Alignment, Nonalignment, and Small Powers: 1945–1965

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I

A FUNCTIONING balance-of-power system, comparable to the one which existed throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, limits the ability of Small Powers to achieve their own goals. However, in compensation it provides more real security for them—in terms of the maintenance of independence—than other historical systems, all of which offered the Small Power some elements of maneuverability but to the detriment of long-range security. At first glance the contemporary political system appears to contradict this generalization: Surely, one would presume, the new status of Small Powers reflects a system in which the weaker units of international politics have finally achieved both security and influence. Nevertheless, a closer examination of actual patterns of interaction substantially qualifies this presumption: The original generalization, that is, remains basically sound.

It is extremely difficult to characterize the present configuration of power, but it is necessary to do so if we are to understand the degree to which the position of Small Powers has been altered. For some years after World War II the transitory weakness of all but the two superpowers combined with the relative quiescence of the non-Western world to create what seemed to be a bipolar system. The revolution in nuclear technology, whatever its ultimate effects, merely confirmed this state of affairs. The world was obviously bipolar in military terms—on both the conventional and nuclear level—and it was more bipolar than anything else in political terms. The monolithic nature of

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both blocs as well as the early difficulties encountered by Yugoslavia—the prime defector—illustrated the point. Similarly, the tendency to regard nonalignment as "immoral," to divide the world sharply into friends and enemies, also reflected thought patterns consonant with a bipolar distribution of power. After all, in a *purely* bipolar world nonaligned states would not exist. And in a tight, but not purely, bipolar world their influence and power *ought* to have been nil: If "immoral" was an inapposite description, "unwise" would not have been.

The world still remains essentially bipolar at the nuclear level and will probably remain so for several decades, that is, unless the possession of a few primitive atomic bombs and an archaic delivery system is presumed to constitute an effective deterrent against the nuclear giants. However, on the political level (but *not* the economic) and on the level of conventional warfare, bipolarity has given way to multipolarity, primarily in the ways in which states behave, if not in the actual capabilities they possess.[1] The reasons for the erosion of the earlier pattern are fairly obvious. The economic and political recovery of formerly weak allies, as well as the cumulative effect of the creation of so many new sovereignties, is most conspicuous. A gradually developing sophistication about the significance of nuclear weapons has also been critical: The assumption that the two superpowers have reached a nuclear stalemate, however much the strategists put the notion in doubt, has affected allies and neutrals in somewhat similar ways. The allies, already stronger, demand not only more participation in their own defense but also more freedom to pursue their own goals independent of Washington or Moscow. And the neutrals perceive the stalemate as an opportunity to maneuver at local levels and care about the East-West struggle only to the extent that they do not want to see the stalemate destroyed by a war which would also injure them simultaneously.

It is misleading to characterize this confused pattern of interactions with a simple label such as bipolarity. Nor is it much more helpful to employ a mixture of labels, e.g., bipolar on the nuclear level, multipolar on the political and conventional levels, tripartite in policy (i.e., a policy which takes account of three centers of influence), dualistic in major conflicts (North-South, East-West), etc.[2] Some of the labels are too simplistic—for example, conceiving the dominant conflicts in a dualistic sense dangerously slights the intrabloc dissensions which have become increasingly prevalent. Moreover, even if the descriptions are accurate, we are left with so many levels of interaction that their relationships cannot be isolated.

In any event, the contemporary international system is so variegated and

[1] George Liska, *Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence* (Baltimore, Md: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), pp. 214ff.

[2] See Liska in *ibid.* for an attempt at this kind of clarification.

multifaceted that it confuses rather than compels clear policy choices. It might be argued, for example, that a balance-of-power system contains obvious policy imperatives which any actor in the system can ignore only at its own peril. The same argument could not be made with respect to what we have now, at least since the relatively simple bipolar pattern of the earlier period has eroded. But if a statesman is limited in the directions he can draw from systemic patterns, what landmarks do in fact serve to orient his behavior?[3] The contention here is that he operates with a set of loosely drawn "rules of thumb" based on his perception of the characteristics of the present configuration which are *both* salient and relevant to his immediate situation. That is, in lieu of the ordering principles attendant upon a systemic categorization which would encompass the relationships between the salient landmarks, he must perceive and order those landmarks himself. And he will do so within a context which is local, *ad hoc,* and parochial, not systemic.

Some of those characteristics are so obvious—so salient—that they have served as rough but constant guides throughout the years since World War II. The technological revolution in weaponry is clearly preeminent. By ruling out large-scale wars (except for ultimate threats) and by exacerbating the problem of controlling limited violence (because of the fear of escalation and the unsuitability of nuclear weapons for local conflicts) the new weapons have altered traditional security calculations for both Great Powers and Small Powers.[4]

Traditional behavioral patterns have also been altered because of the intrusion of a large number of actors who are not only new but also different in kind. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Economic Community (EEC), and the Afro-Asian bloc have few—if any—*significant* parallels in earlier international systems. Even the development and policies of the United Nations in an era of nuclear weapons, rampant anticolonialism, and East-West conflict have diverged from those of its predecessor. In particular, the United Nations has tended to reinforce and incorporate a less permissive attitude toward the use of force. By exerting pressure, however successfully, for peaceful settlement or peaceful nonsettlement of disputes the UN has gone some way toward creating an international environment which is *slightly* less dangerous for the weaker members of the system. More significantly, the new states which have emerged since the war differ in many essential respects from the traditional members of the international system.

Despite its virtual universality, or perhaps in part because of it, the con-

[3] The extent to which assumptions about the nature of the international system actually influence decision makers has never been proved—the supposition that they act in a certain way because they perceive that they are operating within one kind of system and would therefore act differently in another kind of system is still merely an analytical and *a priori* judgment. In fact, decision makers may never make *systemic* judgments at all but merely react (as the next sentence in the text suggests) to perceptions about the immediate impact of a range of considerations which constantly vary as problems vary.

[4] This point is discussed at greater length below.

temporary system is also characterized by a large element of subsystem dominance. The fact that nuclear war is unlikely, or that it is presumed to be so, has tended to concentrate attention on regional conflicts to the extent that it is generally assumed that the most dangerous *systemic* threat is the escalation of a subsystem conflict—which accounts in some significant degree for the influence of many Small Powers.

Finally, it is clear that the value consensus which facilitated the process of politics in earlier years is no longer in existence. It would be difficult to repeat at least one of Neville Chamberlain's follies. While he could still presume, with very little opposition, that Adolph Hitler could be treated like a Birmingham (or was it Manchester?) businessman, we are now very much aware that many actors in the present system not only reject the old tradition of European politics but also are willing to use virtually any means to alter the course of events in a favorable direction. Whether this is simply another way of noting the decline of Europe or the intrusion of ideological issues into politics is uncertain. But its effect is to compound the confusion and suspicion created by the interaction of the factors already noted.[5]

One recent analysis of the contemporary scene has argued that its most salient characteristic is that *both* total war and limited war are less likely than in earlier periods.[6] If true, it would surely dilute the significance of the preceding points, for a declining value consensus would be of minimal significance if it occurred in an environment dominated by a decreasing likelihood of all kinds of war. However, while very few analysts would dispute the contention that total wars are less likely, the proposition that limited wars are also less likely is clearly debatable—unless the proposition is assumed to refer only to direct conflicts between the Great Powers. At any rate, the contention that Small Powers have more maneuverability in our time can be argued without reference to the relative likelihood of limited wars.

The unique characteristics of the contemporary international system limit the extent to which it can be compared with earlier systems, even those in which the power configuration was more or less bipolar (e.g., 1891–1914 or 1933–1939). For one thing, the thought patterns of the earlier "bipolar" systems, insofar as those thought patterns can be detected and isolated, remained within the old balance-of-power tradition. A self-conscious perception that the rules of statecraft had to be adjusted to a new kind of power configuration did not occur. For that matter, it occurred only fitfully and irregularly in the contemporary world and, as a tendency, has declined rather sharply in recent years. In earlier international systems Small Powers achieved a transitory maneuverability as a result of the power configuration per se, as well as the

[5] For a somewhat different attempt to list the basic features of the contemporary system, see Michael Brecher, *The New States of Asia* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963).

[6] Herbert S. Dinerstein, "The Transformation of Alliance Systems," *American Political Science Review*, September 1965 (Vol. 59, No. 3), p. 590f.

prevalent assumption that *general* war was imminent. In the contemporary system the power configuration is not nearly so clear, and it is the assumption that general war must be avoided, not that it is imminent, which accounts in some degree for the new status of Small Powers. Superficial similarities in overt behavior cannot obscure the differing bases on which that behavior rests. Perhaps the differences, as well as the similarities, between the various systems which have been described as bipolar will be clearer if we examine contemporary alliance policies and contrast them with earlier examples.

II

An initial distinction must be made between NATO and other contemporary alliances. The conditions which facilitated the creation of an alliance of such scope and power are no longer present. In a sense, in its early years when the Soviet threat appeared very real and very immediate, NATO was analogous to the alliance blocs created in the decade before World War I. In both periods alliances were conceived primarily as elements in a war policy: The emphasis was on preparedness and on common reactions to external threats. Moreover, strategic responses based on mobilization schedules in the one case and on massive retaliation in the other tended to bind statesmen in a similar way. The necessity of striking first was so critical that it could accelerate the incipient destabilization created by any crisis. Membership patterns were also generally similar, emphasizing bloc solidarity even at the cost of national interests. And in both cases, regional and ideological (the Franco-Russian case aside) affinities reinforced a rigid bipolarity.

However, the two cases are not completely parallel. The Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance sought relatively limited ends (no one wanted to *destroy* the old system) but with the aid of all the means at their disposal (even if they did not understand just how destructive those means really were); the cold-war antagonists originally sought wider gains (in part because of ideological differences) but by much less than total means. In addition, the contemporary system was organized on a global basis, whereas its predecessors were organized on a European basis. Thus the pattern of politics which emerged in each case was bound to be different.

As the military threat represented by the Soviet Union (and by Germany from the other perspective) has seemed to recede and as the allies of each superpower have gained strength, the cohesiveness and integration of each alliance have tended to decline. The sense of permanence which once surrounded both blocs has dissipated; one hears ever more discussion, for example, of the possibility of imminent demise for NATO. The analogy with the blocs created before World War I *seems* much less pertinent than it once did. The extent to which NATO will regain its original strength is debatable;

and it is very unlikely that any other alliance will be created which parallels the early NATO in integration and scope. Therefore, NATO will be treated as a unique case and not as an example of general alliance patterns in the Cold War.

To understand these general patterns it is necessary to examine the policies of the new nations. Since those policies are normally described in terms of "neutrality" or "nonalignment," an examination of alliance policy may seem contradictory or useless. However, the rationale for nonalignment also clarifies and illuminates the contrary case: the conditions which would foster alignment.

Differences *between* Small Powers have grown increasingly important. That statement is particularly true for the period since World War II although it also has some relevance for the interwar years. It is no longer possible to use the term "Small Power"—even with the explicit qualification that we are concerned only with "Small Powers faced by a great-power threat"—without further identification: It is necessary to indicate which Small Power, or at least which group of Small Powers, one has in mind. Thus the rest of this essay will be concerned only with those non-Western Small Powers which have gained their independence since 1945.

The distinction would not be necessary if it was assumed that the current status of all Small Powers could be explained solely in terms of the impact of bipolarity and nuclear weapons. Clearly it cannot. The behavior of the nonaligned countries differs from the behavior of most of the older generation of Small Powers not only because the environment in which they live is different but also because they are, in many respects, a different kind of Small Power. It is not simply that they are weak, inexperienced, beset by regional conflicts, nationalistic, and unstable domestically—the same characteristics could be used to describe the first generation of "new" Small Powers, the successor states to the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The critical difference does not lie so much in their external circumstances as it does in the fact that many of the contemporary nonaligned states lack any identification with, or attachment to, the traditions of the Western state system. They tend, that is, to think differently than their Western counterparts (*both* the stable ones like Belgium and the unstable ones like Rumania in the interwar years). Most significantly, perhaps, they do not have the *same* sense of what being a Small Power implies in terms of a range of acceptable behavior.

In theoretical terms the point need not be carried to an extreme. There are still enough similarities between the two groups of Small Powers to warrant the assumption that they can be subsumed under the same general label. Most of the European Small Powers (except for Sweden, Finland, Austria, and Switzerland) belong to one or another of the great-power blocs; very few of the new states do. However, *both* the allied and the nonallied Small Powers

have at least one identical systemic interest: insuring that both blocs survive. The allied Small Powers require the presence of the other bloc in order to maintain their value as allies.[7] The unaligned Small Powers require the presence of both antagonists in order to retain their maneuverability. The similarity noted merely reflects a commonplace: The lesser units in any bipolar or quasi-bipolar system prefer the dangers and advantages of bipolarity to the disadvantages a hegemonial system offers. Still, the point remains that all Small Powers have some similar interests imposed upon them by the nature of the environment. Their differences arise, primarily, from the fact that the nonaligned states—as previously noted—possess a different political tradition and lack a stable organizational framework.

The remainder of this essay will concentrate on the policies of the new generation of Small Powers. Inevitably, the policies of the older Small Powers will be slighted. This decision reflects a number of considerations which ought to be noted. The most significant is the implicit assumption that the behavior of the European (and most other aligned) Small Powers has not altered greatly and that their decision to join the bloc system after 1945 has little *theoretical* interest as they possessed few, if any, viable alternatives at the time. The inclination to concentrate on the new and nonaligned states also reflects their prominence and importance in the contemporary international system—and the concomitant assertion that their new status symbolizes a fundamental revision of great-power/small-power relationships, a point of real theoretical import.

III

The deterioration of semantic accuracy in the use of the term "neutrality" can be traced back to the efforts of various European Small Powers to cloak their frightened reactions to the anarchy of the 1930's in familiar terms.[8] Neutrality traditionally referred to the rights and duties of nonbelligerents during the course of a war. Obviously, whatever else it may refer to, the current attraction of policies defined as "neutral" has nothing to do with legal rights. On the contrary, it reflects political, military, and psychological judgments about the opportunities and dangers of the contemporary political configuration.

The current policies of the new states are also not analogous to the status of guaranteed neutrality. In addition to the specific political requirements which had—or have—to be present to make any guarantee viable, it was presumed that the recipient of such status was being withdrawn from world politics—that the political system would operate *as if* the guaranteed state was no longer present. Contemporary neutrality does not necessarily envisage any such thing:

[7] See Karl Deutsch and Morton A. Kaplan, "The Limits of International Coalitions," in James N. Rosenau (ed.), *International Aspects of Civil Strife* (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1964), pp. 170–189.

[8] See Nils Örvik, *The Decline of Neutrality, 1914–1941* (Oslo: Johan Gundt Tarum-Forlag, 1953).

The state so defining itself (a reversal of the past in itself) may do so in expectation of playing a more active role in world politics, not a less active one.

Nonalignment is thus a more acceptable term, at the very least because it lacks the historical connotations of "neutrality" or any of its derivatives. In addition, it is a more descriptive choice since it corresponds to what its advocates say they are doing, even if their policies reveal inconsistencies.

Some contemporary analysts regard nonalignment as a new departure in world politics. Thus J. W. Burton argues that the nonaligned states are "not involved in the power dispute" between the United States and the Soviet Union and that they have "a status and stability wholly unlike any previous form of noninvolvement in conflict."[9] He concludes that:

> Nonalignment has become an institution, and moreover one which does not necessarily rest upon the continued existence of rivalry between two power groupings.[10]

If Burton's argument is substantially correct, then the role of the Small Power in international relations has indeed been altered—if not reversed.

It bears emphasis that the attractions of nonalignment are not new. As a tactical approach to the issues of foreign policy—and nonalignment ought not to be mistaken for a foreign policy as such—it has frequently appealed to the weaker members of an international system which has *bipolar* characteristics.[11] The virtues—and perquisites—of a position between or unattached to the great-power blocs are hardly as new as Josip Broz Tito and Gamal Abdel Nasser apparently believe.[12] In fact, of course, everybody would prefer to avoid the onerous commitments of alignment—as long as their security position seems unthreatened.

Nonalignment is thus attractive (and usually viable) in periods of "cold war"—that is, when great-power relationships have neither sunk to war nor risen to peaceful cooperation. In such circumstances Small Powers find themselves the objects of competition but not the victims of war (or, perversely, of great-power cooperation which would remove their bargaining leverage). The viability of nonalignment is, therefore, directly related to the power balance between the Great Powers. It is decisively affected by that balance, and it in turn exercises some influence over its operation.[13] Nonalignment is

[9] J. W. Burton, *International Relations: A General Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), p. 115.

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 167. For another argument about the distinctive character of nonalignment see Cecil Crabb, *The Elephants and the Grass* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965).

[11] The point ought to be emphasized to avoid misunderstanding: Nonalignment is an entirely different kind of proposition in a balance-of-power system. In fact, it is unlikely that it would be viable in any system where the Great Powers competed for each other's allegiance directly rather than concentrating on winning the support of a "third world."

[12] Thus Nasser has said "Tito is a great man. He showed me how to get help from both sides—without joining either." (Quoted in Peter Lyon, *Neutralism* [Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1963], p. 86.)

[13] Coral Bell, "Non-alignment and the Power Balance," in Davis B. Bobrow (ed.), *Components of Defense Policy* (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1965), p. 69.

not only impossible in conditions of overt great-power war or substantive cooperation; it is also nonviable—*for Small Powers*—in a balance-of-power system where the Great Powers primarily seek the support of their peers rather than their inferiors.

Nonalignment, in sum, is a tactical principle designed to extract the widest range of advantages from a particular kind of power configuration. Therefore, Professor Burton and others, including, of course, many spokesmen for the nonaligned states, overstate the case when they argue that nonalignment has become an institution of world politics unaffected by the vagaries of "power politics." Jawaharlal Nehru himself was more analytically perceptive when he declared in 1954 that:

> When there is substantial difference in the strength of the two opposing forces, we in Asia, with our limitations, will not be able to influence the issue. But when the two opposing forces are fairly evenly matched, then it is possible to make our weight felt in the balance.[14]

There is, however, a more substantial reason for doubting the presumed institutional permanence of nonalignment, irrespective of alterations in the distribution of power. Nonalignment is viable for a Small Power only so long as it is not threatened by a Great Power; once directly threatened, it is difficult to avoid alignment with another Great Power.[15] In a real sense, then, an explicit policy of nonalignment always involves an implicit *arrière-pensée* that, in effect, great-power support will be available if needed. The future ally is disguised, but it is the presumption that he will be there, once called, which makes his disguise acceptable. And thus, once again, the contention that nonalignment is independent of power relations is incorrect. A recent statement by Raj Krishna, an Indian economist, is illustrative: "Non-alignment has always been, in reality, an informal, unstated, unilateral alignment with unnamed Powers."[16] So, too, is an earlier statement of an avowed "neutralist," Cambodia's Prince Norodom Sihanouk: "In case of a massive Viet Minh invasion we will count on the aid—material and armaments—of the United States. . . ."[17]

Still, something must be conceded to those who contend that contemporary nonalignment policies differ from earlier versions. My point is that the difference is one of degree rather than kind. But why has it changed at all? What has transformed a rather obvious tactical principle into—at least in the words

[14] Quoted in *ibid.*

[15] The situation is different if war has broken out. See Annette Baker Fox, *The Power of Small States* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959), for a discussion of Small Powers directly threatened by the Great Powers during World War II.

[16] Raj Krishna, "India and the Bomb," *India Quarterly,* April–June 1965 (Vol. 21, No. 2), p. 122.

[17] Quoted in Roger M. Smith, *Cambodia's Foreign Policy* (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1965), p. 53. And for Sweden's tacit assumption that Western support will be forthcoming even without an alliance, see James J. Robbins, *Recent Military Thought in Sweden on Western Defense* (RM-1407) (Santa Monica, Calif: RAND Corporation, 1955), pp. 80, 84.

of some of its advocates—an institution much venerated and much praised? We can begin to understand only if we examine the dynamics of nonalignment in relationship to the environment in which it must operate—for if contemporary nonalignment is, indeed, different, even if only in degree, it is because of (and not in spite of) the nature of the prevailing configuration of power.

IV

The general characteristics of nonalignment are relatively easy to detect.[18] Its proponents see it as an active policy designed to exploit the Cold War for their own ends.[19] Thus, Kwame Nkrumah could declare in 1961 that: "We have adhered strictly to our policy of positive neutralism and non-alignment and whatever we have done, we have always placed Africa first."[20] The benefits which nonalignment presumably confers range over a wide area. One study notes that it has been justified as a means of: 1) ensuring freedom and independence; 2) keeping Small Powers out of larger conflicts of no concern to them; 3) avoiding alliances which make local problems more difficult to solve; 4) preventing the diversion of scarce resources to military obligations; and 5) obtaining foreign aid from both sides.[21]

It is surely true that most nonaligned states seek benefits from both sides in the Cold War and that they assume that it guarantees them more independence and prestige than any other alternative. Yet this catalogue of advantages, true as far as it goes, obscures the decisive consideration: the underlying conditions which makes the achievement (as distinct from the desirability) of any advantages possible. Small Powers, historically confined to a limited role, even locally, are now significant elements of the political process —in fact, in regional terms they are very close to being environment-determining actors rather than mere objects of a game played by others. More than ever before, they influence the nature of great-power involvement in local areas and articulate their own desires and their own needs to a unique degree. It is absurd to suggest that they have actually reversed the traditional hierarchy of international politics, but they do exert a significant influence on the fate of their own regions, and they have even achieved something of a role in extra-regional conflicts.

It is the impact of nuclear weapons on world politics which is normally

[18] Not, of course, to all people. A recent article in India has noted that in some circumstances "you would have found Nepal practicing non-alignment against us." (M. R. Masani, "The Challenge of the Chinese Bomb," *India Quarterly,* January–March 1965 [Vol. 21, No. 1], p. 15.)

[19] The desire to extract some benefits from a relatively bipolar situation is not new: The Balkan states before 1914 and Poland after 1933 are indicative.

[20] Quoted in Arnold Rivkin, *The African Presence in World Affairs* (Glencoe, Ill: The Free Press, 1963), p. 196.

[21] Ernest Lefever, "Nehru, Nasser, and Nkrumah on Neutralism," in Lawrence Martin (ed.), *Neutralism and Nonalignment* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p. 95.

adduced as an explanation for this development. Insofar as these weapons have made great-power wars too dangerous, they have altered—and *perhaps* revolutionized—the relationship between members of the international system. Conflict, rather than being eliminated, has been concentrated in areas where nuclear weapons cannot be used effectively or where the stakes involved would not justify their use. In addition, conflict has been transferred from the formal military level to the level of political, economic, and paramilitary confrontation.

In the past the influence of Small Powers rose only when they were sought as allies on the eve of a great-power conflict. But now, with great-power military conflict limited, they are still sought as allies or friends—but *in place of,* not *because of,* an imminent great-power war. That is, Small Powers are now sought as symbols of victory in a political struggle which is never destined (in terms of the intentions of the competitors) to erupt into great-power conflict—at least, even according to Mao Tse-tung, for some long period of time. The basis of small-power influence is thus different from any of its earlier manifestations, and since it primarily rests on perceptions about a technological development which cannot be reversed rather than on a political development which can, it *may* be more permanent. After all, whatever its global significance, from the point of view of Small Powers it is clearly advantageous to be sought as allies or friends in a political conflict which the Great Powers envisage as the only viable alternative to direct conflict. They are still targets of great-power policies, but they have more means by which to defend themselves in a political conflict, and they are somewhat less exposed to direct great-power military intervention. A reasonable fear that intervention will increase the dangers of escalation, that it will offend other nonaligned countries, and that it will not lead to a quick and relatively painless solution to the crisis which prompts thoughts of intervention has induced caution—though surely not abstinence—on the part of the Great Powers.

In an international environment with the preceding characteristics the UN is bound to play a significant role. It becomes one of the primary arenas in which the political struggle between the Great Powers manifests itself. Great Powers intent on seeking influence within the UN must, at a minimum, pay lip service to its principles; but they may also do more and actually adapt or alter their behavior rather than violate those principles too grossly. Thus, the UN may restrain the Great Powers, an act which inevitably benefits the weaker members of the system.

On a more specific level, the UN also enhances the influence of the nonaligned states by virtue of its voting system, which is disproportionately weighted in favor of the weaker members. In any system in which the political allegiance of Small Powers becomes valuable, whatever the reason, the utility of their mere ability to cast a vote rises. But that utility is obviously enormously

increased in a situation where their vote is not only symbolically significant but also, particularly in combination with the votes of their peers, frequently substantively decisive. In sum, as an institution which serves as a partial restraint upon the Great Powers and which also grants a singularly large amount of influence to its weaker members, the UN facilitates the success of nonalignment policies.

Stanley Hoffmann has noted that revolutionary periods, such as our own, tend to increase the influence of lesser units since military power is only one dimension among several in such periods.[22] Deficiencies in material power no longer seem quite so critical. Mere possession of the formal accouterments of sovereignty is enough to make a Small Power a worthwhile target of the political-symbolic struggle now under way. The military capabilities of Small Powers are significant only in a very limited sense, for they are usually inadequate even on a local level. And, of course, on the global level the two superpowers can more easily change the military balance in their own laboratories or by increasing their own defense budgets than by acquiring allies.

Clearly, then, the primary reason for the new status of Small Powers inheres, as it always has, in the nature of great-power relationships. Since the latter have been altered by the impact of nuclear weapons, the position of Small Powers was bound to undergo some amount of transformation. However, the attractions of nonalignment cannot be attributed *solely* to the new military technology: It is a necessary but not sufficient explanation. By themselves nuclear weapons would only make nonalignment a more attractive tactical principle. But nonalignment is more than that to its advocates: It has a *mystique* surrounding it which can only be understood in terms of the nature of the nonaligned states themselves. What would have been, to an earlier generation of Small Powers, a device to extract concessions has become, to a new generation, a state of mind presumably capable of ordering all questions of foreign policy in a meaningful way.

Nonalignment is especially significant now because it is psychologically attractive to its practitioners. For states only recently freed from dependence, any political stance which emphasizes independence and which rationalizes a unique role in world politics will gain adherents. Nonalignment, as C. B. Marshall has noted, simultaneously reflects a desire to avoid commitment to former rulers and yet to exercise real influence on the course of events.[23] The mere act of repudiating the traditional system of international politics—a sys-

[22] Stanley Hoffmann, "Restraints and Choices in American Foreign Policy," *Daedalus*, Fall 1962 (Vol. 91, No. 4), pp. 692–693.

[23] C. B. Marshall, "On Understanding the Unaligned," in Martin, *Neutralism and Nonalignment*, pp. 13–33. The psychological attractions of nonalignment suggest that it would have been an attractive policy to the new states *irrespective of the distribution of power*. Note, for example, some of the similarities in behavior between the United States in its formative years and the current generation of new states. However, it is worth reemphasizing that nonalignment—whatever its instinctive appeal—could not be a *successful* policy without a particular kind of power configuration.

tem which excluded, ignored, or abused them—has its own peculiar "moral" appeal of somehow transcending "power politics."

The desire to take independent positions on general issues, to avoid identification with the great-power blocs, thus rests on more than the tactical possibility of extracting aid from both sides. An analysis, even by a spokesman for the nonaligned states, which notes only the advantage of being courted by all sides is too "classical." Raj Krishna's statement is illustrative:

> The military significance of the policy of non-alignment is simply that it avoids a complete military alliance with any one Power in order to permit limited military agreements with all Powers.[24]

Nonalignment is attractive not only because of the tangible benefits it promises *and* not only because of the nature of great-power relationships but also because it grants status to those heretofore denied it by the hierarchical or quasi-hierarchical structure of international society.

The psychological attraction of nonalignment is reinforced by all the other environmental pressures which affect the behavior of emerging societies—nationalism, anticolonialism, revolutionary attitudes, the imperatives of economic growth, and so forth. Very few of the underdeveloped countries have been able to contend with these forces in an effective way. The normal result has been domestic instability. A foreign policy of nonalignment can become, in the circumstances, a means of bolstering prestige lost on the home front. The publicity engendered by playing a world role may compensate for domestic failures; at the least it may silence, or justify silencing, internal critics. In fact, a rationale for nonalignment can be developed based solely on its significance in internal politics.[25] It ought not, however, to be overemphasized, for it is a successful domestic tactic only to the extent that it achieves external gains—and that depends on great-power relationships. But it does indicate, once again, why nonalignment has become something more than a tactical principle.

V

What relationship is there between public declarations of faith in nonalignment and the actual policies of the new states? How do its proponents translate theoretical and practical desirability into substantive policy decisions?

In theory, nonalignment could serve as the basis for a real attempt to stabilize the Cold War; in reality, it has done quite the opposite. Most contemporary Small Powers have applied the general principles of nonalignment in an

[24] Krishna, *India Quarterly*, Vol. 21, No. 2, p. 122.

[25] See the essay by Robert Good, "State-Building as a Determinant of Foreign Policy in the New States," in Martin, *Neutralism and Nonalignment*. This would have been an unlikely, if not inconceivable, rationale in the past when the *ethos* and imperatives of modernization did not prevail—and when the new states were, in general, more viable creations.

intensely egocentric manner. If nonalignment merely reflected felt security needs within a particular kind of power configuration, the result *might* have been different. However, it also reflects an aggregate of emotional and psychological factors which inevitably affect the quality of the policies pursued.

The new states have been concerned with the East-West conflict and its derivatives only to the extent that they hope to benefit from it. Since they assume that their position is strongest when the two blocs are stalemated and that such a stalemate exists in fact, their only concern with East-West issues has been to ensure that no crisis gets so out of hand that it leads to war. Thus their efforts have been directed at facilitating any settlement which appears to reduce tensions, irrespective of the quality of the settlement.[26] A consistent indifference to the terms of any settlement has been supplemented by an increasingly prevalent assumption that both great-power blocs are immoral, that the only moral policies in this world are those practiced by nonaligned states, and therefore that the nature of a settlement between immoral parties is clearly not of great import.[27] What they hope to do, of course, is to maneuver expediently in one major conflict in order to enhance their position in the conflict which they feel is dominant.[28]

The result could have been different if the new states were stable and viable constructions. As it is, they face too many pressures, particularly domestic, to indulge in the kind of thoughtful, long-range security policies *occasionally* practiced by European Small Powers of another generation. The situation could also have developed differently if the nonaligned states perceived the Soviet Union (and China) as a security threat. For the most part they do not. Their own inexperience, the oft-noted "appeals of Communism," and an understandable reluctance to forsake the advantages of nonalignment account for an apparent indifference to Soviet designs. Communism is by definition (Lenin's) nonimperialistic; aggression is always by imperialists; *ergo,* the Communists cannot be aggressors. In any case, even if the threat is perceived, there are too many perquisites attached to nonalignment to abandon it easily. The excessively optimistic assumption that the elimination of great-power conflict has *completely* transformed the nature of the struggle in the underdeveloped areas so that it will always take a nonmilitary form merely confirms the tendency to slight or ignore security questions—they are by definition and

[26] See William C. Johnstone, *Burma's Foreign Policy* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1963), for numerous examples with respect to Burma.

[27] *Ibid.*, pp. 113–115.

[28] A Ghanaian memorandum for a meeting of the nonaligned states in 1958 reflects both the sense of moral superiority and the desire to use the East-West conflict expediently:

> It would be unwise, therefore, to implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of European policies. Our detached position invites us to pursue quite a different course. . . . Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalship, interest, humor or caprice?

(Quoted in Thomas Hovet, Jr., *Africa in the United Nations* [Evanston, Ill: Northwestern University Press, 1963], p. 27.)

by conviction, or by hope, of secondary importance.[29] The willingness of the United States to come to the aid of those new states which guessed wrong and remained nonaligned in the face of a threat which should have sent them beseeching aid (e.g., India) has not facilitated early appreciation of the security problem—why ally if you can get all the benefits without doing so?

The end result is a series of nonalignment policies justified in the most principled terms but in reality resting on very pragmatic and instrumental judgments about the best way to take advantage of contemporary events.[30] Ironically, there is a sense in which nonalignment policies based solely on expediential calculations are ultimately destructive of real independence for Small Powers: Their vaunted flexibility turns out to be nothing more than the traditional scavenger policy of Small Powers in new clothes. They have the freedom, that is, only to react to and take advantage of great-power rivalries.[31]

It is doubtful that nonalignment can ever be very much more than a tactical principle. However, its advocates maintain that it is more than that. Thus they can fairly be blamed for not even attempting to develop nonalignment policies which rest on wider and sounder considerations. That refusal assures the continuation of a large gap between theory and practice: a theory which asserts the constructive role of nonalignment in world politics but a practice which turns it into a device to extract and extort minimal gains.

The emergence of Communist China as an independent threat—and as a new policy option—may alter the pattern of the first two decades of the Cold War. That pattern has, in any event, been in the process of evolution. In the first decade when the blocs were cohesive and the level of tension and enmity was high, the nonaligned states were actively courted by both sides—but as converts. Tactically speaking, nonalignment was extremely attractive since the Small Powers could gain very little from joining either side. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union appeared to be a very attractive ally: Not choosing between them, insofar as it remained possible, was clearly the wisest course. In addition, as a group, the nonaligned states were relatively unified by virtue of common agreement on the relevance of the anticolonial issue.

The situation began to change in the mid-1950's. The cause and effect relationships are extremely difficult to untangle, but several points can be made with some assurance. Intense pressure to join either bloc began to relax. In fact, the blocs themselves began to lose cohesiveness, though this was not the decisive consideration. The military factor was undoubtedly critical. Aside

[29] See Liska, p. 210f.

[30] See Lefever in Martin, *Neutralism and Nonalignment,* p. 96.

[31] See Johnstone, p. 76, where he notes Burma's "growing dependence upon the vagaries, sudden changes, and swift developments in the struggle of the giants." See also Pierre Hassner, "La montée des jeunes États et les relations entre les deux blocs," in J. B. Duroselle and J. Meyriat (ed.), *La communauté internationale face aux jeunes États* (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1962), p. 399.

from the problem of bases, which affected a limited number of new states, Small Powers became increasingly less significant (if not actually a hindrance) in terms of security. If security was to come via a "balance of terror" and if the Small Powers were therefore no longer needed as allies or outposts, they could safely remain nonaligned: but no more nor no less. Their allegiance was still symbolically significant and neither bloc willingly countenanced overt commitment to the other.

Some decline in tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union and a concomitant shift in psychological attitudes toward nonalignment were also significant. Nonalignment became progressively less "immoral" as the overt allegiance of Small Powers became less important. In certain circumstances nonalignment even began to appear as an optimum alternative. In situations where the major powers were reluctant to intervene because the potential dangers seemed too high, e.g., in the Congo and Laos, particularly since one intervention would prompt another, some form of "neutralization" seemed clearly preferable.[32] Intervention was also bound to cause trouble between the rest of the nonaligned states and the two superpowers; and as their votes in the UN and their political support on a wide range of issues became increasingly more important than their military contribution, that too became a consideration.

The reduction of tensions was not entirely beneficial to the Small Powers. Nonalignment was neither as wise nor as advantageous as it had been in the earlier power configuration. It was, to a significant degree, simply harder to extract concessions in a less intense conflict. The image of the "enemy" was not quite so clearly sketched. The relative decline in the colonial issue (somewhat counterbalanced by the rise of the issue of economic development in the UN and elsewhere) and a relative increase in domestic difficulties also contributed to the emergence of a new pattern. In addition, the rapid proliferation of new states tended to decrease the bargaining potential of any single state (or group); it clearly provided the Great Powers with a degree of leverage they previously lacked. Differences *between* the nonaligned states began to emerge. Significantly, some discussion developed about what role they could or ought to play in world politics. The discussion was unnecessary in the early period when the role was imposed by external circumstances; the possibility or wisdom of creating a bloc of nonaligned states began to be seriously discussed only when the conditions which *might* have made it possible were being eroded. Nonalignment, in sum, was not disavowed nor did any major alternatives to it appear, but it had to be both justified and practiced in a more sophisticated manner.

The emergence of China has created—or may create—an entirely new pattern of relationships. At the moment the impact is more theoretical than prac-

[32] See Bell in Bobrow, *Components of Defense Policy*, pp. 70–71.

tical, but it is hardly likely to remain so for long. China's refusal to accept the legitimacy of nonalignment harkens back to an earlier era of the Cold War. Some similarities with the first decade of the Cold War are striking. Thus the argument, for example, that India is not nonaligned but rather aligned with the United States and the Soviet Union recalls the simple dichotomy which seemed so compelling to John Foster Dulles—and perhaps to Joseph Stalin. And China's "have-not" position recalls earlier versions of Soviet policy: As the state with less to lose in any confrontation, it can afford a revolutionary policy which justifies overbidding the status quo powers.[33] There is, however, an obverse side to this in that the Chinese are not only a threat but also a potential—very potential—source of aid and support. The emergence of a new center of power goes some way toward creating a tripolar balance which could, in theory anyway, provide more security for the Small Powers than could be found in any bipolar situation. At any rate, the historical record suggests that the security of Small Powers increases (though not their opportunities to improve their position) as the balance of power widens. Unfortunately, that may not be the case in a situation where at least one of the major powers is determined to destroy the system itself. And it is not absolutely clear that a tripolar system, because of its inherent instability, is actually more advantageous than either a bipolar or multipolar world: It may depend on the extent to which conflict within it remains on an essentially nonmilitary level.

The decisive factor in the years ahead may very well be the attitude the Soviets assume toward the Chinese challenge. They could choose to pursue a conservative policy in the developing areas, concentrating on stabilizing pro-Soviet and "neutralist" regimes against the revolutionary threat from Peking. That might, as Professor Halpern has suggested, provide the nonaligned states with two options against the Chinese: the support of the United States against the threat of external aggression and the tacit but important support of the Soviet Union against internal subversion.[34]

The problem, of course, is that the Soviet Union may respond by reviving its revolutionary ardor and attempting to outbid the Chinese. In that case the compromises implicit in mutually acceptable "neutralization"—as in the Congo and Laos—will be undermined by the aggressive behavior of *both* the Chinese and the Soviets. This suggests that the Sino-Soviet split is essentially tactical and that its primary result will be a competition to see which Communist power is more Communist, i.e., revolutionary.[35]

Which choice the Soviets will make is clearly uncertain. They may, in the

[33] *Ibid.*, p. 73f.

[34] Manfred Halpern, *The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa* (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 410f.

[35] Thus one analyst argues that the Sino-Soviet split "obliges each side . . . to intensify its efforts to demonstrate its superiority over rivals." (Brian Crozier, "The Struggle For the Third World," *International Affairs* [London], July 1964 [Vol. 40, No. 3], p. 451.)

grand tradition of Western statecraft, merely muddle along until events impose a choice. However, whatever ultimately happens, in the short run some provision must be made to handle the worst contingency—two revolutionary regimes intent on disrupting an already precarious stability.

It is possible to argue that Chinese behavior will be constrained by the fear of driving the United States and the Soviet Union together, though it seems an overly optimistic assumption. The kinds of things which the Chinese are capable of doing in the immediate years ahead are not likely to be dangerous enough *to the Soviet Union and the United States* to force the two together—the Chinese threat may have to be direct before it compels a true "reversal of alliances." For the interim, therefore, policy makers cannot assume Soviet support against the Chinese. The best that can be hoped for is a kind of tacit acquiescence in United States efforts to thwart Chinese designs, and even that may not come to pass.

The aggressive and revolutionary nature of the Chinese threat will undoubtedly increase the importance of fundamental questions of security. Nonalignment, that is, will have to be justified not only in psychological and economic terms but also in military terms. And for states which suddenly realize that they confront a real threat to their security, it may not appear sufficient. They may feel compelled to consider the virtues—and defects—of alignment in a new perspective, and it thus seems appropriate to conclude this essay with a few words about alliances and nonalignment.

VI

Complete commitment to a policy of nonalignment involves a repudiation of any alliance involving Great Powers. The latter, in an effort to attain or sustain influence, have been compelled to illustrate their good faith by offering aid shorn of strings and by pledging nonintervention. In an atmosphere in which alliances are—or have been—regarded as symbols of virtually all of the worst aspects of traditional "power politics,"[36] Small Powers have been forced to rely on the UN, or some form of interarea agreement, or the exhaustion of minimal resources to settle their disputes. The cost of overt attachment to one of the blocs (but particularly the Western) merely to pressure a local enemy has seemed excessive: It may in fact amount to ostracization by the other nonaligned states.

In psychological terms alignment constitutes a serious derogation of independence—and a loss of prestige and status. However, there is also a range of traditional assumptions about the evils of an alliance with a superior power which buttress the decision to remain unaligned. Nonalignment thus appears to be the only way to limit great-power intervention: Once one Great Power

[36] See Liska, pp. 206–207.

allies with a local state, inevitably its opponent follows suit (or tries to, which leads to the same result). The Little Entente and the Arab League illustrate the point. Both were designed, at least in part, to exclude or limit the extent of great-power intervention in each area. And in a system with ideological undertones, alignment guarantees that one will become a prime target for subversion, whereas nonalignment offers some possibility of avoiding it (particularly when both blocs accept nonalignment as a legitimate tactic).

Some of the standard arguments against alliances are also still significant, e.g., a loss of independence and flexibility, an increase in outside intervention, and so forth. Moreover, to the extent that the United States appears or appeared to be relying on nuclear weapons to honor our alliance commitments, any desire to align with us was vitiated, the prospect of defense by nuclear weapons being much worse than the prospect of no defense at all. A live satellite lives to fight—or at least to maneuver—another day.

Despite the disadvantages, some of the new states have entered alliances with the United States or its great-power allies. They have done so reluctantly and only when the perception of an external threat has been very high or when it has seemed to be the only way to counterbalance a superior local state (e.g., Pakistan and India). While the theoretical distinction between a bilateral great-power/small-power alliance and a mixed, multilateral alliance still holds, in practice the distinction has been diluted. In substance, multilateral alliances like the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) really constitute unilateral great-power guarantees.[37] For the most part it has been the superior power, the United States, which has insisted on the multilateral form in an effort to decrease the political losses attendant upon alignment. The Small Powers, conversely, once recognizing a situation grave enough to justify an alliance commitment, *may* prefer a bilateral agreement. The latter is likely to offer more opportunities to increase aid: The pie will be cut into fewer slices. Moreover, the commitment to act undoubtedly will be diluted in a multilateral alliance. It may, for example, be easier for the United States to evade its commitment in SEATO than in a bilateral pact such as the United States–Formosa agreement.[38] On the other

[37] See George Modelski, *SEATO: Six Studies* (Melbourne, 1962), p. 8, where he describes SEATO as "a great power association for the support of certain small nations. . . . " The Small Power, at any rate, may try to extend and strengthen the commitment of a multilateral alliance to compensate for its lesser degree of credibility.

[38] Thus a study of all the crises faced by SEATO shows that "in all cases the decisive event at issue had been the actual or potential joint or individual intervention of the Western great powers on behalf of a small state of South-East Asia." (*Ibid.*, p. 15.)

For Philippine efforts to extend and improve the nature of the United States commitment in SEATO see Roger M. Smith, "The Philippines and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization" (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program, 1959), pp. 12, 18. And for the efforts of Thailand to strengthen SEATO and for fears that the United States commitment to it was weakening (particularly after the events in Laos in 1960 and after) see Donald E. Nuechterlein, *Thailand and the Struggle For Southeast Asia* (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1965), Chapters IV and V.

hand, a multilateral alliance still gives the Small Power more intra-alliance bargaining leverage and more opportunity to advance its own views. It may also cost less in terms of external prestige and domestic discontent.[39] The decision on form will be heavily conditioned by perceptions concerning the degree of immediate danger: If high, a bilateral alliance is clearly wiser.

Ultimately, the primary advantage of an alliance with a Great Power involves recognition of the fact—by all concerned—that the Small Power has the ability to commit its ally: The latter presumably cannot accept the losses attendant upon its weaker partner's defeat. This can be a significant advantage, given the mutual fears of the major powers. In contrast to the past, where there was a relative advantage in committing oneself last *(ceteris paribus)* and thus tipping the scales decisively, the advantage now tends to lie with the side which commits itself first.[40] The opponent must then decide whether the stake is worth the risk of escalating the conflict by intervening. The Small Power which can force one of the Great Powers to intervene on its behalf, or appear ready to, may thereby be able to achieve some kind of local stalemate. In particular, if the losses incurred by accepting the situation seem smaller than the potential losses of escalating the conflict, the benefits of alliance may be high.

Even if the other Great Power intervenes, it is likely to do so at a minimal level, i.e., below the threshold of direct great-power conflict. Traditionally, when the Great Powers fought, small-power allies simply became a target of attack. Now, with the response set at a level below war, the Small Power may not suffer as much from being the weakest link. The enemy response may be an effort to persuade it to change its alignment, or an increase in internal subversion, but not an overt attack.

The preceding arguments primarily reflect the pressures of an international system in which nuclear weapons have forced the Great Powers to walk very softly just because they are carrying a very big stick. The impact of nuclear weapons on great-power/small-power relationships obviously increases when the military aspect of that relationship comes to the fore. But there is also a sense in which nuclear weapons may restrict the freedom of small-power allies—at least at its outer limits where that "freedom" appears to be causing a crisis which might involve the Great Powers. The "mindlessness" and drift which characterized an earlier generation of relationships between unequal allies—and which in certain circumstances gave the weaker partner significant

[39] It might also be noted that SEATO conferred some benefits on states which remained out of it. Thus "Communist China knew that too great a pressure on Burma involved the risk of forcing her into SEATO." (Modelski, p. 9.) Although India stayed out of SEATO, which in any case could not offer support in the north where India was threatened, it might have benefited from Chinese concessions there in response to the southern threat represented by SEATO. See Rosemary Brissenden, "India, Neutralism, and SEATO," in *ibid.*, pp. 217ff.

[40] See Liska, p. 76. I have qualified the point somewhat.

leverage to achieve its own ends—is now too dangerous to countenance. The Great Powers may be forced to control the behavior of their weaker allies when it becomes too aggressive (particularly, of course, if nuclear weapons spread). In sum, while the existence of nuclear weapons has tended to lessen the chances of general war and has thus transformed the role of Small Powers, it has done so only within certain clear limits. The freedom to maneuver is high, but the freedom to start World War III—to be another Serbia—is very low.[41]

The fact that the Great Powers may be forced to control the behavior of their weaker partners when it becomes too destabilizing merely reinforces a tendency which has been developing since this century began. From the point of view of Small Powers, alliances have increasingly become instruments designed to achieve nonmilitary goals. In theory this would seem to suggest, as Herbert Dinerstein has argued, that the Small Powers thus have more freedom *within* an alliance to achieve their own goals since the necessity of worrying about preparations for war would be considerably relaxed.[42] However, in practice the point is not so clear. The non-Western Small Powers have tended to join an alliance with the Western powers *only* when they confront a military threat and are hardly in a position to ignore military considerations. And they are free to maneuver within an alliance only to the extent that their actions do not precipitate or exacerbate a crisis. *In general,* the point that alliances are increasingly becoming nonmilitary instruments still holds but with much less force for a bilateral alliance between a Great Power and a Small Power than for other forms of alliance.

It is clear that an argument for the increased utility of alliances composed solely of Small Powers can be made. In the past their greatest advantage has been in the political sphere, their weakness in the military realm. But in a period when the primary conflict is carried on by political means and for symbolic victories, the military weakness of small-power alliances is less important and their political strength more important. In addition, the significance which both blocs have attributed to parliamentary victories in the United Nations has given even more influence to groups of Small Powers able to vote together.

However, rather than full-fledged small-power alliances, akin to the Little Entente or the Balkan League, what has emerged is a number of very loose

[41] Thus Thornton Read has noted that:

> The weaker member of an alliance is less able to commit its stronger ally to a course of action that the latter is reluctant to undertake. For example, in 1914 Austria was able to commit Germany to war, while in 1956 the United States not only dissociated itself from the British-French Suez adventure but even subjected its allies to pressure.

(*Military Policy in a Changing Political Contest* [Policy Memorandum No. 31] [Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Center of International Studies, 1964], p. 41 n.)

[42] Dinerstein, *American Political Science Review,* Vol. 59, No. 3, p. 593.

voting blocs involving very little cooperation outside the UN.[43] One reason for the failure to develop real alliances is, of course, the inability of the new states to agree on anything but a mutual dislike of colonialism. Since the regions they inhabit are frequently territorially unsettled, there is no internal consensus concerning the status quo. They can agree on the negative task of evicting the Great Powers, but on little else.[44] Any regional arrangement would have to involve a commitment to accept previous boundaries, but since many of the new states are revisionists (or threatened by revisionists), regional agreements have proved to be tenuous and unproductive. A good many of the revisionists also feel they can strike a better bargain with the Great Powers in bilateral rather than regional negotiations. Still, even though the record of the few regional groups which have been formed scarcely justifies optimism, at least one recent study of the Arab League contends that its failures have been caused by external factors beyond the League's control and that it has had *some* success in dealing with internal crises:

> The Arab League states have effectively policed their own region during most of the League's history. Despite bitter propaganda exchanges between rival Arab states, there have been surprisingly few breaches of the peace by Arab League members.[45]

While it would be absurd to suggest that that assessment validates the theoretical proposition that the significance of small-power alliances is on the rise, it does at least suggest that the judgment that small-power alliances are worthless ought to be reconsidered.

[43] See the books by Hovet and Rivkin, previously cited, for a discussion of these blocs.

[44] Peter Calvocoressi, *World Order and New States* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p. 66, notes that regional arrangements would have to be defensive since agreement could not be reached on an offensive project.

[45] Robert W. Macdonald, *The League of Arab States* (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 292–293.