

Douglas Selvage and Christopher Nehring

The AIDS Conspiracy

The Ministry for State Security and the
KGB's AIDS disinformation campaign

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¹ For information on the Bulgarian Commission and its archives, see Schiller-Dickhut, Reiner; Rosenthal, Bert (eds.): The "European Network of Authorities Responsible for Secret Police Records": A Reader on Their Legal Basis, Structures, and Tasks. Berlin 2010, pp. 6–17.

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1 Preliminary remarks on sources, terms and Structures

The Soviet Union's AIDS disinformation campaign, launched in the mid-1980s, has been and remains the focus of an ongoing debate. Controversies in the discussion concern the role of the KGB, the Stasi, and the Stasi's Main Directorate A (HV A), which was responsible for foreign intelligence. These controversies are partly rooted in the unsatisfactory availability of sources, but also stem from differing understandings of the use of terms such as "conspiracy theory" or misunderstandings about the meaning of "Chekist" technical terms and thus the activities of the KGB or Stasi.

There is also a certain lack of knowledge about the structures and mechanisms of foreign propaganda in the relevant Eastern Bloc countries.

In order to reduce existing misunderstandings and avoid provoking new ones, the authors of this study aim to describe the source material, clarify terms, and outline the structures of foreign propaganda in former Eastern Bloc countries.

Sources: In

1992, the head of Russian intelligence, Yevgeny Primakov, admitted that the KGB was behind the international disinformation campaign that placed the origin of the HIV virus in a US military research laboratory at Fort Detrick, Maryland.² However, he said nothing about a supporting role of the Stasi or the HV A in the campaign, or about a KGB relationship with the scientist couple Jakob and Lilli Segal. Both were Soviet citizens and residents of the GDR, who had authored a scientific study supporting the Fort Detrick thesis and were frequently cited in Soviet propaganda.

Further research into the disinformation campaign has been hampered by the fact that the files of the former KGB in the archives of its successor organizations remain, with few exceptions, closed to external researchers.

In the same year, 1992, former HV A officers Günter Bohnsack and Herbert Brehmer claimed that the HV A's disinformation department, HV A/X, had been behind the drafting and dissemination of Segal's study. The whole thing was one of their "active measures,"

² KGB planted story tying US to AIDS, Russian says. In: The Boston Globe v. 19.3.1992, S. 1.

which they had carried out at the request of the KGB.³ However, their claim was difficult to substantiate archivally, as most of the files of the former HV A were either destroyed⁴ or misplaced⁵ and therefore are not part of the BStU's archives. The claims of the former Stasi officers were not only taken up by the German press, but also by historian Thomas Boghardt in a 2009 article for the journal of the "Center for the Study of Intelligence" of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). He supported his thesis that the HV A played a central role in the disinformation campaign primarily with statements by Bohnsack—from his publications, from statements to third-party authors, and from private correspondence with Boghardt.⁶

Based on in-depth research into the files of the former state party SED, the East German Ministry of Health, and MfS service units in the BStU archives, molecular biologist and bioethicist Erhard Geißler concluded that J. Segal's "propaganda campaign" was "by no means" a disinformation campaign by the MfS.⁷

There is no evidence in the BStU archives that the HV A played a role in the

³ Bohnsack, Günter; Brehmer, Herbert: Mission: Deception. How the Stasi Made Politics in the West. Hamburg 1992, pp. 219–220.

⁴ In February 1990, the Security Working Group of the Central Round Table, which included members of the East German opposition and former East German office holders, approved the self-dissolution of the HV A. As a result, the HV A was permitted to destroy its own archives. Knabe, Hubertus: The MfS's Work in the West: The Interplay of "Reconnaissance" and "Defense." Berlin 1999, p. 133.

⁵ Based on records from the Polish State Security Service in the archives of the Polish Institute of National Remembrance (IPN), Polish scholars claim that in 1990, files from the HV A archive were transported to the Soviet Union in railway containers. See, for example, Cenckiewicz, Sławomir: "W kontenerach do Moskwy... [In Containers to Moscow]." In: Cenckiewicz, Sławomir (ed.): *ylinderami Bezpieki i Partii: Studia – źródła – Publicystyka* [Traces of State Security and the Party: Studies – Sources – Journalism]. Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN 2009, pp. 589–600.

⁶ Boghardt, Thomas: Operation INFEKTION. Soviet bloc intelligence and its AIDS disinformation campaign. In: *Studies in Intelligence* 53 (2009) 4, pp. 1–24. Boghardt also cites individual documents from the SED holdings in the Foundation Archive of the Parties and Mass Organizations of the former GDR in the Federal Archives, but does not cite any Stasi files in his work.

⁷ Geißler, Erhard: "Better AIDS than nothing at all from the West!" How the party and state leadership of the GDR dealt with the AIDS problem. In: *Journal of the Research Association SED-Staat* 22 (2007), pp. 91–116, here 108–114.

The creation or dissemination of the various versions of Segal's hypothesis.⁸ Geißler found important sources on the SED government's AIDS policy in the holdings of the other MfS service units in the BStU archive, as well as sources concerning the activities of Jakob and Lilli Segal and the negative reaction of most East German experts to Segal's AIDS thesis. Based on these sources, he concluded that the MfS only learned of Segal's thesis in September 1986.⁹ However, Geißler did not, or did not visibly, reflect on the fact that the HV A's archives, which shed light on the HV A's activities, are in fact not available for research. The lack of evidence of any influence by the HV A does not constitute proof of its inactivity, but is primarily due to the current state of sources. Findings of influence or non-influence on the Segals and their research by the MfS must be evaluated against this background.

However, the authors of this study have uncovered new documents on the KGB's disinformation campaign and the accompanying role of the HV A in the archives of the former Security and Intelligence Services of Bulgaria (AKRDOPBGDSRSBNA or COMDOS-A) in Sofia and, thanks to inferences from these files, also in the archives of the Federal Office of State Security (BStU) in Berlin. They also drew on the former HV A database (SIRA: System of Information Research of the HV A)¹⁰ and the (partial) index card of the HV A "Rosenholz"¹¹, two sources that have not been used in previous research.

⁸ Ibid., p. 114.

⁹ Geißler, Erhard; Sprinkle, Robert Hunt: Disinformation squared: Was the HIV-from-Fort-Detrick myth a Stasi success? In: Politics and the Life Sciences 32 (2013) 2, S. 3–99, hier 45.

¹⁰ A detailed description of the SIRA database can be found online at http://www.bstu.bund.de/DE/Wissen/Aktenfunde/HVA-Sira/hva-sira_node.html. The database was largely reconstructed at the end of 1998 and has been available for research since then. The reconstruction continued in the following years. See also Konopatzky, Stephan: "Potential and Limitations of the SIRA Databases: The Examples of Günter Guillaume and Werner Stiller." In: Herbstritt, Georg; Müller-Enbergs, Helmut (eds.): Facing the West... GDR Espionage Against the Federal Republic of Germany. Bremen 2003, pp. 112–132. For a comprehensive overview of SIRA, see Herbstritt, Georg: "German Citizens in the Service of GDR Espionage: An Analytical Study." Göttingen 2007, S. 54–64.

¹¹ For Rosenholz, see Müller-Enbergs, Helmut: "Rosenholz": A Source Critique. Berlin 2007. (BF Informiert; 28), p. 52; http://www.bstu.bund.de/DE/Wissen/File_finds/Rosenholz/rosenholzbericht2007_pdf.pdf.

on the topic do not appear. Part of an IM file belonging to a Segal employee ("Nils") was also located. These new sources, along with the findings in SIRA and Rosenholz, prove how many HV A files on the AIDS disinformation campaign and their presence in the Segals' circle were destroyed or misplaced - including the files on the object operation "Denver", object operation "Vorwärts II", security operation "Wind", on the operative personal control "Diagnosis" and on HVA IMs in the Segals' circle - "Nils", "Joachim" and "Jörg". In addition, a few minutes of conversations between the HV A and the KGB are in the BStU archives, unfortunately none of them are related to the topic of this study. If the relevant KGB files on the AIDS disinformation campaign and on records of conversations with HV A and HV A/X are preserved, they could one day provide some further important information on the subject of this investigation.

Terms: Conspiracy and conspiracy theory. In her book "The AIDS Conspiracy: Science Fights Back," economist and AIDS activist Nicoli Nattrass writes of a "real conspiracy" between the Soviet secret service KGB and the espionage-dedicated Main Directorate A of the East German Ministry for State Security. They conceived a plan to spread the theory that the HIV virus responsible for AIDS was artificially developed in a US military research laboratory at Fort Detrick.¹²

The East German molecular biologist Erhard Geißler agrees with Nattrass insofar as the thesis that HIV was developed as a biological weapon is a conspiracy theory. However, unlike the authors of this study, he finds no convincing evidence that the HV A was involved in the KGB's activities in formulating and disseminating this conspiracy theory. Therefore, he concludes, Nattrass is spreading a "conspiracy theory about a conspiracy theory" or a "conspiracy theory squared."¹³ The pivotal point for Geißler is the question of whether the HV A or the MFS in general played a role in the development or dissemination of a particular version of the "HIV as a biological weapon" thesis. He refers to the "continuation

¹² Nattrass, Nicoli: The AIDS Conspiracy. Science Fights Back. New York, 2012, S. 2.

¹³ Geißler, Erhard: AIDS and its pathogens – a web of hypotheses, findings, and conspiracy theories. In: Anton, Andreas (ed.): Conspiracy: Sociology of Conspiracy Thinking. Wiesbaden 2014, pp. 113–128, here 127 and 132.

The "Detrick Thesis" of the East German academic couple Jakob and Lilli Segal, both Soviet citizens. Geißler, who risked his career in the 1980s by contradicting Segal's thesis in the GDR and abroad, is certain that the Segals not only developed their thesis without influence from the HV A and the MfS, but also published and disseminated it without any help from these quarters. He supports his assumption with several publications that he empirically substantiates. Nattrass, on the other hand, writes of "Soviet-Stasi-Segal misinformation"¹⁴ based on "tertiary literature,"¹⁵ without providing any archival evidence.

Although the term "conspiracy theory" is controversial, Nattrass, Geißler, and the authors of this publication use it in its common sense, that is, with a negative connotation. Accordingly, a "conspiracy theory" is more than a theory about a conspiracy, "a mostly secret agreement between a small group of people" that plans to "achieve a specific goal" through conspiracy.¹⁶ The following definition by historian Helmut Reinalter will be used:

"The term 'conspiracy theory' refers to the attempt to interpret events, conditions, connections, and developments from the perspective of a conspiracy. This usually involves the targeted conspiratorial activity of individuals or groups of individuals. Conspiracy theories construct a simplified model of reality in order to better understand complex relationships; they reduce complexity. In addition, there is a normative standard because the processes characterized as conspiracy are not assessed from a value-neutral perspective, but rather from a normative standpoint. In this sense, conspiracy theories are not based on a diagnosis, but always contain an ideological assessment of the events and relationships."¹⁷

According to this definition, a "conspiracy theory" is not a »Theory« in the scientific sense, that is, a »more developed

¹⁴ Nattrass: AIDS Conspiracy (Anm. 12), S. 69.

¹⁵ Geißler: AIDS and its pathogens (note 13), p. 132.

¹⁶ Pfahl-Traughber, Arnim: "Building Blocks" for a Theory of "Conspiracy Theories." In: Reinalter, Helmut (ed.): Conspiracy Theories, pp. 30 ff., here 31.
Quoted from: Reinalter, Helmut: The World Conspirators. What They Were Never Supposed to Know. Salzburg 2010, pp. 16 f.

¹⁷ Reinalter: The World Conspirators (note 16), p. 7 f.

rationally justified model [...] about a certain state of affairs,¹⁸ but the exact opposite.

Before an event can be proven or rejected as a conspiracy, there is first the hypothesis that an event could have been a conspiracy. What should such a hypothesis or theory be called? Reinalter proposes the terms "central control or conspiracy hypothesis." In contrast to conspiracy theories, such hypotheses are verifiable or falsifiable, based on concrete evidence, and are abandoned by the person who proposed them—even if sometimes reluctantly—when sufficient counter-evidence is available.¹⁹ According to this definition, Nattrass'

The claim of secret collaboration between HV A and the KGB in propagating the "Fort-Detrick thesis" is not a conspiracy theory – and certainly not "squared"—but rather a central control hypothesis. This is true even if the evidence for it was rather weak until the publication of this publication, as Geißler has repeatedly shown.²⁰

MfS Terms: Disinformation and Active Measures The MfS's political-operational dictionary defines "disinformation" as the deliberate dissemination of fundamentally or partially untrue information through words, writing, images, or actions with the aim of directing enemy activities and forces in a direction favorable to the MfS, or of unsettling or paralyzing these forces.²¹ The dissemination of such disinformation, including conspiracy theories about the "enemy" abroad, was only one component of the "active measures" (Russian: *aktivnie meropriyatiya*) undertaken by the HV A, the KGB, and their "brother agencies" (the secret services of the socialist countries). The KGB's internal definition of "active measures" underscored their goals:

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 18.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 17.

²⁰ For the weak evidence, see, for example, Geißler: AIDS and its pathogens (note: 13), pp. 127–131; Geißler, Sprinkle: Disinformation squared (note 9), pp. 33 ff.; Geißler: "Dear AIDS..." (note 7), pp. 108–114; Geißler, Erhard: AIDS Conspiracy: Where did the virus really come from? In: einestages, Spiegel Online, July 20, 2012, <http://einstages.spiegel.de/s/tb/25215/aids-verschwoerung-woher-kam-hiv-wirklich.html>.

²¹ Suckut, Siegfried (ed.): The Dictionary of State Security: Definitions of "Political-Operational Work." Berlin 1996, p. 88.

"Agency-operational measures aimed at influencing the foreign policy and internal political situation of the target countries in favor of the Soviet Union, the other countries of the socialist community, the world communist and national liberation movements by weakening the political, military, economic and ideological position of capitalism and undermining its aggressive plans, thus creating favorable conditions for the successful implementation of the Soviet Union's foreign policy and ensuring peace and social progress."²²

Although the MfS shared the general objectives of the KGB, it defined In 1979, "active measures" were more general and with particular regard to their implementation:

"Active measures are aimed at using operational forces, means, and methods to expose, compromise, disorganize, and decompose the enemy or individual enemy forces and institutions; to spread progressive ideas and thoughts and promote progressive groups and currents in the area of operations; and to influence the development of leadership personalities and those individuals who play a special role in shaping public opinion. The use of conspiratorial forces, means, and methods must be carried out in such a way as to conceal the starting points, individuals involved, and objectives of the active measures."²³

Terms: Multipliers, "unconscious multipliers," unofficial employees with special tasks (IMA), and contact persons. To conceal the "starting points, actors, and objectives of the active measures," the "brother agencies" sought out appropriate "multipliers." They were supposed to be able to "trigger and steer political movements, form public opinions, or even initiate disclosure campaigns."²⁴ Using the example of the HV A, multipliers can be divided into two broad categories: those who consciously and deliberately spread disinformation and those who "unconsciously"

²² Mitrokhin, Vasilii: KGB Lexicon: The Soviet Intelligence Officer's Handbook. London, Portland 2002, S. 13.

²³ MfS, IM Directive 2/79, dated December 8, 1979. In: Müller-Enbergs, Helmut: Unofficial Employees of the Ministry for State Security. Part 2: Instructions for Working with Agents, Scouts, and Spies in the Federal Republic of Germany. Berlin 1998, p. 476.

²⁴ Müller-Enbergs: Unofficial Colleagues, Part 2 (note 23), p. 226.

Most multipliers" or, somewhat derogatorily, "useful idiots."²⁵ The multipliers who were knowingly deployed included IMs working for the HV A or other MfS service units. Among these, there was a special category of IMs from the HV A, and this was used particularly in the HV A/X: Unofficial Employees for Special Tasks (IMA), who specialized primarily in carrying out "active measures," including disinformation (rather than, like most IMs, in gathering information). For this "demanding unofficial activity," the HV A primarily recruited journalists from the GDR or from the "operational area" (i.e., from the non-socialist world).²⁶ So-called "contact persons" (KP) of the MfS in the GDR could also serve as knowingly acting multipliers. According to the MfS definition, they were "trusted citizens" of the GDR "who are approached to solve specific tasks."²⁷

In most cases, however, multipliers who were instrumentalized played a central, if not the most important, role: the already cited "unconscious multipliers" or "useful idiots."²⁸ The best multipliers for the KGB, HV A and the "brother organs" were –

According to the ideas of the First High Command of the KGB, these were often those contact persons in the "operational area" to whom one did not reveal oneself as a secret service.²⁹ The MfS's IM directive called for the development of "stable

²⁵ "Once on Stalinallee." In: Der Spiegel, July 15, 1991, pp. 32–34, here 34. The term "multiplier" is also used by Müller-Enbergs. See Müller-Enbergs: Unofficial Employees, Part 2 (note 23), p. 226.

²⁶ Müller-Enbergs: Unofficial Colleagues, Part 2 (note 23), p. 41 f.

²⁷ Directive 1/58 for work with unofficial employees in the territory of the German Democratic Republic, dated October 1, 1958. In: Müller-Enbergs, Helmut: Unofficial Employees of the Ministry for State Security. Part 1. Berlin 1996, pp. 195–239, here 205. See also Müller-Enbergs, Helmut: Contact Person. In: Engelmann, Roger et al. (eds.): The MfS Lexicon. Terms, Persons, and Structures of the State Security of the GDR. 2nd ed., Berlin 2012, p. 207.

²⁸ "Once on Stalinallee." In: Der Spiegel, July 15, 1991, pp. 32–34, here 34; Müller-Enbergs, Helmut: Main Administration A (HV A). Tasks – Structures – Sources. Berlin 2011, p. 176.

²⁹ The Art of Planning, Elaboration, and Implementation of AM, based on one of the statements by V. Ivanov (Bulgarian), January 1985. In: Kirjakova, Tatyana; Angelova, Nadezhda Angelova (eds.): KGB i DS – Vrytski i zavisimosti (KGB and DS – Relationships and Dependencies), CD edition. Sofia 2010, pp. 1514–1519, here 1517. Available online: <http://AKRDOPBGDSRSBNA-R.bg/media/KGB-disk.pdf>. Vladimir Petrovich Ivanov was head of the disinformation service "A" of the First General Staff of the KGB. See also D. Stankov, Auf-

Connections" to such CPs for active measures without recruiting them as IMs because this was not possible, expedient, or necessary for "political, operational, or other reasons."³⁰

Among the "unconscious multipliers" who allowed themselves to become instruments of Eastern disinformation were not only Communist Party members. There were also individuals who spread the disinformation theories without any direct influence from the Eastern intelligence services. They believed in these theories and therefore repeated them publicly, or –

in the case of foreign journalists and media – reported "objectively" on the disinformation thesis(es) without clearly refuting them.

Such cases were considered successes by the active measures (AM) departments precisely because they were not used in a targeted manner. The stated goal of active measures was to allow a disinformation theory to take on a life of its own and spread further without intelligence assistance.

Structures of Foreign Propaganda: The

Eastern secret services did not operate alone in foreign propaganda. They were not only networked under the leadership of the KGB, they were also directed by the ruling communist parties of their respective countries under the direction of the CPSU. The disinformation or "black propaganda" of the secret services had to be coordinated with the open, "white propaganda" of the ruling parties.

While the Ideological Departments of the Central Committees (CC) of the ruling communist parties bore primary responsibility for ideological education, including the propagation of enemy images at home, the International Departments (IA) of the CC were in charge of disseminating propaganda abroad. The International Department of the CPSU Central Committee set the general policy for foreign propaganda. This policy was then implemented in the area of "white propaganda"—that is, through supposedly objective (albeit ideologically distorted) reporting with cited sources—by the state news agencies and the state press. The IA policy also served as a guide for the KGB when it deployed "black" propaganda abroad or at home.

Record of the discussions with Service "A" of the First General Assembly of the KGB in Moscow from October 25 to 28, 1988, on cooperation with Department 8 of the First General Assembly of the DS (Bulgarian), November 28, 1988. In: Kirjakowa; Angelowa (eds.): KGB i DS (note 29), pp. 1870–1903, yesterday 1875 f.

³⁰ See MfS: IM Directive 2/79, dated December 8, 1979. In: Müller-Enbergs: Unofficial Employees, Part 2 (note 23), pp. 476 and 507 f. See also Müller-Enbergs' commentary on AM, ibid., pp. 225 f.

However, much of it remained in the realm of "grey" propaganda.

For example, state news agencies disseminated reports from Western media that the KGB had previously specifically planted in these outlets as part of a disinformation campaign.³¹ KGB agents also worked within the press. Certain publications, such as the Literaturnaya Gazeta, were considered media outlets that the KGB used intensively to disseminate favorable information.³²

Foreign propaganda was organized similarly in the other Warsaw Pact countries. In the GDR, Hermann Axen, Central Committee Secretary for International Relations (IV) and member of the Politburo, oversaw foreign propaganda. Axen headed the Foreign Policy Commission of the Central Committee of the ruling Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) and directed the work of the International Relations Department (IV) of the Central Committee. Both bodies were responsible for the general policy of foreign propaganda. The Foreign Propaganda Department of the SED Central Committee, which was responsible for the "white" propaganda institutions—e.g., the Panorama Foreign Press Agency and Radio Berlin International—was subordinate in content and practice to Axen and Department IV.³³ Axen and the corresponding departments and commissions in the Central Committee, in turn, took into account the propaganda line of the CPSU, which the SED usually followed. The general line for foreign propaganda was communicated to Axen by Boris Ponomaryev, head of the IA of the Central Committee of the CPSU, mainly at bilateral and multilateral meetings.³⁴

³¹ On the organization of Soviet foreign propaganda, see Godson, Roy; Shultz, Richard H.: Active Measures in Soviet Strategy. In: Laird, Robbin Frederick; Hoffmann, Erik P. (eds.): Soviet Foreign Policy in a Changing World. Hawthorne 1986, pp. 207–218, here 208 f.; Statement by Robert M. Gates, Director of Central Intelligence. In: United States, 95th Congress, 1st Session, September 12–13, 1985, Part 2 of 5, pp. 2–28, here 2–5. On "white," "gray," and "black" propaganda, see Kux, Dennis: Soviet Active Measures and Propaganda. In: Parameters, Journal of the US Army War College XV (1985) 4, pp. 19–28, here 19; Scholz, Michael F.: Active measures and disinformation as part of East Germany's propaganda war, 1953–

1972. In: Macrakis, Kristie; Friis, Thomas Wegener; Müller-Enbergs, Helmut (Hg.): East German Foreign Intelligence: Myth, Reality and Controversy. Abingdon, New York 2003, S. 113–133, hier 113.

³² Kalugin, Oleg: Spymaster: My Thirty-Two Years in Intelligence and Espionage against the West. Philadelphia 2009, S. 178.

³³ Muth, Ingrid: GDR Foreign Policy 1949–1972. Content, Structures, Mechanisms. Berlin 2001, pp. 59 and 66 f.

³⁴ From 1973 onwards, multilateral meetings of the International and Ideological Secretaries of the "fraternal parties" (from all states of the Warsaw Pact) played a special role.

The main topics for foreign propaganda could then be transmitted through various channels from the Central Committee to the MfS and the responsible Main Administration A. When it came to the general policy, Minister for State Security Erich Mielke, who, as a member of the Politburo, had access to the relevant plans, and the MfS's own SED district leadership served as transmission belts. When it came to coordinating the content of individual operations, the head of the Main Administration A and the head of the Department X (HV A/X), responsible for disinformation, had direct contact not only with Department IV, but also with the Western Department of the Central Committee and the Central Committee's "Agitation and Propaganda" Department.³⁵

The MfS saw itself not only as the "shield and sword of the party"³⁶ (the SED) but also, according to Mielke, as a "combat department of the glorious Soviet Cheka"³⁷ (the Soviet secret police). In foreign propaganda, the MfS therefore also received guidance from the "Chekists" of the KGB. The leadership of the MfS and the HV A received corresponding requests and instructions directly from the KGB.³⁸ Regular bilateral meetings took place not only between the heads of the First Main Directorate (HV) of the KGB, which was responsible for intelligence, and the HV A, but also between the heads of the "A" services of the First Main Directorate of the KGB, Major General Vladimir Petrovich Ivanov, and the HV A/X, Colonel Rolf Wagenbreth, which was responsible for disinformation. In addition, there were multilateral meetings between the chiefs of intelligence or their department heads, at which joint

At these meetings, Ponomaryev mediated and coordinated a common line for foreign and domestic propaganda (responses to alleged ideological attacks from the West). Minutes of these meetings are held by the Hermann Axen Office in the Federal Archives. See the Foundation Archive of the Parties and Mass Organizations of the former GDR in the Federal Archives (BArch), DY 30/IV 2/2.035, vols. 21–25.

³⁵ Marxen, Klaus; Werle, Gerhard (eds.): Criminal Justice and GDR Injustice. Documentation. Vol. 4/1: Espionage. Berlin 2004, pp. 474–475; Scholz: Active Measures and Disinformation (note 31), pp. 118–119.

³⁶ Süß, Walter: "Shield and Sword" – The Ministry for State Security and the SED. In: Henke, Klaus-Dietmar; Engelmann, Roger (eds.): File Status: The Significance of the State Security Service's Records for Contemporary History Research. Berlin 1995, pp. 83–97.

³⁷ Mielke's closing remarks at the district delegate conference of the MfS in preparation for the 10th Party Congress from February 20 to 21, 1981; BStU, MfS, ZAIG 3967, pp. 1–54, here 13.

³⁸ Scholz: Active Measures and Disinformation (note 31), pp. 116–117; Bittmann, Ladislav: The KGB and Soviet Disinformation: An Insider's View. Washington 1983, pp. 28–30; Bohnsack; Brehmer: Mission to Defraud (note 3), pp. 40–43.

Disinformation operations were discussed. Such meetings were organized under the umbrella of the "brother agencies"—the state security services of the Warsaw Pact countries, with the exception of Romania.³⁹ Representatives of the friendly security agencies of Vietnam, Cuba, or Mongolia also sometimes participated in these meetings.

³⁹ In the files of the BStU, only a few documents have been found so far about a multilateral meeting in 1988 in Berlin (see BStU, MfS, ZAIG, No. 8121 and No. 6082) and A speech by Markus Wolf, Deputy Minister for State Security and head of the HV A, at the 1982 meeting in Moscow (see BStU, MfS, HA I, No. 16660, pp. 299–316) was found. For a collection of the speeches and an analysis, see Žájek, Pavel: Socialistická solidarita bratrských rozvýdek. Dokumenty z poslední porady nájelníků I. správ v Berlíně, 17.–21. června 1988 [Socialist Solidarity of the Fraternal Intelligence Organs. Documents from the Last Conference of the Heads of the First Line in Berlin, October 17–21, 1988] (Czech). In: Securitas Imperii 21 (2012) 2, pp. 182–227. In Sofia in the COMDOS-Arch-R, F. 9, documents from the following multilateral meetings of the intelligence agencies can be found: Budapest 1970 (op. 2, ae 790), Warsaw 1974 (op. 2, ae 791, 792, 793), Prague 1978 (op. 3, ae 414) and Budapest 1986 (op. 4, ae 671).

In 1998, the "taz" newspaper—and they should have known!—selected the theory that the HIV virus responsible for AIDS was artificially created as a biological weapon on behalf of the US government as second place among its 21 best conspiracy theories of all time.⁴⁰ While the ranking is open to debate, it is undoubtedly one of the most persistent conspiracy theories of the 20th and 21st centuries. As this study will show, interest in this conspiracy theory remains unbroken, while its proponents remain incorrigible. However, the entire "theory" has one minor flaw: It was conceived by the Soviet secret service in collaboration with other "masterminds" and disseminated and developed in a variety of ways for almost a decade. As will be demonstrated in detail here, the GDR's foreign intelligence agency, the HV A, also played a significant role in this. Now, the AIDS conspiracy theory would hardly have made it onto any top-ten list if it didn't drag a long tail of interwoven and highly controversial content and disinformation behind it.

For example, as early as 1992, two HV A officers, Günter Bohnsack and Herbert Brehmer, essentially exposed the entire "theory" as an "active measure" of the disinformation department HV A/X.⁴¹ So far, so good. But the theory was far from over. As recently as 2013, the conspiracy theory and the history of its spread were still raising heated debates. "Disinformation squared," "conspiracy theories about a conspiracy theory," wrote opponents of the theory, but also persistent defenders, who recently even expressed their opinions through rap, were heard.

This study will now provide empirical evidence that there was a "real conspiracy" between the KGB and the HV A to spread the Fort-Detrick theory of HIV origin, and that a biologist named Jakob Segal was one of its protagonists as a conscious or unconscious multiplier⁴².

In contrast to previous publications, which based their theses mainly on

⁴⁰ The 21 best conspiracy theories. In: taz, October 12, 1998, p. 24. The "taz" cited as its source: Ringel, Michael (ed.): *The Ingenious Book of Truth*. Frankfurt, 1998.

⁴¹ Bohnsack; Brehmer: Mission to Mislead (note 3), p. 219 f.

⁴² For the concept of the "conscious or unconscious multiplier," see the preface.

Based on the statements of former HV A officer Günter Bohnsack,⁴³ this study is based on sources accessible for the first time from the archives of the Bulgarian State Security and the archives of the Federal Office for State Security (BStU). It contradicts the findings of Erhard Geißler and Robert Sprinkle regarding the MfS's role in Segal's thesis, which read: "The KGB was certainly close to the crime scene, while the Stasi was nowhere to be seen."⁴⁴ This study shows that the MfS took action very close to the "crime scene": by assisting in the dissemination and publication of Segal's thesis, in obtaining a publication ban against the Segals' East German opponents, with research and other assistance from selected IMs, in the creation of a research position for the couple in the Ministry of Health (MfG) of the GDR, and in co-financing a film for West German and foreign television. Not only did they propagate their thesis, but they also portrayed Jakob and Lilli Segal as heroes. The HV A/X's support for the film in 1989 demonstrated, as they themselves emphasized, that they continued the AIDS disinformation campaign, even though Moscow had abandoned it in favor of disarmament negotiations with the United States.

After 1989, the Segals themselves continued to spread their version of the Fort-Detrick thesis out of personal conviction, and Jakob Segal combined it with support for unproven alternative therapies against HIV/AIDS. Thanks to a new generation of unwitting disseminators and conspiracy theorists, the KGB's Fort-Detrick theory and its Segal version continue to have medical and political side effects that endanger physical and political health, sometimes with fatal consequences.

⁴³ See, for example, Boghardt: Operation INFEKTION (note 6); Behling, Klaus: Kund-schafter a. D.: The End of GDR Espionage. Stuttgart, Leipzig 2003, p. 253 and Bohnsack; Brehmer: Auftrag Irreführung (note 3), p.

⁴⁴ 219 f. "... the KGB was certainly near the crime scene, while the Stasi was nowhere around." Geißler; Sprinkle: Disinformation squared (note 9), p. 76.

- 3 Launch of a campaign: the KGB's AIDS disinformation and the "brother organs," 1983–1986

On 7 September 1985, the First Main Directorate (I. HV) of the KGB, responsible for foreign intelligence, informed its Bulgarian colleagues in the First Main Directorate of the Bulgarian State Security (Dyrzhavna sigurnost – DS):

»We are implementing a complex of measures in connection with the new dangerous disease that has emerged in the USA in recent years [...] AIDS and its subsequent widespread spread to other countries, including Western Europe. The aim of these measures is to create a favorable opinion abroad that this disease is the result of out-of-control secret experiments by the US intelligence services and the Pentagon with new types of biological weapons. 45

The starting point for such measures were the "facts" that had already appeared in the Indian press. This was an anonymous letter from a supposedly "well-known American scientist and anthropologist" in the Indian newspaper "Patriot" on July 17, 1983, under the headline: "AIDS May Invade India: Mystery Disease Caused by US

Experiments." The KGB-inspired "letter" 46 claimed that the AIDS pathogen was the result of "the Pentagon's experiments to develop new and dangerous biological weapons" at the US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) in Fort Detrick, Maryland. 47 Although various conspiracy theorists in the US had previously accused the Pentagon, the CIA, or the US government in general of being responsible for the artificial creation of the AIDS virus, the article in the Patriot

the first verifiable publication that indicated Fort Detrick as the exact place of origin.

⁴⁵ KGB, Information Nr. 2955 (russ.), 7.9.1985; COMDOS-Arch, Fond (F.) 9, opis (op.) 4, a.e. 663, Bl. 208 f., hier 208.

⁴⁶ There are several indications and clues that the article was inspired by the KGB—among other things, the "Patriot" was considered a KGB mouthpiece in intelligence circles at the time. See Boghardt: Operation INFEKTION (note 6), pp. 5 f.; United States Department of State (US DOS): Soviet Influence Activities: A Report on Active Measures and Propaganda, 1986–87, Washington 1987, p. 44.

⁴⁷ AIDS may invade India: Mystery disease caused by US experiments. Patriot, July 17, 1983, pp. 1 ff. The authors thank Thomas Boghardt for providing a copy of the article.

Now, in 1985, the Bulgarian "brother organ," following the example of the KGB, was to spread the theses of the 1983 article through its "opportunities in party, parliamentary, socio-political, and journalistic circles in Western and developing countries." ⁴⁸ The KGB's First General Assembly listed the main arguments of its nascent AIDS disinformation campaign:

"Judging from these reports [the 'facts' of the Indian press, editor's note], as well as the American military's interest in the symptoms of AIDS, the speed and geography of its spread, the most likely assumption seems that this very dangerous disease is the result of a series of Pentagon experiments with new types of biological weapons. This is also confirmed by the fact that the disease initially affected only certain groups of people (homosexuals, drug addicts, Latinos)." ⁴⁹

Another argument was that the army—USAMRIID at Fort Detrick was mentioned—was making the greatest progress in combating the disease. However, this knowledge was not shared with civilian institutions, which was specifically aimed at increasing the army's combat effectiveness. As the KGB and its "brother agencies" campaign continued, the USAMRIID at Fort Detrick was often replaced by the "Pentagon" in general as the alleged origin of the AIDS pathogen.⁵⁰ Furthermore, the aim was to create fear about the spread of the virus by the American government and Americans in general. For example, the transmission of AIDS through American donor blood was one aspect that was to be addressed.

This raises the question of why the KGB allowed so much time to pass between the original article in the Patriot in 1983 and the launch of its large-scale propaganda campaign in 1985. The reluctance may have been due to the fact that the original article received little coverage in the world press. It was based on an earlier KGB disinformation alleging that a research laboratory at the University of Maryland in Lahore, Pakistan, was a biological research facility.

⁴⁸ KGB, Information Nr. 2955 (russ.), 7.9.1985, COMDOS-Arch-R, F. 9. op. 4, a.e. 663, Bl. 208 f., hier 208.

⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 209.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

warfare.⁵¹ It was originally part of another campaign of active measures by the KGB designed to create tensions between India and Pakistan, and especially between India and the USA.

By 1985, however, the situation regarding AIDS had changed, and therefore the 1983 thesis was taken up again. Compared to 1983, public attention to AIDS was now much greater, as people were already talking about an epidemic.⁵² There were several reasons why the KGB wanted to go on the offensive in 1985. In the USA, the right-wing "permanent presidential candidate" Lyndon LaRouche had accused the Soviet Union in his "Executive Intelligence Review" of having developed the AIDS pathogen itself as a biological weapon.⁵³ Moscow and the KGB considered LaRouche to be close to the CIA.⁵⁴ In February 1985, a US government report had also accused the Soviet Union of violating the Geneva Conventions by producing biological weapons.

⁵¹ Boghardt: Operation INFektion (Anm. 6), S. 5; Pentagon Said Pursuing CBW Research in Lahore, Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in English, 13.12.1986. In: Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), Daily Report, Soviet Union, FBIS-SOV-86-246, 23.12.1986, S. A3.

⁵² Boghardt: Operation INFECTION (Note 6), p. 6.

⁵³ Zapewalow, Valentin: Panika na zapade, ili shto skrivaetsya za sensatsiei vokrug AIDS. Literturnaja gaveta (LG) of October 30, 1985, p. 14 [German: Zapewalow, Valentin: Panik im Westen: was steht hinter der Sensation um AIDS?] in: BStU, MfS, ZAIG No. 14572, pp. 166–173, here 172; Hamerman, Warren J.: AIDS Epidemic Explodes: What is the Russian Angle? In: Executive Intelligence Review (EIR) 12, October 18, 1985, pp. 52–54. Interestingly, the CIA received a report from a "reliable source" that a "Moscow facility" was working on a virus in 1981 that "was intended to weaken or destroy the human immune system." The goal was supposedly defensive, to develop an antidote. The USSR also most likely sent a sample of the AIDS virus from Africa in the late 1970s to Moscow for research purposes, according to the CIA.

Nevertheless, the CIA, for its part, ruled out the possibility that the USSR could have developed the AIDS virus through genetic engineering or was behind its spread in the USA. The AIDS virus was an "unlikely candidate" for biological warfare because of the difficulties in developing a suitable vaccine for its own soldiers. CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, Science and Weapons Daily Review, February 28, 1985; CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), National Records and Archives Administration (NARA), College Park, Maryland; CIA-RDP86R00254R000301730001-6.

⁵⁴ Zapevalov: Panic in the West (note 53), p. 172.

have.⁵⁵ There was therefore reason enough for the Soviet Union to strike back with concentrated force.

The public premiere of the KGB's expanded and intensified campaign took place on October 30, 1985, with the publication of an article in the Literaturnaya Gazeta by Valentin Zapevalov entitled "Panic in the West: What's Behind the AIDS Sensation?"⁵⁶ The article in the LG, which served as a primary channel for the KGB's disinformation campaign,⁵⁷ followed the points outlined by the KGB's First General Assembly. After initially citing information from the Indian newspaper Patriot, the text provided further details on the alleged development of the AIDS virus. Employees of the American Centers for Disease Control (CDC) had helped the Pentagon by traveling to Zaire, Nigeria, and Latin America and collecting samples of "highly pathogenic viruses" that were not found in Europe or Asia. These samples were then combined and used to create a new type of virus: HIV. Blood donations from infected people would, for example, be transferred to unsuspecting patients during operations.

Isolated experiments with the new virus were then carried out both in Haiti and on marginalized groups in American society – drug addicts, homosexuals, and the homeless.⁵⁸ Zapevalov summarized:

"[...] It is entirely possible that, in the end, as has happened repeatedly in the past, one of the victims will file a lawsuit against the Pentagon and the CIA, and then it will finally become apparent that all AIDS patients are the victims of yet another inhumane experiment."⁵⁹

Zapevalov's article was reprinted shortly thereafter in Kuwait, Bahrain, Finland, Sweden, Peru, and other countries.⁶⁰

⁵⁵ Boghardt: Operation INFECTION (Note 6), p. 6.

⁵⁶ Zapevalov: Panic in the West (note 53), p. 172.

⁵⁷ Oleg Kalugin, former head of the "K" (Intelligence) line of the First General Staff of the KGB, writes: "During all the years I was in Foreign Intelligence, Literary Gazeta was our main channel in the Soviet press for propaganda and disinformation." Kalugin, Spymaster (note 32), p. 178.

⁵⁸ Zapevalov: Panic in the West (note 53), pp. 170 f.

⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 172.

⁶⁰ Memorandum von [Name geschwärzt], Chief, Foreign Subversion and Instability Center, Office of Global Issues, Directorate of Intelligence, CIA: Soviet Disinformation: Allegations of US Misdeeds, 28.3.1986; CREST, NARA, CIA-RDP86TO1017R000100620001-1, 7 Bl., hier 3.

3.1 The KGB and conspiracy theories in the USA: The cycle of misinformation and disinformation

The KGB's disinformation about AIDS did not emerge out of nowhere. It was partly based on true facts, but primarily made use of various conspiracy theories about the origin of HIV/AIDS in the USA itself. As a result, a dynamic developed in which false information in the form of conspiracy theories in the USA and the disinformation theories of the KGB and the HV A mutually fed each other. This cycle of false information and disinformation about AIDS continued until

at the end of the Cold War and beyond – with all the negative consequences.

Soviet disinformation referred to various revelations made in the United States itself in the 1970s and 1980s. For example, in 1975, the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Government Conduct Relating to Intelligence Activities (the "Church Committee") investigated the CIA's "MKULTRA" project.

exposed. In the 1950s, CIA chemist Sidney Gottlieb had tested LSD and other drugs on unsuspecting individuals – often with serious consequences.⁶¹ In 1960, on the orders of the CIA's Deputy Director of Plans, Richard Bissell, who was responsible for covert operations, Gottlieb visited Fort Detrick to provide a toxin for a possible assassination attempt on an African head of government – ultimately, the assassination attempt was made on Congolese leader Patrice Lumumba. Gottlieb delivered the toxin to the CIA station in the Congo, but the assassination attempt was nullified after Lumumba was executed by American-backed government troops.⁶² In the 1970s, the Tuskegee Syphilis Study was exposed by the American press.

⁶¹ United States, Congress, Senate, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess., Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities: Foreign and Military Intelligence. Final Report, Book 1. Washington 1976, S. 389–403. Verfügbar online: Assassination Archives and Research Center (AARC) Public Library, http://www.aarclibrary.org/publib/contents/church/contents_church_reports_book1.htm.

⁶² United States, Congress, Senate, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities: Interim Report. Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders. Washington 1975, S. 19–30. Verfügbar online: AARC Public Library, http://www.aarclibrary.org/publib/contents/church/contents_church_reports_ir.htm. In the report, Gottlieb was referred to by his birth name, Joseph Scheider.

From 1932 to 1972, an agency of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services studied the effects of syphilis on 399 previously infected, impoverished African-American sharecroppers. This group, some of whom were illiterate, was not informed that penicillin had been identified as an effective treatment for the disease in 1947. Nor was any treatment with the drug provided.

Many of those affected passed the disease on to their unborn children, and many died before the study was discontinued in 1972.

The sudden outbreak of the HIV epidemic and its initially unclear origin made the KGB's disinformation seem plausible against the background of such reports.⁶³ An epidemic was first reported in 1981 in which healthy homosexual men in Los Angeles and other US cities suddenly fell ill with opportunistic infections that indicated an immune deficiency. It was suspected that a sexually transmitted pathogen was at work, and the disease was originally called "Gay-Related Immunodeficiency Disease" (GRID).⁶⁴ When it emerged that more than half of the people with the same symptoms were not homosexual men, but rather hemophiliacs, intravenous drug users, and immigrants from Haiti, the disease was officially renamed AIDS by the US Centers for Disease Control (CDC) in 1982.⁶⁵ It was not until May 1983 that a group of scientists at the Pasteur Institute, led by virologists Luc Montagnier and Françoise Barré-Sinoussi, isolated a new retrovirus from lymphoid ganglia, which they believed to be the AIDS pathogen. They called it "lymphadenopathy-associated virus" (LAV). In May 1984, a team of scientists led by virologist Robert Gallo at the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) in the United States confirmed that the AIDS pathogen was a virus. They called it "Human T-cell leukemia virus."

(HTLV).⁶⁶ It was not until 1985 that it was determined that LAV and HTLV were the same virus. In May 1986, it was renamed HIV on the recommendation of the International Committee on Taxonomy of Viruses.⁶⁷

⁶³ Harden, Victoria A.: AIDS at 30: A History. Washington 2012, S. 119 f.; Thomas, Stephen B.; Quinn, Sandra Crouse: The Tuskegee Syphilis Study, 1932 to 1972: implications for HIV education and AIDS risk education programs in the black community. In: American Journal of Public Health 81 (1991) 11, S. 1498–1505, *passim*.

⁶⁴ Harden: AIDS at 30 (Anm. 63), S. 23.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 34.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 58 f.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 68.

At this point, HIV was still considered "a sinister virus of unknown origin," as the French physician and AIDS researcher Jacques Leibowitch wrote in his 1984 book with the same title.⁶⁸

The revelations about the "imperial presidency"⁶⁹ in the United States in the 1960s and 1970s and the sudden outbreak of the AIDS epidemic among marginalized groups in US society—homosexuals, drug addicts, immigrants from Haiti, and African Americans—also served as a breeding ground for conspiracy theories in the United States. This is hardly surprising, since conspiracy theories are often developed and spread by socially marginalized individuals who have already frequently fallen victim to state and societal discrimination and genuine conspiracies. They express the despair, anger, and distrust of such individuals toward political, economic, and social elites and foreign powers (e.g., the "superpowers").⁷⁰ While African Americans could cite several historical grounds for suspicion against the U.S. government, most homosexuals found the Reagan administration's response to the AIDS epidemic, in which they saw themselves as the primary victims, far too hesitant. There were grounds for suspicion here, too, as many religiously conservative supporters and members of the administration viewed the AIDS epidemic as God's just punishment for the sin of homosexuality. They also criticized the alleged focus of medical research on AIDS, a disease they viewed as the result of personal immorality. This would come at the expense of research into other deadly diseases such as cancer.⁷¹ As the KGB had recognized, it was only a small step from complaining that the government was doing too little to combat AIDS to claiming that the government was somehow behind it.

Quite a few gay newspapers in the USA spread such conspiracy theories, such as the »New York Native« and the »Gay

⁶⁸ Leibowitch, Jacques: AIDS: A mysterious virus of unknown origin.

Munich 1986; Translation of Leibowitch, Jacques: A strange virus from elsewhere. Paris 1984.

⁶⁹ Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr.: The Imperial Presidency. Boston 1973, *passim*.

⁷⁰ See, for example, Rödlach, Alexander: Witches, Westerners and HIV: AIDS and Cultures of Blame in Africa. Walnut Creek 2006, S. 117 f.

⁷¹ Harden: AIDS at 30 (Anm. 63), S. 98, 101 f. u. 123; Gibson, William E.: Robertson: Stop Aids By Altering 'Aberrant' Habits. In: Sun-Sentinel v. 22.10.1987, verfügbare online: http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/1987-10-22/news/8702010274_1 robertson-and-bush-aids-epidemic-aids-victims.

Community News in Boston. On July 9, 1983, a week before the Patriot article, gay activist Charlie Shively published an opinion piece in Gay Community News blaming the American government for creating the AIDS epidemic. He cited a theory published in New York Native that the AIDS pathogen originated from the African swine fever virus, which the CIA allegedly introduced into the Western Hemisphere for biological warfare against Cuba. Because of the high cost to the American government of combating swine fever (an \$18 million compensation for the slaughter of pigs in Haiti), Shively posed the question: "Would it be possible that, given \$100 million, the doctors would simply decide to kill all the queers, Haitians, and intravenous drug users [...]?"

In this case, the "doctors" referred to the AIDS researchers at the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), whom Shively mistakenly⁷² accused of authoring the Tuskegee Syphilis Study. However, Shively discussed another possibility for the origin of the AIDS pathogen: that it had been artificially created by the US government.⁷³ A then-new book by Robert Harris and Jeremy Paxman on the US government's chemical and biological warfare programs contained the testimony of an employee of the US Department of Defense, Dr. Donald MacArthur. In 1969, he testified before Congress about the potential artificial creation of a pathogen against which the human immune system had no defenses. Furthermore, according to Harris and Paxman, a 1975 American military manual pointed to the possibility of developing "ethnic chemical weapons" capable of killing members of a specific population group.⁷⁴ Shively summarized his opinion: "AIDS sounds like the kind of ethnic weapon that nullifies the individual's immunological defense response." He indirectly pointed to the Pentagon—but not exactly Fort Detrick, like the "Patriot"—as a possible manufacturing site.⁷⁵

⁷² The US Public Health Service, which, like the CDC, was part of the Department of Health and Human Services, conducted the syphilis study.

⁷³ Shively, Charley: Speaking Out: The CDC-CIA-AIDS Political Alliance. In: Gay Community News v. 9.7.1983, S. 5.

⁷⁴ Harris, Robert; Paxman, Jeremy: A Higher Form of Killing: The Secret Story of Chemical and Biological Warfare. London 1982, S. 240 f.

⁷⁵ Shively: Speaking Out (Anm. 73), S. 5.

Conspiracy theories about AIDS in the United States and KGB disinformation not only referred to the same or similar sources of information and examples. The Eastern disinformation campaign utilized conspiracy theories in the United States, and conspiracy theorists in the United States increasingly referred to disinformation from the East. For example, the American government officials responsible for combating Eastern disinformation received a tip-off that the KGB was simply obtaining many of its disinformation theories about "ethnic weapons" and presumably also about AIDS from gay newspapers.⁷⁶ African-American newspapers and gay newspapers, which in turn spread conspiracy theories about AIDS, began citing the KGB's disinformation theories.

One example of this is the journalistic activity of the American psychiatrist Nathaniel S. Lehrman, who – apparently unknowingly – acted as a multiplier of the KGB's disinformation on AIDS in the USA. In various articles for the New York-based African-American newspaper "Amsterdam News," he hinted at a possible "AIDS conspiracy" by the American government. In November 1985, he allegedly claimed to the newspaper that the spread of the AIDS epidemic in parts of Africa was the result of CIA bacteriological and chemical experiments; that similar experiments were openly conducted on Western homosexuals, drug addicts, and African Americans; and that the Centers for Disease Control had participated in CIA experiments. All three claims fit with Zapevalov's article in "Literaturnaya Gazeta" and the guidance the KGB had given to the Bulgarians. About the theses

In addition to the KGB's claims, Lehrman claimed that chemical agents were probably responsible for AIDS and that the associated HTLV virus caused only a mild infection.⁷⁷

Lehrman later denied in a letter to the editor of the Amsterdam News⁷⁸ and in a press release⁷⁹ that he had ever made the first three KGB-related claims.

⁷⁶ Snyder, Alvin A.: *Warriors of Disinformation. How Charles Wick, the USIA, and Videotape Won the Cold War*. New York 1995, S. 113 f.

⁷⁷ Browne, J. Zamgba: Link AIDS to CIA Warfare. In: *New York Amsterdam News*, November 30, 1985, p. 12; also in: BStU, MfS, HA II, No. 22082, p. 42.

⁷⁸ Lehrman, Nathaniel: Some minor inaccuracies. In: *New York Amsterdam News*, December 28, 1985, p. 12; also in: BStU, MfS, HA II, No. 22082, p. 42.

⁷⁹ Lehrman, Nathaniel S., M.D., Clinical Director, Retired, Brooklyn State Hospital: Media Cover-Up of AIDS? February 1986. In: BStU, MfS, HA II, No. 22082, Bl. 41–45.

In the February 1986 press release, he focused more on his thesis that there might be a chemical agent that causes AIDS.⁸⁰ However, in his letter to the editor, he left open the possibility that the "spread of AIDS in Africa could be the result of activities of the American government, including the CIA."⁸¹ In the press release, he softened his statement on alleged human experiments, which was summarized in the newspaper report:

"Although our government did conduct such 'experiments' on ignorant populations, I did not say that they were conducted 'publicly,' nor that they were certainly conducted on homosexuals, drug addicts, or blacks, which I suspect they were."⁸²

In another article in the Amsterdam News in January 1986, he revisited his theory of a chemical agent causing AIDS and suggested the possibility that "religious terrorists" or others using "gay dust" wanted to kill not only homosexuals but also drug addicts and African Americans. He hypothetically asked whether AIDS in Africa could be the result of the activities of "American government agencies" seeking to effect a change of leadership there.⁸³

The question arises: Did Lehrman work for the KGB? There is no evidence of any knowing or willing activity on behalf of the KGB. Nevertheless, there were indications of possible indirect influence from Moscow on him. In his letter to the editor of the Amsterdam News

Lehrman had supported his claim of possible CIA involvement in the spread of AIDS by pointing to an issue of the Washington magazine "Covert Action Information Bulletin" (CAIB) from the summer of 1982 (No. 17).⁸⁴

⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 41.

⁸¹ Lehrman: Some minor inaccuracies (Anm. 78), S. 12.

⁸² Lehrman: Media Cover-Up? (note 79), p. 42.

⁸³ Lehrman, Nathaniel: A 'natural' epidemic? In: New York Amsterdam News, January 18, 1986, pp. 13 and 56; also in: BStU, MfS, HA II, No. 22082, p. 43.

⁸⁴ Lehrman: Some minor inaccuracies (note 78), p. 12. The issue of CAIB mentioned contained articles on American biological warfare weapons and the possible role of the USA in an epidemic of dengue fever in Cuba and Nicaragua – previous propaganda theses of their communist governments and Moscow.

Siehe Lawrence, Ken: The History of US Bio-Chemical Killers. CAIB 17 (Summer 1982), pp. 5–8; Wolf, Louis: The Pentagon's Other Option. CAIB 17 (Summer 1982),

The CAIB had a colorful past. Its founding by CIA defector Philip Agee, some left-wing Washington journalists, and disaffected former CIA employees was announced in 1978 at the 11th World Festival of Youth and Students in Cuba. According to the memos of defected KGB archivist Vasily Mitrokhin, the "K" (Intelligence) line of the KGB's First General Staff was behind this founding. Agee had long been listed as a KGB agent (code name: PONT), according to Mitrokhin's notes, while the other members of the CAIB's editorial board (KGB code name: RUPOR) knew nothing of this. A working group with employees from the "K" line and the "A" service of the KGB's First General Staff, responsible for active measures, was set up under the leadership of VN

Kosterin, the deputy head of Service A, to supply the CAIB with compromising materials about the CIA. Ultimately, however, the KGB found it difficult to find enough classified material for the quarterly publication. Therefore, the publishers searched for publicly available materials that could be used against the CIA or American government agencies.

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Even though Lehrman was unknowingly a multiplier of the KGB's AIDS disinformation, the KGB nevertheless used his publications to substantiate its own disinformation thesis. In a follow-up article to Zapevalov's contribution, Literaturnaya Gazeta quoted

on 17 May 1986 under the title »AIDS: More Questions than Answers« Lehrman as an American expert who confirms the theory of the artificial origin of AIDS. He claimed, the paper continued, that AIDS victims "could in some cases be the targets of premeditated murder" and named the possible culprit—the CIA.⁸⁶ "Literaturnaya Gazeta"

had not invented the quotes; they came from Lehrman's press release, which was also available to HV A87 and presumably to the KGB or at least to the "Literaturnaya Gazeta."⁸⁸

S. 8–24; Schaap, Bill: U.S. Biological Warfare: The 1981 Cuba Dengue Epidemic. CAIB 17 (Summer 1982), pp. 28–31.

⁸⁵ Andrew, Christopher; Mitrokhin, Vasiliy: The Black Book of the KGB: Moscow's Fight Against the West. Munich 2001, pp. 327–328.

⁸⁶ AIDS: More Questions Than Answers [AIDS: More Questions Than Answers]. In: LG v. 17.5.1986, p. 15.

⁸⁷ Lehrman: Media Cover-Up? (Anm. 79), Bl. 41. In der Presseerklärung stand folgender Satz: »If non-infectious causes of AIDS do indeed exist, as seems more than possible, its victims may, in some cases, be targets of deliberate murder.« SPID (Anm. 86), S. 15.

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Lehrman was aware that Soviet publications on AIDS cited him as a source. He even cited this in his own article on AIDS in the "Covert Action Information Bulletin" of summer 1987: "Is AIDS Not Contagious? The Possibility and Its Implications from the CBW's Point of View."⁸⁹ In it, he suggested—similar to Zapevalov before him—that

that AIDS was the intentional or unintentional product of American CBW research. He stated:

"It might seem crazy, but an understanding of the illegal, murderous acts carried out by our government, including the CIA and, more recently, the NSC, and the history of U.S. government involvement in CBW research should help us understand that truth is often stranger than fiction."⁹⁰

In the article, he not only popularized the theories of virologist and AIDS denier Peter Duesberg, who denied that the HIV virus actually causes AIDS,⁹¹ but also Segal's theory of HIV as a biological weapon,⁹² which has since become the most important "argument" in Eastern disinformation about AIDS. Lehrman was not the only one spreading the propaganda theories of the USSR and the KGB regarding AIDS and the alleged biological warfare of the USA. In the same and the following issue of CAIB, there was a longer article on AIDS by journalist and editorial board member Robert Lederer, who presented several "alternative theories" on the origin of the HIV virus.⁹³ He wrote not only about the possibility of an artificial origin at Fort Detrick based on the theories of Jakob Segal,⁹⁴ but also about other possible origins in connection with the American government's alleged chemical and biological warfare plans. The options were indirect dioxin exposure (similar to »Agent Orange-

⁸⁹ Lehrman, Nathaniel S.: Is AIDS Non-Infectious? The Possibility and its CBW Implications. In: CAIB 28 (Summer 1987), pp. 55–62, here 62. CBW is an abbreviation for chemical and biological weapons.

⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 61.

⁹¹ Ebenda, S. 56 f u 59 f.

⁹² Ibid., p. 61 f.

⁹³ Lederer, Robert: "Origin and Spread of AIDS (I). Is the West Responsible?" In: CAIB 28 (Summer 1987), pp. 43–54. The article was continued in the next issue of CAIB. See Lederer, Robert: "Origin and Spread of AIDS (II). Is the West Responsible (Conclusion)?" In: CAIB 29 (Winter 1988), pp. 52–65.

⁹⁴ Lederer: Origin and Spread of AIDS (I) (note 93), p. 46. Lederer cited Jakob and Lilli Segal in this context.

ge" in Vietnam)⁹⁵, the co-infection with the viruses for maguari and dengue fever, in whose spread in Cuba the US government was allegedly involved,⁹⁶ or the infection with the African swine fever virus,⁹⁷ for whose emergence in Cuba the CIA was allegedly responsible.⁹⁸ At the same time, however, Lederer criticized the weaknesses of the various theories, including Segal's thesis.⁹⁹ There are "logical difficulties" with Lehrman's simultaneous support of Segal's thesis and Duesberg's assumption that the virus, whether artificially produced or not, cannot be considered the cause of AIDS.¹⁰⁰

A second important disseminator of the KGB's HIV bioweapons theory in the US and Europe, also cited in the new LG article, was the English physician John Seale. He, too, was unaware of his role.¹⁰¹ Seale had served as a witness for the thesis of the LaRouche magazine "Executive Intelligence Review," according to which the AIDS epidemic in the West only brought advantages to the closed societies of the East, as they were supposedly able to isolate themselves well. Nevertheless, at this time, Seale still believed in the hypothesis of the American virologist Myron "Max" Essex of the Harvard School of Public Health, according to which HIV arose naturally in Africa through the transmission of a similar virus from vervet monkeys to humans.¹⁰²

However, Zapevalov's article and Soviet propaganda in general had led him to the conclusion in the autumn of 1985 that the virus must be of artificial origin.¹⁰³ He now claimed that HIV was probably

⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 47 f.

⁹⁶ Ibid., pp. 49–53. Lederer reminded his readers in this context of the CAIB's accusation that the US government's biological warfare was behind a dengue fever epidemic in Cuba in 1981. Ibid., p. 53, fn. 54. For the accusation, see Schaap: US Biological Warfare (note 84), p. 28. For the corresponding Soviet and Cuban propaganda, see CIA Memorandum, Soviet Disinformation, March 28, 1986, p. 3 (see fn. 32).

⁹⁷ Lederer: Origin and Spread of AIDS (II) (Anm. 93), S. 52–55.

⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 53.

⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 47.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 47, fn. 17.

¹⁰¹ Veitch, Andrew: Germ of Doubt. In: The Guardian v. 20.12.1985, S. 15.

¹⁰² Geißler: AIDS and its pathogens (note 13), p. 114.

¹⁰³ See Seale, John: Response to a letter to the editor by Zhores Medvedev. In: Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine (JRSM) 79 (August 1986), pp. 494–495.

was created through the genetic manipulation of the Visna virus, a retrovirus in sheep. Although Seale himself considered the Soviet Union rather than the USA to be the country producing the "artificial" virus,¹⁰⁴

He was quoted in a broadcast of the Moscow Radio World Service in December 1985¹⁰⁵ and again in 1986 in the Literaturnaya Gazeta on the alleged artificial origin of the virus.¹⁰⁶ However, Seale continued to accuse the Soviet Union of manufacturing the virus and supported a ballot initiative by LaRouche in California to isolate AIDS patients from society.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁴ Veitch: Germ of Doubt (Anm. 101), S. 15.

¹⁰⁵ Seale: Reply (note 103), p. 494 f.

¹⁰⁶ SPID (Anm. 86), S. 15.

¹⁰⁷ Burdman, Mark: Support grows in U.K. for measures rejected by California voters. In: EIR 13 (1986) 45, S. 35–37, hier 35. Verfügbar online:
http://www.larouchepub.com/eiw/public/1986/eirv13n45-19861114/eirv13n45-19861114_035-aids_debate_in_britain_support_g.pdf.

4

Multipliers of the Fort-Detrick thesis: the SED, the HV A and the Segals

The First High Command of the KGB informed its Bulgarian colleagues about its own AIDS disinformation campaign not only as a formality, but because it expected intelligence assistance in spreading its thesis.¹⁰⁸ With the same expectation, it also contacted High Command A in 1985.

The KGB explained to the Bulgarian comrades that since 1985 it had "carried out a series of activities" on this topic together "with the German [...] colleagues."¹⁰⁹ The HV A had been commissioned by the KGB to make its own "scientific" contribution to the campaign.¹¹⁰ The organizational work was undertaken by Section 1 of the HV A, Department X (HV A/X/1), which was responsible for active measures intended to provoke or intensify differences between the USA and its NATO allies (OVO "Axis", XV 173/72), promote disarmament and the peace movement in the West (OVO "Mars", XV 1971/75), and mobilize states in the Third World against the USA (OVO "Forward", XV 3741/73).¹¹¹ Although the HV A had already begun its work in 1985, according to the KGB, Ingo Dams of the HV A/X/1 only initiated a corresponding object operation (OVO) »Denver« on July 17, 1986.¹¹²

¹⁰⁸ KGB, Information Nr. 2955 (russ.), 7.9.1985, COMDOS-Arch-R, F. 9. op. 4, a.e. 663, Bl. 208 f., hier 208.

¹⁰⁹ Information Nr. 2742 (russ.), o. D.; COMDOS-Arch-R, F. 9, op. 4, a.e. 675, Bl. 156–159, here 157. The file is titled "Cooperation with the KGB 1987" and otherwise contains only documents for the year 1987.

¹¹⁰ Boghardt: Operation Infection (note 6), p. 8 including fn. 42; Bohnsack; Brehmer: Mission to Mislead (note 3), p. 219.

¹¹¹ Müller-Enbergs: Head Office A (note 28), p. 172.

¹¹² OVO "Denver," Reg. No. XV 3429/86; BStU, AR 2, MfS, RoHo, F22. The code name of the campaign was not "Infektion," as Boghardt claimed in 2009 based on a tip from Bohnsack. See Boghardt: Operation INFEK-TION (note 6), pp. 8 and 21, fn. 43. There was a joint operation called "Infektion."

The intelligence departments of the Eastern European state security services against Radio Free Europe (RFE) and Radio Liberty (RL), in which HV A/X also participated with active measures. See Colonel Geyer, HV A/IX: Report, February 18, 1976; BStU, MfS, ZAIG No. 22570, pp. 217–222, here 218; MfS, Draft: Plan of Joint or Coordinated Active Measures for 1984, August 23, 1983; Archiv bezpečnostních složek [Archives of the State Security Services, Prague – ABS], A.ř. 81282/117, pp. 64–70, here 69 f.

The HV A/X wrote to its Bulgarian counterparts regarding the object process »Denver« Colleagues:

"In order to expose the dangers to humanity arising from the research, production, and use of biological weapons, and to reinforce anti-American reservations around the world, as well as to initiate domestic political conflicts in the United States, the GDR side submits a scientific study and other materials proving that AIDS originated in the United States and not in Africa, and that AIDS is a product of US biological weapons research."

Beyond the stated goals of the KGB, HV A/X also wanted to initiate "domestic political conflicts in the USA."¹¹³ At a meeting with his Bulgarian colleagues in September 1986, the deputy head of HV A/X, Wolfgang Mutz, claimed that "Denver" constituted a "significant part of the AM of the department [HV A/X]."

¹¹⁴

The study mentioned – "a major study with scientific value," according to Mutz – was already finished.¹¹⁵ It proves, according to Mutz, that "AIDS is a result of a biological weapon of the USA" and that it "was and is being used by them [i.e., the HV A] in various AMs around the world." Furthermore, the Americans wanted "a copy from the author."¹¹⁶ The study described by Mutz as part of the "Denver" process could only refer to the manuscript "AIDS – Nature and Origin"¹¹⁷ by Professor emeritus Jakob Segal, his wife Lilli, and chemist Ronald Dehmlow. The brief description of the content fits exactly with Segal's study. It was translated into English.

¹¹³ Plan of joint and coordinated active measures of the intelligence agencies of the Ministry of the Interior of the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the Ministry of State Security of the GDR for 1987 and 1988, Berlin, September 3, 1986; COMDOS-Arch-R, F. 9, op. 4, ae 670, pp. 108–119, here 112.

¹¹⁴ Lieutenant D. Stankow, Head of Department 8 of the First High Representative of the DS, information (short transcript) about the discussions with Comrade Wolfgang Mutz, Deputy Head of the AM Department at the Main Directorate for Reconnaissance of the MfS of the GDR, during his stay in Bulgaria from 16 to 19 September 1986 (Bulgarian), 22 November 1986; COMDOS-Arch-R, F. 9, op. 4, ae 670, pp. 121–128, here 123 f.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ See L. Nikolov, Department 8 of the First General Assembly, DS, information on working consultations with the German comrades from September 16 to 19, 1986, in Sofia and concrete agreements on individual joint AMs (Bulgarian), October 7, 1986; COMDOS-Arch-R, F. 9, op. 4, ae 670, pp. 103–107, here 104.

¹¹⁷ The manuscript was completed by the beginning of June 1986 at the latest. See letter from an East German doctor to Jakob Segal, June 2, 1986; BArch, NY 4516, prel. K. 12, AIDS+Nazi-Verbrechen, np

The study ("AIDS – Its Nature and Origin")¹¹⁸ had already been distributed during the summit of the Non-Aligned States in Harare in September 1986 as part of a brochure entitled "AIDS – USA-home made evil, NOT imported from AFRICA."¹¹⁹ A week before Mutz's meeting with the Bulgarians, a diplomat from the US Embassy in East Berlin had asked the Segals for a copy of their study.¹²⁰ This study and the Segals' further work on AIDS were discussed by the KGB and the HV A during their exchange with their Bulgarian colleagues as part of the OVO "Denver."

The Segals' manuscript advanced the KGB theory by providing even more detailed information about the virus's origin at Fort Detrick, its escape from the laboratory there, and its spread in the United States:

- The virus was created in 1977 at Fort Detrick by recombining parts of two other viruses (Visna and HTLV-1).
- The artificially created virus was then tested on prisoners near Fort Detrick, with the promise of early release.¹²¹
- Because of the long incubation period of the artificially produced virus, the pathogen was dismissed early on by those in charge at Fort Detrick as "insufficiently effective," and the test prisoners were therefore released as healthy after approximately 12 to 18 months.
- "Criminals who had engaged in homosexual practices during their long prison sentences apparently went to the nearest big city after their release," according to Segal's manuscript. "It

¹¹⁸ Segal, Prof. Dr. Jakob; Segal, Dr. Lilli; Dehmlow, Dr. Ronald: AIDS – Its Nature and Origin. OO, n.d., 52 pp. The authors thank Todd Leventhal of the US Department of State's Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications for providing a copy of the original study, which he received as deputy director of the Office to Counter Soviet Disinformation at the US Information Agency.

¹¹⁹ Segal, Prof. Dr. sc. Jakob; Segal, Dr. Lilli: AIDS: USA-home made evil, NOT imported from AFRICA, 2nd, revised edition. OO, n.d. However, the following information about the publication was provided: "published on the occasion of the VIII Non-Aligned Summit in Harare (Zimbabwe) in 1986."

¹²⁰ Information on activities of US agencies in connection with a scientific work on the origin of AIDS, n.d.; BStU, MfS, HA II, No. 22082, p. 36 f.

¹²¹ Segal; Segal; Dehmlow: AIDS – Its Nature and Origin (note 118), p. 12. See also Geißler: "Dear AIDS..." (note 7), p. 98.

It is therefore logical that after the end of the incubation period, i.e. around 1979, the first AIDS cases were registered exclusively among homosexual men in New York.¹²²

– AIDS subsequently spread throughout the world, starting from the homosexual scene in New York.¹²³

The manuscript and the Segals' subsequent publications contained numerous factual errors. For example, the genetic engineering required to artificially create a third virus from two viruses was incorrect.¹²⁴

Not yet invented in 1977. Furthermore, blood samples from 1959 existed that contained HIV antibodies, making it possible to detect HIV viruses more than 20 years before they were supposedly artificially produced.

Moreover, there were far fewer AIDS cases in the cities closer to Fort Detrick, Baltimore and Washington, D.C., than in New York. Furthermore, there was no evidence whatsoever for Segal's claims about Fort Detrick itself, for the existence of alleged test subjects, or for their releases from prison. Segal's thesis was, on the whole, unscientific. Its "complete chain of evidence" consisted of "possibilities," not "facts"; but "natural science demands verifiable facts."¹²⁵ This was explained at the time by the leading West German molecular geneticist, Professor Benno Müller-Hill. He had already explained to Segal in a private correspondence in December 1985: "There is hard evidence that the virus was transmitted from monkeys to humans in Africa in 1979 and from there made its way

[...] There is no evidence whatsoever to support the claim that AIDS is a product of DNA manipulation.¹²⁶

Furthermore, Segal's thesis exhibited many characteristics that are also found in conspiracy theories, such as logical and heuristic errors. First, it attributed extraordinary abilities to certain actors. In this case, the US government

¹²² Ibid., p. 13.

¹²³ Ibid., p. 14 f. See also Geißler: "Dear AIDS..." (note 7), p. 98.

¹²⁴ Das amerikanische Außenministerium behauptete in Antwort auf Segals These: »The HTLV-I and VISNA viruses were first cloned in 1983 and sequenced in 1983 and 1985, respectively, several years after Segal claims they were manipulated to create HIV-I.« US DOS: Soviet Influence Activities (Anm. 46), S. 36.

¹²⁵ Müller-Hill, Prof. B.: Possibilities are proven by facts. In: Kruse, Kuno (ed.): AIDS: Pathogens from the Gene Laboratory? Berlin [West] 1987, pp. 44–46, here 44.

¹²⁶ Letter from Müller-Hill to Prof. em. Dr. sc. Jakob Segal and Dr. agr. Lilli Segal, December 12, 1985; quoted from: Geißler: "Dear AIDS..." (note 7), p. 101.

would have had to develop and apply special knowledge and skills in the field of genetic engineering at an early stage, long before they became public knowledge.¹²⁷ Secondly, a large and growing number of people would have had to keep knowledge of the conspiracy secret.¹²⁸

– in this case, not only employees of the U.S. Department of Defense, but also the scientists at Fort Detrick and the prisoners used as test subjects. Last but not least, this group of people also included employees of the prison authorities who had approved the convicts' participation in the experiment and their early release, as well as the doctors treating them. The Segals went even further in this direction, considering all mass media in the United States and leading AIDS researchers as part of this conspiracy. ¹²⁹

In this context, the Segals highlighted the role of virologist Myron "Max" Essex of the Harvard School of Public Health and his hypothesis of a natural AIDS origin in Africa. He allegedly "launched" his hypothesis or "fairy tale" in the mass media at a time when fears about the development of biological weapons and AIDS had created a "tense situation" in public opinion in the USA.¹³⁰ The Segals concluded: "His fairy tale was an attempt to misinform the public, which was concerned about the spread of AIDS; the attempt succeeded."¹³¹ The Segals had discovered an error in Essex's statements. Although he and his co-researchers had only reported a close relationship between a retrovirus in

¹²⁷ Sunstein, Cass R.; Vermeule, Adrian: Conspiracy Theories. In: University of Chicago Law School Public Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series 199 (2008), S. 5. Verfügbar online: Social Science Research Network, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1084585.

¹²⁸ Shermer, Michael: Conspiracy Theory Detector. In: Scientific American, December 2010. Available online: <http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-conspiracy-theory-detector/?print=true>.

¹²⁹ The Segals wrote: "There was a danger of a massive public backlash if the production of biological weapons turned out to be the source of this catastrophe. To avoid 'panic,' the media, which had initially predicted five million patients to capitalize on the sensational value, soon reduced their estimates to a figure between two and three hundred thousand." Segal; Segal; Dehmlow: AIDS – Its Nature and Origin (note 118), p. 17.

¹³⁰ Ibid., p. 18.

¹³¹ Ibid., p. 20 f.

Vervet monkeys and HIV,¹³² Essex presented an "informal hypothesis" to the press that the AIDS virus had been transmitted from vervet monkeys to humans.¹³³ However, he withdrew his "informal" hypothesis within a year when further experiments showed that the viruses were not so closely related after all.

Although the Segals noted Essex's withdrawal,¹³⁴ they continued to cite the vervet monkey hypothesis in their work, equating it with the broader theory of the natural origin of HIV in Africa. The hypothesis was used by the Segals as the "Straw Man Argument"¹³⁵ as follows: If one believed in a natural origin of the AIDS pathogen in Africa, one had to believe in the (rejected) vervet monkey origin hypothesis, which the Segals and others had already proven false. If one did not accept this hypothesis, the only alternative was Segal's thesis of an artificial origin of the pathogen in Fort Detrick.

All further hypotheses and studies that pointed to a natural, African origin of HIV were either equated by the Segals with the vervet monkey theory or dismissed as inventions designed to mislead the public.¹³⁶ The circle of scientists who had participated in the conspiracy or were

¹³² Kanki, P. J.; Alroy, J.; Essex, M.: Isolation of T-lymphotropic retrovirus related to HTLV-III/LAV from wild-caught African green monkeys. In: *Science* 230 (1985), S. 951–954.

¹³³ Essex claims that he stated, as an "informal hypothesis," that HIV originated in non-hominoid primates in Africa. The press had "made too much of the word 'green.'" Telephone interview, Myron Essex with Douglas Selvage, December 20, 2013. Nevertheless, the press at the time quoted him directly on the potential origin of the AIDS virus in vervet monkeys. See, for example, Haney, Daniel Q., AP: Discovery of monkey AIDS virus may speed vaccine development, April 14, 1985; AP News Archive. Available online:

www.apnewsarchive.com/1985/Discovery-Of-Monkey-AIDS-Virus-May-Speed-Vaccine-Development/id-d7f5a8979677d791edb3b04db2395c77.

¹³⁴ Segal, Jakob; Segal, Lilli: AIDS – Nature and Origin. In: Kruse (ed.): *Pathogens from the Gene Laboratory?* (note 125), pp. 79–127, here 103.

¹³⁵ A "straw man argument" is a logical fallacy in which the opponent's original thesis in a debate is replaced by another. The substitute thesis, the "straw man," is then attacked and rejected in place of the original thesis. See Walton, Douglas: "The straw man fallacy." In: Bentham, Johan van et al. (ed.): *Logic and Argumentation*. Amsterdam 1996, pp. 115–128.

¹³⁶ Segal; Segal: *Nature and Origin* (note 134), pp. 103–106.

According to Segal's presentation, the idea that she had been misled became ever broader – and Segal's thesis thus became ever more unlikely.

Scientific work on the African origin of AIDS became a "progressive research program" in the sense of the philosopher and science theorist Imre Lakatos: The Africa thesis repeatedly explained new findings on the epidemiology of AIDS.¹³⁷ New findings on retroviruses among primates and humans in and outside of Africa substantiated it. Segal's thesis, on the other hand, became a "degenerative research program" in which its proponents defended the original thesis without being able to address new developments. This reveals a third, typical characteristic of conspiracy theories.¹³⁸

A fourth central characteristic of conspiracy theories was evident in the Segals' unwillingness to falsify their thesis.¹³⁹ For example, they did not respond to the criticism that the nearest major cities from Fort Detrick were not New York, but Washington or Baltimore, by admitting a problem with their thesis or by abandoning it. Rather, they made a small change in the text: the prisoner guinea pigs had simply gone to the nearby city of New York after their release.¹⁴⁰

They didn't explain why.

Despite these logical and factual errors, the Segals' manuscript fit well with the KGB's plans to ostensibly scientifically prove, or at least embellish, the Fort Detrick thesis and "work on a broad front against the USA as the source of origin."

¹⁴¹ Although the

Segals had Soviet citizenship and lived in East Berlin, they were often described in the Eastern and international press as

¹³⁷ Lakatos, Imre: Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes. In: Lakatos, Imre; Musgrave, Alan (Hg.): Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. Cambridge 1970, S. 91–196, hier 126.

¹³⁸ Clarke, Steven: Conspiracy Theories and Conspiracy Theorizing. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 32 (2002), S. 131–150, hier 136 f.

¹³⁹ Reinalter: The World Conspirators (note 16), p. 17.

¹⁴⁰ Segal; Segal: Nature and Origin (note 134), p. 94.

¹⁴¹ Ivanov stated this in a bilateral conversation with Colonel D. Stankov at a multilateral meeting of the disinformation departments of the "fraternal organizations" in Budapest in June 1986. See L. Nikolov: Information on the meeting with the Soviet friends during the international conference on AM in Hungary, May 11–17, 1986 (Bulgarian); COMDOS-Arch-R, F. 9 op. 4, ae 669, pp. 220–221.

"French scientists" because they had lived in France in the 1930s and during World War II. This was intended to make the AIDS disinformation spread by the East appear to be supported by "Western" scientists.¹⁴²

Even more important for the KGB's disinformation campaign, however, was the Segals' fight against the vervet monkey hypothesis.

The KGB and the Segals viewed the public announcement of the monkey variant as an attempt to expose the artificial HIV origin theory as unscientific and to limit the reputational damage the United States suffered as a result of the Fort Detrick theory.¹⁴³ An offensive against this theory and the African origin theory in general was intended to strengthen Soviet foreign propaganda and Soviet influence in Africa. A second article in *Literaturnaya Gazeta*

In May 1986, a report on the artificial origin of AIDS was published

Dispute during the international symposium "AIDS in Africa" in Brussels in December 1985. After some Western scientists, including Essex, had put forward the theory of origin in the vervet monkeys, a group of African researchers published a statement stating that none of the conference documents provided "specific evidence"

for an African origin of the virus. The question of the African origin of AIDS was removed from the agenda,

because "this version had a strong smack of racism."

¹⁴⁴

Some African governments even banned or canceled the participation of their scientists in the symposium. They feared negative effects on tourism if their country were associated with AIDS patients. And they rejected the theory of an African origin of AIDS as racist.¹⁴⁵ This reaction of many African

¹⁴² US DOS: Soviet Influence Activities (note 46), p. 35. See also "Did AIDS originate in the Pentagon's laboratories? Tribuna [Prague], October 15, 1986, pp. 14–15; quoted in: FBIS Daily Report, Eastern Europe, FBIS-EEU-86-207, October 27, 1986, p. D5.

¹⁴³ See L. Nikolov: Information on the meeting with Soviet friends during the international conference on AM in Hungary, 11–17 May 1986 (Bulgarian); COMDOS-Arch-R, F. 9 op. 4, ae 669, pp. 220–221.

¹⁴⁴ The article quoted VP Sergiev, head of the Main Directorate for Quarantinable Diseases of the Soviet Ministry of Health, at the Brussels meeting. SPID (note 86), p. 15. See also Norman, Colin: "Politics and Science Clash on African AIDS." In: Clarke, Loren K.; Potts, Malcolm (eds.): AIDS Reader, Vol. 1. Wellesley 1988, pp. 288–291.

¹⁴⁵ See, for example, Klingholz, Reiner: Deadly Puzzle at the Equator. In: Die Zeit, February 28, 1986, <http://www.zeit.de/1986/10/toedliches-puzzle-am-aequator>; Nel-

The influence of Russian countries gave the Soviet disinformation campaign new scope. The Segals' paper also took advantage of these new opportunities. It attempted to refute the thesis of Essex and other Western scientists by referring to various follow-up sessions of the Brussels conference and a subsequent conference on AIDS in Paris in June 1986, where it compiled relevant counterarguments.¹⁴⁶

4.1 Science between ideology and stubbornness: the Segals and Eastern secret services

The Segals and their research were at the center of the Eastern propaganda campaign on AIDS and the USA starting in 1986. Were the Segals working on behalf of the HV A or the KGB? Or were they trying to spread their theories independently, but were they used for their own purposes by East German and Soviet "Chekists" without their knowledge?

If one considers the question solely on the basis of the Segals' past, one could consider both possibilities to be correct.

As convinced communists, Soviet citizens, and fighters against fascism and Western "imperialism," they had no reservations about collaborating with Soviet agencies and the Stasi. During World War II, they received orders from Soviet government agencies as partisans in France. Because of their membership in the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) and their involvement in communist organizations, the Jewish Segals were forced from Germany to France after the Nazis seized power in 1933.

son, Harry: African Nations Shun AIDS Research Reports. LA Times v. 1.12.1985, http://articles.latimes.com/1985-12-01/opinion/op-5439_1_aids-research; Kochleff, Paul: AIDS in Burundi and South Africa: A Day-to-Day Experience. In: Denis, Phillippe; Becker, Charles (Hg.): The HIV/AIDS Epidemic in Sub-Saharan Africa in a Historical Perspective, Online Edition, S. 143–154, hier 146, <http://rds.refer.sn/IMG/pdf/14KOCHELEFF.pdf>; Africans resent blame for AIDS, St. Petersburg [Florida] Times v. 6.12.1987, S. 1D; Fortin, Alfred J.: The Politics of AIDS in Kenya. In: Clarke; Potts (Hg.): AIDS Reader (Anm. 144), S. 292–304, here 292–298.

¹⁴⁶ The Segals' paper included a nine-page addendum with quotes from posters presented at the international AIDS conference in Paris in June 1986 and from the Brussels conference. See Segal; Segal; Dehmlow: AIDS – Its Nature and Origin (note 118), p. 18 and bibliography.

fled. In 1940, when Jakob Segal received his doctorate in biology from the Sorbonne, both Segals took Soviet citizenship. (Jakob Segal's family originally came from Lithuania.) Nevertheless, they remained in France, where they fought in the resistance against Nazi rule. In 1944, Lilli Segal was deported to Auschwitz, but survived thanks to a successful escape during a labor assignment. In 1953, they emigrated from France to East Berlin on orders from Moscow. Jakob Segal, who was appointed professor at Humboldt University, founded the Institute for General Biology there in 1953.¹⁴⁷ After their move, Captain Heinz Kairies from Department 2 of Department VI of the Stasi, which was responsible for the security and operational processing of nuclear research facilities in the GDR, contacted them.¹⁴⁸ Based on the meeting, at which Segal passed on information about Western and East German scientists in nuclear research, Kairies's superior demanded: "Prepare S.[egal] as a GI. Further strengthen contact. give orders."¹⁴⁹ Both Segal¹⁵⁰ and his wife Lilli¹⁵¹ were then considered by Kairies as contact persons (KP) in the sense of »trustworthy citizens« of the GDR »who are approached to solve specific tasks«.¹⁵² According to Kairies, both Jakob and Lilli Segal offered to collect secret information for him.¹⁵³ On November 5, 1955, Kairies received an order from the »Comrade Advisor« not to

¹⁴⁷ Voigt, Annette: Jakob Segal. In: Federal Foundation for the Reappraisal of the SED Dictatorship: Biographical Databases, Who Was Who in the GDR? <http://bundesstiftung-aufarbeitung.de/wer-war-wer-in-der-ddr-%2363%3B-1424.html?ID=3253>; Höxtermann, Ekkehard: Segal, Jakob. In: Neue Deutsche Biographie 24 (2010), pp. 159–160; available online: <http://www.deutsche-biographie.de/pnd126674272.html>. On the order for her relocation to the GDR, see Segal, Lilli: From Contradiction to Resistance. Memories of a Daughter from a Good Family. Berlin 1986, p. 252.

¹⁴⁸ Kairies wrote of an earlier meeting with Segal "a quarter of a year ago." See Captain Kairies, Dept. VI, Report, March 10, 1955; BStU, MfS, AIM 1459/62, pp. 15–18, here 15. Regarding Section VI/2, see Wiedmann, Roland: The Service Units of the MfS 1950–1989: An Organizational Overview. Berlin 2012, p. 50.

¹⁴⁹ See handwritten note on Kairies' report (note 148).

¹⁵⁰ Kairies, Report, 16 August 1955 (note 148), pp. 34 ff., here 35.

¹⁵¹ Kairies, Report, 4.11.1955 (note 148), pp. 39–42, here 39.

¹⁵² Directive 1/58, 1 October 1958, p. 205.

¹⁵³ See Kairies, report, March 10, 1955, p. 18; Captain Kairies, Dept. VI/2: Report on the meeting with Prof. Segal and his wife, June 22, 1955; BStU, MfS, AIM 1459/62, p. 30–32, here 31.

to hold further meetings with Jakob Segal because the KGB was working with him.¹⁵⁴

This note is, to date, the only evidence in the BStU archives of a KGB connection to Segal. Despite the Soviet advisor's instructions, Kairies met again with "KP Prof. Segal" on November 21, 1955.¹⁵⁵ The next verifiable meeting was not until May 22, 1957.¹⁵⁶ After further meetings in 1958 and 1959,¹⁵⁷ Segal was finally registered in December 1959 by an officer named Jahn of Section 4 of Department VI, which was responsible for research and development facilities, as secret informant "Hae[c]kel" (Reg. No. 15405/60).¹⁵⁸

This demonstrates a general willingness of the Segals to secretly

Collaboration with the MfS and KGB. ¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁴ Kairies, memo, November 5, 1955; BStU, MfS, AIM 1459/62, p. 43.

¹⁵⁵ Kairies, Dept. VI/2, meeting report, November 23, 1955; ibid., pp. 44 ff.

¹⁵⁶ Major Kairies, Dept. VI/2, memo, May 25, 1957; ibid., p. 46.

¹⁵⁷ Only two are verifiable. See [illegible], Lieutenant Colonel, Dept. VI/2, report, July 9, 1958; ibid., pp. 49–53, and Major Kairies, Working Group for Guidance and Control, report, October 16, 1959; ibid., pp. 54.

¹⁵⁸ IM-Vorg. "Haekel" [sic!], Reg. No. 15405/60; BStU, AR 2, F22; IM-File "Haek-kel"; BStU, MfS, AIM 1459/62. For Section VI/4, see Wiedmann: Die Diensteinheiten des MfS (note 148), p. 50.

¹⁵⁹ At a meeting with Kairies on March 10, 1955, Segal spoke of his previous work for "the Enlightenment" until 1945 in France and offered to establish contact between the MfS (Kairies: "us") and scientists who had possessed plans for a nuclear reactor. At the same meeting, he also suggested that the MfS (Kairies: "we") "stage a car accident" in order to "eliminate" a scientist with alleged Nazi connections. Captain Kairies, Dept. VI: Report concerning discussion with Prof. Dr. Segal, March 10, 1955; BStU, MfS, AIM 1459/62, pp. 15–18, here 15 f. At a second meeting, Segal recounted "that he had told his wife about his connection to us, and she would also attach great importance to speaking with us." Segal attested to her

Worth as a source: "His wife often visits the wives of other scientists and is now serving as an interpreter at the International Trade Union Congress." Kairies, report on the discussion with Professor Segal on March 16, 1955; ibid., pp. 19 f., here 20. At a meeting with Kairies on June 22, 1955, Jakob Segal denounced scientists who had expressed negative views on Walter Ulbricht's speech at the last Central Committee meeting. Lilli Segal, who would be travelling to a women's congress in Lausanne in July 1955, had asked that "if we [i.e. the MfS] have something to do in Switzerland, this task be given to her to complete." If the MfS wanted, she would also use her future position as head of the State Library to carry out "valuable investigations" for the MfS (Kairies: "us") in the "patent system in

On the other hand, they displayed a certain stubbornness toward the SED and the MfS. As Soviet citizens and former resistance fighters, they allowed themselves to criticize the SED and its policies.¹⁶⁰ In 1962, the MfS even completely severed its contact with Jakob Segal because of his stubbornness. Contrary to the instructions of his commanding officer, Segal had not left his position at Humboldt University in favor of the German Academy of Sciences. Because his information was only of a "general nature," further cooperation, according to his commanding officer, was "pointless." The MfS archived the materials on GI "Haeckel" in the same year.¹⁶¹ In 1967, the "Reconnaissance Administration" of the GDR Ministry of National Defense—the military intelligence service—determined that the Segals "did not cooperate with any other agency, including Soviet intelligence."¹⁶² There is no evidence in the MfS files or index cards of any further registration of Jakob or Lilli Segal as contact persons or unofficial employees of the MfS until the mid-1980s.

Jakob Segal displayed the same mixture of ideological loyalty and stubbornness in his scientific work. For example, in the 1950s, he was one of the strongest advocates of the Stalinist line in biology in the GDR, which was shaped by Trofim Lysenko's dogma that hereditary characteristics of cultivated plants are determined by the environment and not by

Genes are determined. Lysenkoism violated all the fundamentals of genetics even in the Stalin era and was controversial in the GDR, where genetics was still tolerated and taught despite the official political line.¹⁶³ Segal was excommunicated in 1958 by the SED party organ "Neues Deutschland" for his text "The Dialectical Method in Biology."

praised because, among other things, he made a "contribution to our ideological struggle" by »engaging in the false theory of 'science as

West Berlin and West Germany." See Kairies, Report, June 22, 1955; ibid., pp. 30–32, here 30 f.

¹⁶⁰ See, for example, the characterization by Jakob Segal, former director of the Institute of General Biology at the Humboldt University of Berlin, March 18, 1983; BStU, MfS, HA VII/1, ZMA No. 935, pp. 56–66, here 60.

¹⁶¹ Jahn, Dept. VI/4, Resolution, January 13, 1962; BStU, MfS, AIM 1459/62, pp. 71 ff., here 72.

¹⁶² Captain Wilke, Sub-Department 12/1, Ministry of National Defense of the GDR, file note, February 24, 1961; BStU, MfS, AVA 5276/75, pp. 167–169, here 168.

¹⁶³ Hagemann, Rudolf: How did East German genetics avoid Lysenkoism? In: Trends in Genetics 18 (2002) 6, pp. 320–324, here 321; Dept. XX/3, BV Berlin: Report: Prof. Segal, March 17, 1987; BStU, MfS, HA XX, No. 7101, pp. 306–307, here 306.

itself'.¹⁶⁴ Professor Hans-Alfred Rosenthal, Director of the Institute of Virology at the Charité Hospital in East Berlin, later claimed that Segal continued to support Lysenko's ideas – including the non-existence of genes – even after Lysenko himself had abandoned them.¹⁶⁵ A natural science that was not subordinate to ideology or did not serve it seemed inconceivable to Segal.

He evidently enjoyed advancing self-made scientific hypotheses against established science, despite all evidence and all previous research. After abandoning Lysenkoism, for example, he developed his own "fold-and-drum model" of molecular protein structure, which he contrasted with the generally accepted helix model.¹⁶⁶ When journalist Monika Maron pointed out the opinions of other scientists on his theory in an interview, he replied:

"You know, you have to have a certain amount of arrogance and say to yourself: First, I'm right. Second, I have seven Nobel laureates against me, but I'm still right. Third, the others are wrong. It may take two hundred years before they understand that, but I'm right."¹⁶⁷

For some East German scientists, Segal was considered a "lateral thinker"¹⁶⁸, for others simply an annoyance. Rosenthal explained in a private conversation in 1987: "Prof. Segal suffers from the obsessive idea of always having to represent an opinion different from the current doctrine. [He] proclaims his theories as absolute truths, even when their untenability has long been proven."¹⁶⁹ Thus, in 1987, Rosenthal explained the Segals' insistence on the Fort-Detrick theory of AIDS origin against all scientific evidence and against the conviction of not only others

¹⁶⁴ Vogel, H.; Oberländer, KH: The Dialectical Method in Biology. On an interesting work by Prof. Segal. Neues Deutschland (ND), December 20, 1958, p. 9.

¹⁶⁵ Dept. XX/3, BV Berlin: Report: Prof. Segal, March 17, 1987; BStU, MfS, HA XX, No. 7101, pp. 306 ff., here 306.

¹⁶⁶ Löther, Rolf: Memories of my scientific career. In: Jahn, Ilse; Wessel, Andreas (eds.): For a Philosophy of Biology. Munich 2010, pp. 81–96, here 86.

¹⁶⁷ Maron, Monika: A Scientist. Encounter with Professor Jacob Segal. In: Wochenpost, November 8, 1974, pp. 16–17; quoted in: Geißler: "Dear AIDS..." (note 7), p. 107.

¹⁶⁸ Löther: Memories (note 166), p. 86.

¹⁶⁹ Dept. XX/3, BV Berlin: Report: Prof. Segal, March 17, 1987; BStU, MfS, HA XX, No. 7101, pp. 306 ff., here 306.

Scientists in the West, but also his colleagues in the GDR and the Soviet Union.

Based on his previous research and activities, it seems quite possible that Jakob Segal independently arrived at his theory of the origin of HIV and, together with his wife, advocated it as a lone fighter in the fight against American "imperialism."

In any case, he was a devout believer in his own thesis, to which he remained faithful, even after the collapse of communism and until his death in 1995.

However, based on their biographies, it cannot be ruled out that the Segals developed and disseminated their thesis in collaboration with or on behalf of the KGB or the Stasi.

Former HV A officers Günter Bohnsack and Herbert Brehmer claimed in 1992 that Main Administration A was behind it. The apparatus itself had formulated the thesis, which was only later taken up and published by Jakob Segal.¹⁷⁰

Based on his correspondence with the journalist Klaus Behling (who, incidentally, cited Bohnsack as a source for the KGB's AIDS disinformation in his book),¹⁷¹ historian Thomas Boghardt described in somewhat more detail that HV A/X had probably supplied Segal with the relevant materials. This was intended to lead him to the – from the perspective of HV A/X –

come to the "correct conclusion" that the AIDS pathogen had been artificially produced in Fort DeTrick.¹⁷² According to Boghardt's account, Segal was a "dupe" manipulated and controlled by the HV A.¹⁷³

4.2 Research in coordination with Central Committee Secretary Axen, 1985 to 1986

Contrary to the claims of Bohnsack, Brehmer, and Boghardt, no evidence has yet been found in the archives of the BStU¹⁷⁴ or in the archives of the Bulgarian secret police or intelligence service that the HV A or the MfS instructed or influenced Jakob Segal to begin his research on AIDS. According to current records, he began research on AIDS in the summer of 1985.

¹⁷⁰ Bohnsack; Brehmer: Mission to Mislead (note 3), p. 219 f.

¹⁷¹ Behling: Scouts (retired) (note 43), p. 253.

¹⁷² Boghardt: Operation INFEKTION (note 6), p. 9 and fn. 51.

¹⁷³ Ibid., p. 12.

¹⁷⁴ Geißler: AIDS conspiracy (note 20).

He began his research independently and in consultation with the Central Committee Secretary for International Relations, Hermann Axen. The first reference to HV A contacting Segal in the BStU archives dates from July 1986, when the German version of his study, which was used for the brochure in Harare, was already partially completed.

It would not be unusual if Jakob Segal had come to his AIDS research independently, and not just because of his biography. At the time he began his research, there were several personalities in the GDR and the West who, without demonstrable influence from the Stasi or the KGB, spoke or wrote about the artificial production of the AIDS virus through genetic engineering or about a conspiracy by the US government to produce or spread it.¹⁷⁵ To name just a few examples: As mentioned above, homosexual activists in the US had already written in 1983 about an alleged secret role of the US government in connection with the AIDS epidemic.¹⁷⁶ Erika Hickel, the "chief genetic engineering critic" of the Green Party, spoke before the Bundestag in January 1985 about the artificial production of the AIDS virus.¹⁷⁷ An IMS named "Albert Heim" also advocated the theory of artificial production of the virus in Fort Detrick to the Stasi as early as September 1985.¹⁷⁸ Another East German scientist, the biochemist Samuel Mitja Rapoport, wanted to publish an article about the alleged origin of HIV in Fort Detrick in the GDR press in November 1985.¹⁷⁹

According to current knowledge, Segal began his AIDS research in the summer of 1985.¹⁸⁰ Already in early October 1985 – i.e., before Zapevalov's article – he wrote privately about "suspicions [...] that AIDS originated in the US research center for biological warfare, Fort Detrick, through genetic manipulation." He also noted that broadcasts and articles about the vervet monkey hypothesis

¹⁷⁵ Geißler: "Dear AIDS..." (note 7), p. 96 f.

¹⁷⁶ Siehe z. B. Shively: Speaking Out (Anm. 73), S. 5.

¹⁷⁷ Geißler: "Dear AIDS..." (note 7), p. 96 including fn. 42.

¹⁷⁸ HA XVIII/5, MfS: Information: Thesis on AIDS, November 19, 1985; BStU, MfS, HA XVIII, No. 19131, pp. 6–9.

¹⁷⁹ Geißler: "Dear AIDS..." (note 7), p. 97.

¹⁸⁰ This is what Segal claimed privately to an East German scientist.

See letter from Jakob Segal to an East German geneticist, July 16, 1987; BArch, NY 4516, prel. K. 12, AIDS+Nazi Crimes, np

Their task was to "mislead the public." ¹⁸¹ Nevertheless, his research was influenced by the articles in "Patriot" and "Literaturnaya Gazeta," as he privately admitted, and therefore at least indirectly by the KGB.

His arguments incorporated many points from the two articles—most importantly, the precise location of the alleged artificial origin of the HIV virus at Fort Detrick; an additional KGB invention that went beyond the current conspiracy theories in the US and Europe.¹⁸² Because of his previous connection, direct KGB influence on Segal's research cannot be ruled out, but there is no evidence of such influence to date.¹⁸³

Segal's first report on the origins of AIDS was already completed in December 1985.¹⁸⁴ It was presumably a "literature study" on AIDS, which he wrote jointly with his wife. Department 7 of HA VII of the Stasi received a copy by chance—that is, without any request—from its IM candidate, "Nils," in January 1986.¹⁸⁵ This is the earliest verifiable date at which the Stasi became aware of Segal's research.¹⁸⁶ The "literature study" already included the points listed above, which also became part of the later scientific study and the brochure for Harare.¹⁸⁷

The MfS was able to learn a lot about Segal's research from "Nils", as he was the graduate chemist Ronald Dehmlow,

¹⁸¹ Letter from Jakob Segal to a "comrade," SED-KL, German Television, Berlin, October 3, 1985; BArch, NY 4516, prel. K. 12, AIDS+Nazi Crimes, np

¹⁸² Letter from Jakob Segal to Benno Müller-Hill, December 2, 1985; quoted in: Geißler: "Dear AIDS..." (note 7), p. 114; Geißler; Sprinkle: Disinformation squared (note 9), p. 31.

¹⁸³ Geißler; Sprinkle: Disinformation squared (note 9), p. 2.

¹⁸⁴ Jakob Segal: 1. Memorandum on AIDS for the Axen Department, Central Committee of the SED, 27.8.1986; BArch, DY 30/26444, np At the end of August 1986, he wrote to Axen that he had already prepared his first report on the origin of AIDS 9 months earlier – that is, at the end of December 1985.

¹⁸⁵ HA VII/7 of the MfS received the following "interim report" on the Segals' research on AIDS on January 21, 1986: "On the Origin of AIDS," a literature study by Dr. Lilli Segal and Prof. Dr. Jakob Segal, undated; BStU, MfS, AIM 4835/88, Vol. 1, pp. 35–47. The "literature study" was submitted by IM candidate "Nils" to HA VII/7 on January 21, 1986. See Lt. Theisinger, HA VII/7: Report on a Further Contact Discussion with IM Candidate "Nils," January 22, 1986; ibid., pp. 24–5, here 24.

¹⁸⁶ See Geißler; Sprinkle: Disinformation squared (note 9), p. 45.

¹⁸⁷ Segal; Segal; Dehmlow: AIDS – Its Nature and Origin (Anm. 118), passim.

the aforementioned co-author of Segal's thesis. Dehmlow had known Jakob Segal since 1978. As a student at Humboldt University, he began researching ultraviolet irradiation (UVB) and oxygen therapy (HOT) with Segal.¹⁸⁸ He continued this joint research, now also on AIDS, at the People's Police Hospital (KHdVP) in Berlin. Dehmlow had been known to the Stasi for some time. During his studies, from 1975 to February 1984, he was registered by HV A/XI/6 as IM "Niels".¹⁸⁹ Shortly after his appointment to the KHdVP, he was contacted by the staff of HA VII/7190 and from December 1984 as IM candidate "Nils" (now without the "e")¹⁹¹ and from June 1986 as IMS "Nils" (Reg. No. XV 2987/86).¹⁹² Although the officers of HA VII/7 "Nils" were primarily responsible for securing their area of responsibility – i.e. the

¹⁸⁸ Geißler; Sprinkle: Disinformation squared (note 9), p. 34.

¹⁸⁹ From 1975 to February 1984, Dehmlow was known as IM »Niels« (Reg. No. XV 1788/75) by Kurt Zeichner (from 1987 under the working name »Kurt Reiss« Second working name "Kurt Bender") of HV A/XI/6. Regarding Dehmlow and "Niels," see BStU, AR 2, MfS, RoHo, F16 and F22, Reg. No. XV 1788/75. The later registration of Dehmlow by HA VII/7 was noted on F16 in RoHo. Apparently, the IM file "Niels" was archived due to the IM's de-conspiracy. See Oltn. Theisinger, HA VII/7: Meeting Report: IMS "Nils," August 27, 1987; BStU, MfS, AIM 4835/88, Vol. I, pp. 307 f., here 308. Regarding Kurt Zeichner/Kurt Reiss, see: Reiss, Kurt; Cadre Index Card (KKK); BStU, AR 2, HA KuSch/AKG-KA HM; and the following cards in: BStU, AR 2, RoHo, F16: Zeichner, Kurt, Staff Card (MA); Reiss, Kurt, MA Card; Zeichner, Kurt, Reg. No. XV 1093/62; Bender, Kurt, Reg. No. XV 1093/62. Dehmlow denies ever having worked as an IM for the MfS. Interview with Dehmlow by Selvage, October 31, 2013.

¹⁹⁰ Dehmlow was only contacted by the staff of HA VII/7 in 1984 regarding a matter he had raised. Because Dehmlow claimed to have worked for three years during his registration as IM "Niels" of HV A/XI/6 under the guise of a civilian employee of the NVA, Zeichner allegedly promised that these three years would be counted as his service time in Dehmlow's new job at the government hospital. Because these three years were not counted by the KHdVP, Dehmlow contacted Reiss. HA VII/7, which was responsible for the KHdVP, therefore contacted Dehmlow in October 1984. See Nagel, HA VII/7: Handwritten notes from the contact conversation.

with Gen. Dr. Dehmlow, October 26, 1984; BStU, MfS, AIM 4835/88, Vol. I, p. 3 f.

¹⁹¹ Major Nagel, HA VII/7: Memorandum of contact with IM candidate "Niels," December 21, 1984; BStU, MfS, AIM 4835/88, Vol. I, pp. 5 ff. The "e" was omitted in the next meeting memo. See Nagel, HA VII/7: Meeting memo, January 31, 1985; ibid., pp. 12.

¹⁹² Theisinger, HA VII/7: Resolution: Dearchiving due to handover, 21.4.1988; BStU, MfS, AIM 4835/88, Vol. 2, p. 74 f.

government hospital—to spy on his colleagues,¹⁹³ they repeatedly received reports and documents from Dehmlow about the Segals' AIDS research, even though they had absolutely no interest in it.¹⁹⁴ As he himself recalls, Dehmlow met with Jakob Segal every one to two weeks to discuss the Segals' research on AIDS. Because of these regular conversations and his translation assistance for the English version of the study, Jakob Segal would have named him as a co-author of the study.¹⁹⁵

The purpose of Segal's AIDS research was not purely scientific from the outset. As mentioned above, Jakob Segal did not believe in a natural science detached from communist ideology. In a conversation with Dehmlow and his superior, the Medical Director of the KHdVP, Reinhard Uhlig, in June 1986, he admitted that his research was also intended to serve "propaganda purposes." Such a use was in keeping with his then-current contact with Axen, who was responsible for foreign propaganda. Segal agreed with Uhlig that Dehmlow's name should not be mentioned in such propaganda cases.¹⁹⁶ In the version of his study that appeared in the Harare brochure, Segal adhered to the agreement. The only change to the text was the deletion of Dehmlow's name; all that remained of him was a telltale comma after the names of the two Segals.¹⁹⁷

¹⁹³ For the focus of "IMS," see Müller-Enbergs, Helmut: Unofficial Employee for the Political-Operational Penetration and Securing of the Area of Responsibility (IMS). In: Engelmann et al. (ed.): MfS Lexicon (note 27), p. 174. At a meeting in August 1987, Theisinger instructed "Nils" that his "priority" should be "counter-intelligence work." Olt. Theisinger, HA VII/7: Meeting Report: IMS "Nils," August 27, 1987; BStU, MfS, AIM 4835/88, Vol. I, pp. 307 f., here 308.

¹⁹⁴ Theisinger wrote in a report about a meeting with »Nils« in September 1986: »During the meeting, the IMS was clearly informed that not all scientific problems which it brings to our attention are of operational interest.« Ltn. Theisinger, HA VII/7: Meeting report, IMS »Niels«, 10.9.1986; BStU, MfS, AIM 4835/88, Vol. I, pp. 132 f., here 133.

¹⁹⁵ Interview Selvage mit Dehmlow, 31.10.2013.

¹⁹⁶ Segal and Uhlig further agreed that Dehmlow's name and place of work (KHdVP) would only be mentioned in joint scientific publications in the GDR. In scientific publications abroad, he could be named, but not his place of work (KHdVP). Nagel, HA VII/7: Report on a brief meeting with IMS "Nils," June 5, 1986; BStU, MfS, AIM 4835/88, Vol. I, pp. 72 f., here 73.

¹⁹⁷ Segal; Segal: AIDS – Its Nature and Origin, S. 1. In: Segal; Segal: AIDS: USA-home made evil (Anm. 119).

As early as the spring of 1986, Segal began disseminating his research findings internationally for propaganda purposes. On March 12, 1986, for example, he sent his results to a Japanese professor in Hiroshima with the following recommendation:

»We hope that you will be able to publish this material in Japan, either complete – that would be the best because only the whole lot of arguments form a sound evidence – or in the form of materials for public lectures, for small articles in the press and so on. The people of Japan is [sic, are] certainly interested to know the origin of this new plague, whose casualties soon will depass [sic, surpass] those of Hiroshima with the promise of a death even more dreadful than that by radiation.«¹⁹⁸

On the same day, he sent a German version to Prof. Volkmar Sigusch, director of the Institute for Sex Research at Goethe University in Frankfurt. Segal had learned of Sigusch's plans to publish an anthology on the origins of AIDS.¹⁹⁹ Segal wrote of the manuscript:

"There is currently a tendency to downplay the dangers of biological warfare compared to the threat of nuclear weapons. Knowledge of the true origin of AIDS could help make the population more alert to this by no means less of a danger."²⁰⁰

On June 17, 1986, Jakob Segal tried to explain his thesis to a scientist in Cameroon with the help of a mutual friend:

"[...] You have probably already learned from [our mutual friend] that I and my colleagues have conducted a study on the origin of AIDS, which clearly shows that AIDS originated in the United States and that an African origin of this epidemic is completely ruled out. I assume that medical professionals and journalists in your country would be interested in these findings. I therefore ask you to forward the enclosed material to anyone who might be interested. [...]

In case biologists or physicians are interested in our work, please inform them that a new edition of the work is in preparation.

¹⁹⁸ Letter from Jakob Segal to a Japanese professor, March 12, 1986; BArch, NY 4516, prel. K. 12, Japan, np

¹⁹⁹ Geißler; Sprinkle: Disinformation squared (note 9), p. 19.

²⁰⁰ Letter from Jakob Segal to a West German scientist, March 12, 1986; BArch, NY 4516, prel. K. 13, np

It will cover the specialist literature up to April 1986 and include a complete bibliography.²⁰¹

His correspondence suggests that Segal was equally interested in publishing his study in various languages as a brochure or excerpts in newspapers—i.e., for propaganda purposes—and in academic journals. This means that even before the Non-Aligned Summit in Harare, he was a knowing disseminator of the Fort Detrick thesis, in coordination with Axen in the Central Committee of the SED and indirectly on behalf of the Central Committee of the CPSU, which set the line of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact in foreign propaganda, including on the question of the origins of AIDS. Despite its use for propaganda purposes, Segal viewed his own thesis not as disinformation, but as an inconvenient truth that confirmed his own enemy image of US "imperialism."

4.3 The Segals, the HV A and the Non-Aligned Summit in Harare, September 1986

While Segal, according to current knowledge, began his AIDS research independently of the Stasi, the High Command of the Allied Forces (HVA) contacted him before the Non-Aligned Summit in Harare. According to a report by Dehmlow and the comments of his commanding officer, the High Command of the Allied Forces (HVA) was interested in his research and offered him advice. It is reasonable to conclude that Segal was aware of the Stasi's use of his study for propaganda purposes before and during the summit.

On July 31, 1986, Dehmlow, as IMS "Nils," urgently reported to his commanding officer, Lt. Axel Theisinger, that Segal had "deconspired" to him. In a discussion with Dehmlow about his AIDS research, he had stated that "the comrades in security had advised him to do so." Until then, Segal had always referred to the "Party" as his client. Theisinger continued: "The IMS [i.e., Dehmlow] recognized [...] that the professor might have been in contact with the 'friends' [i.e.,

²⁰¹ Letter from Jakob Segal to a Cameroonian scientist in Yaounde, June 17, 1986; BArch, NY 4516, prel. K. 12, folder: France, Belgium, Holland, Spain, Portugal, Italy, np

[the KGB] or the MfS." 202 Theisinger, for his part, knew exactly for whom Segal was conducting his research at this time. He noted that Segal "had been positively registered for the HV A and was conducting AIDS research on behalf of the Central Committee of the SED, Comrade Axen, and the HV A and was undertaking trips in this context to the NSW. The service unit that had positively registered Segal was, however, the only one."

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not the HV A/X, but Section 5 of Department XIII in the Science and Technology Sector of the HV A (HV A/SWT/XIII/5).204 The phrase "positively recorded" was used in the MfS to describe a person who worked for the MfS.205

For the HV A/X, Mutz informed his Bulgarian counterpart in September 1986 that the HV A/X was collaborating "with the operational department on the problem [AIDS]" in the creation of disinformation.206 For espionage activities in the area of AIDS and biotechnology or genetic engineering, the responsible "operational department" was the department HV A/SWT/XIII/5 under the leadership of Lutz Thielemann.207 He was the superior of

²⁰² Theisinger, HA VII/7: Personal information about Prof. Dr. Segal, Jakob, recorded in HV A/SWT/13, Gen. Tiedemann [real name Thielemann], July 31, 1986; BStU, MfS, AIM 4835/88, Vol. I, pp. 113 ff., here 114.

²⁰³ Ibid., p. 113.

²⁰⁴ Theisinger, Information, 31.7.1986, Bl. 113.

²⁰⁵ See, for example, the memo from HA I/Dept. MfNV, Ref. Special Administrations, to the BV Dresden, Dept. Cadres and Training, November 21, 1968; BStU, MfS, KS 21175/90, p. 160; Ofw. Förster, Dept. III/2, memo, February 2, 1976; BStU, MfS, AP 14313/76, p. 37 f.; the memo from Lieutenant Colonel Berndt, Deputy Head of HV A/II/4, to Gen. Palme, Dept. III of the MfS, February 9, 1976; BStU, MfS, AP 14313/76, p. 39 f.; Förster, Dept. III of the MfS, order for archiving, September 3, 1976. BStU, MfS, AP 14313/76, p. 144.

²⁰⁶ Lieutenant D. Stankow, Head of Department 8 of the First Higher Regional Court of the DS, information (short transcript) about the discussions with Comrade Wolfgang Mutz, Deputy Head of the AM Department at the Main Directorate for Reconnaissance of the MfS of the GDR during his stay in Bulgaria from 16 to 19 September 1986 (Bulgarian), 22 November 1986; COMDOS-Arch-R, F. 9, op. 4, ae 670, pp. 121–128, here 123 f.

²⁰⁷ The most successful IMs of the HV A in the areas of Western AIDS research and genetic engineering were not, however, from the HV A/SWT/XIII/5, but led by Department XV of the Berlin Federal Office for Security. Its quantitatively most productive informant with information on West German AIDS research was IM "Katharina." "Katharina" provided at least 68 pieces of information on AIDS research and genetic engineering to the MfS between 1985 and 1989.

(Search query: "QUA.RGNR=XV/349/85" results in 68 pieces of information in SIRA-TDB 11.

See BStU, MfS, HV A/MD/2, SIRA-TDB 11.) The IM »Harry« (XV/2329/74), a

Lieutenant Colonel Dieter van de Sand, for whom Jakob Segal was registered. Lilli Segal was also registered by HV A/SWT/XIII/5.²⁰⁸ The "security" advice to Jakob Segal will have been sent via the registering unit, HV A/SWT/XIII/5.

After the Stasi had contacted Jakob Segal, he and his wife Lilli served as multipliers for the Fort-Detrick thesis of the KGB and the HV A at the time of the summit in Harare. Before and during the meeting, a mimeographed brochure containing the aforementioned English version of their study, "AIDS – Its Nature and Origin," was distributed.

distributed. The brochure, which listed the Segals as authors, was titled "AIDS: USA-home made evil, NOT Imported from AFRICA." The brochure

An employee of Schering AG in West Berlin, he was arguably the most successful informant in the field of western, or rather West German, genetic and biotechnology. Between 1975 and 1989, he verifiably provided 729 pieces of information to the HV A on these and other topics—primarily internal, confidential documents of Schering AG. (The search query "QUE.RGNR=/*2329/74"" results in a total of 426 pieces of information in SIRA-TDB 11 and 303 pieces of information in SIRA-TDB 12. See BStU, MfS, SIRA-TDB 11 and SIRA-TDB 12. For "Harry," see also Reg. No. XV/ 2329/74; BStU, MfS, RoHo F16.) Much of "Harry's" information was forwarded by the HV A to the KGB.

²⁰⁸ On October 23, 1986, Colonel Oldenburg of the HV A/IX/C provided information about the American diplomats' visit to the Segals to HA II/3, which was responsible for defense. In it, the Segals were described as "a married couple of scientists registered for DE HV A/SWT/XIII." See note from Colonel Oldenburg, Deputy Head, HV A/IX/C, to OSL Häseler, HA II/3, October 23, 1986, with attachment, Information on activities of the US agency in connection with a scientific work on the origins of AIDS, n.d.; BStU, MfS, HA II, No. 22082, pp. 50–52, here 51. Jakob Segal's registration was stated even more specifically in a report from Department XX/3 of the Berlin BV of the MfS dated March 25, 1987: "HV A XIII/5/183." See Dept.

XX/3, BV Berlin, Information on Prof. Segal's activities regarding the dissemination of his views on the origin of the AIDS virus (LAV), March 18, 1987; BStU, MfS, HA XX, Vol. 7101, p. 304 f. Van de Sand's employee number in HV A was 183. See van de Sand, Dieter, MA card; BStU, AR 2, RoHo F16. Van de Sand was also registered under his birth name, Dieter Bahr, as IM "Behrend" (XV 6331/81) by HV A/XIII/5 from 1981 to 1985 (from 1983 as HIM) and received a false ID from the MfS under the alias "Dieter Behrend." BStU, AR 2, RoHo F 16 for Bahr, Dieter, Reg. No. XV

6331/81 and for Behrend, Dieter, Reg. No. XV 1093/62; BStU, AR 2, RoHo F16; for van de Sand, Dieter, KKK; BStU, AR 2, HA KuSch/AKG-KA HM.

also contained an introduction by an anonymous author, 209 who summarized their arguments in a somewhat more propagandistic way. The Harare Sunday Mail published an article on Segal's thesis on its front page. It quoted from the introduction but cited the Segals ("French scientists") as the source. The vervet monkey hypothesis was a "huge and racist deception operation" by the USA and represented an attempt to "sweep the white man's latest filth out the door." 210 In addition, a review appeared.

on the brochure in the Zimbabwean journal "Social Change and Development," which was further disseminated after the summit, mainly in the African media, and served as an additional channel for popularizing the Fort Detrick thesis.211 In Germany, the "Evangelical Press Service" (epd) reprinted the review as "documentation" in its information service epd-Development Policy. The epd editorial team commented positively: "The French doctors Jakob and Lilli

Segal cites compelling reasons why the AIDS virus did not originate in Africa, but in US laboratories researching biological weapons.212 In the second edition of the mimeographed pamphlet "AIDS: USA-home made evil," an excerpt from the review in "Social Change and Development" was printed on the back cover, along with the magazine's address.213

The author of the introduction and the publisher of the brochure remain unknown to this day. In March 1987, Jakob Segal wrote to a Japanese professor about the mimeographed brochure: "African journalists had it [i.e., Segal's study] transformed into a brochure, werry [sic!] cor-

²⁰⁹ See the introduction, "AIDS in Africa," np In: Segal; Segal: AIDS: USA-home made evil (note 119). In the introduction, the author referred to the Segals in the third person as "scientific experts" and to "their" study.

²¹⁰ US germ warfare blunder started Aids, say scientists. In: Sunday Mail (Harare) v. 24.8.1986, S. 1.

²¹¹ Book Review: »AIDS – USA – home Made Evil, Not Imported from Africa«. In: Social Change and Development 14 (1986), pp. 34–37. The authors thank Prof. Geißler for providing a copy of the review. Because Professor Geißler had not yet received a copy of the brochure, he originally concluded that this four-page review of the same name was distributed in Harare in the form of the aforementioned brochure. See Geißler: AIDS und seine Erreger (note 13), pp. 124, 128 f.

²¹² AIDS – Not from Africa, but from the USA. In: epd-Entwicklungs politik 3 (1987), p. rt. The editorial commentary can be found on page "r."

²¹³ See Segal; Segal: AIDS: USA-home made evil (note 119).

rectly made.²¹⁴ In a public statement in 1992, Segal spoke of »African experts« who had compiled the brochure.²¹⁵ Unfortunately, we do not know who the »African journalists« or

"Experts" were, whether they even existed. Even if the persons implied had compiled or distributed the publication, this excludes any involvement of the HV A, the KGB, or their "brother agencies."

not sufficient, especially because it was common practice to use journalists outside the Eastern Bloc as "channels" for their disinformation.

An active role of HV A/X in the publication of the brochure cannot be ruled out, especially because it promoted the international dissemination of Segal's thesis as part of its object process "Denver"
considered.

The same applies to the distribution of the brochure before and during the Non-Aligned Summit in Harare.²¹⁶ Boghardt claimed, based on his correspondence with Bohnsack,²¹⁷ that two officers of the HV A/X had travelled to Harare specifically to monitor the distribution of the brochure: the officer of the HV A/X responsible for disinformation within the NPG movement (»Vorwärts II«, Reg. No. XV 3741/73), Deputy Head of Unit of the HV A/X/1, Captain Hans Pfeifer,²¹⁸ presumably

²¹⁴ Letter from Jakob Segal to a Japanese professor, March 2, 1987; BArch, NY 4516, prel.

K. 12, np Based on this letter, Geissler concluded that the brochure contained only a summary of Segal's study. See Geissler: AIDS und seine Erreger (note 13), p. 128.

²¹⁵ Prof. Jakob Segal, Public Statement, January 30, 1992; BArch, NY 4516, prel. K. 7, n. p.

²¹⁶ L. Nikolov, Department 8 of the First General Assembly, DS, information regarding working consultations held with the German comrades from September 16 to 19, 1986, in Sofia and concrete agreements on individual joint AMs (Bulgarian), October 7, 1986; COMDOS-Arch-R, F. 9, op. 4, ae 670, pp. 103–107, here 104. Unfortunately, there is no direct evidence (or counter-evidence) regarding the distribution of the study on the General Assembly A.

in the files of the Federal Office of State Security (BStU), because the documents relating to the OVO "Denver," like most of the HV A holdings, were destroyed or disappeared. In any case, based on the current state of the files, involvement of HV A/X in the distribution cannot be ruled out. See Geißler: "Dear AIDS..." (note 7), p. 114.

²¹⁷ Boghardt: Operation INFECTION (Note 6), p. 22, Fn. 56.

²¹⁸ Vorwärts II, Reg. No. XV 3741/73; BStU, MfS, HV A/MD/6, SIRA-TDB 21, ZV8242043; Pfeifer, Hans; BStU, AR 2, HA KuSch/AKG-KA HM; Pfeifer, Hans; MA-Karte; BStU, MfS, RoHo, F16. HV A described "Vorwärts" as follows: "Measures to support the anti-imperialist character of the NPG."

See MfS: Draft: Plan of joint or coordinated active measures

under his working name »Hans Glaser«, 219 and the experienced, long-time employee of HV A/X, Horst Schötzki (OibE »Schatz«), presumably under his legend as a journalist for the East German magazine »Hori-The object operation »Denver« fell within the area of responsibility zont«.

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by Pfeifer. Even if both did not appear in Harare,²²¹

The HV A could have used enough staff through its legally covered residency (LAR) in the GDR Embassy. For the year 1986, six OibE and IM are documented, who submitted reports via the LAR to

the HV A provided – among others, the alleged resident of the HV A in Zimbabwe, Gerhart Hofmann (OibE »Joachim«, Reg. No. XV 327/73, of the HV A/III/8), under the cover of being the 1st Secretary of the GDR Embassy in Sim-

Measures for 1984, August 23, 1983; ABS, A. c 81282/117, pp. 64–70, here 64. See also Bohnsack, Günter: *The Legend Dies*. Berlin 1997, p. 37.

²¹⁹ "Hans Glaser," Reg. No. XV 1093/62; BStU, MfS, RoHo F16.

²²⁰ Schötzki, Horst; BStU, AR 2, HA KuSch/AKG-KA HM; BStU, AR 2, Dept. Fin./Dept. 6-BSK-HIM/OibE; BStU, AR 2, RoHo F16, Reg. No. XV 313/69; BStU, AR 2, RoHo F22, Reg. No. XV 313/69; BStU, MfS, HV A/MD/6, SIRA-TDB 21, ZV 8243824. On Schötzki, see also Staadt, Jochen; Voigt, Tobias; Wolle, Stefan: *Enemy Image Springer: A Publisher and Its Opponents*. Göttingen 2009, p. 141. Schötzki published a firsthand report of the summit in "Horizont."

See Schötzki, Horst: *Movement with Increasing Weight. Horizon*

19 (1986) 10, p. 22 f. It is possible that Schötzki provided two pieces of information based on conversations in Harare to the MfS on September 25, 1986 – one "on the situation in the Philippines" and the second "on the situation in South Africa." See BStU, MfS, HV A/MD/3, SIRA-TDB 12, SE8607335 and SE8607336.

²²¹ By interviewing five conference participants, Geißler and a co-author claimed to have determined that neither Schötzki nor Pfeifer had attended the NPG conference.

Geißler: *AIDS und seine Erreger* (note 13), p. 129. Geißler's unfounded equation of a possible presence of Geißler and Pfeifer in Harare during the summit with a presence at or on the sidelines of the summit is likely due to Boghardt's false assertion that Segal's thesis, or at least AIDS, were topics of discussion at the summit and mentioned in the meeting's final document. This, as Geißler has already shown, was simply not the case. *Ibid.* Boghardt could have easily verified his false claim using the meeting's final document. See Final Document for the Eighth NAM Presidential Summit, September 1–6, 1986. In: James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS): *Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) Dis-armament Database, NAM Summits, Official Documents*; available online: http://cns.miis.edu/nam/documents/Official_Document/8th_Summit_FD_

babwe222 and OibE "Alexander" of HV A/III/8, Axel Juch, under cover as the embassy's second secretary.²²³ Even the GDR ambassador to Zimbabwe, Hans-Georg Schleicher, was registered as IM "Henry" of HV A/III/8.²²⁴ In the run-up to the summit, the head of HV A/X, Wolfgang Wagenbreth, and his deputy, Mutz, had already spoken of an "activation" of the LAR for active measures during the meeting.²²⁵

Whatever role the HV A played or did not play in spreading Segal's thesis during the summit, the I. HV of the

²²² BStU, MfS, HV A/MD/3, SIRA-TDB 21, ZV8205606; Hofmann, Gerhart; BStU, MfS, RoHo F16; Hofmann, Gerhart; BStU, AR 2, HA II/Dept. 14-VSH. During his deployment in Zimbabwe, more information (at least 77) came under the registration number of the alleged resident Hofmann than from any other source. Furthermore, Hofmann was directly supervised by the head of the Africa and South America department HV A III/8, Lieutenant Colonel Jürgen Gehrich. (See BStU, MfS, HV A/MD/3, SIRA-TDB 21, ZV8205606; and on Gehrich, see Müller-Enbergs: Main Administration A (note)).

28), p. 86.) The files of other verifiable OibE and IM in the residency, with one exception, were maintained by Ulrich Härtel, the officer responsible for Zimbabwe in HV A III/8. (IMA "Theo", Reg. No. XV/766/83, ZV8223048; IMA "Jörg", Reg. No. XV/2709/78, ZV8240235; IMA "Palmer", XV/4500/86, ZV8226315; BStU, MfS, HV A/MD/3, SIRA-TDB 21).

²²³ See Juch, Axel, Reg. No. XV 1972/75; BStU, MfS, RoHo, F 16; PNA "Alexander," Reg. No. XV 1972/75; ibid., F22; Juch, Axel, cadre index card; BStU, AR 2, HA KuSch/AKG-KA HM; and on his deployment in the embassy in Zimbabwe: Juch, Axel; BStU, AR 2, HA II/14-VSH.

²²⁴ See Schleicher, Hans-Georg, Reg. No. VIII 1854/64; BStU, MfS, RoHo, F 16; IM "Henry," Reg. No. VIII 1854/64; ibid., F22. The file on "Henry" was also maintained by Härtel in 1986.

²²⁵ Dept. 36 of the First General Assembly of the FMdl of the ČSSR: List of negotiations with the GDR (Czech), n.d.; ABS, A. c. 81282/117, pp. 289–292, here 289 f. The flow of information within the HV A regarding the NPG summit indicates close coordination. The two verifiable pieces of information from the LAR of the HV A in Harare about the

NPG summits were reported directly to HV A/X. See SE8602690 (On the preparation status of the VIII NPG summit in Harare, April 1986) and SE8606994 (Initial assessment of the course and results of the 8th NPG summit, September 9, 1986); BStU, MfS, HV A/MD/3, SIRA-TDB 12. The fact that HV A/X received all 19 verifiable pieces of information from the KGB regarding the summit indicated close coordination between HV A/X and Moscow. See BStU, MfS, HV A/MD/3, SIRA-TDB 12: SE8630167, SE8630381, SE8630615, SE8630674, SE8631088, SE8631087, SE8631090, SE8631096, SE8631095, SE8631123, SE8631124, SE8631189, SE8631207, SE8631227, SE8631232, SE8631233, SE8631234, SE8631235, SE8631275.

The KGB was very satisfied with the result and with the subsequent publications of the Segals. They wrote to their Bulgarian colleagues that the East German thesis

»found considerable resonance in the African countries [...], which stubbornly supported the theory propagated by the Americans of the origin of the AIDS virus in African green monkeys as racist. [...] By showing the defeat of the 'African version,' anti-American sentiments are whipped up in the states of the continent."²²⁶

4.4 The American State Department intervenes: the Segals and the contact person »Diagnosis« of the HV A/SWT

Although Jakob Segal demonstrably knew of the MfS's interest in his research, the surviving files of the HV A in the BStU archives contain no details about his positive registration by the HV A/SWT/XIII/5. Because both Segals were registered by the HV A, there must also have been index cards for them in the HV A index. However, the corresponding files are missing from the BStU's "Rosenholz" database.²²⁷

However, thanks to a visit by two US diplomats to the Segals in September 1986, we owe records from other Stasi units that document some details of the couple's relationship with the HV A. They indicate a closer connection between the Segals and the HV A/SWT/XIII/5. The meetings with the diplomats were important for the Segals and their subsequent work. The course of the meetings strengthened the Segals' belief that the American government was behind the theory of the African origin of AIDS and that

²²⁶ Information Nr. 2742 (russ.), o. D.; COMDOS-Arch-R, F. 9, op. 4, a.e. 675, Bl. 156–159, here 157.

²²⁷ If the Segals were registered as Soviet or French citizens, it is possible that the CIA did not hand over the corresponding cards in "Rosenholz" to the German government. According to CIA guidelines, only copies of card indexes on German individuals in the former HV A card index in the Rosenholz files were handed over to the Federal Republic. See Müller-Enbergs: "Rosenholz" (note 11), p. 52. It is also possible, however, that the cards for the couple were removed from the card index by the HV A earlier or destroyed. One can only speculate as to what happened to the cards.

The truth about its origins in Fort Detrick was being covered up.²²⁸ The meetings led them to the conclusion that Washington wanted to suppress their study. J. Segal later exploited the visit of the alleged "CIA agents" to create greater publicity for his thesis in Germany and in Western countries: He was spreading facts that US agencies had allegedly wanted to cover up.²²⁹

The meetings with the diplomats came as part of the US government's efforts to push back against Moscow's AIDS disinformation. The US government didn't want to simply stand by and watch Moscow damage the US's reputation with its AIDS disinformation.

The Reagan administration had already established an interdepartmental working group within the State Department in 1981 against Soviet active measures in general.²³⁰ Coordinated by this working group, Washington initially attempted to dissuade the USSR from its campaign through diplomatic steps. The American ambassador to the USSR, Arthur Hartman, protested against Zapevalov's article in an unprinted letter to the editor of *Literaturnaya Gazeta*. According to Hartman, the article questioned the Soviet Union's willingness to cooperate internationally in the fight against infectious diseases, especially in the fight against AIDS. Hartman had written further letters of protest to

the "Literaturnaya Gazeta" and "Sovetskaya Rossiya" after both papers repeated the Fort-Detrick thesis in 1986.²³¹ The American ambassador in Prague acted in a similar way after a Czech newspaper published an article with the theses of the "French scientists" Jakob and Lilli Segal.²³² When the Fort-Detrick

²²⁸ Lilli Segal wrote to an East German journalist in Tanzania who was looking for Popularization of Segal's thesis in the local press was difficult: "Two extremely cultured and well-informed diplomats [...] wanted to know where we had obtained our material. That is, they assume there was a leak somewhere." Letter from L. Segal to an East German journalist, Dar-es-Salaam, n.d.; BArch, NY 4516, prel. K. 12, AIDS+Nazi-Verkrimin, np. Regarding the activities of the East German journalist, see his letters to the Segals, November 24, 1986 and n.d.; ibid.

²²⁹ See, for example, the comments by J. Segal in: Lee, Alfred: »AIDS ›Made in Lab‹ Shock«. In: Sunday Express v. 26.10.1986, Bl. 22 f.

²³⁰ Boghardt: Operation INFECTION (Note 6), p. 15.

²³¹ US DOS: Soviet Influence Activities (Anm. 46), S. 48 f.

²³² Did AIDS originate in the Pentagon's laboratories? Tribuna (Prague), October 15, 1986, p. 14 ff. Cited from: FBIS Daily Report, Eastern Europe, FBIS-EEU-86-207, 27.10.1986; On a

When this thesis began to spread in the press of the non-socialist world, the American embassies in the respective countries intervened with the relevant editorial offices to obtain a retraction or at least a counterstatement. The Soviet Union, for its part, made every effort to fend off such attempts by the United States.²³³

It turned out that, not without reason, the American government viewed Segal's thesis as part of Moscow's AIDS disinformation campaign, which it had to counter. Kathleen Bailey, head of the US State Department's Counter-Soviet Disinformation Unit, publicly praised the "Segal Report" as an "impressive addition" to the Soviet disinformation campaign. Because it was full of "technical jargon," "a layperson could not assess its accuracy," and "to anyone inclined to believe the disinformation, it appears convincing."

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With the alleged goal of pointing out "fallacies" in the Segals' report, two diplomats from the American Embassy in East Berlin were commissioned to contact the Segals.²³⁵ On September 12, 1986, after prior notice, the Second Secretary of the Political Department of the American Embassy in East Berlin, John Monroe Koenig,²³⁶ visited Lilli Segal at home. Koenig asked her how she and her husband had come up with the topic of their study. She replied that "her husband, as a biologist, had read the 'stories' spread by the media."

Report that caused Displeasure, Rude Pravo v. 21.11.1986, S. 7. Zit. nach: FBIS Daily Report, Eastern Europe, FBIS-EEU-86-227, 25.11.1986, S. D2.

²³³ US DOS: Soviet Influence Activities (Anm. 46), S. 41 f. u. 49; Williams, Philip: Soviet disinformation on AIDS alarms U.S., Ottawa Citizen v. 20.12.1986, S. B16.

²³⁴ Bailey, Kathleen; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research; Soviets Sponsor Spread of AIDS Disinformation. LA Times, April 19, 1987, p. E2. The two US diplomats who visited the Segals actually existed.

Boghardt, with Bohnsack's support, claimed that two HV A officers had posed as CIA employees under diplomatic cover to scare the Segals and reinforce their thesis.

Despite Bohnsack's confirmation, this claim was completely fabricated. See Boghardt: Operation INFektION (note 6), p. 12. Geißler noted this fact earlier. See Geißler, Erhard: The AIDS disinformation campaign continues and bears rotten fruit, Part II. In: ASA Newsletter 10–2 (137), pp. 16–19, here 17. Bailey noted the visit in her 1987 op-ed in the LA Times of April 19, 1987.

²³⁵ Bailey: Soviets Sponsor Spread of AIDS Disinformation (Anm. 234), S. E2.

²³⁶ Information on activities of US agencies in connection with a scientific study on the origin of AIDS, n.d.; BStU, MfS, HA II, No. 22082, p. 36 ff.

about the African origin and the 'green monkey' [sic, guenons] so absurd that he had seriously considered the biological side of the question." At his request, she gave him a copy of her scientific study – a fact that HV A/X later denied to her Bulgarian colleagues. Koenig had allegedly promised to "study the material as soon as possible and get back to us" – Lilli Segal reported in a briefing sent to the MfS. Koenig had also suggested the possibility of publication in the USA, but that, according to Lilli Segal, could have been "part of the diplomatic game."²³⁷ A second meeting subsequently took place in mid-October 1986 in an East Berlin restaurant between the Segals, Koenig, and a second employee of the American Embassy in East Berlin, Gregory W. Sandford. According to a second report by Lilli Segal, the US diplomats discussed his theories and his work at length, which they now criticized based on the research of Western scientists.²³⁸ According to Lilli Segal's reports, the diplomats also wanted to bring the Segals into discussion with Western scientists. This was presumably intended to dissuade them from their theories or, necessarily, to publicly expose them.

Thanks to the two reports by Lilli Segal on the US diplomats, which were sent to HV A/SWT/XIII/5 and from there forwarded to HV A/IX, which was responsible for external defense,
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²³⁷ Report on contact made by staff of the US Embassy in the GDR, undated; BStU, MfS HA II, No. 22082, pp. 39 ff. Koenig, the current American ambassador to Cyprus, confirmed that he received a copy of the study from the Segals, although he could not recall at which meeting or from which Segal he received it. Email from John Monroe Koenig to Douglas Selvage, October 28, 2013. Regarding the claim by the HV A/X that the diplomats had not and would not receive a copy, see L. Nikolow, Department 8 of the I. HV, DS, information regarding working consultations held with the German comrades from September 16 to 19, 1986, in Sofia and concrete agreements on individual joint AMs (Bulgarian), October 7, 1986; COMDOS-Arch-R, F. 9, op. 4, ae 670, sheets 103–107, here 104.

²³⁸ Supplement to the information on activities of US agencies in connection with a scientific work on the origin of AIDS, n.d.; BStU, MfS, HA II, No. 22082, pp. 46–48.

²³⁹ Note from Colonel Oldenburg, Deputy Head of Division HV A/IX/C, to OSL Häseler, HA II/3, October 23, 1986, with appendix, Information on activities of US agencies in connection with a scientific study on the origin of AIDS, n.d.; BStU, MfS, HA II, No. 22082, pp. 50–52, here 50; Report

Draw conclusions about her and her husband's relationship with HV A.

The two reports were entered into the HV A database with van de Sand as the sender. A contact person (KP) was considered the source for both.

»Diagnose«, 240 which was recorded in the larger security operation (SVG) "Wind" by van de Sand.²⁴¹ "Wind" targeted individuals in the fields of genetic engineering, the pharmaceutical industry, and AIDS research in the two German states. It is reasonable to conclude that Lilli Segal was registered as the "Diagnosis" CP, perhaps also her husband, or perhaps both were registered, to facilitate simplified record keeping.

Further information from the KP "Diagnosis" can also be linked to the Segals. On July 28, 1986, the HV A recorded an information delivery from the KP "Diagnosis" in its database for the first time: a 54-page, English-language assessment of the then-available HIV testing equipment from the British Ministry of Health.²⁴² The connection to the Segals is obvious: The Segals visited

in June Great Britain,²⁴³ where they published this English-language review

on contact by employees of the US Embassy, n.d.; BStU, MfS, HA II, No. 22082, pp. 39–40; Supplement to information on activities by US agencies in connection with a scientific study on the origin of AIDS, n.d.; BStU, MfS, HA II, No. 22082, pp. 46–48.

²⁴⁰ Entries from the KP "Diagnosis" reports on Koenig and Sandford, 16 and 17. October 17, 1986; BStU, MfS, HV A/MD/5, SIRA-TDB 14, SE8607428 and SE8607429. The description in SIRA matches the two reports by Lilli Segal. The categorization of "diagnosis" as a CP can be found in: BStU, MfS, HV A/MD/2, SIRA-TDB 11, SE8607838 and SE8962195.

²⁴¹ SVG "Wind" was created by van de Sand on September 6, 1985. See BStU, AR 2, RoHo F22, Reg. No. XV 3824/85. See also BStU, MfS, HV A/MD/6, SIRA-TDB 21, ZV8200503.

²⁴² See BStU, MfS, HV A/MD/2, SIRA-TDB 11, SE8607838. The entry noted the English title of the report: "Public Health Service and Department of Health and Social Security Evaluation of Commercial Anti-HTLV III/LAV Assay Kits." It was apparently a 90-page brochure published by the British Department of Health and Social Security in the same year. See Mortimer, PP et al.: Public Health Laboratory Service and Department of Health and Social Security Evaluation of Ten Commercial Anti-HTLV III/LAV Assay Kits. London 1986.

²⁴³ In the second half of June, the Segals visited London and Cambridge, among other places, to meet with Dr. Abraham Karpas of Cambridge University and discuss his AIDS test. See letter from Jakob Segal to an English doctor, May 29, 1986; BArch, NY 4516, prel. p. 13, np; Segal, Jakob; Segal, Lilli:

received, as can be seen from the file of IM "Nils."²⁴⁴ On November 17, the HV A entered another piece of information from van de Sand into its database under the code name "Diagnosis": a report about Heym and the American diplomat Sandford.²⁴⁵ Both Segals had already been in contact with Sandford and, at this point, also with Heym.

However, the last information from »Diagnosis« was not entered into the HV A database under the SVG »Wind«, but under a new file process: the Operative Personnel Control (OPK) »Diagnosis« (Reg. No. XV/4983/86).²⁴⁶ In 1986, Commanding Officer van de Sand separated the "Diagnosis" CP from this SVG and created a separate OPK file. Further evidence of the registration of one or both of the Segals as "Diagnosis" CPs can be found shortly after this re-registration: a relative of the couple was registered months later—and not as the main person—under the "Diagnosis" OPK.²⁴⁷

The time at which the OPK was created corresponds to the phase in autumn 1986 in which the Segals became more important for the HV A. After Koenig's visit to Lilli Segal, a "coordinating agreement" was reached in October 1986 between Thielemann and van de Sand of HV A/SWT/XIII, as those responsible for the Segals, with Major Sattler and Olt. Meyer of HA II/3, as those responsible for monitoring

KARPAS screening test. Assessment based on the visit to Cambridge, n.d.; BStU, MfS, AIM 4835/88, Vol. 1, pp. 158–163, here 158, 161, and 163.

²⁴⁴ The Segals attached the assessment to the report they had written on the Karpas screening test for AIDS. Segal; Segal: KARPAS Screening Test (note 243), p. 158. The English report was not archived as an appendix in "Nils's" IM file. As a result of the report, on July 2, Dehmlow received his first verifiable assignment from his commanding officer, Theisinger (HA VII/7), at the request of the HVA/SWT/XIII—namely, the "preparation of a qualified report" on the Karpas screening test and "the necessity of purchasing it." Lt. Theisinger, HA VII/7: Meeting report: IMS "Nils," July 2, 1986; BStU, MfS, AIM 4835/88, Vol. I, pp. 97 f., here 98. Dehmlow took his time with his response. It wasn't until October that he delivered Segal's report, which was already with HV A/SWT/XIII/5, along with his own positive assessment. Theisinger, Meeting Report, IMS "Nils," July 22, 1986, p. 101; Segal; Segal: KARPAS Screening Test (note 243), pp. 158–163. HA VII/7 forwarded "Nils's" report to HV A/SWT/XIII in November. See note from Colonel Bethge, Head of HA VII/7, to Head of HV A/SWT/XIII, November 6, 1986; BStU, MfS, AIM 4835/88, Vol. I, pp. 155–157.

²⁴⁵ BStU, MfS, HV A/MD/5, SIRA-TDB 14, SE8707031.

²⁴⁶ Ibid.

²⁴⁷ BStU, AR 2, MfS, RoHo, F16, Reg. No. XV/4983/86.

of the American diplomats. Thielemann first explained to the Abwehr officers who Professor Segal was from the perspective of the HV A. He was preparing "a scientific paper on the causes and effects of AIDS [...], in which he provides scientific proof that the origin of the now emerging AIDS virus lies in the laboratories of the US nerve warfare research" and was "currently seeking publication in one of the world's leading medical journals." 248 The officers of the HV A/SWT and HA II/3 agreed that "in the interest of the US administration, the embassy will make efforts to minimize the previous loss of image as much as possible."

ten».²⁴⁹

In connection with the bilateral meeting between Jakob Segal and Koenig, reference was even made to "the IM" in reference to Segal, who, according to Thielemann, could be "instructed" by his service unit.²⁵⁰ Despite the term "IM" used in the conversation, Segal can, according to today's

²⁴⁸ Olt. Meyer, HA II/3, Absprachevermerk, 10.10.1986; BStU, MfS, HA II, No. 22082, p. 25 f., here 25.

²⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 26.

²⁵⁰ According to the memo, the "IM" was to be "instructed" to expose Koenig and "possibly his companion" as alleged intelligence agents by reciting "technical specifics" on AIDS. The IM was also to attempt to involve an IM "Martin Bartsch" from HA II/3 in his contact with Koenig, so that he could tap into Koenig in the future. Due to his age, Segal no longer seemed suitable for further, more strenuous intelligence operations to the HV A/SWT. Ibid., p. 26. According to a report by Lilli Segal and the recollection of Gregory Sandford, only the Segal couple, Sandford, and Koenig were present at the second conversation. According to Sandford, Jakob Segal spoke most, and a third person—e.g., IM "Martin

Bartsch" – was not there. See supplement to the information on activities of US agencies in connection with a scientific work on the origins of AIDS, n.d.; BStU, MfS, HA II, No. 22082, pp. 46-48; telephone interview, Douglas Selvage with Gregory W. Sandford, June 18, 2013. John Monroe Koenig, now the US ambassador to Cyprus, however, remembered a third person in the conversation with both Segals, but had forgotten who he was. Email from ambassador John Monroe Koenig to Douglas Selvage, October 27, 2013. Sandford, on the other hand, wrote: "I think I probably would have been aware of any third person, though, since I would have assumed he or she was there as an ideological 'watcher' and might be influencing what Dr. Segal had to say, and I do recall being impressed that Segal apparently believed what he was saying and had arguments to back it up that he thought were convincing." Mail Gregory W. Sandford to Douglas Selvage, October 28, 2013.

According to the files, it can only be viewed as a KP. Assuming that Jakob Segal had been registered as KP "Diagnosis" since 1985, the planned spying on Koenig starting in the fall of 1986 could explain why a separate OPK case was created under the same code name in November 1986. An OPK case could take on the character of an IM precursor at the HV A.

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Overall, the current files indicate a division of labor within the HV A. While the HVA/X was responsible for the international dissemination of Segal's theories as part of its AIDS disinformation campaign (OVO "Denver"), van de Sand and his department head Thielemann in the HV A/SWT/XIII/5 were responsible for the headquarters' covert contacts with the Segals as the "Diagnosis" CP.

4.5 The publication in the West: the Heym interview

The HV A—primarily the HV A/SWT/XIII/5—helped the Segals, in cooperation with other MfS units, behind the scenes to advance their research and publish it in the West. It also supported them by banning academic critics of their thesis from the GDR from publishing in East German and foreign journals.

To Axen and Seidel in the SED Central Committee, Jakob Segal gave the impression that he had to ensure the publication of his thesis on his own.²⁵² This was indeed the case when it came to publication in the GDR, as party and state leader Erich Honecker had opted for a restrictive AIDS information policy.²⁵³ Even the MfS could not change this. The fact that an interview between Stefan Heym and Jakob Segal was published in the West Berlin newspaper "taz" in February 1987, however, was due to the assistance of the HV A, as shown below.²⁵⁴

²⁵¹ Müller-Enbergs: "Rosenholz" (note 11), pp. 58 and 75, fn. 187; 3. Commentary on Directive 2/79. The Recruitment of Unofficial Colleagues by the Intelligence Units of the MfS. In: Müller-Enbergs, Unofficial Colleagues, Part 2 (Anm. 23), S. 585–632, hier 631.

²⁵² Geißler: "Dear AIDS..." (note 7), p. 99 f.

²⁵³ Kurt Hager, internal memo to Comrade Seidel, 25.9.1986, BArch, DY 30/26444, np

²⁵⁴ Gast, Wolfgang: Barschel Letters, IMF, or AIDS Propaganda – the Stasi Tried to Interfere. In: taz, December 30, 1992, p. 5.

The contact by the American diplomats in September and October 1986 spurred the Segals to publish their study as soon as possible. Lilli Segal had already addressed a sore point in her report on the first meeting with Koenig in September: "He [Koenig] also did not ask why we had not published the material here yet."²⁵⁵ Yet she knew the answer herself: There was the

restrictive policy in the GDR regarding publications about AIDS²⁵⁶, This also applied to the Segal thesis favored by the KGB. Jakob Segal attempted to break this deadlock by securing an appointment with his acquaintance and "client," Hermann Axen. However, Axen forwarded the request on September 3 to the Central Committee Secretary for Health Affairs, Karl Seidel.²⁵⁷ Seidel, who met with Segal on September 17, 1986, was personally enthusiastic about the possible publication of Segal's study in the GDR. Five days later, he wrote to the Central Committee Secretary for Culture and Ideological Affairs, Kurt Hager:

"The view put forward by Comrade Prof. Segal on the origin and spread of AIDS, if confirmed, or even partially confirmed, would be tantamount to an exposure of steps taken by US imperialism in preparing for biological warfare, which is highly politically explosive. In particular, the justified polemic against the monkey theory of *the origin of AIDS is likely to reinforce anti-imperialist sentiments and activities among numerous political forces in Africa, who would have to understand this theory as an insult and defamation perpetrated by US imperialism.*

It is therefore considered correct not to recommend any hesitation regarding the discussion or publication of the views expressed by Prof. Segal, if this is done in an appropriate manner [...]"²⁵⁸

Seidel's thinking was similar to that of the First General Assembly of the KGB. However, on November 25, 1986, Hager reminded Seidel, with reference to "Comrade Erich Honecker," of "our restrictive information policy on AIDS," which should "be maintained." Segal was still not allowed to publish his thesis in the GDR, but he received the green light to publish it abroad. Hager wrote:

²⁵⁵ Report on contact made by US Embassy staff, undated; BStU, MfS, HA II, No. 22082, pp. 39 ff., here 40.

²⁵⁶ Geißler: "Dear AIDS..." (note 7), p. 92.

²⁵⁷ Departure of Jakob Segal at Axen, 26.8.1986; BArch, DY 30/26444, np

²⁵⁸ K. Seidel, Department of Health Policy, memorandum on a conversation with comrade Prof. Jakob Segal on September 17, 1986; BArch, DY 30/26444, np. The italicized passages were underlined, presumably by Hager.

"Since Comrade Segal himself speaks of a hypothesis, possible publications in official GDR publications should be avoided. To what extent his assumptions can be published in relevant foreign journals [...], I do not know. They would, of course, have to be the responsibility of Comrade Segal himself as a scientist."²⁵⁹

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MfAA), for its part, announced that foreign journalists were not required to obtain permits to conduct interviews with the Segals. The official reason: Both were retired professors and therefore did not need to apply for a permit.²⁶⁰ However, for most ordinary pensioners in the GDR, such freedom of speech did not apply to Western media. The SED (Social Democratic Party of Germany) and the State Security Service (Stasi) evidently wanted to support the international dissemination of Segal's thesis by all means.

In private, however, the Segals not only complained about their "publication ban" in the GDR.²⁶¹ They also portrayed themselves as if they were on their own when it came to potential publications of their thesis and journalistic activities in Western countries. In April 1987, Lilli Segal even claimed that they had to organize and finance their lecture tours to West Germany themselves.

²⁶²

The first major breakthrough for the Segals and their thesis after Harare was probably not the result of the work of the Stasi or the KGB. On October 25, 1986, the London Sunday Express published an article on its front page, "AIDS 'Made in Lab' Shock" by Alfred Lee. The subtitle declared: "The deadly AIDS virus was artificially created by American scientists in the course of laboratory experiments that ultimately proved catastrophic. To this day, this secret has been kept from the world by a massive cover-up." The article quoted Seale, Segal, and a third "scientist," the Caliph.

²⁵⁹ Kurt Hager, internal memo to Comrade Seidel, 25.9.1986, BArch, DY 30/26444, n. p.

²⁶⁰ Major Jahnke, HA XX/9: Transcript (IM report "Maria" dated 10 April 1987), 15 April 1987; BStU, MfS, AOP 26320/91, appendix, vol. 20, pp. 33–37, here 34.

²⁶¹ Deputy Minister of Health Prof. Dr. Schneidewind; conversation with comrade Prof. Dr. Jakob Segal, emeritus of the Humboldt University of Berlin, on October 2, 1987; BStU, MfS, HA XX, No. 7101, pp. 317 ff., here 317.

²⁶² Major Jahnke, HA XX/9: Transcript (IM report "Maria" of April 10, 1987), April 15, 1987; BStU, MfS, AOP 26320/91, appendix, vol. 20, pp. 33–37, here 37. Lilly Segal allegedly explained to IM "Maria" that she and her husband were permitted "to do whatever they considered right in this matter, but without the support of the GDR government." Ibid., pp. 34.

fornical physician Robert Strecker, on the artificial origin of HIV.²⁶³

Strecker, who had already begun researching the spread of AIDS with his brother Theodore in 1983, was presumably influenced by Seale's writings to incorporate the Fort Detrick thesis into his own AIDS conspiracy theory.²⁶⁴ His brother Theodore had already written about an artificial origin in Fort Detrick in March 1986, before the Segals, with the help of the HV A, spread their version. The Strecker brothers claimed that the AIDS pathogen originated from

A recombination of the sheep Visna virus with the bovine leukemia virus (BLV) was initiated by the communist-infiltrated World Health Organization (WHO) in collaboration with the US National Cancer Institute (NCI) and the National Institutes of Health (NIH). The virus was spread in Africa by the WHO through vaccines and among homosexuals in the US through the hepatitis B vaccine.²⁶⁵

The article in the Sunday Express was followed by a wave of articles and reports in the Western media "from the Baltic Sea to the Mediterranean and from the Atlantic to the Pacific" – including in the Canberra Times

(Australia), in »La Stampa« (Italy), »Ethnos« (Greece), as well as in Brazil, Sweden, and Spain.²⁶⁶ The American government suspected Victor Louis, a well-known KGB disinformation specialist and informant for the »Sunday Express«, of being responsible for the publication,²⁶⁷ but the KGB claimed to its Bulgarian colleagues that the article had appeared »independently« of its own efforts.

268 According to Jakob Segal, Seale was behind the article; the

²⁶³ Lee: "AIDS 'Made in Lab' Shock" (note 229), p. 1. This quote is a working translation by the MfS from English, n.d.; BStU, MfS, HA II, No. 22082, pp. 29–34, here 29.

²⁶⁴ Strecker was familiar with at least one of Seale's earlier letters to the JRSM and presumably knew the others as well. See Strecker, Robert B.: Letter to the Editor. In: JRSM 79 (1986), pp. 559–560. Strecker hinted to another AIDS conspiracy theorist, Leonard Horowitz, that he was influenced by Seale's research. See Horowitz, Leonard G.; Emerging Viruses: AIDS & Ebola. Nature, Accident or Intentional? Rockport 1996, p. 104.

²⁶⁵ Strecker, Theodore A.: This is a Bio-Attack Alert, March 28, 1986. Available online: http://www.umaja-research.com/bio-attack_doc.htm.

²⁶⁶ Godson, Roy: Outlook. In: The Washington Post v. 25.1.1987, S. B1.

²⁶⁷ Williams: Soviet disinformation (Anm. 233), S. B16.

²⁶⁸ Information Nr. 2742 (russ.), o. D.; COMDOS-Arch-R, F. 9, op. 4, a.e. 675, Bl. 156–159, here 157.

He concluded this from his conversations with journalist Lee, who called him three times with questions. Segal thanked Seale.²⁶⁹ Whatever the reason for the Sunday Express publishing the article, the Soviet "Chekists" were pleased that it lent their disinformation thesis "additional credibility and authority."²⁷⁰

Jakob Segal, who was interviewed for the article, also took advantage of the American diplomats' visits to popularize his research in the West. The Sunday Express quoted him as saying:

"The two men showed me their letters of recommendation. One said he was a historian, and the other that he was a [political] consul. I'm pretty sure they were from the CIA, though, and that they were very concerned that the cover-up regarding the origin of AIDS was about to be lifted. I told them everything I knew and what I believed."²⁷¹

After the article's publication, the Segals received numerous interview requests from foreign journalists. They were pleased by the renewed attention. Although they had noted that the brochure "AIDS: USA-home made evil" had "made its way around" in Africa, the article in the "Sunday Express" had "the greatest impact." Lilli Segal wrote to an East German journalist she knew in Dar es Salaam: "For 14 days, journalists from various countries were queuing up and down the door."²⁷²

²⁶⁹ Geißler; Sprinkle: Disinformation squared (note 9), p. 41.

²⁷⁰ Information Nr. 2742 (russ.), o. D.; COMDOS-Arch-R, F. 9, op. 4, a.e. 675, Bl. 156–159, here 157.

²⁷¹ Working translation from English, page 31.

²⁷² [L. Segal], Reply letter to a "comrade", n.d.; BArch, NY 4516, prel. K. 12, AIDS+Nazi crimes, GDR, np It was written in response to the following letter: Letter from an East German journalist, Dar es Salaam, 24.11.1986, or an earlier letter from the same; ibid.

However, in the autumn of 1986, there were several indications that the HV A was in the process of paving the way for additional publications by the Segals in Western countries. After the article in the Sunday Express, for example, the Segals were contacted by the Indian journalist Kunhanandan Nair.²⁷³ Nair had been an accredited correspondent for the Indian newspapers Blitz and Patriot in East Berlin for many years,²⁷⁴ which were known for publishing Soviet disinformation.²⁷⁵ Nair was also a fixture for HV A. In the run-up to the summit in Harare, HV A/X had written a book that "exposed" and harshly criticized the CIA's policies regarding the Non-Aligned Movement and the Third World in general, using a mixture of facts and disinformation theories from the KGB and the Eastern "brother agencies."²⁷⁶ The book was alternately referred to by HV A/X as an active measure, "Spiegel"²⁷⁷ or »jungle«²⁷⁸. At an international press conference on August 21, 1986 in New Delhi, where the Executive Committee of the Non-Aligned Movement was meeting in preparation for the summit in Harare, the book »Devil and his Dart: How the CIA is Plotting in the Third World« (German edition: »CIA Komplotte gegen die

²⁷³ [L. Segal], Reply letter to a "comrade," n.d.; ibid.

²⁷⁴ Nair was a committed communist and supporter of the SED regime. In a 1962 interview with "Neues Deutschland," he stated: "The GDR's anti-fascist protective wall has rendered extraordinary service to the cause of peace during its one-year existence: It has prevented the Cold Warriors' march into the East. It has put an end to the massive economic sabotage against the GDR. It has forced the Western powers to recognize the existence of the GDR." Protective wall renders peace service. In: ND, August 9, 1962, p. 1.

²⁷⁵ US DOS: Soviet Influence Activities (Anm. 46), S. 43, Fn. 43, u. S. 44.

²⁷⁶ Plan of joint, coordinated political and active measures for 1986, November 28, 1986; ABS, A. c. 81282/117, pp. 293–295, here 295.

²⁷⁷ Plan of joint and coordinated active measures of the intelligence agencies of the Ministry of the Interior of the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the Ministry of State Security of the GDR for 1987 and 1988, September 3, 1986; COMDOS-Arch-R, F. 9, op. 4, ae 670, pp. 108–119, here 113.

²⁷⁸ Plan of joint, coordinated political-active measures for 1986 [with Czechoslovakia], p. 295. Because the "Mirror" active measure was aimed at discrediting Western intelligence agencies, particularly the CIA, it presumably fell under Operation "Jungle" (XV 2139/67) of HV A/X/5 under the leadership of Herbert Brehmer. See BStU, MfS, HV A/MD/3, SIRA-TDB 21, ZV8256438; Müller-Enbergs: Main Administration A (note 28), p. 178.

Third World"). Nair appeared as the author of the book,²⁷⁹ which was subsequently distributed by the HV A during the summit in Harare.²⁸⁰

Following his success in Harare and the article in the Sunday Express, Nair now interviewed Jacob Segal. Although the interview first appeared in Blitz on July 2, 1987, under the title "AIDS – A US Military Monster: Yankee Business, not Monkey Business," it had already been published earlier in the Nairobi Sunday Times without naming the author and was reprinted in the Senegalese newspaper Le Devoir.²⁸¹ In India, an English version of Segal's study, along with Nair's interview, was published in book form in 1989.²⁸²

At the end of 1986, a freelance West German journalist based in Brussels, Heimo Claaßen, also contacted Jakob Segal. As a journalist, he reported not only on politics in Brussels, primarily within the European Community, but also on developments in Africa, where he traveled frequently. According to his own statement, his interest in the origin of AIDS arose during a trip to Zaire in 1984.²⁸³ In 1963, the HV A had created the IM file "Joachim" (XV 4735/63) on Claaßen. Since 1983, the IM file "Joachim" was managed by Hans Pfeifer, whose report

²⁷⁹ Nair, Kunhanandan: Devil and His Dart. How the CIA is Plotting in the Third World. New Delhi 1986. Mutz revealed the exact English title of the book at a meeting from September 16 to 19, 1986, with the Disinformation Department of the Bulgarian Ministry of the Interior. See Lieutenant D. Stankow, Head of Department 8 of the First High Command of the DS, information (short transcript) on the conversations with Comrade Wolfgang Mutz, Deputy Head of the AM Department at the High Command of the A during his stay in Bulgaria from September 16 to 19, 1986 (Bulgarian), November 22, 1986; COM-DOS-Arch-R, F. 9, op. 4, ae 670, pp. 121–128, here 121 f. For the press conference for the first English edition, see the front cover of the German edition: Nair, Kunhanandan: CIA Plots Against the Third World. Berlin [East] 1987.

²⁸⁰ Lieutenant D. Stankow, Head of Department 8 of the First General Assembly of the DS, information (short transcript) about the discussions with Comrade Wolfgang Mutz, Deputy Head of the AM Department at the General Assembly of the DS during his stay in Bulgaria from September 16 to 19, 1986 (Bulgarian), November 22, 1986; COMDOS-Arch-R, F. 9, op. 4, ae 670, pp. 121–128, here 121 f.

²⁸¹ US DOS: Soviet Influence Activities (Anm. 46), S. 37 f.

²⁸² Segal, Jacob; Segal, Lilli: The Origin of AIDS, Trichur 1989. When the Segals organized a Japanese translation of their study based on the Indian edition in 1992, Jacob Segal wrote to the Japanese translator that his interview with Nair should not be translated and reprinted because it contained "many errors."

See letter from Jakob Segal to a Japanese translator, September 2, 1992; BArch, NY 4516, prel. p. 12, Japan.

²⁸³ Geißler; Sprinkle: Disinformation squared (note 9), p. 74.

HV A/X/1 was also responsible for "Denver."²⁸⁴ Between 1969 and 1987, HV A verifiably recorded 40 information deliveries that it traced back to "Joachim," and which it used in at least 16 cases as sources of outgoing information to the East German party and state leadership. The incoming and outgoing information mainly dealt with topics of European integration and the European Community from a Brussels perspective and developments in African countries.²⁸⁵ Among other things, HV A/X registered several reports from "Joachim" on the situation in Zaire in 1984.²⁸⁶

After the first meeting with Segal, Claaßen introduced him to the West German author »Booby Hatch« at the end of 1986, who appeared under a pseudonym. Together.²⁸⁷ "Hatch" described himself as a doctor of natural sciences, molecular biologist, and former scientist at a genetic research center in California.²⁸⁸ As early as 1984, he published an article in the West German scientific journal "Interaction," in which he expressed fears that the AIDS pathogen had been transmitted from monkeys to humans due to lax safety precautions in biomedical research laboratories using retroviruses and other viruses.²⁸⁹ Dehmlow later claimed that Segal had been influenced by "Hatch's" publications.²⁹⁰ This could well have been the case. "Hatch" had already written

²⁸⁴ See BStU, MfS, HV A/MD/6, SIRA-TDB 21, ZV8237870; BStU, AR 2, RoHo, F16 and F22, Reg. No. XV 4735/63.

²⁸⁵ The search query "QUA.RGNR=/*4735/63"" results in 3 incoming information items in SIRA-TDB 11 and 37 incoming information items and 2 outgoing information items in SIRA-TDB 12. The incoming information items served as sources for 14 outgoing information items sent to the party and state leadership. See BStU, MfS, HV A/MD/6, SIRA-TDB 11.

²⁸⁶ See the following entries in: BStU, MfS, HV A/MD/6, SIRA-TDB 11: New activities of OTRAG, SE8305200; On activities on the former OTRAG site in Zaire, SE8401024; Activities of the Bundeswehr in Zaire, SE8401025; On the situation on the border between Angola and Zaire, SE8404887.

OTRAG was the abbreviation for Orbital Transport- und Raketen Aktiengesellschaft, a West German company that was working on an alternative propulsion system for rockets. OTRAG conducted test flights in Zaire, among other things.

²⁸⁷ Geißler; Sprinkle: Operation AIDS, p. 73.

²⁸⁸ Sigusch, Volkmar; Gremliza, Hermann L. (eds.): Operation AIDS. Specifically Sexuality. Hamburg 1986, p. 3.

²⁸⁹ Hatch, Booby: AIDS. Accident, Coincidence, or Non-Coincidence? In: Interaction 23 (Nov. 1984), pp. 38–41.

²⁹⁰ Geißler; Sprinkle: Disinformation squared (note 9), p. 30.

before Segal of the possible origin of the AIDS pathogen through a laboratory accident, emphasized the similarity between the AIDS pathogen and the Visna virus, rejected the African hypothesis of the AIDS origin in favor of an American origin, and left open the possibility until 1986 that HIV arose from the recombination of other viruses in the genetic laboratory.²⁹¹ Later, when "Hatch" solidified his opinion that the AIDS pathogen arose naturally from non-human primates, the differences of opinion between the two grew.²⁹² At the end of 1986, however, Segal and "Hatch" agreed to Claaßen's proposal to collaborate on a book under the working title "AIDS from the Gene Laboratory?" Claaßen then took steps to find a left-wing publisher in the West. This apparently turned up in the Rotbuch publishing house, with whom Segal corresponded in 1987 about such a publication. Claaßen handed a copy of Segal's study to the editor of "Wechselwirkung," Reinhart Behnisch, who expressed interest in publishing it.²⁹³ Claaßen's commitment to publication(s) in the West fit with the goals pursued by Pfeifer and Dams in the object process "Denver." Despite their efforts, neither an article by Segal appeared in "Wechselwirkung," nor the planned anthology published by Rotbuch Verlag.

Instead, the Segals and the HV A received help from an unexpected source. By pure chance, the East German writer and regime critic Stefan Heym learned of Segal's theory from his doctor on October 9, 1986.²⁹⁴ Heym was convinced by this theory, and after the article in the Sunday Express, he interviewed Segal on November 8.

Publication in the West. Heym offered the interview to the weekly magazine "Der Spiegel," but the magazine showed no interest.²⁹⁵ Although "Der Spiegel" reported on Segal's thesis on November 10, it did so along with strong counterarguments from Western experts in genetic and AIDS research.²⁹⁶ The vervet monkey theory is no longer current, according to the experts, but "most retrovirologists" nevertheless suspect "that AIDS has existed for decades, perhaps centuries, in small Central African settlements as a local village disease."

²⁹¹ Hatch, Booby: Is AIDS a laboratory accident? In: Sigusch; Gremliza (ed.): Operation AIDS (note 288), pp. 32–37; here 34 f.

²⁹² Geißler; Sprinkle: Disinformation squared (note 9), p. 30 f.

²⁹³ Ibid., p. 74.

²⁹⁴ Geißler: "Dear AIDS..." (note 7), p. 112.

²⁹⁵ Geißler; Sprinkle: Disinformation squared (note 9), p. 54.

²⁹⁶ AIDS: Parents Wanted. In: Der Spiegel, November 10, 1986, pp. 272, 275, and 278.

re.²⁹⁷ "Der Spiegel" mentioned Jakob Segal's interview with the "Sunday Express" on the occasion of the visit of the American diplomats (or alleged "CIA men"), but in the context of a larger struggle between the KGB and the CIA. Both secret services, according to "Der Spiegel," had tried to blame the other side for the artificial production of HIV.²⁹⁸ After his unsuccessful interview with "Der Spiegel," Heym offered his interview to the weekly newspaper "Die Zeit" and the magazine "Quick."

but both also declined. ²⁹⁹

One gets the impression that Heym was only able to offer his interview with Segal in the Federal Republic because HV A/SWT/XIII was working behind the scenes. Heym was constantly monitored and frequently hindered in his work as a writer by HA XX/9 of the MfS, which pursued him in the Operational Procedure (OV) "Diversant."³⁰⁰ Without further explanation, HA XX/9 could have prevented the publication of the interview in the West. But Heym's contact with the Segals led to Tustanowski, the officer in HA XX/9 responsible for the OV "Diversant," inquiring about HV A/SWT's jurisdiction over the Segals. On October 28, 1986, he met with van de Sand to learn more about the meetings between the Segals and the Heyms. If van de Sand had not already made it clear at that time, Colonel Jesse, Head of Department of HV A/SWT/XIII, informed by November 12th at the latest that HV A had an "operational interest [...] in ensuring that Prof. Segal's thesis that the AIDS virus is a product of American biological weapons research is spreading in NSW. "³⁰¹

In other words, HA XX/9 was to take no action to prevent the publication of the Heym-Segal interview. Subsequently, HA XX informed the Deputy Minister of State Security, Rudi Mittig, of HV A's "operational" concern to have Heym's interview with Segal published in the West.³⁰²

²⁹⁷ Ebenda, S. 275 u. 278.

²⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 275. However, the evidence for CIA disinformation was rather weak. "Der Spiegel," like "Literaturnaya Gazeta" before it, equated LaRouche's opinion with the CIA.

²⁹⁹ Geißler; Sprinkle: Disinformation squared (note 9), p. 54.

³⁰⁰ Walther, Joachim: Literature as a Security Area. Writers and State Security in the German Democratic Republic. Berlin 1996, p. 91.

³⁰¹ Note from Colonel Jesse, Head of HV A, SWT/Department XIII to Head of HA XX/9, November 12, 1986; BStU, MfS, AOP 26320/91, appendix, vol. 19, pp. 203 ff.

³⁰² See HA XX, Information on the intended publication of an interview by the author Stefan Heym with Prof. Dr. Segal about the origin of the AIDS

Because Heym hadn't managed to publish his interview with Segal even after months, HV A/X provided some help behind the scenes. Joachim Nölte, a major and officer on special assignment (OibE) of HV A/X/4,303, working under the alias of an employee in the press department of the GDR Foreign Ministry, informed Arno Widmann of the "taz" newspaper that Stefan Heym had a "bombshell story" about AIDS. For Heym, Widmann's contact in early 1987, after so many disappointments, must have been a relief. At Heym's request, Widmann promised to print the interview in its entirety.

This is how it appeared in the "taz" on February 18, 1987. 304 Segal's thesis was very well received by the left in the Federal Republic and in West Berlin, the paper's core readership at the time. 305

Although (or perhaps even because) Heym had done the hard work, the HV A also counted the publication as its success. This is understandable,306 even if Bohnsack exaggerated the role of the HV A.307 The departments for active measures of the eastern state security services measured the success of their AM, among other things, by whether their disinformation theories took on a life of their own and were disseminated behind the scenes by other, i.e. independent multipliers with little or no intelligence assistance.308 If this could be achieved, the active measure had proven successful. By this standard, the

Virus, November 25, 1986; BStU, MfS, HA XX/AKG, No. 6443, pp. 112–114, here 112 and 114.
For the original version of the information with the sender (ie, HA XX) see BStU, MfS, AOP 26320/91, attachment, vol. 19, p. 206 f.

³⁰³ Nölte, Joachim: BStU, AR 2, HA KuSch/AKG-KA HM; Nölte, Joachim, Reg.-No. XV 2553/80: BStU, AR 2, RoHo F16; OibE "Tell", Reg. No. XV 2553/80: BStU, AR 2, RoHo F22; Salary master card, Reg. No. XV 2553/80: BStU, AR 2, Dept. Fin./Dept. 6-BSK OibE.

³⁰⁴ Feddersen, Jan; Gast, Wolfgang: How the AIDS virus came to Fort Detrick. In: taz, January 9, 2010, <http://www.taz.de/1/archiv/digitaz/artikel/?ressort=hi&dig=2010/01/09/a0021&cHash=7c6cade87e/>.

³⁰⁵ Feddersen and Gast wrote: "The left-wing scene eagerly absorbed the thesis: Finally, as it was received, the disease not only has a name, but also a culprit: the USA, already enemy number one under then-President Ronald Reagan." Ibid.

³⁰⁶ Bohnsack; Brehmer: Mission to Mislead (note 3), p. 220.

³⁰⁷ Geißler: AIDS and its pathogens (note 13), p. 130.

³⁰⁸ Siehe Selvage, Douglas: Operation Synonym. Czechoslovak State Security, Sovi-et-Bloc Active Measures and the Helsinki Process, 1976–1983. In: Wegener Friis, Thomas; Buýhak, Wýadysýaw (Hg.): Need to Know: Intelligence and Politics, Western and Eastern Perspectives. Odense 2014 (in Kürze erscheinend), S. 14.

Heym's personal commitment to Segal's version of the Fort Detrick thesis was a success—both for the HV A and for the KGB. From a "Chekist" perspective, Heym therefore served as an unwitting multiplier of their disinformation thesis. He himself, of course, viewed the situation differently. He supported Jakob Segal in publishing his thesis, which provided further evidence of the dangers of the US armament program, against the resistance of Western agencies and the (alleged) censorship of the SED. The publication of the Heym interview and the actions within the framework of the "Denver" operation were certainly topics of discussion between the HV A/X and the KGB. One week after the publication in the "taz," Pfeifer flew to Moscow under his working name "Glaser," accompanied by the Soviet liaison officer to the HV A/X in Berlin, Yevgenii Ditschenkow, for a "short-term consultation" with the First HV of the KGB on active measures.³⁰⁹

Another unplanned success for HV A/X came when Kuno Kruse of the taz newspaper decided to publish an anthology containing the Heym interview, Segal's study, and other scholars' comments on the matter—including Hatch's—in the taz newspaper. The MfS learned of Kruse's plans by May 1987 at the latest.³¹⁰ In his introduction to the brochure

In "AIDS: Pathogens from the Genetic Laboratory?", published in June 1987, Kruse left it open whether he considered Segal's study to be true or not. However, he justified its publication with an argument often found among supporters of conspiracy theories: everything must be open to discussion. In this case, it was stated: "As long as [...] clear evidence [for the Africa theory] cannot be presented, the question of laboratory production [...] must also be open to discussion when considering the origin of the novel pathogen."

Furthermore, the scientists' alleged "assumption" that "the virus [...] originated in the sultry swamps of the Dark Continent" was part of "Eurocentric thinking." Therefore, the thesis fit with the deep concerns that the Green Party and other peace and environmental activists in West Berlin and the Federal Republic had about genetic engineering, biological weapons, and their potential alliance. Kruse wrote:

³⁰⁹ Memo from Colonel Wagenbreth, Head of HV A/X, to the Head of Dept. X, Major General Damm, February 12, 1987; BStU, MfS, Dept. X, No. 1123, p. 36. Regarding Ditschenkow, see Müller-Enbergs: Main Administration A (note 28), p. 171.

³¹⁰ Information G/019264/12/05/87/02, 13.5.1987; BStU, MfS, AOP 26320/91, appendix, vol. 20, pp. 49 ff.

"Regardless of the outcome of the debate summarized in this book, Professor Segal certainly already deserves credit for having drawn the attention that the issue of AIDS rightly attracts to another possible threat to humanity: the frightening prospect of the development of new biological weapons through genetic engineering."³¹¹

The brochure ultimately consisted of Heym's interview with Segal,³¹² criticisms of Segal's thesis by Western scientists,³¹³ a reply by Jakob Segal to the criticisms,³¹⁴ and the slightly revised original text "AIDS - Nature and Origin".³¹⁵ It also included some contributions from the thematic area – such as criticism of genetic engineering and other theories on the artificial origin of the AIDS pathogen.³¹⁶

At that time, not only peace activists in the Federal Republic of Germany defended Segal's thesis, arguing that it – even if it were wrong – at least pointed to the dangers of genetic engineering. For example, the East German peace activist and civil rights activist Ehrhart Neubert, then AIDS advisor of the Evangelical Church, also argued that

³¹¹ Kruse, Kuno: Foreword. In: Kruse (ed.): Pathogens from the Gene Laboratory? (note 125). S. 5 f., yesterday 6.

³¹² Jakob Segal in conversation with Stefan Heym. AIDS – man made in the USA. In: ibid., pp. 15–30.

³¹³ Interview with Prof. Meinrad Koch. Genetic engineering – an imitation of nature. In: ibid., pp. 31–35; Burger, Rudolf: A technological miracle. In: ibid., pp. 36–43; Müller-Hill: Possibilities are proven by facts (note 125), pp. 44–46; Röhl, Roland: Frankenstein's serious flaws. In: ibid., p. 47.

³¹⁴ Ibid., pp. 48–58.

³¹⁵ Segal; Segal: Nature and Origin (note 134), pp. 79–127. This German version was not the "original text," but a slightly revised version of the German text, which is available in French translation in the files of the Federal Institute of St. Petersburg (BStU) with a research status as of August 1986. See Segal, Prof. Dr. Jakob; Segal, Dr. Lilli: Le SIDA – sa nature et son origine (State of Knowledge August 86); BStU, MfS, HA VII/1, ZMA No. 935, pp. 90–139. The German version in Kruse's anthology, for example, included a new passage about Essex's distancing from the vervet monkey theory in December 1986. Segal; Segal: Natur und Ursprung (note 134), p. 103.

³¹⁶ Hatch, Booby (pseud.): AIDS – a legacy of research? In: ibid., pp. 59–67; Bullard, Linda: The new living weapons. In: ibid., pp. 68–71; Sander, Uwe: Experiment with viruses, pp. 72–78.

Church in the GDR.³¹⁷ He defended Segal's thesis, which he knew from the Heym interview and from the information service "epd-Entwicklungs politik," against Erhard Geißler's criticism. It was not about "framing the genetic engineers," as Geißler had claimed, "but rather about naming the dangers and drawing social consequences."³¹⁸ Nevertheless, Neubert did not believe in the laboratory "accident theory"

of AIDS, whether by Segal or »Booby Hatch«,
Africa theory, which he rejected as racially motivated.³²⁰ In 1987, he created his own
alternative conspiracy theory:
³²¹ The term "AIDS" was invented by conservatives in the USA to push back the "emancipatory movements" of the 1960s and 1970s.

³²² The transmission of the "AIDS myth" through the mass media would have "reinforced old, latently effective sexist prejudices by marking the 'risk groups' (homosexuals, bisexuals, promiscuous people and drug addicts) and made them plausible with the help of scientific language."

Through "various monkey theories" of the origin of AIDS, "the derogatory 'chain of infection' of monkeys, Negroes, and homosexuals" was also constituted, thus strengthening racist prejudices. ³²³ Although Neubert left open the possibility of a genuine AIDS disease, he suggested that it did not exist. He wrote in 1989: "AIDS, if this definition can hold up at all, is at best one disease among others.

³¹⁷ For Neubert's status as AIDS advisor for the Protestant Church, see Geene, Raimund: AIDS Policy: A Clinical Picture Between Medicine, Politics, and Health Promotion. Frankfurt/Main, 2000, p. 306.

³¹⁸ Neubert called Segal's theory, along with the "Booby Hatch" theory, the (laboratory) "accident theory" for the origin of the AIDS pathogen. He wrote: "The value of this accident theory lies primarily in its reference to the dangers of genetic engineering." Neubert, Ehrhart: Between Fear and Devotion. Socio-ethical and Theological Aspects of AIDS. Berlin 1989, p. 150, fn. 31. This quote is from Geißler, Erhard: Frankenstein's Death – Remarks on a Discussion. In: Sinn und Form 38 (1986) 1, pp. 158–177, here 168.

³¹⁹ Neubert: Between Fear and Attention (note 318), p. 24 f.

³²⁰ Ibid., p. 44.

³²¹ Schröder, Richard: AIDS. Critical Comments on Ehrhart Neubert's AIDS Study. In: Zeichen der Zeit 43 (1989) 3, pp. 68–73, here 69. Schröder used the term "conspiracy theory."

³²² Neubert: Between Fear and Affection (note 318), pp. 21–24. See also Neubert, Ehrhart: Education about AIDS. In: Signs of the Times 43 (1989) 3, pp. 62–68, yesterday 62 f.

³²³ Neubert: Education about AIDS (note 322), p. 63.

A disease that has so far not made any significant appearance, either statistically or in any other parameters.³²⁴ In 1987, he wrote: 'Christian doctors and medical institutions should never diagnose AIDS, but rather name the diseases from which the patients actually suffer.'³²⁵ Neubert received criticism for this from the Protestant theologian and philosopher Richard Schröder, who wrote in 1989:

»[...] apart from the fact that theologians should never prescribe diagnostic rules to physicians, the diagnosis of AIDS is by no means useless, for it names the hidden cause of the various diseases from which the patients obviously suffer, and thus opens up ways, unfortunately not yet to therapy, but certainly to disease prevention.«³²⁶

With his thesis, Neubert became a pioneer of the AIDS deniers around the US molecular biologist Peter Duesberg, who also deny the disease AIDS, but furthermore deny that the

HIV alone causes AIDS.³²⁷ John Lauritsen, a writer for the gay newspaper New York Native and one of the most well-known AIDS deniers in the USA, approvingly quoted Neubert in 1991: "It is not the virus, but the [AIDS] diagnosis that kills."³²⁸ As will be shown below (Section 6.5), such AIDS denial led to catastrophic consequences for the prevention and treatment of AIDS.

Although the MfS apparently had no interest in Neubert's thesis, the HV A/X was particularly pleased with Kruse's brochure.

On 29 June 1987, she wrote to her Bulgarian colleagues about the active

³²⁴ Neubert: Between Fear and Attention (note 318), p. 133 f.

³²⁵ Neubert, Ehrhart: Case Study AIDS. A Socially Critical Study. Berlin 1987 (Theological Studies Department of the Federation of Protestant Churches in the GDR, Contributions B. Social Diaconia; 15). For internal church use only, p. 12. The complete study is filed in: BStU, MfS, HA XX/4, No. 1181, pp. 1–125.

³²⁶ Schröder: AIDS (note 321), p. 68.

³²⁷ See Neubert's postscript on Duesberg's work in: Neubert: Between Fear and Attention (note 318), p. 164.

³²⁸ Lauritsen, John: HIV VooDoo From Burroughs-Wellcome. In: New York Native, January 7, 1991. The article is available online on Peter Duesberg's website, "Duesberg on AIDS": <http://www.duesberg.com/media/jlvooodoo-2.html>. Lauritsen cited an essay by Neubert in 1991: Neubert, Ehrhart: Art Product "AIDS" in Difficulties, Space & Time, Special Issue 4 (October 1990), pp. 98–102. This special issue of the "naturopathic and science-critical" journal was titled "AIDS' – the disease that doesn't exist." Geene: AIDS Politics (note 317), p. 308.

Measure »Detrick«, which appears to be a continuation of the object-The Denver incident was:

»The active measure to discredit the United States by exploiting the AIDS issue continues to be successfully implemented. Media publications in more than 50 countries have been recorded so far, as well as a strong positive impact of the measure, especially on political leadership circles in Africa. US statements on the measure assume that the United States has suffered serious foreign policy damage and that its reputation has declined, especially in developing countries [...]. The intention is to continue the AIDS measure and to target it even more specifically against the most aggressive circles of US monopoly capital:

- against the preparation and planning of a biological weapons war by the USA,
- against US military bases abroad (thesis: AIDS is caused by US military),
- on the disruption of the US's foreign policy relations and
- on the initiation of political disputes in the USA.

Support is requested for the further implementation of this measure. Reference can be made, among other things, to a publication produced in the Federal Republic of Germany or West Berlin, which appeared in June 1987 under the title: 'AIDS pathogens from the genetic laboratory'"³²⁹

For this purpose, the HV A/X sent a copy of the freshly printed brochure to the Bulgarian "comrades." They viewed this publication as part of their active measure "Detrick." ³³⁰

According to the standards of the HV A/X, the mention of Segal's thesis in Johannes Mario Simmel's bestselling novel "But with the Clowns Came the Tears" (1987) could also be considered a success. The denial of the thesis at the end by the novel's hero should not have been considered a "brilliant own goal" by the HV A.³³¹ The departments for active measures, for example, also considered it a success when Western governments publicly contradicted their disinformation theories, because such denials created new publicity for the original disinformation.³³² For them, the principle "No publicity is bad publicity" had long been valid. This attitude was not fundamentally wrong. The Simmel novel itself "directly addressed the Fort-Detrick hypothesis and specifically the interview with Segal by Stefan

³²⁹ Recording (presumably from the HV A/X), June 29, 1987; COMDOS-Arch-R, F. 9, op. 4, ae 676, p. 46 f.

³³⁰ Ibid.

³³¹ See Geißler: AIDS Conspiracy (note 20).

³³² Selvage: Operation »Synonym« (Anm. 308), S. 14.

Heym³³³ and presumably created a new audience for both. Following the film adaptation of the novel in 1990, newspaper articles appeared that addressed the potential harm of Western genetic engineering, including in relation to the activities of the US government.³³⁴

Although HV A/X no longer exists and can no longer celebrate this success, the article fit the goals cited in the object process "Denver," namely "exposing the dangers to humanity arising from the research, production, and use of biological weapons and reinforcing anti-American reservations."³³⁵ Without the publication of the Heym interview in the "taz," for which HV A had provided covert assistance, Simmel would not have learned of Segal's thesis.

Simmel even called Heym to express his concerns, whereupon Heym defended Segal's thesis.³³⁶ Later, Heym would campaign for the publication of the novel in the GDR, not least because he saw in it "the misanthropic and contemptuous policies and practices of imperialism" – also in the area of "genetic warfare" – were exposed.³³⁷ In Heym as well as in Simmel, the HV A found unconscious multipliers for its disinformation thesis, who were active and useful without any further action on the part of the HV A.

4.6 Support from the MfS and SED: muzzle for East German critic

The MfS provided the Segals with behind-the-scenes support against other East German scientists who questioned their thesis. And there were quite a few of them. On November 21, 1986, the Segals participated in a colloquium organized by Professor Niels Sönnichsen, head of the

³³³ Geißler: AIDS and its pathogens (note 13), p. 231.

³³⁴ Lilli Segal, for example, kept such an article in her private archive, but without any indication of which edition or publication it came from.

See genetic research: This is where the stuff that nightmares are made of is created.
BArch, NY 4516, vorl. K. 12, np

³³⁵ Plan of joint and coordinated active measures of the intelligence agencies of the Ministry of the Interior of the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the Ministry of State Security of the GDR for 1987 and 1988, Berlin, September 3, 1986; COMDOS-Arch-R, F. 9, op. 4, ae 670, pp. 108–119, here 112.

³³⁶ Geißler: AIDS and its pathogens (note 13), p. 231.

³³⁷ HA XX/7, Information on the current conduct of Stefan Heym, October 30, 1987; BStU, MfS, AOP 26320/91, Vol. 20, p. 123 f.

AIDS Advisory Group of the GDR Ministry of Health.

Sönnichsen later reported to the Minister of Health of the GDR, Ludwig Mecklinger, that "an extremely lively and controversial, at times polemical discussion [...] took place, in which all the speakers (except Segal) expressed that there was no basis for the theory of Prof.

Segal could provide some clues, but no conclusive evidence existed. Prof. Segal was not dissuaded from his opinion." Sönnichsen was aware of the political dimension of the thesis. He reported to Mecklinger:

"The speakers unanimously took the view that there is no doubt about the aggressiveness of US imperialism and that it will undoubtedly use all means at its disposal. However, if the claim is made that HIV was produced in the USA using genetic engineering for biological warfare, this must be conclusively proven. Otherwise, it can only have negative consequences for the GDR and the other socialist countries."³³⁸

Rosenthal, also a member of this AIDS advisory group, shared Sönnichsen's assessment of the meeting. He warned that Segal was "making GDR science look ridiculous internationally." Segal's thesis was "below high school level," according to Rosenthal. Segal's claim that genetic recombination of viruses was impossible in nature and that the AIDS virus must therefore be a product of artificial production was particularly "of the utmost primitiveness."³³⁹ Lilli Segal recalled that Prof. Erhard Geißler, then head of department at the Central Institute for Molecular Biology in Berlin-Buch and also a member of the advisory group, had "attacked the thesis quite vehemently" at the colloquium.³⁴⁰ Shortly after the publication of the Heym interview, Sönnichsen criticized her thesis in "Der Spiegel." In response to a question from Der Spiegel, he explained: "What Segal says is a hypothesis, not an original one, by the way. Others have put it forward before him. If we open Meyer's Lexicon, under 'Hypothe-

³³⁸ Sönnichsen, Niels: To the Minister of Health, Gen. Prof. Dr. sc. med. Ludwig Mecklinger, November 24, 1986, with attachment: Report on a colloquium at the Charité Dermatology Clinic on November 21, 1986; Federal Archives Lichtenberg (BAL), DQ 1/12727, quoted in: Geißler: "Dear AIDS..." (note 7), p. 101.

³³⁹ Dept. XX/3, BV Berlin, Report: Prof. Segal, March 17, 1987; BStU, MfS, HA XX, No. 7101, pp. 306 ff., here 306.

³⁴⁰ Geißler; Sprinkle: Disinformation squared (note 9), p. 66.

sex: Hypothesis is an unproven opinion. That is my comment.«³⁴¹

Although Sönnichsen left the question of the origin of the HIV virus open, Geißler and Rosenthal wanted to publish an article in the GDR against Segal's thesis.³⁴²

Against this backdrop of resistance to Segal's position in scientific circles in the GDR, Department 1 of HA XX of the MfS, responsible for health care, contacted Kurt Seidel, head of the Health Policy Department of the SED Central Committee. HA XX/1 reported after the meeting that Seidel was "aware of the context surrounding the publication of Prof. Segal's views on the AIDS problem" and was "supported by him." Seidel immediately recognized that "a domestic discussion of Segal's hypotheses" by critical East German scientists "counteracts the political objective of these publications and must be prevented." Seidel would inform Sönnichsen "accordingly that no publicity-related activities on AIDS would take place without his [Seidel's] consent."

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This not only reaffirmed the SED's GDR-wide ban on publications on the origin of the HIV virus, but also extended it to foreign countries for Segal's opponents. This gave Segal, as an East German scientist, a virtual monopoly on publications on the origin of AIDS abroad, just as the Stasi wanted.

HA XX/1 had little to worry about Seidel not considering their request. Seidel, who had been recruited in 1967 by the Dresden branch of the MfS as IM "Fritz Steiner," was taken on as IM by HA XX/1 in 1971, when he was appointed head of the mental hospital at the Charité in Berlin. After he took up a full-time position in the Central Committee of the SED in 1978, his IM activity ended due to the prohibition on secret police involvement in the party apparatus. Therefore, an agreement was reached between HA XX/1 and Seidel to "maintain official contact [...] in the future." ³⁴⁴ As IM "Fritz Steiner," and later as department head in the Central Committee of the SED, Seidel worked closely with the MfS and Soviet governments.

³⁴¹ Bickerich, W.; Schwarz, U.: Nothing can be prevented with punishment: East Berlin dermatologist Niels Sönnichsen in an interview about AIDS in the GDR. In: Der Spiegel, March 9, 1987, pp. 31–40, here 40.

³⁴² Geißler: "Dear AIDS..." (note 7), p. 106.

³⁴³ HA XX/1, memo, March 11, 1987; BStU, MfS, AOP 26320/91, appendix, vol. 20, p. 19.

³⁴⁴ Olt. Jaekel, Final Report on the IM Case "Fritz Steiner," November 7, 1983; BStU, MfS, AIM 13788/83, Vol. 1, P. 198; Seidel's Declaration of Commitment, October 23, 1967; ibid., p. 41a.

agencies in defending Soviet psychiatry against accusations and condemnation in the World Psychiatric Association for political abuse.³⁴⁵ Even before the AIDS problem emerged, Seidel had experience in helping the MfS and Moscow with joint projects.

After his conversation with the Stasi, Seidel warned the scientists Geißler and Rosenthal. Geißler recalled: "If we publish this, people would have to assume we were conducting CIA business."³⁴⁶

Jakob Segal later wrote of a compromise whereby neither he nor his numerous critics in East German science were allowed to publish on the origin of the AIDS virus in the GDR.³⁴⁷

Seidel, the Stasi, and Segal also wanted to prevent East German scientists outside the GDR from publishing criticisms of Segal's thesis. For this reason, and because of the popularization of his thesis outside the GDR, Segal can be considered a beneficiary of both the Stasi and the Central Committee of the SED.

But the GDR's AIDS experts neither gave up their private criticism of Segal nor their attempts to overturn the Central Committee's publication ban.

Sönnichsen, for example, explained to an MfS informant shortly after Seidel's decision:

"It is an undisputed fact that Professor Segal has backing; otherwise, it would be impossible for him to operate unhindered in this way. He is a Soviet citizen (with a passport), but has lived in the GDR for about 30 years and now travels around as a pensioner. Professor Sönnichsen's opinion: Whoever backs him must discipline him."³⁴⁸

Interestingly, Sönnichsen and Segal's critics seemed to be the staff in Department XX of the Charité responsible for monitoring the Berlin district administration to their cause,³⁴⁹ which, however,

³⁴⁵ See Süß, Sonja: Politically Abused? Psychiatry and State Security in the GDR. Berlin 1998, pp. 182–183, 584–589, 593–600, 603–611, 615–619, and 628–632.

³⁴⁶ Geißler: "Dear AIDS..." (note 7), p. 106.

³⁴⁷ Letter from Jakob Segal to the Deputy Minister of Health of the GDR, Ulrich Schneidewind, October 3, 1987; BStU, MfS, HA XX, No. 7101, p. 319.

³⁴⁸ Drewitz, Dept. XX/3, BV Berlin, Report, March 16, 1987; BStU, BV Berlin, Dept. XX, No. 3822, pp. 30 ff., here 31.

³⁴⁹ See, for example, Department XX/3 [of the Berlin Federal Office for Social Affairs], Information: Activities of Prof. Segal regarding the dissemination of his views on the origin of the AIDS virus (LAV), March 18, 1987; BStU, MfS, HA XX, No. 7101, p. 304 f.

had no demonstrable impact on the support of the HV A or the superior MfS offices for the work of the Segals.

In the fall of 1987, there were signs that the publication ban on critics of Segal's thesis was beginning to crumble. On October 2, Segal complained to Deputy Health Minister Ulrich Schneidewind about various publications in the GDR by AIDS experts that "claimed practically the opposite of what Segal considered verifiable" (Schneidewind). Among other things, he cited a publication by Rosenthal in the East German CDU daily newspaper "Neue Zeit."

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The newspaper became a platform for opponents of Segal's thesis. One day after Segal's conversation with Schneidewind, the newspaper quoted Geissler as saying that he had "vigorously" rejected the claim that "the HIV virus, the AIDS pathogen, was created through genetic manipulation."

³⁵¹ The HV A switched to defense. It commissioned Dehmlow, alias "Nils," via HA VII/7, to prepare an article for the "Neue Zeit" newspaper, which it described as a "counter-speech to Prof. Rosenthal." should have served. Dehmlow fulfilled the order in December 1987,³⁵² but the article was apparently never published in the "Neue Zeit."³⁵³ In January 1988, the newspaper even published an interview with the leading American AIDS researcher Robert Gallo, who openly spoke of a natural origin of the virus and its transmission from monkeys to humans.³⁵⁴ Despite Segal's massive protests,³⁵⁵ the publication ban in force in the GDR became the origin of the HIV virus against him –

but also his opponents – not abolished.

Geißler, on the other hand, achieved a personal success when he took part in the congress of the American Association for the Advancement of Science in early 1989.

³⁵⁰ Deputy Minister of Health Prof. Dr. Schneidewind, conversation with comrade Prof. Dr. Jacob Segal, emeritus of the Humboldt University of Berlin, October 2, 1987; BStU, MfS, HA XX, No. 7101, pp. 317 ff., here 317.

³⁵¹ Klages, Eberhard: Ethical questions of genetic engineering: Study by Prof. Dr. Erhard Geißler in "Notebooks from Burgscheidungen." In: Neue Zeit, October 3, 1987, p. 7.

³⁵² Oltm. Theisinger, Meeting Report: IMS "Nils," December 3, 1987; BStU, MfS, AIM 4835/88, Vol. 2, p. 17 f.

³⁵³ Full-text searches of "Neue Zeit" in the journal information system (ZEFYS) of the Berlin State Library did not yield any corresponding articles. See <http://zefys.staatsbibliothek-berlin.de/ddr-presse/>.

³⁵⁴ Five years after the discovery: A conversation with American AIDS specialist Prof. Dr. Robert Gallo. In: Neue Zeit, January 14, 1988, p. 7.

³⁵⁵ Schneidewind, conversation with Segal, October 2, 1987, pp. 317–318; letter from Segal to Schneidewind, October 3, 1987; BStU, MfS, HA XX, No. 7101, p. 319.

in San Francisco, USA. The German Press Agency (dpa) quoted his statement on the sidelines of the congress that Segal's thesis was an "unappetizing political thriller" and "total nonsense."³⁵⁶ After Geissler returned to Berlin, he was summoned to the Central Committee. Seidel informed him that Segal had denounced him to Axen: "I would travel around the heartland of the class enemy and denounce him, the good communist Segal." Seidel, who by then had also had trouble with Segal, listened to Geissler's criticism of Segal's thesis. Geissler believed he had convinced Seidel. In the end, Segal's denunciation had "no adverse consequences" for Geissler. Nevertheless, the ban on publishing information on the origin of the AIDS virus officially remained in place until the fall of the Berlin Wall, and Segal was never "called back" by the SED.

³⁵⁷ This remained the case, although in the spring of 1989 Seidel assured Prof. Rüdiger von Baehr, the director of the Institute for Medical Immunology at the Charité and, alongside Sönnichsen, one of the leading AIDS researchers in the GDR, that "this campaign [on AIDS] should now be ended" and that "Segal should no longer appear in this form." ³⁵⁸ Both Segal and the HV A apparently disagreed. So-

4.7 The Segals as beneficiaries of HV A/SWT, 1987–1989

While there is no documentary evidence for the years 1985 to 1986 that would prove that the MfS supported the Segals and their research and lecture activities, the situation is different for the period after 1987.

The first evidence of such assistance dates back to a meeting between Dehmlow (IMS "Nils") and his commanding officer in HA VII/7, Theisinger, and with Thielemann from HV A/SWT/XIII/5 on 27 August 1987.

During this meeting, Thielemann explicitly commissioned Dehmlow to provide "professional and scientific support to Prof. Segal." Furthermore, Thielemann tasked "Nils" with developing "scientifically sound counterarguments against the common theory" of the artificial production of the AIDS pathogen.

³⁵⁶ DPA report, January 17, 1989; reprinted in: Geißler, Erhard: Anthrax and the Failure of the Intelligence Services. Berlin 2003, pp. 249–250.

³⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 250.

³⁵⁸ Major Dewitz, Dept. XX/3, BV Berlin, Report: Cooperation with the Federal Republic of Germany in the field of AIDS research, May 11, 1989; BStU, MfS, BV Berlin, Dept. XX, No. 3855, pp. 21 ff., here 22.

through genetic engineering and the "checking of Prof. Segal's environment for possible enemy attacks as well as for possible persons, 359 which support the above theory",

At the meeting, Thielemann even offered Dehmlow a new position at an institute of the Academy of Sciences in Berlin-Buch. The position would have involved the IM being taken over by HV A/SWT/XIII/5. However, Dehmlow, supported by Theisinger, declined.³⁶⁰

The job offer was presumably the HV A/SWT/XIII/5's reaction to Dehmlow's growing professional problems. His position at the People's Police Hospital became increasingly difficult as a result of the harsh criticism of Segal's thesis at the colloquium at the Charité in November 1986.³⁶¹ One of Dehmlow's superiors had decided after the colloquium that Dehmlow should generally cease his research on "all sorts of unimportant problems, such as AIDS, UVB, etc." at the KHDVP and his collaboration "with the senile old Professor Segal".³⁶² The superior wanted Dehmlow's labor to be used for his own research project.³⁶³ He even claimed to Dehmlow that "the Enlightenment" – i.e., the HV A – had instructed him "to slow down Segal and especially me [Dehmlow], we had already caused enough damage – through our activities we had exposed a source of 'A' who was very close to the situation."³⁶⁴ Dehmlow then replied to his superior that "Prof. Segal's activities are covered by Comrade Axen at home and abroad."

365 After Dehmlow's "consultation with Dieter" (van de Sand?)³⁶⁶, Segal and Dehmlow turned to Uhlig in January 1987, the

³⁵⁹ Olt. Theisinger, HA VII/7, Treffbericht: IMS »Nils«, 27.8.1987; BStU, MfS, AIM 4835/88, Bd. I, Bl. 307 f.

³⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 308.

³⁶¹ At van de Sand's request to HA VII/7, Dehmlow, under the alias "Nils," prepared and submitted a report on the colloquium. See note from Colonel Bethge, Head of HA VII/7, to the Head of HVA/SWT/13, January 6, 1987; BStU, MfS, AIM 4835/88, Vol. I, pp. 177–189, here 177.

³⁶² Olt. Theisinger, HA VII/7, file note, January 21, 1987; BStU, MfS, AIM 4835/88, Vol. I, pp. 222 ff., here 222. See also IM "Nils," HA VII/7, report, November 26, 1986; BStU, MfS, AIM 4835/88, Bd. I, Bl. 175 f.

³⁶³ See the handwritten notes of "Nils," n.d.; BStU, MfS, AIM 4835/88, Vol. I, pp. 192 f., here 193.

³⁶⁴ IM "Nils," HA VII/7, report, November 26, 1986; ibid., pp. 175 ff., here 175.

³⁶⁵ Handwritten notes by "Nils," n.d.; ibid., pp. 192 f., here 193.

³⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 192.

Medical Director of the KHdVP. Uhlig, who had also participated in the colloquium in November 1986, confirmed his support for Segal's thesis and offered to create a new position for Dehmlow at the government hospital, outside the area of responsibility of the dissatisfied superior in the KHdVP. Dehmlow should continue his previous research with Segal and contact Uhlig directly if he encountered further difficulties.³⁶⁷ Uhlig was presumably aware of the secret police connections because he was listed as OibE by HA VII/7.³⁶⁸ Despite the claims of the superior dissatisfied with Dehmlow, there were no indications that the "Enlightenment" or at least the HV A/SWT/XIII/5 had ended their support for Segal's work. The problems at the KHdVP were not permanently resolved, and Dehmlow repeatedly came into conflict with his superior.³⁶⁹ Dehmlow continued to hope for support from the MfS for his proposal to create a research position for medical biophysical chemistry at the government hospital—to continue his previous research on UVB, HOT, and AIDS.³⁷⁰ This could explain why he turned down the position at the Academy of Sciences offered by the HV A/SWT.

Despite his problems in the KHdVP, Dehmlow fulfilled the assignment from HV A/SWT/XIII/5 to support Jakob Segal in his academic work.³⁷¹ And he was by no means alone. On October 11, 1987, Dehmlow, alias "Nils," provided an assessment of a person in the Segals' circle.³⁷² "Nils" wrote about the target person, a "new acquaintance of Prof. Segal":

»He is extremely attentive and helpful to Prof. Segal and his wife (even driving to the train station when traveling, etc.) [...]. His personal interest in AIDS is

³⁶⁷ IM, HA VII/7, Information, 7.1.1987; BStU, MfS, AIM 4835/88, Vol. I, pp. 197 f., here 197.

³⁶⁸ See Uhlig's MfS personnel file: BStU, MfS, KS 29084/90, especially pages 2 and 31–44.

³⁶⁹ Theisinger, memo, January 21, 1987, pp. 222–233; "Nils," handwritten note, May 20, 1987; BStU, MfS, AIM 4835/88, Vol. I, p. 266.

³⁷⁰ See draft concept for the Research Center for Medical Biophysical Chemistry, n.d.; ibid., pp. 224–233; Oltn. Theisinger, HA VII/7, meeting report, IMS "Nils," January 7, 1987; ibid., pp. 190–191.

³⁷¹ Oltn. Theisinger, Meeting Report: IMS "Nils," September 30, 1987; ibid., Vol. I, pp. 312 f., here 313.

³⁷² Theisinger, HA VII/7/3, Information, Auftrag HV A, 12.11.1987; BStU, MfS, AIM 4835/88, Bd. 2, Pg. 5.

still understandable – also in terms of operational work – however, the immediate effort (help with purchasing the computer, setting it up, running it, creating disks, organizing programs, library work also in West Berlin, involving one of his documentarians, etc.) is unusual. 373

Dehmlow concluded that the Segals' new helper "with a probability bordering on certainty [...] must be an employee of our security forces."374 This was indeed the case. The helpful person was registered as IMA "Jörg" for HV A/SWT/XIII/5 from February 1986, and the process was managed by van de Sand from April 1987.³⁷⁵ From 1987 to 1989, HV A/SWT/XIII/5 recorded the receipt of at least 39 pieces of information from "Jörg" on genetic engineering, pharmaceutical research, AIDS, and Western medicines.³⁷⁶ For his part, Dehmlow saw good prospects for cooperation with "Jörg" in 1987: "A good collaboration in a professional field is developing between us, which can go beyond the AIDS problem in the narrower sense."³⁷⁷

From April 1988, Dehmlow was able to devote himself fully to Segal's research and other assignments from HV A/SWT/XIII/5. He became the head of a research center for medical biophysical chemistry, which corresponded exactly to his ideas. He reported to the GDR Deputy Minister of Health, Ulrich Schneidewind. Thielemann indicated to Theisinger that he had helped to create the position.³⁷⁸ When Dehmlow took up his new position, Thielemann officially took over the file on IMS "Nils" from Theisinger and handed it over to van de Sand shortly thereafter.³⁷⁹ Jakob Segal was employed under Dehmlow as the "scientific director" of the research center, and his wife Lilli as a "documentation consultant."³⁸⁰ Jakob Segal wrote in May 1988 to

³⁷³ "Nils," First brief remarks on [target person], November 10, 1987; BStU, MfS, AIM 4835/88, Vol. 2, p. 6.

³⁷⁴ Ibid.

³⁷⁵ See BStU, AR 2, RoHo, F16 and F22, Reg. No. XV 1229/77, IMS "Jörg".

³⁷⁶ See results for the search query "QUA.RGNR=/*1229/77" in: BStU, MfS, HV A/MD/3, SIRA-TDB 11. The last verifiable information from "Jörg" was sent to van de Sand on May 3, 1989. See SE8962255 in: ibid.

³⁷⁷ "Nils," First Brief Remarks, November 10, 1987; BStU, MfS, AIM 4835/88, Vol. 2, No. 7.

³⁷⁸ Oltn. Theisinger, Meeting Report: IMS "Nils," March 3, 1988; ibid., pp. 47 f., here 48.

³⁷⁹ Theisinger, HA VII/7, Resolution: Dearchiving due to transfer, 21 April 1988; ibid., p. 75; entry for IM "Nils," Reg. No. XV 2987/86; BStU, MfS, HV A/MD/6, SIRA-TDB 21, ZV8815425.

³⁸⁰ Letter from Lilli Segal to an Acquaintance, 13.8.1988; BArch, NY 4516, Carton 12, np

an acquaintance: "We were promised generous funding for staff, equipment, and devices, and we began very slowly and carefully to look for young, interested people."³⁸¹ According to Lilli Segal in an interview with "taz," the new research center would conduct "fundamental AIDS research."³⁸² The new arrangement corresponded to Dehmlow's plan.³⁸³ It made van de Sand's work easier because he knew that Jakob Segal, whom he had "positively identified," Lilli Segal, and the IM "Nils," whom he had taken over, were working in the same environment. He could more easily pass on information to them and more easily collect information from and about them. Apparently, Dehmlow, as "Nils," had continued to serve Segal's research and the defense against "attacks" against the Segals on behalf of HV A/SWT/XIII/5. He had also acquired other scientific information through the same office on behalf of HV A/SWT. For 1989, the HV A recorded a total of 15 pieces of information from "Nils" to van de Sand on biotechnology and AIDS.³⁸⁴ Among them was an "interactive program for displaying protein molecule models."³⁸⁵ Such acquisitions could have been useful both for Segal's research center at the MfG and for the information needs of the HV A/SWT. Van de Sand received further information from a CP named "Bianca" within the security operation "Wind" (she mainly provided public US government documents on AIDS and Fort Detrick),³⁸⁶ which could also have been useful for Segal's research.

³⁸¹ Letter from Jakob Segal to a Professor in Frankfurt/M., 26.5.1988; BArch, NY 4516, worl. K. 13, np

³⁸² Böhm, Charlotte: "We Remain on the Barricades": On the Autobiography of the Biologist and AIDS Researcher, Resistance Fighter, and Jew Lilli Segal. In: *taz*, January 7, 1989, p. 9.

³⁸³ Template: Concept for the Research Center for Medical Biophysical Chemistry, n.d.; BStU, MfS, AIM 4835/88, Vol. I, pp. 224–233.

³⁸⁴ See results for the search query "QUA.RGNR=/*2987/86"; BStU, MfS, HV A/MD/3, SIRA-TDB 11.

³⁸⁵ See *ibid.*, SE8962429.

³⁸⁶ See the entries for incoming information on KP "Bianca" under SVG "Wind" (XV 3824/85); BStU, MfS, HV A/MD/3, SIRA-TDB 11, SE8804673, SE8804674, SE8804675, SE8807521, SE8808066, SE8808880, SE8809393, SE8809394, SE8861596, SE8962192. In 1988, van de Sand recorded "Bianca" in an IM pre-run (XV 726/88). See BStU, MfS, HV A/MD/6, SIRA-TDB 21, ZV8815074.

Journalist Klaus Behling claims that the HV A provided further research assistance to the Segals, which cannot be documented by the "Nils" IM file. Specifically, the HV A obtained a 1969 report from a US congressional committee and passed it on to Segal for publication.³⁸⁷ During that congressional committee meeting, a Dr. Donald MacArthur of the US Department of Defense stated:

"Molecular biology is a field that is making very rapid progress, and respected biologists believe that within a period of five to ten years it would be possible to produce a synthetic biological pathogen that does not exist in nature and against which no natural immunity can be developed."³⁸⁸

For the Segals, the report was considered clear proof that the US government had planned and paid for the production of the AIDS pathogen in advance.³⁸⁹ However, no evidence has yet been found in the BStU archives that the Segals had received the report or an excerpt from it in English or in a German translation from the HV A.

In the case of a second document, a request from the American environmental organization "Foundation for Economic Trends" (FET) to the American Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci III, which the Segals published in translation,³⁹⁰ it can be proven that the HV A passed on a German translation of this document to the "brother organizations," along with the Segals' latest research results for the campaign on the topics of AIDS and Fort Detrick.³⁹¹ The FET request was aimed at eliciting information from the American Department of Defense about whether the Pentagon had ever attempted to develop the virus described by MacArthur.³⁹²

Whether one believes the claims of Bohnsack, Behlings and Boghardt regarding earlier research assistance from HV A for the Segals

³⁸⁷ Behling: Scout a. D. (note 43), p. 253. See also Boghardt: Operation INFEKTION (note 6), p. 17 and fn. 100.

³⁸⁸ Segal, Lilli; Segal, Jakob: AIDS – the trail leads to the Pentagon. 2nd, revised edition, Essen 1990, p. 122.

³⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 68.

³⁹⁰ Ibid., pp. 125–128.

³⁹¹ List of materials submitted by German comrades at the labor consultation in Sofia in 1988 (Bulgarian), n.d.; COMDOS-Arch-R, F. 9, op. 4, ae 691, pp. 109–111.

³⁹² Segal; Segal: AIDS – the trail leads to the Pentagon (note 388), pp. 125–128.

Whether they gave it or not, at least from 1987 onward, there was verifiable support from HV A/SWT/XIII/5 for the Segals' research, for example, the assignments from HV A/SWT/XIII/5 for Dehmlow, the assistance provided to them by IM "Jörg," and the establishment of the special research center for medical biophysical chemistry at the MfG, under whose roof the Segals and Dehmlow were able to advance their research. It is quite possible that the Segals were unaware of this support. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, Jakob Segal told the journalist Kuno Kruse that he had learned about the collaboration of one of his assistants with the Stasi. He and his wife had felt "abused by the Stasi."

and were "very disappointed" with this employee.³⁹³

³⁹³ Telephone interview Douglas Selvage with Kuno Kruse, 29.1.2014.

5

The Limits of the Campaign: The Segals, the Soviet Union, and AIDS Disinformation, 1987–1989

Segal and the HV A/X weren't the only ones who had problems recruiting scientists in the GDR to support their thesis. Mutz, deputy head of department of HV AX, and Pfeifer, deputy head of section of HV AX/1, informed their Bulgarian colleagues in September 1988 that, despite the efforts of the "Soviet comrades," scientists in the USSR were also not inclined to support Segal's thesis.³⁹⁴ The Bulgarian "Chekists," for their part, had similar problems with Bulgarian scientists.³⁹⁵ But it was even worse: In their counter-propaganda, the Americans were able to cite many leading scientists from the USSR who rejected an artificial origin of the HIV virus, considered an African origin probable, or, contrary to Segal's thesis, dated the virus's emergence to before 1977.³⁹⁶

The KGB had failed in its goal of controlling "everything" that was to be published on the subject of AIDS in the USSR and of preventing "the launch of versions of AIDS that were favorable to the USA (such as those about the monkey origin of the disease)." ³⁹⁷

The statements of Soviet scientists against individual points of Segal's assumption served, as the MfS and Seidel had anticipated in the case of the GDR, to refute the thesis of the American government. In August 1987, the American State Department published an exposé on Soviet active measures, in which Moscow's AIDS disinformation campaign was one of the central themes. With regard to the GDR, the Americans only had to

³⁹⁴ D. Stankow, Deputy Head of the First General Assembly of the DS and Head of the 8th Department of the First General Assembly: Report of our discussions with the German comrades on the AM line, November 10, 1988; COMDOS-Arch-R, F. 9, op. 4, ae 691, pp. 86–98, here 92.

³⁹⁵ Report on the discussions held with the German comrades from 26 to 29 September 1989, 10 October 1989; COMDOS-Arch-R, F. 9, op. 4, ae 691, pp. 184–196, here 189.

³⁹⁶ US DOS: Soviet Influence Activities (Anm. 46), S. 36 f.

³⁹⁷ This is how Ivanov expressed himself to his Bulgarian colleagues in May 1986. See L. Nikolov: Information on the meeting with Soviet friends during the international conference on AM in Hungary, May 11–17, 1986 (Bulgarian); COMDOS-Arch-R, F. 9 op. 4, ae 669, pp. 220–221.

They cited Sönnichsen's comment to "Spiegel" to question Segal's thesis. However, they focused on Dr.

Viktor Zhdanov, Director of the Virological Institute of the Soviet Academy of Sciences and the leading AIDS expert in the USSR, devoted an entire section of their report to this. Just five weeks after Zapevalov's article, he had stated in an interview with Soviet Culture that AIDS originated in Central Africa, and in an interview with Literaturnaya Gazeta in May 1986, he had further explained that the AIDS pathogen could have existed in nature for centuries.

At the Second International Conference on AIDS in Paris in June 1986, Zhdanow further stated that data from his institute showed that AIDS already existed in the USSR in 1974, or – according to the US State Department – "three years before Segal claimed that the AIDS virus was 'manufactured' [in the USA]." 398 Jacob Segal was aware of Zhdanow's opposing position and had complained to Axen in June 1986: "So far, there is a very justified suspicion that AIDS is a product of Fort Detrick, USA. Prof. Zhdanow's statement directly encourages blaming the Soviet Union for AIDS." 399

To make up for the defeat of their thesis on the Soviet flank and to build on the success of the Heym interview, the Segals visited Moscow at the end of February 1987 – one week after Pfeifer's meeting with his KGB colleagues. They were there at the official invitation of the Soviet Ministry of Health. The obvious aim was to persuade Soviet scientists to make a public statement in favor of their thesis. Such a step would also have fit in with the plans of the KGB and HV A/X regarding AIDS disinformation. As an "immediate measure," the Segals suggested to the physicians in the Soviet Ministry of Health that "as long an article as possible be published in the 'Literaturnaya Gazeta' based on our reports, if possible by a Soviet author." Furthermore, a detailed article was to be published in a scientific journal, this time by J. and Lilli Segal. Although the Soviet "comrades" allegedly agreed to this "in principle," none of the publications came out.⁴⁰⁰ The Segals also visited Shdanow's Virological Institute, but

³⁹⁸ US DOS: Soviet Influence Activities (Anm. 46), S. 36.

³⁹⁹ Segal, 1. Memorandum, 27.8.1986; BArch, DY 30/26444, np

⁴⁰⁰ Prof. Dr. Jakob Segal and Dr. Lilli Segal, Report on the Trip to Moscow, February 23–27, 1987, n.d.; BStU, BV Berlin, Dept. XX, No. 3822, pp. 16–18, here 17.

Shdanow himself, whom the Segals described as "a determined opponent of our ideas and a supporter of the theory of green monkeys and the African origin of AIDS," had excused himself due to illness. Although the members of the institute present had argued with the Segals about their thesis, the discussion was "conducted sharply, objectively, and in a friendly manner, in keeping with Soviet custom—in any case, much more objectively than with us in Berlin," according to the Segals.⁴⁰¹

The Segals apparently had more luck with the Soviet press. Apparently, the Soviet authorities were now supposed to make use of the publications in the West, sponsored by the Stasi and KGB, as part of their open or "white" propaganda. A central role in the "white"

The Novosti Press Agency (APN) played a role in Soviet propaganda, sending a journalist to the Segals in East Berlin to interview them for the Soviet press.

Jakob Segal attempted to prevent the journalist from publishing the interview in a Soviet military magazine. He feared, Segal claimed, that otherwise there would be "a flood of slander directed at KGB propaganda." Afterward, various articles about Segal's thesis did indeed appear in the Soviet press, not only in the APN's "Moscow News," but also in the aforementioned military magazine. Lilli Segal explained to an MfS informant that "a short time later, there was a clamor of KGB propaganda from over there," and her husband "raged and raged against Novosti."

Jacob Segal accused Novosti of "not being able to think." He wanted to prevent his thesis from being dismissed as KGB propaganda.

⁴⁰²

The possibilities for Soviet propaganda and the chances of winning Soviet scientists as multipliers for Segal's thesis narrowed further as Soviet-American relations improved noticeably following the summit between Reagan and Gorbachev in Reykjavik in October 1986. Washington's pressure on Moscow to stop the AIDS disinformation campaign grew.

Initially, the American efforts had little effect. Just two weeks after the summit, on October 31, 1986, Pravda published an infamous cartoon in which an American officer blamed a scientist for a test tube full of AIDS viruses, which appeared in the form of

⁴⁰¹ Ibid., p. 16. Privately, Lilli Segal stated that Shdanow "should be considered an idiot in his field in professional circles." Major Jahnke, HA XX/9: Transcript (IM report "Maria" of April 10, 1987), April 15, 1987; BStU, MfS, AOP 26320/91, appendix, vol. 20, pp. 33–37, here 35.

⁴⁰² Major Jahnke, HA XX/9: Transcript (IM report "Maria" of April 10, 1987), April 15, 1987; BStU, MfS, AOP 26320/91, appendix, vol. 20, pp. 33–37, here 34.

small swastikas (see cover illustration). This provoked a renewed public protest from Ambassador Hartman.⁴⁰³ At a meeting of the Joint US-USSR Health Committee in Washington in April 1987, US Surgeon General C. Everett Koop made it clear that there would be no cooperation between the two countries in AIDS research until the disinformation was stopped.⁴⁰⁴ A meeting in Moscow in June 1987 between Charles Wick, head of the United States Information Agency (USIA), and Valentin Falin, head of Novosti, ended abruptly when Falin defended a new report from his agency that the CIA had developed ethnic weapons for use against Africans. The information for the press release, Falin claimed, came from Western press reports—a common practice for active measures. A few days later, Falin even confirmed the content of the report on “ethnic weapons” in an interview with Moscow News.

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A turning point was reached in October 1987 during a meeting between US Secretary of State George Shultz and Gorbachev in Moscow, discussing the upcoming summit in Washington. Gorbachev pulled the US State Department's August 1987 report on Soviet active measures from a stack on his desk and began to vehemently criticize it.

Shultz defended the report, which criticized and documented the AIDS disinformation campaign.⁴⁰⁶ As a result of the meeting, the Soviet Academy of Sciences publicly and officially distanced itself from the Fort Detrick thesis in November 1987,⁴⁰⁷ and during the summit in Washington, Politburo member Alexander Yakovlev agreed with USIA director Wick to stop the mutual disinformation. There should be regular meetings in the future to address incidents of disinformation.

⁴⁰³ Geißler; Sprinkle: Disinformation squared (note 9), p. 26.

⁴⁰⁴ US DOS: Soviet Influence Activities (Anm. 46), S. 42.

⁴⁰⁵ Snyder: Warriors of Disinformation (Anm. 76), S. 116 f.

⁴⁰⁶ Atlas, Terry: »Dirty tricks« file upsets Soviets. Gorbachev angered by U.S. report on disinformation. In: Chicago Tribune v. 27.10.1987, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1987-10-27/news/8703200908_1_soviet-efforts-disinformation-kathleen-bailey; Shipley, David K.: Little Report, with Right Spin, Makes Big Splash. In: The New York Times v. 5.11.1987, S. A32. Der Gor-batschow erregende Bericht war US DOS: Soviet Influence Activities (Anm. 46).

⁴⁰⁷ Soviets reject own press charge that AIDS originated as U.S. plot. In: Orlando Sentinel v. 3.11.1987, S. A7.

discuss.⁴⁰⁸ After several further incidents of AIDS disinformation, the President of the AdW, Vadim Pokrovsky, made an official statement on the theory of the American origin of AIDS in the summer of 1988.

There was "not a single Soviet scientist, not a single medical or scientific institution that shares this position."⁴⁰⁹ The First General Staff of the KGB was hit hard by the statement. They explained to their Bulgarian colleagues: "They [the Americans] posed the question like this: If you write about AIDS like that, then there can be no cooperation in the medical field! Pokrovsky had to give an interview under pressure."⁴¹⁰

The KGB's First High Command itself came to the conclusion that if it wanted to continue its AIDS disinformation, it would have to take a "more in-depth and tactical" approach and focus primarily on the vicinity of American military bases. After the summit in Harare, the KGB's First High Command had already set itself and its "brother agencies" the next task of "intensifying the anti-base sentiment in countries with American armed forces with the slogan that US soldiers are the most dangerous carriers of the virus."

⁴¹¹ Following Zapevalov's

article, which allegedly suggested a high number of AIDS-infected people among US military personnel,⁴¹² the Literurnaya Gazeta delivered further "black propaganda." In April 1986, it reported on an alleged decision by the Honduran parliament to relocate American military bases to isolated areas so that soldiers would not spread the virus among the local population.

⁴⁰⁸ White House, Memorandum of Conversation, Working Luncheon with General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, 10.12.1987, 12 S., S. 8. In: Savranskaya, Svetlana; Blanton, Tom (Hg.): The INF [Intermediate Nuclear Forces] Treaty and Washington Summit: 20 Years Later. In: National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book (NSAEBB) 237(2007). Verfügbar online: <http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB238/usdocs/Doc%2019%20%28Working%20Lunch%20Reagan%20Gorby%2012.10.87%29.pdf>.

⁴⁰⁹ Snyder: Warriors of Disinformation (Anm. 76), S. 182 f.

⁴¹⁰ D. Stankov, Notes on the discussions with Service "A" of the First General Staff of the KGB in Moscow from October 25 to 28, 1988, regarding cooperation with Department 8 of the First General Staff of the DS (Bulgarian), November 28, 1988. In: Kirjakowa; Angelowa (eds.): KGB i DS (note 29), pp. 1870–1903, here 1884.

⁴¹¹ Ibid.

⁴¹² Zapewalow: Panic in the West (note 53), p. 172. A scientific study in the USA, however, found that the spread of AIDS among US military personnel was lower than among the general population.

can.⁴¹³ In May 1986, it reported on alleged concerns in other countries that "the USA had not taken effective steps to initiate quarantine measures against the spread of AIDS outside the USA." In this context, it pointed to public appeals in Japan, where ships of the American fleet were to be kept away from Japanese ports for fear of infection with the AIDS pathogen.⁴¹⁴ The KGB considered it a success that there was a large demonstration in 1988 calling for the closure of American bases in Seoul because of the alleged threat of AIDS. The next target was to be Western Europe.

The "Soviet friends," according to the Bulgarian State Security, had "[...] prepared relevant leaflets with caricatures and data on the number of American military personnel and distributed them in Western European countries."⁴¹⁵ The Bulgarians should also have contributed, according to the KGB, by using their "communication channels" with Turkey to "spread the anti-American, anti-base sentiment."

to "activate" them there.⁴¹⁶ The HV A/X also put pressure on the Bulgarians to initiate corresponding measures in Turkey, Greece and the Arab countries.⁴¹⁷ However, it remains unclear whether the Bulgarian Department for Active Measures, Unit 8 of the 1st HV of the DS, has done much in

⁴¹³ Wesensky, Vladimir: Epidemia so severa? [Epidemic from the North?]. In: LG v. April 1, 1986, p. 9. The allegation that the AIDS epidemic in Honduras originated in US military bases is scientifically controversial and likely false. See Smallman, Shawn C.: *The AIDS Pandemic in Latin America*. Charlotte Hill 2007, pp. 153–154.

⁴¹⁴ SPID (note 86), p. 15; For the appeals in Japan, see Sabatier, Renée: *Blaming Others: Prejudice, Race and Worldwide AIDS*. London et al. 1988, p. 115.

⁴¹⁵ D. Stankov, Notes on the discussions with Service "A" of the First General Staff of the KGB in Moscow from October 25 to 28, 1988, regarding cooperation with Department 8 of the First General Staff of the DS (Bulgarian), November 28, 1988. In: Kirjakowa; Angelowa (eds.): *KGB i DS* (note 29), pp. 1870–1903, here 1884.

⁴¹⁶ Ibid.; D. Stankov, Deputy Head of the First High Command of the DS and Head of the 8th Department of the First High Command, Report on our discussions with representatives of Service "A" of the First High Command of the KGB on the situation in some countries and the tasks of intelligence in the area of the AM (Bulgarian), November 19, 1987. In: Kirjakowa; Angelowa (ed.): *KGB i DS* (note 29), pp. 1756–1780, here 1772.

⁴¹⁷ Plan of joint and coordinated active measures of the intelligence agencies of the Ministry of the Interior of the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the Ministry of State Security of the GDR for 1989 and 1990, n.d.; COMDOS-Arch-R, F. 9, op. 4, ae 691, pp. 104–108, here 105 f. See also note (presumably from the HV A/X), June 29, 1987; COMDOS-Arch-R, F. 9, op. 4, ae 676, pp. 46 f., here 47.

in this area.⁴¹⁸ Nevertheless, the HV A and the KGB considered the spread of AIDS disinformation in conjunction with the ongoing campaign against US military bases a success. HV A/X wrote to its Bulgarian colleagues about the Fort Detrick thesis:

"The spread of this view is very damaging to the political prestige of the United States, negatively affects US relations with other countries, and worsens the situation of US military bases abroad (American soldiers are accused of being responsible for the spread of AIDS in countries with American military bases)."⁴¹⁹

Kathleen Bailey, head of the State Department's Office for Combating Soviet Disinformation, publicly admitted in August 1987 that the AIDS disinformation campaign had complicated "negotiations for the renewal of leases for American military bases in the Philippines and Greece." To her annoyance, Dan Rather, the anchor of the evening news program for one of the three major US television networks at the time, had reported on the allegations in the Soviet press regarding the alleged origin of HIV at Fort DeTrick without seeking comment from the American government.⁴²⁰

Although the KGB continued to spread AIDS disinformation targeted at US military bases in third countries,

⁴¹⁸ The head of the 8th Department, D. Stankov, informed his colleagues at the HV A/X in September 1989 that the DS had made "attempts" to "do something in this regard in Greece and Turkey, including leaflets against the American bases, but so far the results have been modest."

Report on the discussions held with the German comrades from 26 to 29 September 1989, 10 October 1989; COMDOS-Arch-R, F. 9, op. 4, ae

691, pp. 184–196, here 189. In October 1989, Department 8 requested relevant information from its Soviet colleagues on AIDS cases among American military personnel in Turkey and Greece for its active measure "Pandem." It was "difficult" for the AM to "find even a few cases of such patients." See "Information on the joint work with Soviet friends on the US, NATO, and Western European lines on the AM line in 1989" (Bulgarian), October 10, 1989. In: Kirjakowa; Angelowa (eds.): KGB i DS (note 29), pp. 2020–2027, here 2022.

⁴¹⁹ Translation from the German (bulgar.), 29.2.1988; COMDOS-Arch-R, F. 9, op. 4, a. e. 676, Bl. 49–52.

⁴²⁰ Gillette, Robert: Soviets Suggest Experiment Leaks in U.S. Created the AIDS Epidemic. In: LA Times v. 9.8.1987, S. D15.

The propaganda in the Soviet press about the alleged American origin of AIDS was stopped in September 1988 , despite the objections of the Soviet press agencies TASS and Novosti (especially Falin).⁴²¹

⁴²² Around this time, according to his own account, Jakob Segal was invited to a meeting by the Soviet embassy in East Berlin. The cultural attaché apologized to him that his thesis would no longer be published in the USSR "alongside the classical theories." Reagan allegedly threatened to cancel the next summit with Gorbachev if the USSR did not stop these "insulting slanders." The USSR by no means had "less sympathy" for Segal and his research, but nuclear disarmament was Moscow's highest priority.⁴²³

5.1 AIDS disinformation of the HV A/X and the Segal thesis

The US put pressure not only on Moscow but also on East Berlin.

The goal was to stop AIDS disinformation. As in the case of Hartman in Moscow, John C. Kornblum, deputy commander of the American sector of Greater Berlin, protested in a letter to the editor of the "taz" newspaper against the publication of the Fort Detrick thesis in the form of the Heym interview.⁴²⁴ In January 1988, the American ambassador to East Berlin, Francis J. Meehan, lodged an official protest with the GDR's deputy foreign minister, Kurt Nier, against the ongoing activities of Jakob Segal.⁴²⁵ East German physicians involved in AIDS research warned that Segal's activities could bring scientific research in the GDR into disrepute and impair the possibilities for cooperation with the West in AIDS research.

⁴²¹ Snyder: Warriors of Disinformation (Anm. 76), S. 115 f. u. 181 f.; TASS's Shishkin Interviewed on US Visit, Moscow Domestic Service in Russia, 0945 GMT 13.5.1988. In: FBIS Daily Report, Soviet Union, FBIS-SOV-88-094, 16.5.1988, S. 12–14.

⁴²² USIA: Recent Appearances of Soviet Disinformation, October 6, 1989, quoted in: Gordiewski, Oleg; Andrew, Christopher: KGB: The History of Its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev. Munich 1992, p. 812, fn. 44.

⁴²³ Klaus Hartmann spoke with Prof. Dr. Jakob Segal. AIDS – Where does the disease originate and how should it be treated? In: Freidenker 1 (1994), pp. 8–19, here 11.

⁴²⁴ Kornblum, John C.: False and malicious. In: taz, March 3, 1987, p. 18.

⁴²⁵ Prof. Dr. Segal, Jakob, in: BStU, AR 2, MfS, HA II/AKG-DOK.

The HV A/X, however, was unimpressed by the American government's countermeasures. Quite the opposite: The report by the American State Department, which had so incensed Gorbachev and which highlighted Jacob Segal's role in the KGB's disinformation campaign,⁴²⁶ was seen by the MfS employees as confirmation of the effectiveness of their active measures. According to the HV A, the State Department had downplayed the damage the AIDS disinformation campaign caused to the USA, especially in Western Europe. The HV A wrote to its Bulgarian colleagues:

"Perhaps to mitigate the impact of the thesis in NATO member states, the US State Department did not report much in the study about the mass media reaction and political activity in NATO member states (reports in the press and on the radio in Italy and the FRG, publications in academic journals in the FRG, manuscripts in the FRG)." ⁴²⁷

In September 1988, Mutz and Pfeifer personally handed over the next, revised version of Segal's study from the left-wing Munich journal "Streitbarer Materialismus"⁴²⁸ to their Bulgarian colleagues in Sofia for further use in active measures. The article, according to the Stasi officers, was a "revised version of the book [sic] by [the]

Prof. [redacted] [...], in which he considered the latest results of investigations and argued against all opponents." The HV A/X assessed the article as "good material, relatively peaceful, but convincing."⁴²⁹ The "German comrades" confidently declared: "Regardless of their angry reaction, the Americans are unable to refute Professor [redacted]'s hypothesis regarding the origin of the AIDS virus."⁴³⁰ Mutz and Pfeifer submitted their

⁴²⁶ US DOS: Soviet Influence Activities (Anm. 46), S. 33.

⁴²⁷ Original document in Bulgarian, based on a translation from German. February 29, 1988; COMDOS-Arch-R, F. 9, op. 4, ae 676, pp. 49–52, here 51.

For the German translation of the part of the American report on active measures against AIDS, see BStU, MfS, HA XX, No. 7101, pp. 228–284.

⁴²⁸ List of materials, n.d., p. 110. For the article, see Segal; Segal; Dehmlow: AIDS – Its Nature and Origin (note 118), pp. 7–68.

⁴²⁹ D. Stankow, Deputy Head of the First General Assembly of the DS and Head of the 8th Department of the First General Assembly: Report of our discussions with the German comrades on the AM line, November 10, 1988; COMDOS-Arch-R, F. 9, op. 4, ae 691, pp. 86–98, here 94. The professor's name was redacted by COMDOS-Arch-R.

⁴³⁰ Ibid., p. 88.

Bulgarian colleagues presented three additional documents on the continuation of the AIDS disinformation campaign within the framework of Operation "Detrick" (Bulgarian codename: "Pandemic"). First, they presented an article from the magazine "Horizont" with an English translation about "criminal experiments." Although the article did not deal directly with AIDS, according to HV A/X, it exposed "the criminal experiments of American scientists," "beginning with experiments on soldiers on the effects of radiation even before Hiroshima and Nagasaki and arriving at the latest biological weapons." The article is based on revelations by the US Congress in 1986, according to which the US government had, in some cases, secretly irradiated soldiers and civilians without their knowledge in order to measure and document the short- and long-term effects. As a second document, they submitted an article from the "Frankfurter Rundschau" of August 13, 1988: "With AIDS, there are limited prospects for effective protection through immunization." The interesting thing about the article, according to the HV A/X, was that it "rejected the African origin of AIDS" and pointed to an "artificial origin." ⁴³¹ As a third document, the HV A/X handed over a request from the American environmental organization "Foundation for Economic Trends" (FET) to the American Secretary of Defense, Frank C. Carlucci III, "to conduct a complete review of the project to create a synthetic agent for biological warfare." FET cited MacArthur's testimony before the American Congress in 1969 in this context. ⁴³²

The materials passed on once again reflected how closely the AIDS disinformation in the East was connected to developments in the USA. Both the article in "Horizont"⁴³³ and the Segals' publications⁴³⁴ cited revelations from 1986 in US Congressional hearings on illegal radiological experiments on

⁴³¹ List of materials, n.d., p. 110. The aforementioned article was written by Marion Kunze: "Criminal Experiments. A Documentary Report." In: Horizont 19 (1986) 7, p. 30.

⁴³² Ibid. HV A/X also submitted a working translation of the motion into German. For a German translation of the motion, see Segal; Segal: AIDS – the trail leads to the Pentagon (note 388), pp. 125–128.

⁴³³ Kunze: Criminal Experiments (note 431), p. 30.

⁴³⁴ Jakob Segal in conversation with Stefan Heym, pp. 12–13; Segal: Reply, p. 55.

unsuspecting American citizens.⁴³⁵ For example, in November 1988, the leadership of HV A/X spoke of information from the American "Foundation on Economic Trends" (FET).⁴³⁶ In September 1986, FET filed a lawsuit against the US Department of Defense (DOD) to stop the development and production of pathogens that could be used for biological warfare. Although, according to the Department of Defense, the pathogens were to be used for the development of antidotes and therefore for defensive purposes, FET argued in a statement of reasons for its lawsuit that they could also be used offensively and posed a danger in themselves. It further claimed that by 1985, the DOD had conducted approximately 15 genetic engineering experiments on various, highly dangerous pathogens such as anthrax, salmonella, and meningitis viruses. Even more dangerous, claimed Dr. Niel Levitt, a former microbiologist at USAMRIID in Fort Detrick, was that 2,352 ml of solution containing Chikungunya viruses had disappeared from the laboratory.⁴³⁷ Although the FET's explanatory memorandum mentioned nothing about AIDS, the alleged genetic manipulation of toxins, their potentially offensive use, and the unintentional disappearance of virus solution from Fort Detrick fit the KGB's propaganda thesis on the origin of AIDS.

The FET's motion was related to the testimony given by its president, Jeremy Rifkin, in 1988 as a witness before a US congressional committee on the testing of biological warfare agents. He had quoted MacArthur's 1969 congressional testimony and then hypothetically asked how it was possible that the Department of Defense, at the "beginning of genetic engineering," could have even dreamed of "developing an AIDS-like virus." Rifkin clarified that both he and "scientific experts around the world"

⁴³⁵ Siehe U.S. Congress, 99th Cong., 2d. Sess., Subcommittee on Energy Conservation and Power, Committee on Energy and Commerce, House of Representatives: American Nuclear Guinea Pigs: Three Decade of Radiation Experiments on U.S. Citizens. Washington 1991, *passim*.

⁴³⁶ Report of our discussions with the German comrades on the AM line (Bulgarian), November 11, 1988; COMDOS-Arch-R, F. 9 op. 4 ae 691, pp. 86–94, here 93.

⁴³⁷ See the excerpts from the explanatory memorandum in: Fighting biological weapons research in the courts. In: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 43 (1987) 1, pp. 45 ff.

considered the AIDS pathogen to be a "naturally occurring virus."⁴³⁸

Nevertheless, Rifkin had opened the door for conspiracy theorists and disinformation specialists, who could now use MacArthur's 1969 testimony to claim that the US Department of Defense had planned to produce the AIDS virus through genetic engineering as early as 1969. This was all the more true because the FET submitted its request for clarification of the research proposed by MacArthur to Carlucci. The HV A/X seemed to hope, probably based on the request, that the US government would be forced to acknowledge its alleged culpability for the AIDS epidemic.⁴³⁹

It is unknown whether the Bulgarians used the FET proposal, which HV A/X presented to them. Jakob Segal did resort to it. In September 1989, he undertook a lecture tour through Germany "to remind people of his theses, which have since been largely forgotten." From the 1969 hearing transcript, he read the "clear evidence" that the "AIDS virus was developed as a prospective biological weapon on the orders of the Pentagon and financed by Congress."⁴⁴⁰

He ignored the fact that MacArthur had never promised to develop such a virus and had made it clear that the Pentagon had not conducted any relevant research.⁴⁴¹

A complete translation of the FET's application, which corresponded to the one that HV A/X had handed over to the Bulgarians, was published by the Segals in their 1990 book "AIDS – the Trail Leads to the Pentagon."⁴⁴² This also included a portion of MacArthur's 1969 statement in translation.⁴⁴³ The publication of the book

⁴³⁸ U.S. Congress, 100th Cong., 2d. Sess.: Biological warfare testing. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Security, and Science of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Subcommittee on Energy and Environment of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, and the Subcommittee on Military Installations and Facilities of the Committee on Armed Services.

Washington 1988, S. 77.

⁴³⁹ Stankow, report, November 10, 1988, p. 93.

⁴⁴⁰ Geene: AIDS-Politik (Anm. 317), S. 294.

⁴⁴¹ Geißler: AIDS and its pathogens (note 13), p. 122.

⁴⁴² Segal; Segal: AIDS – the trail leads to the Pentagon (note 388), pp. 125–130.

⁴⁴³ Ibid., pp. 116–124. A final piece of evidence in the book is somewhat idiosyncratic: an anonymous letter from a person who quoted an anonymous American from the "top of the military intelligence establishment" that Segal's account of the artificial creation of the AIDS virus was correct. The alleged

took place only after the dissolution of the MfS and the HV A. The Segals had to take care of the promotion for their book alone. They did this together with the Green Party politician Manuel Kiper, who had written his own article for the book on the dangers of biological weapons research – mainly in the USA.⁴⁴⁴

5.2 »Monkey Business«: HV A/X takes over

During a visit to their colleagues in Bulgaria from September 26 to 29, 1989, Mutz and Pfeifer announced that they would continue to pursue the "Detrick" initiative in connection with the "thesis of the emergence and spread of AIDS as a result of American experiments." Pfeifer, who had since advanced to head the "Disarmament, USA, Peace Movement, Non-Aligned Movement" section (HV A/X/1), expressed the opinion that, "contrary to some viewpoints, this topic is still relevant."

Both he and Mutz said "that we shouldn't distance ourselves from the action," there was no reason to do so. Segal's thesis had "now also been supported by a number of other scientists."

These other scientists remained unnamed, but Mutz and Pfeifer again asked – in vain – that the DS's First General Assembly should "seek respected defenders of the thesis."⁴⁴⁵

Interestingly, the people with a different "viewpoint" that Pfeifer spoke of were to be found in the Soviet Union and the KGB, respectively. The Bulgarian "Chekists" summarized the comments of their Stasi colleagues:

"The Soviet comrades believe that the idea [i.e., the Fort-Detrick thesis] has been exhausted, but they [the HV A/X] do not agree with this, and they are taking new measures, but they are also carrying out the old ones and believe that they are achieving good results. In their opinion, the culmination of the action has not yet been reached."⁴⁴⁶

The letter concludes: "My God, it's so easy to become paranoid about these things.

Those bastards!" Ibid., p. 130.

⁴⁴⁴ Kiper, Manuel: Biowar. In: ibid., pp. 249–300.

⁴⁴⁵ Report on the discussions held with the German comrades from 26 to 29 September 1989, 10 October 1989; COMDOS-Arch-R, F. 9, op. 4, ae 691, pp. 184–196, here 188.

⁴⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 189.

Major General Vladimir Petrovich Ivanov, head of the disinformation service "A" of the First General Staff of the KGB, had visited Wagenbreth in Berlin a week earlier.

⁴⁴⁷ Presumably, at this meeting the Fort-Detrick theory declared "obsolete" by the KGB.

A sign of the success of the AIDS campaign, according to Pfeifer and Mutz, was the fact that they had "made a film about AIDS," which was "shown three times in the Federal Republic of Germany" and in which "many countries" had expressed interest.⁴⁴⁸ During their visit to Bulgaria a year earlier, Mutz and Pfeifer had already spoken of the film project as part of the "De-trick" operation. It was said at the time that HV A/X had requested "the production of a film."⁴⁴⁹ The film was "a matter for their operational channel (illegal)." They continued:

"The film that the comrades in West Germany are preparing about the AIDS problem will be a work of their operative channel (illegally). This channel has already signed a contract with West German television. They are taking every measure to ensure that no one notices that the GDR has any connection to the film, even though they have to provide financial support. The interview that Prof.

Segal's presentation in October of this year is intended to be the culmination of this effort. [...] It will be a documentary in the style of English investigative crime films. The arguments will be presented objectively, with one exception: It will show that the Americans are spreading disinformation about AIDS and that they are abusing technological interventions. 450

In 1989, Mutz and Pfeifer further reported that the film had been produced "by a private film company in cooperation with the West German Broadcasting Corporation." The HV A/X had even subsidized the "production of the film with a certain sum." "The West German side [presumably the West German Broadcasting Corporation] paid 80,000 DM for the production of the film, and the German comrades paid 40,000 DM." Interestingly, the "Soviet comrades had proposed paying 60,000 DM for the film, but

⁴⁴⁷ Note from Colonel Wagenbreth, Head of HV A/X, to the Head of Department X of the MfS, Willi Damm, August 24, 1989, in: BStU, MfS, Department X, No. 1124, p. 65.

⁴⁴⁸ Report on the discussions held with the German comrades from 26 to 29 September 1989, 10 October 1989; COMDOS-Arch-R, F. 9, op. 4, ae 691, pp. 184–196, here 188.

⁴⁴⁹ D. Stankow, Deputy Head of the First General Assembly of the DS and Head of the 8th Department of the First General Assembly: Report of our discussions with the German comrades on the AM line, November 10, 1988; COMDOS-Arch-R, F. 9, op. 4, ae 691, pp. 86–98, here 93.

⁴⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 94.

The German comrades have rejected this participation." There is now a possibility that the film's distribution could recoup the production costs. "Currently," according to Mutz and Pfeifer, "the film is being distributed by producers in West Germany for 10,000 DM and for African and Third World countries for 5,000 DM per copy." They handed over both a German and an English version of the film to the Bulgarian "comrades." 451 HV A/X asked the Bulgarian comrades for help in distributing the film in Western and developing countries. The Bulgarians suggested the services of one of their best channels of the 1980s, the agent "Shiwa," director of an Indian institute for the Non-Aligned Movement. 452

According to Mutz and Pfeifer's description, the film co-financed by HV A/X can only be "AIDS – the African Legend" by West German documentary filmmaker Malte Rauch and journalist Heimo Claaßen. The latter, as already mentioned, was managed by HV A/X/1 in the IMA case "Joachim." After Pfeifer was promoted to head of department, Dams, still responsible for "Denver," took over the IMA case "Joachim"—that is, at the time of Claaßen's film project.

and Rauch.453 Rauch was recorded by Dams on 31 July 1987 under the object procedure "Denver", presumably as a person without contact from the MfS.454

The film »AIDS – the African Legend« was, as Mutz and Pfeifer mentioned, shown three times on West German television before their visit to Sofia in September 1989: on 3 January 1989 in the series »Weltweit« on West Drei at 8 p.m.,455 on 22 May at 10:30 p.m. on Hessen 3 and Eins Plus456 and on 5 June at 11:20 p.m. on SWR 3.457 The film was also shown on

⁴⁵¹ Report on the discussions held with the German comrades from 26 to 29 September 1989, 10 October 1989; COMDOS-Arch-R, F. 9, op. 4, ae 691, pp. 184–196, here 189.

⁴⁵² Ibid. Regarding "Zhiwa," see the record of the implementation of measures along the "China and NPG" line together with the Soviet friends [19]89 (Bulgarian), n.d. In: Kirjakowa; Angelowa (ed.): KGB i DS (note 29), pp. 2012–2014.

⁴⁵³ See BStU, MfS, HV A/MD/6, SIRA-TDB 21, ZV8237870; BStU, AR 2, RoHo, F22, Reg. No. XV 4735/63.

⁴⁵⁴ See BStU, AR 2, RoHo, F16, Reg. No. XV 3429/86.

⁴⁵⁵ Frühwein, Marietta: Preliminary: Where does AIDS come from? In: taz, January 3, 1989, p. 14.

⁴⁵⁶ "AIDS – the African Legend." In: taz, May 22, 1989, p. 14.

public events for screening. Jakob Segal planned to participate in a panel discussion following a public screening in Frankfurt am Main in February 1989. The film had "evoked a huge response," according to Lilli Segal.⁴⁵⁸

The documentary suggests that the AIDS pathogen originated in the research laboratory at Fort Detrick, without imposing this theory on the audience. After an opening sequence set in New York, showing how the marginalized groups of US society are hardest hit by AIDS, it turns to the African origin theory with quotations from Gallo and Essex . It reiterated the Segals' argument, equating the African origin theory with the already rejected vervet monkey hypothesis—the Segals' well-known straw man argument.

The film quotes Montagnier, among others, with his rejection of the vervet monkey theory,⁴⁶² without mentioning that he had rejected Segal's theory of artificial origin in 1987 as "dubious" and impossible.⁴⁶³ Prof. Gerhard Hunsmann of the German Primate Center in Göttingen, one of the leading AIDS researchers in the Federal Republic, was quoted on the question of earlier serum samples from Africa: Of the approximately 7,000 frozen blood units from Africa in his institute, only 37 to 38 from 1982 to 1983 tested positive for HTLV-I.⁴⁶⁴

What was not mentioned was the fact that this same Prof. Hunsmann was the

⁴⁵⁷ WDR: Full information: AIDS – the African legend; database of the WDR Historical Archives, May 13, 2013, pp. 1–3, here 1. The authors thank Petra Witting of the WDR Historical Archives for the information.

⁴⁵⁸ Letter from Lilli Segal to an acquaintance in Hannoversch Münden, February 24, 1989; BArch, DY 4516, prel. K. 13, np

⁴⁵⁹ »AIDS – the African legend«, Min. 7:49–8:00.

⁴⁶⁰ Ibid., min. 9:02 ff. In the interview in the film, Essex spoke of an African origin among monkeys or apes, but not about vervet monkeys.

⁴⁶¹ Ibid., min. 9:02 ff., 15:16–15:28, 19:29–19:43. See also Frühwein: Vorlauf (note 455), p. 14.

⁴⁶² "AIDS – The African Legend," min. 22:59–23:35. The film admitted, however, that Montagnier also supported the Africa thesis, "albeit somewhat more cautiously" than Gallo and Essex. See ibid., min. 10:52 ff.

⁴⁶³ US DOS: Soviet Influence Activities (Anm. 46), S. 36.

⁴⁶⁴ »AIDS – the African legend«, Min. 27:48 ff.

refused to cooperate with East German colleagues in AIDS research as long as Jakob Segal was allowed to continue to spread his thesis.⁴⁶⁵

The film centers on the interview with the "research couple" Jakob and Lilli Segal in their East Berlin apartment. In it, they reiterated their rejection of the "green ape theory"⁴⁶⁶ and their own assumption of artificial origin at Fort Detrick for the camera.⁴⁶⁷ The narrator in the film explains that the Segals simply concluded "what was obvious," namely, that the AIDS pathogen did not originate from nature.⁴⁶⁸ Jakob Segal claimed, as always, that the burden of proof lies with the proponents of the African origin theory,

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Apparently, no concrete evidence was needed for his chain of evidence.

In the film, the Segals are portrayed as heroic fighters for the truth against the "greats of science" who reject their theory.⁴⁷⁰

or the "great experts of the scientific community from Washington to Paris to Moscow," where "alternative theories [...] are not presented. In other words: the film turns out to be a men,"⁴⁷¹

Variation of the old theory, spread by the KGB, the Segals and the HV A, of the artificial origin of the AIDS pathogen in Fort Detrick.

The content of the film fits in with the materials that both HV A/X and the Segals were collecting and distributing for their ongoing AIDS activities. In addition to the interview with the Segals, there was an interview with Rifkin of the FET, whose request to Secretary of Defense Carlucci was distributed in German translation by both HV A/X and the Segals.⁴⁷² In the film, Rifkin explained that under Reagan, "the U.S. Department of Defense [...] drastically increased research funding for biological weapons research," that "a large number of research contracts were awarded to universities," and that "the most dangerous pathogens were being worked on."⁴⁷³ The narrator in the film quotes MacArthur's statement

⁴⁶⁵ Dewitz, Report (note 358), p. 22.

⁴⁶⁶ »AIDS – the African legend«, Min. 18:35–20:30.

⁴⁶⁷ Ibid., min. 29:46–30:54.

⁴⁶⁸ Ibid., min. 29:46 ff.

⁴⁶⁹ Ibid., min. 29:46–30:54.

⁴⁷⁰ Ibid., min. 31:43–31:53.

⁴⁷¹ Ibid., min. 10:28 ff.

⁴⁷² See list of materials, n.d., p. 110; Segal; Segal: AIDS – the trail leads to the Pentagon (note 388), pp. 125–128.

⁴⁷³ "AIDS – the African Legend," minutes 36:09–36:29. Quotes from WDR, Full Information, May 13, 2013, p. 2.

before the US Congressional Committee in 1969 on the development of a new virus.⁴⁷⁴

Rifkin commented on his foundation's proposal.

request for information on the possible consequences of these aforementioned plans to the American Secretary of Defense. Although Rifkin stated in his interview for the film that most likely no such research had taken place, the film emphasized that the response to FET's request was still open.⁴⁷⁵

London journalists Richard and Rosalind Chirimuuta also appeared in the film with their book "AIDS, Africa and Racism."⁴⁷⁶ In the work, they lamented the pervasive racist stereotypes in many Western publications, including those by medical professionals, regarding the African origin of AIDS. They also challenged established AIDS science by attempting to "debunk the fundamentally flawed nature of the evidence and arguments offered in support of the African hypothesis [of the origin of the AIDS virus]."

⁴⁷⁷ Her interview in the film, as well as her book, therefore fit the aforementioned goal of the KGB and HV A/X to rouse public opinion in Africa against the allegedly racist and American thesis of the African origin of AIDS.⁴⁷⁸ HV A/X was also familiar with Chirimuitas' work from previous contexts. Mutz and Pfeifer reported to their Bulgarian colleagues in September 1989, with reference to the film, that their unit had "in the meantime [...] published two brochures on AIDS," and one of them was by Chirimuuta, who had written a "brochure"—presumably "AIDS, Africa and Racism"—"which had already received two editions."⁴⁷⁹ They had apparently already mentioned Chirimuitas' book at their meeting with the Bulgarians in September 1988:

⁴⁷⁴ Ibid., min. 36:29–37:25.

⁴⁷⁵ Ibid., min. 37:25–38:45.

⁴⁷⁶ Ibid., min. 16:23–17:36.

⁴⁷⁷ Chirimuuta, Richard C.; Chirimuuta, Rosalind J.: AIDS, Africa and Racism. Stanhope 1987, S. 2.

⁴⁷⁸ See, for example, Information No. 2742 (Russian), n.d.; COMDOS-Arch-R, F. 9, op. 4, ae 675, pp. 156–159, here 157; Note (presumably from the HV A/X), June 29, 1987; COMDOS-Arch-R, F. 9, op. 4, ae 676, pp. 46–47.

⁴⁷⁹ Report on the discussions held with the German comrades from 26 to 29 September 1989, 10 October 1989; COMDOS-Arch-R, F. 9, op. 4, ae 691, pp. 184–196, here 189. Either the HV A/X or their Bulgarian colleagues had misidentified Chirimuuta as a "Senegalese journalist." He was born in Zimbabwe, where he was actively involved in the freedom struggle until his deportation.

"A book by two Zimbabwean journalists has been published in London who, in principle, share Segal's views. The book has been very well received by government circles in Zimbabwe, as the letter from the Minister of Health shows. He believes that action must be taken to refute the thesis that AIDS has an African origin."⁴⁸⁰

One can understand that HV A/X wanted to support the dissemination of the Chirimuutas' work as part of their "Detrick" campaign, even if only because the Chirimuutas received no such support at all. The original 1987 version of the book referred to the same 1969 statement by MacArthur to the American Congress that the film, the Segals, and Rifkin also quoted.⁴⁸¹ The Chirimuutas' rejection of the Soviet accusations of artificial origin was already considered by them at the time to be proof that the American government wanted to shift responsibility for AIDS onto Africa.⁴⁸²

The HV A/X should have considered the 1989 reprint of the book by the Chirimuutas to be even more helpful for their work, since an addendum now cited Segal's claim as a counter-hypothesis to the supposedly racist theory of African origin.⁴⁸³ The addendum also suggested, like contemporaneous Soviet disinformation, that the USA wanted to conduct criminal HIV experiments on Africans in order to find a vaccine against the virus.⁴⁸⁴ The Chirimuutas

in 1972. From this point on, he lived in London. See Chirimuuta, Richard C.; Chirimuuta, Rosalind J.: AIDS, Africa and Racism. 2nd, ed. ed., London 1989, author page.

⁴⁸⁰ Rosalind Chirimuuta, however, was from Australia. See *ibid.* D. Stankow, Deputy Head of the First General Assembly of the DS and Head of the 8th Department of the First General Assembly: Record of our discussions with the German comrades on the AM line, November 10, 1988; COMDOS-Arch-R, F. 9, op. 4, ae 691, pp. 86–98, here 94.

⁴⁸¹ Chirimuuta; Chirimuuta: AIDS, Africa and Racism (Anm. 477), S. 7.

⁴⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 8.

⁴⁸³ Chirimuuta; Chirimuuta: AIDS, Africa and Racism (Anm. 479), pp. 141, 164.

⁴⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 164–165. On Soviet disinformation, see CIA, DOI: Worldwide Active Measures Propaganda Alert, February 1987, p. 2; Annex, AIDS Disinformation Campaign. Appendix to: Director of Central Intelligence, Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) 70/1-87, Sub-Saharan Africa: Implications of the AIDS Pandemic, June 2, 1987, 22 pp., p. 19. In: CIA Freedom of Information Act Website, http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_0000579295.pdf.

thanked Claaßen, among others, for "additional information and encouragement" since the first edition.⁴⁸⁵

The English version of Claaßen and Rauch's film, which HV A/X offered to its Bulgarian colleagues, was broadcast under the title "Monkey Business: AIDS. The Africa Story" on January 22, 1990, at 11:05 p.m. on Britain's Channel 4. The film had 581,000 viewers, relatively few compared to other television programs at the same time (e.g.

BBC News 6,224,000 viewers or Independent Television News 7,093,000 viewers).⁴⁸⁶ Two British researchers found

Their research with several discussion groups found that, contrary to the majority of study participants, film viewers tended not to believe in an African origin of AIDS or at least doubted it. Rather, they believed in an artificial origin of the HIV virus in the USA.⁴⁸⁷ Regardless of whether the HV A played a role in the British television broadcast or not, the intended effect on viewers was achieved.

The broadcast of the film activated new and unsuspecting multipliers for the thesis of the HV A/X – among others the WDR, the Channel 4, the editor responsible for the program in »Weltweit«, Jörg Armbruster,

and the commentator for "Weltweit," Dietrich Peter Winterberg.⁴⁸⁸ The "taz," which had already done much to spread Segal's thesis, now once again served, without its own knowledge, as a multiplier. The newspaper signaled approval of the new film and quoted Rauch, without any qualifying comment, with his main thesis: "What we have discovered: The Africa thesis is so important for many people because it is the only alternative to the other hypothesis, namely that AIDS comes from a laboratory—a commercial or military research laboratory, which today is no longer distinguishable." The reviewer explained: "In her documentary film with the internal working title 'The Monkey Theater,' one thing becomes clear above all: The Africa/ape thesis is not only scientifically outdated long ago, but has been contradicted for a long time."

⁴⁸⁵ See the "Acknowledgements" in Chiramuuta; Chirimuuta: AIDS, Africa and Racism (note 479).

⁴⁸⁶ Kitzinger, Jenny; Miller, David: »African AIDS«. Media and Audience Beliefs. In: Aggleton, Peter; Davies, Peter; Hart, Graham (Hg.): AIDS, Rights, Risk and Reason. London 1992, S. 51, Fn. 11.

⁴⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 45 f.

⁴⁸⁸ For Winterberg's affirmative commentary on the film's thesis, see AIDS – the African Legend, min. 0:00–1:32. Armbruster was the editor responsible for the program. See WDR, Full Information, May 13, 2013, p. 1.

"This knowledge has been kept alive and disseminated to this day."⁴⁸⁹ The only thing the reviewer was even remotely right about: the Africa/ape theory has been addressed again and again by scientists. This was for one reason alone: new evidence was constantly being found to confirm the theory.

⁴⁸⁹ Frühwein: Vorlauf (note 455), p. 14.

6

Long-term medical and political effects: AIDS misinformation, 1990–2013

Despite scientific progress in exploring the origins, epidemiology, and control of HIV infection and AIDS since the 1980s, the disinformation theories of the KGB and the Segals, along with various conspiracy theories from the US and other countries, continue to live on the internet and in the minds of countless people. And this is not surprising. As has been shown,

During the Cold War, misinformation in the form of conspiracy theories in the United States and East German disinformation theories about AIDS fed into each other. The Fort-Detrick thesis and aspects of Segal's research were then and continue to be integrated into other conspiracy theories about AIDS and its treatment. Various propagators of the Fort-Detrick and Segal theories remained actively involved in spreading misinformation about AIDS and its treatment after the fall of the Berlin Wall and continue to do so today.

The names and theories of some active measures by the KGB and the HV A were mixed, partly via multipliers, with further false information about AIDS and today extend beyond the original disinformation theories. The conspiracy to spread disinformation about AIDS at that time, in which the KGB, the Stasi and their "brother agencies," the CPSU, the SED, and Jakob Segal, among others, participated, not only led to the shaming of the USA, which was indeed intended. It also had side effects. These include, in part, the rejection of scientifically and medically based knowledge about AIDS, primarily among those segments of the population most severely affected by AIDS. Presumably, not infrequently, with fatal consequences.

6.1 The Segals between conspiracy theory and early therapy, 1990–1995

Despite the political changes, the Segals continued to stand by their Fort-Detrick thesis out of personal conviction. Jakob Segal, in particular, continued to appear in public with several publications. Not only "AIDS – the trail leads to the Pentagon" (1990),⁴⁹⁰ the manuscript of which was probably written before

⁴⁹⁰ Segal; Segal: AIDS – the trail leads to the Pentagon (note 388).

Not only the "Wehrmacht" (Wehrmacht) project, which was completed after the fall of the Wall, came out, but also a series of other interviews and publications, culminating in the book "AIDS is Defeatable" (1995),⁴⁹¹ which was published shortly after Jakob Segal's death. There were no significant changes to their original line of thought, except for a greater focus on the person of the leading American AIDS researcher Robert Gallo. The Segals now hinted, hardly unmistakably, that he had played a role in the alleged artificial production of the AIDS pathogen, and not just in its cover-up.⁴⁹²

In order to continue to defend their thesis in a united Germany, they had to downplay or cover up their previous contacts with GDR officials and Soviet government agencies, especially after Primakov's revelations and Bohnsack's allegations in 1992. The Segals developed a new legend, according to which they had been "AIDS dissidents" in the GDR. They had fought against resistance from the SED and Moscow to bring the truth about the artificial origin of HIV to light in Fort Detrick. To substantiate this, they repeatedly addressed the publication ban against their thesis in the GDR.⁴⁹³ Of course, they failed to mention that the publication ban applied to all publications on the topic of AIDS origins.

They concealed their privileged position compared to other East German scientists in publishing in the West or Jakob Segal's advocacy for bans against his scientific opponents. They now particularly emphasized the fact that Jakob Segal—allegedly because of his predicament—had given a lecture on his thesis to the oppositional "Church from Below" in September 1987.⁴⁹⁴ Such a lecture did indeed take place, but the Stasi subsequently had only positive things to report about this "factually delivered lecture" on AIDS.⁴⁹⁵

⁴⁹¹ Segal, Jakob; Segal, Lilli; Klug, Christoph: AIDS can be defeated: artificial production, early therapy, and its boycott. Essen 1995.

⁴⁹² Geene: AIDS Policy (note 317), p. 294; Segal; Segal: AIDS – the trail leads to the Pentagon (note 388), p. 72; Segal, Jakob: New Status of the AIDS Discussion, 1993, www.monochrom.at/segal/i.htm.

⁴⁹³ Segal: Public Statement (note 215); Johnson, Ian: German scientist couple presses theory that AIDS was created at Fort Detrick. In: The Baltimore Sun, February 21, 1992, p. 2A; Segal; Segal; Klug: AIDS can be defeated (note 491), p. 200.

⁴⁹⁴ Segal: Public Statement (note 215).

⁴⁹⁵ MfS, BV Berlin, information about the implementation of an "open work workshop" in the Protestant Sophiengemeinde in Berlin-Mitte on 11 and 12. September 1987, 15.9.1987; BStU, MfS, BV Berlin, AKG, No. 199, pp. 1–4, here 2.

Nor were there any signs of repressive measures against the Segals afterward. Quite the opposite: Behind the scenes, the MfS supported the establishment of the new research center for the Segals at the MfG. Nevertheless, as part of their post-reunification legend, the Segals claimed they had received no money or assistance from the GDR government to research or disseminate their theories.⁴⁹⁶

For many listeners on the left wing of reunified Germany, and for quite a few AIDS activists, the Segals' self-defense was entirely credible and, in fact, unnecessary. They wanted to hear about alternative explanations and therapies for HIV infection and AIDS.⁴⁹⁷ This openness arose from the state of AIDS research at the time. A great deal of pessimism began to spread among homosexuals and those infected with AIDS in the late 1980s, when health authorities revised their earlier estimates that only 5 to 10 percent of HIV-infected people would develop AIDS. They now suspected that 70 to 100 percent would become ill and presumably die from AIDS. The long-promised vaccine was not (and still is not) invented.

The introduction of the first antiretroviral (ARV) drug against HIV, zidovudine or azidothymidine (AZT), in 1987, contributed little to the fight against AIDS. Initially, the drug was only given to AIDS patients, and only from 1990 onward was it also given to asymptomatic HIV-infected people, whom it presumably could help more. AZT was very expensive, a fact that led to accusations against the pharmaceutical industry.

Furthermore, it had strong, harmful side effects, only occasionally contributed to prolonging the lives of AIDS patients, and lost effectiveness because the virus developed resistance to it. Because mainstream science still seemed powerless against AIDS, many people placed all their hopes in other explanations of AIDS and alternative therapies.⁴⁹⁸ Under these circumstances, the theories of the US molecular biologist Peter Duesberg, a member of the American Academy of Sciences and former researcher on retroviruses and cancer, for example, became increasingly popular. From 1987 onwards, he denied that HIV alone caused AIDS. The virus itself was not particularly dangerous, according to Duesberg. There must always be cofactors

⁴⁹⁶ Johnson: German scientist couple (Anm. 493), S. 2A.

⁴⁹⁷ Segal; Segal; Klug: AIDS can be defeated (note 491), p. 162; Geene: AIDS policy (note 317), p. 295 f.

⁴⁹⁸ Epstein, Steve: Impure Science: AIDS, Activism, and the Politics of Knowledge. Berkeley 1996, S. 117.

Available online: <http://ark.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/ft1s20045x>.

that cause AIDS. If these cofactors were identified and avoided, HIV-infected people could supposedly escape the AIDS disease. Starting in 1991, he developed a theory of the toxicological origin of AIDS, a "drug-AIDS hypothesis," according to which drug use causes AIDS. In 1992, he went so far as to claim that the use of AZT could cause AIDS — "AIDS by prescription." He made this claim at a time when many HIV-infected and AIDS patients refused to use AZT because of its side effects and complained about the expensive, not always effective drug and the pharmaceutical industry.⁴⁹⁹

A high point for "AIDS dissidents" or deniers in Europe was the first alternative "International Symposium AIDS – A Different View" in Holland in May 1992. Even Montagnier, who co-discovered HIV, had become convinced of the importance of co-factors and participated. In the weeks before the conference, Rupert Murdoch's press empire in Great Britain, which had long been reporting on AIDS in "headline" fashion, had written about the "astonishing challenge to AIDS orthodoxy" posed by Duesberg and Montagnier.⁵⁰⁰ During the symposium, unrest arose when Duesberg blamed AIDS victims for their own illness because of their excessive lifestyles. The meeting ended in a scandal, as Duesberg declared all safer sex campaigns pointless, "because AIDS is by no means a communicable disease" and "drugs are to blame for everything." Many well-known conference participants protested against this in a press release, which called safer sex "our most important weapon in the fight against AIDS."

designated.⁵⁰¹

During the conference, the work of the Segals was also discussed, thanks to the Swede "Kwame"⁵⁰² Ingemar Ljungqvist. Ljungqvist, who had

⁴⁹⁹ Ebenda, S. 107, 115 f., 118, 146 fu 149.

⁵⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 150.

⁵⁰¹ Silberstein, Cronette: "Drugs are to blame for everything." In: taz, May 22, 1992, p. 19.

⁵⁰² Ljungqvist earned the nickname "Kwame" (Saturday) during his time as a teacher in Ghana and West Africa. See Hellertz, Pia: Jag har läst AIDS TABU Ursprung – Utveckling – Behandling av Kwame Ingemar Ljungqvist [My reading: AIDS Taboo: Origin – Development – Treatment by Kwame Ingemar Ljungqvist]. February 2013,
http://www.2000taletsvetenskap.nu/recensioner/aids_tabu.pdf.

knew him personally and attributed his knowledge of AIDS to them,⁵⁰³ reported on a "new path in AIDS therapy" by Jakob Segal.⁵⁰⁴ In 1990, Ljungqvist co-founded a "Swedish AIDS Group against Racism" (Svenska aidsgruppen mot rasism, SARA) in Uppsala, which rejected the African theory of AIDS origins as racist and therefore spread Segal's thesis.⁵⁰⁵ In 1991, SARA co-edited an English brochure on alternative AIDS therapies by Jakob Segal in his new publishing house, "Neuer Weg."⁵⁰⁶

Segal claimed a say in the public discourse on AIDS therapies based on his theory of the artificial origin of AIDS. As always, he knew better than mainstream scientists.

He explained: "Over 120,000 scientists have been working on AIDS for ten years. They have spent over 300 billion dollars without developing an effective therapy. My theory on the artificial production of the AIDS virus has allowed me to develop the correct understanding of AIDS and to make new suggestions for therapy."⁵⁰⁷

Segal even put forward several suggestions for alternative therapies. In a 1990 article co-authored with his old research colleague Dehmlow, he cautiously suggested that ultraviolet radiation (UVB) could "delay or prevent the infection of new cells and the development of disease," even in the case of HIV infection.⁵⁰⁸

Segal repeated this "therapeutic approach" in his own book "AIDS: Cell Physiology, Pathology and Therapy" in 1992. ⁵⁰⁹ Dehmlow had such

⁵⁰³ Andersson, Christoph: Operation Norrsken: Om Stasi och Sverige under kalla kriget [Operation Northern Lights: About the Stasi and Sweden during the Cold War]. Stockholm 2013, pp. 182 and 187.

⁵⁰⁴ Silberstein: "Drugs are to blame for everything" (note 501), p. 19.

⁵⁰⁵ See SARA's self-portrayal: Om föreningen SARA [About the SARA Association], 2000 Talets-Vetenskap, http://www.2000taletsvetenskap.nu/om_sara.php. SARA accuses the "research establishment" of uncritically accepting Gallo and Essex's "green monkey myth."

⁵⁰⁶ Segal, Jakob; Swedish AIDS-group against Racism: New Directions in AIDS Therapy. Essen 1991.

⁵⁰⁷ Schwahlen, Katrin: Genes, Viruses, and the CIA. In: Friday, May 17, 1991, p. 15.

⁵⁰⁸ Segal, Jakob; Dehmlow, Ronald: Cell Physiological Basis of the Effects of UV-Irradiated Blood. In: Segal, Jakob; Seng, Gunther (eds.): Methods of UV Irradiation of Blood – HOT and UVB. Stuttgart 1990, pp. 38–52, here 48.

⁵⁰⁹ Segal, Jakob: AIDS: Cell Physiology, Pathology, and Therapy. Essen 1992, pp. 265–280.

One possibility had already been mentioned in 1987 – as IMS "Nils" in a report for the Stasi on UVB and oxygen therapy. He had also pointed out the economic advantages of the potential, successful treatment of AIDS and other diseases with UVB therapy. The GDR would have been able to carry out such a therapy without expensive imports from Western countries.⁵¹⁰ Segal had already wanted to treat HIV-infected patients with UVB during the GDR era, but this was rejected by Seidel.⁵¹¹

After the end of the GDR, Dehmlow increasingly specialized in such alternative therapies and even became president of the Society for Ozone and Oxygen Applications in Berlin.⁵¹² However, UVB and HOT found no support in the Joint Federal Committee of Physicians and Health Insurance Funds, which generally recognized "no reliable evidence for the benefit and medical necessity" of their use, without even mentioning AIDS.⁵¹³

Segal saw other possibilities for early AIDS therapy in traditional and natural remedies from Africa and Asia. Regarding the negative results of tests with African medicinal plants against HIV infections in the USA, he wrote – completely illogically and unscientifically: "If in America all patients in the late stages [of AIDS] died, it was to be assumed that in Africa patients in earlier stages survived to a high degree when treated with native medicinal plants." Good news also came from China: "And if in May 1995 Chinese doctors reported cures for AIDS with

⁵¹⁰ IM of HA VII/7, Development, status, and possibilities of the UVB: a brief assessment, January 28, 1988; BStU, MfS, AIM 4835/88, Vol. 2, pp. 31–33, here 33.

Theisinger had IMS "Nils" prepare such an expert report at the request of the Schwerin district administration of the MfS and its Sternberg district office (KD). See Olt. Theisinger, HA VII/7, Meeting Report, IMS "Nils," January 28, 1988; ibid., pp. 28 ff.; Letter from the Sternberg district office to HA VII/7, January 4, 1988; ibid., p. 30.

⁵¹¹ Segal had complained to Axen about Seidel's decision. Geißler; Sprinkle: Disinformation squared (note 9), p. 72.

⁵¹² See the website, Airnergy: Energy from Within, <http://www.airnergy.com/aktuell/news-uebersicht/newsansicht/article/veroeffentlichung-von-dr-ronald-dehmlow-zu-sauerstoff-therapien/index.html>.

⁵¹³ Ultraviolet irradiation of the blood (UVB). Summary report of the "Medical Treatment" working committee of the Federal Committee of Physicians and Health Insurance Funds on the consultations pursuant to Section 135, Paragraph 1 of the Social Code Book V, March 30, 2001, p. 4. Available online: http://www.kbv.de/media/sp/2001_03_30_RMvV_32_nicht_approved_UVB_Report_AA_AeB.pdf.

a natural remedy, this is entirely in line with our expectations.⁵¹⁴

But the "new approach" to AIDS therapy, on which Segal particularly focused, looked something else entirely: regular administration of small doses of aspirin in the early stages of HIV infection.⁵¹⁵ In 1992, he explained: "Aspirin should [...] effectively inhibit HIV proliferation."⁵¹⁶ He asked hypothetically why doctors were not using aspirin to treat AIDS. His answer was: "Imagine: If the patient can now be cured without having to go to the hospital with two aspirin tablets daily, i.e., with pennies, then it is obvious that the doctors don't like me, the pharmaceutical industry, and the USA don't like me either." In this context, he referred to the high price of AZT, the then-monopoly of the Anglo-American company Burroughs-Wellcome on the drug, and its alleged ineffectiveness.⁵¹⁷ According to Segal's account, most doctors had no interest in his suggestions for early therapy because they had been bribed by the pharmaceutical industry in the form of paid conference trips, honoraria, and gifts.⁵¹⁸

Segal saw another conspiracy and this time a particularly malignant: Most doctors simply let HIV-infected patients die because they and their sponsors in the pharmaceutical industry could not earn anything from early treatment with aspirin. The rejection of most doctors is, however, easily explained. The effectiveness of aspirin against HIV remained unproven, and a 1995 US study on the treatment of HIV-infected patients with aspirin, which the Segals and Klug cited in their book, had to be discontinued due to the toxic side effects of aspirin in higher doses. Klug and the Segals, in contrast to the lead physician of the study and the responsible medical review board in the US, claimed that the study should not have been discontinued, despite the critical liver values of some patients. While the American researchers were planning new trials with other aspirin-related drugs,⁵¹⁹ the Segals and Klug initiated their

⁵¹⁴ Segal; Segal; Klug: AIDS is defeatable (note 491), pp. 135 and 137.

⁵¹⁵ Geene: AIDS-Politik (Anm. 317), S. 294.

⁵¹⁶ Segal: AIDS: Zellphysiologie (Anm. 509), S. 265.

⁵¹⁷ Klaus Hartmann spoke with Prof. Dr. Jakob Segal, p. 15 f.

⁵¹⁸ Segal; Segal; Klug: AIDS can be defeated (note 491), p. 166.

⁵¹⁹ Ibid., pp. 116–121. Regarding the termination of the American study, see the statement by Joseph A. Sonnabend, MD, Medical Director, Community Research Initiative.

They conducted their own study on aspirin. They asked readers who used the early aspirin therapy they recommended to send progress documentation to the World Health Organization (WHO) and to them via the publishing house "Neuer Weg." 520 Raimund Geene, who interviewed the Segals, wrote about their approach: "On such a basis, not even hypotheses can be generated. Apparently, the Segals are unaware of the dubious nature of such self-organized therapeutic attempts." 521

In his 1992 book, Segal proposed another possibility for early therapy, which would, however, require time for research and development: passive immunization with a part of the HIV virus, the p24 capsular protein. 522 However, he failed to mention in his publications that the inventor of the polio vaccine, Jonas Salk, had already proposed something similar in 1987. 523 In the same year that Segal's book was published, Salk applied for a patent in the USA for an experimental vaccine made from capsular proteins of the HIV virus, including p24. 524 Neither Segal lived to see the start of clinical trials for the experimental vaccine Remune in 2000. 525

ve on AIDS, 21.1.1995; University of Michigan, Jon Cohen AIDS Research Collection. Available online:

<http://quod.lib.umich.edu/c/cohen aids/5571095.0298.021/1?rgn=main;view=image>.

⁵²⁰ Segal; Segal; Klug: AIDS can be defeated (note 491), p. 125 f.

⁵²¹ Geene: AIDS-Politik (Anm. 317), S. 296.

⁵²² Segal: AIDS: Cell Physiology (note 509), pp. 279–280; Segal; Segal; Klug: AIDS is defeatable (note 491), pp. 110–113.

⁵²³ Salk, Jonas: Prospects for the Control of AIDS by Immunizing Seropositive Individuals. In: Nature 327 (1987), S. 473–476.

⁵²⁴ Salk, Jonas; Carlo, Dennis J.: Patent application 5256767, Retroviral antigens, 26.10.1993. Available online: <http://patft.uspto.gov/netacgi/nph-Parser?Sect2=PTO1&Sect2=HITOFF&p=1&u=%2Fnetacgi%2Fsearch-bool.html&r=1&f=G&l=50&d=PALL&RefSrch=yes&Query=PN%2F5256767>. The application was submitted on November 10, 1992.

⁵²⁵ Churdboonchart, V. u. a.: A double-blind, adjuvant-controlled trial of human immunodeficiency virus type 1 (HIV-1) immunogen (Remune) monotherapy in asymptomatic, HIV-1-infected thai subjects with CD4-cell counts of >300. In: Clinical and Diagnostic Laboratory Immunology 7 (2000) 5, S. 728–733.

6.2 Segal's legacy in literature and film

Although Jakob Segal and Lilli Segal died in 1995 and 1999, their interpretation of the Fort-Detrick thesis lived on not only among alternative AIDS activists, but also in literature, film, and music. Multipliers from the 1980s played a role in this. However, the activities of the Segals and their followers during the 1990s were more significant.

Particularly traumatic for the proponents of Segal's thesis and characteristic of its classification as a conspiracy theory was the fact that the Segals could not provide any empirical evidence to support their
to prove the famous "chain of evidence." For example, none of the US prisoners allegedly used as guinea pigs for the Fort Detrick virus could ever be identified.

However, after 1989, there were two attempts in the field of fine art to close this evidential gap, at least artistically. The first attempt came in 1996 in the form of a novel entitled "The Vaccination," for which Rauch and Claaßen wrote a foreword. The novel, whose author remained anonymous, recounted the alleged experiment at Fort Detrick and the fate of the prisoners' guinea pigs after their release. The anonymous author dedicated the novel to the so-called "masterminds": Claaßen, Rauch, the Chirimutas, and the Segals.⁵²⁶ Rauch and Claaßen, for their part, wrote in the foreword: "The Segals, the Chirimutas, and we in our film could only show interim results of this research [on AIDS] [...] – the whole picture is still far from clear."

The novel is "a welcome and inspiring next step toward understanding, further thought, and hopefully, someday, even action."⁵²⁷ In 1997, WDR used the new novel as an opportunity to rebroadcast excerpts from the film "AIDS – the African Legend" along with interviews with the authors.⁵²⁸

The second attempt took place in 2000 with Jochen Hick's film "No One Sleeps," whose plot is based on Segal's thesis. In the film, the heroine finds a list of prisoners who are said to have participated in the experiments at Fort Detrick. In the film, these prisoners were then, one by one, killed by the American federal police.

⁵²⁶ Schulz, Johann (pseud.); Sherry, Juan (pseud.): *The Vaccination*. Stuttgart 1996.

⁵²⁷ Rauch, Malte; Claaßen, Heimo: Foreword. In: *ibid.*, np

⁵²⁸ Geißler; Sprinkle: *Disinformation squared* (note 9), p. 74.

(FBI) to cover up the experiment.⁵²⁹ WDR, which had broadcast "AIDS – the African Legend" at the time, acted together with arte as co-producer for the Hicks film, which was shown at the 2000 Berlinale.⁵³⁰ WDR was not the only unwitting disseminator of communist disinformation. The "taz" newspaper also reviewed the film rather positively, without mentioning its earlier role in spreading Segal's thesis or its dubious nature.⁵³¹ The review in the "taz" appeared at a time when the newspaper had already distanced itself from its earlier role and Segal's thesis as a result of Primakov's revelations, Bohnsack's publications, and its own access to the Stasi files.⁵³²

Had the Stasi still existed, the Stasi's High Command A/X would likely have considered not only the novel, but also the film and its screening during the Berlinale a major success in its "Denver" project. Service "A" of the KGB's First High Command would likely have agreed with this assessment. Its successor in the area of active measures, the Department for Relief Measures of the "Sluschba vneschnei rasvedki" (SWR) of the Russian Federation, may have viewed these publications with a certain degree of satisfaction.

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The same applies to the short film by Swedish director Roy Andersson, "Nothing Happens" (Swedish: *Någonting har hänt*), which continues to popularize Segal's thesis in Sweden.⁵³⁴ Andersson was commissioned by the Swedish Board of Health and Welfare to make an educational film on AIDS prevention for the military and schools. During production, he learned about Segal's thesis and Seale's claims, and they convinced him.

Ultimately, the film was more about the alleged artificial origin of the virus than about AIDS prevention. The film made light of the theory

⁵²⁹ Political Film Society: Film Reviews. No One Sleeps. <http://www.geocities.com/polfilms/noonesleeps.html>.

⁵³⁰ Panorama/IFB 2000: No One Sleeps. n.d. Available online: http://www.berlinale.de/external/de/filmarchiv/doku_pdf/20000279.pdf; Berlinale: 2000 Programme. Available online: http://www.berlinale.de/de/archiv/jahresarchive/2000/02_programm_2000/02_Programm_2000.html

⁵³¹ Diehl, Alexander: Gay Film? In: taz, October 9, 2000, p. 23.

⁵³² Guest: Barschel Letters (note 254), p. 5.

⁵³³ For the Department of Relief, see Soldatov, Andrei; Borogan, Irina: *The New Nobility: The Restoration of Russia's Security State and the Enduring Legacy of the KGB*. New York, 2010, pp. 108–109.

⁵³⁴ Andersson: *Operation Norrsken* (Note 503), pp. 181–185.

of African origin and dismissed them as racist. Alleged experiments in the USA with HIV on mentally disabled people and prisoners were equated in the film with the criminal experiments on prisoners in Auschwitz.⁵³⁵ Because the film did not fulfill the mandate of the Office of Health and Social Affairs, it was rejected and kept under lock and key until 1993. In that year, however, it was considered a "revelation."

from secret government files was shown on Swedish television. It has since received various awards at international film festivals⁵³⁶ and is still offered online by Andersson for use in schools.⁵³⁷

Andersson's film helped to further publicize the work of Ljungqvist, a former student of the Segals in Sweden, who reiterated Segal's thesis in his book "AIDS Taboo" (1992).⁵³⁸ Although Ljungqvist and his "Swedish AIDS Group Against Racism" (SARA) now devote themselves to alternative medicine in general with their internet magazine "2000-Talets Vetenskap,"⁵³⁹ they continue to spread Segal's thesis as well as the AIDS conspiracy theory of the US physician Alan Cantwell.⁵⁴⁰ The latter adopted most elements of Robert Strecker's conspiracy theory on the origin and spread of AIDS through vaccines, although, in contrast to the conservative Strecker, he represents a more left-wing and homosexual perspective.⁵⁴¹ Ljungqvist

continues to promote alternative therapies against AIDS on its website, e.g. by taking colloidal silver,⁵⁴² a treatment that is

⁵³⁵ Ibid., pp. 171–175.

⁵³⁶ Ibid., pp. 181–185.

⁵³⁷ Ibid., p. 187 f.

⁵³⁸ Ibid., pp. 181–185.

⁵³⁹ SARA: About the association SARA (Note 505).

⁵⁴⁰ Ljungqvist, Ingemar: Origin of AIDS, n.d. Available online:

<http://www.2000taletsvetenskap.nu/gammalt/aids/Origin.htm>; Cantwell, Alan R.; Ljungqvist, Ingemar: Is HIV a Man-Made Virus Designed to Kill Blacks and Gays? In: Konformist, August 1999, verfügbar online:

<http://www.konformist.com/1999/aids/cantwell1.htm>. The authors, of course, answer their own question in the affirmative.

⁵⁴¹ Siehe Cantwell, Alan: Reverend Jeremiah Wright Is Right About Man-Made AIDS, 20.4.2008. Verfügbar online: <http://www.rense.com/general81/sdf.htm>; Cantwell, Alan, Jr.: AIDS and the Doctors of Death: An Inquiry into the Origin of the AIDS Epidemic. Los Angeles 1995, S. 17–30; Knight, Peter (Hg.): Conspiracy Theories in American History: An Encyclopedia. Santa Barbara 2003, S. 43 f.

⁵⁴² Aids, the pathogenesis and ten good treatments, verfügbar online:

Doctors consider it ineffective, questionable, and in higher doses even dangerous.⁵⁴³

6.3 Dubious Therapies: Christoph Klug and the Marxist-Leninist Party of Germany as Segal's heirs

Ljungqvist was not the only one who continued to propagate Segal's thesis alongside alternative therapies for AIDS in the 2000s. The intellectual heir of Segal's thesis and its early therapy did the same: its co-author Christoph Klug, a member of the Marxist-Leninist Party of Germany (MLPD) and director of the MLPD-affiliated publishing house "Neuer Weg" in Essen,⁵⁴⁴ which published the Segals' last books in the 1990s. The left-wing extremist⁵⁴⁵ MLPD used the Segals' conspiracy theory to promote, among other things, its goal of "an international socialist revolution."⁵⁴⁶ Klug and the MLPD-affiliated support group "Neue Wege in der HIV-Therapie" (FNW) propagated Segal's thesis.

<http://www.2000taletsvetenskap.nu/gammalt/aids/Tengood.htm>;

Ljungqvist, Ingemar: HIV/AIDS. Efficient Treatment with Simple Methods, available online:

http://www.2000taletsvetenskap.nu/gammalt/aids/aidstreatments_selenium_si_lver.htm.

⁵⁴³ U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, National Institutes of Health, National Center for Complementary and Alternative Medicine: Colloidal Silver, Stand: März 2013. Verfügbar online: <http://nccam.nih.gov/health/silver>.

⁵⁴⁴ Segal; Segal; Klug: AIDS is defeatable (note 491); Geene: AIDS policy (note 317), p. 295.

⁵⁴⁵ Federal Ministry of the Interior: 2012 Report on the Protection of the Constitution. Berlin 2013, pp. 203–205. Available online: <http://www.verfassungsschutz.de/embed/vsbericht-2012.pdf>. For a definition of "left-wing extremism," see the online glossary of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV): http://www.verfassungsschutz.de/de/service/glossar/_IL#linksextremismus.

⁵⁴⁶ Klug and Dr. Willi Mast (MLPD) declared in 2002: "The worldwide AIDS epidemic is an expression of the crisis [of capitalism] and the profound questioning of all living conditions by imperialism. [...] many wish [...] that people, not profit, should be the focus of production and research [...] when the rule of capitalism is overthrown in an international socialist revolution.« Klug, Christoph; Mast, Willi:

Dramatic spread of AIDS in Africa, Asia, and Eastern Europe – A new program to combat AIDS worldwide! In: Rote Fahne (RF), July 11, 2002, <http://interaktiv.mlpd.de/rf0228/rfart2.htm>.

and their proposals for early therapy as an "immediate program."⁵⁴⁷ The activities of Klug and the MLPD show how political extremists instrumentalize conspiracy theories for their own anti-democratic⁵⁴⁸ political goals and how conspiracy theories in the medical field can bring with them health-threatening consequences and side effects.⁵⁴⁹

It is not surprising that the CPSU, the SED, and then the MLPD all resorted to conspiracy theories. When it comes to conspiracies

Right-wing and left-wing extremists are particularly active in propagating them. Uwe Backes and Eckhard Jesse write: "Conspiracy theories [i.e., conspiracy theories] accompany the history of extremist groups."⁵⁵⁰ The belief in a Jewish world conspiracy, for example, underlies the ideology of many right-wing extremist groups, while left-wing extremists see a world conspiracy of "monopoly capitalists" at work behind most of the problems of modern society.⁵⁵¹ Such conspiracy theories are intended to underline the particularly insidious and sinister character of the enemy portrayed and to contribute to the construction of enemy images.

Associated conspiracy theories are used to recruit and mobilize supporters and to gain or remain in power.⁵⁵³

In the case of the AIDS conspiracy theory, Klug and the MLPD acted in a similar way to the CPSU and SED before: They used the Fort Detrick

Thesis and the early therapy of the Segals to denounce American »imperialism« and to promote their own communist goals.

⁵⁴⁷ Mast, Willi: Chemical workers discuss emergency AIDS program, RF of September 27, 2001, <http://interaktiv.mlpd.de/rf0139/rfart8.htm>. An important step in the fight against AIDS, RF of December 20, 2001, <http://interaktiv.mlpd.de/rf0151/rfart14.htm>.

⁵⁴⁸ For the terms "extremists", "extremist" and "extremism" in the sense of the definition of the BMI, see BfV, Online Glossary, http://www.verfassungsschutz.de/de/service/glossar/_IE.

⁵⁴⁹ Siehe z. B. Goertzel, Ted: Conspiracy theories in science. In: European Molecular Biology Organization (EMBO) Reports 11 (2010) 7, S. 493–499, hier 494–496.

⁵⁵⁰ Backes, Uwe; Jesse, Eckhard: Political Extremism in the Federal Republic of Germany. 4th ed., Bonn 1996, p. 257.

⁵⁵¹ Ibid., p. 257 f.

⁵⁵² Jesse, Eckhard: Enemy Images in Extremism. In: Backes, Uwe; Gallus, Alexander; Jesse, Eckhard (eds.): Yearbook Extremism and Democracy 23 (2011), pp. 13–36, here 18.

⁵⁵³ Ibid., pp. 17–23.

paginate.⁵⁵⁴ According to the MLPD's self-image, however, the party, in contrast to the former SED and CPSU, is a true representative of communism because it always remained faithful to the teachings of Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong.⁵⁵⁵ In order to exploit Segal's thesis for its own purposes, the MLPD took up the legend of the Segals' "AIDS dissidence" in its party organ, "Red Flag" (RF), and developed it further. According to the distorted timeline of the "Red Flag," the foreign ministers of the USA and the USSR agreed at a meeting "on closer economic cooperation" in the fall of 1986 "to settle the public discussion about the origin of HIV from a US laboratory in order not to jeopardize the 'policy of détente'." Therefore, Segal received a "publication ban" from the SED and took the detour via Heym and the "taz" to publish his thesis. After the publication, in March 1987, the "Red Flag" offered Segal its "support [...] in breaking the press censorship" of the GDR and the USSR. A series of articles by Jakob Segal, "AIDS – Commissioned by the Pentagon," appeared in the RF and was subsequently published as a brochure.⁵⁵⁶

However, there was and is no evidence of any complaints from the SED or the MfS about this series of articles. Moscow continued to support Jakob Segal and his thesis until spring 1987, as is evident from the publication of a short version of his thesis in "Moscow News."⁵⁵⁷ Nevertheless, the legend served to perpetuate a conspiracy between the two.

the »monopoly capitalists« of the West and the »bureaucratic capitalists«

⁵⁵⁴ See, e.g., Klug; Mast: Dramatic spread of AIDS (note 546).

⁵⁵⁵ See the Statute of the MLPD. In: Organizational Political Principles of the Marxist-Leninist Party, Essen 2009, pp. 1–20, here 4 f. Available online: http://www.mlpd.de/partei/grundsatze/organisationspolitische-grundsaezte-der-mlpd/at_download/file; Party program of the MLPD, Chapter A, Social Development in Germany, n.d. Available online: <http://www.mlpd.de/partei/parteiprogramm/gesellschaftliche-entwicklung-in-deutschland>. See also Müller-Enbergs, Helmut: A Stalinist sect turns 40 – for 25 years it has been called the MLPD. In: Backes, Uwe; Jesse, Eckhard (eds.): Yearbook Extremism and Democracy 2008. Baden-Baden 2009, pp. 167–184.

⁵⁵⁶ See Geene: AIDS Policy (note 317), p. 295; 15 Years of Criticism of Bourgeois AIDS Policy – A Brief Chronicle. In: RF, July 11, 2002, <http://interaktiv.mlpd.de/rf0529/rfart12.htm>; Marxist-Leninist League of Intellectuals (Essen): AIDS: Commissioned by the Pentagon: Documentation. Essen 1989 (15 pp.).

⁵⁵⁷ Prof. Jakob Segal, GDR: Where Does AIDS Come from? In: Moscow News v. 20.4.1987, S. 10.

sten" of the East to cover up the origins of AIDS as a justification for the MLPD's adoption of Segal's thesis. In this way, the MLPD could also claim to have always been the only true representative of this thesis. The alleged blockade of Segal's proposals on

The successful treatment of AIDS by pharmaceutical companies served the MLPD, despite the growing number of deaths, as a lesson in the necessity of a communist world revolution according to its own principles.⁵⁵⁸

At the local level, Klug sought support for Segal's thesis and his proposals for early treatment. He found support among members of AIDS-Hilfe Stuttgart (AHS) and its magazine "Rainbow."

Under editor Ralf Bogen, it served several times as a publication platform for the ideas of Jakob Segal and his old and new followers. In June 1996, the AHS, in cooperation with ACT UP Stuttgart, organized an event on "current therapy standards and alternatives for HIV and AIDS".⁵⁵⁹ At the event, Klug presented the main points of his earlier book, which he had written in collaboration with the Segals,⁵⁶⁰ and at the end, a majority of those present passed a resolution to the Federal Ministry of Health demanding that early therapy with aspirin and passive immunization with the p24 protein of the HIV virus be immediately reviewed.⁵⁶¹ When the MLPD called for a protest demonstration in Frankfurt in 1999 against the awarding of the highest prize in German medicine, the Paul Ehrlich Prize, to Gallo, Bogen organized an information evening in Stuttgart beforehand. He and his co-organizers, in line with Segal's theory, accused Gallo of playing a key role in the alleged artificial creation of the HIV virus. To educate the event participants, excerpts from the film "AIDS – The African Legend" were shown.⁵⁶²

Through Klug's preparatory work and thanks to the support of the AHS and other organizations, the association "New Ways in HIV-

⁵⁵⁸ Klug; Mast: Dramatic spread of AIDS (note 546).

⁵⁵⁹ Association for New Approaches in HIV Therapy: Activities Chronicle 1990–2005, http://www.hiv-therapie.org/html/archiv_1990-2005.html.

⁵⁶⁰ Bogen, Ralf: Getting involved – ACT UP; Rainbow Medical Information, supplement to Rainbow (1996) 25, 5 pp., here 3. Available online: http://www.hiv-therapie.org/1996_RAINBOW_NR_25.pdf.

⁵⁶¹ Ibid., p. 1.

⁵⁶² Marquart, Elisabeth; Bogen, Ralf: No award for Robert Gallo! Gallo belongs in court, not in St. Paul's Church! Rainbow (1999) 33, pp. 19–23.

"Therapy" (FNW) was founded in Gelsenkirchen.⁵⁶³ The "Red Flag" noted: "From the very beginning, the MLPD has supported the establishment of this association to the best of its ability."⁵⁶⁴ Klug's acquaintances from the MLPD and the AHS played a leading role in the new association—e.g., Bogen (AHS), Dr. med. Günther Bittel (MLPD), and Dr. med. Willi Mast (MLPD).⁵⁶⁵ After consulting with association members, Klug compiled an "immediate program" to combat AIDS based on Segal's research and therapy approaches. It envisaged, among other things, the "development of a vaccine based on Jakob Segal's proposal," "immediate distribution of ASS (aspirin) and minerals to prolong the time from infection to the onset of the disease," "free access to modern antiviral therapy," and "financing of the program by the perpetrators and spreaders of HIV." The last point drew on Segal's thesis. Because the USA was responsible for the artificial production of the AIDS pathogen, it should pay for the entire thing.⁵⁶⁶ The program took into account the fact that effective, highly active antiretroviral therapy (HAART) against HIV/AIDS was introduced in 1996, only insofar as it demanded that the USA cover its costs. Although the FNW learned of Salk's patent in 2000 at the latest⁵⁶⁷ and presumably also of the start of clinical trials on it,⁵⁶⁸ the association repeatedly called on the federal government to provide public funds for experiments with p24.

⁵⁶³ FNW: Activity Chronicle 1990–2005 (note 559).

⁵⁶⁴ 15 years of criticism of bourgeois AIDS policy.

⁵⁶⁵ FNW: Contact, <http://www.hiv-therapie.org/html/kontakt.html>. Regarding Bittel, see also Initiators of an Environmental Union, <http://www.umweltgewerkschaft.org/index.php/de/ueber-uns/initiatoren-auswahl>. Mast became the MLPD's Bundestag candidate in Gelsenkirchen in 2009. See Dr. Willi Mast, Bundestag election candidate of the MLPD and Monday demonstrator in Gelsenkirchen, reports, 2009. Available online: <http://www.mlpd.de/topics/flyers/monday-demo-news/monday-demo-news-38-from-20.7.2009/view>.

⁵⁶⁶ Mast: Emergency AIDS program. An important step in the fight against AIDS (note 547).

⁵⁶⁷ See the FNW flyer: World AIDS Day 2000: For a Turnaround in AIDS Research & AIDS Policy! Available online: http://www.hiv-therapie.org/2000_World_AIDS_Day.pdf.

⁵⁶⁸ Siehe Churdboonchart u. a.: A double-blind, adjuvant-controlled trial (Anm. 525), S. 728–733; Glidden, David; Kim, Soyeon; Lagakos, Stephen: Effectiveness of Remune. Clinical and Diagnostic Laboratory Immunology 8 (2001) 2, S. 468 f.

569 However, by 2004 it had been determined that Salk's vaccine "Re-mune" had no therapeutic benefit as monotherapy.

⁵⁷⁰ Der FNW

explained the difficulties and errors in developing an HIV vaccine by using the wrong animal model in the studies. Because, according to Segal's theory, HIV originated half from the Visna virus in sheep, these animals should have been used for experiments with potential vaccines, rather than chimpanzees or monkeys.⁵⁷¹

Klug, the "Red Flag" and the Friends Association continued to demand a state-subsidized study on aspirin as an early therapy against HIV infection, despite the termination of the American study in 1995 due to adverse side effects. In 2002, Mast interviewed a like-minded person on this issue, the US AIDS activist and businessman Howard S. Armistead, for the "Red Flag." He had conducted his own study in Zimbabwe in 2001 and allegedly found that "patients who took aspirin, selenium, and a multivitamin" experienced an "improvement of more than 50 percent in six

⁵⁶⁹ See, for example, the 2001 email exchange between the FNW and the German AIDS Help Berlin (Deutsche AIDS-Hilfe Berlin). In: Rainbow (2001)40, pp. 12 ff., available online: http://www.hiv-therapie.org/2001_Email-Austausch_mit_der_DAH.pdf; the FNW's open letter to the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) and the Federal Ministry of Health, November 27, 2001; http://www.hiv-therapie.org/2001_Dezember_Offener_Brief_des_Foerdervereins.pdf; the FNW leaflet for World AIDS Day, December 2002; http://www.hiv-therapie.org/2002_Folder_Support_Association.pdf.

⁵⁷⁰ Lundgren, JD: Is the Salk principle still viable for the design of an effective HIV vaccine? HIV Medicine 2004:5, p. 315 f. By 2006 at the latest, all clinical Studies for the potential use of Remune or its successor drug, IR 103, are underway. See Remune (HIV-1 immunogen, Salk vaccine). In: AIDS-Meds, http://www.aidsmeds.com/archive/Remune_1644.shtml; IR103. In: ibid., http://www.aidsmeds.com/archive/IR103_1645.shtml.

⁵⁷¹ This is how Dr. Willi Mast explained the situation at a vaccine symposium organized by AIDS-Hilfe Stuttgart in November 2003. According to his own account, Mast had "collaborated scientifically with Prof. Segal from 1988 until his death on issues of immunology and AIDS." See Mast, Willi: "Where are the obstacles to researching an AIDS vaccine?" In: Bogen, Ralf: Reader for the vaccine symposium on November 22, 2003, in Stuttgart, pp. 5 ff. Available online: <http://www.hiv-therapie.org/2003-impfstoff-Reader.pdf>. See also the FNW flyer for World AIDS Day 2001, which revived Segal's hypothesis:

months." For the "Red Flag," Armistead's study was considered further proof of the effectiveness of aspirin, contrary to the claims of the pharmaceutical industry, the Federal Health Office, and the German AIDS Help organization.⁵⁷² The newspaper overlooked the fact that only ten people in the study received Armistead's mixture of selenium, aspirin, and multivitamins (SAM). Due to the limited number of participants, the study lacked scientific validity. Nevertheless, in 2002, as president of SAM Medical Products, Armistead launched his "SAM Combination Antiviral Therapy" on the Zambian market.⁵⁷³ After a week and a half, however, the Zambian Ministry of Health ordered the suspension of sales of SAM and confiscated the product's stock. It stated that there was no evidence for the effectiveness of SAM against HIV, and that its selenium content exceeded the recommended daily intake.⁵⁷⁴ Nevertheless, in 2004, the "New Ways in HIV Therapy" support association decided to co-finance a comparable study in Zimbabwe on the effectiveness of aspirin and selenium in HIV therapy.⁵⁷⁵ The warnings of the managing director of the German AIDS Help (DAH), Hannelore Knittel, that the planned study, as presented, was "ethically unjustifiable," were ignored by the association . Interestingly, three of the four study leaders in Zimbabwe were FNW.

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the same as in Armistead's 2001 study: Dr. Marianne Thomsen from the non-governmental organization Humana People-to-People International (HPtP) and Prof. EN Sibanda and Dr. Graÿyna Stanczuk from the medical

⁵⁷² Mast, Dr. Willi: Does aspirin work for AIDS? RF v. 11.4.2002, <http://interaktiv.mlpd.de/rf0215/rfart17.htm>. Armistead's name was misspelled throughout the article as "Armistaed."

⁵⁷³ Researcher Proposes Low Cost ARV. In: The Standard (Zimbabwe) v. 5.9.2004. Available online: <http://allafrica.com/stories/200409070522.html>.

⁵⁷⁴ Zambia orders withdrawal of untested AIDS drug. Panapress, November 25, 2002. Available online: <http://www.panapress.com/Zambia-orders-withdrawal-of-untested-AIDS-drug--13-468995-17-lang1-index.html>. See also "Sam's AIDS Drug in New Twist." In: Times of Zambia, September 3, 2004. Available online: <http://allafrica.com/stories/200409030326.html>.

⁵⁷⁵ FNW: Activity Chronicle 1990–2005 (note 559).

⁵⁷⁶ Letter from Hannelore Knittel, Managing Director, DAH, to Bittel, September 7, 2004, 3 pages, here 3. Available online: <http://www.hiv-therapie.org/DAH-02-09-2004-Seite-1>, <http://www.hiv-therapie.org/DAH-02-09-2004-Seite-2>, and <http://www.hiv-therapie.org/DAH-02-09-2004-Seite-3>. For the reply letter from Dr. Detlef Rohm, FNW, to Knittel, October 20, 2004, see www.hiv-therapie.org/DAH-Ethik-20-10-2004.doc.

Faculty of the University of Zimbabwe. Both studies were viewed by HPtP as part of its own project to combat AIDS in Africa, "Total Control of the Epidemic."⁵⁷⁷ The roots of HPtP in the Danish revolutionary school reform movement "Tvind" of Maoist Arndi Petersen⁵⁷⁸ may have played a role in the FNW's decision to co-finance the study. In the end, Thomsen declared the one-year "pilot study" with 31 subjects a success in an FNW publication.⁵⁷⁹ Klug, for his part, spoke after the study of a "relieving and life-prolonging effect" of aspirin among HIV-infected people⁵⁸⁰ – among other things in a lecture series in Saxony in 2006, which was co-organized by the German Freethinkers Association (Deutscher Freidenker-Verband eV), the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation, which is close to the PDS, and the Left Party/PDS. With his lecture "AIDS – failed bioweapon and bomb business" he also tried to win over a new generation for Segal's thesis – among others at the Technical University of Chemnitz.⁵⁸¹ Thomsen, Sibanda and Stanczuk reported

⁵⁷⁷ Siehe Humana People-to-People (HPtP): Total Control of Epidemic (TCE), o. D. Available online: <http://www.fonden.org/trial/content.htm>. HUMANA in Germany: TCE – Total Control of the Epidemic – our program against HIV/AIDS, n.d. Available online: http://www.humana-de.org/21_tce/, and in particular the links to "TCE – clinical investigation," 2001, http://www.humana-de.org/21_tce/tce_klin.html, and to the FNW donation appeal, July 2004, http://www.humana-de.org/21_tce/. See also Sibanda, Elope Nimele; Stanczuk, Grajyna A.; Thomsen, Marianne: Acetyl salicylic acid (ASPIRIN) increases the CD4+ T lymphocytes and suppresses TNF- γ in HIV-I infected patients. Results of a 12 month, three-arm, placebo-controlled pilot study, AIDS vaccines and related topics, 2004, pp. 179–190; Abstract available online: <http://cat.inist.fr/?aModele=afficheN&cpsidt=16464616>.

⁵⁷⁸ See Nordhausen, Frank: Africa Aid for Free. In: Berliner Zeitung, January 3, 2014. Available online: <http://www.berliner-zeitung.de/archiv/ehemalige-mitarbeiter-werfen-der-firma-humana-ausbeutung-vor-die-bundesregierung-hat-jetzt-reagiert-afrika-hilfe-umsonst,10810590,10627452.html>.

⁵⁷⁹ Thomsen, Maria: Significant successes in HIV/AIDS therapy with aspirin (ASS), n.d. In: FNW website, <http://www.hiv-therapie.org/> ThomsenAspirin.pdf.

⁵⁸⁰ Klug, Christoph: Correcting some fundamental misconceptions about HIV and AIDS: An introduction, pp. 153–162, here 159. It is unclear from which Publication Klug's article comes from.

⁵⁸¹ See Fischer, Wolfram: Lecture series in Plauen, Zwickau, Chemnitz, Greiz, and Jena. In: Information from the Association for New Paths in HIV Therapy, 1 (July 2006), p. 12, available online:

In contrast, in a medical journal,⁵⁸² they were much more reserved about the study's results, and even the FNW admitted in its 2012 newsletter that there were "gaps in the data" that "may have contributed to the inability to determine clear study results." The blame for this was "the catastrophic political situation in Zimbabwe."⁵⁸³

6.4 Rapped Segal: The »bandwidth« between left and Right-wing extremism

Ironically, the association »New Ways in HIV Therapy«

Major publicity outside of the "Red Flag" and "Rainbow" only came after its self-dissolution in April 2012. A new ⁵⁸⁴ The reason for the renewed publicity controversy surrounding Segal's thesis was aroused. The Duisburg hip-hop duo "Die Bandbreite" was disinvited from the Christopher Street Day (CSD) in Duisburg because they wanted to rap their new song about AIDS. The lyrics reflected Segal's thesis:

»...Do you believe the crap about the monkeys, the nasty green monkeys? The animals that their Zairian hunters first infected, SIV mutates, and the blacks bring it across the pond, so that HIV 81 then reaches the USA via Haiti.

But it can't be that easy, as a mistake can creep in, because SIV and HIV have virtually no similarities. [...]

http://www.hiv-therapie.org/2006_Juli_Interview_mit_Rainer_Seybold.pdf; and Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung Sachsen eV, Events 2006, n.d.,

http://www.sachsen.rosalux.de/fileadmin/ls_sachsen/dokumente/archiv/chronik2006.pdf.

⁵⁸² Sibanda; Stanzuk; Thomsen: Acetyl salicylic acid (note 577), pp. 179–190; abstract available online: <http://cat.inist.fr/?aModele=afficheN&cpsidt=16464616>. Sie schrieben in ihrem Abstract: »The data presented in this pilot study show that, the administration of aspirin to HIV-1 infected individuals resulted in a significant increase in T lymphocytes numbers, decreases in p24 and in TNF- γ . We are persuaded that there is merit in further investigating the mechanisms through which this combination increased the CD4+ cell count and defining whether this agent has any role in the HIV management algorithms.« FNW, Newsletter, Juni 2012, 8 S., hier 8; <http://solidaritaet-international.de/>

⁵⁸³

uploads/media/Newsletter_2_2012_online-2_02.pdf.

⁵⁸⁴ Ibid.

Doctor MacArthur [sic] in 69 asked the House of Representatives for money because

the country needed a biological weapon for its military.

And so it happened, the money went out and then Robert Gallo showed up.

They say he discovered AIDS. False! The man built AIDS. [...]

AIDS has the same morphology as the Visna virus, which affects sheep, the same molecular weight, and sixty percent genome identical.

Ultimately, the liaison is successful and AIDS is born in the laboratory.

Now research is shifting to testing on the population. [...]«585

Because the duo insisted on performing the song, they were disinvited and the performance canceled. Dietmar Heyde of Duisburg AIDS Help had explained the reasons in an email to the duo's singer and songwriter, Marcel Wojnarowicz, before the disinvitation:

"We, as AIDS-Hilfe, clearly distance ourselves from the origin story of HIV propagated in the song, which adheres to a conspiracy theory that, while it has a certain charm, has long been scientifically and epidemiologically refuted and is highly ideological (and dates back to the height of the Cold War, which certainly gives it a certain charm, but it must be placed in the context of historical events). In my opinion, this interpretation is not only false and refuted, but also extremely counterproductive with regard to our prevention efforts."586

During his research, journalist Philipp Wahl learned that the "pseudo-scientific song" had been commissioned by the FNW.⁵⁸⁷

The chairman of the FNW, Detlef Rohm, had given the duo the paid commission and presented the song, including the corresponding video on YouTube, at the very last general meeting of the association in April 2012.⁵⁸⁸ The last verse of the song makes the sponsorship clear:

⁵⁸⁵ The Bandwidth: AIDS: Transcript. On: YouTube: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tS4uMEs6_yw&feature=youtu.be.

⁵⁸⁶ Wojna: Statement by Dietmar Heyde of AIDS-Hilfe, July 31, 2012. In: The Bandwidth website, <http://www.diebandbreite.de/stellungnahme-von-dietmar-heyde-von-der-aids-hilfe/>.

⁵⁸⁷ Wahl, Phillip: Wide-ranging AIDS and Nazi songs divide homosexuals ahead of Pride. In: Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, June 27, 2012; <http://www.derwesten.de/staedte/duisburg/aids-und-nazi-songs-der-bandbreite-spalten-homosexuelle-vor-dem-csd-id6817083.html?from=mobile>.

⁵⁸⁸ FNW: Newsletter of June 2012, p. 2. The video remains at the same location on YouTube as of January 4, 2014:

Wojnarowicz calls for the implementation of the association's "immediate program," including early treatment with aspirin.⁵⁸⁹

The controversy surrounding the song escalated when Marcus Meier of "Neues Deutschland" picked up on the story and placed the song on the right side of the political spectrum. Meier pointed out that Wojnarowicz cited a book by Wolfgang Eggert, "The Planned Epidemics: AIDS – SARS and Military Genetic Research" (2003), as a key source for the song, in addition to a brochure by Klug. According to Meier, the book was considered "crude anti-Semitic propaganda." According to Eggert, HIV was developed by the US government at Fort Detrick and passed on by the CIA to the Mossad. The Israeli secret service then spread the virus in Africa through deliberately contaminated blood transfusions. Behind everything, he claimed, was a Jewish end-time cult sect.⁵⁹⁰ Eggert wrote of a "biblical-apocalyptic project that extended into the present: It is the possible creation of an artificial pathogen that will destroy all races in the world—except for the genetically 'purest' Jewish core."⁵⁹¹ In the book, Eggert cites the writings of American conspiracy theorists on the alleged spread of the virus in Africa by the WHO and, like them, named the Polish-Jewish scientist Wolf Szmuness as a key figure. While Szmuness, who emigrated from Poland to the USA in the early 1970s, was alleged evidence of a communist conspiracy to spread AIDS for the Strecker brothers, he served Eggert as proof of a Zionist world conspiracy.⁵⁹² Regarding Eggert's conspiracy theory, Meier wrote in »Neues Deutschland«: »Compared to this apocalyptic 'project'

the Holocaust must appear as if it were a marigold [sic]."⁵⁹³ Eggert had described the alleged project in his book, relativizing the Holocaust, as "the greatest Shoah of all time."⁵⁹⁴ Because of the reference to Eggert, a link from the "Bandbreite" website to the sale offer for Eggert's book at his publisher "Chronos-Medien" – which offers further books about his conspiracy theories about Jews – and

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tS4uMEs6_yw&feature=youtu.be.

⁵⁸⁹ Choice: AIDS and Nazi songs (note 587).

⁵⁹⁰ Meier, Marcus: How left-wing is paranoia? In: ND, June 2, 2012, online edition: <http://www.neuesdeutschland.de/artikel/228439.wie-links-ist-paranoia.html>.

⁵⁹¹ Eggert, Wolfgang (ed.): The Planned Epidemics: AIDS – SARS and Military Genetic Research. Munich 2003, p. 72.

⁵⁹² Ebenda, S. 54 u. 71.

⁵⁹³ Meier: How left-wing is paranoia? (note 590).

⁵⁹⁴ Eggert: The Planned Epidemics (note 591), p. 83.

Because of the appearances of the "Bandbreite" at right-wing and right-wing conservative events, Meier placed them closer to the "right-wing comrades" than to the "left-wing comrades." Their reference to Eggert's book and the According to Meier, advertising for it on their website serves as an "appetizer for anti-Semitism." He accused them of adopting "conspiracy theory theses" and mixing them "with left-wing slogans." In this context, he mentioned a second "Bandbreite" song about September 11, titled "selbstgemacht," which claimed that the US government itself had blown up the World Trade Center.⁵⁹⁵

Despite their promotion of Eggert and appearances at events associated with the right-wing scene, "Die Bandbreite" rejected the accusations of proximity to the right-wing spectrum. The (still operating) FNW and the MLPD came to their aid, confirming "Bandbreite's" proximity to them. Bittel (MLPD), still the FNW's executive director, participated "as an advocate for the Bandbreite" at a public event on November 12, 2012, on the topic of the disinvitation.⁵⁹⁶ When renewed accusations arose against the band for "sexist, right-wing populist, and anti-American lyrics" in the run-up to their performance at the Gelsenkirchen Pentecost meeting,⁵⁹⁷ the MLPD, as co-organizer of the event, defended them: "We have not seen a single one of these accusations confirmed. Otherwise, as co-organizers, we would naturally have spoken out against a performance."⁵⁹⁸

Wojnarowicz, for his part, explained: »How the alleged legal bias of

⁵⁹⁵ Meier: How left-wing is paranoia? (note 590).

⁵⁹⁶ After the discussion on the allegations at the Pride parade, November 16, 2012. In: Die Bandbreite Website,
<http://www.diebandbreite.de/nach-der-diskussion-zu-den-vorwuerfen-beim-csd/>.

⁵⁹⁷ Sepultura at the Rock Hard Festival, Die Bandbreite at the MLPD in Gelsenkirchen. In: WAZ, May 16, 2013. Available online: <http://www.derwesten.de/staedte/gelsenkirchen/sepultura-beim-rock-hard-festival-die-bandbreite-bei-der-mlpd-in-gelsenkirchen-id7956913.html#plx1921309348>.

⁵⁹⁸ Turmoil surrounding the Pentecost youth meeting and the performance of the "Bandbreite." In: RF, May 16, 2013. Available online: <http://www.rf-news.de/2013/kw20/wirbel-um-das-pfingstjugendtreffen-und-den-aufritt-der-bandbreite>.

Whether this volume is compatible with the left communist attitude of the MLPD remains [...] unanswered.«⁵⁹⁹

Wojnarowicz recalled that Klug's (MLPD) brochure entitled "AIDS in Africa" also served as a source for the lyrics. He stated on his website: "Two completely independent sources provided us with almost identical information about the origin of the HIV virus. We also found support for the theses presented in the video clip from the support association 'New Ways in HIV Therapy'.⁶⁰⁰ Contrary to appearances, however, the two sources were not completely independent of each other, because both Eggert⁶⁰¹ and Klug⁶⁰² took Segal's thesis as their starting point. The "Bandbreite" song AIDS was not just "rapped Eggert," as Meier claimed,⁶⁰³ but also rapped Klug and even more so rapped Segal.

By quoting Eggert, Wojnarowicz took the FNW and the MLPD as examples. They hadn't shied away from embracing the conspiracy theories of others, regardless of their political background, as long as they somehow confirmed Segal's thesis.

The "Rainbow," for example, reprinted an interview with Eggert about his book in 2004.⁶⁰⁴ In the introduction to the interview, FNW members Ralf Bogen and Reiner Seybold, then also managing director of the Action Alliance against AIDS, justified the publication as follows:

»Eggert critically examines Prof. Gallo's widespread dogma that HIV was originally a natural monkey virus from Africa. [...]

The clear clarification of the HIV origin question is important for the rapid development of an effective AIDS vaccine.

⁵⁹⁹ Wojna: Subtle agitation by derwesten.de against "Die Bandbreite" and the MLPD, May 16, 2013; Bandbreite website, <http://www.diebandbreite.de/subtile-hetze-von-derwesten-de-gegen-die-bandbreite-und-die-mlpd/>.

⁶⁰⁰ Wojna: Videoclip AIDS, 29.5.2012; The Bandwidth Website, <http://www.diebandbreite.de/videoclip-aids/>.

⁶⁰¹ Eggert: The Planned Epidemics (note 591), pp. 23 f., 47, 49–52 and 77–82.

⁶⁰² Klug, Christoph: AIDS in Africa. Essen 2001, p. 2 f.

⁶⁰³ Meier: How left-wing is paranoia? (note 590).

⁶⁰⁴ AIDS – The Weapon from the Gene Lab. Interview with W. Eggert, Part 1, by Alain Rappsilber from BOX 128, pp. 18–19. In: Rainbow (2004) 48, pp. 18–19. The second part of the interview appeared in the next issue. See the interview with W. Eggert, Part 2, by Alain Rappsilber from BOX 128, pp. 18–19. In: Rainbow (2004) 49, p. 16.

For the necessary vaccination trials, the correct selection of suitable animal models [ie sheep!] is important.«⁶⁰⁵

In the introduction to the second part of the interview, they repeated the myth that "in the 1960s, the Pentagon had approved a research project to artificially create a virus that would destroy the human immune system." ⁶⁰⁶ Although ordering information for Eggert's book appeared in Rainbow, ⁶⁰⁷ his accusation of guilt against a Jewish end-time cult remained unmentioned. The AIDS song by Bandbreite also omitted this. Although, unlike Rainbow, it does point to Szmuness's alleged role in spreading HIV in Africa through US vaccines. ⁶⁰⁸

In the case of the MLPD, Mast reported positively in the "Red Flag" in 2002 on the writings of US conspiracy theorist Boyd E. Graves. Graves, as Mast emphasized, had "reconfirmed" the Fort Detrick thesis.

⁶⁰⁹ But according to Graves's account, the production and spread of AIDS around the world was a joint program of the USA and the USSR to exterminate Black people and homosexuals. He himself allegedly cured himself of AIDS with colloidal silver – a cure whose effectiveness an Israeli pharmaceutical company and an Israeli research institute allegedly wanted to cover up. ⁶¹⁰ Mast does not report on these aspects of Graves' writings. The "Red Flag" also linked to a rewritten version of MacArthur's 1969 testimony before the US Congress on Graves' website. In Graves's new version, it was anachronistically suggested, among other things, that First Lady Hillary Clinton, with her plans for national health insurance, would infect more people with immunization.

⁶⁰⁵ Bogen, Ralf; Seybold, Rainer: HIV – a failed result of research into virus-linked biological warfare agents? In: Rainbow (2004) 48, p. 18. On Seybold, see Action Alliance against AIDS (ed.): 10 Years of Action Alliance against AIDS. We're Sticking to It! No location given 2012, p. 18; Bogen's interview with Seybold: Pills instead of Profits – LIFE for 6 Million People – Treatment for All. In: Info from the FNW: HIV Therapy (note 581), pp. 10–13, here 10.

⁶⁰⁶ Bogen; Seybold: HIV – a failed result? (note 605), p. 15.

⁶⁰⁷ See Rainbow (2004) 48, p. 19.

⁶⁰⁸ The Bandwidth: AIDS, transcript from YouTube: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tS4uMEs6_yw&feature=youtu.be

⁶⁰⁹ Mast, Willi: New Evidence: AIDS Virus is a Product of Biological Weapons Research. In: RF, January 17, 2002, <http://interaktiv.mlpd.de/rf0203/rfart10.htm>.

⁶¹⁰ MacConnachie, James; Tudge, Robin: Rough Guide to Conspiracy Theories, 3. Ausgabe. London 2013, Kindle E-book, Position 8173.

tions would have wanted to infect.⁶¹¹ Despite everything, the RF considered the document to be further proof of Segal's thesis.

It should be noted here that not only members of the MLPD and its allied circles used conspiracy-political approaches from the other end of the political spectrum. Eggert, for his part, did not shy away from making use of conspiracy-political ideas from the left, such as Segal's thesis.⁶¹² In general, there is still a lively exchange of conspiracy-political approaches between the left and the right regarding AIDS, as was already evident before 1989 and with the example of the KGB, the Segals, Streckers, and others.

The reason for this lies with the alleged "culprit" of the conspiracy: the US government. In the US and Europe, the American government serves as a bogeyman for both right-wing and left-wing extremists, and both sides invent and spread corresponding conspiracy theories—not only about the origin of AIDS, but also, for example, about the "self-inflicted" attacks of September 11th. This shared anti-Americanism⁶¹³ also explains why the songs of "Bandbreite," with their conspiracy-political approaches, find an audience among both left-wing and right-wing extremists in German-speaking countries, and why the band therefore receives invitations to perform from both political persuasions.

6.5 Disinformation, misinformation and fatal consequences?

In connection with the controversy over »The Bandwidth«, Dietmar Heyde, managing director of AIDS-Hilfe Duisburg/Kreis Wesel, expressed his concern that FNW's "pretense of cheap therapies" was playing into the hands of AIDS deniers in developing countries. Dr. Ingulf Becker-Boost, an infectious disease specialist at the Sittardsberg Health Center and a caregiver for more than 200 HIV-infected people, referred in this context to the "unfortunate actions" of former South African President Thabo Mbeki.⁶¹⁴

⁶¹¹ From Official U.S. Govt. Documents House of Rep[resentatives] American Mass-es Hoodwinked AIDS Visus [sic] a Political Disease, o. D. American Patriot Friends Network, <http://www.apFn.org/apfn/aids2.pdf>.

⁶¹² Eggert: The Planned Epidemics (note 591), pp. 23 f., 47, 49–52 and 77–82.

⁶¹³ Jesse: Enemy Image (note 552), pp. 13–36, here 14, 27 and 31.

⁶¹⁴ Choice: AIDS and Nazi songs (note 587).

This referred to Mbeki's AIDS policy during his term in office (1999–2008). When he was elected, approximately one-fifth of adults in South Africa were infected with HIV. Approximately 300,000 South Africans had already died from it, and during his term in office, the number of deaths rose to 2.7 million. Nevertheless, Mbeki believed in the theories of Duesberg and other AIDS deniers and ignored the findings of established AIDS scientists. Consequently, he blocked

He promoted the introduction of ARVs in government clinics at a time when the effectiveness of HAART therapy and the benefit of AZT in preventing the transmission of HIV from mothers to their unborn children had already been proven. His Minister of Health, Dr. Mantombazana Ed-mie Tshabalala-Msimang, even declared ARVs "poison" and instead favored unproven and ineffective alternative therapies such as morphine.

Garlic and beetroot, or the vitamin supplements of the German alternative medicine practitioner Matthias Rath.⁶¹⁵ Estimates suggest that as a result of the delayed introduction of ARVs by the Mbeki government, approximately 333,000 additional South Africans died of AIDS during his term in office.⁶¹⁶

At first glance, the writings of the Segals, Klugs, the FNW, and the MLPD, including conspiracy theories and proposals for early AIDS treatment, do not appear to have had the destructive consequences of the activities of Duesberg and other AIDS deniers. The latter significantly influenced Mbeki's policies. In contrast to Duesberg, the Segals were always aware of the dangers of HIV and therefore supported "safe sex."⁶¹⁷ During a lecture tour through South Africa, Klug, as a member of the MLPD, together with its sister party, the Communist Party of South Africa Marxist-Leninist (CPSA-ML), took a stand against Mbeki's AIDS policy. As part of their "militant alliance" for the introduction of Klug's emergency program against AIDS in South Africa, they called for early treatment with aspirin and the development of a p24-based vaccine, as well as the immediate introduction of ARVs without profit for the pharmaceutical industry.⁶¹⁸ Klug and the FNW

⁶¹⁵ Natrass: AIDS Conspiracy (Anm. 12), S. 5 f., 96.

⁶¹⁶ Ibid., p. 89.

⁶¹⁷ Segal; Segal; Klug: AIDS is defeatable (note 491), pp. 224 and 230.

⁶¹⁸ "The fight against AIDS needs strong organizations" (Part 1). The "Red Flag" spoke with Shobane F. Mpeake and Christoph Klug. In: RF, July 21, 2005, <http://interaktiv.mlpd.de/rf0529/rpart12.htm>.

reject Duesberg's AIDS denial as unscientific and false.⁶¹⁹

Despite these important differences between Segal and Duesberg followers, Nicoli Nattrass finds that belief in the virus as an unfortunate bioweapon can be just as dangerous to public health as belief in the narratives of AIDS denialists. She writes: "A growing body of research demonstrates that conspiracy-political beliefs about AIDS in the United States and South Africa are associated with unprotected sex, non-compliance with antiretroviral treatment, and failure to test for HIV."⁶²⁰ All three behavioral patterns can have fatal consequences.

⁶¹⁹ Mast, Dr. W.: Prof. Duesberg's denial of the danger of HIV is intended to undermine the fight for worldwide access to AIDS medications and the development of an effective vaccine. In: FNW website, n.d., <http://www.hiv-therapie.org/html/duesberg.html>; Segal; Segal; Klug: AIDS is defeatable (note 491), pp. 227–231.

⁶²⁰ "A growing body of research shows that AIDS conspiracy beliefs in the US and South Africa are associated with risky sex, with non-adhering to antiretroviral treatment, and with non-testing for HIV." Nattrass: AIDS Conspiracy (note 12), p. 1. On the connection between belief in conspiracy theories and unprotected sex, see also, for example, for the USA: Bogart, LM; Bird, S. Thorburn: Exploring the Relationship of Conspiracy Beliefs about HIV/AIDS to Sexual Behaviors and Attitudes among African-American Adults. In: Journal of the National Medical Association 95 (2003) 11, S. 1057–1065. Verfügbar online: <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2594665/>; Bogart, LM; Thorburn, S.: Are HIV/AIDS Conspiracy Beliefs a Barrier to HIV Prevention among African Americans? In: JAIDS 38 (2005) 2, pp. 213–218; Ross, M.; Essien, J.; Torres, I.: Conspiracy Beliefs about the Origin of HIV/AIDS in Four Racial Groups. In: JAIDS 41 (2006) 3, pp. 342–344. For South Africa see Grebe, E.; Nattrass, N.: AIDS Conspiracy Beliefs and Unsafe Sex in Cape Town. In: AIDS and Behavior 16 (2012) 3, pp. 761–763. On the connection with non-adherence to treatment with ARVs see Bogart, L. et al.: Conspiracy beliefs about HIV are related to antiretroviral treatment nonadherence among African-American men with HIV. In: JAIDS 53 (2010) 5, pp. 648–655. On the connection with non-testing for HIV, see for the USA: Bohnert, AS; Latkin, CA: HIV Testing and Conspiracy Beliefs Regarding the Origins of HIV among African Americans. In: AIDS Patient Care and STDs 23 (2009) 9, S. 759–763; und für Südafrika: Bogart u. a.: Conspiracy Beliefs, *passim*, und W. S. Tun, S. Kellerman, und S. Maime, Z. Fipaza, M. Sheehy, L. Vu1, und D. Nel, Conspiracy beliefs about HIV, attitudes towards condoms and treatment and HIV-related preventive behaviors among men who have sex with men in Tschwane (Pretoria), South Africa, 18th Interna-

Why can belief in the theory of HIV as a biological weapon lead to such destructive behavior? Nattrass sees the reason for this in the implication of the theory that scientists and clinicians have either been duped by a conspiracy or are themselves participating in it. This, in turn, "undermines confidence in the scientific consensus on the possibilities of prevention and treatment. If AIDS scientists lie or are so easily deceived

of AIDS. ⁶²¹

are, their pleas for "safer sex" may also be superfluous. For example, the South African AIDS activist Edwin Cameron told the "taz" newspaper in 2010: "Theories like Segal's have hindered many years of prevention in Africa – people continue to believe that AIDS comes from the USA, from tourists, from gays."⁶²² When it comes to ARV therapy, a belief in the theory of HIV as a biological weapon often leads to a search for scientifically untenable alternative therapies. This assumption led Jakob Segal to search for effective alternative therapies outside of mainstream science. This same belief influenced Tshabalala-Msimanga in her propagation of alternative approaches in South Africa. Belief in Segal's thesis or other conspiracy theories may lead HIV-infected individuals to the same search for and perhaps rejection of ARVs in favor of AIDS therapies whose efficacy is not proven,⁶²³ —perhaps UVB, traditional African and Chinese remedies, or aspirin.

The obvious conclusion is that the dissemination of the theory of HIV as a biological weapon, in its original Fort Detrick version by the KGB or in the more scientific-sounding version by the Segals, had unplanned and unwanted side effects. The Fort Detrick disinformation campaign by the KGB and the High Command, the CPSU and the SED, the core of which was spread by conscious or unconscious supporters like the Segals, has outlived its originators, taken on a life of its own, and is now exerting an impact on the fight against the HIV epidemic.

tional AIDS Conference, Vienna, 2010, Abstract available online: <http://pag.aids2010.org/Abstracts.aspx?AID=14825>.

⁶²¹ Nattrass: AIDS Conspiracy (Anm. 12), S. 1 f.

⁶²² Feddersen, Jan; Gast, Wolfgang: Propaganda and the "taz." When the Stasi used us. In: taz, January 9, 2010, pp. 16–17.

⁶²³ Nattrass: AIDS Conspiracy (Anm. 12), S. 1 f.; Bogart u. a.: Conspiracy beliefs about HIV (Anm. 620), S. 648–655.

7

Summary

Based on newly accessible sources in the Sofia archive of the COM-DOS and new discoveries and analyses of documents in the archive of the Federal Office of State Security (BStU), previously unknown details have been uncovered about the involvement of the HV A and the research couple Jakob and Lilli Segal in the KGB's AIDS disinformation campaign. There was a conspiracy between the KGB and the HV A to spread AIDS disinformation in the form of the Fort-Detrick theory of HIV's origins. Individuals like the Segals served at least as unwitting multipliers in this campaign. A closer examination of Segal's thesis and the cycle of disinformation and misinformation about AIDS reveals the negative political and public health consequences of the theory of HIV as a biological weapon.

The KGB launched its campaign in 1985 with the theory of the artificial origin of the AIDS pathogen at Fort Detrick. It involved Eastern European "brother agencies," other state security services of the Warsaw Pact, in the dissemination of its disinformation. The HV A's contribution consisted of

the preparation of a "scientific study" on the origins of AIDS at Fort Detrick. HV A/X/1 managed and completed this task within the framework of a new object operation called "Denver."

According to current records, the Segals decided to begin their research into the origins of AIDS in 1985, independent of any direct intelligence influence. Jacob Segal was indirectly influenced by the KGB through articles in the Patriot and Literaturnaya Gazeta that allegedly located the artificial origin of the HIV virus in Fort Detrick. Due to his previous connections to Soviet agencies and the conceptual proximity of his research to the KGB's Fort Detrick theory in these publications, direct KGB influence cannot be ruled out. However, there is no evidence of this.

In the spring of 1986, Jakob Segal was already talking about using his research for propaganda purposes and named the Secretary for International Relations of the Central Committee of the SED, Hermann Axen, as the client. In June 1986, Axel Theisinger of HA VII of the MfS wrote that Segal had submitted his study on AIDS not only to Axen, but also to the HV A. This means that Jakob Segal and perhaps also his wife were involved in a more comprehensive

Cooperation between the CPSU, SED, KGB, and MfS to spread the Fort Detrick thesis. The service unit for which Segal was "positively recorded" was not the Disinformation Department HV A/X, but

HV A/SWT/XIII/5, responsible for espionage in the field of genetic and biotechnology. Based on the information provided to HV A, Jakob or Lilli, or both Segals, were evidently registered as contact persons for "diagnosis" by HV A/SWT/XIII/5. There was a division of labor between HV A/SWT/XIII/5, which was responsible for research into genetic and biotechnology and AIDS and, not coincidentally, also for the Segals, and HV A/X/1, responsible for active measures against AIDS ("Denver").

An English version of Segal's study, "AIDS: Its Nature and Origin," with a brief introduction by an unknown author, was distributed in a mimeographed brochure entitled "AIDS: USA-homemade evil, NOT imported from Africa" prior to and during the Non-Aligned Summit in Harare in early September 1986. It is reasonable to conclude that the HV A played a role in the compilation and distribution of the brochure. The Segals' study was considered by the HV A/X to be part of their OVO "Denver"; Jakob Segal was aware of the MfS's interest in his study, and the HV A was, at least from the MfS's perspective, one of the clients for Segal's work at that time. However the brochure was prepared and distributed, the KGB was satisfied with Segal's study, and in particular with its rejection of the short-lived vervet monkey theory. The work served to whip up anti-American sentiment in Africa. Soviet intelligence viewed the study and its dissemination as part of its broader AIDS disinformation campaign in collaboration with its "brother agencies."

The Segals received help from the MfS and especially from the HV A in disseminating and defending their thesis and for their research. The MfS, in cooperation with the Central Committee of the SED, imposed a publication ban on East German scholars who questioned Segal's theses, both in the West and the East. There are several indications that after Harare, HV A/X attempted to pave the way for further publications by the Segals in Western countries. Kunhanandan Nair, who apparently published an earlier manuscript by HV A/X as "The Devil and his Dart" in 1986, interviewed the Segals in the autumn of 1986. Corresponding articles appeared in the Nairobi Sunday Times, the Senegalese newspaper Le Devoir, and the Indian newspaper Blitz. In India, an English version of Segal's study, along with Nair's interview, was published in book form in 1989. Heimo Claaßen, a West German journalist based in Brussels, suggested to Jakob Segal the publication of an anthology of his study in the West, attempted to organize this, and submitted Segal's study to the journal Wechselwirkung for publication.

investigation continued. At that time, Claaßen was being led by HV A/X/1, the department responsible for "Denver," in the IMA case "Joachim." Before Claaßen's efforts could bear fruit, Stefan Heym's interview with Jakob Segal was published in the "taz" newspaper. HV A/X played a role in this in that one of its OibEs alerted "taz" journalist Arno Widmann to the existence of the interview. HV A also informed other MfS service units that it was interested in publishing the interview to prevent them from taking action against Heym.

men.

The decision of Kuno Kruse of the taz newspaper to publish an anthology containing Segal's thesis and other contributions, however, was not a direct result of the activities of HV A. Nevertheless, HV A/X distributed a copy under the object process "Denver" to its Bulgarian colleagues and presumably also to other "brother organs" for their active measures and for AIDS disinformation. In August 1987, HV A/SWT/XIII/5 directly commissioned Ronald Dehmlow, co-author of the Segal study, as IMS "Nils," to assist the Segals in their investigations. A second IM of HV A/SWT/XIII/5, "Jörg," helped them to

During this time, he also participated in research and traveled to the Federal Republic of Germany and West Berlin. In April 1988, with the assistance of HV A/SWT/XIII/5, Dehmlow became head of a research center for medical biophysical chemistry in the Ministry of Health. Under Dehmlow, Jakob Segal was appointed scientific director and his wife Lilli was appointed documentation consultant. According to entries in the HV A database, there was a regular exchange of information between the research center staff and van de Sand, HV A/SWT/XIII/5.

In the second half of 1987, the KGB was forced to end its AIDS disinformation, or at least limit it to measures against the presence of US military bases. Despite Falin's resistance, the "white propaganda" organs subordinate to the Central Committee of the CPSU were also forced to cease the campaign. This was prompted by Gorbachev's efforts to conclude arms control and disarmament agreements with the US. The US had demanded an end to the AIDS disinformation campaign as a precondition for relevant summits between Gorbachev and Reagan.

Despite similar protests from the State Department to the MfAA and against the advice of the KGB, HV A/X continued its active measures in the operation "Denver." They received new impetus from the revelations of the US NGO "Foundation for Economic Trends" (FET) under the leadership of Jeremy Rifkin. The FET had published a statement by a US

American Defense Department scientist Donald MacArthur revealed this to a Congressional committee in 1969.

MacArthur spoke of the possibility of developing a virus against which the human immune system would have no defense. FET submitted a request to the Department of Defense for information on whether or not appropriate research into such a virus had been initiated. Segal used MacArthur's statement as proof of his thesis. In 1989, Segal undertook a lecture tour of Germany to announce precisely this. HV A/X submitted a German translation of FET's request to the US Department of Defense to the Bulgarian "brother body" for use in future active measures, along with the latest version of Segal's thesis in the form of an article in "Streitbarer Materialismus." In 1990, the Segals published a translation of MacArthur's statement and FET's request in their book "AIDS – the Trail Leads to the Pentagon."

The last and perhaps most ambitious active measure of HV A/X within the "Denver" object process was the co-financing of the film "AIDS – The African Legend" by Claaßen, registered in the IMA "Joachim" process of HV A/X/1, and the West German filmmaker Malte Rauch, registered in the OVO "Denver." With the help of the "brother bodies," HV A/X intended to distribute the film in India and other developing countries.

The film, co-financed by WDR, was shown at least three times on West German television in 1989, and the English version, "Monkey Business: AIDS, the Africa Story," was broadcast on Britain's Channel 4.

The film focused on Segal's thesis alongside the new "evidence" of Rifkin's FET and the statements of Richard and Rosalind

Chirimuuta on the allegedly racist motives of the African theory of AIDS origins. The HV A/X wanted to use "Denver" as part of the "Denver" initiative to disseminate Chirimuuta's work "AIDS, Africa and Racism."

contribute.

Since the beginning of the KGB's AIDS disinformation campaign, there has been a cycle of disinformation and misinformation about AIDS, particularly between the KGB and its disseminators, as well as conspiracy theorists in the USA. This cycle did not end with the end of the Cold War. Many of the disseminators of the Fort Detrick theory remained active after 1989—e.g., the Segals, Claaßen, and Rauch—while others began to spread the Fort Detrick theory or its Segal variant even more vigorously. The Segal theory became a topic of literature and film in Germany and Sweden in the 1990s. To disseminate

To promote their thesis and to further disseminate their thesis, the Segals portrayed themselves as "AIDS dissidents" in the former GDR, despite their privileged position compared to other East German scientists in publishing in the West, despite the behind-the-scenes help of the MfS (of which they need not have known), and despite their assumption of a research position in the MfG in 1988.

The "AIDS dissident" legend benefited not only the Segals, but also their new co-author Christoph Klug and the MLPD, of which he was a member. Up to the present day, Klug, the MLPD, and their informally affiliated support group, "New Paths in HIV Therapy," have propagated

The German Society for HIV Prevention and Prevention (e. V.) supports Segal's theory and Jakob Segal's proposal for early treatment with aspirin, even though its effectiveness is unproven and dangerous side effects are known. Not only the use of ineffective alternative therapies, but even the belief in the theory of HIV as a biological weapon can hinder the protection and healing of those affected. Studies show that this group of people often exhibits pronounced risk-taking behavior, "with unprotected sex, non-compliance with antiretroviral treatment, and failure to test for HIV."

⁶²⁴ Each of these

Behavioral patterns can have fatal consequences. As the controversy surrounding the 2012 AIDS song by the duo "Die Bandbreite" (The Bandwidth) – rapped by Segal – demonstrates, conspiracy theories circulate between right-wing and left-wing extremists and can benefit both political movements. In this context, it has been shown that Segal's thesis and its dissemination endanger not only physical but also political health.

⁶²⁴ Nattrass: AIDS Conspiracy (Anm. 12), S. 1.

List of abbreviations

AARC	Assassination Archives and Research Center (US)
ABS	Archive of the State Security Services (Czech)
AdW	Academy of Sciences
AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (engl. – erworbenes Immunodefektsyndrom)
AM	Active measure
AN	Work name, alias name
AP	Associated Press
APN	Foreign Press Agency Novosti (Russian)
NUMBER	Antiretroviral drug
THAT	Azidothymidine (an ARV)
BV	District administration (of the MfS)
CAP	Covert Action Information Bulletin (Washington DC, Quarterly)

CBW Chemical and Biological Warfare Weapons

CDC Centers for Disease Control (US)

COMDOS Commission/Authority for the Investigation of State Security (Bulgarian)

CREST	CIA Records Search Tool
OF	Service unit
DS	State Security (Bulgarian)
COME	Department of Defense
OF THE	Departement of State
EIR	Executive Intelligence Review
EMBO	European Molecular Biology Organization
FMDI	Federal Ministry of the Interior Secret Informer
GI	
HAART	Highly active antiretroviral therapy
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus (engl.)
HOT	Hematogenous oxidation therapy
HW	Head Office
JAIDS	Journal of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndromes
JRSM	Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine
KHdVP	People's Police Hospital
KP	Contact person
LG	Literaturnaja gazeta
KGB	Committee for State Security (Russian)
MfG	Ministry of Health

NARA	National Archives Records and Archives Administration (US)
n.p.	not paginated
NSC	National Security Council (US)
OibE	Officer on special duty
OV	Operational process
THIS	Object process
RF Red Flag	
RoHo Rosenholz	
SPID AIDS (russ.)	
SVG	backup process
USAMRIID	US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases
UVB	US Information Agency
AGE	ultraviolet irradiation