Gov 94OA Analysis

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5/6/2021

imputing percentages with Gilens' data

```
##
## -- Column specification --------------------------------------------------------
## cols(
##   .default = col_double(),
##   xl_area = col_character(),
##   question_text = col_character()
## )
## i Use `spec()` for the full column specifications.
```

Imputing percentages with my own data

```
## Joining, by = "year"
```

Change in gridlock from 2009−2013

Red area indicates the 4−month time period in which the Senate Democrats had a filibuster−proof majority. Gridlock is measures as the percentage of proposed policy changes not adopted.




Change in Senate Democrats' seat advantage from 2009−2013
Red area indicates the 4−month time period in which the Democrats had a filibuster−proof majority.
Senate Democrats' seat advantage
20
15
10
5
0
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
Year




```
## Joining, by = "year"
## Joining, by = "year"
## Joining, by = "year"
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```

$$policy\_preference = \beta_0 * income + \beta_1 * income^2$$

```
##
## -- Column specification --------------------------------------------------------
## cols(
##   .default = col_double(),
##   xl_area = col_character()
## )
## i Use `spec()` for the full column specifications.
```

Correlations

```
## Loading required package: Hmisc
```

```
## Loading required package: lattice
```

```
## Loading required package: survival
```

Table 1: Correlations among independent variables

	Median voter	Affluent voter	Gridlock	Senate seat advantage	Filibuster-proof
Median voter					
Affluent voter	0.89***				
Gridlock	0.18*	0.20*			
Senate seat advantage	-0.04	-0.05	-0.71***		
Filibuster-proof	0.02	-0.03	-0.01	0.19*	

Note:
***p<.001; n = 1779.

```
## Loading required package: Formula

##
## Attaching package: 'Hmisc'

## The following object is masked from 'package:gt':
##
##     html

## The following objects are masked from 'package:dplyr':
##
##     src, summarize

## The following objects are masked from 'package:base':
##
##     format.pval, units
```

Running models

% Table created by stargazer v.5.2.2 by Marek Hlavac, Harvard University. E-mail: hlavac at fas.harvard.edu % Date and time: Sun, May 09, 2021 - 18:41:38 % Requires LaTeX packages: dcolumn

% Table created by stargazer v.5.2.2 by Marek Hlavac, Harvard University. E-mail: hlavac at fas.harvard.edu % Date and time: Sun, May 09, 2021 - 18:41:39 % Requires LaTeX packages: dcolumn

% Table created by stargazer v.5.2.2 by Marek Hlavac, Harvard University. E-mail: hlavac at fas.harvard.edu % Date and time: Sun, May 09, 2021 - 18:41:39 % Requires LaTeX packages: dcolumn

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More gridlock, less responsiveness to the median voter. More gridlock, less responsiveness to the affluent voter.

More senate seat advantage, more responsiveness to median voter. (not significant) More senate seat advantage, more responsiveness to affluent voter. (not significant)

Filibuster proof, more responsive to median voter (not significant) Filibuster proof, more responsive to affluent voter (not significant)

Running analyses

Table 2: The influence of median voter, affluent voter, gridlock, Senate seat advantage, filibuster-proof majorities on policy outcomes

	Dependent variable:				
	Policy change				
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Median voter	2.668***				
	(0.984)				
Affluent voter		2.055**			
		(0.978)			
Level of gridlock			−1.568***		
			(0.558)		
Senate seat advantage				1.084**	
				(0.430)	
Filibuster-proof majority					2.187*
					(1.172)
Constant	−2.504***	−2.081***	−0.024	−1.597***	−1.088***
	(0.612)	(0.564)	(0.391)	(0.325)	(0.201)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	152.407	155.894	152.635	153.902	156.377

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
All predictors are scaled to range from 0 to 1. The dependent variable is the policy outcome, coded 1 if the proposed policy change took place within four years of the survey date and 0 if it did not. These are all bivariate logistic regressions. N = 135.

Table 3: The influence of gridlock on governmental responsiveness to the median voter and affluent voter

	Dependent variable:	
	Policy change	
	Model 6	Model 7
	(1)	(2)
Preferences of median voter	8.635***	
	(2.904)	
Preferences of affluent voter		7.191***
		(2.760)
Level of gridlock	1.310	0.838
	(1.970)	(1.823)
Preferences of median voter*Gridlock	−7.109*	
	(3.770)	
Preferences of affluent voter*Gridlock		−6.154*
		(3.641)
Constant	−4.005***	−3.144**
	(1.430)	(1.309)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	138.865	144.590

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
All predictors are scaled to range from 0 to 1. The dependent variable is the policy outcome, coded 1 if the proposed policy change took place within four years of the survey date and 0 if it did not. These models are all multivariate logistic regressions. N = 135.

Table 4: The influence of Senate seat advantage on governmental responsiveness to the median voter and affluent voter

	Dependent variable:	
	Policy change	
	Model 8	Model 9
	(1)	(2)
Preferences of median voter	1.305	
	(1.463)	
Preferences of affluent voter		0.846
		(1.569)
Senate seat advantage	−0.752	−0.186
	(1.351)	(1.227)
Preferences of median voter*Senate seat advantage	3.548	
	(2.260)	
Preferences of affluent voter*Senate seat advantage		2.649
		(2.213)
Constant	−2.373***	−2.071**
	(0.915)	(0.899)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	145.548	150.721

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
All predictors are scaled to range from 0 to 1. The dependent variable is the policy outcome, coded 1 if the proposed policy change took place within four years of the survey date and 0 if it did not. These models are all multivariate logistic regressions. N = 135.

Table 5: The influence of filibuster-proof majorities on governmental responsiveness to the median voter and affluent voter

	Dependent variable:	
	Policy change	
	Model 10	Model 11
	(1)	(2)
Preferences of median voter	2.706***	
	(1.015)	
Preferences of affluent voter		2.173**
		(1.011)
Filibuster-proof majority	0.909	1.700
	(5.246)	(3.495)
Preferences of median voter*Filibuster-proof majority	2.609	
	(10.237)	
Preferences of affluent voter*Filibuster-proof majority		1.464
		(7.654)
Constant	−2.607***	−2.228***
	(0.635)	(0.589)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	152.089	155.206

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
All predictors are scaled to range from 0 to 1. The dependent variable is the policy outcome, coded 1 if the proposed policy change took place within four years of the survey date and 0 if it did not. These models are all multivariate logistic regressions. N = 135.