Lecture 3: The Liar Paradox

Philosophy of Logic and Language — HT 2016-17

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Selected Bibliography

Starred items (*) are more introductory, and good places to start. Yablo (1985) argues the paradox does not crucially rely on self or circular reference. Soames (1999) discusses the ineffability objection to Kripke's approach, as does McGee (1991). Priest and Berto (1998/2013) provide an overview of dialetheism; Parsons (1990) and Shapiro (2004) are critical. Parsons (1974) and Burge (1979) defend a contextualist approach. For discussion of absolutely unrestricted quantification, see the papers in Rayo and Uzquiano (2006). Eklund (2002) defends the idea that natural languages are inconsistent.

*JC Beall, Michael Glanzberg, and David Ripley (2011/16) 'Liar Paradox' in E. Zalta, ed. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liar-paradox/

Tyler Burge (1979) 'Semantical Paradox' in Journal of Philosophy 76(4), pp. 169-198.

*Alexis P. Burgess and John P. Burgess (2010) Truth (Princeton UP), Ch. 8.

Matti Eklund (2002) 'Inconsistent Languages' in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 64(2), 251-275.

Van McGee (1991) Truth, Vagueness, and Paradox (Hackett), Ch. 4 & 5.

Charles Parsons (1974) 'The Liar Paradox' in Journal of Philosophical Logic 3(4), pp. 381-412.

Terence Parsons (1990) 'True Contradictions' in Canadian Journal of Philosophy 20(3), pp. 335-53.

*Graham Priest and Francesco Berto (1998/2013) 'Dialetheism' in E. Zalta, ed. *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dialetheism/

Agustín Rayo and Gabriel Uzquiano, eds. (2006) Absolute Generality (OUP).

*Mark Sainsbury (2009) *Paradoxes*, 3rd edition (CUP), Ch. 6 and 7.

Stewart Shapiro (2004) 'Simple Truth, Contradiction and Consistency' in Graeme Priest, JC Beall, and Bradley Armour-Garb, eds. *The Law of Non-Contradiction* (OUP).

Scott Soames (1999) Understanding Truth (OUP), Ch. 6.

Stephen Yablo (1985) 'Truth and Reflection' in Journal of Philosophical Logic 14(3), pp. 297-349.