Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance

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Why will a military intervene in its own nation's system of government? What conditions promote or inhibit domestic military intervention? These are the central questions of this article.

More nations today are engaged in the process of realigning and reorganizing their militaries than at any point since World War II. Civil-military relations have reemerged as a vital topic of study for students of international relations, comparative politics, and military sociology. A major conclusion of current civil-military relations theory is that militaries should remain physically and ideologically separated from political institutions. By contrast, the alternative theory proposed in this article argues that three partners—the military, the political elites, and the citizenry—should aim for a cooperative relationship that may or may not involve separation but does not require it. This concordance theory sees a high level of integration between the military and other parts of society as one of several types of civil-military relationship. Because all such relationships reflect specific institutional and cultural conditions shared by the three partners, no single type is seen as leading necessarily to domestic military intervention. Concordance does not preclude the separation of civilian institutions and control of the military, but, under certain cultural conditions, civilian institutions or the very idea of "civil" may be inappropriate. Therefore, the specific type of civil-military relationship adopted is

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less important than the ability of the three partners involved to agree on four indicators: the social composition of the officer corps, the political decision-making process, recruitment method, and military style. Thus, concordance theory achieves two goals: first, it explains the institutional and cultural conditions that affect relations among the military, the political elites, and society; second, it predicts that if the three partners agree on the four indicators, domestic military intervention is less likely to occur.

There are two problems with the current theory of separation that concordance theory resolves. First, the current theory is derived largely from the experience of the United States, and assumes that American institutional separation should be applied to all nations to prevent domestic military intervention. It will be argued, however, that the American case is grounded in a particular historical and cultural experience—and may be inapplicable to other nations. Concordance theory, by contrast, considers the unique historical and cultural experiences of nations and the various other possibilities for civil-military relations, which may be different from the American example.

Second, the current theory argues for the separation of civil and military institutions. In fact, institutional analysis is the theory's centerpiece. Yet this method of analysis fails to take into account the cultural and historical conditions that may encourage or discourage civil-military institutional separation. Concordance moves beyond institutional analysis by addressing issues relevant to a nation's culture. Current international events demonstrate that ethnic orientations and issues of multicultural diversity are in fact causes of the domestic unrest now found throughout the world. Concordance theory operationalizes the specific institutional *and* cultural indicators mentioned above and explains the empirical conditions under which the military, the government, and the society may agree on separate, integrated, or other forms of civil-military relations in order to prevent domestic military intervention.

Both the current theory of civil-military separation and the new theory of concordance proposed here are descriptive as well as prescriptive. Separation theory describes the separation of civil and military institutions that is found in the United States, and prescribes this theory as the best deterrent to domestic military intervention for a wide range of cultures different from each other and from the United States. Concordance theory describes a concordance among the military, the political elites, and the citizenry found in a wide range of cultures (including the U.S., where there has long been substantial agreement among all sectors of the society about the role of the armed forces). It prescribes this theory as a

deterrent to domestic military intervention that flexibly applies to cultures different from each other and from the United States.

Two case studies presented here challenge the current theory and illustrate the merits of concordance theory: Israel and India. Israel is a nation under high external threat conditions, has a virtual absence of civil institutions, but has never experienced domestic military intervention. Relative to its military, India's civil institutions have been in decline for several years; and yet the armed forces have not intervened. These nations reflect the importance of indigenous political institutions and culture as they bear on the military.

An additional theoretical point deserves consideration. Proponents of the structural Realist school of thought believe that the international environment in general and a nation's external threat condition in particular greatly influence domestic politics. They also believe that nations experiencing high external threat conditions, like Israel, should be more prone to have an active military than nations under low external threat conditions. An active military, on the domestic front, also has the propensity for domestic military intervention, as illustrated by Lasswell's theory of the "garrison state." Concordance theory does not deny the importance of external threat conditions, but similarly to current civil-military relations theory, domestic politics is the primary focus. What sets concordance theory apart from both Realism and the current theory is the centrality of culture as it bears on political and military institutions, as well as on the citizenry.[1]

The first part of this article briefly discusses and critiques the current civil-military relations theory. The second part introduces concordance theory. And the final section applies concordance to Israel and India. These cases demonstrate how different historical and cultural experiences encourage similar positive relationships among the military, the political elites, and the citizenry without necessarily embracing American civil-military separations.

Concordance does not exclude cases, such as the United States, in which there has been a long tradition of civil control over the military. Rather, concordance views the American case as one example of how an agreement may be reached among the three partners over the four indicators, rather than merely accepting the dominant paradigm that is the current theory of civil-military relations. In this respect, concordance is a far more comprehensive theory of civil-military relations. But the full details of how the American case can be explained in terms of concordance will be addressed in another, lengthier study.

Part I: Civil-Military Relations Theory

The separation between civilian and military institutions is the centerpiece of the current civil-military relations literature, which enjoyed theoretical ascendency in the 1950s and 1960s. During this period many nations underwent significant transformations involving domestic military interventions, such as coup, blackmail, and "supplantment."[2] Some scholars viewed the armed forces as a potentially positive contributor to domestic political development. Most, however, warned of domestic coercion and dominance by the military.[3] Because of these potential threats to democracy, the American theoretical and empirical approach, which emphasized the separation between "civil" and "military" institutions, was devised to influence civil-military relations abroad.

The current theory postulates an institutional separation: detaching the professional military from political ambitions and specific political causes leaves it no reason to intervene in the sphere of civilian institutions. The professional military is prepared to advise civilians and defend the nation from foreign incursions, but the armed forces are not involved in political decision-making. Civil-military separation requires a distinct set of civilian institutions that maintain political control over the armed forces.[4]

The first major critique of the current theory is that it is historically and culturally bound to the American case. More specifically, the separation of the American military from civilian institutions is based upon a particular standard of professionalism. That standard highlights military insularity, political neutrality, and conservative defense planning.[5] Because the American standard of military professionalism subsequently became *the* model, it was, as a consequence, exported to nations that had standards, histories, and cultures of professionalism quite different from the western norm.

Even in American military professionalism, historical and cultural issues have always played an important role. For example, in 1951 Louis Smith wrote the following about civilian dominance of the American military:

> . . . civil dominance, regardless of how securely grounded it may be in the constitution and in the statutes, is not self implementing. Like any other principle, it must be cherished in the public mind if it is to prevail. Like any other policy, it requires translation into effective leadership. . . . every system of mili-

> tary power and of civil-military relations operates at a given time and in terms of the conditions and opinions of that time.[6]

Simply because they happen to work well in the United States, civil institutions will not naturally appear in another nation, nor can they be superimposed on its culture. Smith understood that the constitutional process and the public mind, which harbors particular political and cultural values, must work hand in hand to enable the most effective relationship between political institutions, the military, and the citizenry. Not necessarily applicable to other political cultures, civilian control prevails in American political culture because the conditions for implementing that type of control are embedded here.[7]

The second major criticism is the institutional emphasis of the current theory. Although institutional analysis is a vital aspect of civil-military relations, the literature, which points to the separation of civil and military institutions, neglects issues of culture.[8] As noted, the very idea of American institutional separation is grounded in a particular historical and cultural experience, and institutional separation is a cultural norm that is embedded within the current theory. Civil-military separation is not the only possible form of civil-military relationship, but it is the one that occurs in the United States. Depending upon the culture, history, and politics of a particular nation, civil-military relations may involve separation, integration, or a variety of other forms. Although civilian and military institutions are important aspects of civil-military relations, the current literature fails to consider the important influences of civilian society and culture.

Cultural factors include the values, attitudes, and symbols informing not only the nation's view of its military's role, but also the military's own view of that role. As shown in the two case studies below, these factors have tremendous influence on the absence or prevalence of domestic military intervention. The literature refers to civilian and military institutions. Yet these institutions must often contend with disparate societal forces. For example, characteristics of the general population may influence the role and purpose of the military. When the army recruits its soldiers, it must draw from existing civilian sectors with distinctive cultural norms and values. How does the background of these soldiers affect recruitment patterns and military service? How do communities view the military, and how does this affect their support for or opposition to the armed forces? Cultural considerations, absent from the current theory, are clearly important factors affecting civil-military relations.

Consequently, there are two types of cases that reveal the shortcomings of the current theory of civil-military separations: those contradicting predictions of intervention and those contradicting predictions of nonintervention. In this article, I will limit myself to the first type.

Part II: Concordance Theory

Current civil-military relations theory emphasizes the separation of civil and military institutions and the authority of the civil sphere over the military to prevent domestic military intervention. By contrast, the theory of concordance highlights dialogue, accommodation, and shared values or objectives among the military, the political elites, and society. Concordance theory accomplishes two goals. First, it explains which institutional and cultural conditions—involving separation, integration, or some alternative—prevent or promote domestic military intervention. Second, it predicts that when agreement prevails among the three partners, domestic military intervention is less likely to occur. The central argument, therefore, is that if the military, the political elites, and the society achieve concordance on four indicators, then domestic intervention is less probable.

Concordance theory explains the specific conditions determining the military's role in the domestic sphere that includes the government and society. Concordance does not require a particular form of government, set of institutions, or decision-making process. But it usually takes place in the context of active agreement, whether established by legislation, decree, or constitution, or based on longstanding historical and cultural values. In contrast to the prevailing theory, which emphasizes the separation of civil and military institutions, concordance encourages cooperation and involvement among the military, the political institutions, and the society at large. In other words, concordance does not assume that separate civil and military spheres are required to prevent domestic military intervention. Rather, it may be avoided if the military cooperates with the political elites and the citizenry. Cooperation and agreement on four specific indicators may result in a range or civil-military patterns. including separation, the removal of civil-military boundaries, and other variations.

Military, Political Leadership, and the Citizenry

Concordance theory views the military, the political leadership, and the citizenry as partners and predicts that when they agree about the role

of the armed forces by achieving a mutual accommodation, domestic military intervention is less likely to occur in a particular state.

The first partner—the military—can be defined quite simply. It encompasses the armed forces and the personnel. The officers and enlisted personnel are usually those most dedicated to the maintenance of the armed forces.

The second partner—the political leadership—can best be defined in terms of function. The exact nature of governmental institutions and the methods of their selection are less important when determining concordance than is identifying the elites who represent the government and have direct influence over the composition and support of the armed forces. Thus cabinets, presidents, prime ministers, party leaders, parliaments, and monarchies are all possible forms of governmental elites.

The third partner—the citizenry—is by corollary even more varied and is also best defined by function. How do the citizens interact with the military? And is there agreement among the citizens themselves over the role of the military in society? The current civil-military relations literature does not consider the citizenry, but instead relies on political institutions as the main "civil" component of analysis. While the relationship of civil institutions to the military is indeed important, it reflects only a partial story of civil-military relations. By contrast, concordance considers the citizenry as an important partner of the military and the political elites. Thus concordance is not restricted to an institutional analysis, but incorporates additional elements of society that affect the role and function of the armed forces.

On what levels can the government and the citizenry affect the military's role in a nation? It is argued here that there are four aspects or indicators of concordance: the social composition of the officer corps, the political decision-making process, the recruitment method, and the military style. In the past, the first three have been discussed in the context of theories emphasizing the separation of political institutions from the military. Concordance borrows important concepts of civil-military relations from the current literature, but places them in a wider historical and cultural context that allows richer theoretical conclusions and enables better evaluation of empirical case studies. The four indicators are important elements of concordance because they reflect specific conditions that influence agreement or disagreement among the three partners. Thus, depending on particular cultural and historical conditions, the indicators will determine whether relations among the military, the government, and the society take the form of separation, integration, or some other alternative. The crucial point, therefore, is the cultural and historical context that shapes the relationship among the partners and the indicators.

Composition of the Officer Corps

Composition of the officers corps is a primary indicator of concordance. Most modern militaries have an officer corps that is in charge of broad institutional and day-to-day functioning of the armed forces; these are the career soldiers who dedicate their lives to soldiering and to the development of the military and the definition of its relationship to the rest of society. The officer is distinguished from the rank-and-file soldier, and, as leaders of the armed forces, the officer corps can provide not only the critical links between the citizenry and the military but also between the military and the government.

A particular composition of the officer corps exists in all modern militaries. In democratic societies, the officer corps usually represents the various constituencies of the nation. Broad representation, however, is not a requisite for concordance, since it is conceivable that the society and the military could agree on a less broadly representative corps. For example, during the British Indian colonial period the "very fact that the army was drawn from particular castes and classes sets these classes well apart" from the "mass of Indian peasantry."[9] This example affirms that particular historical and cultural traditions prevail in nations, and that those traditions can affect agreement or disagreement over the composition of the officer corps.

Political Decision-Making Process

The political decision-making process, as an indicator, involves the institutional organs of society that determine important factors for the military: budget, materials, size, and structure. The political decision-making process does not imply a particular form of government—democratic, authoritarian, or any other. Rather it refers to the specific channels that determine the needs and allocations of the military.

For example, budgets, materials, size, and structure are issues decided by open parliaments, closed cabinets, special committees, and political elites, and may involve the participation of military officers. Often the military makes its needs known through a governmental channel or agency that takes into consideration both military and societal resources and requirements. In many countries there is a close partnership—or, in some instances, collusion—between the military and industry that is known as the "military industrial complex." Such a partnership may have the

support of the citizenry, which may be persuaded that external threat conditions facing a nation warrant a close military and industrial relationship. The domestic economy may also play a role as the business sector and the citizens stand to gain from the creation of new industry and employment. The critical issue is that agreement occur among the political elites, the military, and the citizenry over the political process that best meets the needs and requirements of the armed forces.

Recruitment Method

The third indicator of concordance is recruitment method. Recruitment is the enlistment of citizens into the armed forces, and the method of recruitment may be either coercive or persuasive.[10] Coercive recruitment refers to the forcible conscription of men and supplies for military purposes, in which demands are made upon the citizenry, through conscription and taxation, to supply the needs and obligations of the military. Such demands are often harsh because the citizens are forced to cooperate against their will. Consequently, this form of recruitment does not usually allow concordance between the military and the citizenry.

Persuasive recruitment can take the form of either voluntary or involuntary enlistment. Persuasion is based on "beliefs": the population believes that the sacrifice of military service is worthwhile for the sake of security, patriotism, or any other national cause. The government is not forced to coerce its people into military service when they "willingly offer themselves" by volunteering or accepting the need for enlistment.[11] Persuasive recruitment implies an agreement among the political leadership, the military, and the citizenry over the requirements and composition of the armed forces.

Military Style

The final indicator of concordance is military style. This refers to the external manifestations of the military and the inner mental constructions associated with it: what it looks like, what ethos drives it, and what people think about it.

Why is style so important? Style is about the drawing of social boundaries or their elimination. It is the mode by which members of particular elites associate with each other as peers and differentiate themselves from the members of other elites and the members of nonelite groups. It is

important because it reflects how something appears; and appearance stands as a symbol that can, by the nature and force it conveys, connote a type of power or authority. Military style deals directly with the human and cultural elements of the armed forces. How the military looks, the overt and subtle signals it conveys, the rituals it displays—these are all part of a deep and nuanced relationship among soldiers, citizens, and the polity.

Military style is not separate from the other components of concordance. To the contrary, it manifests itself within, among, and throughout the substance of the other variables. It is usually part of the historical development associated with military traditions and symbols: The uniform, for example, has always been one important symbol of respectability, professionalism, separateness, or cohesiveness—depending upon the character of the nation and its armed forces. Other military symbols and rituals include military parades and marches, military music, social traditions, and ceremonies that capture the meaning of belonging to the armed forces. Symbols and rituals may be found in the officer corps, in the methods used to induct soldiers, and in the institutional processes that determine the needs and requirements of the armed forces.

Two Cases of Concordance

This article offers a new conceptual framework for examining civil-military relations, different from the assumption in the current literature that the military should remain separate from civilian political institutions. Although concordance theory incorporates what is of value in the current literature, it does not assume that the separation between civil and military institutions is necessarily the best theoretical and empirical scenario. Institutional civil-military separation may be one form concordance takes, since in some countries separation is precisely what is agreed upon by the military, the political elites, and the citizenry. As a conceptual framework, however, concordance does not limit itself to one civil-military scenario based on separations. Concordance explains the institutional and cultural conditions that affect the distinctive relationships among the three partners. Furthermore, concordance has predictive power: if the military, the political elites, and the citizenry agree on the four indicators, domestic military intervention is less likely to occur.

Nations without a history of western civil institutions, or nations that incorporate both western and indigenous values into their political systems, are less likely to benefit from a conceptual approach that emphasizes the American separation between civil and military. Concordance

theory, by contrast, does not superimpose predetermined values upon a nation. In the following case studies, domestic military intervention has never occurred. Concordance has been achieved among the military, the political elites, and the society in politically and culturally distinctive ways.

Israel

As a nation under high external threat conditions with a powerful and active military, Israel, according to prevailing theory, is a prime candidate for domestic military intervention.[12] Why has she never experienced such an intervention? Israel was born with a security condition unparalleled in post-World War II history. The persistent climate of war and terrorism decisively shaped the relationship of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) to the Israeli political institutions and society, and the IDF's influence on government, industry, and the ethos of the Israeli people illustrates how civil-military relations cannot always be discussed on the basis of well-developed "civil" or "civilian" spheres separate from the army. As a result of the removal of boundaries dividing the military, the political institutions, and the citizenry, Israel can be characterized as an "uncivil state"—the civil-military separations that define many western European and American nations are absent in the Israeli case, and any attempt to impose them would fly in the face of its political and cultural traditions.[13]

Despite this lack of civil-military separation, Israel has achieved agreement and cooperation among the military, the political elites, and the citizenry with respect to the four indicators of concordance, as described below.

The Israeli officer corps differs from the Western European form taught in military academies. Its professionalism, by western standards, is characterized by an intimate and informal Israeli culture: the corps is not a separate and exclusionary institution, but a group of elite soldiers who sustain the citizens' army largely by maintaining the respect and trust of the citizen soldiers. Although the officer corps is disproportionately Eastern European, the citizenry, for the most part, has not opposed its make-up.[14] The broad recruitment patterns of the IDF are largely responsible; as a whole, Israeli recruitment outside the corps does not alienate any one sector of society. The recruitment process is involuntary yet persuasive. All Israeli men and women (with some exceptions) are required to spend a significant part of their lives as soldiers in the IDF. But the majority of Israelis are persuaded that their military service is necessary for the protection of the state. Israel cannot fully mobilize without its part-time

citizen-soldiers, and Israeli society as a whole is well represented within the rank and file of the army, navy, and air force. These broad recruitment patterns prevent alienation of any one group, which is often a reason for opposition to or rebellion within a military. Rather, universal recruitment helps to instill consensus over the composition of the Israeli officer corps and the role and purpose of the military.

With respect to political decision-making, Israel has always claimed to have a government represented by civilians, quite separate from the military. It is true that government officials who have previously served in the army do not consider themselves to be military personnel and do not don military uniforms in the Knesset (the Israeli parliament). Former military personalities, however, have often held major political positions in Israel. In addition, top political and military positions (prime minister, minister of defense, and chief of staff) are quite interchangeable, and have, in the past, been held by the same person at different times—without the political echelon or the citizenry perceiving a conflict of interest.

Institutional mechanisms for defining military and civilian roles in security were never implemented by the Knesset. In the early years, Ben-Gurion, who was Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, would "praise the efficacy of the state channel" when in fact the army was "mainly subordinate to him."[15] While the political tenor of the nation has dramatically changed since Ben-Gurion's day, there remains substantial ambiguity about the relative power of the prime minister, minister of defense, and chief of staff. Rules are often made to define the scope of military authority, and then changed depending on the particular governmental cabinet. All this precludes the possibility of a distinct and well regulated civilian authority that controls the military.

The absence of regulation found in civilian control over the military is also reflected in the Israeli military style, and most notably in the IDF uniform. The infantry uniform consists of a khaki-colored shirt and pants, with a colored beret signifying the soldier's brigade. The often sloppy and unkempt appearance of the uniform reflects the easy interchangeability between citizen and soldier; whereas in other countries the uniform is the critical divider between the two. The Israeli uniform's informal appearance breaks down the traditional boundaries; it is a reflection of the general informality prevalent in Israeli society. For example, the male soldiers wear black boots that are not kept shined for appearance; the women must also wear black shoes, and are often seen in the Reebok™ style of their choice. This informality, symbolized by the uniform, enables the citizen-soldier to make a rapid transition to full-time soldier; and

in a nation where quick mobilization is often essential, such a transition is vital to the efficacy of the military.

India

At first thought, India does not appear to be a comparable case for consideration because it stands in such striking contrast to Israel, where the elimination of civilian and military boundaries challenges the theory of civil control. The Indian armed forces still betray the influence of the many decades of British rule. This legacy of British professionalism and the related subordination of the Indian armed forces to civil institutional control are often put forth as major reasons for the prevention of domestic military intervention in India and as examples supporting the current theory of "civilian control." Why should we concern ourselves with concordance theory, then, if civil control provides an adequate explanation of civil-military relations in India?

Despite the traditional separation between civil and military institutions, the Indian political system over the past ten years has undergone significant changes that have led to a weakened central government. Many of these changes were prompted by domestic social violence, as well as by economic problems resulting from the new international order. It is argued here that the military has adapted to the political transformations in India, even though these have led to a weakened political center. A major reason for this adjustment is that Indian political development is not limited strictly to an institutional relationship with a strong political center. Since independence, the military as an institution and in conjunction with civilian authorities has groomed Indian soldiers to adapt to the changing and often conflict-filled political and cultural landscape of Indian society. This process has nurtured agreement among the military, the political elites, and the citizenry about the role and function of the armed forces in India; and it is this long-term concordance that has enabled the military to meet the challenges of critical stages in Indian state-building.

For many years after independence, the Indian officer corps was considered the "last outpost of the British Raj,"[16] as the corps incorporated the style and selective recruitment of the British. But since the 1980s the corps has more middle class origins, from a greater diversity of regions and castes—and is hence far more representative of Indian society than it was during the early years of statehood. A successful bridge between the British legacy and the Indian reality thus became the cornerstone of the ethic and social composition of the officer corps.[17]

Within the rank and file, Indian military recruitment is both voluntary and persuasive. As in other democratic nations, many of India's soldiers

are motivated by patriotism, loyalty, monetary remuneration, and quality living conditions. Furthermore, the Indian military is an internationally respected institution that has performed well during wartime. Past successes have given to the armed forces prestige and a meaningful role and function in Indian society. Thus recruits are often persuaded to join the military for nationalistic and personal reasons.

Although in the past Hindus and Sikhs provided a disproportionate number of recruits, the ranks since independence have been diversified in caste and region. For example, in a Mahar or Dogra regiment one can find recruits from different geographical areas and caste backgrounds. As recruitment continues to broaden the societal base of the corps and the ranks, the likelihood of ethnic/religious cliques diminishes. In recruitment, clearly, the government and the military have been sensitive to establishing positive links between the armed forces and the general population.[18]

In political decision-making, a definite process emerged during Indian state-building and the development of the Congress party: A three-tier committee system was established that until the present time has consisted of the Defense Committee of the Cabinet (DCC), the Defense Minister's Committee, and the Chief of Staff Committee (CSC). In matters of security, the prime minister's council delegated its authority to the DCC and what is now called the Political Affairs Committee (PAC). The result is that the civilian component of the three-tier system has maintained control over the armed forces, largely because the military has accepted civil authority.

Despite the apparent strength of civilian control over the military, the Indian political center, relative to the armed forces, has in fact significantly weakened since the end of the Nehru-Gandhi family dynasty. Failure to control Hindu-Muslim violence, the challenge of maintaining a secular state, India's post-Cold War economic conditions, increasing government scandal and corruption—all these have served to greatly weaken the civilian political system. Moreover, as a result of the religious-ethnic turmoil that the central government now confronts, the Indian military has increasingly been involved in "aid to the civil" in order to quell domestic violence and terrorism, thereby offering further evidence of the government's weakened position. One important Indian scholar summarizes the situation as "the disintegration of India's dominant political institutions."[19]

When we consider why the Indian military has not intervened, therefore, civil control over the military can no longer be the single explanation. Civil control theory concerns only the institutional mechanisms controlling the relationship between the civilian government and the armed

forces. Indian society, however, has undergone tremendous political and social changes since independence. Regarding Indian civil-military relations in terms of concordance among the military, the political elites, and the citizenry about the role and function of the armed forces best captures the true complexity of Indian civil-military relations. The composition of the Indian officer corps, the military's conscription method, and military style, in conjunction with the current political decision-making process, are essential parts of an understanding of civil-military relations in India, drawing attention to the importance of specific cultural and institutional contexts such as religion, caste, language, and domestic conflicts—not to mention the integration of a British legacy into an indigenous Indian society.

For example, despite more equalitarian trends in recruitment, the Indian martial tradition is still heavily influenced by British military history. Indian military style often exhibits the British "brusqueness" and swagger stick manner, and, of course, English is the spoken language within the corps. Also, soldiers live and train in secluded British-inspired cantonments. Yet, despite this British influence, the Indian army is a true example of the integration between the British and native India. One important example of this integration is the military uniform. Since the 1800s Indian uniforms have been characterized by "native costume and European fashion." One such uniform is the infantry's prim and well-kept British khaki, highlighted by a native Sikh turban. The uniform and general style of the officer corps and rank and file symbolize a successful bridge between British colonial presence and Indian independence.[20]

These two cases demonstrate how the current theory of civil-military relations fails to explain particular examples of relationships between the military, the political elites, and the society. The historical and cultural conditions found in Israel and India are distinctive and bear significantly on the way in which the military views its role in these nations. As in Israel, civil-military relations in India are shaped by a complex history that includes foreign and domestic influences. The Israeli Defense Forces are largely a product of indigenous Jewish culture, thus explaining the virtual absence of Western European civil institutions. By contrast, India integrated British colonial history into its rich native culture. Although strong civil institutions are important political constructions, they alone do not explain the complexity of Indian civil-military relations, especially since those institutions have been greatly weakened and the military has refrained from domestic military intervention.

Conclusion

A longstanding assumption in the field of civil-military relations is that of a dichotomous power relationship between civil and military spheres. Domestic military intervention is prevented if civil institutions are in control and maintain a check over a professional military. Domestic military intervention is more likely to occur if civilian institutions do not exist or are too weak to control the armed forces.

This article challenges these basic assumptions about civil-military relations. Part I offers a critique of the current theory that focused on its western-bound, dichotomous, and institutional nature. Part II discusses the theory of concordance and applies it to two case studies: Israel and India. The active and enduring agreement among the military, the political elites, and the citizenry in these countries is better able than current theory to explain why domestic military intervention has not occurred in these states. Cultural and institutional factors, focusing on the composition of the officer corps, political decision-making processes, recruitment method, and military style offers a better explanation of civil-military relations in these countries.

As American policymakers consider the Middle East, South Asia, and other regions, it is becoming more clear that institutional issues are only one part of the civil-military relations equation. Social unrest resulting from ethnic and religious turmoil plagues many nations in their search for a more stable form of government and for an effective military. The relationship between civil and military institutions is not enough to explain the dynamic interactions taking place among the political, military, and social sectors of society. Policymakers should consider the indigenous conditions and complexities of nations before assuming that a particular civil-military scenario prevents domestic military intervention in all cases.

Notes

1. Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading: MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979); Harold Lasswell, "The Garrison State Hypothesis Today," in *Changing Patterns of Military Politics,* ed. Samuel Huntington (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962).

2. For a discussion of various forms of domestic military interventions, see Samuel Finer, *The Man on Horseback* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), 78–79.

3. See, for example, the work of Lucian Pye and Guy Pauker in contrast to that of Morris Janowitz and Samuel Huntington; Lucian Pye, "Armies in the Process of Political Modernization," in *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries,* ed. J.J. Johnson (New Haven: Princeton University Press, 1968) 69. See also Guy Pauker, "Southeast Asia as a Problem Area in the Next Decade," *World Politics,* 11, 1959; Morris Janowitz, *The Military in the Political Development of New Nations* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964); and Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 222.

4. See, for example, Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), 72–93, 83–85.

5. Ibid., 83–85, 96–97.

6. Louis Smith, *American Democracy and Military Power* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), 11, 32.

7. Political culture is defined as "that elusive notion that encompasses the attitudes, dispositions, orientations, expressive symbols and values defining the situation in which political actions take place . . . ," Myron Weiner, "Political Culture in Foreign Area Studies," in *The Political Culture of Foreign Area and International Studies,* eds. Richard J. Samuels and Myron Weiner (Washington: Brasseys (US), Inc., 1992), 4.

8. This thesis agrees with Geertz's idea that culture is found in a particular context that is to be uniquely understood and described—and not superimposed upon another culture: "As interworked systems of construable signs . . . culture is not a power, something to which social events, behaviors, institutions, or processes can be causally attributed; it is a context, something within which they can be intelligibly—that is, thickly—described." Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures* (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 14.

9. Stephen P. Cohen, *The Indian Army* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), 50, 51, 62.

10. These two forms of recruitment are borrowed from Samuel Finer's "extraction coercion-persuasion cycle," in "State and Nation-Building In Europe: The Role of the Military," in *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 95–96.

11. Ibid., 95–96.

12. See note one.

13. Rebecca L. Schiff, "Civil Military Relations Reconsidered: Israel as an 'Uncivil' State," *Security Studies* 1, 4 (Summer 1992).

14. A 1983 survey shows that only about 13 percent of officers from the ranks of major and above were of Asian-African origin. More current statistical information on the ethnic representation of the officer corps has not been released by the Israeli Defense Forces. Sammy Smooha, "Ethnicity and the Military In Israel: Theses for Discussion and Research," *State, Government and International Relations,* 22, (Winter 1983–84) 17, (Hebrew).

15. Yoram Peri, *Between Battles and Ballots: Israeli Military in Politics* (Cambridge University Press, 1983), 49, 51.

16. Stephen P. Cohen, *The Indian Army* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 182.

17. Pradeep P. Barua, "Ethnic Conflict In the Military of Developing Nations: A Comparative Analysis of India and Nigeria," *Armed Forces & Society* 19, Summer (1992): 131–132.

18. Stephen P. Cohen, *The Indian Army,* 188–189.

19. Sumit Ganguly, "From the Defense of Nation to Aid to the Civil: The Army in Contemporary India," *Journal of Asian and African Studies* XXVI, 1–2 (1991), 22; Atul Kohli, "State-society Relations in India's Changing Democracy," in *India's Democracy,* ed. Atul Kohli (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990), 306.

20. Richard Knotel, Herbert Knotel, and Herbert Sieg, *Uniforms of the World* (New York: Exeter Books,1980), 276–277.