

Questions:

1. **RSA** Assume that we use RSA with the prime numbers $p = 3$ and $q = 11$.

- (a) Calculate n and $\phi(n)$.
- (b) Given the public exponent $e = 7$, calculate d .
- (c) Encrypt the message $M = 9$
- (d) Sign the message $M = 15$.
- (e) Verify the Signature $S = 9$.

2. **Hash Function 1**

- (a) Does the hash function $h(x) = g^x \bmod p$ satisfy one-wayness? x in this case is the data being hashed.
- (b) From Fermat's little theorem we can see that if $y = x + k \cdot (p - 1)$, and k is an integer/ p is prime and is not divisor of a , then we should have $g^x \bmod p = g^y \bmod p$.

Why? $g^{x+k \cdot (p-1)} \bmod p \equiv g^x \cdot g^{k \cdot (p-1)} \bmod p \equiv (g^x \bmod p) \cdot (g^{k \cdot (p-1)} \bmod p) \equiv g^x \bmod p \cdot (1 \bmod p) \equiv g^x \bmod p$

Using this fact can you find another message that will result in the same hash as for message $x = 1$ when $p = 19$ and $g = 7$?

- (c) Do you think $h(x) = g^x \bmod p$ is a good hash function?

3. **Hash Function 2** Suppose we use a hash function $H(x)$ of output length 128 bits, which accepts input in blocks of size 16 characters (16 bytes/128 bits), meaning that a message is always split into blocks of 16 characters and input into the hash function.

- (a) We want to hash the message **TheMessage** (10 characters). Because we can only hash 16 characters at a time, we pad the input message with 0, so the input becomes **TheMessage000000**. As a rule, padding always has to be applied, meaning that if a message is already 16 characters long, we add a whole block of 16 characters of padding. Show that using this padding scheme, it is trivial to come up with a different message which will produce the same hash value.
- (b) Show a minor modification of the padding scheme which will resist the attack above.
- (c) Assuming that padding scheme is secure, what is the estimated computational effort needed to find a collision on this hash?

4. MAC

Suppose you are using a MAC based on a block cipher in CBC mode ($C_i = E(K; P_i \text{ XOR } C_{i-1})$, $IV = 0$ for C_0), and you know the following two messages:

$$M' = M_0 || M_1$$

$$M'' = M_2 || M_3 || M_4$$

together with their corresponding MAC tags T' and T'' . Show that you can create a new message $M''' = M_0 || M_1 || X || M_3 || M_4$ and the correct MAC tag T''' without knowing the key K . You can choose any value for X to make this work. For the purposes of calculating the MAC IV is always 0.