

# REGRESSION RECAP

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Adapted from Josh Angrist

# Regression: What You Need to Know

*We spend our lives running regressions (I should say: "regressions run me"). And yet this basic empirical tool is often misunderstood. So I begin with a recap of key regression properties. We need these to make sense of IV as well.*

Our regression agenda:

- 1 Three reasons to love
- 2 The CEF is all you need
- 3 The long and short of regression anatomy
- 4 The OVB formula
- 5 Limited dependent variables and marginal effects
- 6 Causal vs. casual

# The CEF

- The *Conditional Expectation Function* (CEF) for a dependent variable,  $Y_i$  given a  $K \times 1$  vector of covariates,  $X_i$  (with elements  $x_{ki}$ ) is written  $E[Y_i|X_i]$  and is a function of  $X_i$
- Because  $X_i$  is random, the CEF is random. For dummy  $D_i$ , the CEF takes on two values,  $E[Y_i|D_i = 1]$  and  $E[Y_i|D_i = 0]$
- For a specific value of  $X_i$ , say  $X_i = 42$ , we write  $E[Y_i|X_i = 42]$
- For continuous  $Y_i$  with conditional density  $f_y(\cdot|X_i = x)$ , the CEF is

$$E[Y_i|X_i = x] = \int t f_y(t|X_i = x) dt$$


If  $Y_i$  is discrete,  $E[Y_i|X_i = x]$  equals the sum  $\sum_t t f_y(t|X_i = x)$

- The CEF residual is uncorrelated with any function of  $X_i$ . Write  $\varepsilon_i \equiv Y_i - E[Y_i|X_i]$ . Then for any function,  $h(X_i)$  :

$$E[\varepsilon_i h(X_i)] = E[(Y_i - E[Y_i|X_i])h(X_i)] = 0$$

(The LIE proves it)

- **Figure 3.1.1** shows my favorite CEF



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Figure 3.1.1: Raw data and the CEF of average log weekly wages given schooling. The sample includes white men aged 40-49. The data are from the 1980 IPUMS5 percent sample.

# Population Regression

- Define *population regression* ("regression," for short) as the solution to the population least squares problem. Specifically, the  $K \times 1$  regression coefficient vector  $\beta$  is defined by solving

$$\beta = \arg \min_b E \left[ (Y_i - X_i' b)^2 \right]$$

- Using the first-order condition,

$$E [X_i (Y_i - X_i' b)] = 0,$$

the solution for  $b$  can be written

$$\beta = E [X_i X_i']^{-1} E [X_i Y_i]$$

- By construction,  $E [X_i (Y_i - X_i' \beta)] = 0$ . In other words, the population residual, defined as  $Y_i - X_i' \beta = e_i$ , is uncorrelated with the regressors,  $X_i$
- This error term has no life of its own:  $e_i$  owes its meaning and existence to  $\beta$

## Three reasons to love

- 1 Regression solves the population least squares problem and is therefore the BLP of  $Y_i$  given  $X_i$
  - 2 If the CEF is linear, regression is it
  - 3 Regression gives the best linear approximation to the CEF
- The first is true by definition; the second follows immediately from CEF-orthogonality. Let's prove the third - it's my favorite!


### Theorem

*The Regression-CEF Theorem (MHE 3.1.6)*

*The population regression function  $X_i'\beta$  provides the MMSE linear approximation to  $E[Y_i|X_i]$ , that is,*

$$\beta = \arg \min_b E\{(E[Y_i|X_i] - X_i'b)^2\}.$$

- **Figure 3.1.2** illustrates the theorem (What does this depend on?)



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Sample is limited to white men, age 40-49. Data is from Census IPUMS 1980, 5% sample.

Figure 3.1.2: Regression threads the CEF of average weekly wages given schooling

# The CEF is all you need

- The regression-CEF theorem implies we can use  $E[Y_i|X_i]$  as a dependent variable instead of  $Y_i$  (but watch the weighting!)
- Another way to see this:

$$\beta = E[X_i X_i']^{-1} E[X_i Y_i] = E[X_i X_i']^{-1} E[X_i E(Y_i|X_i)] \quad (1)$$

The CEF or grouped-data version of the regression formula is useful when working on a project that precludes the analysis of micro data

- To illustrate, we can estimate the schooling coefficient in a wage equation using 21 conditional means, the sample CEF of earnings given schooling
- As **Figure 3.1.3** shows, grouped data weighted by the number of individuals at each schooling level produces coefficients *identical* to that generated by the underlying micro data



## A - Individual-level data

```
. regress earnings school, robust
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs =	409435
Model	22631.4793	1	22631.4793	F( 1,409433) =	49118.25
Residual	188648.31	409433	.460755019	Prob > F =	0.0000
Total	211279.789	409434	.51602893	R-squared =	0.1071
				Adj R-squared =	0.1071
				Root MSE =	.67879

		Robust			Old Fashioned	
earnings	Coef.	Std. Err.	t		Std. Err.	t
school	.0674387	.0003447	195.63		.0003043	221.63
const.	5.835761	.0045507	1282.39		.0040043	1457.38

## B - Means by years of schooling

```
. regress average_earnings school [aweight=count], robust
(sum of wgt is 4.0944e+05)
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs =	21
Model	1.16077332	1	1.16077332	F( 1, 19) =	540.31
Residual	.040818796	19	.002148358	Prob > F =	0.0000
Total	1.20159212	20	.060079606	R-squared =	0.9660
				Adj R-squared =	0.9642
				Root MSE =	.04635

average_earnings	Coef.	Robust		Old Fashioned	
		Std. Err.	t	Std. Err.	t
school	.0674387	.0040352	16.71	.0029013	23.24
const.	5.835761	.0399452	146.09	.0381792	152.85

Figure 3.1.3: Micro-data and grouped-data estimates of returns to schooling. Source: 1980 Census - IPUMS, 5 percent sample. Sample is limited to white men, age 40-49. Derived from Stata regression output. Old-fashioned standard errors are the default reported. Robust standard errors are heteroscedasticity-consistent. Panel A uses individual-level data. Panel B uses earnings averaged by years of schooling.

## Regression anatomy lesson

- Bivariate reg recap: the slope coefficient is  $\beta_1 = \frac{\text{Cov}(Y_i, x_i)}{V(x_i)}$ , and the intercept is  $\alpha = E[Y_i] - \beta_1 E[X_i]$
- With more than one non-constant regressor, the  $k$ -th non-constant slope coefficient is:

$$\beta_k = \frac{\text{Cov}(Y_i, \tilde{x}_{ki})}{V(\tilde{x}_{ki})}, \quad (2)$$

where  $\tilde{x}_{ki}$  is the residual from a regression of  $x_{ki}$  on all other covariates

- The anatomy formula shows us that each coefficient in a multivariate regression is the bivariate slope coefficient for the corresponding regressor, after "partialing out" other variables in the model.
- Verify the regression-anatomy formula by subbing

$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 x_{1i} + \dots + \beta_k x_{ki} + \dots + \beta_K x_{Ki} + e_i$$

in the numerator of (2) and work through to find that  
 $\text{Cov}(Y_i, \tilde{x}_{ki}) = \beta_k V(\tilde{x}_{ki})$

# Omitted Variables Bias

- The omitted variables bias (OVB) formula describes the relationship between regression estimates in models with different controls
- Go long: wages on schooling,  $S_i$ , controlling for ability ( $A_i$ )

$$Y_i = \alpha + \rho S_i + A_i' \gamma + \varepsilon_i \quad (3)$$

- Ability is hard to measure. What if we leave it out? The result is

$$\frac{\text{Cov}(Y_i, S_i)}{V(S_i)} = \rho + \gamma' \delta_{As},$$

where  $\delta_{As}$  is the vector of coefficients from regressions of the elements of  $A_i$  on  $S_i$  . . .

- *Short equals long plus the effect of omitted times the regression of omitted on included*
- Short equals long when omitted and included are uncorrelated
- **Table 3.2.1** illustrates OVB (some controls are bad; the formula works for good and bad alike)

TABLE 3.2.1  
Estimates of the returns to education for men in the NLSY

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Controls:</i>	None	Age Dummies	Col. (2) and Additional Controls*	Col. (3) and AFQT Score	Col. (4), with Occupation Dummies
	.132 (.007)	.131 (.007)	.114 (.007)	.087 (.009)	.066 (.010)

*Notes:* Data are from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (1979 cohort, 2002 survey). The table reports the coefficient on years of schooling in a regression of log wages on years of schooling and the indicated controls. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. The sample is restricted to men and weighted by NLSY sampling weights. The sample size is 2,434.

\*Additional controls are mother's and father's years of schooling, and dummy variables for race and census region.

## Limited dependent variables

- Regression always make sense in the sense that regression approximates the CEF
- Can I *really* use OLS if my dependent variable is . . . a dummy (like employment); non-negative (like earnings); a count variable (like weeks worked)?
- *Regress easy, grasshopper* . . . but if you do stray, show me the MFX
- Probing probit: assume that LFP is determined by a latent variable,  $Y_i^*$ , satisfying

$$Y_i^* = \beta_0^* + \beta_1^* s_i - v_i, \quad (4)$$

where  $v_i$  is distributed  $N(0, \sigma_v^2)$ . The latent index model says

$$Y_i = 1[Y_i^* > 0],$$

so the CEF can be written

$$E[Y_i | s_i] = \Phi \left[ \frac{\beta_0^* + \beta_1^* s_i}{\sigma_v} \right]$$

## Limited dependent variables (cont.)

- For Bernoulli  $S_i$ :

$$E[Y_i|S_i] = \Phi \left[ \frac{\beta_0^*}{\sigma_v} \right] + \left\{ \Phi \left[ \frac{\beta_0^* + \beta_1^*}{\sigma_v} \right] - \Phi \left[ \frac{\beta_0^*}{\sigma_v} \right] \right\} S_i$$

OLS is bang on here! (why?)

- But it ain't always about treatment effects; MFX for probit are

$$E \left( \frac{\partial E[Y_i|S_i]}{\partial S_i} \right) = E \left( \varphi \left[ \frac{\beta_0^* + \beta_1^* S_i}{\sigma_v} \right] \right) \frac{\beta_1^*}{\sigma_v} \quad (5)$$

Index coefficients tell us only the sign of the effect of  $S_i$  on average  $Y_i$  (sometimes, as in MNL, not even that)

- For logit:

$$E \left( \frac{\partial E[Y_i|S_i]}{\partial S_i} \right) = E[\Lambda(\beta_0^* + \beta_1^* S_i)(1 - (\Lambda\beta_0^* + \beta_1^* S_i))]\beta_1^* \quad (6)$$

- OLS and MFX from any nonlinear alternative are usually close (identical for probit when  $S_i$  is Normal)

# Making MFX

- Are derivative-based MFX kosher in a discrete-regressor scenario?
  - With covariates, stata generates discrete average derivatives like this,

$$E \left\{ \Phi \left[ \frac{\beta_0^* X_i + \beta_1^*}{\sigma_v} \right] - \Phi \left[ \frac{\beta_0^* X_i}{\sigma_v} \right] \right\} \quad (7)$$

- Note that

$$\Phi \left[ \frac{X_i' \beta_0^* + \beta_1^*}{\sigma_v} \right] = \Phi \left[ \frac{X_i' \beta_0^*}{\sigma_v} \right] + \varphi \left[ \frac{X_i' \beta_0^* + \Delta_i}{\sigma_v} \right] \beta_1^*$$

for some  $\Delta_i \in [0, \beta_1^*]$ . So the continuous MFX calculation

$$E \left\{ \varphi \left[ \frac{X_i' \beta_0^* + \beta_1^* s_i}{\sigma_v} \right] \right\} \beta_1^* \quad (8)$$

approximates the discrete

- Stata notices discrete regressors, in which case you'll get (7) unless you ask for (8)
- OLS vindicated: MHE **Table 3.4.2**

TABLE 3.4.2  
Comparison of alternative estimates of the effect of childbearing on LDVs

		Right-Hand-Side Variable									
		More than Two Children					Number of Children				
		Probit			Tobit		Probit MFX			Tobit MFX	
			Avg. Effect, Full Sample	Avg. Effect on Treated	Avg. Effect, Full Sample	Avg. Effect on Treated		Avg. Effect, Full Sample	Avg. Effect, Full Sample	Avg. Effect on Treated	
Dependent variable	Mean (1)	OLS (2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	OLS (7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	
A. Full sample											
Employment	.528 (.499)	-.162 (.002)	-.163 (.002)	-.162 (.002)	—	—	-.113 (.001)	-.114 (.001)	—	—	
Hours worked	16.7 (18.3)	-5.92 (.074)	—	—	-6.56 (.081)	-5.87 (.073)	-4.07 (.047)	—	-4.66 (.054)	-4.23 (.049)	
B. Nonwhite college attenders over age 30, first birth before age 20											
Employment	.832 (.374)	-.061 (.028)	-.064 (.028)	-.070 (.031)	—	—	-.054 (.016)	-.048 (.013)	—	—	
Hours worked	30.8 (16.0)	-4.69 (1.18)	—	—	-4.97 (1.33)	-4.90 (1.31)	-2.83 (.645)	—	-3.20 (.670)	-3.15 (.659)	

*Notes:* The table reports OLS estimates, average treatment effects, and marginal effects (MFX) for the effect of childbearing on mothers' labor supply. The sample in panel A includes 254,654 observations and is the same as the 1980 census sample of married women used by Angrist and Evans (1998). Covariates include age, age at first birth, and dummies for boys at first and second birth. The sample in panel B includes 746 nonwhite women with at least some college aged over 30 whose first birth was before age 20. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses in column 1. Standard errors are shown in parentheses in other columns. The sample used to estimate average effects on the treated in columns 4, 6, and 10 includes women with more than two children.

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## Casual vs. causal

- *Casual* regressions happen for many reasons: exploratory or descriptive analysis, just having fun, no long-term commitment . . .
- *Causal* regressions are more serious and enduring, describe counterfactual states of the world, useful for policy analysis
- Americans mortgage homes to send a child to elite private colleges. Does private pay? Denote private attendance by  $C_i$ . The causal relationship between private college attendance and earnings is

$$\begin{aligned} Y_{1i} & \text{ if } C_i = 1 \\ Y_{0i} & \text{ if } C_i = 0 \end{aligned}$$

- $Y_{1i} - Y_{0i}$  is an individual causal effect. Alas, we only get to see one of  $Y_{1i}$  or  $Y_{0i}$ . The observed outcome,  $Y_i$ , is

$$Y_i = Y_{0i} + (Y_{1i} - Y_{0i})C_i \quad (9)$$

We hope to measure average  $Y_{1i} - Y_{0i}$  for some group, say those who went private:  $E[Y_{1i} - Y_{0i} | C_i = 1]$ , i.e., TOT

## Casual vs. causal (cont.)

- Comparisons of those who did and didn't go private are biased:

$$\underbrace{E[Y_i|C_i = 1] - E[Y_i|C_i = 0]}_{\text{Observed difference in earnings}} = \underbrace{E[Y_{1i} - Y_{0i}|C_i = 1]}_{\text{TOT}} + \underbrace{E[Y_{0i}|C_i = 1] - E[Y_{0i}|C_i = 0]}_{\text{selection bias}} \quad (10)$$

- It seems likely that those who go to private college would have earned more anyway. The naive comparison,  $E[Y_i|C_i = 1] - E[Y_i|C_i = 0]$ , exaggerates the benefits of private college attendance
  - Selection bias = OVB in a causal model*
- The *conditional independence assumption* (CIA) asserts that conditional on observed  $X_i$ , selection bias disappears:

$$\{Y_{0i}, Y_{1i}\} \perp\!\!\!\perp C_i | X_i \quad (11)$$

- Given the CIA, conditional-on- $X_i$  comparisons are causal:

$$E[Y_i|X_i, C_i = 1] - E[Y_i|X_i, C_i = 0] = E[Y_{1i} - Y_{0i}|X_i]$$

## Using the CIA

- The CIA means that  $C_i$  is "as good as randomly assigned," conditional on  $X_i$
- A secondary implication: Given the CIA, the conditional on  $X_i$  causal effect of private college attendance on private graduates equals the average private effect at  $X_i$ :

$$E[Y_{1i} - Y_{0i} | X_i, C_i = 1] = E[Y_{1i} - Y_{0i} | X_i]$$

- This is important . . . but less important than the elimination of selection bias
- Note also that the marginal average private college effect can be obtained by averaging over  $X_i$ :

$$\begin{aligned} & E\{E[Y_i | X_i, C_i = 1] - E[Y_i | X_i, C_i = 0]\} \\ &= E\{E[Y_{1i} - Y_{0i} | X_i]\} \\ &= E[Y_{1i} - Y_{0i}] \end{aligned}$$

- This suggests we compare people with the same  $X$ 's ... like matching . . . but I wanna regress!

# Regression and the CIA

- The regression machine turns the CIA into causal effects
- Constant causal effects allow us to focus on selection issues (MHE 3.3 relaxes this). Suppose

$$Y_{0i} = \alpha + \eta_i \quad (12)$$

$$Y_{1i} = Y_{0i} + \rho$$

- Using (9) and (12), we have

$$Y_i = \alpha + \rho C_i + \eta_i \quad (13)$$

- Equation (13) looks like a bivariate regression model, except that (12) associates the coefficients in (13) with a causal relationship
- This is not a regression, because  $C_i$  can be correlated with potential outcomes, in this case, the residual,  $\eta_i$

## Regression and the CIA (cont.)

- The CIA applied to our constant-effects setup implies:

$$E[\eta_i | C_i, X_i] = E[\eta_i | X_i]$$

- Suppose also that

$$E[\eta_i | X_i] = X_i' \gamma$$

so that

$$E[Y_i | X_i, C_i] = \alpha + \rho C_i + E[\eta_i | X_i] = \alpha + \rho C_i + X_i' \gamma$$

- Mean-independence implies orthogonality, so

$$Y_i = \alpha + \rho C_i + X_i' \gamma + v_i \tag{14}$$

has error

$$v_i \equiv \eta_i - X_i' \gamma = \eta_i - E[\eta_i | C_i, X_i]$$

uncorrelated with regressors,  $C_i$  and  $X_i$ . The same  $\rho$  appears in the regression and causal models!

- Modified **Dale and Krueger (2002)**: private proving ground

# Matchmaker, Matchmaker . . . Find Me a College!

Applicant Group	Student	Private			Public			1996 Earnings
		Ivy	Leafy	Smart	All State	Ball State	Altered State	
A	1		Reject	<b>Admit</b>		Admit		110,000
	2		Reject	<b>Admit</b>		Admit		100,000
	3		Reject	Admit		<b>Admit</b>		110,000
B	4	<b>Admit</b>			Admit		Admit	60,000
	5	Admit			Admit		<b>Admit</b>	30,000
C	6		<b>Admit</b>					115,000
	7		<b>Admit</b>					75,000
D	8	Reject			<b>Admit</b>	Admit		90,000
	9	Reject			Admit	<b>Admit</b>		60,000

Notes: Students enroll at the college indicated in **bold**; enrollment decisions are also highlighted in grey.

Table 2.1: The College Matching Matrix

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	No Selection Controls			Selection Controls		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Private School	0.135 (0.055)	0.095 (0.052)	0.086 (0.034)	0.007 (0.038)	0.003 (0.039)	0.013 (0.025)
Own SAT score/100		0.048 (0.009)	0.016 (0.007)		0.033 (0.007)	0.001 (0.007)
Predicted log(Parental Income)			0.219 (0.022)			0.190 (0.023)
Female			-0.403 (0.018)			-0.395 (0.021)
Black			0.005 (0.041)			-0.040 (0.042)
Hispanic			0.062 (0.072)			0.032 (0.070)
Asian			0.170 (0.074)			0.145 (0.068)
Other/Missing Race			-0.074 (0.157)			-0.079 (0.156)
High School Top 10 Percent			0.095 (0.027)			0.082 (0.028)
High School Rank Missing			0.019 (0.033)			0.015 (0.037)
Athlete			0.123 (0.025)			0.115 (0.027)
Selection Controls	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Columns (1)-(3) include no selection controls. Columns (4)-(6) include a dummy for each group formed by matching students according to schools at which they were accepted or rejected. Each model is estimated using only observations with Barron's matches for which different students attended both private and public schools. The sample size is 5,583. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.

Table 2.2: Private School Effects: Barron's Matches

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	No Selection Controls			Selection Controls		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Private School	0.212 (0.060)	0.152 (0.057)	0.139 (0.043)	0.034 (0.062)	0.031 (0.062)	0.037 (0.039)
Own SAT Score/100		0.051 (0.008)	0.024 (0.006)		0.036 (0.006)	0.009 (0.006)
Predicted log(Parental Income)			0.181 (0.026)			0.159 (0.025)
Female			-0.398 (0.012)			-0.396 (0.014)
Black			-0.003 (0.031)			-0.037 (0.035)
Hispanic			0.027 (0.052)			0.001 (0.054)
Asian			0.189 (0.035)			0.155 (0.037)
Other/Missing Race			-0.166 (0.118)			-0.189 (0.117)
High School Top 10 Percent			0.067 (0.020)			0.064 (0.020)
High School Rank Missing			0.003 (0.025)			-0.008 (0.023)
Athlete			0.107 (0.027)			0.092 (0.024)
Average SAT Score of Schools Applied to/100				0.110 (0.024)	0.082 (0.022)	0.077 (0.012)
Sent Two Application				0.071 (0.013)	0.062 (0.011)	0.058 (0.010)
Sent Three Applications				0.093 (0.021)	0.079 (0.019)	0.066 (0.017)
Sent Four or more Applications				0.139 (0.024)	0.127 (0.023)	0.098 (0.020)

Note: Standard errors are shown in parentheses. The sample size is 14,238.

Table 2.3: Private School Effects: Average SAT Controls

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	No Selection Controls			Selection Controls		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
School Avg. SAT Score/100	0.109 (0.026)	0.071 (0.025)	0.076 (0.016)	-0.021 (0.026)	-0.031 (0.026)	0.000 (0.018)
Own SAT score/100		0.049 (0.007)	0.018 (0.006)		0.037 (0.006)	0.009 (0.006)
Predicted log(Parental Income)			0.187 (0.024)			0.161 (0.025)
Female			-0.403 (0.015)			-0.396 (0.014)
Black			-0.023 (0.035)			-0.034 (0.035)
Hispanic			0.015 (0.052)			0.006 (0.053)
Asian			0.173 (0.036)			0.155 (0.037)
Other/Missing Race			-0.188 (0.119)			-0.193 (0.116)
High School Top 10 Percent			0.061 (0.018)			0.063 (0.019)
High School Rank Missing			0.001 (0.024)			-0.009 (0.022)
Athlete			0.102 (0.025)			0.094 (0.024)
Average SAT Score of Schools Applied To/100				0.138 (0.017)	0.116 (0.015)	0.089 (0.013)
Sent Two Application				0.082 (0.015)	0.075 (0.014)	0.063 (0.011)
Sent Three Applications				0.107 (0.026)	0.096 (0.024)	0.074 (0.022)
Sent Four or more Applications				0.153 (0.031)	0.143 (0.030)	0.106 (0.025)

Note: Standard errors are shown in parentheses. The sample size is 14,238.

Table 2.4: School Selectivity Effects: Average SAT Controls

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	Dependent Variable					
	Own SAT score/100			Predicted log(Parental Income)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Private School	1.165 (0.196)	1.130 (0.188)	0.066 (0.112)	0.128 (0.035)	0.138 (0.037)	0.028 (0.037)
Female		-0.367 (0.076)			0.016 (0.013)	
Black		-1.947 (0.079)			-0.359 (0.019)	
Hispanic		-1.185 (0.168)			-0.259 (0.050)	
Asian		-0.014 (0.116)			-0.060 (0.031)	
Other/Missing Race		-0.521 (0.293)			-0.082 (0.061)	
High School Top 10 Percent		0.948 (0.107)			-0.066 (0.011)	
High School Rank Missing		0.556 (0.102)			-0.030 (0.023)	
Athlete		-0.318 (0.147)			0.037 (0.016)	
Average SAT Score of Schools Applied To/100			0.777 (0.058)			0.063 (0.014)
Sent Two Application			0.252 (0.077)			0.020 (0.010)
Sent Three Applications			0.375 (0.106)			0.042 (0.013)
Sent Four or more Applications			0.330 (0.093)			0.079 (0.014)

Note: Standard errors are shown in parentheses. The sample size is 14,238.

Table 2.5: Private School Effects: Omitted Variable Bias

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# What Next?

- Regression always makes sense ... in the sense that it provides best-in-class approximation to the CEF
- MFX from more elaborate non-linear models are usually indistinguishable from the corresponding regression estimates
- We're not always content to run regressions, of course, though this is usually where we start
  - Regression is our first line of attack on the identification problem; it's all about *control*
- If the regression you've got is not the one you want, that's because the underlying *relationship* is unsatisfactory
- Whats to be done with an unsatisfactory relationship?
  - Move on, grasshopper ... to IV!
- But wait: we need some *training* first

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## 14.387 Applied Econometrics: Mostly Harmless Big Data

Fall 2014

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