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:Understanding the data, gaps and detection techniques











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# KEY POINTS OF THIS TALK

- What is an EDR?
- What's this topic about?
- Event Source and Raw data
- Understanding the data
- The Internals The architecture
- Detection-working of EDR
- What the EDRs can't capture.
- The Gaps and limitations
- The UseCase and advancement of the EDR
- The correlation.
- Conclusion





#### WHATISANEDR?



#### Endpoint Detection and Response

- If we have AV, NGAVs then why EDRs?
- If EDRs then why XDRs and MDRs?
- Why and who should implement it?
- What magical things does the EDR has?

- Continuous real time visibility to the endpoint
- N/w, telemetry
- About the own system health and current processes.



#### WHAT'S THIS TOPIC ABOUT?



#### The data to deal with



What data is useful, how the data is processed, which one to filter and which one to process

#### The architectural overview



The basic overview and important components of an EDR. Flow of the data and interruption.

#### Detection technique

The magic behind detection and the fundamental core technique.

#### The gaps or limitations

Why does the word "Bypass" exist for EDRs?



# EVENT SOURCE AND RAW DATA I

#### Source of data: The Endpoints

- Different sources of the events. The Telemetry
- Integration with third party application
- Format of the raw data
- Storing and processing.

#### Key Components of a EDR



Sensors/Agent

Telemetry

Detection

#### Examples of the event sources: Linux



Linux audit subsystem

eBPF (Extended Berkeley Packet Filter)

Inotify (inode notify) / fanotify - kernel subsystem

Linux audit subsystem

```
monika@labmachine01:~$ sudo auditctl -l
-w /etc/passwd -p rw -k Moni_passwd_monitor
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S execve -F key=Moni_Command_Monitor
-w /var/log -p wa -k Moni_log_directory_change
monika@labmachine01:~$
```



Inotify (inode notify) / fanotify - kernel subsystem

```
fanotify_demo.c *
 GNU nano 7.2
"include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <sys/fanotify.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <poll.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <errno.h>
#define EVENT_SIZE (sizeof(struct fanotify_event_metadata))
#define EVENT_BUF_LEN (1024 * (EVENT_SIZE + 16))
int main() {
    struct fanotify_event_metadata *metadata;
    char buf[EVI
    ssize_t len;
    fan_fd = fanotify_init(FAN_CLOEXEC | FAN_NONBLOCK, O_RDONLY);
    if (fan_fd < 0) {
       perror("fanotify_init");
       exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
                                   MARK_ADD, FAN_OPEN | FAN_EVENT_ON_CHILD, AT_FDCWD, "/tmp") < 0) {
    if (fanotify_mark(fan_fd, F
       perror("fanotify_mark");
       exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
    printf("Monitoring /tmp for access events. Press Ctrl+C to stop.\n");
    while (1) {
```

```
while (1) {
    // Read events
    len = read(fan_fd, buf, EVENT_BUF_LEN);
    if (len < 0 && errno != EAGAIN) {
        perror("read");
        exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
    }

    metadata = (struct fanotify_event_metadata *)buf;
    while (FAN_EVENT_OK(metadata, len)) {
        if (metadata->nsk & FAN_OPEN) {
            printf("File opened: FD=%d\n", metadata->fd);
        }
        close(metadata->fd); // Close file descriptor
        metadata = FAN_EVENT_MEXT(metadata, len);
    }
}

close(fan_fd);
return 0;
}
```



Inotify (inode notify) / fanotify - kernel subsystem

```
ubuntu@ubuntu2204:-$ echo "Hello bangalore" > /tmp/example1.txt
ubuntu@ubuntu2204:-$ sudo ./fanotify_demo
Monitoring /tmp for access events. Press Ctrl+C to stop.
File opened: FD=4
```

# Examples of the event sources: Windows



- ETW (Event Tracing for Windows)
  - Start-EtwTraceSession
  - Stop-EtwTraceSession
- Event Viewer (For GUI)
- commands: Get-EventLog
  - Get-WinEvent
- Windows Detours.
- Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL)

#### ETW (Event Tracing for Windows)



```
PS C:\WINDOWS\system32> $SessionName = "ProcessTraceSession"
>> $OutputFile = "C:\Logs\ProcessTrace.etl"
>>
>> # Create the ETW trace session
>> logman create trace $SessionName -p "{9e814aad-3204-11d2-9a82-006008a86939}" 0x10 5 -o $OutputFile
>>
>> # Start the trace session
>> logman start $SessionName
>> Write-Host "ETW Trace Session '$SessionName' started."
The command completed successfully.
```

#### ETW (Event Tracing for Windows)



```
S C:\WINDOWS\system32> logman query $5essionName
                     ProcessTraceSession
lame:
                     Stopped
tatus:
loot Path:
                     C:\Logs\
egment:
                     0ff
chedules:
                     0n
                     SYSTEM
un as:
                     ProcessTraceSession\ProcessTraceSession
lame:
                     Trace
ype:
utput Location:
                     C:\Logs\ProcessTrace_000001.etl
ppend:
                     Off
                     0ff
ircular:
verwrite:
                     0ff
uffer Size:
                     8
uffers Lost:
                     0
Suffers Written:
uffer Flush Timer:
:lock Type:
                     Performance
ile Mode:
                     File
rovider:
                     Windows Kernel Trace
rovider Guid:
                     {9E814AAD-3204-11D2-9A82-006008A86939}
evel:
eywordsAll:
                     0x0
leywordsAny:
                     0x10 (cswitch)
roperties:
                     0
ilter Type:
                     0
he command completed successfully.
S C:\WTNDOWS\system32>
```

# UNDERSTANDING THE DATA I UNDERSTANDING THE DATA I

- Brittle design
  - False positive is very less. False -ve is high.
- Robust way
  - o False +ve high, false -ve will less.
- Hybrid approach

#### Examples:

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Brittle:

The attacker may try to rename and recompile the names

```
query = '''
event.category:process and event.type:start and
process.args:("-action" and ("-kerberoast" or askhash or asktgs or asktgt or s4u or ("-
tiakdtptt) or (dump and (tickets or keytab))))
'''
```

#### Robust:


TCP port 88, the standard Kerberos port

```
query = '''
network where event.type == "start" and network.direction == "outgoing" and
destination.port == 88 and source.port >= 49152 and
process.executable != "C:\\Windows\\System32\\lsass.exe" and destination.address
!and2@e0t@nation.address !="::1" and
/* insert False Positives here */
not process.name in ("swi_fc.exe", "fsIPcam.exe", "IPCamera.exe", "MicrosoftEdgeCP.exe",
"MicrosoftEdge.exe", "iexplore.exe", "chrome.exe", "msedge.exe", "opera.exe", "firefox.exe")
'''
```

## INTERNALS - ARCHITECTURE



#### Level - | Basic Architecture of EDR




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## INTERNALS - ARCHITECTURE



#### Level - 2 Intermediate Architecture of EDR



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# INTERNALS - ARCHITECTURE



Level - 3 Advanced Architecture of EDR

What else can make the EDR Advanced!

The best approach for securing endpoints is "multi-layered"

# DETECTION-WORKING OFEDR 1

#### **Detection Logics**

- What is a detection logic?
- Why they are needed?
- How they are written?
- A good detection logic



# WHAT THE EDRS CAN'T CAPTURE

- Encrypted and Obfuscated content.
- Memory and Kernel Level data
- Network outside the range.
- Data out of detection logic.
- Tricks used by Attackers



# THE GAPS & LIMITATIONS I

- Why does the word "EDR Bypass" even exist?
- Where are we lagging?
- Eg: Renaming the arguments in the source code like
  - changing -action to -dothis
- Some common strategies which leads to bypass.



# THE USECASE AND ADVANCEMENT OF THE EDR

- How we can enhance the security?
- Practices nowadays for enhancement.
- How AI/ML has solved many of the problems.



## WHY & WHERE CORRELATION IS NEEDED?



- What do we mean by Correlation here?
- Key Components of Correlation
  - o Source, Data, Volume, Time, Logic, Intelligence.
- Performance and False Positive/Negative.
- Behavioral Correlation, process manipulation, creation.
- Correlation and analyzing multiple branches of a process.
- Prioritizing and actions.



#### THECONCLUSION



- Is an ideal EDR just a myth?
- The importance of the EDR.



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# THANKYOU!