convinced Boutros-Ghali that he needed to delegate authority to someone in the field, but he chose to delegate that authority to his civilian special representative in theater, not the UNPROFOR commander. This meant that the NATO military commander and the civilian UN Special Representative both had to approve the use of air power before strikes could be launched. Their continuing disagreements essentially prevented air strikes during most of the operation. The lack of integration and strategic coordination between the UN and the NATO led to paralysis while UN forces continued to absorb attacks and the slaughter of civilians continued.

REDUCED RESPONSIVENESS: THE DEMANDS OF CONSENSUS

A responsive military is one that "adjusts its operational doctrine and tactics to exploit its adversary's weaknesses and its own strengths" and "adjusts and compensates for external constraints."[29] As with integration, the normal difficulties with achieving responsiveness in a single military are exacerbated in a multilateral context. To the extent that alliances require debate and discussion to generate consensus among participating states,

their military forces may lack the flexibility necessary to respond to rapid developments and changing situations.

The targeting disputes that emerged during Operation Allied Force in Kosovo illustrate this dynamic. Because the NATO allies believed that Slobodan Miloševiç would capitulate after a few days of bombing, the alliance's military had prepared only 169 targets, and the North Atlantic Council (NAC), the alliance's supreme civilian authority, had approved striking only 51 of those targets. Each of the additional 807 potential targets that were identified during the 78-day campaign had to be proposed, reviewed, and approved by NATO and national authorities. Any one of the alliance's 19 members could veto a proposed target, and many allies exercised that right. France, for example, opposed striking bridges in Belgrade, the power grid, and targets in Montenegro, even though NATO's air commander believed that this decision reduced his effectiveness by increasing the danger to his forces and leaving strategic targets intact.[30] The need to maintain political consensus made the targeting process extremely cumbersome, and it limited NATO's ability to respond effectively to the unanticipated duration of the campaign and to adapt to changes in Serbian tactics.[31]

Furthermore, responsiveness suffers dramatically when alliance members do not share the same strategic and political goals. Different states join multinational operations for different reasons, and sometimes their strategic interests are mismatched or even incompatible. In Bosnia, for example, the dual-key structure just described resulted from two different strategic approaches: the United States favored a strategy based on air strikes, whereas the Europeans and Canadians were already pursuing a strategy based on the presence of ground forces. The participants thought that the dual-key structure was an acceptable compromise, but it never worked effectively because their fundamental differences in strategy had never been resolved. Operations in Somalia during the summer of 1993 provide an even clearer example. After a major attack on UN forces in June, the UN command sought to apprehend Mohammed Aideed and those responsible for the attack. The Italians, however, disagreed with this approach, believing a strategy of accommodation would defuse the increasingly tense situation and that it provided the best hope for a lasting peace. Italian forces in Somalia started negotiating with Aideed, even when that contradicted the UN commander's directions and intent, and rumors abounded that the Italians had cut some sort of deal with Aideed's forces so they would not be attacked.[32] Multinational military forces cannot be considered responsive in any way when individual force contingents are taking actions that undermine the strategic, operational, and tactical objectives of the military commander.

Tactical Command and Control

Alliances must establish coordination structures at the tactical as well as at the strategic level to function effectively.[33] Army units from different countries must be able to tell where all friendly forces are on the battlefield, to avoid redundancy at best and fratricide at worst.[34] Yet the coordination structures that are established to achieve this goal may reduce integration, by separating national contingents and making communication among them more challenging. They may also reduce overall levels of skill because widely varying skill levels and types of skills among alliance members may pose significant operational and tactical challenges.

REDUCED INTEGRATION: SECTOR ASSIGNMENTS AND LIAISON TEAMS

One way that alliances manage skill differences across force contingents is to separate them physically from each other on the battlefield. That way, each contingent can conduct operations in its own way within its own area, without having to work directly with more or less skilled contingents. Each country is assigned its own sector of the battlefield and may not cross sector boundaries without express permission from the highest levels of command. Perhaps the best known sector model was NATO's "layer cake" approach for defending Europe in the event of a Soviet attack during the Cold War, where national corps sectors were arrayed on West Germany's eastern front.[35] Sector models have also been used in a number of recent operations, including the 1991 Gulf War and the peace enforcement operation in Bosnia and Kosovo. Geographic separation measures are attractive in their simplicity, but they hinder integration by creating inconsistent approaches across the battlefield and leaving vulnerable "seams" that the adversary can exploit. Furthermore, to the extent that capabilities are not spread equally throughout all sectors, geographic separation measures may make it easier for the adversary to detect the weakest points and alter military plans accordingly.

Alliances often try to manage the integration problems caused by geographical sectors by exchanging liaison teams with each other. The U.S. military has relied heavily on liaison teams in recent years, either on their own or in combination with the geographic separation measures just described. During the 1991 Gulf War, U.S. liaison teams were attached to Arab forces at every echelon down to the battalion level, and large liaison teams were sent to the two major Arab command headquarters. There was also considerable liaison between the U.S. XVIII Airborne Corps and the French division at the corps, division, and brigade levels.[36] Before and

during the multinational operation in Haiti in 1994, U.S. coalition support teams served as liaisons with contingents from other countries and also provided them with communications and training.[37] In Bosnia, U.S. special forces formed liaison teams with foreign military units to coordinate numerous battlefield functions, and U.S. and Russian units exchanged liaison teams at both the headquarters and field level.[38] Peacekeeping operations in both Bosnia and Kosovo rely on liaison teams for coordination between U.S. brigade headquarters and foreign battalions that operate in U.S.-led multinational sectors.[39]

Liaison teams cannot, however, fully compensate for the reduced integration that occurs in multinational military operations. They require significant resources, which may come at the expense of war-fighting missions. Furthermore, they often lack the specialized regional or technical expertise necessary to promote integration. The U.S. Army, for example, does not have specifically trained tactical liaison personnel.[40] When a requirement emerges, teams are assembled through a process that one observer described as a "hey, you" staffing procedure: individual personnel are pulled from their regular assignments, told to work with other U.S. Army personnel that they do not know, and assigned to work with foreign units or even foreign countries with which they have no previous experience.[41] The army sometimes relies instead on special forces to provide liaison teams, but this is only a partial solution at best. Special forces report through their own command and control structures,[42] which makes it extremely difficult for them to provide timely and effective coordination between fielded conventional land force units; increasing demands for special forces mean that they will not always be available to provide this function for the army. These trends will limit the degree of integration that can be achieved in future alliance operations.

In addition to geographic separation measures and liaison teams, alliance members often try to improve their technical interoperability, so their tactical command and control systems can work together as seamlessly as possible. Technical interoperability promotes integration in a multinational context because it enables different force contingents to communicate and coordinate their actions. However, it is extremely difficult to achieve. Technical interoperability remains a significant challenge for NATO, even though the allies have been working on it for more than half a century. Many allies, including the United States, do not adhere to the interoperability standards that they have committed themselves to adopt, for reasons that range from sensitivities about sharing advanced technologies to the desire to bolster national defense industries. Furthermore, technical interoperability is an available option for only a handful

of the world's armies because most armies do not possess highly advanced technical systems that can be networked together. Technical interoperability is the best (if still imperfect) solution to integration problems at the tactical level, but alliance operations often involve participants for whom this is not technically possible. Geographic separation measures, liaison teams, and technical interoperability are all ways to improve tactical command and control in a multinational operation, but their various limitations mean that alliances often suffer from reduced integration, which in turn reduces military effectiveness.

REDUCED SKILL: CAPABILITY AGGREGATION PROBLEMS

Skill reflects the extent to which military personnel can prepare for and execute the fundamental tasks of war fighting. According to Chapter 1 of this book, there are a number of different indicators of military skill, including levels of initiative, motivation, adaptability, proficiency at executing doctrine, and ability to assimilate technology.[43] Because individual militaries vary across a wide continuum on this dimension, it naturally follows that multinational military operations are likely to include contingents with varied levels of skill.

Almost by definition, the resulting alliance force will possess less skill than if the most capable military contingent were conducting the operation unilaterally. Furthermore, the most capable military may not be able to execute operations in its preferred manner if it is operating as part of an alliance: it may have to adjust the very qualities that make it so capable to accommodate its allies and partners. It may not be possible, for example, to execute highly flexible and adaptive operations when inflexible and static partners are present on the same battlefield, or to use the full capabilities of advanced technologies alongside militaries that cannot operate in a similar manner.

States whose militaries possess low degrees of skill may seek to join alliances alongside more skilled partners in the hope that learning will improve their own skills. This may well occur in alliance operations that are well integrated and where different national contingents work closely together. Yet if the degree of integration is low, and national contingents are separated by different chains of command at the strategic level or geographic separation measures at the tactical level, the chance that learning will improve skills across alliance contingents remains low as well.

Even if two or more militaries with very high levels of skill choose to operate together, the resulting multinational operation will not necessarily reflect a high level of skill. This is the central fallacy of the capability aggregation model: militaries in multinational operations do not auto-

matically combine their capabilities effectively. One military may have achieved a high level of skill through intensive personnel training and allowing junior officers a great deal of flexibility, whereas another military may have achieved a similarly high level of skill by incorporating advanced technologies in every command echelon and relying on senior officers to direct the battle based on their ability to process the information provided by such technologies. Differing command styles, doctrine, and training would make it very difficult for personnel from two such militaries to operate as effectively together as each one would on its own.

INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION, DISSEMINATION, AND ANALYSIS

Intelligence collection, dissemination, and analysis is a third activity that alliance operations affect. Intelligence sharing is a perennial problem in alliance operations.[44] Accurate and timely intelligence is a crucial enabler of effective military operations, allowing mission capabilities and tactics to be tailored to the latest conditions. In multinational operations, however, national sensitivities often limit information sharing among partners and allies. This problem particularly plagues multinational operations involving the United States because U.S. technical collection capabilities and advanced military technologies are unrivaled throughout the world. The United States is often very reluctant to share information with its alliance partners, to protect its sources and methods and to prevent unauthorized leaks. This reduces integration: participating military forces are more likely to make inconsistent decisions when they have inconsistent information and intelligence available to them.

REDUCED INTEGRATION: RESTRICTIONS ON INTELLIGENCE SHARING

Problems with information sharing affect all countries participating in multinational operations, even among close allies. In the 1991 Gulf War, for example, the small planning group that developed the plans for Desert Storm included a British brigadier, but U.S. members of the group regularly classified their documents as NOFORN, meaning "no foreigners," and once tore their maps from the wall when the British officer entered the room.[45] In Haiti, the procedures for release of intelligence were so stringent that the United States provided virtually no information to its foreign partners at the outset of the operation, although these procedures were later modified a bit.[46] In Kosovo, the United States was extremely reluctant to share intelligence with its NATO allies because of fears of leaks, and decided that information about the most sensitive air operations should not be given to the allies.[47] Operation Allied Force therefore

involved two separate Air Tasking Orders (ATOs): one that was released to NATO, which included all flights by European aircraft and nonstealthy U.S. aircraft, and one that the United States classified as NOFORN, which included all flights by B-2 bombers and F-117 fighters, and strike packages that included U.S. Tomahawk and conventional air-launched cruise missiles. The dual ATOs caused serious confusion when U.S. aircraft suddenly appeared on NATO radar screens without any advance warning.[48] This impedes integration because aircraft have to be assigned to missions without knowing what missions other alliance aircraft are undertaking, and it increases the potential for friendly fire incidents.

Recent operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have been plagued by intelligence-sharing problems as well. In Afghanistan, operational security was deemed so important that information was highly compartmentalized and not releasable. The involvement of special forces intensified this problem because they use their own classification scheme and their information and intelligence is generally not even releasable to conventional U.S. forces. U.S. commanders often asked other countries to undertake missions without being able to tell them the reason for the mission. This reduced responsiveness by making it very difficult for military and civilian leaders from foreign countries to calculate the risks and benefits of their own operations.[49] Many partners also grew frustrated that they shared intelligence with the United States but did not receive any intelligence in return. Information provided by a foreign partner occasionally became classified as NOFORN within the U.S. system, meaning the intelligence could not be shared with the country that provided it in the first place.[50] In both Afghanistan and Iraq, foreign partners complained they did not have access to the SIPRNET, the secure Internet that the U.S. military uses to share classified information. Most U.S. operational planning routinely occurs on the SIPRNET, but allies and partners are not allowed to access it because the system contains some information that is classified NOFORN. In Afghanistan, U.S. planners put coalition planning tools on the SIPRNET, apparently unaware that foreign partners would not be able to access these at all.[51] In Iraq, British and Australian military officers report that U.S. officers occasionally skirted these restrictions by pulling up information on the SIPRNET while they were present and then deliberately looking away.[52]

Problems with intelligence sharing can never be fully resolved because national sensitivities and concerns about operational security concerns will always be present and leaks remain a real possibility. Yet these problems have the unintended consequence of limiting integration. Alliance members who rely on different information and intelligence are likely to make

different strategic, operational, and tactical decisions, thereby hindering integration within the overall operation. Even when information can be shared, lengthy declassification procedures may further exacerbate these problems by making information irrelevant by the time it can be released. Concerns about sources, methods, and leaks are certainly legitimate, but they do pose problems for achieving good integration within alliances.

When Do These Factors Have the Biggest Effect?

As described in Chapter 1, integration, skill, and responsiveness are continuous rather than dichotomous variables. Militaries have greater or lesser degrees of these qualities, rather than simply being characterized by their presence or absence. The previous three sections discussed dynamics that have the potential to reduce military effectiveness but their effect is not automatic. This section offers several hypotheses about the conditions under which the dynamics described earlier will have the greatest impact on military effectiveness. These hypotheses will certainly need to be refined through empirical testing, but they do offer some deductive insights about the effectiveness of multinational military operations.

We should expect alliance operations to lead to decreasing integration, skill, and responsiveness as the participants and their capabilities grow increasingly heterogeneous. Alliances where members contribute wholly separate capabilities may not suffer from these problems; for example, if one country provides ground forces for an operation and another provides airlift capacity, then military efficiency may not suffer at all. But when multiple countries contribute ground forces, the inevitable variations among them may indeed undermine military efficiency.

More specifically, we should expect reduced effectiveness in any of the five following circumstances.

First, effectiveness will be decreased *when participants lack a history of military cooperation*. The more experience countries have in conducting military operations together, the more likely they are to develop workable command and control structures and information-sharing procedures. Established alliance relationships do not guarantee effectiveness; as NATO demonstrates, even long-standing commitments to cooperation do not always guarantee smooth interaction. Yet we should generally expect that states without such a history of cooperation will be even less likely to fight together effectively than states with some previous history of addressing the challenges of multinational operations.

Second, effectiveness will be decreased *when training and doctrine for multinational operations is limited or unrealistic*. In contrast, militaries that incor-

porate preparations for multinational operations into their own doctrine and training—even if they do not train together with their potential future partners—should be more flexible and adaptable during multinational operations than militaries that focus primarily on unilateral operations. Such preparations can help militaries identify inadvertent mistakes and unforeseen trade-offs before actually conducting such operations, enabling them to develop solutions and work-arounds.

Third, effectiveness will be decreased *when equipment varies widely.* It should be easier to integrate military forces using similar types of equipment—such as two types of main battle tanks—than to integrate those whose equipment is dissimilar.

Fourth, effectiveness will be decreased *when technology varies widely.* Militaries that rely on advanced technologies will find it difficult to operate alongside militaries that do not. Not only will technical interoperability problems arise, but doctrine and concepts of operations that rely on advanced technologies may simply be unworkable in alliances that include members who are less technologically advanced.

Fifth, effectiveness will be decreased *when insufficient language or area expertise is available.* Alliance members often speak different languages and come from different cultures while conducting operations in unfamiliar parts of the world. Linguists and regional experts can minimize these frictions, but they are rarely available in sufficient numbers and with adequate skill levels to overcome the linguistic and cultural challenges of a heterogeneous alliance or one that is conducting operations far from home.

Conclusion: Alliances in Strategic Context

Alliance operations pose significant problems at the tactical, operational, and even the strategic level, which often make them less integrated, skillful, and responsive compared to unilateral operations. Yet it is very important to note that multinational operations offer considerable geostrategic and political advantages to their members and facilitate political-military integration that may well often outweigh the costs of reduced military effectiveness in these areas. States that choose to participate in multinational operations may, therefore, demonstrate high integration between their policy goals and their choice of military strategy, but the political benefits that they receive may come at the cost of some integration, skill, and responsiveness.

What political benefits of operating in alliances might make states willing to absorb these specific costs in terms of effectiveness? Political legitimacy is the single most important political benefit that multinational

military operations provide. Operations that involve more than a single country tend to be viewed as more legitimate by domestic and international audiences alike, and the impact of this legitimacy should not be underestimated.[53] Sometimes legitimacy is formally bestowed on a multinational military operation by international organizations such as the UN, as was the case for the 1991 Gulf War, or through standing alliances like NATO, as in the 1999 war over Kosovo. Yet multinational operations can also *produce* legitimacy, in addition to having it bestowed on them. In Afghanistan, for example, foreign participation in ongoing combat and reconstruction efforts helps reinforce the legitimacy of these operations.[54]

Legitimacy is also produced by the fact that alliance members share the risk that is an integral part of combat operations. Countries do not lightly choose to place their military forces in harm's way, and they are unlikely to do so unless they strongly support the political objectives of the operation. Generally speaking, the legitimacy of a military operation tends to increase as more countries are willing to accept the possibility that their sons and daughters will die fighting for the objectives at stake. A military operation where one country bears most of the risk, or where allies and partners only play a small role, is likely to be viewed as less legitimate than multinational operations where risks are spread evenly among the participants.

Why does legitimacy matter? From a strictly military perspective, mission objectives can often be achieved whether an operation is considered legitimate or not. But legitimacy often becomes a crucial factor in the broader political context and in securing the political objectives of the military operation. Legitimacy matters domestically, for public opinion is more likely to support multinational rather than unilateral operations. Legitimacy also matters internationally, for it bolsters global support for the operation, and other countries are less likely to feel threatened when powerful countries such as the United States choose to exert their power in cooperation with others, rather than on their own. Perhaps most importantly, legitimacy often helps promote the long-term success of an operation. Many recent U.S. military operations, including those in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and most recently Iraq, have been conducted not only to defeat the enemy but also to create a new political order. Over the long term, such operations depend on support and cooperation from local populations. In such situations, multinational alliances are generally perceived as being less self-interested and more impartial than unilateral interveners. Legitimacy in this context can strengthen acceptance of the new political order, which is a key element of mission success.

The political benefits provided by legitimacy are strong enough that, for these reasons alone, state leaders will often seek allies and partners in

military operations, despite some of the operational and tactical costs. No country will ever give up its right to conduct unilateral operations, but particularly in the ever-changing strategic environment, unilateral operations are likely to become the exception rather than the rule. Even though alliance operations are likely to be less effective in military terms than unilateral operations, they may nonetheless remain very attractive options for civilian leaders who must factor the political benefits of multinational operations into their equations. Military planners must not assume that civilian leaders will avoid multinational operations because of their reduced military effectiveness. Rather, prudence requires that militaries prepare for multinational operations *despite* their reduced effectiveness in particular areas in some tactical activities. The decision to operate as part of an alliance is ultimately a political judgment, not a military judgment. Whether it is worth sacrificing effectiveness in some areas to obtain benefits in other areas is a question that politicians alone must answer—but it is a trade-off that they are often willing to make.

Notes

1. For general discussions of wars fought as part of multinational alliances, see Paul W. Schroeder, "Alliances, 1815–1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management," in Klaus Knorr, ed., *Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1976), 227–62; Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (New York: Random House, 1987); and William J. Astore and James E. Kinzer, *Future War: Coalition Operations in Global Strategy*, Executive Summary of the Eighteenth Military History Symposium, United States Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, October 21–23, 1998.

2. The Spanish-American War is usually cited as the exception to this generalization. For more on the U.S. experience with multinational operations, see Walter D. Freeman, Randall J. Hess, and Manuel Faria, "The Challenges of Combined Operations," *Military Review* 72, no. 11 (1992): 2–11; Jeffrey W. Yaegar, "Coalition Warfare: Surrendering Sovereignty," *Military Review* 72, no. 11 (1992): 51–63; John D. Becker, "Combined and Coalition Warfighting: The American Experience," *Military Review* 73, no. 11 (1993): 25–29; and Steve Bowman, "Historical and Cultural Influences on Coalition Operations," in Thomas J. Marshall, ed., *Problems and Solutions in Future Coalition Operations* (Carlisle, Pa.: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 1997), 1–21.

3. Neither country has ruled out the possibility of using force unilaterally, but when pressed, civilian and military officials in both countries had great difficulty specifying a scenario that would require unilateral action. Author interviews in the United Kingdom (August 2002, April 2003, and August 2003), and in Australia (June 2003).

4. This definition synthesizes the most common elements of definitions of alliances, which vary considerably. For more on those definitions, see Nora Bensahel, *The Coalition Paradox: The Politics of Military Cooperation*, Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University, 1999, Chapter 2.

5. In military usage, the term *alliance* refers to an explicit and formal agreement among two or more states to cooperate together on military matters, generally with some expectation of long-term cooperation. By contrast, the term *coalition* refers to informal groupings of states that come together to respond to a particular contingency, with no expectation of continued cooperation beyond that contingency. This chapter uses the term *alliance* to encompass coalitions as well because the distinctions between them do not significantly affect the variables being examined in this volume.

6. States also have the option of bandwagoning with the growing threat, but the risks inherent in this strategy led Waltz to conclude that "balancing, not bandwagoning, is the behavior induced by the system." Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 126. For more on the dominance of balancing behavior, see Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987), 147–80.

7. Although the distinction between internal and external balancing is generally associated with Waltz's work, earlier classical realists make the same point. According to Hans Morgenthau, states "have three choices in order to maintain and improve their relative power positions. They can increase their own power, they can add to their own power the power of other nations, or they can withhold the power of other nations from the adversary. When they make the first choice, they embark upon an armaments race. When they choose the second and third alternatives, they pursue a policy of alliances." Hans J. Morgenthau, "Alliances in Theory and Practice," in Arnold Wolfers, ed., *Alliance Policy in the Cold War* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1959), 185.

8. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 168.

9. The relative levels of internal and external balancing are often determined by a combination of systemic and domestic interests. See James D. Morrow, "Arms versus Allies: Trade-offs in the Search for Security," *International Organization* 47, no. 2 (1993), esp. 231.

10. George Liska, *Nations in Alliance* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), 26.

11. Ole R. Holsti, P. Terrence Hopmann, and John D. Sullivan, *Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances: Comparative Studies* (New York: Wiley, 1973). Similar statements can be found in Glenn H. Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," *World Politics* 36, no. 4 (1984): 462; and Michael Don Ward, *Research Gaps in Alliance Dynamics*, Monograph Series in World Affairs 19, no. 1 (Denver: Graduate School of International Studies, 1982), 7.

12. James D. Morrow, "Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances," *American Journal of Political Science* 35, no. 4 (1991), 904–33.

13. Walt, *Origins of Alliances*, 157.

14. Holsti, Hopmann, and Sullivan, *Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances*, 22.

15. Ward, *Research Gaps in Alliance Dynamics*, 12. Emphasis added.

16. Allan C. Stam III, *Win, Lose, or Draw: Domestic Politics and the Crucible of War* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), 89–91, 148–49; quotation, 149.

17. Although the authors point out these problems in their literature review, their own analysis rests on the assumption that "nations enter an alliance in order to increase their military capability." Holsti, Hopmann, and Sullivan, *Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances*, 22 and 55.

18. Steven E. Miller, quoted in John G. Heidenrich, "Arming the United Nations: Military Considerations and Operational Constraints," in Fariborz L. Mokhtari, ed., *Peacemaking, Peacekeeping and Coalition Warfare* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1994), 41–56.

19. Robert Powell, *In the Shadow of Power* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 163–64.

20. Glenn H. Snyder, *Alliance Politics* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997).

21. Ronald R. Krebs, "Perverse Institutionalism: NATO and the Greco-Turkish Conflict," *International Organization* 53, no. 2 (1999): 343–77; Patricia Weitsman, *Dangerous Alliances*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004).

22. See Chapter 1 of this book.

23. Unity of command requires that all forces operate under a single commander, with authority passed down in clear vertical lines to the smallest unit in the operation. Unity of effort requires all forces within an operation to be working toward the same military and political objectives. For more on these two definitions, see United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-0: Doctrine for Joint Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 10, 2001), A-2.

24. See Bensahel, *The Coalition Paradox*, Chapter 3.

25. Ibid., Chapter 4.

26. See Mark Bowden, *Black Hawk Down* (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1999).

27. See Bensahel, *The Coalition Paradox*, Chapter 5.

28. The formation of the safe areas is itself an example of how the need to maintain political cohesion can outweigh considerations of operational efficiency. In March 1993, UN force commander Philippe Morillon had found himself trapped in Srebrenica by Muslims demanding safety guarantees, and he declared, "You are now under the protection of the United Nations." Although Morillon had no authority to make that promise, the Security Council decided it had to back him up and officially recognize several safe areas, to maintain cohesion and credibility. The UN estimated that protecting the safe zones would require between 17,000 and 34,000 troops, yet a total of only 7,000 troops was provided for this mission. The concern for political cohesion and credibility thus drove a decision that was militarily ineffective because the numbers of troops committed were clearly insufficient to achieve the stated objective. Ibid., 164–69.

29. See Chapter 1 of this book.

30. In another example, the Netherlands consistently opposed targeting the presidential palace in Belgrade—a key facility and symbol of the Milošević re-

gime—because a Rembrandt painting was located inside. See John E. Peters, Stuart Johnson, Nora Bensahel, Timothy Liston, and Traci Williams, *European Contributions to Operation Allied Force: Implications for Transatlantic Cooperation* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, MR-1391-AF, 2001), 25–29.

31. Peters et al., 99, conclude that NATO needs "a more responsive system for requesting forces and assets from its members" and recommend that the alliance adopt "a faster, more flexible system for making operational decisions such as targeting."

32. At one point, the UN commander tried to fire the Italian force commander, but the Italian authorities stated that they did not accept his authority to do so. The Italian force commander remained in his position until his regularly scheduled rotation out of theater. For more on the Italian challenge to operations in Somalia, see Bensahel, *The Coalition Paradox*, 130–35.

33. This section summarizes unpublished work done by Adam Grissom, Nora Bensahel, John Gordon, Terrence Kelly, and Michael Spirtas at RAND during 2003 and 2004.

34. Tactical command and control arrangements are much easier to achieve for air and naval forces than for land forces. Air and naval assets can be individually rotated in an Air Tasking Order or a naval task force as requirements change, but land forces cannot be quickly moved or reassigned. This section therefore focuses on tactical command and control for land forces.

35. This arrangement was referred to as the "layer cake" because the sectors were stacked on top of each other. For more on this arrangement, as well as a map depicting the sector assignments, see Richard L. Kugler, *Commitment to Purpose: How Alliance Partnership Won the Cold War* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, MR-190-FF/RC, 1993), 202–4.

36. United States Department of Defense, *Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992), 235, 494, and 501; Michele Zanini and Jennifer Morrison Taw, *The Army and Multinational Force Compatibility* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, MR-1154-A, 2000), 53–54.

37. Zanini and Taw, *The Army and Multinational Force Compatibility*, 59–61.

38. Richard L. Layton, "Command and Control Structure," in Larry Wentz, ed., *Lessons from Bosnia: The IFOR Experience* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 1997), 47; Major Charles J. McLaughlin, "U.S.-Russian Cooperation in IFOR: Partners for Peace," *Military Review* 77, no. 4 (1997): 129–30.

39. Author interview, June 2002.

40. The U.S. Army's Foreign Area Officer (FAO) program produces soldiers with specific linguistic skills and regional knowledge, but they focus primarily on political-military issues at the strategic level rather than on the tactical level. They lack the equipment, technical training, and often the staff expertise necessary to serve as effective tactical liaison officers. See Captain Joseph B. King, "Foreign Area Officers and Special Forces: Synergy in Combined Peacekeeping Operations," Center for Army Lessons Learned, 1998.

41. Lieutenant Colonel David H. Robinson, "Liaison: Our Doctrinal Stepchild," U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1993, available at www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1993/RDE.htm.

42. Special Forces report to the Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) commander in theater, who reports through the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) to the secretary of defense and the president. Conventional army units, by contrast, usually report through the joint or combined land force component commander (JFLCC or CFLCC), through the Unified Combatant Command for that region, to the secretary of defense and the president.

43. See Chapter 1 of this book.

44. This section draws heavily on Nora Bensahel, "Preparing for Coalition Operations," in Lynn E. Davis and Jeremy Shapiro, eds., *The U.S. Army and the New National Security Strategy* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, MR-1657-A, 2003), 117–18.

45. Peter de la Billière, *Storm Command* (London: HarperCollins, 1992), 90–91; Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *The Generals' War* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1995), 166.

46. Zanini and Taw, *The Army and Multinational Force Compatibility*, 58.

47. These fears may well have been justified. French officers serving at NATO headquarters had long been accused of leaking alliance information, and in 1998, a French officer serving at NATO headquarters was arrested for allegedly leaking information about NATO's plans in Kosovo to officials in Serbia. Peters, et al., 40–41.

48. Peters, et al., *European Contributions to Operation Allied Force*, 39–41.

49. Author interviews, June and July 2002.

50. Author interviews, July 2002.

51. Author interviews, July 2002 and June 2003.

52. Author interviews, June and August 2003.

53. For a discussion of how multilateral operations have come to be seen as more legitimate than unilateral operations, see Martha Finnemore, *The Purpose of Intervention* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2003), esp. Chapter 3.

54. One might also argue that the converse is occurring in Iraq as of this writing: the lack of broad-based international participation in major combat and in the early phases of reconstruction undermined the legitimacy of the operation, particularly for many Iraqis.