

(TENTAR) (DE VERDADE) COMO USAR O APPARMOR NO DEBIAN?

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ABOUT ME

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Privacy + Anonymity + Security

Monero + Anti-forensics

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AppArmor?

QUESTIONS

- (a) Who has used or is using AppArmor?
- (b) Who has already created\changed an AppArmor profile?
- (c) Who has had problems with AppArmor?

AppArmor?

MISCONCEPTIONS

- Focus on server
- Focus on processes that face users or Internet
- Focus on breaking things

AppArmor?

DOESN'T

- Doesn't replace traditional file permissions
- Doesn't restrict database permissions
- Doesn't validate user inputs (webpages, etc)
- Doesn't solve all problems

Let's enable AppArmor by default (why not?)

- *To:* debian-devel@lists.debian.org
 - *Subject:* Let's enable AppArmor by default (why not?)
 - *From:* intrigeri <intrigeri@debian.org>
 - *Date:* Fri, 04 Aug 2017 19:31:36 -0400
 - *Message-id:* <[🔗] 857eyij4fb.fsf@boum.org>
 - *Reply-to:* debian-devel@lists.debian.org
-

Hi!

tl;dr: I hereby propose we enable AppArmor by default in testing/sid, and decide one year later if we want to keep it this way in the Buster release.

My goals when initiating this discussion are:

- Get a rough idea of what amount of effort the Debian project is happy (and able) to invest into such proactive security measures.
- Learn about any relevant social & technical concerns I am not aware of.

I don't expect we'll make a decision based on this very proposal: I expect the proposal will need to be refined, or abandoned, to take into account what we will learn during this preliminary discussion.

<https://lists.debian.org/debian-devel/2017/08/msg00090.html>

A very brief overview about AppArmor profiles

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Application Binary Interface version

Features: Kernel X AppArmor

```
abi <abi/4.0>,
```

```
include <tunables/global>
```

/etc/apparmor.d/tunables
Variables directory

```
@{exec_path} = @{bin}/whoami  
profile whoami /{,usr/}{,s}bin/whoami flags=(complain) {
```

```
  include <abstractions/base>
```

```
  include <abstractions/consoles>
```

```
  include <abstractions/namespace-strict>
```

```
@{exec_path} mr,
```

```
  include if exists <local/whoami>  
}
```

/etc/apparmor.d/abstractions
Generic profiles directory

```
# vim:syntax=apparmor
```



```
abi <abi/4.0>,
```

```
include <tunables/global>
```

```
@{exec_path} = @{bin}/nmap  
profile nmap /{,usr/}{,s}bin/nmap flags=(complain) {
```

```
...
```

```
capability net_bind_service,  
capability net_raw,
```

```
network inet dgram,  
network inet6 dgram,  
network inet stream,
```

```
...
```

```
signal (receive) set=(term, kill) peer=zenmap,
```

```
...
```

```
owner @{tmp}/zenmap-stdout-* rw,  
owner @{tmp}/zenmap-*.xml rw,  
...
```

Variable definition

Attachment specification

Attach profile to app

Profile
name

Profile flags:

- enforce (default if not specified)
- complain, unconfined, etc

```
abi <abi/4.0>,
```

```
include <tunables/global>
```

```
@{exec_path} = @{bin}/sudo
```

```
profile sudo /{,usr/}{,s}bin/sudo flags=(attach_disconnected,complain) {
```

```
  include <abstractions/base>
```

```
  include <abstractions/app-launcher-root>
```

```
  include <abstractions/app/sudo>
```

```
  capability chown,  
  capability fowner,  
  capability mknod,  
  capability sys_ptrace,
```

Capability rules

```
  network inet dgram,  
  network inet6 dgram,
```

Network rules

```
  ptrace read,
```

Ptrace rules

Signal rules

```
  signal send set=(winch, hup, term),
```

```
...
```

```
...
@{exec_path} = @{bin}/sshd
profile sshd /{,usr/}{,s}bin/sshd flags=(attach_disconnected,complain) {
```

```
...
@{exec_path} mrix,
```

```
@{bin}/@{shells}          rux,
@{bin}/false              rix,
@{bin}/nologin            rpx,
@{bin}/passwd             rpx,
@{lib}/{openssh,ssh}/sftp-server rpx,
@{lib}/{openssh,ssh}/sshd-session rix,
```

File access modes

```
...
/var/lib/lastlog/ r,
/var/lib/lastlog/* rwk,
/var/lib/wtmpdb/ r,
/var/lib/wtmpdb/* rwk,
```

```
# For scp
owner @{user_download_dirs}/{,**} rwl,
owner @{user_sync_dirs}/{,**} rwl,
```

```
...
```

AppArmor + SystemD

[Service]

...

AppArmorProfile=profilename

AppArmor + Containers

<https://kubernetes.io/docs/tutorials/security/apparmor/>

<https://docs.docker.com/engine/security/apparmor/>

Demo

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apparmor.d

<https://github.com/roddhjav/apparmor.d>
<https://apparmor.pujol.io/>

~1600 profiles
aa-log
Full System Policy
Demo

AppArmor Play
<https://play.pujol.io>
ssh root@play.pujol.io
Password: apparmor

AppArmor + Demo

AuthPass privacy issues?

<https://github.com/authpass/authpass/issues/391>

AppArmor + Demo

LibreOffice - CVE-2024-12425

<https://codeanlabs.com/blog/research/exploiting-libreoffice-cve-2024-12425-and-cve-2024-12426/>

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AppArmor + Future

- Permission Prompting
- Apparmor extension file
- Object delegation
- many others

<https://gitlab.com/apparmor/apparmor/-/issues/510>

Thanks!

<https://moisesmsf.github.io/awesome-apparmor>