

Overview of Differential Privacy part 1

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Statistical Data Privacy

Outline

- 1 Introduction
- 2 Definitions and implications
- 3 Summary and References

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Recap of synthetic data

- Synthetic microdata
 - 1 Bayesian synthesis models (Lectures 4 and 5)
 - 2 Methods for utility evaluation (Lectures 6 and 7)
 - 3 Methods for risk evaluation (Lectures 8, 9, and 10)
- Synthetic data is driven by modeling, i.e., from the angle of utility
- Risk evaluation methods make assumption about intruder's knowledge and behavior
- Can we approach data privacy from the angle of risk?

Differential privacy

- Dwork et al. (2006), computer science
- A formal mathematical framework to provide privacy protection guarantees
- Main initial focus is on **summary statistics**, not microdata nor tabular data

Discussion question: What summary statistics of your course project dataset that you think would be useful to be released and therefore need protection?

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Adding noise for privacy protection

- Key idea: add **noise** to the **output** of **statistics** calculated from **databases**
- Added noise is random; depends on a predetermined **privacy budget** and the type of statistics

Definitions: database

- Databases are datasets that data analysts use for analysis
- Databases are confidential, whether and how can the data analyst get information of quantities of interest?
- Whether and how the database holder can provide information to the data analyst: useful and privacy-protected

Definitions: database cont'd

- Example: CE sample

Variable Name	Variable information
UrbanRural	Binary; the urban / rural status of CU: 1 = Urban, 2 = Rural.
Income	Continuous; the amount of CU income before taxes in past 12 months (in <i>USD</i>).
Race	Categorical; the race category of the reference person: 1 = White, 2 = Black, 3 = Native American, 4 = Asian, 5 = Pacific Islander, 6 = Multi-race.
Expenditure	Continuous; CU's total expenditures in last quarter (in <i>USD</i>).
KidsCount	Count; the number of CU members under age 16.

- A quantity of interest: the number of rural CUs in this sample

Definitions: statistic

- Denote numeric statistics as functions $f : \mathbb{N}^{|\mathcal{X}|} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^k$, mapping databases to k real numbers, \mathbb{R}^k
- Example: the data analyst can learn the following statistic of the CE database
 - ▶ how many rural CUs are there in this sample?

Discussion question: As the database holder, can we give out the actual values? Why or why not?

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Discussion question: As the database holder, can we give out the actual values? Why or why not?

- We will add noise to the statistic output for privacy protection, how?

Definitions: Hamming-distance

- Given databases $\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y} \in \mathbb{N}^{|\mathcal{X}|}$, let $\delta(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y})$ denote the Hamming distance between \mathbf{x} and \mathbf{y} by:

$$\delta(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}) = \#\{i : x_i \neq y_i\}. \quad (1)$$

- Under differential privacy, we add noise by considering the scenario where **two databases differ by one record**, i.e., $\delta(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}) = 1$

Definitions: ℓ_1 —sensitivity

- The ℓ_1 —sensitivity is the magnitude a single individual's data can change the ℓ_1 norm of the function f in the worst case
- Formally, the ℓ_1 —sensitivity of a function $f : \mathbb{N}^{|\mathcal{X}|} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^k$ is:

$$\Delta f = \max_{\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y} \in \mathbb{N}^{|\mathcal{X}|}, \delta(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y})=1} \|f(\mathbf{x}) - f(\mathbf{y})\|_1. \quad (2)$$

- The ℓ_1 norm between $f(\mathbf{x})$ and $f(\mathbf{y})$ is the absolute difference between $f(\mathbf{x})$ and $f(\mathbf{y})$, denoted as $\|f(\mathbf{x}) - f(\mathbf{y})\|_1$
- Δf is the maximum change in the function f on \mathbf{x} and \mathbf{y} , where $\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y} \in \mathbb{N}^{|\mathcal{X}|}$ and differ by a single observation (i.e., $\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y} \in \mathbb{N}^{|\mathcal{X}|}, \delta(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}) = 1$)

Definitions: ℓ_1 —sensitivity cont'd

- Example: CE database
 - ▶ \mathbf{x} is the confidential CE sample, \mathbf{y} is the database where one data entry is different from \mathbf{x} ($\delta(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}) = 1$)
- Statistic f : How many rural CUs are there in this sample?
 - ▶ Discussion question: what is the ℓ_1 —sensitivity for statistic f ?

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- Another statistic f_y : what is the average income of this sample?
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 - ▶ Discussion question: what is the ℓ_1 —sensitivity for statistic f ?
 - ▶ answer: $\Delta f = \frac{b-a}{n}$ ($b - a$ is the range, and n is the sample size)

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 - ▶ answer: $\Delta f = \frac{b-a}{n}$ ($b - a$ is the range, and n is the sample size)
- In sum, the ℓ_1 -sensitivity depends on the database and the statistic sent to the database by the data analyst

Definitions: ϵ -differential privacy

- We want to guarantee that a mechanism behaves similarly (i.e., giving similar outputs) on similar inputs (e.g. when two databases differ by one)
- One approach:
 - ▶ bound the log ratio of the probabilities of the outputs from above
 - ▶ give an upper bound on the noise added to the output to preserve privacy

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- A mechanism \mathcal{M} with domain $\mathbb{N}^{|\mathcal{X}|}$ is ϵ -differentially private for all $\mathcal{S} \subseteq \text{Range}(\mathcal{M})$ and for all $\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y} \in \mathbb{N}^{|\mathcal{X}|}$ such that $\delta(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}) = 1$:

$$\left| \ln \left(\frac{\Pr[\mathcal{M}(\mathbf{x}) \in \mathcal{S}]}{\Pr[\mathcal{M}(\mathbf{y}) \in \mathcal{S}]} \right) \right| \leq \epsilon. \quad (3)$$

Definitions: ϵ -differential privacy cont'd

$$\left| \ln \left(\frac{Pr[\mathcal{M}(\mathbf{x}) \in \mathcal{S}]}{Pr[\mathcal{M}(\mathbf{y}) \in \mathcal{S}]} \right) \right| \leq \epsilon$$

- The ratio $\ln \left(\frac{Pr[\mathcal{M}(\mathbf{x}) \in \mathcal{S}]}{Pr[\mathcal{M}(\mathbf{y}) \in \mathcal{S}]} \right)$
 - ▶ is the log of the ratio of the probability of the output undergone mechanism \mathcal{M} from the database \mathbf{x} , and that from the database \mathbf{y}
 - ▶ can be considered as the difference in the outputs
- Bound the ratio above by ϵ , the privacy budget (to be defined next), i.e., setting the maximum difference
- ϵ -differential privacy provides us a means to perturb the output by adding noise, so that similar inputs produce similar outputs under the mechanism \mathcal{M}

Definitions: privacy budget

- The term ϵ is the privacy budget, that is to be spent by the database holder when calculating statistics

Implications

- With given privacy budget, we can then add noise according to the ϵ -differential privacy definition to the output, in order to preserve privacy
- Relationships among: database, statistic, sensitivity, privacy budget and added noise
- Two important implications:
 - ① the added noise is positively related to the sensitivity
 - ② the added noise negatively related to the privacy budget

Implications: sensitivity and added noise

- The ℓ_1 –sensitivity of statistic (function) f is to capture the magnitude a single individual's data can change the ℓ_1 norm of the statistic f in the worst case, denoted as Δf
- ℓ_1 –sensitivity depends on
 - 1 the database
 - 2 the statistic
- Examples:
 - 1 a count statistic, $\Delta f = 1$ (regardless of the database)

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- ℓ_1 -sensitivity depends on
 - 1 the database
 - 2 the statistic
- Examples:
 - 1 a count statistic, $\Delta f = 1$ (regardless of the database)
 - 2 an average statistic, $\Delta f = \frac{b-a}{n}$ (depends on the database: a, b, n)

Implications: sensitivity and added noise cont'd

- For a statistic f with large ℓ_1 -sensitivity, Δf , larger noise is needed for the same level of privacy protection (i.e., given fixed privacy budget), and vice versa
- Consider two statistics:
 - ① what is the average income of this sample (income before taxes in past 12 months)?
 - ② what is the average expenditure of this sample (total expenditures in last quarter)?

Discussion question 1: given fixed privacy budget ϵ , which statistic has a larger sensitivity?

Implications: sensitivity and added noise cont'd

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- Answer: 1

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Discussion question 1: given fixed privacy budget ϵ , which statistic has a larger sensitivity?

- Answer: 1

Discussion question 2: given your answer to discussion question 1, which statistic needs a larger noise to be added?

- Answer: 1

Implications: sensitivity and added noise cont'd

- In sum, the sensitivity and the added noise are positively related: given fixed privacy budget ϵ , larger sensitivity results in larger added noise

Implications: privacy budget and added noise

- ϵ -differential privacy provides an upper bound on the noised necessary to be added to the output for privacy protection
- The upper bound is ϵ , the privacy budget
- The privacy budget ϵ does not depend on the database or the statistic

$$\left| \ln \left(\frac{Pr[\mathcal{M}(\mathbf{x}) \in \mathcal{S}]}{Pr[\mathcal{M}(\mathbf{y}) \in \mathcal{S}]} \right) \right| \leq \epsilon$$

Discussion question: what's the relationship between the privacy budget and added noise, given fixed ℓ_1 -sensitivity?

- What happens to the added noise when ϵ increases?
- What happens to the added noise when ϵ decreases?

Implications: privacy budget and added noise cont'd

- In sum, the privacy budget and the added noise are negatively related: given fixed sensitivity Δf , larger privacy budget results in smaller added noise

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Summary

- Key idea of differential privacy: add **noise** to the **output** of **statistics** calculated from **databases**
- Added noise is random; depends on a predetermined **privacy budget** and the type of statistics
- Two important implications:
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Summary

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- Added noise is random; depends on a predetermined **privacy budget** and the type of statistics
- Two important implications:
 - ① the added noise is positively related to the sensitivity
 - ② the added noise negatively related to the privacy budget
- Lecture 12: Overview of differential privacy part 2
 - ▶ We will explore the Laplace Mechanism, which satisfies ϵ -differential privacy for some statistics, and add Laplace noise to summary statistics such as count and average

References I

Dwork, C., F. McSherry, K. Nissim, and A. Smith. 2006. “Calibrating Noise to Sensitivity in Private Data Analysis.” Proceedings of the Third Conference on Theory of Cryptography, 265–84.