When (and why) we shouldn't expect reproducibility in machine learning-based science: Culture, study design, causality, and asymptotics

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



Outline

- Methodological problems:
  - Sampling frame and measurement: ML tries to circumvent internal/construct validity, and sampling frame. Sometimes this works. Sometimes it doesn't.
  - "Prediction" vs. causality: "prediction" has a lot of complexity that casual usage ignores
  - Model metrics are estimators! They have asymptotic distributions, can be biased, etc.
    - Dependencies are a form of leakage, and bias the CV estimators of model success
    - We should figure out asymptotic distributions to help design tests and power calculations, and start using them
- Contextual points:
  - Cultural issues: Lack of exposure to the entirety of research methods. To a certain extent, expecting replication might be understanding science in a bad way
  - Lessons from other fields: We probably won't get reform until we have a crisis, and we probably won't get to a crisis



Background (Malik, 2020)





Problem 1: Sampling frame and measurement

Traversing the hierarchy of limitations



- Each branch has trade-offs, and problems propagate
- No one method is inherently better any other
- Mixed methods can combine (although I don't consider this in the paper)

Quantification locks in meaning

- Qualitative research can get directly at how things are multifaceted, heterogeneous, intersubjective
- Quantification/ measurements lock in one meaning; and frequently are *proxies*, which are imperfect



Challenges of quantification/ measurement





- *Constructs*: primitives of social science
  - What we care about
  - Often unobservable (and hypothetical/subjective, e.g. friendship)
  - Proxies always give errors (for binary constructs: false negatives and false positives), and even can be gamed



Example: Epic sepsis model

- Wong et al. (2021) found that a model to predict sepsis from the electronic health records company Epic worked far less well than claimed
- AUC of .63, versus what Epic reported of .76 to .83
- One possible culprit: *different definitions*. Epic developed its model based on defining sepsis by the point where physicians intervened (what there was direct data for). Wong et al.'s evaluation was based on defining sepsis by meeting a certain number of CDC and ICD-10 criteria
- Of course the model as fitted wouldn't generalize! Maybe the same model, re-fitted on the "better" measure, would work

Stats and ML use central tendencies



- Statistics and machine only option to both directly use data *and* account for variability
- They do so via *central tendency*
- This requires multiple observations, and independence assumptions (we cannot do anything with an *n* of 1!)



Importance of sampling frame

- Because ML uses the same fundamental mechanism as stats (reducing aggregates via central tendency), it has the same issue that *results will only generalize insofar as the sample is representative*
  - (That was the problem with "Dewey defeats Truman", and also the "Literary Digest poll" in survey sampling, that led to reform there)
- The "patterns" we "recognize" are correlations, not necessarily universal regularity, so we can't ignore the sampling frame
- "Sampling on the dependent variable" is a classic problem: Cohen and Ruths (2013) have an amazing *mea culpa* where they note that they filtered Twitter users to only those who had a signal for political orientation. That was an unrealistic sampling frame



Core issues of study design

- Sampling frame is typically taught in social sciences, not necessarily in machine learning
- Measurement models are the domain of psychometrics, and are almost completely unknown in ML (Jacobs & Wallach, 2019)
- These are a standard part of education that ML should make room for (will return to later under "culture")



Problem 2: "Prediction" vs. causality



Causality is hard, maybe too hard



- Properly controlled experiments lack ecological validity
- Observational inference can never totally account for the possibility of hidden confounders, which can frustrate even the most perfect application of causal techniques (Arceneaux, Gerber, & Green, 2010)

ML is "prediction" only



- "Predictions" are defined as what minimizes loss *within a predetermined frame*
  - *Correlations* do this
- Non-causal correlations can sometimes predict well within a frame, but they frequently don't explain, and can fail outside
  - If that was the definition (Milton Friedman: "prediction in the presence of change"), correlations wouldn't work, but that is hard to formalize



A "realist" definition for machine learning



- Realist definitions: what things are, rather than what they aspire to be
- Machine learning: An instrumental use of correlations to try and *mimic* the outputs of a target system (rather than trying to understand causal relationships between inputs and outputs). Focus on highly flexible "curve-fitting" methods. (Diagram: Breiman, 2001. See also Jones, 2018)

Leads to two separate goals



- Non-causal ("spurious") correlations may fit robustly (e.g., latent common cause)
  - Breiman, 2001: "prediction problems"
    Shmueli, 2010: "to predict"
  - Kleinberg et al., 2015: "umbrella problems"
  - Mullainathan & Spiess 2017: "**y-hat problems**"
- Carefully built models that capture causality (or "pure" associations) may fit poorly overall
  - Breiman: "information"
  - Shmueli: "to explain"
  - Kleinberg et al.: "rain dance problems"
  - Mullainathan & Spiess: "**beta-hat problems**"



ML: Only external validity



Kass, 2011



Adapted from Borgatti, 2012

Levels of prediction (Rescher, 1998)



TABLE 6.1: A SURVEY OF PREDICTIVE APPROACHES

Predictive Approaches	Linking Mechanism	Methodology Of Linkage
UNFORMALIZED/JUDGMENTAL		
judgmental estimation	expert informants	informed judgment
FORMALIZED/INFERENTIAL		
RUDIMENTARY (ELEMENTARY)		
trend projection	prevailing trends	projection of prevailing trends
curve fitting	geometric patterns	subsumption under an established pattern
circumstantial analogy	comparability groupings	assimilation to an analogous situation
SCIENTIFIC (SOPHISTICATED)		
indicator coordination	causal correlations	statistical subsumption into a correlation
law derivation (nomic)	accepted laws (deterministic or statistical)	inference from accepted laws
phenomenological modeling (analogical)	formal models (physical or mathematical)	analogizing of actual ("real-world") processes with presumably isomorphic model process



"Things do change" (Hoadley, 2001)



Ginsberg et al., 2012



Santillana et al., 2014



Correlations can't "predict in the presence of change" or interventions



- Very different sets of correlations can "predict" (correlate) equally well (Mullainathan and Spiess 2017)
  - Breiman (2001) called this the "Rashomon Effect"
- But different fits suggest very different outputs under covariate shift, and under interventions



Pet peeve: language

- Communication: **stop saying "prediction" if it is really "correlation"**
  - **The use of 'prediction' leads to false, inflated expectations.** Instead of saying prediction for post-hoc demonstrations (Gayo-Avello, 2012), use "retrodiction" instead: it is awkward, but that's what we need. For time series: nowcasting, back-testing.
  - Attempts to model partial correlation, i.e., "ceteris paribus", can be described with "association"
- Prediction is overused as it is
  - Statements like "predict the probability of risk", or "calculate the probability of a likelihood" are redundant if not nonsensical (akin to, "a probability of a probability [of a probability]").
  - Probabilities and risks are already latent, predictions are of things that will manifest. We should say that *estimate* probabilities and risk (say *estimated probabilities*, etc.)
  - Use "detection" or "classification" if labels are manifest but unknown. E.g., we don't "predict" race. "Detecting" and "predicting" cancer imply two very different tasks.



Problem 3: Model metrics are estimators, with unknown asymptotics and sources of bias



Model metrics as estimators

- If we make a commitment to a statistical view of the world (unobservable but inferable underlying regularity realized with haphazard variability), then the precision, recall, AUC, etc., are *estimators* of the underlying quantity of out-of-sample performance
  - Quantifying uncertainty provides a hedge on performance claims
- We can frame and study their properties statistically!
  - We can design corrections, find instrumental variables, etc.
  - *Dependencies* cause test error to be biased (and, in a simple case, error has a generalized non-central chi-square distribution, which is heavily right-tailed, versus the symmetry of a binomial distribution)
  - Metrics other than accuracy (binomial) look like they have weird distributions. Somebody should look into this, and also design asymptotic tests
  - Under this view, it makes sense to use instrumental variables to try and get unbiased estimates of out-of-sample performance! (Kleinberg et al., 2018)



Matrix bias-variance decomposition

$$
\begin{aligned}
\text{err}(\hat{\mu}) &= \frac{1}{n}\mathbb{E}_f \| Y - \widehat{Y} \|_2^2 \\
&= \frac{1}{n}\left[\mathbb{E}_f \| Y \|_2^2 + \mathbb{E}_f \| \widehat{Y} \|_2^2 - 2\mathbb{E}_f(Y^T \widehat{Y}) \right] \\
&= \frac{1}{n}\left[\mathbb{E}_f \| Y \|_2^2 + \mathbb{E}_f \| \widehat{Y} \|_2^2 - 2\,\text{tr}\,\mathbb{E}_f(Y \widehat{Y}^T) \right] \\
&\quad + \frac{1}{n}\left[\mu^T\mu + \mathbb{E}_f(\widehat{Y})^T \mathbb{E}_f(\widehat{Y}) + 2\,\text{tr}\,\mu\mathbb{E}_f(\widehat{Y})^T \right] \\
&\quad + \frac{1}{n}\left[-\mu^T\mu - \mathbb{E}_f(\widehat{Y})\mathbb{E}_f(\widehat{Y})^T - 2\mu^T\mathbb{E}_f(\widehat{Y}) \right] \\
&= \frac{1}{n}\left[\text{tr}\,\Sigma + \| \mu - \mathbb{E}(\widehat{Y}) \|_2^2 + \text{tr}\,\text{Var}_f(\widehat{Y}) - 2\,\text{tr}\,\text{Cov}_f(Y, \widehat{Y}) \right]
\end{aligned}
$$

irreducible ("Bayes") error — bias squared — variance of the estimator — "optimism"



Classic argument for CV

Training:

$$\begin{aligned}\text{err}(\hat{\mu}) &= \frac{1}{n}\mathbb{E}_f \| Y - \widehat{Y} \|_2^2 \\ &= \frac{1}{n}\left[\text{tr}\,\Sigma + \|\mu - \mathbb{E}(\widehat{Y})\|_2^2 + \text{tr}\,\text{Var}_f(\widehat{Y}) - 2\,\text{tr}\,\text{Cov}_f(Y, \widehat{Y})\right]\end{aligned}$$

Testing:

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Err}(\hat{\mu}) &= \frac{1}{n}\mathbb{E}_f \| Y^* - \widehat{Y} \|_2^2 \\ &= \frac{1}{n}\left[\text{tr}\,\Sigma + \|\mu - \mathbb{E}(\widehat{Y})\|_2^2 + \text{tr}\,\text{Var}_f(\widehat{Y}) - \cancel{2\,\text{tr}\,\text{Cov}_f(Y^*, \widehat{Y})}\right]\end{aligned}$$

The difference is the *optimism* (Efron, 2004; Rosset & Tibshirani, 2018):

$$\text{Opt}(\hat{\mu}) = \text{Err}(\hat{\mu}) - \text{err}(\hat{\mu}) = \frac{2}{n}\,\text{tr}\,\text{Cov}_f(Y, \widehat{Y})$$



Apply this to non-iid data

- Imagine we have, for $\mathbf{\Sigma}_{ii} = \sigma^2$ and $\mathbf{\Sigma}_{ij} = \rho\sigma^2, \quad i \neq j$

$$\begin{bmatrix} Y_1 \\ Y_2 \end{bmatrix} \sim \mathcal{N}\left(\begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{X} \\ \mathbf{X} \end{bmatrix} \boldsymbol{\beta}, \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{\Sigma} & \rho\sigma^2 \mathbf{1}\mathbf{1}^T \\ \rho\sigma^2 \mathbf{1}\mathbf{1}^T & \mathbf{\Sigma} \end{bmatrix} \right)$$

- Then, optimism in the training set is:

$$\frac{2}{n} \operatorname{tr} \operatorname{Cov}_f(Y_1, \widehat{Y}_1) = \frac{2}{n} \operatorname{tr} \operatorname{Cov}_f(Y_1, \mathbf{H} Y_1) = \frac{2}{n} \operatorname{tr} \mathbf{H} \operatorname{Var}_f(Y_1) = \frac{2}{n} \operatorname{tr} \mathbf{H}\mathbf{\Sigma}$$

- But test set also has nonzero optimism!

$$\frac{2}{n} \operatorname{tr} \operatorname{Cov}_f(Y_2, \widehat{Y}_1) = \frac{2}{n} \operatorname{tr} \operatorname{Cov}_f(Y_2, \mathbf{H} Y_1) = \frac{2\rho\sigma^2}{n} \operatorname{tr} \mathbf{H}\mathbf{1}\mathbf{1}^T = 2\rho\sigma^2$$

One draw as an example

Correlation between observations can pull training and test observations close to one another, but potentially far from an independent draw





Simulated MSE





Lessons: Split by dependencies

- ML needs to contend with dependencies, because the iid assumption matters for estimates of model performance
  - Even statistical relational learning, which models dependencies, doesn't talk about data splitting by dependencies
- Maybe we can't make a better *model*, but dependencies are a form of leakage between training and test sets
  - We can use the framework of "optimism" to understand and quantify this (meta-meta-prediction is useful; Rescher, 1998)
  - Ideally, no dependencies between training and test sets
  - Unfortunately, the mean function and covariance function are jointly unidentifiable nonparametrically (Opsomer & Jean, 2011), so we will have to rely on theory and limited explorations (e.g., ACF, PACF)



How are metrics distributed? (Preliminary explorations)

- Under this specification and DGP, the test error has a "generalized non-central chi-squared" distribution
- But even in the iid case, we know frighteningly little about asymptotic distributions (in that I found no work other than around accuracy, which is binomial) and the variability they might suggest
- A quick simulation of a logistic fit to $X_i \sim \mathcal{N}(0, 1)$ and $Y_i \sim \text{Bin}(\text{logistic}(x_i))$ at $n = 101$ (small, prime-numbered sample size) and $n = 10{,}000$ (large sample size) gives reasons for worry



Distributions of counts? n = 101 (n_{sim} = 50,000)

Predicted positive

Predicted negative

Actual positive





Actual negative







Distribution of precision/recall? n = 101 (n_{sim} = 50,000)









Distribution of AUC/F_1? n = 101 (n_{sim} = 50,000)

- AUC has a 95% empirical confidence (tolerance) interval of [.64, .83]
- Small sample size is an issue, but also, we usually try to stay away from modeling ratios, since the ratio of two normal distributions is Cauchy, which has no expected value (practically: ratios are unstable)
- What about larger sample size?





Distributions of counts? $n = 10^4$ ($n_{sim} = 50{,}000$)

	Predicted positive	Predicted negative
Actual positive		
Actual negative		



Distributions of precision/recall? $n = 10^4$ ($n_{sim} = 50{,}000$)









Distributions of AUC/F_1? $n = 10^4$ ($n_{sim} = 50{,}000$)

- 95% tolerance interval is tighter, but still larger than state-of-the-art improvements
- Also… are precision, recall, and F_1 mixtures?? That is really weird!
  - **How has nobody looked at this??** The distribution of estimators is stats theory 101!
  - (The problem persists for various seeds. But maybe I made a mistake?)
- Conclusion: even for large sample size, a simple DGP, and a "true" model, the distribution of common metrics is not simple







Take-aways: We should study asymptotic distributions of metrics, and use them!

- Can somebody please find the distributions of ML model success metrics? (I started to try, via joint distribution of TP, FP, FN, TN as a multidimensional [3+1 dimensions] binomial, and then taking ratios of marginals, but it's a lot of algebra)
- With distributions, we could find asymptotic confidence intervals, and conduct significance testing of model results
  - Yes, *p*-values and hypothesis testing have done enormous damage, **but ignoring variance might be worse**
  - Also, we should probably start doing **power calculations** in ML
- Maybe, when studying asymptotic distributions, we'll find sufficient statistics for model success (like the parameters of a multivariate binomial) and good estimators thereof



Cultural issues



Narrow technical training

- Phil Agre (1997):
  - "My college did not require me to take many humanities courses, or learn to write in a professional register, and so I arrived in graduate school at MIT with little genuine knowledge beyond math and computers. This realization hit me with great force halfway through my first year of graduate school...
  - "I was unable to turn to other, nontechnical fields for inspiration… The problem was not exactly that I could not understand the vocabulary, but that I insisted on trying to read everything as a narration of the workings of a mechanism."
- Study design and measurement still partially fall under "technical" knowledge; the problem is far more profound



Paradigms of inquiry

Issue	Positivism	Post-positivism	Critical theory et al.	Constructivism	Participatory
Ontology	Naïve realism: Reality independent of and prior to human conception of it, apprehensible	Critical realism: Reality independent of and prior to human conception, but imperfectly and approx. apprehensible	Disenchantment theory: reality is secret/hidden, shaped by power structures and solidified over time	Relativism: multiple realities, constructed in history through social processes	Participative: multiple realities, co-constructed through interactions between specific people and environments
Epistemology	Reality knowable. Findings are singular, neutral, perspective-independent, atemporal, universally true	Findings provisionally true; multiple descriptions can be valid but are probably equivalent; findings can be affected/distorted by social + cultural factors	How we come to know something, or who knows it, matters for how meaningful it is	Relativistic: no neutral perspective to adjudicate competing claims	We come to know things, create new understandings, & transform world by involving other people in process of inquiry
Methodology	Hypotheses can be verified as true. Quant methods, math.	Falsification of hypotheses; primacy of quant, but some qual and mixed methods	Dialogic (conversation + debate) or dialectical ($\text{thesis}_1 \rightarrow \text{antithesis}_1 \rightarrow \text{synthesis}_2 := \text{thesis}_2 \ldots$)	Dialetical, or exegetical (reading between the lines")	Collaborative, action-focused; flattening hierarchies; engaging in self- and collective reflection, action
Axiology	Quant knowledge-holders have access to truth, and responsibility from it	Quant knowledge valuable but can be distorted; qual can help find and correct	Marginaliz*ation* provides unique insights, knowledge of marginaliz*ed* valuable	Understanding construction is valuable; value relative to given perspective	Reflexivity, co-created knowledge, and non- western ways of knowing are valuable and combat erasure and dehumanization

Malik & Malik (2021), via Guba and Lincoln (2005)



Ways of understanding a person

	As a case (quant)	**In narrative (qual)**
Context/circumstance	Stripped away	Key
Mental states	Absent (for the most part)	Crucial; constitutive
Relevant features	Determined in advance	Emergent
Orientation to time	Atemporal	Chronological
Ordering of features	Unimportant	Meaningful
Other actors	Invisible	Often present
Causal logic	Mathematical	Theoretical
Boost predictive validity	Add cases	Know person better

Slide from Barbara Kiviat (work in progress), based on "Bowker and Star 2000; Bruner 1986; Desrosières 1998; Espeland 1998; Espeland and Stevens 1998, 2008; Fourcade and Healy 2017; Hacking 1990; Porter 1994, 1995; Ricouer 1998; White 1980, 1984". I would add: Patton 2005; Abbott 1988



Why this matters: it's why we *expect* generalization

- We expect that models are picking up on signal, not noise
  - Statistics makes the assumption that we can treat the world as made up of entities that are distinct but are realizations of an underlying process. Machine learning shares this assumption, even if it is not explicit about it (e.g., theory about convergence to the "oracle predictor" rather than about convergence to a "true" parameter)
- If we define the "signal" as what is invariant, then failures of generalizability means we've failed to find the underlying regularity
- But is there really aggregate regularity? Or only *narrative*, if any?
  - E.g., Twitter and elections (Gayo-Avello, 2012)
  - Note: one explanation for stats working is that it *imposes* regularity

"What are we even doing?"

- "If science isn't 'true', then what are we even doing? We might as well be doing English literature, or art criticism!"
  - Intellectual supremacy is probably a bad reason for doing science
- At least for the social world, I am skeptical of attempts to find underlying regularity in the [social] world as cases; both because only trivial things can have universal aggregate regularity, and because attempts to find social regularity can end up imposing it
  - But neither can I imagine our civilization without the use of summary statistics for management, planning, and allocation…



Lessons from other fields

Proximate causes? Concerns?

- Attention in 2011/2012 in both psychology and biomedicine, rapidly led to major policy initiatives
- What caused? In psych: one researcher admitting to a decade of (deliberate) fraud that went undiscovered + the "ESP" study + decades of concern → "soul searching"
- Psychologists and collaborators thought the crisis/problems were worse there: stat ignorance ("methodolatry")? Objects of study more variable? Bad incentives?
- But discourse in biomedicine was very similar: clustering doesn't separate fields (Nelson, Chung, Ichikawa, & Malik, 2022)





Take-aways

- Machine learning is not necessarily special in having a crisis, or worse than other fields
- In other fields, **dramatic failures (rather than long-standing concerns) precipitated an experience of "crisis"**
- Machine learning had a dramatic failure in Google Flu Trends, which Lazer (2014) called "big data's 'Dewey Defeats Truman' moment"
  - But that didn't prompt much reform
  - Epic Sepsis model? Also a flash in pan







What can we expect? What should we *want*?

- We probably won't get large-scale reform attempts until we enter a crisis. Crisis requires dramatic failure and attention
  - If we really want reform, maybe we should *want* a crisis, and try to precipitate one…
- Hype about claimed success are probably enough to prevent get around high-profile failures for some time
  - Consequences of a crisis? Maybe loss of legitimacy and funding (another "AI winter"): but also, if hype is sufficient there is a niche for "reformers" (Nelson, 2018) who preserve legitimacy and funding
- The fundamental sources of the problem: yes, methods and incentives, both of which we can and should improve
- A different solution: I don't think replication should be the measure of science, such that failures of replication shouldn't be that big a deal



Summary and conclusion



Contextual issues

- Maybe irreproducibility is just an artifact of a positivist commitment: if we change our understanding of what science is, should be, and could be to something far humbler, then reproducibility wouldn't be a problem
- Based on prior fields, and on current hype, we shouldn't expect reform without a crisis and we shouldn't expect a crisis anytime soon
- But there are still methodological steps we can and should take. These will hopefully at fix any problems for ML applications to physical sciences and some engineering



Methodological issues

ML models will only generalize insofar as the **data are representative**

Selection on the dependent variable is not something we can do in application

If the **underlying measurements** are not consistent, the model can also fail to generalize

Point estimates of **model metrics** don't give possible **variability** even with the same population

Dependencies cause a form of **leakage**

Unless models give unbiased estimates of partial correlation, **causal shifts** will make them invalid



Suggested fixes

Gather representative data and/or make more limited claims

Include weak signal observations, rather than filter them out

Use a **measurement model** (for the response), or at least consider validity and reliability

Get **confidence intervals** around all measures of model success, and **study asymptotics**

Split data by dependencies (temporal block CV, leave-one-subject-out CV, network CV, etc.)

Change language to temper expectations, and **sometimes, pursue causality**



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

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

Appendix: Simulation code

```
library(ModelMetrics)

# Rename for convenience
logistic <- function(x) plogis(x)
logit <- function(p) qlogis(p)

set.seed(20220728)
nsim <- 50000
results <- data.frame(accuracy = rep(NA, nsim),
                      ppv = rep(NA, nsim),
                      tp = rep(NA, nsim),
                      tn = rep(NA, nsim),
                      fp = rep(NA, nsim),
                      fn = rep(NA, nsim),
                      tpr = rep(NA, nsim),
                      tnr = rep(NA, nsim),
                      auc = rep(NA, nsim),
                      f1score = rep(NA, nsim))
# Either run with 97 or 101 (small sample size:
# these are prime number close to 100, so
# that accuracy and other fractions divided by
# a prime denominator), or 10k (large sample
# size)

# n <- 97
# n <- 101
n <- 10000

# Draw X once ("fixed X" setting), then draw a new Y
# each simulation run, y ~ bernoulli(logistic(x))
x <- rnorm(n = n, mean = 0, sd = 1)

for (i in 1:nsim) {
  y <- rbinom(n = n, size = 1, prob = logistic(x))
  glm1 <- glm(y ~ x, family = "binomial")
  results$accuracy[i] <- mean(y==(predict.glm(glm1, type = "response")>.5))
  results$ppv[i] <- ppv(y, predict.glm(glm1, type = "response")) # Precision
  results$tp[i] <- sum(y==1 & (predict.glm(glm1, type = "response")>=.5))
  results$tn[i] <- sum(y==0 & (predict.glm(glm1, type = "response")<.5))
  results$fp[i] <- sum(y==0 & (predict.glm(glm1, type = "response")>=.5))
  results$fn[i] <- sum(y==1 & (predict.glm(glm1, type = "response")<.5))
  results$tpr[i] <- tpr(y, predict.glm(glm1, type = "response")) # Recall
  results$tnr[i] <- tnr(y, predict.glm(glm1, type = "response")) # Specificity
  results$auc[i] <- auc(y, predict.glm(glm1, type = "response"))
  results$f1score[i] <- f1Score(y, predict.glm(glm1, type = "response"))
  if (i%%1000==0) {print(i)}
}
```