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Curriculum Vitae Fall 2019

MONICA TRAN XUAN

Personal Data

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Citizenship: Vietnam (F-1 Visa)

Major Fields of Concentration

Macroeconomics, International Economics, Public Finance

Education

Degree	Field	Institution	Year
PhD	Economics	University of Minnesota (expected)	2020
MA	Economics	University of Minnesota	2017
BSc	Mathematics and Economics	Carroll University	2014
	summa cum laude	·	

Dissertation

Title: "Fiscal Policies, Redistribution, and Limited Commitment" Dissertation Advisor: Professor V. V. Chari and Professor Larry E. Jones

Expected Completion: Summer 2020

References

Professor V. V. Chari	(612) 626-7151	Department of Economics
	chari002@umn.edu	University of Minnesota
		4-101 Hanson Hall
Professor Larry E. Jones	(612) 624-4553	1925 Fourth Street South
	lej@umn.edu	Minneapolis, MN 55455
Professor Manuel Amador	(612) 624-4060 amador@umn.edu	
Dr. Benjamin Malin	(612) 204-5499	Research Department

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Honors and Awards

2017	Summer Economics Fellowship, American Economic Association
2016	Participant, The Princeton Initiative: Macro, Money and Finance, nominated by Department of Economics,
	University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota
2016	Distinguished Teaching Assistant, Department of Economics, University of Minnesota, Minnesota
2015	Morton and Artice Silverman Fellowship, Department of Economics, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis,
	Minnesota
2014	Bert and Susan Hill Gross Fellowship, Department of Economics, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis,
	Minnesota
2014	Mathematics Major of the Year, Department of Mathematics, Carroll University, Waukesha, Wisconsin
2014	Phi Kappa Phi, Carroll University, Waukesha, Wisconsin
2013 & 2014	Who's Who Among American Colleges and Universities, Carroll University, Waukesha, Wisconsin
2013	Outstanding Student in Economics Award, Department of Business, Accounting, and Economics, Carroll
	University, Waukesha, Wisconsin

Teaching Experience

August 2016	Teaching Assistant, Department of Economics, University of Minnesota, Minnesota, Minnesota. Led
	recitations for Numerical Methods course for PhD students.
2015-2016	Teaching Assistant, Department of Economics, University of Minnesota, Minnesota, Minnesota. Led
	recitations to for the graduate level <i>Macroeconomic Theory</i> sequence.
2013-2014	Teaching Assistant, Carroll University, Waukesha, Wisconsin. Led recitations for Intermediate Algebra.
2011-2014	Math Center Assistant, Carroll University, Waukesha, Wisconsin. Led tutoring sessions for Calculus and
	Introduction to Statistics.
2012-2013	Teaching Assistant, Carroll University, Waukesha, Wisconsin, Led recitations for Computational Thinking.

Research Experience

2016-Present	Research Analyst, Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Minneapolis, Minnesota.	
	Research assistant to the Economic Analysis Group.	
Summer 2019	Dissertation Intern, Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, St. Louis, Missouri.	
Summer 2017	Dissertation Fellow, Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, Richmond, Virginia.	
2013-2014	Research Scholar, 2013 Pioneer Scholar Program, Carroll University, Waukesha, Wisconsin.	
2012-2013	Research Assistant, Carroll University, Waukesha, Wisconsin. Research assistant to Professor Christopher	
	Kuster.	

Publication

"Will the U.S. Velocity of Money Rise up Again? New Evidence from Random Walk Hypothesis," *Undergraduate Economic Review*, Vol.10:1, 2014: Article 14.

Working Papers

- "Redistribution, Sovereign Debt, and Optimal Taxation," job market paper
- "Optimal Redistributive Policy in Debt Constrained Economies," working paper

Presentations

- "Sovereign Debt-Financed Redistribution," presented at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, St. Louis, Missouri, August 2019.
- "Optimal Redistributive Policy in Debt Constrained Economies," presented at Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, Richmond, Virginia, June & August 2017; National Taxation Association Annual Meeting, Philadelphia, Pennsylania, November 2017; Midwest Economics Association Meeting, Evanston, March 2018; Midwest Macroeconomics Meeting, Madison, Wisconsin, May 2018; Annual Congress of the European Economic Association, Cologne, Germany, August 2018; North American Summer Meeting of the Econometric Society, Seattle, Washington, June 2019.

[&]quot;Austerity, Inequality, and Sovereign Default," in progress

"Will the U.S. Velocity of Money Rise up Again? New Evidence from Random Walk Hypothesis," presented at Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, Dallas, Texas, March 2014.

Computer Skills

Fortan, Python, Matlab, Stata, R, Julia, Lyx, LaTeX

Languages

English (fluent), Vietnamese (native)

Abstracts

"Redistribution, Sovereign Debt, and Optimal Taxation," job market paper

This paper examines the interaction between a country's concern for redistribution and its external indebtedness. I document a positive correlation between income inequality and external debt across countries and time periods. I propose a small open economy model in which taxes are distortionary and the government has a redistributive motive and lacks commitment. Domestic and external credit markets are state contingent, and the government faces endogenous borrowing constraints. Theoretically, I find that when borrowing constraints bind, the government reduces redistribution (measured as the variance of utility) and increases its debt repayment by lowering labor taxes and levying taxes on domestic borrowing. I then develop a theory of debt sustainability based on a motive for redistribution, in which the endogenous cost of default comes from the high and volatile labor distortions needed for redistribution in financial autarky. The model quantitatively accounts for (i) the cross-country positive correlation between pre-tax income inequality and external debt, (ii) the average level and volatility of Italy's external debt-to-output ratio, and (iii) the increase in external debt-to-output following an increase in Italy's income inequality from the 1985-2001 period to the 2002-2015 period. The optimal austerity policies following a negative productivity shock are increasing external borrowing and redistribution while reducing redistribution to repay debt in the future. The magnitude of these responses varies with wage inequality.

"Optimal Redistributive Policy in Debt Constrained Economies"

This paper studies optimal taxation in an open economy. The government has a redistributive motive and faces self-enforcing debt constraints that arise from the limited commitment of the government. Redistributive policies are proportional taxes on labor and domestic saving. The standard Ramsey results of labor tax smoothing and a zero capital tax in the limit no longer hold. Instead, optimal labor taxes decrease over time and eventually converge to a non-zero limit, and the optimal capital tax is positive in the limit. The efficient contract features front-loading distortion and back-loading efficiency, allowing the government to borrow more in the future. The model's numerical exercise shows that a stronger redistributive motive requires greater tax distortions at the beginning of time as well as a higher external debt level in the long run.

"Austerity, Inequality, and Sovereign Default"

This paper explores how a government's redistributive concern affects its austerity policies and incentive to default. I study optimal sovereign default, debt and tax policies in an Eaton-Gersovitz-Arellano model with heterogeneous agents. The government has lack of commitment in all policies. I show that the model is equivalent to a modified representative-agent setup in which the government chooses the distribution of consumption shares, and the effective risk aversion is higher. The model can account for a higher average debt-to-output ratio as well as a higher average spread than the canonical representative-agent model.