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Title: 1Block address authentication protocol (1Block)
Author: Monte Ohrt @mohrt
Status: Draft


The following is an open protocol allowing simple and secure authentication based on Blockchain ECC. By authentication we mean to prove to a service/application that we control a specific Blockchain address by signing a challenge, and that all related data and settings may securely be linked to our session. The Blockchain is a reference to the underlying Elliptic Curve Cryptography technology that powers Bitcoin. 1Block uses the Blockchain technology, but is not directly related to Bitcoin currency or used for Bitcoin transactions. A Bitcoin wallet is not required to use 1Block.

The original premise came from the Bitcoin community with the idea of using Bitcoin signatures to manage authentication. Eric Larcheveque came up with the BitID protocol outlining these ideas. 1Block has similarities to it, but does diverge enough to be its own protocol. Namely, uncoupling itself from Bitcoin wallets using only the Bitcoin message signing for authentication, separating individual services with separate private key pairs, and adding a ID revoking mechanism to the core protocol. 1Block adheres to BitID similarities where it can. SQRL by Steve Gibson is another similar open protocol using ECC for authentication, however it does not use Blockchain technology. Some ideas come from SQRL, namely the Diffie-Hellman key exchange to manage a secure key revoking mechanism.

One of the driving purposes of using Blockchain is the available toolsets for Javascript and browsers. This made it possible to write the 1Block clients completely in HTML, CSS and Javascript, making a very flexible and portable platform.


Web sites and applications shouldn’t have to rely on problematic identification methods such as usernames and passwords :

  • This is a human problem.
  • This is a customer support problem.
  • This is an industry problem.

Using 1Block for authentication purposes has many benefits :

  • supported by nearly all smart phones and browsers
  • simple registration and login process for end user
  • eliminates keyboard interaction
  • reduces phishing/malware risks
  • reduces need for 2nd factor auth
  • no need to remember, create or change passwords
  • services know only site-specific public addresses
  • no personal or sensitive information supplied with a login
  • each login is unique, no useful information to sniff

Classical password authentication is an insecure process that could be solved with public key cryptography. The problem, however, is that it theoretically offloads a lot of complexity and responsibility on the user. Managing private keys securely is complex. However this complexity is already being addressed in the Blockchain ecosystem. 1Block leverages these efforts and makes authentication a much simpler and safer process for the end user.

See complete 1Block presentation :

Mobile Application

The mobile app is written in Apache Cordova, and therefore should be compatible with any platform Cordova supports. 1Block has been tested on various Android and iPhone devices. Ionic Framework is the working engine, which combines Cordova with a foundation of custom CSS and AngularJS.


You can think of a 1Block ID as your keychain. A single ID is used to log into any number of services. Usually one ID is all you need. However, the 1Block client supports multiple IDs. For instance, you may have an ID for personal use and another for business use. Or, maybe you have multiple IDs for a single service that you manage. The IDs are generated by the client for you. They are generated by a mnemonic pass phrase (See BIP39) and are stored offline by writing the phrase down. The IDs can be copied to multiple devices via QR code or by regeneration from the pass phrase.

In order to access a restricted area or authenticate oneself against a given service, the user is presented a QR code :

TODO: add QR code graphic

The client browser then begins polling the service for a successful signature. This is polled via javascript ajax requests or possibly by a single websocket connection.

The QR code contains a login challenge of the following format :

  • oneblock is the protocol scheme
  • is the callback URL
  • x is a one-time identifier for the session, or in cryptographic terms a "nonce"

HTTPS is highly recommended, however HTTP is supported via the &u=1 parameter.

The end user unlocks their 1Block ID on the device, scans the QR code, confirms the website URL being logged into, and submits (signs) the QR challenge. Alternately the QR code can be clicked/tapped to launch a browser extension or app to complete the signature.

TODO: show steps

The 1Block client hashes the service URL with the 1Block ID on-the-fly to generate a unique key-pair for the given service. This key-pair is used for all subsequent logins for this service. This avoids services storing any identifiable data between each other. The signature along with the public address is POSTed to the callback URL. Note that the service only stores public addresses, not public keys. A public address is a RIPE160 hash of the public key. This provides another layer of security on the service side.

Signatures must comply to the Bitcoin signed message format : \x18Bitcoin Signed Message:\n#{message.size.chr}#{message}

\x18Bitcoin Signed Message:

The details surrounding Bitcoin message signing and verification are handled by Bitcoin libraries. The 1Block client uses the Bitcore javascript library. The service side is dependent on the implementation.

The receiving server verifies the validity of the signature and proceeds to authenticate the user. The server only stores the public address for the service along with information for revoking an ID. A timeout for the validity of the nonce should be implemented by the server in order to prevent replay attacks. The example services implement a 5 minute timeout window. The service should also check the IP of the client browser during polling to further midigate session hijacking.


In the event that a camera is not accessible for QR code data transfer, the 1Block client supports the ability to manually copy and paste the 1Block challenge. The chrome extension will scrape the challenge from the page instead of using QR codes. You can also manually copy and paste your ID to transfer your ID between devices. The ID is always transferred in encrypted form.


Hopefully the need to revoke a key is a very rare occurance. Your ID exists only on your device and is encrypted with an unlock code. However, it is possible to lose a device and have a weak enough unlock code for a hacker to eventually unlock. For this reason, a revoke/replace mechanism is built into the protocol. 1Block utilizes the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol to ensure only site-specific information exists server side.

When a 1BlockID is first generated, a revoke key is also generated. The revoke private key exists nowhere on a device, only offline in paper form via the mnemonic phrase. The revoke public key is retained on the client device along with the 1Block ID. Upon initial sign-in to a service, a random site revoke key-pair is generated. The site revoke private key is mixed with the revoke public key to create a shared key-pair. Then some text (login host) is signed with the shared key-pair. The site revoke private key is then discarded. Each service stores the site revoke public key and the signature.

To revoke an ID, the user must restore the revoke private key to a client device by entering the mnemonic phrase. Now the 1Block ID can be placed into "revoke" mode. A separate 1Block ID is chosen to replace it. Upon the next login to a service, The service identifies the mode and sends the site revoke public key back to the client. The client then mixes the revoke private key with the site revoke public key to re-create the shared key-pair. This can then be used to sign the text (login host) and POST it back, along with the new ID information. The service verifies the signature with the shared public address. If it is successful, the 1Block ID is removed and replaced with the new one.

Please reference the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol for the details of how the above works.

It is important to note that if a 1Block ID is ever compromised, a hacker could only log in as that user but not revoke the ID themselves. The offline revoke private key is required to revoke the ID.

Recovery from Lost IDs

Since the 1Block ID only exists on a client device and the revoke key only exists offline, it is imperative that the user is responsible with this information (ie. store in a safety deposit box.) In the event that a 1Block ID is lost and/or a revoke key is lost, the only recovery method would be of something outside the protocol, such as contacting each service and have them manually reset the 1Block ID on the account.

Reference implementation

A demonstration of the workflow is available here :

See also

BitID protocol :

SQRL, a similar proposal not implemented in Blockchain ECC :