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[RELEASE] Several mitigations for attacking privacy via key reusing forks #3322
I can't speak for the code itself, but I support the general approach. It boils down to three things:
Of course, a disclaimer that if a large proportion of transactions (for ringsize 5 >33%; ringsize 7 >50%) on the forked chain don't take advantage of 1, then there is a relatively likely chance that the real input can be revealed.
For ringsize 5, suppose 50% of initial transactions on a fork use this tool. Then, approx. 6.25% of other transactions will be compromised (total 53%, since 50%*6.25%) on the fork chain. Suppose half of the transactions on Monero are related to the fork, then the proportion of compromised inputs on the Monero chain falls to approx. 53/2 = 27%.
These are terribly rough estimates, but even small proportions of people using this tool help the forked chain to a small extent and Monero to a larger extent.