The false promise of international institutions

Abstract:
Many political scientists believe that international institutions, such as NATO, the EC and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, are instrumental in keeping world peace and global security. However, their belief is unwarranted since the underlying principles of institutionalism are flawed in their causal logic and have little empirical evidence. The popularity of institutionalism lies in its relationship to realism and American political ideology.

Full Text:
Since the Cold War ended, Western policymakers have sought to create security arrangements in Europe, as well as in other regions of the globe, that are based on international institutions. In doing so, they explicitly reject balance-of-power politics as an organizing concept for the post-Cold War world. During the 1992 presidential campaign, for example, President Clinton declared that, "in a world where freedom. not tyranny, is on the march, the cynical calculus of pure power politics simply does not compute. It is ill-suited to a new era." Before taking office, Anthony Lake, the president's national security adviser, criticized the Bush administration for viewing the world through a "classic balance of power prism," whereas he and Mr. Clinton took a "more 'neo-Wilsonian' view." (1)

This approach to international politics rests on the belief that institutions are a key means of promoting world peace. (2) In particular, Western policymakers claim that the institutions that "served the West well" before the Soviet Union collapsed must be reshaped to encompass Eastern Europe as well. (3) "There is no reason," according to Secretary of State Warren Christopher, "why our institutions or our aspirations should stop at [the] aid frontiers of the Cold War," (4) The institutions he has in mind include the European Community (EC), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), and the Western European Union (WEU). No single institution is expected to play a dominating role in Europe, however; instead, the aim is to create "a framework of complementary mutually reinforcing" institutions. (5) "We can promote more durable European security," Christopher claims, "through interlocking structures, each with complementary roles and strengths." (6)

No other region of the world has institutions as extensive and as well-developed as those in Europe. Consequently, Western policymakers trumpet the importance of creating webs of overlapping institutions outside of Europe. Special emphasis is placed on Asia, where there are only a few weak institutions, and where fear of Japan, coupled with the rise of China and the prospect of a further reduction in the American presence, has observers worried about future stability in the region. (7)

There has also been a recent wave of academic interest in institutions. Academic institutionalists, not surprisingly, consider institutions to be a powerful force for stability. (8) Robert Keohane, for example, declares that, "avoiding military conflict in Europe after the Cold War depends greatly on whether the next decade is characterized by a continuous pattern of institutionalized cooperation." (9) Commenting on the aftermath of the Soviet collapse and the end of the Cold War, John Ruggie maintains that "there seems little doubt that multilateral norms and institutions have helped stabilize their international consequences. Indeed, such norms and institutions appear to be playing a significant role in the tnanagemeflt of a broad array of regional and global, changes in the world system today." (10)

This article examines the claim that institutions push states away from war and promote peace. I concentrate on assessing the major international relations theories that employ institutions as a core concept liberal institutionalism, collective security, and critical theory. (11) I begin, however, with a brief review of realism, because of the "institutionalist" theories is largely a response to realism, and each directly challenges realism's underlying logic. (12) Realists and institutionalists particularly disagree about whether institutions markedly affect the prospects for international stability. Realists say no; institutionalists say yes. Realists maintain that institutions are basically a reflection of the distribution of power in the world. They are based on the self-interested calculations of the great powers, and they have no independent effect on state behavior. Realists therefore believe that institutions are not an important cause of peace. They matter only on the margins. Institutionalists direc tly challenge this view of institutions, arguing instead that institutions can alter state preferences and therefore change state behavior. Institutions can discourage states from calculating self-interest on the basis of how every move affects their relative power positions. Institutions are independent variables, and they have the capability to move states away from war.

Although institutionalists are united in their opposition to realist claims about institutions, each institutionalist theory makes a different argument about how institutions work to alter state behavior. My goal is to evaluate these three theories to determine whether the claim that institutions cause peace is persuasive. That task involves answering four questions: 1) What are institutions? 2) How do they work to cause peace? Specifically, what is the causal logic that underpins each theory? 3) Are these different logics that explain how institutions work compelling? 4) Does the evidence support these theories?

My central conclusion is that institutions have minimal influence on state behavior, and thus hold little promise for promoting stability in the post--Cold War world. The three theories on which the case for institutions is based are all flawed. Each has problems in its causal logic, and all three institutionalist theories find little support in the historical record.

The remainder of this article is organized as follows. I begin with a brief definition of institutions and a discussion of realism, because each of the institutionalist theories takes its bearings from realism. In the main body of the article, I describe and evaluate liberal institutionalism, collective security, and critical theory. The concluding section considers why institutions are so highly regarded by policymakers and academics, when there is so little evidence that they are an important cause of peace.

What Are Institutions?

There is no widely-agreed upon definition of institutions in the international relations literature. (13) The concept is sometimes defined so broadly as to encompass all of international relations, which gives it little analytical bite. (14) For example, defining institutions as "recognized patterns of behavior or practice around which expectations converge" allows the concept to cover almost every regularized pattern of activity between states, from war to tariff bindings negotiated under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), thus rendering it largely meaningless. (15) Still, it is possible to devise a useful definition that is consistent with how most institutionalist scholars employ the concept.

I define institutions as a set of rules that stipulate the ways in which states should cooperate and compete with each other. (16) They prescribe acceptable forms of state behavior, and proscribe unacceptable kinds of behavior. These rules are negotiated by states, and according to many prominent theorists, they entail the mutual acceptance of higher norms, which are "standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations." (17) These rules are typically formalized in international agreements, and are usually embodied in organizations with their own personnel and budgets. (18) Although rules are usually incorporated into a formal international organization, it is not the organization tier se that compels states to obey the rules. Institutions are not a form of world government. States themselves must choose to obey the rules they created. Institutions, in short, call for the "decentralized cooperation of individual sovereign states, without any effective mechanism of command." (19)

To answer the three remaining questions about how institutions do or do not work, we must examine the different institutionalist theories separately. However, a brief discussion of realism is in order first.

Realism

Realism, paints a rather grim picture of world politics. (20) The international system is portrayed as a brutal arena where states look for opportunities to take advantage of each other, and therefore have little reason to trust each other. (21) Daily life is essentially a struggle for power, where each state strives not only to be the most powerful actor in the system, but also to ensure that no other state achieves that lofty position.

International relations is not a constant state of war, but it is a state of relentless security competition. with the possibility of war always in the background. The intensity of that competition varies from case to case. Although it might seem counterintuitive, states do frequently cooperate in this competitive world. Nevertheless, cooperation among states has its limits, mainly because it is constrained by the dominating logic of security competition, which no amount of cooperation can eliminate. Genuine peace, or a world where states do not compete for power, is not likely, according to realism.

This pessimistic view of how the world works can be derived from realism's five assumptions about the international system. The first is that the international system is anarchic. This does not mean that it is chaotic or riven by disorder. (22) It is easy to draw that conclusion, since realism depicts a world characterized by security competition and war. However, "anarchy" as employed by realists has nothing to do with conflict; rather it is an ordering principle, which says that the system comprises independent political units (states) that have no central authority above them. Sovereignty, in other words, inheres in states, because there is no higher ruling body in the international system. There is no "government over governments." (23)

The second assumption is that states inherently possess some offensive military capability which gives them the wherewithal to hurt and possibly to destroy each other. States are potentially dangerous to each other. A state's military power is usually identified with the particular weaponry at its disposal, although even if there were no weapons, the individuals of a state could still use their feet and bands to attack the population of another state.

The third assumption is that states can never be certain about the intentions of other states. Specifically, no state can be certain another state will not use its offensive military capability against the first. This is not to say that states necessarily have malign intentions. Another state may be reliably benign, but it is impossible to be certain of that judgment because intentions are impossible to divine with 100 percent certainty. There are many possible causes of aggression, and no state can be sure that another state is not motivated by one of them. Furthermore, intentions can change quickly, so a state's intentions can be benign one day and malign the next. Uncertainty is unavoidable when assessing intentions, which simply means that states can never be sure that other states do not have offensive intentions to go with their offensive military capability.

The fourth assumption is that the most basic motive driving states is survival. States want to maintain their sovereignty. The fifth assumption is that states think strategically about how to survive in the international system. States are instrumentally rational.

Nevertheless, they may miscalculate from time to time because they operate in a world of imperfect information, where potential adversaries have incentives to misrepresent their own strength or weakness and to conceal their true aims.

None of these assumptions alone mandates that states will behave competitively In fact, the fundamental assumption dealing with motives says that states merely aim to survive, which is a defensive goal. (24) When taken together, however, these five assumptions can create incentives for states to think and sometimes to behave aggressively. Specifically, three main patterns of behavior result.

First, states in the international system fear each other. They regard each other with suspicion, and they worry that war might be in the offing. They anticipate danger. There is little room for trust among states. Although the Level of fear varies across time and space, it can never be reduced to a trivial level. (25) The basis of this fear is that in a world where states have the capability to offend against each other, and might have the motive to do so, any state bent on survival must be at least suspicious of other states and reluctant to trust them. Add to this the assumption that there is no central authority that a threatened state can turn to for help, and states have even greater incentive to fear each other. Moreover, there is no mechanism--other than the possible self-interest of third parties--for punishing an aggressor. Because it is often difficult to deter potential aggressors, states have ample reason to take steps to be prepared for war.

The possible consequences of falling victim to aggression further illustrate why fear is a potent force in world politics. States do not compete with each other as if international politics were simply an economic marketplace. Political competition among states is a much more dangerous business than economic intercourse; it can lead to war, and war often means mass killing on the battlefield and even mass murder of civilians. In extreme cases, war can even lead to the total destruction of a state. The horrible consequences of war sometimes cause states to view each other not just as competitors, but as potentially deadly enemies.

Second, each state in the international system aims to guarantee its own survival. Because other states are potential threats, and because there is no higher authority to rescue them when danger arises, states cannot depend on others for their security. Each state tends to see itself as vulnerable and alone, and therefore it aims to provide for its own survival. As Kenneth Waltz puts it, states operate in a "self-help" system. This emphasis on self-help does not preclude states from forming alliances. (26) But alliances are only temporary marriages of convenience, where today's alliance partner might be tomorrow's enemy, and today's enemy might be tomorrow's alliance partner. States operating in a self-help world should always act according to their own self-interest, because it pays to be selfish in a self-help world. This is true in the short term as well as the long term, because if a state loses in the short run, it may not be around for the long haul.

Third, states in the international system aim to maximize their relative power positions over other states. (27) The reason is simple: the greater the military advantage one state has over other states, the more secure it is. Every state would like to be the most formidable military power in the system because this is the best way to guarantee survival in a world that can be very dangerous. This logic creates strong incentives for states to take advantage of one another, including going to war if the circumstances are right and victory seems likely. The aim is to acquire more military power at the expense of potential rivals. The ideal outcome would be to end up as the hegemon in the system. Survival would then be almost guaranteed.

All states are influenced by this logic, which means not only that they look for opportunities to take advantage of one another, but also that they work to insure that other states do not take advantage of them. (28) States are, in other words, both offensively-oriented and defensively-oriented. They think about conquest themselves, and they balance against aggressors; this inexorably leads to a world of constant security competition, with the possibility of war always in the background. Peace, if one defines that concept as a state of tranquility or mutual concord, is not likely to break out in this world.

COOPERATION IN A REALIST WORLD

Although realism envisions a world that is fundamentally competitive, cooperation between states does occur. It is sometimes difficult to achieve, however, and always difficult to sustain. Two factors inhibit cooperation: relative-gains considerations, and concern about cheating. (29)

States contemplating cooperation must consider how the profits or gains will be distributed among them. They can think about the division in two different ways. They can think in terms of absolute gains, which means each side focuses on maximizing its own profit, and cares little about how much the other side gains or loses in the deal. Each side cares about the other only to the extent that the other side's behavior affects its own prospects for achieving maximum profits. Alternately, states can think in terms of relative gains, which means each side not only considers its individual gain, but also how well it does compared to the other side.

Because states in a realist world are concerned about the balance of power, they must be motivated primarily by relative gains concerns when considering cooperation. While each state wants to maximize its absolute gains, it is more important to make sure that it does better, or at least no worse, than the other state in any agreement. However, cooperation is more difficult to achieve when states are attuned to relative-gains logic, rather than absolute-gains logic. This is because states concerned about absolute gains need only make sure that the pie is expanding and that they are getting at least some portion of the increase, while states that worry about relative gains must care also about how the pie is divided, which complicates cooperative efforts.

Concerns about cheating also hinder cooperation. States are often reluctant to enter into cooperative agreements for fear that the other side will cheat on the agreement and gain a relative advantage. There is a "special peril of defection" in the military realm, because the nature of military weaponry allows for rapid shifts in the balance of power. Such a development could create a window of opportunity for the cheating state to inflict a decisive defeat on the victim state. (30)

These barriers to cooperation notwithstanding, states do cooperate in a realist world. For example, balance-of-power logic often causes states to form alliances and cooperate against common enemies. States sometimes cooperate to gang up on a third state, as the Germans and the Soviets did against Poland in 1939. (31) Rivals as well as allies cooperate. After all, deals can be struck that

roughly reflect the distribution of power, and satisfy concerns about cheating. The various arms control agreements signed by the superpowers during the Cold War illustrate this point.

The bottom line, however, is that cooperation takes place in a world that is competitive at its core--one where states have powerful incentives to take advantage of other states. This point is graphically highlighted by European politics in the forty years before World War I. There was much cooperation among the great powers during this period, but that did not stop them from going to war in 1914. (32)

INSTITUTIONS IN A REALIST WORLD

Realists also recognize that states sometimes operate through institutions. However, they believe that those rules reflect state calculations of self-interest based primarily on the international distribution of power. The most powerful states in the system create and shape institutions so that they can maintain their share of world power, or even increase it. In this view, institutions are essentially "arenas for acting out power relationships." (33) For realists, the causes of war and peace are mainly a function of the balance of power, and institutions largely mirror the distribution of power in the system. In short, the balance of power is the independent variable that explains war; institutions are merely an intervening variable in the process.

NATO provides a good example of realist thinking about institutions. NATO is an institution, and it certainly played a role in preventing World War III and helping the West win the Cold War. Nevertheless, NATO was basically a manifestation of the bipolar distribution of power in Europe during the Cold War, and it was that balance of power, not NATO per se, that provided the key to maintaining stability on the continent. NATO was essentially an American tool for managing power in the face of the Soviet threat. Now, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, realists argue that NATO must either disappear or reconstitute itself on the basis of the new distribution of power in Europe. (34) NATO cannot remain as it was during the Cold War.

Varieties of Institutionalist Theories

There are three institutionalist theories, and each offers a different argument about how institutions push states away from war and help foster stability. (35) Liberal institutionalism is the least ambitious of the three theories. It does not directly address the important question of how to prevent war, but focuses instead on explaining why economic and environmental cooperation among states is more likely than realists recognize. Increased cooperation in those realms is presumed to reduce the likelihood of war, although liberal institutionalists do not explain how. The theory is predicated on the belief that cheating is the main inhibitor of international cooperation, and that institutions provide the key to overcoming that problem. The aim is to create rules that constrain states, but not to challenge the fundamental realist claim that states are self-interested actors.

Collective security directly confronts the issue of how to prevent war. The theory starts with the assumption that force will continue to matter in world politics, and that states will have to guard against potential aggressors. However, the threat of war can be greatly reduced, according to the theory, by challenging realist thinking about state behavior, and substituting in its place three anti-realist norms. First, states should reject the idea of using force to change the status quo. Second, to deal with states that violate that norm and threaten (or start) a war, responsible states must not act on the basis of their own narrow self-interest. Rather, they must suppress the temptation to respond in whatever way would maximize their individual gains, and instead automatically join together to present the aggressor with the threat of overwhelming force. Third, states must trust each other to renounce aggression and to mean that renunciation. They must also be confident that other states will come to their rescue, should they become the target of aggression.

Critical theory is the most ambitious of the theories, as its ultimate aim is to transform the fundamental nature of international politics and to create a world where there is not just increased cooperation among states, but the possibility of genuine peace. Like collective security, but unlike liberal institutionalism, critical theory directly challenges realist thinking about the self-interested behavior of states. The theory is predicated on the assumption that ideas and discourse--how we think and talk about international politics--are the driving forces behind state behavior. It utterly rejects realism's claim that state behavior is largely a function of the given structure of the external world. For critical theorists, ideas shape the material world in important ways, and thus the way to revolutionize international politics is to change drastically the way individuals think and talk about world politics. Intellectuals, especially the critical theorists themselves, are believed to play a key role in that process.

LIBERAL INSTITUTIONALISM

Liberal institutionalism does not directly address the question of whether institutions cause peace, but instead focuses on the less ambitious goal of explaining cooperation in cases where state interests are not fundamentally opposed. (36) Specifically, the theory looks at cases where states are having difficulty cooperating because they have "mixed" interests; in other words, each side has incentives both to cooperate and not to cooperate. (37) Each side can benefit from cooperation, however, which liberal institutionalists define as "goal-directed behavior that entails mutual policy adjustments so that all sides end up better off than they would otherwise be." (38) The theory is of little relevance in situations where states' interests are fundamentally conflictual and neither side thinks it has much to gain from cooperation. In these circumstances, states aim to gain advantage over each other. They think in terms of winning and losing, and this invariably leads to intense security competition, and sometimes war. But liberal institutionalism does not deal directly with these situations, and thus says little about how to resolve or even ameliorate them.

Therefore, the theory largely ignores security issues and concentrates instead on economic and, to a lesser extent, environmental issues. (39) In fact, the theory is built on the assumption that international politics can be divided into two realms--security and political economy--and that liberal institutionalism mainly applies to the latter, but not the former. This theme is clearly articulated by Charles Lipson, who writes that "significantly different institutional arrangements are associated with international economic and security issues." (40) Moreover, the likelihood of cooperation is markedly different within these two realms: when economic relations are at stake, "cooperation can be sustained among several self-interested states," whereas the prospects for cooperation are "more

impoverished ... in security affairs." (41) Thus, the theory's proponents pay little attention to the security realm, where questions about war and peace are of central importance.

Nevertheless, there are good reasons to examine liberal institutionalism closely. Liberal institutionalists sometimes assert that institutions are an important cause of international stability. Moreover, one might argue that if the theory shows a strong causal connection between institutions and economic cooperation, it would be relatively easy to take the next step and link cooperation with peace. (42) Some proponents of the theory maintain that institutions contribute to international stability; this suggests that they believe it is easy to connect cooperation and stability. (43) I doubt this claim, mainly because proponents of the theory define cooperation so narrowly as to avoid military issues. Let us assume, however, that liberal institutionalists are attempting to take a giant step toward developing a theory that explains how institutions push states away from war.

CAUSAL LOGIC. Liberal institutionalists claim to accept realism's root assumptions while arguing that cooperation is nevertheless easier to achieve than realists recognize. Robert Keohane, for example, writes in After Hegemony that he is "adopting the realist model of rational egoism." He continues: "I propose to show, on the basis of their own assumptions, that the characteristic pessimism of realism does not necessarily follow. I seek to demonstrate that realist assumptions about world politics are consistent with the formation of institutionalized arrangements ... which promote cooperation." (44) In particular, liberal institutionalists emphasize that states "dwell in perpetual anarchy," and must therefore act as rational egoists in what is a self-help world. (45)

According to liberal institutionalists, the principal obstacle to cooperation among states with mutual interests is the threat of cheating. (46) The famous "prisoners' dilemma," which is the analytical centerpiece of most of the liberal institutionalist literature, captures the essence of the problem that states must solve to achieve cooperation. (47) Each of two states can either cheat or cooperate with the other. Each side wants to maximize its own gain, but does not care about the size of the other side's gain; each side cares about the other side only so far as the other side's chosen strategy affects its own prospects for maximizing gain. The most attractive strategy for each state is to cheat and hope the other state pursues a cooperative strategy. In other words, a state's ideal outcome is to "sucker" the other side into thinking it is going to cooperate, and then cheat. But both sides understand this logic, and therefore both sides will try to cheat the other. Consequently, both sides will end up wors e off than if they had cooperated, since mutual cheating leads to the worst possible outcome. Even though mutual cooperation is not as attractive as suckering the other side, it is certainly better than the outcome when both sides cheat.

The key to solving this dilemma is for each side to convince the other that they have a collective interest in making what appear to be short-term sacrifices (the gain that might result from successful cheating) for the sake of long-term benefits (the substantial payoff from mutual Long-term cooperation). This means convincing states to accept the second-best outcome, which is mutual collaboration. The principal obstacle to reaching this cooperative outcome will be fear of getting suckered, should the other side cheat. This, in a nutshell, is the problem that institutions must solve.

To deal with this problem of "political market failure," institutions must deter cheaters and protect victims. (48) Three messages must be sent to potential cheaters: you will be caught, you will be punished immediately, and you will jeopardize future cooperative efforts. Potential victims, on the other hand, need early warning of cheating to avoid serious injury, and need the means to punish cheaters.

Liberal institutionalists do not aim to deal with cheaters and victims by changing fundamental norms of state behavior. Nor do they suggest transforming the anarchical nature of the international system. They accept the assumption that states operate in an anarchic environment and behave in a self-interested manner. (49) In this regard, their approach is less ambitious than collective security and critical theory, which aim to alter important international norms. Liberal institutionalists instead concentrate on showing how rules can work to counter the cheating problem, even while states seek to maximize their own welfare. They argue that institutions can change a state's calculations about how to maximize gains. Specifically, rules can get states to make the short-term sacrifices needed to resolve the prisoners' dilemma and thus to realize long-term gains. Institutions, in short, can produce cooperation.

Rules can ideally be employed to make four major changes in "the contractual environment." (50) First, rules can increase the number of transactions between particular states over time. (51) This institutionalized iteration discourages cheating in three ways. It raises the costs of cheating by creating the prospect of future gains through cooperation, thereby invoking "the shadow of the future" to deter cheating today. A state caught cheating would jeopardize its prospects of benefiting from future cooperation, since the victim would probably retaliate. In addition, iteration gives the victim the opportunity to pay back the cheater: it allows for reciprocation, the tit-for-tat strategy, which works to punish cheaters and not allow them to get away with their transgression. Finally, it rewards states that develop a reputation for faithful adherence to agreements, and punishes states that acquire a reputation for cheating. (52)

Second, rules can tie together interactions between states in different issue areas. Issue-linkage aims to create greater interdependence between states, who will then be reluctant to cheat in one issue area for fear that the victim--and perhaps other states as well--will retaliate in another issue area. It discourages cheating in much the same way as iteration: it raises the costs of cheating and provides a way for the victim to retaliate against the cheater.

Third, a structure of rules can increase the amount of information available to participants in cooperative agreements so that close monitoring is possible. Raising the level of information discourages cheating in two ways: it increases the likelihood that cheaters will be caught, and more importantly, it provides victims with early warning of cheating, thereby enabling them to take protective measures before they are badly hurt.

Fourth, rules can reduce the transaction costs of individual agreements. (53) When institutions perform the tasks described above, states can devote less effort to negotiating and monitoring cooperative agreements, and to hedging against possible defections. By increasing the efficiency of international cooperation, institutions make it more profitable and thus more attractive for self-interested states.

Liberal institutionalism is generally thought to be of limited utility in the security realm, because fear of cheating is considered a much

greater obstacle to cooperation when military issues are at stake. (54) There is the constant threat that betrayal will result in a devastating military defeat. This threat of "swift, decisive defection" is simply net present when dealing with international economics. Given that "the costs of betrayal" are potentially much graver in the military than the economic sphere, states will be very reluctant to accept the "one step backward, two steps forward" logic which underpins the tit-for-tat strategy of conditional cooperation. One step backward in the security realm might mean destruction, in which case there will be no next step-backward or forward. (55)

FLAWS IN THE CAUSAL LOGIC. There is an important theoretical failing in the liberal institutionalist logic, even as it applies to economic issues. The theory is correct as far as it goes: cheating can be a serious barrier to cooperation. It ignores, however, the other major obstacle to cooperation: relative-gains concerns. As Joseph Grieco has shown, liberal institutionalists assume that states are not concerned about relative gains, but focus exclusively on absolute gains. (56) Keohane acknowledged this problem in 1993: "Grieco has made a significant contribution by focusing attention on the issue of relative gains, a subject that has been underemphasized, especially by liberal or neoliberal commentators on the world economy." (57)

This oversight is revealed by the assumed order of preference in the prisoners' dilemma game: each state cares about how its opponent's strategy will affect its own (absolute) gains, but not about how much one side gains relative to the other. In other words, each side simply wants to get the best deal for itself, and does not pay attention to how well the other side fares in the process. (58) Nevertheless, liberal institutionalists cannot ignore relative-gains considerations, because they assume that states are self-interested actors in an anarchic system, and they recognize that military power matters to states. A theory that explicitly accepts realism's core assumptions--and liberal institutionalism does that--must confront the issue of relative gains if it hopes to develop a sound explanation for why states cooperate.

One might expect liberal institutionalists to offer the counterargument that relative-gains logic applies only to the security realm, while absolute-gains logic applies to the economic realm. Given that they are mainly concerned with explaining economic and environmental cooperation, leaving relative-gains concerns out of the theory does not matter.

There are two problems with this argument. First, if cheating were the only significant obstacle to cooperation, liberal institutionalists could argue that their theory applies to the economic, but not the military realm. In fact, they do make that argument. However, once relative-gains considerations are factored Into the equation, it becomes impossible to maintain the neat dividing line between economic and military issues, mainly because military might is significantly dependent on economic might. The relative size of a state's economy has profound consequences for its standing in the international balance of military power. Therefore, relative-gains concerns must be taken into account for security reasons when looking at the economic as well as military domain. The neat dividing line that liberal institutionalists employ to specify when their theory applies has little utility when one accepts that states worry about relative gains. (59)

Second, there are non-realist (i.e., non-security) Logics that might explain why states worry about relative gains. Strategic trade theory, for example, provides a straightforward economic logic for why states should care about relative gains. (60) It argues that states should help their own firms gain comparative advantage over the firms of rival states, because that is the best way to insure national economic prosperity There is also a psychological logic, which portrays individuals as caring about how well they do (or their state does) in a cooperative agreement, not for material reasons, but because it is human nature to compare one's progress with that of others. (61)

Another possible liberal institutionalist counterargument is that solving the cheating problem renders the relative-gains problem irrelevant. If states cannot cheat each other, they need not fear each other, and therefore, states would not have to worry about relative power. The problem with this argument, however, is that even if the cheating problem were solved, states would still have to worry about relative gains because gaps in gains can be translated into military advantage that can be used for coercion or aggression. And in the international system, states sometimes have conflicting interests that lead to aggression.

There is also empirical evidence that relative-gains considerations mattered during the Cold War even in economic relations among the advanced industrialized democracies in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OSCD). One would not expect realist logic about relative gains to be influential in this case: the United States was a superpower with little to fear militarily from the other OECD states, and those states were unlikely to use a relative-gains advantage to threaten the United States. (62) Furthermore, the OECD states were important American allies during the Cold War, and thus the United States benefited strategically when they gained substantially in size and strength.

Nonetheless, relative gains appear to have mattered in economic relations among the advanced industrial states. Consider three prominent studies. Stephen Krasner considered efforts at cooperation in different sectors of the international communications industry He found that states were remarkably unconcerned about cheating but deeply worried about relative gains, which led him to conclude that liberal institutionalism "is not relevant for global communications." Grieco examined American and EC efforts to implement, under the auspices of GATT, a number of agreements relating to non-tariff barriers to trade. He found that the level of success was not a function of concerns about cheating but was influenced primarily by concern about the distribution of gains. Similarly, Michael Mastanduno found that concern about relative gains, not about cheating, was an important factor in shaping American policy towards Japan in three cases: the FSX fighter aircraft, satellites, and high-definition television. (63)

I am not suggesting that relative-gains considerations make cooperation impossible; my point is simply that they can pose a serious impediment to cooperation and must therefore be taken into account when developing a theory of cooperation among states. This point is apparently now recognized by liberal institutionalists. Keohane, for example, acknowledges that he "did make a major mistake by underemphasizing distributive issues and the complexities they create for international cooperation." (64)

CAN LIBERAL INSTITUTIONALISM BE REPAIRED? Liberal institutionalists must address two questions if they are to repair their theory First, can institutions facilitate cooperation when states seriously care about relative gains, or do institutions only matter when states can ignore relative-gains considerations and focus instead on absolute gains? I find no evidence that liberal institutionalists

believe that institutions facilitate cooperation when states care deeply about relative gains. They apparently concede that their theory only applies when relative-gains considerations matter little or hardly at all. (65) Thus the second question: when do states not worry about relative gains? The answer to this question would ultimately define the realm in which liberal institutionalism applies.

Liberal institutionalists have not addressed this important question in a systematic fashion, so any assessment of their efforts to repair the theory must be preliminary. What exists are a lengthy response by Keohane to Grieco's original work on relative gains, and two studies responding to Grieco's writings by Robert Powell and Duncan Snidal, which Keohane and other liberal institutionalists point to as exemplars of how to think about the relative-gains problem. (66)

Powell and Snidal offer different arguments about when relative-gains considerations are slight. Nevertheless, both are essentially realist arguments. (67) Neither study discusses how institutions might facilitate cooperation, and both explanations are built around familiar realist concepts.

At the root of Powell's argument is the well-known offense-defense balance made famous by Robert Jervis, George Quester, Jack Snyder, and Stephen Van Evera. (68) Powell maintains that relative-gains considerations matter little, and that states act in accordance with liberal institutionalism when the threat of aggressive war is low and "the use of force is no longer at issue." (69) That situation obtains when the cost of aggression is high, which is, in turn, a function of the "constraints imposed by the underlying technology of war." (70) In other words, when the prevailing military weaponry favors the offense, then the cost of war is low, and relative-gains considerations will be intense. Institutions can do little to facilitate cooperation in such circumstances. However, when defensive technology dominates, the cost of initiating aggression is high and the relative-gains problem is subdued, which allows institutions to cause cooperation.

Snidal maintains that relative-gains concerns might not matter much to states even if they face a serious threat of war. The root concept in his argument is the distribution of power in the international system. (71) Specifically, he maintains that in a multipolar system where more than a small number of states have roughly equal power, states will not worry much about relative gains. Increasing the number of states in the system decreases concern for relative gains. "The reason is that more actors enhance the possibilities of protecting oneself through forming coalitions; and, generally, the less well united one's potential enemies, the safer one is. (72) However, he concedes that "the relative gains hypothesis... has important consequences for two-actor situations and, where there are small numbers or important asymmetries among larger numbers, it may modify conclusions obtained from the absolute gains model." (73)

I draw three conclusions from this discussion of the liberal institutionalists' efforts to deal with the relative-gains problem. First, even if one accepts Powell and Snidal's arguments about when states largely ignore relative-gains concerns, those conditions are rather uncommon in the real world. Powell would look for a world where defensive military technologies dominate. However, it is very difficult to distinguish between offensive and defensive weapons, and Powell provides no help on this point. (74) Nuclear weapons are an exception; they are defensive weapons in situations of mutual assured destruction (75) Still, the presence of massive numbers of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of the superpowers during the Cold War did not stop them from engaging in an intense security competition where relative-gains considerations mattered greatly. Very importantly, Powell provides no historical examples to illustrate his central argument. Snidal would look for a multipolar world with large numbers of roughly equa l-sized great powers. However, historically we find multipolar systems with small numbers of great powers--usually five or six-and very often significant power asymmetries within them. Snidal offers no historical examples of multipolar systems in which the great powers largely ignored relative-gains considerations. (76)

Second, liberal institutionalism itself has little new to say about when states worry about relative gains. Proponents of the theory have instead chosen to rely on two realist explanations to answer that question: the offense-defense balance and the distribution of power in the system. Thus, liberal institutionalism can hardly be called a theoretical alternative to realism, but instead should be seen as subordinate to it. (77)

Third, even in circumstances where realist logic about relative gains does not apply, non-military logics like strategic trade theory might cause states to think in terms of relative gains. Liberal institutionalist theory should directly confront those logics.

PROBLEMS WITH THE EMPIRICAL RECORD. Although there is much evidence of cooperation among states, this alone does not constitute support for liberal institutionalism. What is needed is evidence of cooperation that would not have occurred in the absence of institutions because of fear of cheating, or its actual presence. But scholars have provided little evidence of cooperation of that sort, nor of cooperation failing because of cheating. Moreover, as discussed above, there is considerable evidence that states worry much about relative gains not only in security matters, but in the economic realm as well.

This dearth of empirical support for liberal institutionalism is acknowledged by proponents of that theory. (78) The empirical record is not completely blank, however, but the few historical cases that liberal institutionalists have studied provide scant support for the theory. Consider two prominent examples.

Keohane looked at the performance of the International Energy Agency (TEA) in 1974-81, a period that included the 1979 oil crisis. (79) This case does not appear to lend the theory much support. First, Keohane concedes that the IEA failed outright when put to the test in 1979: "regime-oriented efforts at cooperation do not always succeed, as the fiasco of IEA actions in 1979 illustrates." (80) He claims, however, that in 1980 the IEA had a minor success "under relatively favorable conditions" in responding to the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War. Although he admits it is difficult to specify how much the IEA mattered in the 1980 case, he notes that "it seems clear that 'it (the IEA] leaned in the right direction'," a claim that hardly constitutes strong support for the theory. (81) Second. it does not appear from Keohane's analysis that either fear of cheating or actual cheating hindered cooperation in the 1979 case, as the theory would predict. Third, Keohane chose the IEA case precisely because it involved rel ations among advanced Western democracies with market economies, where the prospects for cooperation were excellent. (82) The modest impact of institutions in this case is thus all the more damning to the theory.

Lisa Martin examined the role that the European Community (EC) played during the falklands War in helping Britain coax its reluctant allies to continue economic sanctions against Argentina. after military action started. (83) She concludes that the EC helped Britain win its allies' cooperation by lowering transaction costs and facilitating issue linkage. Specifically, Britain made concessions on the EC budget and the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP); Britain's allies agreed in return to keep sanctions on Argentina.

This case, too, is less than a ringing endorsement for liberal institutionalism. First, British efforts to maintain EC sanctions against Argentina were not impeded by fears of possible cheating, which the theory identifies as the central impediment to cooperation, So this case does not present an important test of liberal institutionalism, and thus the cooperative outcome does not tell us much about the theory's explanatory power. Second, it was relatively easy for Britain and her allies to strike a deal in this case. Neither side's core interests were threatened, and neither side had to make significant sacrifices to reach an agreement. Forging an accord to continue sanctions was not a difficult undertaking. A stronger test for liberal institutionalism would require states to cooperate when doing so entailed significant costs and risks. Third, the EC was not essential to an agreement. Issues could have been linked without the EC, and although the EC may have lowered transaction costs somewhat, there is no re ason to think these costs were a serious impediment to striking a deal. (84) It is noteworthy that Britain and America were able to cooperate during the Falklands War, even though the United States did not belong to the EC.

There is also evidence that directly challenges liberal institutionalism in issue areas where one would expect the theory to operate successfully. The studies discussed above by Grieco, Krasner, and Mastanduno test the institutionalist argument in a number of different political economy cases, and each finds the theory has little explanatory power. More empirical work is needed before a final judgment is rendered on the explanatory power of liberal institutionalism. Nevertheless, the evidence gathered so far is unpromising at best.

In summary, liberal institutionalism does not provide a sound basis for understanding international relations and promoting stability in the post-Cold War world. It makes modest claims about the impact of institutions, and steers clear of war and peace issues, focusing instead on the less ambitious task of explaining economic cooperation. Furthermore, the theory's causal logic is flawed, as proponents of the theory now admit. Having overlooked the relative-gains problem, they are now attempting to repair the theory, but their initial efforts are not promising. Finally the available empirical evidence provides little support for the theory

COLELCTIVE SECURITY

The theory of collective security deals directly with the issue of how to cause peace. (85) It recognizes that military power is a central fact of life in international politics, and is likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. The key to enhancing stability in this world of armed states is the proper management of military power. As Inis Claude notes, "the problem of power is here to stay; it is, realistically, not a problem to be eliminated but a problem to be managed." (86) For advocates of collective security, institutions are the key to managing power successfully.

Although the theory emphasizes the continuing importance of military force, it is explicitly anti-realist. Its proponents express a distaste for balance-of-power logic and traditional alliances, as well as a desire to create a world where those realist concepts have no role to play. (87)

In the early twentieth century, Woodrow Wilson and others developed the theory of collective security, which formed the basis for the League of Nations. Despite the well-known failings of that particular institution, the theory's popularity remains high. In fact, there has been much interest in collective security in the aftermath of the Cold War. (88) Claude notes, "Whatever their failures, the Wilsonians clearly succeeded in establishing the conviction that collective security represents a brand of international morality vastly superior to that incorporated in the balance of power system." (89)

Curiously, however, it is difficult to find scholarly work that makes the case for collective security without simultaneously expressing major reservations about the theory, and without expressing grave doubts that collective security could ever be realized in practice. Consider the writings of Claude, who is sympathetic to collective security, and has produced some of the most important work on the subject. He wrote in Power and International Relations, "I would regard the epithet unrealistic as fairly applicable to the theory of collective security." In Swords into Plowshares, he maintained that for "men involved in ... establishing a collective security system ... their devotion to the ideal has been more a manifestation of their yearning for peace and order as an end than as an expression of conviction that the theory of collective security provides a workable and acceptable means to that end." Finally, Claude wrote in 1992, "I reached the conclusion some thirty years ago that ... the implementation of co llective security theory is not a possibility to be taken seriously." (90)

CAUSAL LOGIC. Collective security starts with the assumption that states behave according to the dictates of realism. (91) The aim, however, is to move beyond the self-help world of realism where states fear each other and are motivated by balance-of-power considerations, even though the theory assumes that military power will remain a fact of life in the international system. For advocates of collective security, institutions are the key to accomplishing this ambitious task. Specifically, the goal is to convince states to base their behavior on three profoundly anti-realist norms.

First, states must renounce the use of military force to alter the status quo. They must not launch wars of aggression, but instead must agree to settle all disputes peaceably. Collective security allows for changes in the status quo, but those changes must come via negotiation, not at the end of a rifle barrel. The theory, as Claude notes, "depends upon a positive commitment to the value of world peace by the great mass of states." (92)

The theory nevertheless recognizes that some states may not accept this norm: if there were universal subscription to the norm, there would be no need for a collective security system to deal with troublemakers, since there would be none. (93) However, the overwhelming majority of states must renounce wars of conquest, or else the system would collapse.

It is difficult to stipulate how many aggressors a collective security system can handle at once before it comes undone. The answer depends on the particular circumstances facing the system, such as: the number of great powers, the distribution of power among them, geography, and whether the aggressors are minor or major powers. The upper limit for aggressive major powers is probably two at any one time, but even then, the system is likely to have difficulty dealing with them. Some collective security systems might even have trouble fighting two minor powers at the same time, since minor powers today are often well-armed. Fighting simultaneous wars against Iraq and North Korea, for example, would be a very demanding task, although the great powers would win them. Ideally, a collective security system would confront only one aggressor at a time, and not too often at that. Claude sums up the matter nicely: "Collective security assumes the lonely aggressor; the violator of the world's peace may be allowed an acc omplice or two, but in. principle the evil-doer is supposed to find himself virtually isolated in confrontation with the massive forces of the international posse comitatus." (94)

Second, "responsible" states must not think in terms of marrow self-interest when they act against lonely aggressors, but must instead choose to equate their national interest with the broader interests of the international community. Specifically, states must believe that their national interest is inextricably bound up with the national interest of other states, so that an attack on any state is considered an attack on every state. (95) Thus, when a troublemaker appears in the system, all of the responsible states must automatically and collectively confront the aggressor with overwhelming military power. The aim is "to create automatic obligations of a collective character." (96)

States in a self-help world calculate each move on the basis of how it will affect the balance of power. This narrow sense of self-interest means that states are likely to remain on the sidelines if vital interests are not threatened. (97) This kind of behavior is unacceptable in a collective security world, where there must instead be "a legally binding and codified commitment on the part of all members to respond to aggression whenever and wherever it might occur." (98) A collective security system allows states little freedom of action. The practical effect of this comprehensive system of mutual assistance is that lonely aggressors are quickly confronted with a coalition of overwhelming military strength. For both deterrence and warfighting purposes, this "preponderant power" is far superior to the "minimum winning coalitions" that a troblemaker faces in a balance-of-power world. (99) Once it becomes clear that aggression does not pay, even states reluctant to accept the first norm (the renunciation of agg ression) will be more inclined to accept it.

Third, states must trust each other. States must not only act in accordance with the first two norms, but they must trust that other states will do likewise. If states fear each other, as they do in a realist world, collective security cannot work. States, Claude emphasizes, must "be willing to entrust their destinies to collective security. Confidence is the quintessential condition of the success of the system; states must be prepared to rely upon its effectiveness and impartiality." (100)

Trust is actually the most important of the three norms because it underpins the first two. Specifically, states must be very confident that almost all the other states in the system will sincerely renounce aggression, and will not change their minds at a later date. States also have to be confident that when an aggressor targets them, none of the other responsible states will get cold feet and fail to confront the troublemaker. This element of certainty is of great importance in a collective security system because if it fails to work, at least some of those states that have ignored the balance of power and eschewed alliances are going to be vulnerable to attack.

This discussion of trust raises an additional point about the problems a collective security system faces when it confronts multiple aggressors. The previous discussion focused mainly on the logistical difficulties of dealing with more than one troublemaker. However, the presence of multiple aggressors also raises the question of whether most states in the system are deeply committed to peace, and therefore, whether it makes sense to trust collective security. The more troublemakers there are in the system, the more doubts responsible states are likely to have about their investment in collective security. This same logic applies to suggestions that collective security can get by without requiring that all states join the system. Some argue that one or more states can remain on the sidelines, provided the member states can still confront any troublemakers with overwhelming military force. (101) Although these free-riders are assumed to be non-aggressors, there is no guarantee that they will not later turn to conquest, in which case their free ride might have allowed them to improve significantly their relative power position. This free-rider problem, like the multiple-aggressor problem, is likely to undermine the responsible states' trust in collective security and thus to cause its failure.

FLAWS IN THE CAUSAL LOGIC. There are two major flaws in collective security theory, and both concern the all-important component of trust. Collective security IS an incomplete theory because it does not provide a satisfactory explanation for how states overcome their fears and learn to trust one another. Realists maintain that states fear one another because they operate in an anarchic world, have offensive military capabilities, and can never be certain about other states' intentions. Collective security is largely silent about the first two realist assumptions, as the theory says little about either anarchy or offensive capability. (102) However, it has something to say about intentions, because the theory's first two norms call for states not to aggress, but only to defend. States, in other words, should only have benign intentions when contemplating the use of military force.

However, the theory recognizes that one or more states might reject the norms that underpin collective security and behave aggressively. The very purpose of a collective security system, after all, is to deal with states that have aggressive intentions. In effect, collective security admits that no state can ever be completely certain about another state's intentions, which brings us back to a realist world where states have little choice but to fear each other.

There is a second reason why states are not likely to place their trust in a collective security system: it has a set of demanding requirements--I count nine--that are likely to thwart efforts to confront art aggressor with preponderant power. Collective security, as Claude notes, "assumes the satisfaction of an extraordinarily complex network of requirements." (103)

First, for collective security to work, states must be able to distinguish clearly between aggressor and victim, and then move against the aggressor. However, it is sometimes difficult in a crisis to determine who is the troublemaker and who is the victim. (104) Debates still rage about which European great power, if any, bears responsibility for starting World War I. Similar disputes have followed most other wars.

Second, the theory assumes that all aggression is wrong. But there are occasionally cases where conquest is probably warranted. For example, there are good reasons to applaud the 1979 Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, since it drove the murderous Pol Pot from power.

Third, some states are especially friendly for historical or ideological reasons. Should a state with close friends be labeled an aggressor in a collective security system, its friends are probably going to be reluctant to join the coalition against it. For example, it is difficult to imagine the United States using military force against Britain or Israel, even if they were branded aggressors by the international community.

Fourth, historical enmity between states can also complicate collective security efforts. Consider that a European collective security system would have to depend heavily on Germany and Russia, the two most powerful states on the continent, to maintain order. However, the idea of Germany, which wrought murder and destruction across Europe in 1939-45, and Russia, which was the core of the Soviet empire, maintaining order in Europe is sure to meet significant resistance from other European states.

Fifth, even if states agree to act automatically and collectively to meet aggression, there would surely be difficulty determining how to distribute the burden. States will have strong incentives to pass the buck and get other states to pay the heavy price of confronting an aggressor. (105) During World War I, for example, Britain, France, and Russia each tried to get its allies to pay the blood price of defeating Germany on the battlefield. (106) Rampant buck-passing might undermine efforts to produce the preponderant military power necessary to make collective security work.

Sixth, it is difficult to guarantee a rapid response to aggression in a collective security system. Planning beforehand is problematic because "it is impossible to know what the alignment of states will be if there is an armed conflict." (107) There are also significant coordination problems associated with assembling a large coalition of states to fight a war. Rapid response becomes even more problematic if the responsible states must deal with more than one aggressor. It took more than six months for the United States to put together a coalition to liberate Kuwait from Saddam Hussein. As impressive as the American effort was, threatened states are not likely to have much faith in a security system that tells them help is likely to come, but will only arrive months after they have been conquered.

Seventh, states are likely to be reluctant to join a collective security effort because the system effectively transforms every local conflict into art international conflict. States that see conflict around the globe wilt surely be tempted to cordon off the troubled area and prevent further escalation, as the West has done in the former Yugoslavia. (108) Collective security, however, calls for escalation, even though it is intended for peaceful purposes.

Eighth, the notion that states must automatically respond to aggression impinges in fundamental ways on state sovereignty, and will therefore be difficult to sell. States, especially democracies, are likely to guard jealously their freedom to debate whether or not to fight an aggressor. War is a deadly business, especially if great powers are involved, and few countries want to commit themselves in advance to paying a huge blood price when their own self-interests are not directly involved.

Ninth, there is some contradiction concerning attitudes towards force that raises doubts about whether responsible states would actually come to the rescue of a threatened state. Collective security theory is predicated on the belief that war is a truly horrible enterprise, and therefore states should renounce aggression. At the same time, the theory mandates that states must be ready and willing to use force to thwart troublemakers. However, responsible states find war so repellent that they would renounce it; this raises doubts about their willingness to go to war to stop aggression. Indeed, most advocates of collective security prefer "creative diplomacy and economic sanctions" to military force when dealing with an aggressor state. (109)

In sum, states have abundant reasons to doubt that collective security will work as advertised when the chips are down and aggression seems likely. Should it fail, potential victims are likely to be in deep trouble if they have ignored balance-of-power considerations and placed their faith in collective security. Recognizing this, states are not likely to place their fate in the hands of other states, but will prefer instead the realist logic of self-help.

PROBLEMS WITH THE EMPIRICAL RECORD. The historical record provides little support for collective security, a point acknowledged by the theory's proponents. The great powers have seriously considered implementing collective security three times in this century: after both World Wars, and after the Cold War. The League of Nations, which was established after World War I, was a serious attempt to make collective security work. (110) It had some minor successes during the 1920s. For example, League mediation resolved the Aaland Islands dispute between Finland and Sweden in 1920, and pressure from the League forced Greek, Italian, and Yugoslav troops out of Albania one year later. The League was much less successful in handling several other conflicts during the 1920s, however: it did not prevent or stop the Greco-Turkish War of 1920-22, or the Russo-Polish War of 1920, and France refused to allow the League to consider its occupation of the Ruhr in January 1923, going so far as to threaten withdrawal from the Lea gue if it intervened in the crisis. The League had a mixed record during the 1920s, even though that decade was relatively pacific, and no great power was then bent on aggression.

The international system became increasingly unstable during the 1930s, and the League was seriously tested on six occasions: 1) the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931; 2) the Chaco War of 1932-35; 3) Japan's 1937 invasion of China; 4) Italy's aggression against Ethiopia in 1935; 5) the German occupation of the Rhineland in March 1936; and 6) the Soviet invasion of Finland in 1939. The League failed each test, and was effectively useless by the late 1930s, when the great powers were making the critical decisions that led to World War II.

The United Nations was established in the waning days of World War II to provide collective security around the globe. However, the Soviet-American competition followed on the heels of that war, and the United Nations was therefore never seriously tested as a collective security apparatus during the Cold War. (111)

Since the Cold War ended, there has been much talk in the West about building a collective security system. (112) The success of the American-led coalition that pushed Iraq out of Kuwait led some experts to conclude that the UN might finally be ready to operate as a collective security institution. In Europe, experts have discussed the possibility of turning NATO, or possibly the CSCE, into a collective security system for the continent. It is too early for conclusive judgments as to whether any of these ideas about collective security will be realized. However, almost all the evidence to date points to failure. Iraq was an unusual case, and no effort is underway to reform the UN so that it can perform trite collective security missions. (113) Moreover, the failure of the United States and its European allies either to prevent or to stop the wars in the former Yugoslavia, coupled with NATO's January 1994 decision not to expand its membership eastward, does not bode well for establishing a collective security system in post-Cold War Europe. (114)

FALLBACK POSITIONS. Given the limits of collective security, some of its proponents argue that two less ambitious forms of the theory might be realizable: peacekeeping and concerts. Although they are portrayed as the "budget" version of collective security, some experts think that peacekeeping and concerts might still be a powerful force for international stability. (115)

Peacekeeping, as William Durch notes, "evolved as an alternative to the collective security that the UN was designed to provide but could not." (116) However, peacekeeping is not a watered-down version of collective security. It is, instead, a much less ambitious alternative strategy for promoting stability. Peacekeeping entails third party intervention in minor-power civil wars or disputes between minor powers, for the purpose of either preventing war from breaking out or stopping it once it has begun. This intervention can only be accomplished with the consent of the disputants, and third parties cannot use force to affect the behavior of the parties in dispute. Peacekeeping operations must be "expressly non-threatening and impartial." (117) In essence, peacekeeping is mainly useful for helping implement cease-fires in wars involving minor powers. However, the UN's record in performing even that quite limited task is at best mixed.

Peacekeeping has no role to play in disputes between great powers. Moreover, it forbids the use of coercion, which is essential to a collective security system. Its mission is a far cry from the ambitious goals of collective security. Peacekeeping by the UN or by regional organizations like the Organization of African Unity (OAU) can enhance the prospects for world peace only on the margins. (118)

Concerts are sometimes described as an "attenuated form of collective security," or a "reasonable hybrid version of collective security." (119) Charles and Clifford Kupchan maintain that "collective security organizations can take many different institutional forms along a continuum ranging from ideal collective security to concerts." (120) However, the claim that concerts are a less ambitious version of collective security is incorrect. (121) Concerts essentially reflect the balance of power, and are thus largely consistent with realism, whereas collective security, as explained above, is a fundamentally anti-realist theory. Concerts and collective security systems, therefore, reflect different and ultimately incompatible logics. As Quincy Wright reminds us, "The fundamental assumptions of the two systems are different. A government cannot at the same time behave according to the Machiavellian assumptions of the balance of power and the Wilsonian assumptions of international organization." (122)

A concert is an arrangement in which great powers that have no incentive to challenge each other militarily agree on a set of rules to coordinate their actions with each other, as well as with the minor powers in the system, often in the establishment of spheres of influence. A concert is a great power condominium that reflects the underlying balance of power among its members. The coordinated balancing that takes place inside a concert does not violate great power self-interest. In fact, when those great powers have a dispute, self-interest determines each side's policy and the concert may collapse as a result.

Concerts are most likely to emerge in the wake of great power wars in which a potential hegemon has been defeated, and power is distributed roughly equally among the victors. (123) Four factors account for this phenomenon. First, the great powers would not have much to gain militarily by attacking each other, given the rough balance of power among them. Second, the victorious powers are likely to have a significant interest in maintaining the status quo, mainly because they are in control and the potential hegernon has been subdued. Third, hegemonic wars are very costly, so the great powers are likely to be war-weary and deeply interested in avoiding another costly war. Fourth, the victorious great powers worked together to win the war, so the notion of collective action is likely to appeal to them, and carry over into the early postwar years.

Concerts usually last only a few years. The balance of power changes. Defeated powers rise from the ashes. Victorious powers squabble among themselves, especially about how to deal with minor powers. States become Less sensitive to the costs of war as time passes.

The Concert of Europe, which was established after Napoleonic France had finally been subdued, is the only case of a successful concert. (124) Not surprisingly, it is sometimes held up as a model for the post-Cold War world. The Concert worked fairly well from 1815 to 1823, although the great powers did occasionally clash over their dealings with minor powers. After 2823, however, the Concert was unable to function effectively as a coordinating device for the great powers. "The concert existed in an abortive form" until its final collapse as the Crimean War began in 1854. (125) During its heyday, the Concert of Europe reflected the balance of power; states were not compelled to behave in ways that weakened their relative power position. "Maintaining a balance of power," as Richard Betts notes, "remained an important object of the nineteenth-century Concert regime." (126)

In sum, the theory of collective security directly addresses the issue of how to push states away from war and promote peace, and it recognizes that military power plays a central role in international politics. But the theory has several important flaws. It is built on the foundational norm that states should trust each other, but it does not satisfactorily explain how this is possible in an anarchic world where states have military power and uncertain intentions. Furthermore, the historical record provides little support for the theory. The single case of an operative collective security system was the League of Nations, and it was a spectacular failure. Although peacekeeping and concerts are sometimes described as limited but promising versions of collective security, they are of marginal value in promoting peace. Moreover, both peacekeeping and concerts work according to different logics than collective security. In fact, concerts, like alliances, basically reflect the balance of power, and are thus consi stent with a realist view of institutions.

CRITICAL THEORY

Critical theorists (127) directly address the question of how to bring about peace, and they make bold claims about the prospects for changing state behavior. (128) Specifically, they aim to transform the international system into a "world society," where states are guided by "norms of trust and sharing." Their goal is to relegate security competition and war to the scrap heap of history and create instead a genuine "peace system." (129)

Critical theorists take ideas very seriously. In fact, they believe that discourse, or how we think and talk about the world, largely shapes practice. Roughly put, ideas are the driving force of history Furthermore, they recognize that realism has long been the dominant theory of international politics, and therefore, according to their account of reality, has had substantial influence on state behavior. But critical theorists intend to change that situation by challenging realism and undermining it. Richard Ashley graphically describes their intentions: "Let us then play havoc with neorealist concepts and claims. Let us neither admire nor ignore the orrery of errors, but let us instead fracture the orbs, crack them open, crack them and see what possibilities they have enclosed. And then, when we are done, let us not cast away the residue. Let us instead sweep it into a jar, shine up the glass, and place it high on the bookshelf with other specimens of past mistakes." (130) With realism shattered, the way wou ld presumably be open to a more peaceful world.

Critical theory is well-suited for challenging realism because critical theory is, by its very nature, concerned with criticizing "hegemonic" ideas like realism, not laying out alternative futures. The central aim is "to seek out the contradictions within the existing order, since it is from these contradictions that change could emerge." (131) It is called "critical" theory for good reason. Very significantly, however, critical theory per se has little to say about the future shape of international politics. In fact, critical theory emphasizes that, "It is impossible to predict the future." (132) Robert Cox explains this point: "Critical awareness of potentiality for change must be distinguished from utopian planning, i.e., the laying out of the design of a future society that is to be the end goal of change. Critical understanding focuses on the process of change rather than on its ends; it concentrates on the possibilities of launching a social movement rather than on what that movement might achieve." (13 3)

Nevertheless, international relations scholars who use critical theory to challenge and subvert realism certainly expect to create a more harmonious and peaceful international system. But the theory itself says little about either the desirability or feasibility of achieving that particular end.

CAUSAL LOGIC. Institutions are at the core of critical theory, as its central aim is to alter the constitutive and regulative norms of the international system so that states stop thinking and acting according to realism. Specifically, critical theorists hope to create "pluralistic security communities," where states behave according to the same norms or institutions that underpin collective security. (134) States would renounce the use of military fore, and there would instead be "a generally shared expectation of peaceful change." (135) Furthermore, states would "identify positively with one another so that the security of each is perceived as the responsibility of all." (136) States would not think in terms of self-help or self-interest, but would instead define their interests in terms of the international community. In this new world, "national interests are international interest." (137)

Critical theorists have a more ambitious agenda than proponents of collective security. Critical theorists aim, to create a world in which all states consider war an unacceptable practice, and are not likely to change their minds about the matter. There do not appear to be any troublemaker states in a pluralistic security community as there might be in a collective security system. In fact, military power seems to be largely irrelevant in the critical theorists' post-realist world, which has the earmarks of a true "peace system." (138)

For critical theorists, the key to achieving a "postmodern international system" is to alter state identity radically, or more specifically, to transform how states think-about themselves and their relationship with other states. (139) In the jargon of the theory, "intersubjective understandings and expectations" matter greatly. (140) In practice, this means that states must stop thinking of themselves as solitary egoists, and instead develop a powerful communitarian ethos. (141) Critical theorists aim to create an international system characterized not by anarchy, but by community. States must stop thinking of themselves as separate and exclusive--i.e., sovereign-- actors, and instead see themselves as mutually conditioned parts of a larger whole. (142) States, or more precisely, their inhabitants and leaders, should be made to care about concepts like "rectitude," "rights," and "obligations." In short, they should have a powerful sense of responsibility to the broader international community.

A realist might argue that this goal is desirable in principle, but not realizable in practice, because the structure of the international system forces states to behave as egoists. Anarchy, offensive capabilities, and uncertain intentions combine to leave states with little choice but to compete aggressively with each other. For realists, trying to infuse states with communitarian norms is a hopeless cause.

Critical theory, however, directly challenges the realist claim that structural factors are the main determinants of state behavior. In contrast to realism, critical theory assumes that ideas and discourse are the driving forces that shape the world, although it recognizes that structural factors have some, albeit minor, influence. (143) How individuals think about and talk about the world matters greatly for determining how states act In the international system. Ideas matter so much, according to critical theorists, because the world is socially constructed by individual human beings whose behavior is mediated by their thoughts; these thoughts, in turn, are shared by the members of a larger culture. Individuals bear responsibility for shaping the world they inhabit. The world around them is not a given that forces itself upon them. On the contrary, critical theorists argue that ideational forces or "institutions often can change environments." (144) Markus Fischer sums up this crucial point "In essence, cri tical theory holds that social reality is constituted by intersubjective consciousness based on language and that human beings are free to change their world by a collective act of will." (145)

Robert Cox's description of the state illustrates how this process of thinking about the world determines how it is structured. "The state," he writes, "has no physical existence, like a building or a lamp-post; but it is nevertheless a real entity. It Is a real entity

because everyone acts as though it were."(146) Alexander Wendt's discussion of anarchy provides another good example: "Structure," he writes, "has no existence or causal powers apart from process." (147) States, in fact, can think about anarchy in a number of different ways. "Anarchy is what states make of it." Moreover, "self-help and power politics are institutions. . . not essential features of anarchy."

This discussion of how critical theorists think about the state and anarchy points up the fact that realism and critical theory have fundamentally different epistemologies and ontologies, which are the most basic levels at which theories can be compared. (148) Realists maintain that there is an objective and knowable world, which is separate from the observing individual. Critical theorists, on the other hand, "see subject and object in the historical world as a reciprocally interrelated whole," and they deny the possibility of objective knowledge. (149) Where realists see a fixed and knowable world, critical theorists see the possibility of endless interpretations of the world before them. For critical theorists, "there are no constants, no fixed meanings, no secure grounds, no profound secrets, no final structures or limits of history ... there is only interpretation. ... History itself is grasped as a series of interpretations imposed upon interpretation--none primary, all arbitrary." (150)

Nevertheless, critical theorists readily acknowledge that realism has been the dominant interpretation of international politics for almost seven hundred years. "Realism is a name far a discourse of power and rule in modern global life." (151) Still, critical theory allows for change, and there is no reason, according to the theory anyway, why a communitarian discourse of peace and harmony cannot supplant the realist discourse of security competition and war. In fact, change is always possible with critical theory because it allows for an unlimited number of discourses, and it makes no judgment about the merit or staying power of any particular one. Also, critical theory makes no judgment about whether human beings are "hard-wired" to be good or bad, but instead treats people as infinitely changeable. The key to how they think and behave is the particular "software program" that individuals carry around in their heads, and those can be changed. In essence, critical theorists hope to replace the widely used re alist software package with new software that emphasizes communitarian norms. Once that switch has been made, states will cooperate with each other and world politics will be more peaceful.

Most critical theorists do not see ideas and discourses forming at the grass roots and then percolating up to the elites of society Rather, theirs is a top-down theory, whereby elites play the key role in transforming language and discourse about international relations. Experts, especially scholars, determine the flow of ideas about world politics. It is especially useful, however, if this intellectual vanguard consists of individuals from different states. These transnational elites, which are sometimes referred to as "epistemic communities," are well-suited for formulating and spreading the communitarian ideals that critical theorists hope will replace realism. (152)

Finally, it is worth noting that critical theorists are likely to be quite intolerant of other discourses about international politics, especially realism. (153) Four factors combine to account for this situation. The theory is based on the belief that ideas matter greatly for shaping international policits. Also, it recognizes that particular theories triumph in the marketplace of ideas, and the result is hegemonic discourse. Moreover, although the theory itself does not distinguish between good and bad ideas, critical theorists themselves certainly make that distinction. Furthermore, critical theorists have no historical guarantee that hegemonic discourse will move toward ideas about world politics that they consider sound. Realism, for example, has been the dominant discourse in the international arena for many centuries. Therefore, it makes sense for critical theorists to try to eliminate ideas they do not like, thus maximizing the prospects that their favorite discourse will triumph. Realist thinking, in this view, is not only dangerous, but is the main obstacle critical theorists face in their effort to establish a new and more peaceful hegemonic discourse. (154)

FLAWS IN THE CAUSAL LOGIC. The main goal of critical theorists is to change state behavior in fundamental ways, to move beyond a world of security competition and war and establish a pluralistic security community. However, their explanation of how change occurs is at best incomplete, and at worst, internally contradictory. (155)

Critical theory maintains that state behavior changes when discourse changes. But that argument leaves open the obvious and crucially important question: what determines why some discourses become dominant and others lose out in the marketplace of ideas? What is the mechanism that governs the rise and fall of discourses? This general question, in turn, leads to three more specific questions: 1) Why has realism been the hegemonic discourse in world politics for so long? 2) Why is the time ripe for its unseating? 3) Why is realism likely to be replaced by a more peaceful communitarian discourse?

Critical theory provides few insights on why discourses rise and fall. Thomas Risse-Kappen writes, "Research on ... 'epistemic communities' of knowledge-based transnational networks has failed so far to specify the conditions under which specific ideas are selected and influence policies while others fall by the wayside." (156) Not surprisingly, critical theorists say little about why realism has been the dominant discourse, and why its foundations are now so shaky. They certainly do not offer a well-defined argument that deals with this important issue. Therefore, it is difficult to judge the fate of realism through the lens of critical theory.

Nevertheless, critical theorists occasionally point to particular factors that might lead to changes in international relations discourse. In such cases, however, they usually end up arguing that changes in the material world drive changes in discourse. For example, when Ashley makes surmises about the future of realism, he claims that "a crucial issue is whether or not changing historical conditions have disabled longstanding realist rituals of power." Specifically, he asks whether "developments in late capitalist society," like the "fiscal crisis of the state," and the "internationalization of capital," coupled with "the presence of vastly destructive and highly automated nuclear arsenals [has] deprived statesmen of the latitude for competent performance of realist rituals of power?" (157) Similarly, Cox argues that fundamental change occurs when there is a "disjuncture" between "the stock of ideas people have about the nature of the world and the practical problems that challenge them." He then writes, "So me of us think the erstwhile dominant mental construct of neorealism is inadequate to confront the challenges of global politics today." (158)

It would be understandable if realists made such arguments, since they believe there is an objective reality that largely determines which discourse will be dominant. Critical theorists, however, emphasize that the world is socially constructed, and not shaped in fundamental ways by objective factors. Anarchy, after all, is what we make of it. Yet when critical theorists attempt to explain why

realism may be losing its hegemonic position, they too point to objective factors as the ultimate cause of change. Discourse, so it appears, turns out not to be determinative, but mainly a reflection of developments in the objective world. In short, it seems that when critical theorists who study international politics offer glimpses of their thinking about the causes of change in the real world, they make arguments that directly contradict their own theory, but which appear to be compatible with the theory they are challenging. (159)

There is another problem with the application of critical theory to international relations. Although critical theorists hope to replace realism with a discourse that emphasizes harmony and peace, critical theory per se emphasizes that it is impossible to know the future. Critical theory according to its own logic, can be used to undermine realism and produce change, but it cannot serve as the basis for predicting which discourse will replace realism, because the theory says little about the direction change takes. In fact, Cox argues that although "utopian expectations may be an element in stimulating people to act...such expectations are almost never realized in practice." (160)

Thus, in a sense, the communitarian discourse championed by critical theorists is wishful thinking, not an outcome linked to the theory itself. Indeed, critical theory cannot guarantee that the new discourse will not be more malignant than the discourse it replaces. Nothing in the theory guarantees, for example, that a fascist discourse far more violent than realism will not emerge as the new hegemonic discourse.

PROBLEMS WITH THE EMPIRICAL RECORD. Critical theorists have offered little empirical support for their theory. (161) It is still possible to sketch the broad outlines of their account of the past. They appear to concede that realism was the dominant discourse front about the start of the late medieval period in 1300 to at least 1989, and that states and other political entities behaved according to realist dictates during these seven centuries. However, some critical theorists suggest that both the discourse and practice of international politics during the preceding five centuries of the feudal era or central medieval period (800-1300) was not dominated by realism and, therefore, cannot be explained by it. (162) They believe that European political units of the feudal era did not think and therefore did not act in the exclusive and selfish manner assumed by realism, but instead adopted a more communitarian discourse, which guided their actions. Power politics, so the argument goes, had little relevance in th ese five hundred years.

Furthermore, most critical theorists see the end of the Cold War as an important watershed in world politics. A few go so far as to argue that "the revolutions of 1989 transformed the international system by changing the rules governing superpower conflict and, thereby, the norms underpinning the international system." (163) Realism, they claim, is no longer the hegemonic discourse. "The end of the Cold War...undermined neorealist theory." (164) Other critical theorists are more tentative in their judgment about whether the end of the Cold War has led to a fundamental transformation of international politics. (165) For these more cautious critical theorists, the revolutions of 1989 have created opportunities for change, but that change has not yet been realized.

Three points are in order regarding the critical theorists' interpretation of history. First, one cannot help but be struck by the sheer continuity of realist behavior in the critical theorists' own account of the past. Seven centuries of security competition and war represents an impressive span of time, especially when you consider the tremendous political and economic changes that have taken place across the world during that lengthy period. Realism is obviously a human software package with deep-seated appeal, although critical theorists do not explain its attraction.

Second, a close look at the international politics of the feudal era reveals scant support for the claims of critical theorists: Markus Fischer has done a detailed study of that period, and he finds "that feudal discourse was indeed distinct, prescribing unity, functional cooperation, sharing, and lawfulness." (166) More importantly, however, he also finds "that while feudal actors observed these norms for the most part on the level of form, they in essence behaved like modern states." Specifically, they "strove for exclusive territorial control, protected themselves by military means, subjugated each other, balanced against power, formed alliances and spheres of influence, and resolved their conflicts by the use and threat of force." (167) Realism, not critical theory, appears best to explain international politics in the five centuries of the feudal era.

Third, there are good reasons to doubt that the demise of the Cold War means that the millennium is here. It is true that the great powers have been rather tame in their behavior towards each other over the past five years. But that is usually the case after great-power wars. Moreover, although the Cold War ended in 1989, the Cold War order that it spawned is taking much longer to collapse, which makes it difficult to determine what kind of order or disorder will, replace it. For example, Russian troops remained in Germany until mid-1994, seriously impinging on German sovereignty, and the United States still maintains a substantial military presence in Germany. Five years is much too short a period to determine whether international relations has been fundamentally transformed by the end of the Cold War, especially given that the "old" order of realist discourse has been in place for at least twelve centuries.

A close look at the sources of this purported revolutionary change in world politics provides further cause for skepticism. For critical theorists, "the Cold War was fundamentally a discursive, not a material, structure." (168) Thus, if the United States and the Soviet Union had decided earlier in the Cold War that they were no longer enemies, it would have been over sooner. (169) Mikhail Gorbachev, critical theorists argue, played the central role in ending the Cold War. He challenged traditional Soviet thinking about national security, and championed ideas about international security that sounded like they had been scripted by critical theorists. (170) In fact, critical theorists argue that Gorbachev's "new thinking" was shaped by a "transnational liberal internationalist community [epistemic community] comprising the U.S. arms control community, Western European scholars and center-left policy makers, as well as Soviet institutchiks." (171) These new ideas led Gorbachev to end the Soviet Union's "imperial relationship with Eastern Europe," which led to a fundamental change in "the norms of bloc politics and thereby the rules governing superpower relations." (172) In essence, "the changed practices of one of the major actors... [had] system-wide repercussions." (173) Both superpowers "repudiated the notion of international relations as a self-help system and ... transcended the consequences of anarchy as depicted by realism." (174)

Gorbachev surely played the key role in ending the Cold War, but there are good reasons to doubt that his actions fundamentally transformed international politics. His decision to shut down the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe can very well be explained by

realism. By the mid-1980s, the Soviet Union was suffering an economic and political crisis at home that made the costs of empire prohibitive, especially since nuclear weapons provided the Soviets with a cheap and effective means of defense. Many empires collapsed and many states broke apart before 1989, and many of them sought to give to dire necessity the appearance of virtue. But the basic nature of international politics remained unchanged. It is not clear why the collapse of the Soviet Union is a special case.

Furthermore, now that Gorbachev is out of office and has little political influence in Russia, the Russians have abandoned his "new thinking." (175) In fact, they now have an offensively-oriented military doctrine that emphasizes first use of nuclear weapons. More importantly, since the end of 1992, the Russians have been acting like a traditional great power toward their neighbors. The former Soviet Union seems to be an arena for power politics, and Boris Yeltsin's Russia appears to be fully engaged in that enterprise. (176)

Regarding the more modest claim that the end of the Cold War presents an opportunity to move to a world where states are guided by norms of trust and sharing, perhaps this is true. But since critical theorists acknowledge that their theory cannot predict the future, why should we believe their claim, especially when it means choosing against realism, a theory that has at least 1200 years of staying power?

Critical theorists have ambitious aims. However, critical theory also has important flaws, and therefore it will likely remain in realism's shadow. Specifically, critical theory is concerned with affecting fundamental change in state behavior, but it says little about how it comes about. Critical theorists do occasionally point to particular causes of change, but when they do, they make arguments that are inconsistent with the theory itself. Finally, there is little empirical evidence to support the claims of critical theorists, and much to contradict them.

Conclusion

Many policymakers as well as academics believe that institutions hold great promise for promoting international peace. This optimistic assessment of institutions is not warranted, however, mainly because the three institutionalist theories which underpin it are flawed. There are serious problems with the causal logic of each theory, and little empirical evidence for any of them. What is most impressive about institutions, in fact, is how little independent effect they seem to have had on state behavior.

We have an important paradox here: although the world does not work the way institutionalist theories say it does or should, those theories remain highly influential in both the academic and policy worlds. Given the limited impact of institutions on state behavior, one would expect considerable skepticism, even cynicism, when institutions are described as a major force for peace. Instead, they are still routinely described in promising terms by scholars and governing elites.

It is beyond the scope of this paper to attempt a detailed explanation of this paradox. Nevertheless, 1 would like to close with some speculative comments about this puzzle, focusing on the American context.

The attraction of institutionalist theories for both policymakers and scholars is explained, I believe, not by their intrinsic value, but by their relationship to realism, and especially to core elements of American political ideology Realism has long been and continues to be an influential theory in the United States." (177) Leading realist thinkers such as George Kennan and Henry Kissinger, for example, occupied key policymaking positions during the Cold War. The impact of realism in the academic world is amply demonstrated in the institutionalist literature, where discussions of realism ate pervasive. (178) Yet despite its influence, Americans who think seriously about foreign policy issues tend to dislike realism intensely, mainly because it clashes with their basic values. The theory stands opposed to how most Americans prefer to think about themselves and the wider world. (179)

There are four principal reasons why American elites, as well as the American public, tend to regard realism with hostility. First, realism is a pessimistic theory. It depicts a world of stark and harsh competition, and it holds out little promise of making that world more benign. Realists, as Hans Margenthau wrote, are resigned to the fact that "there is no escape from the evil of power, regardless of what one does." (180) Such pessimism, of course, runs up against the deep-seated American belief that with time and effort, reasonable individuals can solve important social problems. Americans regard progress as both desirable and possible in politics, and they are therefore uncomfortable with realism's claim that security competition and war will persist despite our best efforts to eliminate them. (181)

Second, realism treats war as an inevitable, and indeed sometimes necessary, form of state activity. For realists, war is an extension of politics by other means. Realists are very cautious in their prescriptions about the use of force: ware should not be fought for idealistic purposes, but instead for balance-of-power reasons. Most Americans, however, tend to think of war as a hideous enterprise that should ultimately be abolished. For the time being, however, it can only justifiably be used for lofty moral goals, like "making the world safe for democracy"; it is morally incorrect to fight wars to change or preserve the balance of power. This makes the realist conception of warfare anathema to many Americans.

Third, as an analytical matter, realism does not distinguish between "good" States and "bad" states, but essentially treats them like billiard balls of varying size. In realist theory, all states are forced to seek the same goal: maximum relative power. (182) A purely realist interpretation of the Cold War, for example, allows for no meaningful difference in the motives behind American and Soviet behavior during that conflict. According to the theory, both sides must have been driven by concerns about the balance of power, and must have done what was necessary to try to achieve a favorable balance. Most Americans worlod recoil at such a description of the Cold War, because they believe the United States was motivated by good intentions while the Soviet Union was not. (183)

Fourth, America has a rich history of thumbing its nose at realism. For its first 140 years of existence, geography and the British navy allowed the United States to avoid serious involvement in the power politics of Europe. America had an isolationist foreign policy for most of this period, and its rhetoric explicitly emphasized the evils of entangling alliances and balancing behavior. Even as the United States finally entered its first European war in 1917, Woodrow Wilson railed against realist thinking. America has a long tradition of anti-realist rhetoric, which continues to influence us today.

Given that realism is largely alien to American culture, there is a powerful demand in the United States for alternative ways of looking at the world, and especially for theories that square with basic American values. Institutionalist theories nicely meet these requirements, and that is the main source of their appeal to policymakers and scholars. Whatever else one might say about these theories, they have one undeniable advantage in the eyes of their supporters: they are not realism. Not only do institutionalist theories offer an alternative to realism, but they explicitly seek to undermine it. Moreover, institutionalists offer arguments that reflect basic American values. For example, they are optimistic about the possibility of greatly reducing, if not eliminating, security competition among states and creating a more peaceful world. They certainly do not accept the realist stricture that war is politics by other means. Institutionalists, in short, purvey a message that Americans long to hear.

There is, however, a downside for policymakers who rely on institutionalist theories: these theories do not accurately describe the world, hence policies based on them are bound to fail. The international system strongly shapes the behavior of states, limiting the amount of damage that false faith in institutional theories can cause. The constraints of the system notwithstanding, however, states still have considerable freedom of action, and their policy choices can succeed or fail in protecting American national interests and the interests of vulnerable people around the globe. The failure of the League of Nations to address German and Japanese aggression in the 1930s is a case in point. The failure of institutions to prevent or stop the war in Bosnia offers a more recent example. These cases illustrate that institutions have mattered rather little in the past; they also suggest that the false belief that institutions matter has mattered more, and has had pernicious effects. Unfortunately, misplaced reliance on institutional solutions is likely to lead to more failures in the future.

(1.) Bill Clinton, "American Foreign Policy and the Democratic Ideal," Campaign speech, Pabst Theater, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, October 1, 1992; Steven A. Holmes, "Choice for National Security Adviser Has a Long-Awaited Chance to Lead," New York Times, January 3, 1993.

(2.) The other prominent theme in Western policymaking circles is the Importance of spreading democracy and capitalism across the globe. Prosperous democracies, so the argument goes, do not fight each other. Thus, the aim is to increase the number of stable democracies in the international system. This line of argument is not examined here. For conciseness, international institutions are henceforth referred to simply as institutions.

(3.) Douglas Hurd, "A New System of Security in Europe," Speech to the Diplomatic and Commonwealth Writers' Association, London, June 2, 1992. Hurd, the British Foreign Secretary, said in this speech: "We have in Western Europe, in the West as a whole, a set of international institutions which have proved their worth for one set of problems--the problems for which they were set up, and now have to be adapted for another. That is the key, the necessary changes in all these institutions are the key to getting the right help, the right reassurance to the countries of central and Eastern Europe." Even Margaret Thatcher, with all her reservations about European institutions, has adopted this theme. She argued days after Iraq invaded Kuwait that, "We must bring the new democracies of Eastern Europe into closer association with the institutions of Western Europe.... The European Community has reconciled antagonisms within Western Europe; it should now help to overcome divisions between East and West in Europe." Marg aret Thatcher, "Shaping A New Global Community," Speech to the Aspen Institute, Aspen, Colorado, August 5, 1990.

(4.) Warren Christopher, "Toward a More Integrated World," Statement at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Ministerial Meeting, Paris, June 8, 1994. President Clinton and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl share the same view, as Clinton made clear when describing his private talks with Kohl in July 1994: "We know from our experience how half of Europe was integrated through NATO and other institutions that built stability after World War II. At the heart of our discussion today was what we have to do to integrate Europe's other half, the new independent nations." Thomas L. Friedman, "Clinton Sees Germany as Main Partner of the U.S. in Europe," New York Times, July 12, 1994.

(5.) "Interlocking Institutions: The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)," NATO Basic Fact Sheet No. 6 (Brussels. June 1994). A]so see Jacques Delors. "European Unification and European Security," in European Security after the Cold War, Part 1, Adelphi Paper No. 284 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies [IISSI, January 1994), pp. 3-14.

(6.) Warren Christopher, "The CSCE Vision: European Security Rooted in Shared Values," Statement to the Plenary Session of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Rome, November 30, 1993.

(7.) See Stephen J. Blank, Helsinki in Asia? (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1993).

(8.) Stability is simply the absence of wars and major crises.

(9.) Robert O. Keohane, "The Diplomacy of Structural Change: Multilateral Institutions and State Strategies," in Helga Haftendorn and Christian Tuschhoff, eds., America and Europe in an Era of Chance (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1993), p. 53.

(10.) John G. Ruggie, "Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution," International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 3 (Summer 1992), p. 561.

(11.) Prescriptions about how best to maintain peace should rest on general theories about the causes of war and peace. This point is true for both academics and policymakers. Although policymakers are seldom self-conscious in their use of theory, their views about institutions are nevertheless shaped by their implicit preferences for one theory of international relations over another.

(12.) Keohane, for example. writes, "Institutionalist thinking has focused its critical fire on realism." Robert O. Keohane, "Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge After the Cold War," in David A. Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). p. 271.

(13.) Regimes and institutions are treated as synonymous concepts in this article. They are also used interchangeably in the institutionalist literature. See Robert O. Keohane, "International Institutions: Two Approaches," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 32, No. 4 (December 1988), p. 384; Robert O. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1989), pp. 3-4, and Oran R. Young, International Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural Resources and the Environment (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989), chaps. 1 and 8. The term "multilateralism" is also virtually synonymous with institutions. To quote John Ruggie, "the term 'multilateral' is an adjective that modifies the noun institution.' Thus, multilateralism depicts a generic institutional form in international relations. ... [Specifically] multilateralism is an institutional form which coordinates relations among three or more states on the basis of 'generalized' principles of conduct." Ruggie. "Multilateralism," pp. 570-571.

(14.) For discussion of this point, see Arthur A. Stein, Why Nations Cooperate: Circumstance and Choice in international Relations (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990), pp. 25-27. Also see Susan Strange, "Cave! Hic Dragones: A Critique of Regime Analysis," in Stephen D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes, special issue of International Organization, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Spring 1982), pp. 479-496.

(15.) Oran R. Young, "Regime Dynamics: The Rise and Fall of International Regimes," in Krasner, International Regimes, p. 277.

(16.) See Douglass C. North and Robert P. Thomas, "An Economic Theory of the Growth of the Western World," The Economic History Review, 2nd series, Vol. 23, No. 1 (April 1970). p. 5.

(17.) Krasner, International Regimes, P. 186. Non-realist institutions are often based on higher norms, while few, if any, realist institutions are based on norms. The dividing line between norms and rules is not sharply defined in the institutionalist literature. See Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in The World Political Economy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 57-58. For example, one might argue that rules, not just norms, are concerned with rights and obligations. The key point, however, is that for many institutionalists, norms, which are core beliefs about standards of appropriate state behavior, are the foundation on which more specific rules are constructed. This distinction between norms and rules applies in a rather straightforward way in the subsequent discussion. Both collective security and critical theory challenge the realist belief that states behave in a self-interested way, and argue instead for developing norms that require states to act mor e altruistically. Liberal institutionalism, on the other hand, accepts the realist view that states act on the basis of self-interest, and concentrates on devising rules that facilitate cooperation among states.

(18.) International organizations are public agencies established through the cooperative efforts of two or more states. These administrative structures have their own budget, personnel, and buildings. John Ruggie defines them as "palpable entities with headquarters and letterheads, voting procedures, and generous pension plans." Ruggie, "Multilateralism," p. 573. Once rules are incorporated into an international organization, "they may seem almost coterminous," even though they are "distinguishable analytically." Keohane, International Institutions and State Power. p. 5.

(19.) Charles Lipson, "Is the Future of Collective Security Like the Past?" in George W. Downs, ed., Collective Security beyond the Cold War (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press), p.114.

(20.) Although realist scholars agree about many aspects of international politics, there are important intellectual disagreements among them. Consider Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz, probably the two most influential realists over the past fifty years. Morgenthau maintains that states have a will to power, while Waltz begins his theory with the assumption that states merely want to survive and are therefore driven to maximize security. See Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 5th ad. (New York Knopf, 1973); and Kenneth N. Waltz. Theory of International Politics (Reading. Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979). The discussion in this section is based on my own thinking about realism, which is closer to Waltz than, to Morgenthau.

(21.) See Stephen Van Evera. "The Hard Realities of International Politics," Boston Review, Vol. 17, No. 6 (November/December 1992), p. 19.

(22.) See Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 88-93. Also see Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis, eds., International Politics: Anarchy, Farce, Imperialism (Bostoru Little, Brown, 1973), part I; and Helen Milner, "International Theories of Cooperation among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses," World Politics. Vol. 44, No. 3 (April 1992), p. 468.

(23.) Inis L. Claude, Jr., Swords Into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization, 4th ed. (New York Random House, 1971), p. 14.

(24.) Morgenthau, as emphasized, maintains that states have an innate will to power, and are therefore inherently offensive in their outlook. The argument here is that states begin with a defensive motive, but are forced to think and sometimes act offensively because of the structure of the international system.

(25.) This point is illustrated by the reaction of Britain and France to German reunification at the end of the Cold War. Despite the fact that these three states had been close allies for almost forty-five years, both Britain and France immediately began thinking about the dangers of a united Germany. See David Garnham, "European Defense Cooperation: The 1990s and Beyond," in Dale L. Smith and James Lee Ray, eds., The 1992 Project and the Future of Integration In Europe (Armonk, N.Y.: ME. Sharpe, 1993), pp. 203-205; and Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (New York: HarperCollins, 1993). chaps. 25-26.

(26.) See Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987).

(27.) There is disagreement among realists on this point. Some realists argue that states are principally interested in maintaining the existing balance of power, not maximizing relative power. For examples of this "defensive realism," which contrasts with my

"offensive realism," see: Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer 1988), pp. 498-500; Jack L. Snyder. Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991), pp. 10-13; and Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 126-127. Also see Pareed Zakaria, "Realism and Domestic Politics: A Review Essay," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Summer 1992), pp. 190-196. Morgenthau is also an offensive realist. This disagreement notwithstanding, all realists do believe that states care greatly about the relative balance of power.

(28.) See Walt, Origins of Alliances.

(29.) See Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation."

(30.) Lipson, "International Cooperation," p. 14.

(31.) Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 72-107.

(32.) See John Maynard Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the Pence (New York: Penguin Books, 1988), chap. 2; and J.M. Roberts, Europe, 1880-1945 (London: Longman, 1970), pp. 239-241. There was also significant cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union during World War II, but that cooperation did not prevent the outbreak of the Cold War shortly after Germany and Japan were defeated.

(33.) Tony Evans and Peter Wilson, "Regime Theory and the English School of International Relations: A Comparison," Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Winter 1992), p. 330.

(34.) See Gunther Hellman and Reinhard Wolf, "Neorealism, Neoliberal Institutionalism, and the Future of NATO," Security Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Autumn 1993). pp. 3-43.

(35.) Despite these differences among institutionalist theories, proponents of each theory occasionally make favorable reference to the other theories, and. thus seem to recognize that all three theories are part of an institutionalist body of literature that takes anti-realism as its main point of reference. See, for example: Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe," International Security, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Summer 1991), pp. 114-161; and Ruggie, "Multilateralism," pp. 561-598.

(36.) Among the key liberal institutionalist works are: Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions," World Politics, Vol. 38, No. 1 (October 1985), pp. 226-254; Keohane, After Hegemony; Keohane, "International Institutions: Two Approaches," pp. 379-396; Keohane, International Institutions and State Power, chap. 1; Charles Lipson, "International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs," World Politics, Vol. 37, No. 1 (October 1984), pp. 1-23; Lisa L. Martin, "Institutions and Cooperation: Sanctions During the Falkland Islands Conflict," International Security, Vol. 16, No. 4 (Spring 1992), pp. 143-178; Lisa L. Martin, Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992); Kenneth A. Oye, "Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies," World Politics, Vol. 38, No. 1 (October 1985), pp. 1-24; and Stein, Why Nations Cooperate.

(37.) Stein, Why Notions Cooperate, chap. 2. Also see Keohane, After Hegemony, pp. 6-7, 12-13. 67-69.

(38.) Milner, "International Theories of Cooperation," p. 468.

(39.) For examples of the theory at work in the environmental realm, see Peter M. Haas, Robert O. Keohane, and Marc A. Levy, eds., Institutions for the Earth: Sources of Effective International Environmental Protection (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993), especially chaps. 1 and 9. Some of the most important work on institutions and the environment has been done by Oran Young. See, for example, Young, International Cooperation. The rest of my discussion concentrates on economic, not environmental issues, for conciseness, and also because the key theoretical works in the liberal institutionalist literature focus on economic rather than environmental matters.

(40.) Lipson, "International Cooperation," pp. 2, 12. Also see Axelrod and Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy," pp. 232-233; and Keohane, After Hegemony, pp. 39-41.

(41.) Lipson, "International Cooperation," p. 18.

(42.) I have suggested a possible line of argument in John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer 1990), pp. 42-44. Also, Charles Glaser makes the connection between cooperation and peace in "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 50-90.

(43.) Liberal institutionalists assume that cooperation is a positive goal, although they recognize it has a downside as well. See Keohane, After Hegemony, pp. 10-11, 247-257; and Keohane, "International Institutions: Two Approaches," p. 393. The virtues and vices of cooperation are not explored in any detail in the liberal institutionalist literature.

(44.) Keohane, After Hegemony, p. 67; also see p. 29. Similarly, Arthur Stein claims that, "Despite the different conclusions that they draw about the cooperative or conflictual nature of international politics, realism and liberalism share core assumptions." Stein, Why Nations Cooperate, p. 8.

(45.) Oye, "Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy," p. 1.

(46.) Cheating is basically a "breach of promise." Oye, "Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy," p. 1. It usually implies unobserved non-compliance, although there can be observed cheating as well. Defection is a synonym for cheating in the institutionalist literature.

(47.) The centrality of the prisoners' dilemma and cheating to the liberal institutionalist literature is clearly reflected in virtually all the works cited in footnote 36. As Helen Milner notes in her review essay on this literature: 'The focus is primarily on the role of regimes [institutions] in solving the defection [cheating] problem." Milner, "International Theories of Cooperation," p. 475.

(48.) The phrase is from Keohane, After Hegemony, p. 85.

(49.) Kenneth Oye, for example, writes in the introduction to an issue of World Politics containing a number of liberal institutionalist essays: "Our focus is on non-altruistic cooperation among states dwelling in international anarchy." Oye, "Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy," p. 2. Also see Keohane, "International Institutions: Two Approaches," pp. 380-381; and Keohane, International Institutions and State Power, p. 3.

(50.) Haas, Keohane, and Levy, Institutions for the Earth, p. 11. For general discussions of how rules work, which inform my subsequent discussion of the matter, see Keohane, After Hegemony, chaps. 5-6; Martin, "Institutions and Cooperation," pp. 143-178; and Milner, "International Theories of Cooperation," pp. 474-478.

(51.) See Axelrod and Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy," pp. 248-250; Lipson, "International Cooperation," pp. 4-18.

(52.) Lipson, "International Cooperation," p. 5.

(53.) See Keohane, After Hegemony, pp. 89-92.

(54.) This point is clearly articulated in Lipson, "International Cooperation," especially pp. 12-18. The subsequent quotations in this paragraph are from ibid. Also see Axelrod and Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy," pp. 232-233.

(55.) See Roger B. Parks, "What if 'Fools Die'? A Comment on Axelrod," Letter to American Political Scienice Review, Vol. 79, No. 4 (December 1985), pp. 1173-1124.

(56.) See Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation." Other works by Grieco bearing on the subject include: Joseph M. Grieco, 'Realist Theory and the Problem of International Cooperation: Analysis with an Amended Prisoner's Dilemma Model," The Journal of Politics, Vol. 50. No. 3 (August 1988). pp. 600-624; Grieco, Cooperation among Nations: Europe, America, and Nan-Tariff Barriers to Trade (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990); and Grieco, "Understanding the Problem of International Cooperation: The Limits of Neoliberal Institutionalism and the Future of Realist Theory," in Baldwin, Neorealism and Neoliberalism pp. 301-338. The telling effect of Grieco's criticism is reflected in ibid., which is essentially organized around the relative gains vs. absolute gains debate, an issue given little attention before Grieco raised it in his widely cited 1985 article. The matter was briefly discussed by two other scholars before Grieco. See Joanne Gowa, "Anarchy, Egoism, and Third Images: The Evolution of Cooperation and International Relations," International Organization, Vol. 40, No. 1 (Winter 1986), pp. 172-179; and Oran R Young, "International Regimes: Toward a New Theory of Institutions," World Politics, Vol. 39, No. 1 (October 1956), pp. 118-119.

(57.) Robert O. Keohane, "Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge," in Baldwin, Neorealism and Neoliberalism, p. 283. When liberal institutionalists developed their theory In the mid-1980s. they did not explicitly assume that states pursue absolute gains. There is actually little evidence that they thought much about the distinction between relative gains and absolute gains. However, the assumption that states pursue absolute but not relative gains is implicit in their writings.

(58.) Lipson writes: "The Prisoner's Dilemma, in its simplest form, involves two players. each is assumed to be a self-interested, self-reliant maximizer of his own utility an assumption that clearly parallels the Realist conception of sovereign states in international politics." Lipson, "International Cooperation," p. 2. Realists, however, do not accept this conception of international politics and, not surprisingly, have questioned the relevance of the prisoners' dilemma (at least in its common form) for explaining much of international relations. See Gowa, "Anarchy, Egoism, and Third Images"; Grieco, "Realist Theory and the Problem of International Cooperation"; and Stephen D. Krasner, "Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier," World Politics, Vol. 43, No. 3 (April 1991), pp. 336-366.

(59.) My thinking on this matter has been markedly influenced by Sean Lynn-Jones, in his June 19, 1994, correspondence with me.

(60.) For a short discussion of strategic trade theory, see Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987), pp. 215-221. The most commonly cited reference on the subject is Paul R. Krugman, ed., Strategic Trade Policy and the New International Economics (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1986).

(61.) See Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984), pp. 110-113.

(62.) Grieco maintains in Cooperation among Nations that realist logic should apply here. Robert Powell, however, points out that "in the context of negotiations between the European Community and the United States ... it is difficult to attribute any concern for relative gains to the effects that a relative loss may have on the probability of survival." Robert Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory," American Political Science Review. Vol. 85, No. 4 (December 1991), p. 1319, footnote 26. I agree with Powell. It is clear from Grieco's response to Powell that Grieco includes non-military logics like strategic trade theory in the realist tent, whereas Powell and I do not. See Grieco's contribution to "The Relative-Gains Problem for International Relations," American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 3 (September 1993). pp. 733-735.

(63.) Krasner, "Global Communications and National Power," pp. 336-366; Grieco, Cooperation among Nations; and Michael Mastanduno, "Do Relative Gains Matter? America's Response to Japanese Industrial Policy," International Security, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Summer 1991), pp. 73-113. Also see Jonathan B. Tucker, "Partners and Rivals: A Model of International Collaboration in Advanced Technology," International Organization, Vol. 45, No. 1 (Winter 1991), pp. 83-120.

(64.) Keohane, "Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge," p. 292.

(65.) For example, Keohane wrote after becoming aware of Grieco's argument about relative gains: "Under specified conditions-- where mutual interests are low and relative gains are therefore particularly important to states--neoliberal theory expects neorealism to explain elements of state behavior." Keohane, International Institutions and State Power, pp. 15-16.

(66.) Keohane, "Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge," pp. 269-300; Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains," pp. 1303-1320; and Duncan Snidal, "Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation," American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 3 (September 1991), pp. 701-726. Also see Powell, "Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate," International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Spring 1994). pp. 313-344; Snidal, "International Cooperation among Relative Gains Maximizers," international Studies Quarterly, Vol. 35, No. 4 (December 1991), pp. 387-402; and Powell and Snidal's contributions to "The Relative-Gains Problem for International Cooperation," pp. 735-742.

(67.) On this point, see Sean Lynn-Jones, "Comments on Grieco, 'Realist Theory and the Relative Gains Problem for International Cooperation: Developments in the Debate and the Prospects for Future Research'," unpublished memorandum, December 10, 1992.

(68.) Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," World Politics, Vol. 30. No. 2 (January 1978), pp. 167-214; George H. Quester, Offense and Defense in the International System (New York: John Wiley, 1977); Jack Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984); and Stephen Van Evera, 'The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War," International Security. Vol. 9, No. I (Summer 1984), pp. 58-107.

(69.) Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains," p. 1314; also see p. 1311.

(70.) Ibid., p. 1312. Powell does not use the term "offense-defense" balance in his article.

(71.) Although Snidal's basic arguments about distribution of power fit squarely in the realist tradition (in fact, Grieco made them in abbreviated form In "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation," p. 506), the formal model he develops rests on the non-realist assumption that "gains from cooperation are proportional to the size of the involved states and are shared equally between them." Snidal, "Relative Gains," p. 715. This assumption essentially eliminates the possibility of gaps in gains and thus erases the relative-gains problem. For discussion of this matter, see Grieco's contribution to 'The Relative-Gains Problem for International Cooperation," pp. 729-733.

(72.) Snidal, "Relative Gains," p. 716.

(73.) Ibid., p. 702.

(74.) There is general agreement that defensive weapons make conquest difficult and costly, while offensive weapons make conquest cheap and easy. However, there is no recognized set of criteria for assigning specific weapons either offensive or defensive status. See Marion Boggs, Attempts to Define and Limit "Aggressive" Armament in Diplomacy and Strategy (Columbia: University of Missouri, 1941); Jack Levy, "The Offensive/Defensive Balance of Military Technology. A Theoretical and Historical Analysis," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 2 (June 1984), pp. 219-238; John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 25- 27; and Jonathan Shimshoni, "Technology, Military Advantage, and World War I: A Case for Military Entrepreneurship," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Winter 1990/1991), pp. 187-215.

(75.) See Shai Feldman, Israeli Nuclear Deterrence. A Strategy for the 1980s (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982). pp. 45-49; Charles L. Glaser, An alyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1990); Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma"; and Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War, Vol. II: National Misperception and the Origins of War, forthcoming), chap. 13.

(76.) Keobane actually discusses the prospects for stability in post--Cold War Europe in his response to Grieco; see Keohane, "Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge," pp. 284-291. Surprisingly, his optimistic assessment pays no attention to either Powell or Snidal's arguments, although earlier in that response, he relies on their arguments to "delimit the scope of both realist and institutionalist arguments." See ibid., p. 276.

(77.) Liberal institutionalists have not always been clear about the relationship between their theory and realism. For example, Keohane makes the modest claim in After Hegemony (p. 14) that his theory is a "modification of Realism. Realist theories.... need to be supplemented, though not replaced." lie made a somewhat bolder claim a few years later, writing that, "despite [certain] affinities with neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism should be regarded as a distinct school of thought." Keohane, Tnternational institutions and Slate Power, p. 8. In that same piece, however, he makes the very bold argument that "we must understand that neoliberal institutionalism is not simply an alternative to neorealism, but, in fact, claims to subsume it." Ibid., p. 15.

(78.) For example, Lisa Martin writes that "scholars working in the realist tradition maintain a well-founded 'skepticism about the empirical impact of institutional factors on state behavior. This skepticism is grounded in a lack of studies that show precisely how and when institutions have constrained state decision-making." According to Oran Young, "One of the more surprising features of the emerging literature on regimes (institutions) is the relative absence of sustained discussions of the significance of ... institutions, as

determinants of collective outcomes at the international level." Martin, "Institutions and Cooperation," p. 144; Young, International Cooperation, p. 206.

(79.) Keohane, After Hegemony, chap. 10.

(80.) Ibid., p. 16.

(81.) Ibid., p. 236. A U.S. Department of Energy review of the IEA' performance in the 1980 crisis concluded that it had "failed to fulfill its promise." Ethan B. Kapstein, The Insecure Alliance Energy Crises and Western Politics Since 1944 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), P. 198.

(82.) Keohane, After Hegemony, p. 7.

(83.) Martin, "Institutions and Cooperation." Martin looks closely at three other cases in Coercive Cooperation to determine the effect of institutions on cooperation. I have concentrated on the Falklands War case, however, because it is, by her own admission, her strongest case. See ibid., p. 96.

(84.) Martin does not claim that agreement would not have been possible without the EC. Indeed, she appears to concede that even without the EC, Britain stilt could have fashioned "separate bilateral agreements with each EEC member in order to gain its cooperation, (although) this would have involved much higher transaction costs." Martin, "Institutions and Cooperation," pp. 174- 175. However, transaction costs among the advanced industrial democracies are not very high in an era of rapid communications and permanent diplomatic establishments.

(85.) The works that best articulate the case for collective security are: Inis L. Claude, Jr., Power And International Relations (New York Random House, 1966), chaps. 4-5; Claude, Swords Into Plowshares, chap. 12; and Kupchan and Kupchan, "Concerts and Collective Security." Also see Inis L Claude, Jr., "Collective Security After the Cold War," in Gary L. Guertner, ed., Collective Security En Europe end Asia (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1992), pp. 7-27; and Downs, Collective Security beyond the Cold War. The best critiques of collective security include; Richard K. Betts, "Systems for Peace or Causes of War? Collective Security, Arms Control, and the New Europe," International Security, Vol. 1?, No. I (Summer 1992), pp. 5-43; Josef Joffe, "Collective Security and the Future of Europe: Failed Dreams and Dead Ends," Survival, Vol. 34, No. 1 (Spring 1992), pp. 36-50; Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, pp. 293-306, 407418; and Arnold Wolfers, Discord And Colloborat ion: Essays on International Polities (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), chap. 12. Fora very useful source on collective security, see Maurice Bourquin, ed., Collective Security, A Record of the Seventh and Eighth International Studies Conferences (Paris: International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation, 1936).

(86.) Claude, Power And International Relations, p. 6.

(87.) Consider, for example, how Woodrow Wilson describes pre-World War I Europe. "The day we left behind us was a day of alliances. It was a day of balances of power. It was a day of 'every nation take care of itself or make a partnership with some other nation or group of nations to hold the peace of the world steady or to dominate the weaker portions of the world'." Quoted in Claude, Power and International Relations, p. 81.

(88.) Some examples of recent interest in collective security include: Malcolm Chalmers, "Beyond the Alliance System: The Case for a European Security Organization," World Policy Journal, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Spring 1990), pp. 215-250; Downs, Collective Security beyond the Cold War; Gregory Flynn and David J. Sheffer, "Limited Collective Security," Foreign Policy, No. 80 (Fall 1980), pp. 77-101; Kupchan and Kupchan, "Concerts and Collective Security"; Gene M. Lyons, "A New Collective Security: The United Nations and International Peace," The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Spring 1994), pp. 173-199; Richard H. Ullman, Securing Europe (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991); and Brian Urquhart, "Beyond the Sheriff's Posse," Survival, Vol. 32, No. 3 (May/June 1990), pp. 196-205.

(89.) Claude, Power And International Relations, p. 116. Also see Wolfers, Discord And Collaboration, p. 197.

(90.) Claude, Power And International Relations, pp. 203-204; Claude, Swords Into Plowshares, p. 283; and Claude, "Collective Security After the Cold War," p. 9. The Kupchans, who are also sympathetic to collective security (see "Concerts and Collective Security"), apparently share Claude's doubts about the theory. After detailing the strengths (pp. 125-137) and flaws (pp. 138-140) of collective security, they abandon the theory and advocate a concert system for Europe (pp. 140-161), which, as discussed below, is fundamentally different from collective security.

(91.) My thinking about the logic underpinning collective security has been significantly influenced by Bradley A. Thayer, "A Theory of Security Structures," unpublished manuscript, University of Chicago, July 1994.

(92.) Claude, Swords Into Plowshares, p. 250.

(93.) Collective security is often criticized on the grounds that "it is feasible only when it is also unnecessary." In other words, collective security requires that "all members are willing to accept the political status quo," but if that is the case, collective security would be unnecessary since no state, by definition, would cause trouble. Charles L. Glaser, "Why NATO is Still Best: Future Security Arrangements for Europe." International Security, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Summer 1993), p. 28. Also see Joffe, "Collective Security and the Future of Europe," pp. 44, 46; and Kupchan and Kupchan, "Concerts and Collective Security," p. 124. This criticism is unfair, however, because the very purpose of a collective security system is to deal with aggressors. If states could be guaranteed that no other state would ever launch an aggressive war, there would be no need for collective security. The theory recognizes that such a guarantee is not possible.

(94.) Claude, Power And International Relations, p. 196.

(95.) Woodrow Wilson said in 1916, "We are participants, whether we would or not, in the life of the world. The interests of all nations are our own also. We are partners with the rest. What affects mankind is inevitably our affair as well as the affair of the nations of Europe and of Asia." Quoted in August Heckscher, ed., The Politics of Woodrow Wilson: Selections from His Speeches and Writings (New York: Harper, 1956) , p. 258.

(96.) Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p. 296.

(97.) A state not at risk might fail to come to the aid of a threatened state because the risks and costs of going to war are too high, or because it has an interest in letting the combatants wear each other down, thus improving its own strategic position. A state not directly at risk might even join forces with the aggressor against the threatened state, so as to gain some of the spoils of victory

(98.) Kupchan and Kupchan, "Concerts and Collective Security," p. 119.

(99.) Traditional alliances have no place in a collective security system. Woodrow Wilson is particularly eloquent on this point: "I am proposing that all nations henceforth avoid entangling alliances which would draw them into a competition of power, catch them in a net of intrigue and selfish rivalry, and disturb their own affairs with influences intruded from without. There is no entangling alliance in a concert of power. When all unite to act in the same sense and with the same purpose, all act in the common interest and are free to live their own lives under a common protection." Quoted in Frederick L. Schuman, International Politics: An Introduction to the Western State System (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1933) ,.p. 254.

(100.) Claude, Swords Into Plowshares, p. 255. Also see Claude, Power And International Relations, p. 197.

(101.) See Thomas R. Cusack and Richard J. Stoll, "Collective Security and State Survival in the Interstate System," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 38, No. 1 (March 1994), pp. 33-59; and George W. Downs and Keisuke Iida, "Assessing the Theoretical Case against Collective Security," in Downs, Collective Security beyond the Cold War, pp. 17-39.

(102.) Advocates of collective security usually favor widespread arms reductions, but they also recognize that states must maintain a significant offensive capability so that they can challenge an aggressor. For this reason, some scholars suggest that collective security might undermine stability. See Glaser, "Why NATO is Still Best," pp. 30-33.

(103.) Claude, Swords Into Plowshares, p. 250.

(104.) See Bourquin, Collective Security. pp. 295-338.

(105.) See Mancur Olson, Jr., and Richard Zeckhauser, "An Economic Theory of Alliances," Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 48, No. 3 (August 1966), pp. 266-279; and Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984).

(106.) David French, British Strategy and War Aims, 19l4-1916 (London: Allen and Unwin, 1986).

(107.) G.F. Hudson, "Collective Security and Military Alliances," in Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, eds.; Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of international Politics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966), p. 177.

(108.) For an example of this line at thinking, see Stephen M. Walt, "Collective Security and Revolutionary Change: Promoting Peace in the Former Soviet Union," in Downs, Collective Security beyond the Cold War, pp. 169-195.

(109.) Robert C. Johansen, "Lessons For Collective Security," World Policy Journal, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Summer 1991), p. 562.

(110.) The standard history of the League is FP. Walters, A History Of The League Of Nations, 2 vols. (London: Oxford University Press, 1952).

(111.) See Ernst B. Haas, "Types of Collective Security: An Examination of Operational Concepts," American Political Science Review, Vol. 49, No. 1 (March 1955), pp. 40-62; and Kenneth W. Thompson, "Collective Security Reexamined," American Political Science Review, Vol. 47, No. 3 (September 1953), pp. 753-772.

(112.) See the sources cited in footnote 88.

(113.) See Adam Roberts, "The United Nations and International Security," Survival, Vol. 35, No. 2 (Summer 1993), pp. 3-30; and Claude, "Collective Security After the Cold War," pp. 15-27. For a critical discussion of the performance of the United States and the United Nations in the Gulf War, see Johansen, "Lessons For Collective Security."

(114.) There is still discussion about extending NATO eastward to include Poland, Hungary, and the two Czechoslovakian remnant states. Russia is deeply opposed to such a move, however, and therefore NATO is not likely to expand eastward in any meaningful way. Regardless, even if those four states joined NATO, the remnant states of the former Soviet Union would still be excluded, and their inclusion would be necessary to transform NATO into an effective collective security system for Europe. For an argument that NATO should not be transformed into a collective security system, see Glaser, "Why NATO is Still Best," pp. 26-33.

(115.) Regarding peacekeeping, see Mats R. Berdal, Whither UN Peacekeeping? Adelphi Paper No. 251 (London: IISS, October

1993), pp. 3-4, 75-77. Concerning concerts, see Kupchan and Kupchan, "Concerts and Collective Security," pp. 151-161; Richard Rosecrance, "A Concert of Powers," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 2 (Spring 1992), pp. 64-82; and Philip Zelikow, "The New Concert of Europe," Survival, Vol. 34, No. 2 (Summer 1992), pp. 12-30.

(116.) William J. Durch, "Building on Sand: UN Peacekeeping in the Western Sahara," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), p. 151. Also see Uerdal, Whither UN Peacekeeping?; and William J. Durch, ed., The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis (New York; St. Martins, 1993).

(117.) Berdal, Whither UN Peacekeeping? p. 3.

(118.) For a discussion of the limitations of regional organizations as conflict managers, see S. Neil MacFarlane and Thomas C. Weiss, "Regional Organizations and Regional Security," Security Studies, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Autumn 1992), pp. 6-37.

(119.) Kupchan and Kupchan, "Concerts and Collective Security," p. 120; Betts, "Systems for Peace or Causes of War?" p. 27. Also see Downs, Collective Security beyond the Cold War.

(120.) Kupchan and Kupchan, "Concerts and Collective Security," p. 119.

(121.) I cannot find evidence that Woodrow Wilson, Inis Claude, or Arnold Wolfers considered concerts to be a limited form of collective security. It appears that the first serious efforts to link collective security with concerts were made in post-Cold War writings on collective security especially Rupchan and Kupchan, "Concerts and Collective Security."

(122.) Quincy Wright, A Study Of War, Vol. 2 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942), p. 781. Charles Lipson provides an example of how institutionalists try to combine these two incompatible theories. He writes: "Thus, the [post-1815] Concert is a kind of beacon to advocates of collective security ... not only because it succeeded but because it did so ... without transforming the self-interested behavior of states." Lipson, "Future of Collective Security," p. 119. However, a system based on the self-interested behavior of states is antithetical to collective security, and therefore, it is difficult to understand how such a system could be considered a "kind of beacon to advocates of collective security." For another example of this problem, see Kupchan and Kupchan, "Concerts and Collective Security," p. 116.

(123.) See Robert Jervis, "From Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security Cooperation," World Politics, Vol. 38, No. 1 (October 1985), pp. 58-79.

(124.) Among the best works on the Concert of Europe are: Richard Elrod, "The Concert of Europe: A Fresh Look at an International System," World Politics, Vol. 28, No. 2 (January 1976), PP. 156-174; Edward V. Gulick, Europe's Classical Balance of Power; A Case History of the Theory and Practice of One of the Great Concepts of European Statecraft (New York: Norton, 1955); Jervis, "From Balance To Concert"; Harold Nicolson, The Congress of Vienna; A Study in Allied Unity, 1812-1822 (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1946); Paul W. Schroeder, Austria, Great Britain, and the Crimean War; The Destruction of the European Concert (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1972). Harold Temperley, The Foreign Policy of Canning, 1822-1827: England, the Neo-Holy Alliance, and the New World, 2nd ed. (London: Thomas Nelson, 1966); and Charles K. Webster, The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh: Britain and the European Alliance, 1815-1822, 2nd ed. (London: G. Bell, 1934).

(125.) The phrase is from Gulick, Europe's Classical Balance of Power, p. 22.

(126.) Betts, "Systems for Peace or Causes of War?" p. 27. The Kupchans readily accept that power politics is part of the warp and woof of daily life in a concert system. See "Concerts and Collective Security," pp. 116. 120, 141-144.

(127.) Critical theory is an approach to studying the human condition that is not tied to a particular discipline. In fact, critical theory was well-developed and employed widely in other disciplines before it began to penetrate the international relations field in the early 1980s. This article does not focus on critical theory per se, but examines the scholarly literature where critical theory is applied to international relations. I treat those works as a coherent whole, although there are differences, especially of emphasis, among them. For a general discussion of critical theory, see David Held, Introduction to Critical Theory: Horkheimer to Habermas (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980); and Pauline M. Rosenau, Post-Modernism And The Social Sciences; Insights, Inroads, and Intrusions (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 1992). Also see Pauline Rosenau, "Once Again Into the Fray: International Relations Confronts the Humanities." Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 19. N o. 1 (Spring 1990). pp. 83-110.

(128.) Among the key works applying critical theory to international relations are: Richard K. Ashley, "The Poverty of Neorealism." International Organization, Vol. 38, No. 2 (Spring 1984), pp. 225-286; Ashley, "The Geopolitics of Geopolitical Space Toward a Critical Social Theory of International Politics," Alternatives, Vol. 12, No. 4 (October 1987), pp. 403-434; Robert W. Cox, "Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method," Millennium. Journal of International Studies, Vol. 12, No. 2 (Summer 1983), pp. 162-175; Cox. "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory," Millennium: Journal of International Studies. Vol. 10. No. 2 (Summer 1981), pp. 126-155; Cox. "Towards A Post-Hegemonic Conceptualization of World Order: Reflections on. the Relevancy of Ibn Khaldun," in James N. Rosenau, and Ernst-Otto Czemplel, eds., Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 132-159; Rey Koslowski and F riedrich V. Kratochwil, "Understanding Change in International Politics: The Soviet Empire's Demise and the International System," International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Spring 1994), pp. 215-247; Friedrich Kratochwil and John G. Ruggie, "International Organization: A State of the Art on an Art of the State," International Organization, Vol. 40, No. 4 (Autumn 1986), pp. 753-775; Ruggie, "Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis." World Politics, Vol. 35, No. 2 (January 1983), pp. 261-285; Ruggie, 'Territoriality And Beyond. Problematizing Modernity in International Relations," International Organization, Vol. 47. No. 1 (Winter 1993), pp. 139-174; Alexander Wendt. "The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory," International Organization, Vol. 41. No. 3 (Summer 1987), pp. 335-370; Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The

Social Construction of Power Politics," International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring 1992), pp. 391-425; and Wendt, "C ollective Identity Formation and the International State," America Political Science Review, Vol. 88. No. 2 (June 1994), pp. 384-396. I use the label "critical theory" to describe this body of literature: other labels are sometimes used, among them constructivism, reflectivism, post-modernism, and post-structuralism.

(129.) The quotations in this paragraph are from Ashley, "Poverty of Neorealism," p. 285; and Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It," p. 431.

(130.) Ashley, "Poverty of Neorelaism," p. 286.

(131.) Robert W. Cox, Production, Power, and World Order. Social Forces in the Making of World History (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), p. 393.

(132.) Cox, "Post-Hegemonic Conceptualization," p. 139.

(133.) Cox, Production, Power, and World Order, p. 393. The young Karl Marx summed up this approach in 1844: "the advantage of the new trend [is] that we do not attempt dogmatically to prefigure the future, but want to find the new world only through criticism of the old." Karl Marx, "For a Ruthless Criticism of Everything Existing," in Robert C. Tucker, ed., The Marx-Engels Reader, 2nd ed. (New York: Norton, 1978), p. 13. Marx's early writings have markedly influenced critical theory. See, for example, Ashley, "Poverty of Neorealism," pp. 226-230; and Cox, "Social Forces," p. 133. Critical theorists, however, disparage Marx's later writings, which lay out a structural theory of politics that has much in common with realism.

(134.) Emanuel Adler, "Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Security: A Thirty Year Retrospective and a New Set of Anticipations," Daedalus, Vol. 120, No. 1 (Winter 1991), pp. 11-18; Ashley, "Geopolitics of Geopolitical Space," pp. 428, 430; and Richard Ned Lebow, "The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Failure of Realism," International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Spring 1994), pp. 269-277 Wendt uses the term "cooperative security system" in place of "pluralistic security community." See "Anarchy Is What States Make of It," pp. 400-401. Karl Deutsch invented the concept of a pluralistic security community. See Karl W. Deutsch, et at., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957). pp. 5-9.

(135.) Ashley, "Geopolitics of Geopolitical Space," p. 430. Also see Adler, "Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Security," 11.

(136.) Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It," p. 400.

(137.) Ibid.

(138.) This outcome is fully consistent with Deutsch's definition of a pluralistic security community: "there is real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each there physically, but will settle their disputes in same other way. If the entire world were integrated as a security community, wars would be automatically eliminated." Deutsch, Political Community, p. 5.

(139.) John G. Ruggie, "International Structure and International Transformation: Space, Time, and Method." in Ernst-Otto Czempiel and James N. Rosenau, eds., Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges: Approaches to World Politics for the 1990s, (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1989), p. 30.

(140.) Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It," p. 397.

(141.) "Critical social scientific approaches," as Ashley notes, "are inherently communitarian." See Ashley, "Geopolitics of Geopolitical Space," p. 403; also see pp. 404-407.

(142.) In a recent article, Alexander Wendt discusses the "emergence of 'international states,' which would constitute a structural transformation of the Westphalian states system." Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation," p. 385.

(143.) It is important to emphasize that critical theorists do not make a case for pure idealism, where realist structure has little bearing on state behavior. Their argument is much more sophisticated, as they maintain that structure and discourse are inextricably linked together and constantly interact in a dialectical fashion. Structure, they emphasize, both enables and constrains individual behavior. Nevertheless, the key point for critical theorists is that structure is ultimately shaped and reshaped by discourse. In other words, structure may shape our thinking about the world, but structure is ultimately shaped by our discourse. Structure is not an independent material force that shapes how we think and talk about the world. Social reality in the end, is ultimately a construction of our minds.

(144.) Koslowski and Kratochwil, "Understanding Change," p. 226.

(145.) Markus Fischer, "Feudal Europe, 800-1300: Communal Discourse and Conflictual Practices," International Organization. Vol. 46. No, 2 (Spring 1992). p. 430.

(146.) Cox, "Post-Hegemonic Conceptualization," p. 133.

(147.) Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It," p. 395. The subsequent quotations in this paragraph are from ibid. Also see Richard K Ashley, "Untying the Sovereign State: A. Double Reading of the Anarchy Problematique," Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Summer 1988), pp. 227-262.

(148.) See Cox, "Post-Hegemonic Conceptualization," pp. 132-139; Kratochwil and Ruggie, "International Organization," pp. 763-775;

Yosef Lapid, "The Third Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory in a Post-Positivist Era," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 3 (September 1989), pp. 235-254; Wendt, "The Agent-Structure Problem," pp. 335-370.

(149.) Cox, "Post-Hegemonic Conceptualization," p. 135.

(150.) Ashley, "Geopolitics of Geopolitical Space," pp. 408-409.

(151.) Ibid., p. 422.

(152.) See Adler, "Arms Control"; and Peter M. Haas, ed., Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination, special issue of International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 1 (Winter 1992).

(153.) For example, see Ashley, "Poverty of Neorealism," passim.

(154.) Lebow, for example, writes that "Contemporary realists' ... theories and some of the policy recommendations based on them may now stand in the way of the better world we all seek." Lebow, "The Long Peace," p. 277.

(155.) My thinking on this matter has been markedly influenced by Hein Goemans.

(156.) Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Ideas Do Not Float Freely: Transnational Coalitions, Domestic Structures, and the End of the Cold War," International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Spring 1994), p. 187. Also see Koslowski and Kratochwil, "Understanding Change," p. 225.

(157.) Ashley "Geopolitics of Geopolitical Space," Pp. 426-427.

(158.) Cox, "Post-Hegemonic Conceptualization," p. 138. Also see Cox, "Social Forces," pp. 138-149. For other examples, see Ruggie, "Continuity and Transformation," pp. 281-286; and Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation," pp. 389-390.

(159.) Cox is apparently aware of this problem. After spending eleven pages outlining various objective factors that might shape a new world order, he notes, "It would, of course, be logically inadmissible, as well as imprudent, to base predictions of future world order upon the foregoing considerations." Cox, "Social Forces," p. 149, emphasis added. Nevertheless, he then emphasizes in the next few sentences how important those objective considerations are for understanding future world order prospects. He writes: 'Their utility is rather in drawing attention to factors which could incline an emerging world order in one direction or another. The social, forces generated by changing production processes are the starting point for thinking about possible futures. These forces may combine in different configurations, and as an exercise one could consider the hypothetical configurations most likely to lead to three different outcomes as to the future of the state system. The focus on these three outcomes is not, of course, to imply that no other outcomes or configurations of social forces are possible." In other words, Cox does rely heavily on objective factors to explain possible future world orders.

(160.) Cox, Production, Power, And World Order, p. 393.

(161.) Wertdt, for example, acknowledges that, "Relatively little empirical research has been explicitly Informed by structuration [critical] theory which might illustrate its implications for the explanation of state action." Wertdt, "The Agent-Structure Problem," p. 362.

(162.) Ruggie, "Continuity and Transformation," pp. 273-279. Also see Robert W. Cox, "Postscript 1985," in Robert O. Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 244-245.

(163.) Koslowski and Kratochwil, "Understanding Change," p. 215. Also see Lebow, "The Long Peace"; Risse-Kappen, "Ideas Do Not Float Freely"; and Janice Gross Stein, "Political Learning By Doing: Gorbachev As Uncommitted Thinker and Motivated Learnet" International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Spring 1994), pp. 155-183. All four of these articles are published together as a symposium on "The Bnd of the Cold War and Thearies of International Relations," in the Spring 1994 International Organization.

(164.) Koslowski and Kratochwil, "Understanding Change," p. 217.

(165.) See, for example, Ruggie, "Territoriality and Beyond," pp. 173-174; Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It," p. 422; and Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation," p. 393.

(166.) Fischer, "Feudal Europe." p. 428. Also see the subsequent exchange between Fischer and Rodney Hall and Friedrich Kratochwil in International Organization, Vol. 47, No. 3 (Summer 1993), pp. 479-500.

(167.) Fischer, "Feudal Europe," p. 428.

(168.) Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation," p. 389.

(169.) This sentence is a. paraphrase of Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It," p. 397.

(170.) See Koslowski and Kratochwil, "Understanding Change," p. 233.

(171.) Risse-Kappen, "Ideas Do Not Float Freely," p. 213. Also see ibid., pp. 195-214; and Stein, "Political Learning By Doing," pp. 175-180.

(172.) Koslowski and Kratochwil, "Understanding Change," pp. 228, 239.

(173.) Ibid., p. 227.

(174.) Lebow, "The Long Peace," p. 276.

(175.) See Charles Dick, "The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation," in Jane's Intelligence Review, Special Report No. 1, January 1994, pp. 1-5; Michael C. Desch, "Why the Soviet Military Supported Gorbachev and Why the Russian Military Might Only Support Yeltsin for a Price," Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 16, No. 4 (December 1993), pp. 467-474; and Stephen Foye, "Updating Russian Civil-Military Relations," RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 2, No. 46 (November 19, 1993), pp. 44-50.

(176.) See, for example, Thomas Goltz, "Letter from Eurasia: The Hidden Russian Hand," Foreign Policy, No. 92, pp. 92-116; Steven E. Miller, "Russian National Interests." in Robert D. Blackwill and Sergei A. Karaganov, eds., Damage Limitation or Crisis? Russia end the Outside World, CSIA. Studies in International Security No. 5 (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 1994), pp. 77-106; Alexel K. Pushkov, "Russia and America: The Honeymoon's Over," Foreign Policy, No. 93 (Winter 1993-1994), pp. 77-90; and Bruce D. Porter and Carol R. Saivetz, "The Once and Future Empire: Russia and the Near Abroad'," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Summer 1994), pp. 75-90.

(177.) See Michael J. Smith, Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger (Saton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1956), chap. 1.

(178.) Summing up the autobiographical essays of 34 international relations scholars, Joseph Kruzel notes that "Hans Morgenthau is more frequently cited than any other name in these memoirs,' Joseph Kruzel, "Reflections on the Journeys," in Joseph Kruzel and James N. Rosenau, eds., Journeys through World Politics: Autobiographical Reflections of Thirty-four Academic Travelers (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1989), p. 505. Although "Morgenthau is often cited, many of the references in these pages are negative in tone. He seems to have inspired his critics even more than his supporters." Ibid.

(179.) See Keith L. Shimko, "Realism, Neorealisin, and American Liberalism," Review of Politics, Vol. 54, No. 2 (Spring 1992), pp. 281-301.

(180.) Hans J. Morgenthau, Scientific Men vs. Power Polities (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), p. 201. Nevertheless, Keith Shimko convincingly argues that the shift within realism, away from Morgenthau's belief that states are motivated by an unalterable will to power, and toward Waltz's view that states are motivated by the desire for security, provides "a residual, though subdued optimism, or at least a possible basis for optimism [about international polities]. The extent to which this optimism is stressed or suppressed varies, but it is there if one wants it to be." Shimko, "Realism, Neorealism, and American Liberalism," p. 297. Realists Like Stephen Van Evera, for example, point out that although states operate in a dangerous world, they can take steps to dampen security competition and minimize the danger of war. See Van Evera, Causes of War.

(181.) See Reinhold Niebuhr, The Children of Light and The Children of Darkness: A Vindication of Democracy and a Critique of Its Traditional Defense (New York: Charles Scribner's, 1944), especially pp. 153-190. See also Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (New York: Vintage Books, 1964).

(182.) It should be emphasized that many realists have strong moral preferences and are driven by deep moral convictions. Realism is not a normative theory, however, and it provides no criteria for moral judgment. Instead, realism merely seeks to explain how the world works. Virtually all realists would prefer a world without security competition and war, but they believe that goal is unrealistic given the structure of the international system. See, for example, Robert G. Gilpin, "The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism, " in Keohane, Neorealism and Its Critics, p. 321.

(183.) Realism's treatment of states as billiard balls of different sizes tends to raise the hackles of comparative politics scholars, who believe that domestic political and economic factors matter greatly for explaining foreign policy behavior.

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