

# Introduction

What was the guiding force behind the movement for Pakistan? What inspired Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah (1876-1948) to change his political creed after thirty years of public life and become such an indefatigable advocate of an exclusive Muslim nationalism? Was Jinnah really serious when he defined his goal as "free Islam in a free India"? And in struggling for and creating Pakistan, was Jinnah conscious of what he was really striving for? Above all, what was Jinnah's ideological orientation?

This, it would be readily recognised, is not the first time that questions such as these are being posed and sought to be mooted. But since much of what has thus far appeared on these issues is largely polemical in nature and emotional in approach — though at times extremely profound and highly illuminating — one should be rather wary of accepting different views on the subject uncritically. At best, some of them are mere ex-post-facto justifications, though bearing an element of truth; at worst, most of them are so much dross deserving of ultimate discardment. Hence, any serious attempt at discovering the ideological foundations of the movement that Jinnah launched in the last phase of his political life should begin with an invocation to the first principles: those enunciated, and expounded by the architect of Pakistan himself.

It seems rather platitudinous to say, but nevertheless it is worth noting, that Jinnah's definition of "Pakistan" was influenced by several factors, some internal and other external. But probably the most crucial of them all was the explosive political situation in India. Like Abraham Lincoln's (1809-65), his speeches must be studied in close relation to the occasions which called them forth. And the background for them was provided by the still comparative listlessness of the Muslims in the early 1940s and the consequent tragic lack of that organized strength that had made the Indian

National Congress, India's premier, but Hindu-dominated, organisation, such a formidable political machine; the implacable hostility of the Congress and the Hindus to him personally and to his supreme objective; and their stupendous and sustained efforts to misrepresent, even distort, the Muslim viewpoint and the Pakistan demand. Within the framework of these limitations, therefore, has Jinnah defined "Pakistan".

This framework obviously leads to certain corollaries. In the first place, Jinnah could not work out in detail the theoretical framework of "Pakistan". For one thing, his was not the role of a systematic theoretician — although in the nature of things, he had to theorise a good deal, and that perhaps in spite of himself. For another, he also perhaps did not wish to, if only for reasons of strategy. An iron-clad framework, it is obvious, would not only deny him the elbow-room for future adjustments and compromises; it might also lend his scheme to unrelenting, even incontrovertible, criticism. And that, to be sure, would have seriously jeopardised his chances of success.

Nor did his role as the chief organizer and propeller of the Pakistan movement call for any such attempt. After all, his task was to draw the outline: to enunciate the general principles on which the future state was to be based.<sup>1</sup> Actually, his scruples about democratic principles would not allow him to anticipate the shape of things to come even when he presided over the destinies of Pakistan. In his broadcast to the people of the United States on February 19, 1948, he said, "I do not know what the ultimate shape of this constitution is going to be, but I am sure that it will be of a democratic type, embodying the essential principles of Islam". About general principles he was, however, quite explicit:

Today they [Islamic principles] are as applicable in actual life as they were 1,300 years ago. Islam and its idealism have taught us democracy. It has taught equality of man, justice, and fairplay to everybody. We are the inheritors of these glorious traditions and are fully alive to our responsibilities and obligations as framers of the future. In any case Pakistan is not going to be a theocratic State — to be ruled by priests with a divine mission.<sup>2</sup>

Second, as a political leader, it was not enough for him to subscribe to or propound a realizable goal. More important, he

should persuade others to put faith in it and strive for it. And a lawyer's technique of presenting a case is a good deal different from that of a scholar. Both deal with facts, no doubt, but the lawyer has a greater vested interest in the audience, in the reception accorded to his interpretation of facts. Persuasion being the essence of his success at the bar, the lawyer is principally concerned with identifying "the acceptable". He cannot, therefore, afford to qualify his statements all the time as does the meticulous scholar. Nor can he afford to talk above the level of his audience since "a vested interest in understanding", to quote Galbraith, is not only "more preciously guarded than any other treasure" in social behaviour, but the operation of the concepts of selective exposure and selective perception would also thwart his establishing a rapport with, and getting his message across to, his audience since people usually expose themselves only to such ideas which they are familiar with, at least casually.

After all, Jinnah's was the role of an advocate — in both his professional and political life. In the latter role, he first pled with his own people for the acceptance of his ideology (in early 1940s opposition to Pakistan and Jinnah from some of the topmost Muslim stalwarts was unbelievably vehement, bitter and persistent), and later with the Hindus and the British on behalf of Muslims. He could not, therefore, possibly define "Pakistan" in philosophical terms, nor in dialectics, but in the simple and straightforward language of the common man, as Lincoln in a similar situation would have. People mostly approve what they can easily comprehend, and familiarity, instead of breeding contempt, as in some areas of human behaviour, is the touchstone of acceptability in the field of social ideas and social behaviour. Jinnah had, therefore, to so present the Pakistan demand that, on the one hand, the Muslim masses could easily comprehend it, heartily subscribe to it, and consciously strive for it, and that, on the other, the Hindus and the British should not only be induced to see the justice of the demand but also, if possible, be convinced of its political, economic and administrative feasibility in the Indian situation of the 1940s. Such being the case, his arguments must be stated in easily verifiable terms, based even on commonplace incidents, and in terms of current political parlance; terms and

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incidents which, because of their being within the compass of the comprehension and imagination of his audience, and within the orbit of their experience, could strike a chord in them and cause the prime manifestation of their vested interest in understanding. Illustrative of this aspect of Jinnah's leadership is his famous, cogent definition of Muslim nationhood. He talked not in terms of a vague, elusive abstruse concept, but in the tangible language of the masses:

We are a nation with our own distinctive culture and civilization, language and literature, art and architecture, names and nomenclature, sense of values and proportion, legal laws and moral code, customs and calendar, history and traditions, aptitude and ambitions, in short, we have our own distinctive outlook on life and of life".<sup>4</sup>

It is interesting that of all the definitions of Muslim nationhood offered since the time of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan (1817-98), this was the most cogent, the most closely argued, and the most firmly based in international law.

Since Mohammad Iqbal (1877-1938) had only to convert the thinking microscopic minority among the Indian Musalmans to his viewpoint in 1930 and since he was not concerned at all with the reaction of the Hindus and the British, he could afford to talk in philosophical terms. But not Jinnah, who had the almost insuperable task of inducing Muslims, Hindus and the British, all at the same time, to accept his solution to the knotty constitutional problem of India. Hence his excessive concern to sound intelligible not only all the time but also at two, and possibly three, different levels.

## II

Now, within the framework of these "limitations", let us examine some of Jinnah's more notable pronouncements during the 1940-48 period for his concept of "Pakistan".

In a speech at Aligarh on March 8, 1944 he asserted:

... Pakistan started the moment the first non-Muslim was converted to Islam in India long before the Muslims established their rule. As soon as a Hindu embraced Islam he was [an] outcast not only religiously but also socially, culturally and

economically. As for the Muslim, it was a duty imposed on him by Islam not to merge his identity and individuality in any alien society. Throughout the ages, Hindus had remained Hindus and Muslims had remained Muslims and they had not merged their entities - that was the basis for Pakistan.<sup>5</sup>

In the explanation above, Jinnah's emphasis on conversion of Muslims rather than the induction of Muslims into India may be disputed. It may be said, perhaps with greater relevance, that Pakistan started the moment when the first Muslim set his foot in India; but, then, without widespread conversions, Islam and Muslims would not have continued to remain a force to be reckoned with long after they had lost political power. Hence his stress on conversion of non-Muslims may not, after all, be considered misplaced.

Granted the above reservation about Jinnah's explanation, what does it mean in historical terms? It means that the Pakistan movement or the demand for Pakistan may be traced to the crystallization of historical forces, unleashed by the injection of (what an American historian calls) the "extraneous" element, represented by Islam into the Indian body-politic, way back in 711 C.E.<sup>6</sup> For the first time, Islam, according to a British historian, had "introduced into the heart of [an essentially Hindu] India a new, and in the event, unassimilable interpretation of the meaning and end of life — the Muslim".<sup>7</sup> And, according to an Indian historian,

The main social result of the introduction of Islam as a religion into India was the division of society on a vertical basis. Before the thirteenth century, Hindu society was divided horizontally, and neither Buddhism nor Jainism affected this division. Islam, on the other hand, split Indian society into two sections from top to bottom and what has now come to be known in the phraseology of today as two separate nations came into being from the beginning. It was two parallel societies vertically established on the same soil.<sup>8</sup>

In consequence, the subcontinent had become the home of two worlds — separate, distinct, even divergent. That is what Jinnah meant when he remarked that the Hindus and Muslims "had not merged their [separate] entities". One must therefore conclude that

Jinnah viewed the demand for Pakistan as the culmination, as of that date, of 1,200 years of Muslim history in the subcontinent.

While Islam, thus, occupies the central place in Jinnah's perception of the historical basis of the Pakistan demand, he would also concede Islam a critical role in Pakistan once it was established. Consider, for instance, the following quotations, taken from his speeches between 1940 and 1945, which delineate the taxonomy and the objectives of the Pakistan ideal:

We wish our people [i.e., Muslims] to develop to the fullest our spiritual, cultural, economic, social and political life in a way that we think best and in consonance with our own ideals and according to the genius of our people [March 23, 1940].<sup>9</sup>  
You have asked me for a message. What message can I give you? We have got the greatest message in the Quran for our guidance and enlightenment [April 4, 1943].<sup>10</sup>

What was it that kept the Muslims united as one man, and what was the bedrock and sheet-anchor of the community? . . . Islam. It is the Great Book, [the] Quran, that is the sheet-anchor of Muslim India [December 26, 1943].<sup>11</sup>

Our bedrock and sheet-anchor is Islam . . . Islam is our guide and complete code for our life [March 19, 1944].<sup>12</sup>

Pakistan not only means freedom and independence but the Muslim ideology, which has [got] to be preserved which has come to us as a precious gift and treasure and which, we hope, others will share with us [June 18, 1945] [italics for emphasis].<sup>13</sup>

The Muslims demand Pakistan, where they could rule according to their own cultural growth, traditions and Islamic laws [November 21, 1945].<sup>14</sup>

These pronouncements as well as his definition of Muslim nationhood indicate that Muslims were inspired by a distinct *weltanschauung*. It is rather interesting that he began elucidating it long before he claimed separate nationhood for Muslims and a separate state for them. The first time he alluded to it was in his address to the Gaya Muslim League Conference in January 1938. On that occasion he had said, *inter alia*,

When we say "This flag is the flag of Islam" they think we are introducing religion into politics — a fact of which we are proud.

Islam gives us a complete code. It is not only religion but it contains laws, philosophy and politics. In fact, it contains everything that matters to a man from morning to night. When we talk of Islam we take it as an all-embracing word. We do not mean any ill-will. The foundation of our Islamic code is that we stand for liberty, equality and fraternity.<sup>15</sup>

To this "complete code" theme he returned more extensively in his *Id* message in September 1945, invoking Gibbon as an authority.

Every Musalman knows that the injunctions of the Qur'an are not confined to religious and moral duties. "From the Atlantic to the Ganges", says Gibbon, "the Quran is acknowledged as the fundamental code, not only of theology, but of civil and criminal jurisprudence, and the laws which regulate the actions and the property of mankind are governed by the immutable sanctions of the will of God." Everyone, except those who are ignorant, knows that the Quran is the general code of the Muslims. A religious, social, civil, commercial, military, judicial, criminal, penal code, it regulates everything from the ceremonies of religion to those of daily life; from the salvation of the soul to the health of the body, from the rights of all to those of each individual; from morality to crime, from punishment here to that in the life to come, and our Prophet has enjoined on us that every Musalman should possess a copy of the Quran and be his own priest. Therefore Islam is not merely confined to the spiritual tenets and doctrines or rituals and ceremonies. It is a complete code regulating the whole Muslim society, every department of life, collective[ly] and individually.<sup>16</sup>

All this means that Islam figured as the central strain and strand in Jinnah's political discourse. This explains why Edward Mortimer subtitles his chapter on Pakistan as "Islam as Nationality".<sup>17</sup>

### III

In the post-independence period as well, when Jinnah was head of the state he had founded, he had talked in the same strain except on one occasion — his inaugural address to the Constituent Assembly

of Pakistan (which is discussed in the next section). Consider, for instance, the following:

... the Eid will usher in, I hope, a new era of prosperity and will mark the onward march of renaissance of Islamic culture and ideals [Message to the Nation on the occasion of Eid-ul-Fitr, August 18, 1947].<sup>18</sup>

It should be our aim not only to remove want and fear of all types, but also to secure liberty, fraternity and equality as enjoined upon us by Islam [Speech in reply to the Civic Address presented by the Karachi Corporation, August 25, 1947].<sup>19</sup>

The establishment of Pakistan for which we have been striving for the last ten years is, by the grace of God, an established fact today, but the creation of a State of our own was means to an end and not the end in itself. The idea was that we should have a State in which we could live and breathe as free men and which we could develop according to our own lights and culture and where principles of Islamic social justice could find freeplay [Address to Civil, Naval, Military and Air Force officers of the Pakistan Government at Khaliqdina Hall, Karachi, October 11, 1947].<sup>20</sup>

We thank Providence for giving us courage and faith to fight these forces of evil. If we take our inspiration and guidance from the Holy Quran, the final victory, I once again say, will be ours ...

Do not be overwhelmed by the enormity of the task. There is many an example in [the] history of young nations building themselves up by sheer determination and force of character. You are made of sterling material and are second to none. Why should you also not succeed like many others, like your own "Mujahids". You are a nation whose history is replete with traditions and add to it another chapter of glory ....

All I require of you now is that everyone of us to whom this message reaches must vow to himself and be prepared to sacrifice his all, if necessary, in building up Pakistan as a bulwark of Islam and as one of the greatest nations whose ideal

is peace within and peace without . . . The tenets of Islam enjoin on every Musalman to give protection to his neighbours and to the minorities regardless of caste and creed . . . [Speech at a Rally at the University Stadium, Lahore, October 30, 1947].<sup>21</sup>

While the horizon is beset with dark clouds, let me appeal to you and give this message to the people of Pakistan. Create enthusiasm and spirit and go forward with your task, with courage and hope, and we shall do it. Are we down-hearted? Certainly not. The history of Islam is replete with instances of valour, grit and determination. So march on, notwithstanding obstructions, obstacles and interference; and I feel confident that a united nation of 70 million people with a grim determination and with a great civilization and history need fear nothing. It is now up to you to work, work and work; and we are bound to succeed. And never forget our motto: "Unity, Discipline and Faith". [Broadcast from Radio Pakistan, Lahore, October 30, 1947].<sup>22</sup>

I want you all to work with complete unity and harmony . . . notwithstanding all the dangers that are facing us just now. I am sure we will march forward through them successfully with the honour and prestige of Pakistan higher than ever and upholding the high traditions of Islam and our national banner. [November 8, 1947].<sup>23</sup>

In proposing this scheme, I have had one underlying principle in mind, the principle of Muslim democracy. It is my belief that our salvation lies in following the golden rules of conduct set for us by our great law-giver, the Prophet of Islam [PBUH]. Let us lay the foundation of our democracy on the basis of truly Islamic ideals and principles. Our Almighty has taught us that "our decisions in the affairs of the State shall be guided by discussions and consultations". I wish you, my brethren of Baluchistan, Godspeed and all success in the opening of this new era [Speech at Sibi Durbar, February 14, 1948].<sup>24</sup>

Nature's inexorable law is "the survival of the fittest" and we have to prove ourselves fit for our newly-won freedom. You have fought many a battle on the farflung battlefields of the globe to rid the world of the Fascist menace and make it safe for

democracy. Now you have to stand guard over the development and maintenance of Islamic democracy, Islamic social justice and the equality of manhood in your own native soil [Address to officers and men of the 5th Heavy Ack Ack and 6th Light Ack Regiments in Malir, February 21, 1948].<sup>25</sup>

You are only voicing my sentiments and the sentiments of millions of Musalmans when you say that Pakistan should be based on sure foundations of social justice and Islamic socialism which emphasizes equality and brotherhood of man. Similarly you are voicing my thoughts in asking and in aspiring for equal opportunities for all [Speech at the public reception at Chittagong, March 26, 1948].<sup>26</sup>

My young friends, ladies and gentlemen, I would say one word and it is this that this province of yours [N.W.F.P.] had to undergo a lot of suffering and trouble, but it was ultimately saved by the grace of God. Today, I am happy to see better things here. What more can one really expect than to see that this mighty land has now been brought under a rule, which is *Islamic, Muslim rule*, as a sovereign independent State. Now, we have much more difficult tasks ahead — how to reconstruct, how to build it up and how to revolutionize and remodel the past legacies from which we are suffering, namely, the mentality, the character and the evil customs of which we have been the victims for a century or more as slave people [Speech in reply to the Address of Welcome presented by the Principal, Staff and Students of the Edwardes College, Peshawar, April 18, 1948] [italics for emphasis].<sup>27</sup>

I shall watch with keenness the work of your Research Organization in evolving banking practices compatible with Islamic ideals of social and economic life. The economic system of the West has created almost insoluble problems for humanity and to many of us it appears that only a miracle can save it from disaster that is now facing the world. It has failed to do justice between man and man and to eradicate friction from the international field. On the contrary, it was largely responsible for the two World Wars in the last half century. The Western world, in spite of its advantages of mechanization and industrial

efficiency is today in a worse mess than ever before in history. The adoption of Western economic theory and practice will not help us in achieving our goal of creating a happy and contented people. We must work our destiny in our own way and present to the world an economic system based on [the] true Islamic concept of equality of manhood and social justice. We will thereby be fulfilling our mission as Muslims and giving to humanity the message of peace which alone can save it and secure the welfare, happiness and prosperity of mankind [Speech on the occasion of the opening ceremony of the State Bank of Pakistan, July 1, 1948].<sup>28</sup>

Jinnah also referred to Pakistan as "the premier Islamic State" in his broadcast to the people of the United States;<sup>29</sup> he also reiterated the "complete code" theme in his address to the Karachi Bar Association:

Islamic principles today are as applicable to life as they were 1,300 years ago . . . Islam and its idealism have taught equality, justice and fairplay to everybody . . . Let us make it [the future constitution of Pakistan]. We should make it and we will show to the world . . . No doubt, there are many people who do not quite appreciate when we talk of Islam.

Islam is not only a set of rituals, traditions and spiritual doctrines, Islam is also a code for every Muslim which regulates his life and his conduct in even politics and economics and the like. It is based on the highest principles of honour, integrity, fairplay and justice for all. In Islam there is no difference between man and man. The qualities of equality, liberty and fraternity are the fundamental principles of Islam.

The Governor-General of Pakistan observed that the life of the Prophet [PBUH] was simple according to those times. He was successful in everything that he put his hand to; from as a businessman to as a ruler. He said that the Prophet [PBUH] was the greatest man that the world had ever seen. Thirteen hundred years ago he laid the foundations of democracy [January 25, 1948].<sup>30</sup>

It is rather striking that in alluding to Islam as the centre-piece in the Indo-Muslim *weltanschauung*, Jinnah was taking a stance similar

to Allama Iqbal's. In his famous Allahabad (1930) address Iqbal had said:

... Islam, regarded as an ethical ideal plus a certain kind of polity by which expression I mean a social structure regulated by a legal system and animated by a specific ethical ideal — has been the chief formative factor in the life-history of the Muslims of India. It has furnished those basic emotions and loyalties which gradually unify scattered individuals and groups, and finally transform them into a well-defined people, possessing a moral consciousness of their own. Indeed it is no exaggeration to say that India is perhaps the only country in the world where Islam, as a people building force, has worked at its best. In India, as elsewhere, the structure of Islam as a society is almost entirely due to the working of Islam as a culture inspired by a specific ethical ideal. What I mean to say is that Muslim society, with its remarkable homogeneity and inner unity, has grown to be what it is, under the pressure of the laws and institutions associated with the culture of Islam ...<sup>31</sup>

There is also a striking similarity between Jinnah's and Iqbal's pronouncements relating to Islam. Jinnah had emphasized values such as freedom, democracy, equality, brotherhood, social justice, tolerance, etc., while Iqbal had described equality, solidarity and freedom as "the essence of 'Tauhid' [the cardinal principle of Islam] as a working idea"<sup>32</sup> and had called ... tearing off "from Islam the hard crust which has immobilized an essentially dynamic outlook on life, and to rediscover the original verities of freedom, equality and solidarity with a view to rebuild our moral, social and political life out of their original simplicity and universality".<sup>33</sup> Iqbal considers "a Muslim legislative assembly" as "the only possible form 'Ijma' can take in modern times".<sup>34</sup> Modern Muslim thinkers have pled for extracting "the universal Islam from the Qur'an and the Hadith" and leaving out "those elements which the limiting circumstances of Arabian society and particular conditions of the seventh century A.D. had forced into it".<sup>35</sup> To Iqbal, therefore, "the teaching of the Qur'an that life is a process of progressive creation necessitates that each generation, guided but unhampered by the work of its predecessors, should be permitted to solve its problems".<sup>36</sup>

Because there is no provision for an ordained priesthood or papacy in Islam, and hence, no room for theocracy, Iqbal had ruled out "religious rule" in the autonomous Muslim state(s) he had envisioned in his Allahabad address. In a similar vein did Jinnah. While laying a good deal of stress on Islamic ideals and principles, he ruled out theocracy, saying "Pakistan is not a theocracy or anything like it. Islam demands from us the tolerance of other creeds . . ."<sup>37</sup> And again: "Pakistan is not going to be a theocratic State — to be ruled by priests with a divine mission".<sup>38</sup> And this he affirmed on several occasions. When a newsman asked him at a press conference on July 14, 1947 whether Pakistan would be a theocratic state, he dismissed the question as "absurd".<sup>39</sup> He missed no occasion to preach tolerance, rule out discrimination on the basis of race, colour and religion, commend equal citizenship, equal opportunities and equal obligations for one and all, without any distinction whatsoever, and lay stress on creating a sense of trust and confidence in the minorities, by word and by deed.

Technically speaking, theocracy means a government "by ordained priests, who wield authority as being specially appointed by those who claim to derive their rights from their sacerdotal position". Unlike Catholicism, there is no established church in Islam; (in fact, it decries such a church). Moreover, since Islam admits of no priestcraft, since it discountenances a sacerdotal class as the bearer of an infallible authority, and since it concedes the right of *ijtihad* to "men of common-sense",<sup>40</sup> the concept of theocracy, asserted Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, is "absolutely foreign to Islam".<sup>41</sup> Hence, during the debate on the Objectives Resolution (March 1949), Mian Iftikharuddin refuted the Congress members' fears about the sovereignty clause, saying that "the wording of the Preamble does not in any way make the Objectives Resolution any the more theocratic, any the more religious than the Resolution or statement of fundamental principles of some of the modern countries of the world".<sup>42</sup> Thus neither Iqbal, nor Jinnah, nor any of the independence leaders (including Maulana Shabbir Ahmad Usmani) stood for a theocratic state.

This fortuitous conjunction of views between the ideologue and the architect, one should think, would have facilitated the task of the

future constitution-makers in Pakistan. And it did. It enabled them, among other things, to give official status and embodiment to their views in the Objectives Resolution which, above all, envisioned the establishment of a state "wherein the principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice, as enunciated by Islam, shall be full observed" (italics added).

## IV

Now about Jinnah's August 11 address that has spawned a good deal of controversy. *Inter alia*, he had said:

... If you change your past and work together in a spirit that everyone of you, no matter to what community he belongs ... is first, second and last a citizen of this State with equal rights, privileges and obligations, there will be no end to the progress you will make.

... we must learn a lesson from this [our past experience]. You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other places of worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed — that has nothing to do with the business of the State ... we are starting in the days when there is no discrimination, no distinction between one community and another, no discrimination between one caste, or creed and another. We are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one State ...

... I think we should keep that in front of us as our ideal and you will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the State [italics added].<sup>43</sup>

It is rather interesting to note that of all of Jinnah's pronouncements, this is the one to receive the greatest attention since the birth of Pakistan. Although made somewhat off-the-cuff ("... I cannot make any well-considered pronouncement, but I shall say a few things as they occur to me"),<sup>44</sup> it is considered a policy statement. Not inexplicably though, it has elicited varied comments from

scholars and contemporary journalists, into which we need not go here.<sup>45</sup>

In dissecting this statement, there is little that could lend itself to disputation, though. There is no problem with the dictum that everyone, no matter what community he belongs to, would be entitled to full-fledged citizenship, with equal rights, privileges and obligations, that there would no discrimination between one community and another, and that all of them would be citizens and equal citizens of one state. These principles Jinnah had reiterated time and again during the struggle period, though not in the same words.

It is, however, not usually recognized that political equality in general terms (because absolutism was the rule at the time of the advent of Islam) and equality before law in more specific terms are attributes Islam had recognized long before the world discovered them as secular values. They were exemplified in the Charter of Madinah, drawn up by the Prophet (PBUH) for the governance of the city, which delineates, among others, the relations between the various tribes/parties; and in his letter to Abul Haris, Christian priest and the accredited representative of the Christians of Najran, as well as in the conduct of the Khulafa-i-Rashidun. This Medinite covenant, comprising 47 clauses, lays down, *inter alia*, that the Quraishite Muslims, the Medinites and the Jews of Banu Auf form one community apart from other people, that the Jews shall have their religion and the Muslims their own, that they shall help each other against one who fights with the people of the covenant. Now, how could these disparate tribes characterised by differing religious and racial affiliations form one political community unless their entitlement to equal rights, equal privileges and equal obligations are conceded in the first place. A community postulates such entitlement, and it may be safely conjectured that Jinnah believed that Islam concedes equal citizenship to one and all, without reference to creed, colour or race. "In Islam", he had told the Karachi Bar Association, "there is no difference between man and man."

This, in part, explains why barely three days after his August 11 pronouncement, Jinnah had invoked the Medinite model when

Mountbatten referred to the "secular" model of Akbar in respect of non-Muslims:

The tolerance and goodwill that great Emperor Akbar showed to all the non-Muslims [he said] is not of recent origin. It dates back thirteen centuries ago when our Prophet [PBUH] not only by words but by deeds treated the Jews and Christians, after he had conquered them, with the utmost tolerance and regard and respect for their faith and beliefs. The whole history of Muslims, wherever they ruled, is replete with those humane and great principles which should be followed and practised.<sup>46</sup>

And, once political equality and equality before law are conceded, Hindus would surely cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims in the *political* sense as citizens of the state.

The institution of *jizyah* in early Islam is often invoked to lay the charge of discrimination against non-Muslims in an Islamic polity, but this invocation is based on sheer ignorance or misinterpretation. *Jizyah* was levied not because someone was a non-Muslim, but in lieu of exemption from military service (or *jihad*) which was compulsory for all Muslims. Instead of being discriminatory, this institution conceded non-Muslims the option not to fight the wars of the Islamic/Muslim state on payment of a small levy. In that Islam sought to respect the sensitivities of non-Muslims; it laid down, though in a nebulous form, the foundation of the "prisoner of conscience" principle; (compare this with the U.S. government's attitude towards those refusing to get drafted during the Vietnam war). And those who accepted compulsory military service were not Muslim compatriots — as, for instance, the tribe of Bani Taghlub. Thus *jizyah* does by no means signify a contravention of the principle of equal citizenship.

Finally, one crucial question: If it is still contended that Jinnah had envisaged a "secular" state, does one pronouncement prevail over a plethora of pronouncements made before and after the establishment of Pakistan? Does one morsel make a dinner? Does

As one who has closely studied all of Jinnah's pronouncements during 1934-48, and most of his pronouncements during the pre-1934 period, I can vouchsafe that the word, "secular" (signifying an ideology) does not find a mention in any of them. Even when confronted with the question, he evaded it — as the following extracts from his July 14, 1947 press conference indicates.

Question: Will Pakistan be a secular or theocratic state?

Mr. M. A. Jinnah: You are asking me a question that is absurd. I do not know what a theocratic state means.

A correspondent suggested that a theocratic State meant a State where only people of a particular religion, for example, Muslims, could be full citizens and non-Muslims would not be full citizens.

Mr. M. A. Jinnah: Then it seems to me that what I have already said is like throwing water on duck's back (laughter). When you talk of democracy, I am afraid you have not studied Islam. We learned democracy thirteen centuries ago.<sup>47</sup>

In view of all this, it is rather surprising that Chief Justice (Retd.) Munir invokes Jinnah's August 11 speech to flaunt the claim that "Jinnah was a secularist". But, for sure, Munir cannot be taken too seriously. For one thing, he contradicts himself on the core issue, for another, he goes in for *suppressio veri* and *suggestion falsi* to sustain some other claims. Two instances would suffice. Munir quotes Jinnah's broadcast to the people of the United States wherein Jinnah had categorically stated that Pakistan's constitution would be "of a democratic type embodying the essential principles of Islam". Munir also avers that Jinnah had envisaged a "government . . . based on Islamic principles and traditions".<sup>48</sup> Both these averments contradict his earlier assertion. At another place, he claims that Jinnah had not used the words, "ideology of Pakistan",<sup>49</sup> he could not because this phrase came into vogue much later. But, as indicated earlier, Jinnah had used the more meaningful construct, "Muslim ideology".<sup>50</sup>

There are other reasons as well for not taking Munir too seriously. First, his approach throughout his work (*From Jinnah to Zia*) is rather off-the-cuff. While he comments adversely on the Objectives Resolution, internal evidence indicates that he had not even gone through the debate on the Resolution in the Constituent

Assembly. For one thing, he gets the dates, when the Resolution was moved and adopted, wrong (pp.34-36); (he also gets other important dates wrong—e.g., that of the Partition Plan [p.16]). For another, he cites Liaquat's assertion about the investment of power in the people eliminating "any danger of the establishment of theocracy", made during the debate on the Resolution, from Jansen's *Militant Islam* (1979) instead of from the Constituent Assembly's proceedings. Munir also acknowledges, albeit indirectly, his non-familiarity with the debate on the Resolution:

It is not clear, however, whether this speech [of Liaquat] was made before or after the Objectives Resolution. Nor does he [Jansen] make any reference to the context in which the statement was made. There is, however, no reason to doubt the accuracy of Jansen's statement...<sup>51</sup>

Second, Munir was the Law Minister in President Ayub's first cabinet under the 1962 Constitution, and that constitution had included the Objectives Resolution as Preamble; Third, a Council of Islamic Ideology was provided under this constitution for the first time, and Munir commended it on July 30, 1962, as representing the first instance in modern history to attempt to bring Islam into contact with the political, legal, social and economic conditions of the modern world.<sup>52</sup> Fourth, Munir asserts that "for fifteen years after the establishment of Pakistan, the Ideology of Pakistan was not known to anybody until in 1962 a solitary member of the Jamaat-i-Islami for the first time used the words when the Political Parties Bill was being discussed".<sup>53</sup> But Munir himself cites Fareed S. Jafri ("Pakistan's Growth of Ideology-VII", *Pakistan Standard*, Karachi, January 30, 1955), and Javed Iqbal whose work on the ideology of Pakistan was published in 1961.<sup>54</sup>

All this, to say the least, tends to disqualify Munir from making any authoritative or credible statement about the Objectives Resolution or about ideology as such.

It is well to recall the ideological environment of the period in which the pronouncements we are trying to dissect, analyse and interpret today were made. It was already a bipolar world, smitten by the gathering cold war, symbolised by the Berlin blockade (1948) and the Berlin Wall (soon to be raised). The great ideological divide

had warped simple and long familiar words (such as freedom, liberty, equality, democracy, state, sovereignty, justice, and tyranny) with ideological overtones. Hence these concepts had to be qualified to mean what they actually stand for. Hence when Jinnah talks of the concept, of "a democratic type embodying the essential principles of Islam", he was giving notice that he did not mean the standard Western type or the Soviet brand of people's democracy, but a sort of "Islamic democracy" which, while retaining the institutional appurtenances of a democratic structure, is congruent with Muslims' ethos, aspirations and code of morality. And, as Mian Iftikharuddin argued, "no one need object to the word 'Islamic'. If we can use the words, 'Roman Law' or the 'British Parliamentary system' and so many other terms without shame or stint, then why not 'Islamic'?"<sup>55</sup>

It is also worth noting that this qualification of democracy (viz., Islamic) is profoundly significant. Democracy is a dynamic, rather than a static or merely a formal, concept. It has got something to do not only with the actual (or structural) form of government, but also with the people, their ideals and aspirations -- that is, with their *weltanschauung*. Democracy thrives on the basis of two ideals: a political ideal and an ethical one; on the concurrence of both a governmental form and a popular ideal.<sup>56</sup> This ideal, the ethical aspect, which is an integral part of the democratic process, provides it with content and some solid base, and continuing popular support. The structural apparatus of a democratic set up may be identical or somewhat identical the world over, but the ethical ideal (or moral categories) seeking to give meaning and content to this apparatus, is something to be provided from within, according to the genius and the cultural, social and spiritual heritage of a people.

Hence Professor Wilfred Cantwell Smith considers the term, Islamic democracy, "virtually a tautology", rather than a contradiction in terms. He does it for the simple reason that "in so far as an Eastern nation becomes truly democratic, that is, reflecting its own nature, to that extent it becomes un-Western . . . In so far as Pakistan is really democratic, and not merely superficially so, to that extent it will be Islamic, rather than Western."<sup>57</sup> And if Pakistan is to become Islamic it should be (and would be) through the democratic process — that is, through the supreme will of the people, and through a broad

consensus. And these two attributes, Islamic and democratic, cannot possibly stand as two distinct and separate attributes because the state would be "Islamic via democratic. Democracy thereby", argues Smith, becomes an aspect of its Islamicness, part of the definition of their Islamic state".<sup>58</sup>

## V

Jinnah had often described Pakistan in currently popular phrases such as a "national state" and "Muslim state", but he was never tired of attributing the authorship of Pakistan to every Musalman, of referring to the Holy Quran as "our inspiration and guidance", and of exhorting to lay "the foundation of our democracy on the basis of truly Islamic ideals and principles". He used the words "Islam" and "Muslim" as synonymous and interchangeable terms (in his Edwardes College address); he once described Pakistan as "the premier Islamic State"; he also described Pakistan in terms of "the Muslim ideology, which has [got] to be preserved, which has come to us as a precious gift and treasure and which, we hope, others will share with us".

More important, however, is the connotation in which Jinnah's demand for Pakistan and his pronouncements were understood by the Muslim audiences. The equivalent of "Muslim state" in Urdu generally used by speakers and writers is *Islami riyasat* or *hukumat*, and the Muslim masses understood Pakistan through the Urdu medium.<sup>59</sup>

Till his death on June 25, 1944, Nawab Bahadur Yar Jung (1905-44), who was among the greatest orators (in Urdu) of his time, was chiefly responsible for carrying the message of Pakistan to the various parts of the subcontinent. Not only his 1943 address (see below), but also his various speeches on Pakistan were undeniably explicit and yield the image of a polity based on Islamic principles.<sup>60</sup>

On his part, Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, during the debate on the Objectives Resolution, had talked of setting up "a polity, to the world that Islam is not only a progressive force in the world, but it also provides remedies for many of the ills from which

humanity was suffering".<sup>61</sup> And in his address to the Motamar-i-Alam-i-Islami at Karachi on February 9, 1951, he asserted that

The underlying idea of the movement for the achievement of Pakistan was not just to add one more country to the conglomeration of countries in the world or to add one more patch of colour to the multicoloured global map. Pakistan came into being as a result of the urge by the Muslims of this subcontinent to secure a territory, however limited, where the Islamic ideology and way of life could be practised and demonstrated to the world.<sup>62</sup>

To sum up, then. As Jinnah (and his chief lieutenants) envisioned it, Pakistan was to be an Islamic democracy — a democracy which should strive towards realising in its body-politic the Islamic principles of freedom, equality, and social justice, which should contribute towards "the onward march of renaissance of Islamic culture and ideals"; and, above all, which should "live up to your [Islamic] traditions and add to it another chapter of glory".

And, as indicated above, the integrating and guiding role of Islam in the survival and consolidation of Pakistan as also the role of Pakistan "as a bulwark of Islam" constituted, as it were, the central theme of Jinnah's numerous pronouncements during this (1947-48) crucial period, when he presided over the destinies of this fledgling state.

## Introduction: Notes

1. Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, *Speeches and Statements As Governor-General of Pakistan, 1947-48* (Islamabad, 1989), p. 157; hereafter as *Speeches and Statements 1947-48*.
2. *Ibid.*
3. John Kenneth Galbraith, *The Affluent Society* (London, 1960), p. 6.
4. Jinnah's letter to Gandhi, September 17, 1944, *Jinnah-Gandhi Talks* (Delhi, 1944), p. 22.
5. Jamilud-Din-Ahmad (ed.), *Some Recent Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah* (Lahore, 1947), II: 64; hereafter as *Some Recent Speeches*.
6. T. Walter Wallbank, *A Short History of India and Pakistan* (New York, 1963), p.53.
7. P. Hardy, "Islam in Mediaeval India", in Wm. Theodore de Bary, *Sources of Indian Tradition* (New York, 1958), p. 369.
8. K.M. Panikkar, *A Survey of Indian History* (London, 1963), p. 134, See also R.C. Majumdar (ed.), *History and Culture of the Indian People* (Bombay, 1960s), VI:615-16; R.C. Majumdar, 1979), 1:32-38.
9. *Some Recent Speeches* (Lahore, 1968), I:171.
10. *Ibid.* p. 490.
11. *Ibid.* p 597.
12. *Ibid.*, II:24.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 175.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 237.
15. Waheed Ahmad (ed.), *Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah: The Nation's Voice: Towards Consolidation, Speeches and Statements, March 1935-March 1940* (Karachi 1992), pp. 221-22; hereafter as *The Nation's Voice: Towards Consolidation*. Also, see *Star of India* (Calcutta), January 11, 1938.
16. *Some Recent Speeches*, p. 300-01.
17. Edward Mortimer, *Faith and power: the politics of Islam* (London 1982), ch. 7.

18. *Speeches and Statements, 1947-48*, p. 57.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 65
20. *Ibid.* p. 74.
21. *Ibid.*, pp. 94-95.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 98.
23. *Ibid.*, pp. 101-02.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 142.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 153.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 204.
27. *Ibid.*, p.240.
28. *Ibid.*, p.271.
29. *Ibid.*, p.155.
30. *Ibid.*, pp. 126-27.
31. Dr. Sir Muhammad Iqbal, *Presidential Address: Allahabad Session* (Delhi, 1945), p.2.
32. Sir Muhammad Iqbal, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* (Lahore, 1960), p. 154; hereafter as *Reconstruction*
33. *Ibid.*, p. 156.
34. *Ibid.*, pp. 173-74.
35. *Islamic Literature* (Lahore), editorial, cited in Khalid Bin Sayeed, "Role of Ideology in Pakistan's National Development", *Pakistan Journal of History and Culture* (Islamabad), XIII:I (1992), p.22.
36. Iqbal, *Reconstruction*—, p.168.
37. *Speeches and Statements, 1947-48*, p.150.
38. *Ibid.*, p.157.
39. M. Rafique Afzal (ed.), *Selected Speeches and Statements of the Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah* (Lahore, 1966), pp. 422-23.
40. Syed Sulaiman Nadvi, "The Sovereignty of Allah", trans. Syed Abu Asim, *Islamic Culture* (Hyderabad, Dn.), XXXII:3 (July 1948), p. 238.
41. See the debate on the Objectives Resolution included in Sharif al Mujahid (ed.), *Ideological Orientation of Pakistan* (Karachi, 1976), p.2.
42. *Ibid.*, p.50.
43. *Speeches and Statements, 1947-48*, pp.45-47.

44. *Ibid.*, p. 43.
45. For comments, see Sharif al Mujahid, *Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah: Studies in Interpretation* (Karachi, 1981), pp. 248-49.
46. *Speeches and Statements*, (1947-48) p. 54.
47. Afzal, pp. 422-23.
48. Muhammad Munir, *From Jinnah to Zia* (Lahore, second edn., 1980), pp. xv, 30-31, 32.
49. *Ibid.*, p. 28.
50. See above, note 13.
51. Munir, p.vi.
52. *Dawn*, (Karachi), July 31, 1962.
53. Munir, p. 28.
54. See *ibid.*, pp. 20, 32.
55. Mujahid, *Ideological Orientation of Pakistan*, p. 54.
56. Wilfred Cantwell Smith, *Pakistan as an Islamic State* (Lahore, 1951), p. 48.
57. *Ibid.*, p. 50.
58. *Ibid.*, p. 45; see also Wilfred Cantwell Smith, *Islam in Modern History* (Princeton, 1957), pp. 247-51.
59. See, for instance, Maulana Shabbir Ahmad Usmani's (1885-1948) message to the All-India Jamiat-ul-Islam Conference, Calcutta October 26-29, 1945; his address at the Muslim League Conference, Meerut, and the Punjab Provincial Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Islam Conference, Lahore, January 26, 1946 (since compiled as *Hamara Pakistan* (Hyderabad, Dn., 1946). Maulana Usmani also held a disputation on ulema's attitude towards the Congress in 1957), President, Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Hind, at Deoband on December 7, 1945; others present on the occasion were Maulana Ahmad Sayeed (-1950), Maulana Hifzur Rahman, Maulana Abdul Halim Siddiqi, Maulana Abdul Hannan and Mufti Atiqur-Rahman; see *Mukalimat al Sadrayn* (Delhi, n.d., but 1945). See Maulana Usmani's other addresses and statements in *Khutbat-i-Usmani* (Lahore, 1946); also *Rahbar-i-Deccan* (Hyderabad), October 29, 1945. Also, appeals by Maulana Usmani, Maulana Zafar Ahmad Thanawi (b. 1893), Maulana Azad Subhani (1882-1957), and Maulana Jabbar Wahidi in favour of League

- candidates in the 1945-46 elections, repeatedly published by the pro-League Urdu press, and Maulana Usmani's appeal in favour of Liaquat Ali Khan in *Asr-i-Jadid* (Calcutta), December 4, 1945. Mufti Mohammad Shafi (1897-1976) gave a fatwah in favour of the League: *Waqayatul Muslimin un Walayatul Mushrikin or Congress Awr Muslim Lig Kay Mutalaq Shari'i Faisla* (Deoband, Muhamarram 1365 A.H./December 1945).
60. See A.S.H. Razzaqi (ed.), *Khutbat-i-Quaid-i-Millat* (Hyderabad, Dn., 1947); and Ghulam Mohammad, *Quaid-i-Millat* (Hyderabad, Dn., 1947).
  61. Mujahid, *Ideological Orientation of Pakistan*, p. 4.
  62. *Dawn*, February 10, 1951.

## IDEOLOGY OF PAKISTAN

The term 'ideology' was coined by Antoine de Strutt de Tracy, during the French Revolution (1789). It meant a 'science of ideas'. Without making any direct reference to de Tracy, Justice Mohammad Munir explained that ideology is the science which deals with beliefs, notions and theories. These in turn have their origin in the fundamental assumptions held by a people. These ideas may be naturally acquired; sometimes they may be consciously spread.

The ideology of the French Revolution could be summed up as equality, fraternity and liberty. It overthrew the theory of the divine rights of kings. It also modified the still unfolding law of social contract. According to Charles E. Bressler, ideology refers to the collective or social consciousness of culture.<sup>1</sup> This is opposed to the material reality on which an experience is based. This means that though the ideology of Pakistan has been derived from the Two-Nation theory, it is not identical to it. In other words, the ideology of Pakistan is enshrined, not in the Lahore Resolution, but the Objectives Resolution.

This needs an explanation. An ideology is expressed in absolute, not relative terms. The Two-Nation theory is relative, because it depends on the existence of the 'other'—in our case, the Hindu majority of undivided India. If the Hindus did not exist—or if they existed as a minority—there would have been no need to propound the Two-Nation theory according to which Hindus and Muslims form different nations.

Islamic ideology means to order our individual and collective behaviour in accordance with the Islamic concepts of justice, morality, human rights, and tolerance. Human rights in Islam are an important component of its ideology. The rights of God and the rights of worshippers are clearly demarcated. There are sins against God, such as neglecting prayers, fasting, and pilgrimage. There are sins against human beings, such as killing them, stealing from them, and even backbiting—against which the holy Quran has passed the severest of strictures. Islamic ideology is a matter of personal conscience, but social behaviour.

## IDEOLOGICAL HISTORY

The nature of Islamic ideology was hotly debated during the process of framing constitutions. The place of Islam in state polity was viewed differently

by the Pakistan Muslim League, Pakistan National Congress and the Jama'at-i-Islami. It is undeniable that while religious majorities prefer an ideological state, religious minorities prefer a secular state. This was witnessed between 1937-1939, when Muslims objected to the Congress practices like the Wardha scheme of education, singing of the anti Muslim song, *Bande Matram*, and the practice of saluting the portrait of Gandhi. It is also undeniable that minorities sought mainly to safeguard human rights. If the majority guarantees freedom of conscience and belief, then, the ideology so practiced can be acceptable to minorities.

According to Jinnah, under Ideology we thought it proper to confine ourselves to the public speeches of the Quaid-i-Azam, however, in the testimony of the Raja of Mahmudabad<sup>2</sup> and Isha'at Habibullah, he had objected to Pakistan becoming an Islamic state,<sup>3</sup> on the ground that there were over seventy sects, and 'the consequences would be a struggle of religious opinion from the very inception of the state leading to its very dissolution'. What Mr Jinnah wanted was a 'Liberal Democratic State'.

It should be noted that Jinnah's objection to an Islamic state was not ideological, but empirical. There is one strand of ideology, on which—not only Jinnah and Mahmudabad—but the entire leadership of the Muslim League was in agreement, and that is Islamic socialism.



MUHAMMAD ALI JINNAH (b. 25 December 1876-d. 11 September 1948) was a campaigner for India's freedom. M.A. Jinnah was an instrument of India's partition. Both claims are valid. Whether this represents an advance, or a derailment, depends on the meaning of the word 'freedom'. The Hindus had not gained freedom after the defeat of the Muslims. Would the Muslims gain freedom on the withdrawal of the British?

The first step in the direction of partition was taken when the Congress leadership transited from Jinnah to Gandhi. Both had emerged together as champions of India's freedom, both were disciples of Gopal Krishna Gokhale; and both gained prominence by protesting against the plight of Indians in South Africa; Gandhi with his novel *satyagraha*, and Jinnah by confronting the viceroy face-to-face. Then, was their later divergence an outcome of their vision, or their circumstances? These were not insuperable, and may not have come about without the fateful intervention of Motilal Nehru who primed Jinnah to oppose Gandhi's non-cooperation resolution at Nagpur, in 1920, and then resiled from his stand.<sup>1</sup> Only ten days before, Jinnah had spoken of his belief in the ideal of non-cooperation; and even at Nagpur (where he resigned), Jinnah had not opposed the principles, but he had opposed the impractical portions of Gandhi's resolution.

His resignation from Congress brought about a personality change. Dewan Chaman Lal, who knew Jinnah as a young man, described his 'uninhibited laughter and general bonhomie'.<sup>2</sup> Jinnah's formality and reserve developed as a reaction to the social treatment he received from his Congress compatriots—which was strange considering his close friendship with Nehru's father, and Patel's brother. Again, had Gandhi not gone against Jinnah's pleas, by raising the religious sentiments of the (Muslim) masses during the Khilafat Movement, the role of the Muslim League would have been limited to being a moderating influence in Indian politics.

His reserve also developed when his marriage with a young girl—whom he had pursued tempestuously—broke down. Kanji Dwarkadas—a mutual friend—was called home by Jinnah, the day after the heart rending scene of his wife's burial: 'Never have I found a man so sad and so bitter. He screamed his heart out, speaking to me for over two hours, myself listening to him patiently and sympathetically, occasionally putting in a word here and there. Something, I saw, snapped in him.'<sup>3</sup>

A number of freedom fighters were widowers: Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru, Vallabhbhai Patel and Abul Kalam Azad, but only Jinnah's wife, Ruttie, had been politically active.

Jinnah had resigned from Congress politically, not psychologically. Jinnah caused a split in the Muslim League over the composition of the Simon Commission, rather than abandon Congress (which he had left) in its struggle. Viceroy Lord Willingdon found Jinnah more Congress than Congress, but Jinnah was alienated time and again by Congress; by the abjuration of the Lucknow Pact, by resiling from the Delhi Muslim Proposals, by disregarding the tacit UP 1937

electoral understanding, and finally by renegeing on the grouping clause. Without these rebuffs Jinnah would not have faced a choice between territorial loyalty and communal survival.

Jinnah was not elitist in politics. He led a mass demonstration against Lord Willingdon. He dealt with tough hecklers and their political patrons in a Bombay meeting held to promote the candidature of R.P. Paranjype.<sup>4</sup> Ian Bryant Wells has quoted Jinnah's speech on the Elementary Education Bill: 'Are you going to keep millions and millions of people under your feet for the fear that they may demand more rights?' In spite of these sentiments Indian historians favour a Jinnah who would bow before Nehru—not a Jinnah who would stand up to Lord Mountbatten. Only one reviewer, T.W. Hutton, has identified Jinnah's fear of emotion as central to both his politics and personality. This trait eluded his Congress contemporaries. Speaking at the All-Parties Conference, in 1928, Jinnah said: 'Every country struggling for freedom and desirous of establishing a democratic system has had to face the problem of minorities.... minorities cannot give anything to the majority and the majority alone can give...'.

Twenty years later, addressing the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, the Quaid-i-Azam said: 'You may belong to any religion, cast or creed, that has nothing to do with the business of the state. We are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one state.'

Jinnah was upholding a lifelong principle ignored equally by the citizens of India and Pakistan.

## NOTES

1. Kanji Dwarkadas, *India's Fight for Freedom, 1913–1937: An Eyewitness Story*, Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1966, pp. 286–87.
2. Dewan Chaman Lal, 'The Quaid-i-Azam as I knew him', in Jamiluddin Ahmad (ed.), *Quaid-i-Azam as seen by his Contemporaries*, Lahore: Ashraf, 1976, p. 171.
3. Kanji Dwarkadas, *Ruttie Jinnah: The Story of a Great Friendship*, Bombay: Kanji Dwarkadas, 1963, p. 58.
4. V.N. Naik, *Mr Jinnah: A Political Study*, Bombay: Sadbhakti Publications, 1947, pp. 38–41.

217; Quaid-e-Azam's inaugural address to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on 11th August, 1947, in his capacity as its first President.

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen,

I cordially thank you, with the utmost sincerity, for the honour you have conferred upon me—the greatest honour that is possible for this Sovereign Assembly to confer—by electing

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me as your first President. I also thank those leaders who have spoken in appreciation of my services and their personal references to me. I sincerely hope that with your support and your co-operation we shall make this Constituent Assembly an example to the world. The Constituent Assembly has got two main functions to perform. The first is the very onerous and responsible task of framing our future Constitution of Pakistan and the second of functioning as a full and complete Sovereign body as the Federal Legislature of Pakistan. We have to do the best we can in adopting a provisional constitution for the Federal Legislature of Pakistan. You know really that not only we ourselves are wondering but, I think, the whole world is wondering at this unprecedented cyclonic revolution which has brought about the plan of creating and establishing two independent Sovereign Dominions in this sub-continent. As it is, it has been unprecedented; there is no parallel in the history of the world. This mighty sub-continent with all kinds of inhabitants has been brought under a plan which is titanic, unknown, unparalleled. And what is very important with regard to it is that we have achieved it peacefully and by means of an evolution of the greatest possible character.

Dealing with our first function in this Assembly, I cannot make any well-considered pronouncement as this moment, but I shall say a few things as they occur to me. The first and the foremost thing that I would like to emphasise is this remember that you are now a Sovereign Legislative body and you have got all the powers. It, therefore, places on you the gravest responsibility as to how you should take your decisions. The first observation that I would like to make is this: You will no doubt agree with me that the first duty of a Government is to maintain law and order, so that the life, property and religious beliefs of its subjects are fully protected by the State.

The second thing that occurs to me is this: One of the biggest curses from which India is suffering—I do not say that other countries are free from it, but, I think, our condition is much worse—is bribery and corruption. That really is a poison. We must put that down with an iron hand and I hope that you

will take adequate measures as soon as it is possible for this Assembly to do so.

Black-marketing is another curse. Well, I know that black-marketeers are frequently caught and punished. Judicial sentences are passed or sometimes fines only are imposed. Now you have to tackle this monster which today is a colossal crime against society, in our distressed conditions, when we constantly face shortage of food and other essential commodities of life. A citizen who does blackmarketing commits, I think, a greater crime than the biggest and most grievous of crimes. These blackmarketeers are really knowing, intelligent and ordinarily responsible people, and when they indulge in black-marketing, I think they ought to be very severely punished, because they undermine the entire system of control and regulation of foodstuffs and essential commodities, and cause wholesale starvation and want and even death.

The next think that strikes me is this: Here again it is a legacy which has been passed on to us. Along with many other things, good and bad, has arrived this great evil—the evil of nepotism and jobbery. This evil must be crushed relentlessly. I want to make it quite clear that I shall never tolerate any kind of jobbery, nepotism or any influence directly or indirectly brought to bear upon me. Wherever I will find that such a practice is in vogue, or is continuing anywhere, low or high, I shall certainly not countenance it.

I know there are people who do not quite agree with the division of India and the partition of the Punjab and Bengal. Much has been said against it, but now that it has been accepted, it is the duty of everyone of us to loyally abide by it and honourably act according to the agreement which is now final and binding on all. But you must remember as I have said, that this mighty revolution that has taken place is unprecedented. One can quite understand the feeling that exists between the two communities wherever one community is in majority and the other is in minority. But the question is, whether it was possible or practicable to act otherwise than

what has been done. A division had to take place. On both sides, in Hindustan and Pakistan, there are sections of people who may not agree with it, who may not like it, but in my judgment there was no other solution and I am sure future history will give its verdict in favour of it. And what is more it will be proved by actual experience as we go on that was the only solution of India's constitutional problem. Any idea of a United India could never have worked and in my judgment it would have led us to terrific disaster. May be that view is correct; may be it is not; that remains to be seen. All the same in this division it was impossible to avoid the question of minorities being in one Dominion or the other. Now that was unavoidable. There is no other solution. Now what shall we do? Now, if we want to make this great State of Pakistan happy and prosperous we should wholly and solely concentrate on the well-being of the people, and especially on the masses and the poor. If you will work in co-operation, forgetting the past, burying the hatchet, you are bound to succeed. If you change your past and work together in a spirit that everyone of you, no matter to what community he belongs, no matter what relations he had with you in the past, no matter what is his colour, caste or creed, is first, second and last a citizen of this State with equal rights, privileges and obligations. There will be no end to the progress you will make.

I cannot emphasise it too much. We should begin to work in that spirit and in course of time all these angularities of the majority and minority communities, the Hindu community and the Muslim community—because even as regards Muslims you have Pathans, Punjabis, Shias, Sunnis and so on and among the Hindus you have Brahmins, Vashnavas, Khatri, also Bengalees, Madrasis, and so on—will vanish. Indeed if you to attain the freedom and independence and but for this we would have been free peoples long long ago. No power can hold another nation, and specially a nation of 100 million souls in subjection; nobody could have conquered you, and even if it had happened, nobody could have continued its hold on you for any length of time but for this. Therefore, we must learn

## PAKISTAN MOVEMENT

a lesson from this. You are free, you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other places of worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed—that has nothing to do with the business of the State. As you know, history shows that in England conditions, some time ago, were much worse than those prevailing in India today. The Roman Catholics and the Protestants persecuted each other. Even now there are some States in existence where there are discriminations made and bars imposed against a particular class. Thank God, we are not starting in those days. We are starting in the days when there is no discrimination, no distinction between one community and another, no discrimination between one caste or creed and another. We are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one State. The people of England in course of time had to face the realities of the situation and had to discharge the responsibilities and burdens placed upon them by the government of their country and they went through that fire step by step. Today, you might say with justice that Roman Catholics and Protestants do not exist, what exists now is that every man is a citizen, an equal citizen of Great Britain and they are all members of the Nation.

Now, I think we should keep that in front of us as our idea and you will find that in the course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the State.

Well, gentlemen, I do not wish to take up any more of your time and thank you again for the honour you have done to me. I shall always be guided by the principles of justice and fair play without any, as is put in the political language, prejudice or ill-will, in other words, partiality or favouritism. My guiding principle will be justice and complete impartiality, and I am sure that with your support and co-operation. I can look forward to Pakistan becoming one of the greatest Nations of the world.

HISTORIC DOCUMENTS

I have received a message from the United States of America addressed to me. It reads:

"I have the honour to communicate to you, in Your Excellency's capacity as President of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, the following message which I have just received from the Secretary of State of the United States:

"On the occasion of the first meeting of the Constituent Assembly for Pakistan, I extend to you and to members of the Assembly, the best wishes of the Government and the people of the United States for the successful conclusion of the great work you are about to undertake."

The Jamaat-i Islami. – The Jamaat-i Islami ('Islamic party'), founded in 1941 by Abul Ala Maududi (1903–79), is the fundamentalist party *par excellence* in the sense that it advocates a return to Islamic doctrine in its original form. Its ideology is in line with that of the major international fundamentalist movements, especially the Muslim Brotherhood.<sup>7</sup>

Maududi held that Islam should govern every aspect of life. He was virulently critical of the traditional ulemas, maintaining that they limited themselves to a passive reading of the sacred texts, rather than exercising their faculties of reasoning. He agreed with them on the question of Islam's legislative tradition (the supremacy of the Law – that is to say, the sharia – imposed by Allah, sole lawgiver and sole sovereign lord), but his system of thought gave them no institutional status, and deprived them of their traditional prerogatives. Maududi also disagreed with the ulemas on the question of mysticism and popular religious devotion; he wanted to retain only the juridical and political aspects of Islamic thought. He proposed that the Islamic state should be based on sharia law as the defining law of the country, which should apply to every aspect of the legal system (constitutional, civil, criminal); the state should be led by morally and religiously upright men who modelled themselves on the first Companions of the Prophet. Thus he established the Jamaat-i Islami in 1941. Although Maududi rejected all Western ideology, he drew inspiration from both fascist and communist parties, as we can see from the extremely centralized structure of his organization. He did not have much consideration for mysticism, but he did admire Sufism as an organizational model: the pivotal role of the spiritual master [pīr] corresponded very closely with his own concept of the role of the *amīr* (leader) in the Jamaat-i Islami.

According to the Maududian ideal, the disciplined elite who constitute his organization must work for the creation of an Islamic state which would gradually take over social and political affairs. The main difference between the Jamaat-i Islami and the Tablighi Jamaat, therefore, lies in the fact that the former is aiming for an Islamic revolution via control of the state apparatus (Islamization 'from above'), whereas the latter considers that Islamization on an individual level is a necessary precondition for the building of an Islamic state (Islamization 'from below').

Maududi was against the Movement for Pakistan at the outset, arguing that the Muslim League's nationalism was, in principle, contrary to Islam. He believed that nationalism was a threat to the cohesion of the Muslim community, and would have a divisive effect on the *umma* which would hinder the spread of Islam's universal message. He also believed that the movement for the creation of Pakistan was led by people who rejected any notion of a religious state, and favoured the establishment of a liberal democracy along Western lines. Nevertheless, Maududi came to Pakistan after Partition,<sup>8</sup> thereafter he adapted himself, in both thought and action, to the evolution of Pakistani politics.

The Jamaat-i Islami is strong in the Punjab, in Sind (especially in Karachi) and in the NWFP, where most of its madrasahs are situated (mainly concentrated near the Afghan border); its membership base, which is similar to that of the Ahl-i Hadith, is predominantly middle-class, mostly the urban petty bourgeoisie who have had a modern education.

The Jamaat-i Islami played a crucial role in the Islamization of the Pakistani state, especially under Zia ul-Haq (1979–88), but it is too doctrinaire and elitist to attract real popular support. It usually fares poorly at elections, but it is still capable of mobilizing in the streets and the universities, where its student branch (Islami Jamiat-i Tulaba) always seems to be ready to resort to violence.