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ORIGINAL CORRESPONDENCE

BETWEEN
GENERAL
DUMOURIER, MIRANDA, PACHE AND
BEURNONVILLE,
MINISTERS OF WAR,
SINCE JANUARY,

1793,

Including the Orders of General Dumourier to General
Miranda, from the Invasion of Holland to the Overthrow
of the French, after the Battle of Nerwinden.

TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH,
PUBLISHED BY GENERAL MIRANDA.

LONDON:
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MDCCXCIV.



ADVERTISEMENT.

MUCH as Public curiosity has been excited for months past; many and various as have been the speculative decisions of even the best informed characters in this Kingdom, on Dumourier's Quixotic expedition into Holland, in the beginning of 1793, it has been till now impossible to unveil the truth. We cannot, on the present occasion, better introduce the ORIGINAL CORRESPONDENCE, than in the words of General Miranda himself. " It will be an easy matter to justify myself, when either an act of accusation, or, if possible, any specific charge is attempted to be brought against me.—Till then, I rely on the justice of my country, and submit the following Correspondence to the unbiased judgment of Public opinion;

ORIGINAL CORRESPONDENCE.

&c. &c. &c.

LETTER I.

Paris, Jan. 5, 1793, Second Year of the
French Republic.

*The MINISTER AT WAR to the LIEUTENANT
GENERAL of the Northern Division of the
French Army in Belgium.*

THE Provisionary Executive Council have
authorized me, General, to transmit to
you the order for taking the command of the
French army in Belgium, in the room of Ge-
neral Valence, he having obtained leave of ab-
sence. In this situation you will please particu-
larly to attend to the interest of the Republic.

Signed

PACHE.

PACHE.

LETTER II.

Paris, Jan. 7, 1793, Second Year of the
French Republic.

PACHE, Minister of War, to MIRANDA, Lieutenant General commanding the Army in Belgium.

A WANT of confidence between the Officers on the Staff and the Commissaries appointed for supplying the army with necessaries, occasions material injury to the brave defenders of the Republic.

The Commissioners of the Convention announce, that the army is in want of forage. The Members of the Committee for supplying the army declare, that considerable stores on the bastions at Louvain are suffered to rot, as no magazines have been allowed, and because the Assistant Commissaries neglect forwarding them to those places where they are necessary.

At a moment when public safety, and the certainty of enjoying liberty, require that we should be united to subdue our enemies, I cannot conceive why private emolument and selfish views should thus set at variance men in situations of the greatest responsibility, and endanger the existence

sistence of our brethren, who brave all dangers to defend our common welfare.

There not being a possibility for me to travel into the Low Countries, to ascertain the true state of things, and compare the various accounts with each other, I call upon you, General, in the name of Liberty and Equality, in the name of the Republic, of which you have declared yourself one of the defenders, to afford both protection and assistance to those who are entrusted with the care of supplying our troops with provisions.

Order magazines to be ready for the assistants of the committee, who have contracted ; and in the same manner for those who are charged with the distributing and management of provisions. Order those appointed by the contractors to appear before you.—Let the places be pointed out to you where the provisions are deposited, and the quantities of each sort.—Give orders immediately to every one in his respective department to get them carried off, and sent wherever they are most wanting. Give orders that no obstacle be suffered in the conveyance ; and that no private views, or a shadow of personal interest, may occasion the disorganization of the army, by exposing our brave defenders to the danger of dy-

ing by want, and thus fully the glory of the republican Army.

When you shall have ascertained the quantities which have been bought, and the places where they are stored, you will immediately inform me, General, if there be a sufficient supply; if not, where and how much is to be purchased; I shall immediately give orders for that purpose, and send money sufficient to answer any engagement entered into for supporting our troops,

I repeat it, General, I am most sensibly afflicted with the condition of the French troops in Belgium, which I am determined to use every effort in my power, and whatever is incumbent on me, either by my duty or situation, to amend and improve; but I stand in need of assistance: your acknowledged probity, your friendship and intimacy with Petion, your rank in the army, all determine my appointing you to co-operate with me for the welfare of the army.

Write to me often—every day, relative to your situation, to its improvement, and on the means necessary to be taken for accomplishing that state of tranquillity and security which ought long since to have been attained.

Signed

PACHE.

LETTER III.

General DUMOURIER to General MIRANDA.

Paris, Jan. 10.

THE Minister of War, my dear Miranda, sends you the state of the garrisons, the movements of which are concerted in order to come near maritime Flanders ; and will strengthen your corps with about 10,000 men, of whom there are from 12 to 1500 cavalry : —they are collecting from Dunkirk, by Ostend, Bruges, and extending towards Ghent and Antwerp. You are to seem as if you changed one of the cantonments on your left, in order to strengthen Antwerp by a brigade of infantry, without drawing any from thence. Thus affairs now stand. The English will certainly declare war : their project is to make sure of Zealand : they have nine frigates, which, if not there already, will soon arrive at Flushing. The Dutch will then declare themselves.

The patriots assert, that the Dutch have already evacuated Venloo, which is to be garrisoned by Prussians : —they are likewise to evacuate Maestricht, and be replaced by the allied troops : —thus they will form a body of 20000 men to defend the interior parts, from Bergen-

op-zoom

op-zoom to Nimeguen, and furnish a contingent which, with the assistance of the English, will attack our flank.

As the Stadholder dreads the revolutionary spirit which ferments with the greatest activity in all the provinces, particularly at Amsterdam, and the Hague, he is fortifying the island of Walcheren; and it is his plan to retire there, with the States and the heads of the different administrations, under the protection of the Dutch and English fleets. They are at work at the fortifications with the utmost care and labour; and it is supposed these will be completed in fifteen days.

I am now to inform you of the determination of the Executive Council. As General Valence returns to Paris, you are to take the command of the army; and you are entrusted with the execution of the plan which I now transmit, at the same time that you are enjoined to the closest secrecy.

1st. Leave of absence is granted to General Bourdonnaye, that he may not impede the business you have to accomplish; and all the troops of maritime Flanders are left at your disposal, that every part may be set in motion at your single will. You have at Bruges General Deflers,

sters, who is a very good officer, to whom you will send your orders, and entrust with the disposal of the troops in lower Austrian Flanders, while you are able to do the same relative to lower French Flanders, and then commit them to the care of General Pascal, commander of Dunkirk. Give your orders in such a manner, that the troops shall, in twelve days at most, approach Zealand, and take possession of Dutch Flanders ; while you will order your soldiers to go to the Island of Zuyd-Beveland, and from thence reach Walcheren Island, which we are desirous of taking, before the Stadholder is able to make it a place of refuge, or before it can be fortified, and in a condition to receive a garrison. No time is to be lost ; and although the patriots pretend that the Zealanders are ready, and that in all Zealand there are at most but 55 companies of infantry, of 40 men in a company, and no cavalry ; and that consequently this expedition requires but 3000 men, I think eight battalions of infantry are necessary, the Dutch legion, the flotilla of Moulston, and two regiments of cavalry ; eight twelve pounders, two mortars, two howitzers, a company of artillery, of horse, and sixteen field pieces. You are to go to Antwerp ; and there be joined by the Dutch patriots, who will bring you the maps, and serve you as guides in your progress through the country,

try, after having assured themselves of all the means of effecting the expedition with success. The Minister of the Marine has given orders to prepare furnaces, and every thing necessary on board each of the three armed sloops, in order to fire red-hot balls. These three vessels draw little water, and will easily drive off the frigates by their weight of metal of twenty-four pounders as by their red-hot balls. As a pretence for your journey to Antwerp, you will demand a loan of eight millions of florins from that city ; as I have already signified it to the inhabitants. Insist on it with severity. Inform the city, the body of the clergy, and the merchants on the exchange, that the French will not suffer themselves to be made the dupes of their ill-will ; that the troops are ready to take by contribution to the value of what they are moderate enough to propose by way of loan ; that you know those who have the largest capitals ; that you will take the money from these alone, leaving them to settle afterwards among themselves and fellow-citizens their respective proportions.— Tell them, that I am endeavouring to get the decree of the 15th repealed, and that I hope to succeed ; in which case they will only be subject to the conditions of my proclamation : but that, in consequence of this proclamation, where I say, “ That the provinces and towns which will

“ persist

" persist in considering themselves as subject to
 " the House of Austria, in preserving their old
 " government, founded on the slavery of the
 " people, and the inequality of orders, shall be
 " dealt with as enemies." You will tell them,
 General, that you will act as if you were in an
 enemy's country ; annul all their resolutions ; in
 fine, you will take their money, in order to in-
 demnify us for the expences of the war.

A list to be made out of the richest per-
 sons at Antwerp ; call over their names at the
Hotel de Ville ; let them have a guard kept over
 them ; and do not set them free, until they shall
 have agreed to comply with the loan, either vol-
 untarily or by compulsion. If they appear to
 do it freely, call for two millions of florins, for
 the expence's of the expedition ; if compelled,
 make one pay 50,000 florins, more or less, ac-
 cording to their circumstances ; and make them
 all pay within the space of eight days, having first
 ordered them to be guarded in their own houses.
 Act in the same manner with regard to the cler-
 gy ; but separately from the merchants and
 others in trade.

During this rigorous operation, which alone
 can save the French army and Belgium, con-
 cert with the Dutch patriots for the final exe-

cution of our plan. Cause all the passages to be reconnot red which can lead from Antwerp into South Beveland. Obtain certain information relative to the works of Walcheren Island ; and collect your forces at the point of Antwerp, which should arrive on a fixed day, and depart in the same manner from thence. Place your confidence only in Thowenot and Ruault, in order to assist you in this plan of invasion; which should be suddenly effected, *in order to take the start of the English, who are trifling with us.* In a few days after, I shall privately join you at Antwerp. Every thing must be ready ; and you are to have, one way or the other, two or three millions of florins, as hinted before.

Let it be a part of your plan, 1. That Deflers shall collect at Bruges 4 or 5000 infantry, with four twelve pounders, 1200 horse, two mortars, two field pieces (four pounders) to each battalion, and march with the greatest expedition to Middleburgh, thence to Cadsand Island, and so to Biervliet.

2dly. While you are thus preparing in Austrian Flanders, send an excellent field officer with a trumpet to Ruremond, and acquaint the Governor of Venloo you have received information that the Dutch are going to evacuate that town,

town, which is to be garrisoned by Prussian troops. Assemble all the forces which compose your own army at Ruremonde, or rather at Kom, and give the command to Duval, with two pieces of twenty-four, four of twelve, two mortars, two howitzers, in order to get possession of Venloo, if it be evacuated, or else to prevent its evacuation.

3dly. When you shall have settled the expedition into Zealand, and made sure of Venloo, by the army under Duval, have your orders ready, that without weakening the posts on the river Roér, the army under General Lanou shall completely invest Maestricht ; for that purpose, let the army of Valence be collected at Tongres, after your own shall have evacuated it. You perhaps will tell me, that you neither have provisions nor forage ; but you have on one hand the market of Simson, and also the provisions (though little) collected by Pieck and Moncluan, agents for the Committee of Stores. At any rate, you have only to contract your cantonments. Dispatch an express, and give me information of such obstacles or advantages as may attend the execution of this plan ; which you will be enabled to know to a certainty, when you shall have communicated your intentions to the Dutch patriots, and examined their maps and their par-

ticular projects. All depends on expedition and secrecy. Every day I shall more and more unfold to you my plan : it is set in motion with precipitation, because we are pressed by the tide of great events, and we have not one day to lose ; prepare, therefore, without loss of time. If I should find here any obstacles, either by the wavering or irresolute state of the Executive Council, by the tedious deliberations of the different Committees, or the conflict of factions, I shall make you acquainted daily with the result. If possible, we shall adopt it, or renounce it, to execute another ; or, finally, if nobody will listen to me ; if suspicion, want of candour, the jarring of factions, ignorance, and a pitiful parsimony, more destructive than it is mean and sordid ; if all these, or any of them, prevent my saving my country, I shall resign my command, and lament in some corner the fate of my blind countrymen. Farewell, my friend, my worthy auxiliary, I salute you, and love you with all my soul.

Signed

DUMOURIER.

LETTER

LETTER IV.

General MIRANDA, to General DUMOURIER.

Liege, 15 Jan. 1793

THE more I read your letter of the 10th, my dear and worthy general, the more I discover the expansion of a noble and generous soul, which soars above all obstacles, in proportion to the pressure of difficulties—but to the point.—

I believe your plan is very difficult to be carried into execution, considering our absolute want of magazines, and the present state of nakedness which pervades all our armies.—Nevertheless, the arrival of Commissary Petit-Jean, with orders from the Minister of War, which I shall not fail to enforce, will, I believe, cause our movement to be much better and speedier.

If you had left out of your plan the attempt on Zealand, it appears to me, to be much more practicable, and we should not incur the danger of committing ourselves with the maritime forces of England and Holland, *which cannot fail to check*

check us in the very onset of our attempt, not having on our side any maritime strength to oppose to theirs.

Remember, General, that the Zealanders were those, who with their boats alone, checked the progress of the constantly victorious armies of the tyrant Philip, and finally overthrew them—on this account, if you re-consider the plan, and leave out of it the attempt on Zealand, this province will fall of itself, when the rest of Holland shall be taken by surprize. Dutch Flanders should be invaded, and then the Scheld will be our barrier on that side. This is an observation which may perhaps deserve your attention. Four battalions have already marched towards Antwerp, without any appearance of design, or occasioning any change in our cantonments. The order for the movement of the troops towards maritime Flanders, which you and Pache the Minister promised me, is not yet come. I wait for it impatiently, as well as for your farther instructions to proceed; and now, therefore, let us not lose a moment.

By the most certain information which I have just obtained, it appears that the garrison of Wesel since the 8th instant, has been reinforced by 10, or 12,000 men: this corps can only have for its object to succour Holland in case of an

an invasion, or perhaps to attack Ruremonde, and the left of our cantonments. I have reinforced those behind the Roer, and gave orders to Lamorliere to retreat by the Roer, on the bridges of Ruremonde and Vodorp, and ultimately to fall back on Gelekirchen, which will effectually secure us from the apprehension of a check.

Signed

MIRANDA.

P. S. I foresee many difficulties attending the plan of operations which you have sent to me—according to the rules of art, it appears almost impracticable; nevertheless, do not doubt that I shall do every thing that is possible, and I believe the army, from the confidence they repose in you, will follow with alacrity. I only fear, that in case of success, the adepts will say—
*Casu est non arte.**

* Chance and not knowledge

LETTER

LETTER V.

*To General MIRANDA.*Paris, 19 Jan. 1793, Second year of the
Republic.

I ANSWERED, my dear Miranda, your dispatches by the two messengers; the one who first arrived, returns with this.— I sent them immediately to the council, and their answer is inclosed.

Signed PACHE.

18 Jan. 1793.

“ The Provisionary Executive Council, has
 “ received, General, that which you wrote con-
 “ cerning the attempt on Zealand, with a copy
 “ of the letter from General Miranda. The
 “ Council after deliberating on its contents,
 “ have resolved to suspend for the present the
 “ intended expedition to Zealand, and request
 “ you will communicate this determination to
 “ General Miranda. The members of the Coun-
 “ cil desire, likewise, that General Miranda
 “ should wait for the Dutch Patriots who are
 “ preparing to go to Liege, and that the neces-
 “ sary

"sary measures be taken to ascertain the real
 "disposition and sentiments of the Zealanders,
 "and to compare their different accounts on the
 "subject. General Miranda, however, is not in
 "other respects, to employ the forces which
 "were collected for this expedition, and which
 "are out of the French territories."

You therefore see, my dear General, that we are extremely irresolute, both with regard to the enemies we are now fighting, and to that sort of war in which we are engaged. I see but one single advantage in what has been determined in this affair of Zealand, which is, that you have at present, an army of some thousands, more immediately connected with your own. It is time we should know the forces we have in the Low Countries. I received the state of the army which I commanded, and that of General d'Harville. On the 12th of January, it amounted to 50,000 infantry, and 5800 cavalry, including the garrisons of Brussels, Mecklin, and Mons.

Require of General Valence a separate state of his army, or of the Ardennes, which I suppose amounts to 15 or 16,000 men, of which there are at most only 3000 cavalry. Order a very exact state to be drawn of the northern army which

D

you

you command: encrease it with all the forces that are sent to you from France, and the garrisons of Tournay, Courtray, and other places not comprehended in the state of the 12th, which was sent to me by General Lanoue. Order them to be made out, and send them immediately to me, that I may confer and settle every thing with the Council and Committee of General Safety, upon the most permanent foundation.

I believe, if it be determined that we are to go to war with Holland and England, a false attack only should be made against Zealand—that we should take Maestricht, Venloo, Guel-dres, Emmerick, and falling back towards Nimeguen, and by the high grounds of Amersfort, turn Utrecht, reach the sluice of Muyden, which Marshal Luxembourg failed in, during the year 1762; we shall then, without difficulty, arrive at Amsterdam. In this campaign, which ought to be speedily opened, and which I have for a long time planned we are to consider the Dutch Patriots but in a secondary point of view, and to rely only on our own strength, and on the means of securing our conquests. Zealand falling therefore, as it were, of itself, Walcheren island, though fortified in such a manner as to be considered impregnable, becomes a poor retreat for the House of Orange, the states and administrations

ministrations of the country, because we might unite all the power of the Dutch Navy, with our own formidable artillery to attack and take it, when we shall have nothing else to do in that country. You must, however, not only listen to every thing which the Dutch Patriots have to say to you on the means of effecting the enterprise against Zealand, but also endeavour, by every possible means to make their various proposals probable. For this purpose you should have at this moment with you, a man who is well calculated for this sort of employment, a kind of *Buscon**, who has a brevet of Lieutenant Colonel, and whose name is ——; you are to entrust him with this mission, but with precaution, and without acquainting him with the real object. You are to pretend to know, through his means, the real disposition of the cities of Amsterdam, and Rotterdam. Recommend to him to go to Walcheren Island, to see whether any fortifications are making there, and to return by way of Ostend, after making himself acquainted with the situation and number of ships belonging to the little English Fleet; but take care First, to determine the number of days necessary for his journey. Secondly, not to give him any thing in writing. Thirdly, not to make him ac-

* A better sort of spy.

quainted with any of the Dutch Patriots, whose accounts are to be verified. Fourthly, not to speak to him of any plan relative to Zealand. Fifth, not to give him more money than is necessary for his journey, and for his return, promising, however, some reward, if his statement is very particular and exact.

With respect to Maestricht, I have sufficient information to hope for complete success there. I shall send you in a few days Lieutenant Colonel H—, he is a Saxon Officer, who served in Russia, and whom I have appointed on the staff of the army, as a recompence for the particular intelligence which he obtained for me by going to Maestricht. He appeared to me to be above acting the part of a spy, which he only did on this occasion to oblige me; he will bring you the most minute detail relative to that town, and you are to place your confidence in him.

I will not talk to you of the events of this country.—I endeavour to prepare every thing, as if I were to make the campaign; and yet it is very possible, that I may not, for nothing is determined on, and certainly I shall adhere to my own conditions, whatever may be the result. You have read my letter to the Convention; it was followed by four memorials, relative to which,

which, nothing has as yet been determined, and it appears to me that I shall meet with some difficulty in making them agree with my views. It is upon this condition, that depends either my accepting the command of the army, or my resignation. I hope that your second messenger who shall be immediately dispatched to you, will bring you final resolutions on this subject.

I am sorry that General Marassé gave leave to Major General Canolles to appear at the bar of the National Convention, in the name of the garrison of Antwerp; but if you had read a letter which he wrote to me on this occasion, you would have been more indulgent to this old man, respectable in every sense, and who might be of singular service to you, if you placed more confidence in him. With regard to the burning of your camp equipage in the Hospital at Antwerp, it cannot be imputed to him as a fault; for he must have thought that they were safe among the stores, where he gave orders that they should be placed; and a conflagration is a misfortune, which could not be foreseen. Therefore, whatever disappointment it may be to you, you ought not to consider him as responsible for the damage.

With

With regard to the papers you send me concerning the Committee of Provisions, I expected matters would so turn out, and lest they should be suppressed by the influence of the interested parties, I have transmitted them to the Executive Council.—I likewise send a copy of them to the Committee of General Defence.—I embrace you, my dear Miranda, with all my heart.

Signed

GENERAL DUMOURIER.

L E T T E R VI.

General MIRANDA to General DUMOURIER.

Liege, 23 Jan. 1793.

I RECEIVED last night, my dear General, your letter of the 19th. We have drawn out the three statements of the situation of the armies which you require, with all possible accuracy, to which is added, that of the garrisons of the army of the Ardennes.—By the inclosed account, as you will see, the total amount to be,

Northern

Northern army, with the Garrisons of

Antwerp and vicinity,	23,340
Augmentation,	10,761
Army of the Ardennes,	22,844
Garrisons of the Ardennes,	13,319
	Total
	70,264

In this statement the garrisons of Furnes, Nieuport, Ostend, Courtray, Tournay, Ath, and the former garrisons of Bruges are not included.

We have moreover made the necessary arrangements conformable to your instructions, and we wait your further orders to begin our operations.

I received the Dutch Commissioners, in consequence of the orders of the Executive Power, and your wishes and I informed you in my last letter of the result of our conference.

The Austrian Commissary for the exchange of prisoners of war, writes me a letter of *chicane* relative to the capitulation of Antwerp, which is completely answered by my annexed copy.

Signed

MIRANDA.

LETTER VII.

To General MIRANDA.

Paris, 23 Jan. 1793.

I INFORMED you, my dear Miranda, that I gave over all thoughts as well as you, of the project relative to Zealand; but it is still a stronger reason to push on, most vigorously, the attack of Maestricht, Venloo, and Nimeguen. I shall nevertheless, perhaps, give to Caock and Boudels, the small succours they desire, as they expect to succeed with 3 or 4000 men, which is all required from the Executive Council. In a few days, I will examine the whole matter on the spot. The catastrophe of the 21st, will probably make all the nations of Europe our enemies—learn what has been resolved on, in this respect, by the Executive Council. We are, as yet, uncertain what measures England will take, and whatever is done by that country, will determine our conduct relative to Holland. The Council at the desire of the English and Dutch, have fixed their attention on me, to go to England as extraordinary Ambassador, in order to make that nation give

give a categorical answer either for peace or war, in consequence of which, orders have been sent to our Ambassador, Chauvelin, to return. To-morrow a secret agent will be dispatched, well known to Mr. Pitt and Mr. Fox, to demand from both parties, that is, from the whole nation, a *safe-conduit* for me, and a certainty of being well received, whatever may be the success attending the object of my mission; as it is a *yes*, or a *no*, I am going to demand, as *Cato to Carthage*, this mission will not be longer than eight days.

While I am waiting for an answer, I intend setting off to-morrow night for Dunkirk, thence I shall go to Ostend, Nieuport, Bruges and Antwerp, at which places I shall be at farthest on the 30th. I intend sleeping at Antwerp, where I shall order my horses to be sent, and continue my journey to Ruremonde, Maseick, Tongres, and meet you at Liege. A person of confidence is sent to the Hague, in order to acquaint my Lord Aukland, and the Grand Pensionary Van-Spiegel, to meet and confer with me, *agreeable to their own request*, on the frontier between Antwerp and Breda, in order to commence a negociation. This short delay at Antwerp, will give me time to receive a courier from Le Brun, the Minister, with an answer

from London.. If this answer is categorical and friendly, as they still flatter themselves it will be, then I shall return to Paris, to receive my final instructions ; or I shall go, if the Executive Council think fit, from Antwerp, and embark at Calais. If, on the contrary, the answer of the British Cabinet be either peremptory or evasive, I will attack Maestricht eight days after ; and in order to cover the siege, will make a general movement, at the same time that you will surprise Venloo, where there is only one battalion in garrison. I have very particular information relative to Maestricht, which makes me hope for success. During my stay at Antwerp, I shall complete, by good will or by compulsion, the loan from the merchants, in order to have the first ready money necessary to begin my operations. During this short journey, mark what you have to do. Go to Louvain and St. Tron, and order the artillery to be ready, so that it may set out at farthest from the 10th to the 15th of February. Make likewise every necessary, every possible disposition for the troops, but without its having a too obvious appearance. The great point is to be beforehand with the Prussians at Wesel, and that they should not be soon apprized of our preparations.

I will

I will inform you from Antwerp what measures I shall have taken relative to provisions. However, you are to give immediate orders to the first Commissary and Comptroller of Provisions, to get ready at Tongres ovens for 3000 men. Make known my arrival, as a prelude to a slight inspection general of the quarters, by order of the Executive Council and the Committee of General Defence. Do not mention a syllable relative to *the negociation*; not that I should make a mystery of it, but that it might be kept secret until the moment of its final success or failure. This measure is grand and noble. If it succeeds, we lessen the number of our enemies; and we can carry on the war in the same manner as in the last campaign. If the negociation fails, we take the start of the English and Prussians. We will astonish them, by invading Holland. We will cause a great diversion, which saves the army of Custine; and we shall perhaps afterward obtain peace on easier terms; for that is the object to which we must direct our thoughts, for reasons which I shall make known to you. Do not come to Antwerp to meet me, because it would occasion a surmise different from that appearance of inspection, which I wish my journey should have. We shall give each other a meeting, at Tongres or Ruremonde; but if you have any thing very important to communicate, send

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me General Thowenot to Antwerp, and he shall return immediately. I will write to you more particularly from Antwerp ;—*en attendant*, I embrace you cordially.

Signed,
The Commander in Chief,
DUMOURIER.

LETTER VIII.

General MIRANDA to General DUMOURIER.

Liege, Jan. 28, 1793.

I RECEIVED your letter of the 23d of January; and Lieutenant Colonel —— set off yesterday to fulfil the commission which you ordered me to entrust to him :—he will be at Antwerp about the beginning of February, and make his report to you. The ovens are building at Tongres, according to your orders ; and every preparation pointed out by you is making. The enemies are encreasing their forces : more or less pass every day on the left side of the Rhine. I do not believe, as General Stingel, that their number amounts to 50,000 men ; but I can easily imagine that they do not exceed

exceed 25,000. General Lamorliere told me, that the Prussians have sent troops towards Meurs and Kaldekirchen. This movement may have for its object the taking possession of Venloo, or perhaps the march of the forces from Wesel towards Holland. I sent to Stingel a reinforcement of 5,000 men, with a train of artillery, and three officers of engineers, to fortify some of the posts. This measure has doubtless made him easy ; but it does not lessen my great anxiety relative to the advanced posts.

Signed

MIRANDA,

LETTER IX.

General DUMOURIER to General MIRANDA.

Antwerp, Feb. 5, 1793, Second Year of the French Republic.

I ABSOLUTELY stand in need, General, of General Thowenot : he must bring me the state of the cantonments of your army, of mine, of the army of General Valence, and of the body under the command of D'Harville. It is upon this foundation that I shall determine our general movement, the outlines of which are—

First,

First, You are to march with your army, with four twenty-four pounders, and two mortars, towards Venloo ; while I shall with mine, and part of General Valence's, invest Maestricht with the remainder of the heavy artillery, in order to hasten its capture. You will do the same at Venloo, where you cannot meet with any resistance, as there is no garrison.

My intention is to press Maestricht with unabated spirit ; and I have every reason to hope, that after throwing the third bomb-shell into the town, it will surrender,

Secondly, During this operation, which I hope may not be long, Valence will take a position upon the Roér, and collect his forces.

Thirdly, At the same time, General D'Harville must assemble his force near Namur, to be ready to join Valence, in case General Clairfait, reinforced by succours from Germany, and perhaps by a Prussian army, should be tempted to pass the Roér. If by chance Clairfait should think proper to come down the Rhine and join the Prussians in the neighbourhood of Wesel and Cleves, and afterwards march towards the provinces of Groningen and Zutphen, then D'Harville is to continue in the environs of Aix-la-Chapelle ;

Chapelle ; whilst Valence is to come down the Roér as far as Ruremonde.

I hope, General, that by being very expeditious in all our movements, we shall be masters of those two towns about the latter end of February. But we must not then think of relinquishing our enterprize ; for I consider Nimeguen, during the present state of the war in which we are engaged, as the key to Holland. If we are beforehand with the Prussians in taking this very essential post, we are certain to be in fifteen days masters of Amsterdam. *All this appears chimerical*, if the country were not very much disposed in our favour ; but every information which I have received on the subject, affords me the greatest hope of success.

Lieutenant Colonel F—— returns to you : his journey has been extremely useful to me ; and all his accounts exactly agree with those I have received from several other quarters. I am going to write to Lieutenant General O'Moran, in order to know the certain number of troops which are under his command. Possibly I may think it useful to have a small body near Antwerp, to penetrate between Breda and Bois-le-Duc, towards Gertruydenberg or Heusden : this small body, which I might give to Berneron,

will

will check all the garrisons, and prevent the reinforcement of those on the frontiers, which we mean to attack.

I shall give very clear instructions to all the Generals, my auxiliaries. I request of you only, at this moment, to reflect sufficiently on the outlines of this plan of the campaign, and to send your observations by General Thowenot, whom I beg you will dispatch to me immediately, for we have not a moment to lose.

The General in Chief,

Signed

DUMOURIER.

P. S. Send me Citizen Cantin, my Secretary, with Major General Thowenot.

L E T T E R X.

General DUMOURIER to General MIRANDA.

Antwerp, Feb. 8, Second Year of the French Republic.

IT is nine o'clock in the morning, and Thowenot is not yet arrived ; I am most anxiously expecting him with the detail of the

the movement of the forces. The taking of Venloo is of such importance, that I request you will instantly send off an express to Champmorin, that he may be master of it before the arrival of the Prussians. If that is not done, the campaign on our part is lost, and the defence of the Low Countries very much endangered. My only hope, my dear Miranda, is in the rapid operation of Venloo. Send instantly to Champmorin two mortars, if he has none. Possess Huenswerdt, then you can avail yourself of the Meuse for your artillery and forage. I am sending orders to Duval to join the army directly. If we do not surprize, if we do not astonish, if we are not before hand with the Dutch and English, we lose every thing in the spring, particularly this country, which will be ill-affected towards us, through our own fault; therefore let us do things incredible, I am bold enough to say, impossibilities.

The General in Chief,

Signed

DUMOURIER.

P. S. Annexed is a packet, which I request you to send immediately to Maestricht.

LETTER XI.

*General MIRANDA to Citizen PACHE, Minister
of War.*

Head Quarters, Liege, Feb. 7, 1793, Second Year
of the French Republic.

ALTHOUGH I have not as yet received, Citizen Minister, any official intelligence relative to the declaration of war by the French Republic against Holland, the public notoriety of the event leaves me no occasion to doubt of its certainty. I am to add to the account of the military dispositions which I had the honour to communicate to you yesterday, the taking of the fort of Stevenswerdt, and that of St. Michel, one on the right, and the other on the left side of the Meuse, belonging to the Dutch, as you will see by the annexed copy of the orders given for that purpose to Major General Champmorin, waiting for your further instructions.

I had forgotten to communicate to you the orders which I gave to the army on the third of February, with regard to the glorious death of Citizen

Citizen Pelletier, the illustrious martyr of liberty. I thought that, in following the example of the Legislative Body, and of the Executive Power, the army would only do its duty.

Signed

MIRANDA.

L E T T E R XII.]

General DUMOURIER to General MIRANDA.

Antwerp, Feb. 11, 1793, Second Year of the French Republic.

GENERAL Thowenot, my dear Miranda, will give you all the particulars of the bold enterprize which I projected, the execution of which will take place on the 18th or 19th at farthest. I send you Thowenot, that at the same period at farthest you may begin to bombard Maestricht. You must push on this attack ; for it is not either the proper season, nor is it suitable to our purpose, to begin a regular siege : every thing, therefore, depends on your expedition, in order to march directly against Nimeguen at the head of 25,000 effective men. You will entrust the remainder of your army to

the command of General Lanoue, if General Valence is not yet arrived. You will leave to this General Officer orders and instructions to protect Aix-la-Chapelle, and to defend the passage of the Roer.

I authorize you to take into pay all the Dutch, German and Swiss of the garrison of Maestricht who will be inclined to join you. You are to take in the town all the cloathing and arms that you may find there, even those belonging to the garrison, whom you are to dismiss, if a capitulation be granted. At the worst, you can buy their cloaths ; but you are not to let our troops want any while these gentry are well cloathed. In order to get rid of your prisoners, you must send them into France, particularly the Swiss and the Germans. You will leave General Leveneur in Maestricht with a garrison : it need not be a strong one, since General Lanoue can cover the town.

If we had time to act methodically, it would be necessary that you should take Grave after Maestricht ; but as Nimeguen is the key of the United Provinces on that side, we must prevent the arrival of the Prussians in those parts. As Grave is situated on a curve of the Meuse, and covered by Stevenswerdt and Venloo, where you must

must leave troops, it is better to push forward to Nimeguen.

When you have commenced your expedition, and I shall have begun my hazardous enterprize, you may no longer be enabled to receive any orders from me; for our communication will be entirely interrupted, until we can meet again in the rear of the country, by means of my marching against Utrecht, when the revolution will be completed at Rotterdam and Amsterdam, where I shall make no stay, in order to join you with expedition, and deliver you from the trouble of besieging towns, in consequence of the orders which I will make the *new Republic* give the different Commanders in Chief. I shall probably bring with me a reinforcement of Dutch troops. If I do not completely succeed, I shall at least endeavour to take Breda, and perhaps even Bergen-op-zoom, or Bois-le-Duc, in order at least to cover our left flank in the spring. But the more daring my plan of attack, the greater hopes I entertain of its success. If I had sufficient forces, and time, I would pursue a more methodical system; but in our present situation, we *must astonish and do acts* extremely hazardous.

I beg

I beg you will give General Thowenot the two maps of Germany, which are pasted on linen, and which you must have found in the small drawers of a bureau. Learn if Adjutant General de Pille and his four assistants, whom I ordered to leave Liege, have executed this order ; if not, make them instantly depart.

We are undertaking an enterprize as difficult as it is daring. It is on this occasion that we should say, *Conquer or die* : our warmest friendship shall level all obstacles : you are my faithful second, and I expect every thing from you. On this important occasion, I consider the enterprise as the only means of saving the Republic. Cause Petit-Jean, the Commissary, to whom I sent orders, to come away instantly : he must absolutely stay with me forty-eight hours ; for he alone can procure me the means of not experiencing any delay in my expedition. I have here a Commissary, a great novice, and very timid : and I am not acquainted with the resources of the country. Petit Jean shall return to you immediately. I imagine that in three or four days at farthest your artillery will be before Maestricht, and that you will begin to bombard immediately.

Take

Take care to spread the report that I stay here only for a few days, and that I am to meet you before Maestricht, or farther, if Maestricht be taken about the 20th : and that it may not occasion any murmurs, mention it in a public manner, that I am only staying here in order to complete a loan of 1,200,000 florins, and that I am certain of succeeding. I shall write to you again before my departure ; but once gone, no longer reckon on any news from me until our intended junction. Adieu ! I salute you cordially.

The General in Chief,

Signed

DUMOURIER.

P. S. Annexed is an order for Waggonmaster Payen. Make him set off immediately.

L E T T E R XIII.

General MIRANDA to General DUMOURIER.

Liege, Feb. 12, 1793.

THIS instant I receive your letter of the 11th of February, from Antwerp, and am waiting with the greatest impatience for the arrival of General Thowenot, in order to execute, if possible, your orders.

The

The four assistants to the Adjutant General set off yesterday for Antwerp, agreeably to your commands. With regard to Adjutant General de Pilles, he is at this moment somewhat indisposed ; and if you can let him be with me in the Northern army, he would be infinitely useful to me : I find him a man of integrity, in consequence of the enquiries which I particularly made concerning him, in order to verify what Thowenot told me relative to him ; and I can assure you, that I positively believe all that Thowenot thinks with regard to him is false ; and that the almost general complaint of the morose and jealous character of Thowenot has a certain foundation. Here is Stevenswerdt taken, and Venloo probably attacked at this moment, perhaps taken, as you will see by the detail of the movements of Champmorin, relative to which I send you the annexed copy, and of my dispatches yesterday to the Minister of War. I am employed in constructing a bridge at Viset, which I consider as very essential for our operations against Maelstricht.

The exchange of prisoners of war is going on at Mafeyick between the Austrian Commissaries and ours, with tolerable harmony, and without difficulty. They propose one or two articles more to be added to the cartel, which I submit to your decision.

Baron

Baron Senfft, *ci-devant* the Envoy of the King of Prussia to Liege, has been stopt on his journey from Maestricht to Utrecht : I think he is to be considered as a prisoner of war. But without determining any thing relative to him, I ordered him to be sent to Brussels, where he is to wait your orders and decision in this respect.

Signed

MIRANDA.

LETTER XIV.

General DUMOURIER to General MIRANDA.

Antwerp, Feb. 13, 1793, Second Year of the French Republic.

I SEND you, General, some of my proclamations. Order three or four thousand copies to be printed, and take every possible opportunity to disperse them among the Dutch, as I am now doing on my side. I receive this moment your letter of the 12th, which gives me great pleasure. I hope you will soon inform me of the taking of Venloo. I am persuaded likewise, that before the 17th you will be on your march, and that mortars have already fired on Maestricht. The Prince of Hesse, who com-

G

mands

mands there, is nothing of a military man : he will propose to you, perhaps, to evacuate the town, and to retire with his garrison ; for the plan of the Dutch was to form a small army until the arrival of the Prussians ; and the 6000 men of the garrison of Maestricht, if they were suffered to leave it, would serve to form this little army, or would reinforce the garrisons of Arnham and Nimeguen ; which is absolutely to be avoided, by intimidating the Governor, and making him personally responsible towards the inhabitants for the damages occasioned by the bombardment. If in the siege of Maestricht you appear to meet with resistance, leave it to be dispatched by my army and that of Valence, and march yourself to Nimeguen, taking half the mortars, and the cannon of twelve and sixteen pounders ; if, on the contrary, Maestricht surrenders, in consequence of a brisk attack and bombardment, as I hope it must, then you will be stronger for the attack on Nimeguen.

Upon summoning the town of Maestricht to surrender, do not forget, beside the Governor, to summon the magistrates, and to make them personally responsible for the damage occasioned by the bombardment. Inform them, and through the means of the magistrates, the inhabitants, that you only wage war against the partizans

tizans of the Stadholder, whom you will pursue with all possible rigour; but that you, as well as all of us, entertain no other sentiment for the Dutch nation than that of friendship; and that we only wish to take advantage of the Prussians, who would oppress them, as they have already done. This admonition and advice you will clothe in your own peculiarly animated style, and take great care to circulate copies by every possible means. I hear that the Brunswick troops, in the service of Holland, have no intention whatever to fight. Avail yourself of this information.

You may keep in your army Adjutant General de Pille, who could not agree with Thowenot. This last may be haughty and imperious; but he is too useful a man not to give him this little satisfaction, particularly in consequence of certain very serious charges he laid before me, and of which we will speak, when we meet.

I will write to General Moreton, that he may send Baron Senfft to Valenciennes, from whence Le Brun, the Minister, shall be made acquainted with his arrival, and determine his fate.

Courage, my friend, while we urge on with French impetuosity in this expedition; we can-

not fail of success ; and this brilliant *début* of the campaign will give us *arms, cloaths, provisions, ammunition, and money.*

The General in Chief of the Army in
Belgium,

Signed

DOUMOURIER.

L E T T E R XV.

The MINISTER OF WAR to General MIRANDA.

Paris, Feb. 14, Second Year of the French Republic.

I RECEIVED, Citizen, your letter of the 7th inst. to the Minister of War. The declaration of war by the French Republic against Holland and England should have been by this time officially known to you : I entirely approve, however, of the measures adopted by you in consequence of this determination, before you even received information of the event from the Ministers. You will keep possession of the Dutch forts of Stevenswerdt and St. Michel, which you ordered General Champinorin to take. General Dumourier is now at the head of his army, employed on an expedition against Holland : he has concerted with his Generals the plan

plan of the campaign, and consequently you ought to have received the necessary instructions to co-operate with and assist him.

I thank you for the communication of your letters written to Generals Leveneur, Stingel, and Champmorin; they contain very wise measures, which I cannot but applaud.

I equally approve of the order given by you respecting the death of Citizen Pelletier. Every good Frenchman should participate in the regret occasioned by the loss of this martyr of liberty; and you did well to afford a public testimony of it, by the general mourning which you ordered in the army.

The Minister of War,

Signed

BEURNONVILLE.

P. S. I this instant received your dispatches of the 11th, and am going to acquaint the Convention with the taking of Fort Stevenswerd's. This news will give them as much pleasure as it affords to me.

You may rely on the utmost activity on my part, to compensate for all the misfortunes which overwhelm us. I only require a little patience from

from my comrades, and every thing will go on well. I do not think there is any reason to compliment me on my nomination to the Ministry : I was better at the head of my army ; but a soldier should not have any will. However, I know the evils, and will be able at least to point them out.

LETTER XVI.

General MIRANDA to General BEURNONVILLE,

Liege, Feb. 4, 1793.

I RECEIVED this day, General, the news of the taking of the Dutch fort of St. Michel, upon the left bank of the Meuse, and opposite Venloo, of which our troops took possession without resistance, having made some Dutch soldiers who were before the fort, prisoners. An extraordinary inundation of the Meuse, for some days past, has prevented our becoming masters of the fortifications of Venloo, on the right bank of that river. The Prussians, taking advantage of these circumstances, have thrown themselves into the town in great numbers, assisted by the Dutch troops who guarded the fortifications, and supported by a body

body of infantry amounting, as I have been informed, from 8 to 10,000 men. We occupy the left side of the Meuse, a situation which favours all our operations against Holland, while a considerable body of Prussians occupy Prussian Gueldre, and are raising batteries on the right side of the Meuse. I do not doubt that this Prussian corps, which, as I am informed, amounts to 15,000 men, is destined to assist Holland, should our armies attempt to invade the United Provinces. If a revolution in favour of liberty breaks forth in Holland, it will facilitate our enterprize, and remove numberless difficulties, which we must otherwise experience from the Prussian army.

It is probable, that on the commencement of the siege or bombardment of Maestricht, the Austrian army, which is before us on the Roer, and amounts, as I am informed, to 40,000 men, will attempt to attack ours, stationed behind that river, to cover the attack on Maestricht, and endeavour to compel us to raise the siege. Our forces are far from being sufficient to keep possession of that extent of ground we now occupy, and to execute the plans we are about to enter upon. The Commander in Chief, General Dumourier, has doubtless apprized you of every particular. I have received his orders, and the whole

whole army is in motion, with confidence and alacrity. The enterprize appears astonishingly difficult; I therefore hope, that, if the success is not in every thing answerable to our wishes, and to the hopes you may have conceived of the expedition, we shall meet with that indulgence, which an ardent zeal for the service and glory of the country inspires to a free nation, who beholds her children eager to meet death in her defence.

Annexed is a copy of the report of General Champmorin on the taking of Fort St. Michel, with a note from Lieutenant General Bouchet, requesting you to send us, by return of the messenger, the plans and description of the fortifications of Maestricht, which we are much in want of at present; as also a copy of the letters of the *ci-devant* Marchioness de Favras, which contain some information.

The other paper annexed is a dispatch written in the Dutch language, with a translation, addressed to the magistrates of Maestricht, for the suppression of patriotic writings, which was intercepted at one of our posts near Maestricht.

Signed

MIRANDA.

LETTER

LETTER XVII.

General DUMOURIER to General MIRANDA.

Antwerp, Feb. 15, 1793, Second Year of the
French Republic.

COMMISSARY Petit-Jean, who is arrived this moment, informs me, my dear General, that 12 or 13,000 Prussians have made themselves masters of Venloo and the environs. This intelligence is of a very disagreeable nature ; for having been beforehand with us at Venloo, the Prussians will certainly either wait for us behind the canal Eugene, which runs from Venloo to Gueldre, march to Ruremonde, should they receive reinforcements, or spread themselves in Holland, in order to defeat my expedition. This last measure, should they embrace it, will be dangerous to them ; because, if Maestricht does not hold out long, as I hope it will not ; and if I succeed in penetrating into the heart of Holland, which I am ready to attempt, you marching on your side with spirit against them, at the head of 25 or 30,000 men, I will charge them in the rear, so that they will find themselves obliged to sustain a double fire.

H

Thus

Thus you will be enabled to judge how important it is, the attack on Maestricht be sudden and unexpected, and that you may be able on the first day to fix your mortar batteries.—I send you Lieutenant Colonel —, to whom Beurnonville has not been able to give any other rank than that of *Adjoint*, or assistant to the Adjutant Generals. He will acquaint you with the most secret particulars relative to Maestricht, and you will employ immediately all the means which he has practised to bring about the desertion of the Swiss and Germans. You will also form, under his command, an independent battalion of 800 or 1000 men of these deserters; you will fulfill, in order to attract and fix them among your troops, the promises which he was obliged to make them. We must not be particular as to the money they may cost, for in the end, the city of Maestricht will pay all expenses. I wish, and I venture even to hope, that this place will not cost you more than two or three days, and you will then be able instantly to march against the Prussians, stopping only 24 hours in Maestricht, and setting your columns immediately in motion. If you can at this moment detach some troops to reinforce General Champmolin, they will be very acceptable. I hope he is master of Fort St. Michel, from whence it will be very easy to bombard Venloo.

When

When you have reduced Maestricht, you can, in approaching Venloo, draw off the Garrison of Ruremonde, or leave there what is indispensably necessary, and follow the Prussians towards Nimeguen, while 5 or 6000 men are bombarding Grave in your rear. Consider how important it is, my dear friend, that you should harass the Prussians, to hinder them from marching against me, who have only 15000 men, and scarcely even that number—nevertheless we cannot retreat; my advanced guard sets off on the 18th, and I will follow it the next day. Continue to propagate the report of my arrival at the army, and be active in assembling your artillery, ammunition, and other carriages, that no delay may be suffered after the taking of Maestricht. On your readiness to co-operate with me, depends the fate, not only of Holland, but of the republic, of the liberty of nations; for if we do not succeed in our attempt in this instance, not being either liked by the Belgians, whom, on the contrary we have exasperated against us; nor having an army equal to act defensively, *we shall be driven from Belgium with the same precipitation with which we became masters of the Austrian Netherlands.* Disgrace and consternation must follow our tumultuous and disorderly retreat, and we shall afterwards be exposed to difficulty and danger in defending even our own country. Such

being the extremity to which we may be reduced, it is only by the most undaunted courage, and rapidity that we can save our country.

The Commander in Chief of the Army in Belgium.

Signed

DUMOURIER,

LETTER XVIII.

General DUMOURIER to General MIRANDA.

Antwerp, 16 Feb. Second year of the Republic.

THOWENOT has been obliged, General, to stop at Brussels and Louvain, and perhaps at Tirlemont : but this delay is only for the advantage of your expedition. I think as you do, and I supported what you wrote to the Minister of War, Beurnonville. I do not however think, that Clairfait has already 40,000 men. I know that General Beaulieu has been conveyed to Luxembourg dangerously ill, and that his army is in want of every thing. I know likewise that the army of Clairfait is as badly supplied as our own, and I do not think he can have it in his power, before three weeks, to attempt any thing against that body of the army which

which you will leave assembled near Aix-la-Chapelle, and in the cantonments of the Roér; leave this destination to General Valence, who will join the army immediately. I authorise you to take from my army as many as, with your own, may make from 25 to 30,000 men, and you will leave the remainder to General Valence, to cover Liege and Maestricht. You will likewise leave with him his Lieutenant General Leveneur, and appoint Lieutenant General Lapoue, Governor of Maestricht.

General Eustace * has written to me an absurd letter, in his usual style, complaining that you ordered him to be guarded by two gendarmes. I send him orders to go to Paris, and your gendarmes will return to the army, when they have seen him on his journey. This man has so little worth, that you should not be vexed on his account.

I believe this day, or to-morrow at farthest you will begin your march.—You received my letter yesterday by Lieutenant Colonel _____. I shall leave Antwerp to-morrow or after to-morrow, and shall not delay attempting the *grande avanture*.

The General in Chief of the Army in Belgium.

Signed

DUMOURIER.

* A native of the United States of America.

LETTER XIX.

General MIRANDA, Commander in Chief, to General LANOUE.

Liege, 16 Feb. 1793.

IT is necessary, General, for the service of the Republic, that you should immediately go to Aix-la-Chapelle, and take the command of all the troops of the Belgic army, which are cantoned between the Roér and La Meuse.

General Stingel, who now commands them, has received the necessary orders for the arrangement of the troops, and the measures to be taken, should the enemy make any attempt on the cantonments, or to pass the Roér. You will act in conformity to these orders, and, with the assistance of this respectable veteran, and Generals Miazinski and Dampierre, take all the precautions which your wisdom and military talents suggest, vigorously to defend the passage of the Roér; or to offer battle to the enemy, should they determine to cross that river, with an intention to throw succours into Maestricht, to attack our troops which invest it, or, in fine, to counteract any other attempt they may make.

When

When you have made your observations relative to the position of our troops, and those of the enemy; dispatch a courier immediately, that acting conjointly for the good of the service, I may be enabled to afford you such succours as our extensive operations will permit.

Signed

MIRANDA.

LETTER XX.

*General MIRANDA to General BEURNONVILLE,
Minister at War.*

Liege, Feb. 17, 1793.

I HAVE the honor to send you, General, the annexed copy of all the orders I have just issued to the three armies of Belgium, the North, and the Ardennes, which at present occupy the banks of the Roër, of the Meuse, as far as Fort St. Michel, and which form, at this moment, the investment of Maestricht. I hope they will merit your approbation.

I trust, in eight o ten days at farthest, Maestricht will have surrendered to our arms, from whence, by a rapid march, I propose to attack Nimeguen with a body of 25,000 men, and to
join

join or support General Dumourier, who by that time will have penetrated into Holland on another side, as has been agreed on between us; I foresee extreme difficulty in all these enterprises, but trust we shall surmount them, if either the weather, or chance, be favorable to us.

I send you annexed different papers: 1. An infamous printed paper, which the aristocrats in the environs attempted to circulate among the army, and which the officer to whom it was directed, immediately delivered to me. 2. The military *reconnoissance* made by the officers of the artillery, and the corps of engineers, for the bombardment of Maestricht. 3. Military proceedings against Major General Euftace, for disobedience, and other serious charges—the principal of which is *a correspondence with the Prince of Hesse, Governor of Maestricht*, which was sent to Paris, by General Dumourier. Some members of the National Convention can give information relative to the former conduct of this individual, whom they personally knew at Bordeaux, and of whom they complained in my presence, to Citizen Le Brun, Minister for foreign affairs.

Signed

MIRANDA.

LETTER

LETTER XXI.

The MINISTER AT WAR, to General MIRANDA.

Paris, Feb. 17, 1793, Second Year of the
French Republic.

I RECEIVED, General, your express on the 14th instant, and thank you for the particulars relative to the surrender of fort St. Michel:

I have acquainted the National Convention with the success of this enterprise, conducted by General Champmorin. I saw with concern, that the inundation of the Meuse, prevented the attack of Venloo, which is now garrisoned by the Prussians.—I cannot doubt but you have communicated this circumstance to General Dumourier, and that you will immediately receive instructions how to proceed, and connect your operations. The precautions you have taken to come at the knowledge of the enemy's movements, are very prudent.—I exhort you to continue them. I have seen the extracts of the letters which were intercepted.

I

Adjutant

Adjutant General St. Fief, my assistant in the concerns of the engineers and artillery, answers General Bouchet's enquiries concerning the plans and particulars relative to Maestricht ; General D'Arçon, who at this time should be with General Dumourier, has carried them all away ; and he is in possession of every information, which can throw light on the proper mode of attack. General Bouchet should be made acquainted with them.

The General—Minister of War.

Signed

BEURNONVILLE.

P. S. The moment I receive the plans of which General Bouchet stands in need, I will send them to you. Search is now making for them.

L E T T E R XXII.

General MIRANDA to General DUMOURIER.

Liege, Feb. 18, 1793.

YOU will see, General, by the annexed copy of my letter to the Minister of War, the condition of the forces, and the dispositions

sal of them to execute your orders.—You will thereby be enabled to judge of the impossibility to begin the bombardment in less than four or six days hence, and that consequently we cannot be at Nimeguen with a corps of 25,000 men before the 26th or 28th. This calculation appears to me sufficiently probable, and I believe I shall be able to execute it, if we are not impeded by any unforeseen accident.—You may rely, exclusive of this circumstance, on my fulfilling your orders; or, if you think it proper, send me some fresh instructions.—Colonel — arrived here yesterday, and I shall avail myself to the utmost of his connections with Maestricht.

Send me as soon as possible Commissary Petit-Jean, since those who are here, instead of serving and assisting, are only thwarting us: this principally occasions a delay in our future enterprize, and if not instantly remedied, will end in the discomfiture of the whole.

Signed

MIRANDA.

LETTER XXIII.

General DUMOURIER to General MIRANDA.

Antwerp, Feb. 19th. 1793, Second Year
of the Republic.

THE delays which I experience, General, give me great anxiety, and would still increase it, if your letter of the 18th. did not prove that you experience similar trials: This justifies the opinion I have always entertained, that too much precipitation was used in the declaration of war. They should have spun the negotiation, until I was ready to enter Holland, and lay siege to Maestricht. Make what expedition you can. Petit-Jean, the Commissary, who cannot leave this until the 21st, will join you directly;—he informs me that 7000 horses, which he required from the Northern department for your army, are on their way. We are waiting for the former Comptrollers of provisions and forage, who had returned back for the greater advantage of the armies; I therefore hope, that in this respect, we shall not want for any thing.

Thowenot will give you an account of the general plan which I have drawn for the levy of Belgian

Belgian troops, agreeable to the desire of the Minister of War. I will be after to-morrow before Breda, which I shall threaten to bombard, while vessels are collecting for my great enterprise. I hope the enemies will swallow the bait, and believe that I have a mind to sit down before this town, and afterwards attack Gertruydenberg. I am well pleased with the letter from Dusseldorf; for if it is true, which I have reason to think it is; Clairfayt will not be so soon ready. I can inform you beside, that except the cavalry and the Hungarian grenadiers, all the rest of his army is composed of new levies, which are not equal to ours. Take therefore Maestricht; for we cannot make sure of the course of the Meuse, but when in possession of that town. I know their consternation is very great, that the greater part of the troops in the garrison have very little inclination to fight: that the less method and form employed at this siege, the sooner you will succeed, because the bombardment will be disagreeable to the garrison, and frighten the inhabitants. The emigrants even who retired there, will add to their many embarrassments, and will hasten the surrender of the place. All your orders to the different Generals are clear and comprehensive. I shall send you an express the moment I leave

Antwerp,

Antwerp, and it is very probable you will hear little from me, before our intended junction.

The General in Chief of the Army of Belgium.

Signed

DUMOURIER,

P. S. Translated from the Spanish.

We are now deep in our enterprize, let us not look back ; it is not the time for prudence, or method ; every day lost is attended with the greatest danger.

As I have here two of your messengers, I keep one, whom I shall send away to-morrow.

L E T T E R XXIV.

General MIRANDA, Commander in Chief, to General LANOUÉ.

Liege, 19th Feb. 1793.

I HAVE received, General, your letter, written yesterday from Aix-la-Chapelle. I have ordered a state of the troops under your command to be drawn out, by General Thowenot at the head of the staff, which can be immediately

diately employed, and by which it appears that, with the bodies commanded by Generals La Marche and Neuilly, who are equally subordinate to you, and with five battalions which you are to receive immediately, two of them having begun their march this day, you will have an army of 30,000 effective men, without reckoning a body of 3500 commanded by General Lamorliere, which covers your left, and that of General Levener, consisting of 6000 men before Wyck, who are all in a condition to support you in case of necessity.

You artillery, according to the state given by General D'Aughest, commander in chief, is now 22 field pieces, beside what belongs to the battalions; and four engineers have been employed in fortifying the points which were judged proper for that purpose. Therefore, General, you must endeavour with this force to fulfil what is allotted to you, while we are completing matters on another side, which we are bound to execute, although with less comparative strength. If you think proper to send a copy of this order to General La Marche and Neuilly, or others, you may do so, that a necessary harmony may every where prevail.

I have

I have just given orders, that the military hospital shall not want money, and that there shall be plenty of forage.

Signed

MIRANDA.

LETTER XXV.

General MIRANDA to Citizen LA CROIX, Commissioner from the National Convention to the Army in Belgium.

Liege, Feb. 21, 1793.

THAT you may be enabled, Citizen, to know the particular motives which determined me to comply with the request of the Committee of Safety of the city of Liege, with regard to the English who are now here, I send you a copy of my orders to General Thow-enot, and a list of the English. The correspondence which most of them have kept up, either with the emigrants, or with the garrison of Maestricht, has rendered this precaution necessary, both with regard to themselves as well as for the commonwealth.

A List

A List of the English who are denounced by the Committee of Safety of the City of Liege.

B— GRAINGER, his wife and daughter. Must depart alone by the Diligence.
(Are not gone.)

MRS. TAYLOR, wife of an English Physician :—lives at the Convent of the English Nuns; *although she has a house at Hocbeporte.*

B— MRS. DALLMAN and her niece. Shall depart together on Friday.
(Are not gone.)

LADY CLIFFORD and her two daughters.

— **STANHOPE**, one of the national guards, and his wife. Many persons vouch for them.

B— SERLE, his wife and children. He is very intimate with the Dutch Envoy. Shall depart with his family on Thursday.

(Is gone for Brussells.)

K

LADY

LADY FITZGERALD, with
a niece, great acquaintances of the Pope's Nun-
cio; her brother and sister.

B— RICHARDS and his fa-
mily. Shall depart with his family.

(*Gone for Brussels.*)

MRS. RYAN.

B— BURRESS,—an Irish-wo-
man—in trade. Shall depart with her son by
the Diligence.

(*Is not gone.*)

Certified by YHLER, Major General,
Governor of the City of Liege, Se-
cond Year of the French Republic.

N. B. Those with the mark of letter *B* pre-
fixed to their names, have been particularly de-
nounced as suspicious persons.

LETTER

LETTER XXVI.

The MINISTER OF WAR to General MIRANDA.

Paris, Feb. 22, 1793, Second Year of the
French Republic.

I RECEIVED, General, your letter of the 17th inst. with the particular detail of the measures taken in consequence of General Dumourier's instructions for investing and bombarding Maestricht. Your plan of operations, which I have examined with much attention, appears to be combined and fraught with wisdom. I hope the harmony subsisting between the different Generals, and the valor of our fellow-soldiers, will ensure complete success. I anxiously wait for news from you, and am confident it will prove good.

I cannot at this instant answer the other subjects of your letter ; but will give orders to have it particularly examined. You may rely on my zeal to do every thing you desire, as far as it depends on me.

The Minister of War,

Signed

BEURNONVILLE.

K 2

LETTER

LETTER XXVII.

General DUMOURIER to General MIRANDA.

Groot-Klundert, Feb. 22, Second Year of the
French Republic.

I AM now in full march : my left division, consisting of nine battalions, blocks up Bergen-op-zoom : my advanced guard is on the Merck, and has seized some boats : I hope it will take Dort in its way, assisted by my rear-guard, and the right division. To-morrow I shall send Devaux * with a severe summons to the Governor and magistrates, a copy of which is annexed.

Devaux has imparted a conversation he has had with you. I hope you will take Maestricht, that we may shake hands between Nimeguen and Utrecht. If Nimeguen falls speedily, you must likewise take Amersfort, that the Germans may be completely shut out from the province of Utrecht.

My stay before Breda will be no longer than is necessary to get ready the transports, seventeen

* His Adjutant General, since guillotined at Paris, in the 27th year of his age.—TRANSLATOR.

of whom have already fallen into our hands. If Breda surrenders, I will take artillery of every calibre, which will greatly facilitate my operations in Holland, where I shall find all the pontoons of the republic. You will easily judge that, having sufficient business on my hands, I have only time to wish you well.

The General in Chief of the armies
in Belgium,

Signed

DUMOURIER.

L E T T E R XXVIII.

General MIRANDA to General DUMOURIER.

Hochten, Feb. 25, 1793.

I INCLOSE you a copy, General, of my dispatches to the Minister at War : you will see what I have done in consequence of your orders. We shall see if the confusion in Maestricht, now on fire in five places, will induce the Governor and magistrates to surrender ; if not, I propose leaving this place in four or five days, and will meet you towards Grave or Nimeguen : it is impossible to do it sooner, as I have

have not yet seen Commissary Petit-Jean, and can have no dependance on the subalterns, since my army has been left without a principal Commissary. We now find ourselves almost at a stand, by the disjointed condition of the Administrators, and a want of provisions, the necessary consequence. However, Commissary Petit-Jean having promised to come this day, I shall settle the business with him; and you may rely, that not a moment shall be lost in the execution of your orders.

Signed

MIRANDA.

LETTER XXIX.

*General MIRANDA to General BEURNONVILLE,
Minister of War.*

Hochten, Feb. 25, 1793.

MAESTRICHT having been invested, according to my orders, by a body of 12,000 men, on the right bank of the river, we began our works by raising the necessary batteries to bombard the town. Every thing was happily completed on the 23d, on the heights of Cauwenbergh, at 400 toises from the covered way,

way, and only with the loss of three men, notwithstanding a constant fire from the besieged.

Our batteries being ready to play yesterday at noon, I sent the annexed summons to the Commander in Chief, and to the magistrates of Maestricht. The answer of the Prince of Hesse, the Governor (of which you have a copy), was a refusal—sending me a verbal message by Colonel Arnaudin, that he thought summoning him to surrender the town a surprising matter, as he did not know that the Dutch nation had declared war against France; and that if I would give him permission, he would dispatch an express to their High Mightinesses, to require instructions on this head.

Our fire began in the night, supported by another battery of mortars, raised before Wick, and soon after the town was seen on fire. The enemy extinguished it ; but this morning, at ten, it broke forth with greater fury, and Maestricht is at this instant in flames.

The garrison have made two *forties*, each of about two hundred men ; one, on the side of Wick, the other by St. Peter's gate : our troops easily repulsed them with loss, and we have not lost a man.

I am

I am very desirous to put an end to this siege, and execute matters of greater importance, according to the orders of General Dumourier, communicated to you in a former dispatch; but I ought not to conceal from you, that the want of a principal Commissary with my army, makes it impossible for me to execute all within the limited time, which may be productive of the most fatal consequences to the interest of the Republic.

Signed

MIRANDA.

L E T T E R XXX.

General DUMOURIER to General MIRANDA.

Sevenbergen, Feb. 26, 1793, Second Year of the French Republic.

I AM persuaded, my dear General, that your first messenger will bring me the news of the surrender of Maestricht: I calculate, that as it was on fire in five places on the 25th, you continued it without interruption, and that the citizens will at length be wearied with such useless resistance, and perhaps give law to the Governor. Beside, the news of the taking of

of Breda will spread consternation among them. General Berneron took last night the town of Klundert : to-morrow they will attack Williamstadt ; and the day following Gertruydenberg ; and, in the mean time, my batteries will be placed along the coast, which I have completely reconnoitred, and have the greatest hopes of success. I have for the passage twenty-one covered boats, making near 800 tons, and five or six sloops well calculated for boarding. The artillery of Breda and of Klundert will serve for my batteries, and for keeping up a cross fire during the passage of the advanced guard ; by these means a dozen of armed vessels will be kept at a distance, and I hope will do no great mischief. It is even possible I may seize some to accompany me to Rotterdam.

You will imagine that the artillery of Breda is very considerable ; that of Klundert affords me 1500 good fusils, ten pieces of cannon, out of fifty which I found there ; more than 2000 ten-inch bombs, 18,000 weight of gunpowder, and a tolerable collection of ducats from the worthy inhabitants, as well as by the seizure of what belongs to the Prince of Orange. I have beside from that place 1000 sacks of oats and corn, with forage. I hope my passage will be made before the 5th of March ; and it is very

L

probable

probable that I may then travel along without fighting. Avail yourself of the consternation which all this good news will spread on your side. Extend your arms (*allongez les bras*) as much as you possibly can, that we may join at Nimeguen, and there *dance the Carmagnole together.*

I wrote in the most pressing manner to Beurnonville on the absolute necessity of sending to you immediately Commissary Malus; for Petit-Jean is necessary in Holland, in order to take advantage of the supplies of that country for the war in the Low Countries. I have enjoined General Thowenot to expedite the embodying from 25 to 30 battalions of Belgians, and every Commander, General Officer, or other, is commissioned to assist in this business, each in his respective *arrondissement*. I therefore hope that, before the month of May, we shall have at least 25,000 Belgian infantry to join our army. Our volunteers will return in thousands * when they hear of our success; and I hope that in this corner we shall be able to collect 150,000 men, who will enable me to play some *monkey tricks* (*faire quelques singeries*) with the despots who at-

* Very near 60,000 quitted their colours, having agreed only to serve during the preceding summer.—TRANSLATOR.

tack us. Adieu! my dear comrade—keep up a good fire—drink dry—take care of yourself, and be in good spirits.

The General in Chief of the Army in
Belgium,

Signed

DUMOURIER.

LETTER XXXI.

General MIRANDA to General DUMOURIER.

Hochten, Feb. 27, 1793.

DEAR GENERAL,

SINCE my last letter we have done great damage to the town, notwithstanding a very brisk fire on the part of the besieged, which has done us but little hurt. I avail myself of the favourable opportunity of the good news you communicated, to write to the Governor of Maestricht, a copy of which, his and the magistrates answers, are annexed. This time they did not allow Colonel Arnaudin to go into the town, either that he should not witness the damage done, or for fear that his admission might occasion the inhabitants to get together, of which the patriots would take advantage. But the conversation which he held with an old

L 2

Brunswick

Brunswick officer on guard at the gate, induced him to believe the town was in the greatest distress; and from thence I infer, that by continuing the bombardment, and even throwing in some red-hot balls, Maestricht will surrender to the forces of France in ten days. I will leave this business to General Valence and his army, and form a junction with you.

The General came here to see me, when I made him acquainted with all your plans: he appeared disposed to contribute to the utmost of his power in every thing; he has since written to me from Liege, and renewed his good intentions. General Thowenot and Commissary Petit-Jean came here yesterday, when we settled our respective plans. I agreed with Thowenot, that a body of 10,000 men shall occupy the posts which I leave before Maestricht, while my apparently insensible movement will begin to-morrow, and proceed towards Kerzel and Grave, with a body of from 20 to 23,000 men, where we shall remain from the 4th to the 6th of next month. I will write to you daily. The intelligence I received from Champmorin, of which I send you a copy, determines me, if the roads, which I have ordered to be reconnoitred, are in a good condition, to move forward by the left

left of the Meuse : this General's division naturally forming my advanced guard, I shall sooner reach Grave and Nimeguen. But in this situation it would be imprudent not to leave 4 or 5000 men in the rear towards Ruremonde, to support General Valence on the Roer, and to continue the blockade of Maestricht. I propose that the force under Lamorliere shall remain below Ruremonde, and have placed under his command the army of the Ardennes, that he may be enabled to dispatch those on the right side of the Meuse. Lamorliere's * situation, by this arrangement, will be much improved. At present we have nothing to fear from Beaulieu.

You will see by the copy of the dispatches received yesterday from General D'Harville, that he has stretched towards Luxembourg, after dislodging the enemy from the small town of Laroche, an important point, which will enable him to discover the motions of the enemy from the heights of Houstaife and Laroche : I have communicated it to the Minister, and sent all the dispatches to Valence, with whom he is in future to correspond.

Colonel —— appears to be incapable of executing what he promised you : he has re-

* Since beheaded.

quested

quested to be employed at Rekem, that he may continue his different projects.

Signed

MIRANDA.

SUMMONS

TO THE
MAGISTRATES AND GOVERNOR
OF
MAESTRICHT.

LIBERTY—EQUALITY.

In the name of the French Republic, Lieutenant General Francis Miranda, commanding the Army of the French Republic, before Maestricht,

To the Magistrates of the free People of the City of Maestricht,

“ The French Nation having been compelled
“ to declare war against the Stadholder and his
“ partizans, is desirous to break the bondage of
“ the Batavians. We come into your country
“ as friends and brethren;—therefore it is not
“ against, but for you, that we shall wage war.

“ You

“ Your city is invested, and if compelled by
 “ an obstinate refusal to comply, I must continue
 “ to besiege it. The garrison and partizans of
 “ the Stadtholder cannot hope to defend it
 “ with success. I therefore summon it to sur-
 “ render.

“ Your duty, as representatives of the peo-
 “ ple, calls upon you to protect them against
 “ the disasters and calamities of useless resis-
 “ tance. I require you, in the name of huma-
 “ nity, and for your personal preservation, to pre-
 “ vail on, or to oblige the governor and officers
 “ to deliver up the town without delay, to the
 “ arms of the French Republic.

“ I declare to you, magistrates of the people,
 “ that if unhappily you compel me to fire on
 “ the town, it is you, who shall be made re-
 “ sponsible for the irreparable misfortunes,
 “ which your weakness, or your connivance
 “ with our enemies, may bring on your coun-
 “ try;—and your capital punishment, shall serve
 “ as an example to the satellites of despotism,
 “ and wipe away the national injury.

“ The Friend of the People.

“ F. MIRANDA.”

P. S.

“ P. S. The annexed declaration of the Batavian Committee, in reminding you of your duty will make you, I doubt not, comply with my demand.”

Head quarters, Hockten Feb. 24, Second Year of the French Republic. 4 o'clock P. M.

IN THE NAME OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC.

Lieutenant General Francis Miranda, Commander in Chief of the Army of the French Republic, before Maestricht,

“ SUMMONS the military Commander of the Dutch troops in Maestricht, to surrender in three hours, and deliver up the town to the arms of the French Republic, that the inhabitants may be saved from the horrors of a bombardment and a siege, and the town from flames and total destruction.

“ The General declares to the Governor, that if he is so imprudent, as to hazard a resistance, as useless as it is rash; if he prevents the annexed letter to the magistrates of Maestricht, from being delivered to them; and if he intercepts their answer, his criminal temerity shall be rigorously punished, and the General of the Republic necessitated to put to the sword all the officers of the garrison.

“ The

“ The Batavian citizens and soldiers, who
 “ reluctantly fight against the friends of liberty
 “ and equality, will be admitted to the fraternity
 “ and protection of the French nation, which,
 “ having been compelled to declare war against
 “ the Stadholder and his partizans, anxiously
 “ avails itself of the favourable opportunity
 “ which these usurpers afford them, to re-esta-
 “ blish the national sovereignty, the sacred and
 “ unalienable rights of the people.

“ F. MIRANDA.”

“ The annexed declaration made by the Ba-
 “ tavian Committee, to the troops of the Re-
 “ public of the United Provinces, in remind-
 “ ing them of their duty, should be sufficient to
 “ make them comply with my summons.”

Head quarters, Hochtien, 24 Feb. 1793. Second Year of the
 French Republic.—4 o'clock, P. M.

L E T T E R XXXII.

Hochtien, Feb. 27, 1793

Since the last news, General, which I had the honour to communicate to you on the 25th instant, the bombardment has continued with success, having reduced the town, by repeated fires, to the greatest distress.

M

Having

Having received this morning the official intelligence of the surrender of Breda, I availed myself of this occasion to renew to the Governor and magistrates my declaration, and my repugnance to use such rigorous measures against the inhabitants, whom we wished to consider as friends and brethren. I wrote a letter (annexed is a copy), inviting them to put the town under the safeguard and protection of the armies of France.

The officer charged with the message was not admitted into the town, probably to prevent his remarking the ravages occasioned by the bombardment; with which, however, the officer on guard at the advanced post made him sufficiently acquainted. The Governor and magistrates sent an evasive answer, a copy of which I send you.

We are preparing some batteries, which, in addition to the bombs, will doubtless reduce the town to the indispensable necessity of surrendering in a few days, should our successes in Holland continue. The siege will be carried on by a body of 10,000 troops of the Belgian army, who will occupy the posts before Maestricht, now filled by those under my command; while my army, the advanced guard of which is now

on

on the left side of the Meuse, beyond Venloo, is directing its march towards Grave, to second the operations of General Dumourier in Holland, as it was agreed on between us.

General D'Harville has officially communicated the capture of the post of Laroche, occupied by the Austrians on the old road from Luxembourg to Namur. At my desire, he drove them from thence, and without any loss.

L E T T E R XXXIII.

General MIRANDA to the GOVERNOR of Maestricht.

Hochten, Feb. 27, 1793.

HAVING waited two days for the promised answer of the magistrates of the town of Maestricht, I beg you to consider, and to inform them, that if they persist in refusing a satisfactory answer to the equitable and fraternal proposals made to them by the French Republic, we will use the last resource to complete the absolute destruction of the city.

I announce to you, that a French army, commanded by General Dumourier, is already in

M 2 possession

possession of Breda, and two other fortresses, and that at this moment it has penetrated into the heart of Holland.

These circumstances should point out to you the inutility of a superfluous resistance, which is alone calculated to injure the inhabitants, whom we wish to consider as brothers, and who perhaps are but the innocent victims of private interest,

The Commander in Chief,

Signed

MIRANDA.

L E T T E R XXXIV.

General MIRANDA to General LEVENEUR,

Hochten, Feb. 28, 1793.

I REQUEST you, General, to send to St. Tron or Liege for four twelve pounders, and put them behind a good *épaulement*, that you may throw some red-hot balls *en ricochet* against Wick, while we are doing the same thing on this side with fifteen pounders against Maestricht. This last expedition, added to the ha-
voock

vock made by the bombardment and conflagration of the town, will compel it to surrenders perhaps in a very few days ; it is all that we can do at this season of the year, with the means that are left us, and the orders I have received : I repeat it again, it is not our intention to carry on a regular siege, but merely to bombard the town.

Two officers, who came here this morning in your name, assured me, that some servants belonging to the emigrants left Maestricht by the fortifications of Wick, and were received by your division. I recommend to you the greatest circumspection in this respect, since the laws against emigrants are so very severe ; and that those persons, acting probably as spies, and in the pay of our enemies, may occasion most serious evils, ultimately fatal to the Republic, which we serve in the strictest principle. Another officer of your Staff arrived afterwards, and began to dictate to us, saying, that all we had hitherto done wore only the appearance of a siege, &c. You must be sensible of the impropriety of such behaviour, which I would neither approve of nor hear with patience. Endeavour to execute your orders literally, and agreeable to the intentions of our Commander in Chief, General Dumourier, and not according to that kind

kind of comment which this Officer on your Staff appears to exhibit, as it were, in your name.

If, nevertheless, there is any thing in our park of artillery which may be of use to you for the new battery of twelve pounders, you have only to apply to the General of Artillery D'Hausgest, who will instantly send it you.

L E T T E R XXXV.

The MINISTER OF WAR to General MIRANDA.

Paris, March 2, 1793, Second Year of the French Republic.

WITH your letter of the 27th ult. I received, General, the continuation of the attack of Maestricht. I am not astonished at the resistance of this town : 5 or 6000 emigrants, at the head of which is D'Autichamp, and who on every side see nothing less than certain death, may hinder the inhabitants from surrendering, when perhaps they would be desirous to do so. You must triumph over this resistance; constancy, and, may I add, the obstinacy to conquer in a General born a Spaniard, ought to bear down every thing. I rely, therefore, on that

that spirit and energy with which you will continue to press forward this most important attack. An uninterrupted fire should at length force this place to surrender ; and you must even burn its walls, if it obstinately persists. I approve of the measures for the march of your army against Grave, to second the operations of General Dumourier, leaving 10,000 men of the Belgic army to continue the investment of Maestricht.

I saw with pleasure that the position of our advanced guard beyond Venloo was as grand a measure as could be wished for ; and I must do justice to Champaorin by declaring, that his movements are excellent, and tend to keep the Prussians in awe. It is good news to have driven the Austrians from the post of Laroche : the activity of the troops who carried it leaves us nothing to wish for : every where we see what the ardour of the French soldiers is capable of performing, and it inspires the most happy omens of success in the ensuing campaign.

Signed

BEURNONVILLE.

LETTER

LETTER XXXVI.

DUPLICATE.

*General VALENCE to General DUMOURIER.*Liege, March 2, 1793, Second Year of the
French Republic.

OUR dream in Holland, my dear General, is over: what I foresaw is come to pass: the enemy has attacked Lanoue in his cantonments on the right and left: he then drew out his army before Aix-la-Chapelle, but was routed. I had the first intelligence of this attack yesterday at eleven at night; and I heard this morning at five that he abandons Aix, and retreats to Herve.

In consequence of this disagreeable intelligence, I think it will be necessary to hold out until Miranda determines to offer battle, by passing the Meuse, or to raise the siege of Maestricht, if he is averse to cross the river. Thowenot and I think, that while Miranda takes this step, Levener should fall back on us, and destroy the bridge of Viset; Miranda will then take a position to hinder the enemy from passing by

by Maestricht. Providence, who watches over the destiny of France, has ordered, General, that you are not as yet embarked—fly to us : I declare, that if you do not come, I am unable to command such forces, in such a position : remember that I informed the Minister of it, on his desiring me to replace you, when you first left your army. It is evident, that the expedition to Holland cannot take place, after being obliged to raise the siege of Maestricht. At any rate, you may be here in 24 or 30 hours—fly hither : I repeat it, you will be time enough to determine what measures to take. I have not received any intelligence of what passes on the left of our cantonments, where Champmorin is, &c.—Fly hither. Throw some troops into Mechlin, and at your arrival, you will have it in your power to determine what you will do with the army that has taken Breda.

The General in Chief,

Signed

C. VALENCE.

P. S. Although you may wish pursue your project relative to Holland, you must change the plan of the campaign—you alone can do it—minutes are ages!—You alone, the prime mover of the army, can determine a movement, which puts either Maestricht or our retreat to the hazard of a battle.

N LETTER

LETTER XXXVII.

General MIRANDA to General VALENCE.

Hochten, March 2. 1793.

MY DEAR GENERAL,

IN our present situation, the advanced posts driven back, and all your forces between the Roér and Meuse not having been able to prevent the enemy from entering Maestricht by the bridge of Wick, the only resolution we can come to is, to make Levener repass by Viset, where I will join him with the forces that invest Maestricht; then taking a position between Viset and Tongres, protect the retreat of my artillery, and endeavour to keep the enemy at bay, until your forces having formed a junction with mine, we shall be in a condition to attack and rout them. The troops under Champmorin and Lamorliere will check the Prussians on the left side of the Meuse, and facilitate any movement General Dumourier thinks proper to make, when he is made acquainted with our present situation. Tardy, an officer of engineers, having assured me, that all the Generals declare the enemies' forces amount to 30,000 men at least, I cannot, with a body of 10 or

or 12,000 at most, abandon the artillery, and march against them; while a garrison of 7000 men might perhaps attack me in the rear. I give my orders accordingly, and request you will communicate to me your different arrangements, that we may act in unison.

LETTER XXXVIII.

General MIRANDA to General VALENCE.

Tongres, 10 o'Clock, March 3, 1793.

I AM but just arrived, dear General, and your letter of this morning is this instant presented to me. I am at Tongres, with a body of 6000 men, and have given orders to Leveneur, with an equal number, to keep up the communication between Viset and Liege, that the enemy should not penetrate either on one side or the other. With respect to other arrangements, I am about to depart with General Bouchet for Liege, where we may confer with you, and take such definitive measures as may intimidate the enemy, and enable us to act offensively.

N 2

My

My retreat was effected without molestation, and the artillery is arrived at Tongres, from whence I shall send it by way of Liege towards Louvain. Do not entertain any apprehensions relative to the retreat of Lamorliere and Champmorin : I am almost certain they will easily effect it by Diest and St. Tron, and join us much sooner than by the road of Maseyck. Farewell till noon.

Signed

MIRANDA.

LETTER XXXIX.

General DUMOURIER to General MIRANDA.

Maseyck, March 3, 1793, Second Year of the French Republic.

IT was necessary for me to see your letter *, my dear General, to lessen my apprehensions respecting the check General Lanoue met with near Aix-la-Chapelle. The letter Valence wrote gave me great uneasiness, without affording me an opportunity of judging :

* The first part of Miranda's Letter to the Minister of War, written from Liege, March 4, is the copy of that which Dumourier refers to : it was dated the 2d.

he

he entered into no particulars : your account is infinitely more explicit, and more encouraging. I cannot better answer it, than by sending you a copy of mine to Valence. You will see that our opinions are the same. Defend the Meuse with vigour ; and if the enemy attempt to pass it, face them. Such a spirited measure will destroy the bad impression created by the panic of our advanced guard. Keep this position fifteen days; about that time our army in Belgium will receive prodigious reinforcements, and things will take another turn. Within that period, I shall be master of half Holland, or join you ; but I cannot for five or six days leave an army which is performing wonders, and, as it were, by a kind of magic, because I am at their head. While I am writing, Williamstadt is in flames, and will probably be taken this evening. Berneron conducts the siege. D'Arçon * has taken all the external forts of Gertruydenberg, and will bombard it this night. I am covering Moerdyck with batteries, which will be ready after tomorrow. Thirty-four transports are coming down the canal of Klundert, protected by these batteries, to convey my army to the opposite

* The famous French engineer employed by the Spaniards at the siege of Gibraltar, who attempted to construct boats bomb-proof, in which he failed.—TRANSLATOR.

shore,

shore, where I shall not meet with the least resistance as far as Amsterdam.

A revolution in Holland is linked with this expedition ; if I succeed, I shall free you from enemies, who will march against me, but whom I will easily fight in a country intersected by canals ; where I shall find *money, cloathing, ammunition, provisions in abundance, and 40 or 50,000 men animated with the most ardent republicanism*. If I renounce this prodigious advantage, I shall not be able to save Belgium in the spring ; but if I succeed, by taking the enemy in flank and rear, you will all be saved. The Dutch troops, who fight with reluctance against us, will be glad to have me for their commander, after having compelled the States General to order them to join my standard. Every thing depends on the surrender of Williamstadt and Gertruydenberg : if taken, I pass the Moerdyck and secure my retreat ; if otherwise, I shall move with my army, reinforced by that under General Deflers, to whatever part is chiefly threatened by the Prussians. Say to the troops that my absence is for their advantage ; that I intend to charge the enemy in the rear, while they attack them vigorously in front. Inspire the other Generals with a portion of your energy ; calm those whose imaginations appear to be too ardent ; in short,

be

be my substitute. Nothing is as yet lost; but all would soon be so, were I to abandon my prey, in case Williamstadt and Gertruydenberg should fall.

The Commander in Chief,

Signed

DUMOURIER.

LETTER XL.

Copy of General DUMOURIER's Letter to General VALENCE.

Moerdyck, March 3, 1793, Second Year of the French Republic.

THIERY brings me, my dear Valence, your duplicate. I am far from considering the *Holland dream* as over, however ill-timed I may think the expression. The enemy have not more than from 20 to 25,000 men, who have surprised the cantonments of your advanced guard, and you already conclude that all is lost, and that you are confirmed in the indifferent opinion you have always held of our cantonments. Had these cantonments been vigilantly supported, and, as it was necessary, the troops judiciously stationed (since this advanced guard, occasionally

occasionally reinforced and more compact, was become an army of observation covering a siege) we should not have experienced the present disaster.

As I have already informed you I am in hourly expectation of the final issue of the siege of Williamstadt and Gertruydenberg ; and I certainly do not intend to discourage and leave a victorious army, flushed with success—to do what ?—*But the siege of Maestricht (they say) is over, and Aix-la-Chapelle evacuated.*—What then? Unanimity, vigor, and determination are only wanting, still to defend the Meuse, and cover Liege by the position of Herve. General Thouvenot, who has assisted in all my movements, and planned my encampments, is equal to perfect a system of defence for at least fifteen days; in that time matters will have taken another turn. Should the enemy attempt to pass by Maestricht, Miranda, who commands at Tongres, when joined by you, may easily fall on and pursue them to the gates of the town.

The post of Herve, now considerably reinforced, may be defended for a length of time against even a superior enemy, as I observe, by Levener's letter, that he has fallen back on Henry Chapelle. I presume that all his artillery

lery is safe, as well as the left of the advanced guard. This check should serve as a lesson ; but unfortunate would it be indeed if the Generals of the Republic should suffer themselves to be dismayed so far by it, as to render them incapable of defending the Meuse against as yet an inferior army. I hope they have recovered from their first surprise, and that your next messenger will bring me more encouraging accounts. You must be sensible of my anxiety in the present posture of affairs. I imagine that you will draw from D'Harville's army, or from France, any number of men you may have occasion for. I have requested Beutnonville to send you as many as can be spared. Deflers assembles before Antwerp a body of from 6 to 7000 men, which may be of great service, as well as the 15,000 under my command, whenever it may be necessary to form a junction. Courage, my dear Valence, this is but a slight check which you can easily repair ; it may contribute to afford us better hopes, if we take care to collect our forces more *a propos.*

The Commander in Chief,

Signed

DUMOURIER.

An exact Copy.

Signed DUMOURIER.

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LETTER

LETTER XLI.

General DUMOURIER to General MIRANDA.

Moerdyck, March 4, 1793, Second Year
of the French Republic.

BRAVE Republican—my brother—my friend, forget your cares. Proclaim to your army, and celebrate the capture of Gertruydenberg, which surrendered this evening, at half past four, by capitulation. I hope the armies in Belgium will recover their ardour, and pride themselves with a noble emulation. Gertruydenberg, covered with inundations, defended by numerous forts and formidable artillery, with a garrison of Swiss, withstood only 36 hours the impetuosity of the French, and the great talents of General D'Arçon. Gertruydenberg is the key of Holland, on whatever side I wish to attack it.

You are very sensible, my friend, that I am less disposed than ever to relinquish a plan that gives me *money, ammunition, provisions, and allies*; a plan, in short, which at the same time saves Belgium and France. The consequence will probably be, that the Prussians will abandon the *Austrians*.

Austrians and fly to the Hague and Amsterdam, where I shall arrive before them. I will fight at the head of the same Dutch against whom I now wage war. You will march back towards Grave, and take it; then attack Nimeguen, where we will join and shake hands. In the mean time, Valence having only to cope with the Austrians, over whom he will have a decided superiority, and receiving succours from every quarter, will be enabled to keep them in awe, until your return to take them in flank, by Cleves and Juliers.

There are two ways by which the Prussians may endeavour to check my victorious arms: the first, to force the passage of the Meuse by Ruremonde or Venloo, with a view to cut off the communication with Antwerp. I have taken care to prevent this design, by assembling between Bergen-op-zoom and Breda, a body of troops, under the command of General Deflers, who before the 10th will have between 5 and 6000 men; these will be increased to 15 or 18,000, reinforcements having been sent by the Minister of War. Should the Prussians determine on this step, you are to support Champmorin and Lamorliere, and defend the passage of the Meuse: in case they shall have passed it before you, join Champmorin, Lamorliere, and

Q.2

Deflers,

Deflers, when you will fight them with great advantage. I doubt whether they are strong enough to adopt this first plan.

Secondly. The Prussians may march straight by Nimeguen, and press rapidly for Amsterdam : if they succeed in this, send Deflers to reinforce me by the same road I may have taken, while you besiege Grave, and afterwards Nimeguen ; if they do not adopt either of these measures, and if they remain united to the Austrian army, with an intention to penetrate into Belgium ; then, in conjunction with Valence, you will keep them employed on the Meuse ; and if they are hardy enough to pass it before they receive reinforcements, you can fight them advantageously. At all events, your situation is not dangerous ; but as it is necessary to restore courage to the army, perhaps even to the Generals (Thowenot and you excepted). I send you an Address to the Army, which I request you will proclaim, and order to be printed. Williamstadt defends itself gallantly ; but I believe the surrender of Gertruydenberg will dishearten the garrison. Our artillery is considerably increased by the capture ; and I am fortunate enough to find in every place I go to, a sufficient quantity of ordnance to take the next town. Courage, I say,

my

my dear Peruvian ; remember we have still many great actions to achieve.

The Commander in Chief,

Signed

DUMOURIER.

L E T T E R XLII.

General MIRANDA to the MINISTER OF WAR.

Liege, March 4, 1793. Finished at St. Tron the 6th, and sent off at one in the morning.

THE attack of Maestricht, Citizen General, is carrying on with the greatest success, and, on the 2d inst. our batteries 24 pouders were ready to begin a most tremendous conflagration, which must have reduced the city to the last extremity, and occasioned its surrender ; when, about eleven in the morning, I received official intelligence from General Lanoue, and confirmed by General Valence, that the enemy had attacked our advanced posts on the Roer, forced their passage through the army of observation, commanded by General Lanoue, who covered the investment of Maestricht, and with a body of 35,000 men marched rapidly towards Wick, in order to throw succours into

into

into the town, and put an end to the blockade and attack.

I scarcely had time to withdraw 3000 men under the command of General Levener, who was posted before Wick, and who in three hours afterwards was attacked by the advanced guard of the enemy. I however continued the bombardment in the usual manner, to cover my intentions, and with so much success, that from the beginning of the attack, the conflagration had never been so considerable.

At twelve at night I gave orders for the retreat, sending before me all the artillery, which happily arrived at Tongres, being covered by 4000 men who formed the rear guard.

The enemy, notwithstanding all their efforts, did not make the least impression on them, but were constantly repulsed. A body of 7000 men was posted in an advantageous situation at Tongres, under the Generals Egalité*, Ruault, and Blottefier; another of the same force under Generals Diettmann and Ylher, being the complement of troops forming the blockade of Maestricht, was sent to the heights of Haccour, near Viset, to cover Liege, and prevent the enemy

* The son of Philip of Orleans.

from

from penetrating by either of the roads leading to that city. Our loss in the attack of Maestricht is very trifling, amounting only to 20 killed, and 10 wounded, notwithstanding the very heavy fire kept up by the garrison, estimated at least at 32,000 cannon shot.

An error, committed by the army of observation covering the siege, behind the Roer, is the cause of this confusion in our affairs. I hope *our future efforts* will amply compensate for this misfortune, and that the nation, aware of the importance of the enterprise committed to our care, will assist us in nobly completing it.

This day the enemy made four different attacks on all our posts : two upon Tongres, from whence they were repulsed with loss. One at Haccour, the other at Herve. I re-inforced the posts at Haccour this morning, with a considerable body. The enemy who presumptuously advanced towards Jupille, halted, and retreated after a short cannonade from one side of the Meuse to the other. The measures agreed on yesterday by Generals Thowenot, Valence and myself, will, I trust, be sufficient to check them.

March

March 5.

Last night at 10 o'clock I learnt, that the enemy made a fourth attack with between 12 and 13,000 men, took Tongres, and forced our army to retreat to Hans and St. Tron. This intelligence determined General Valence and myself to order all the troops at Viset, Herve, &c. to Hans, near the citadel of Liege, that they might retreat in force to St. Tron, where we could take a good military position, and if necessary, even risk a battle.

We therefore assembled in force this morning, and marched to St. Tron, by the high road of Liege. About half way, we fell in with between 3 and 4000 men, which the enemy had sent to the village of Orey.—Our light troops attacked them, and they fell back to Tongres.

At 8 o'clock at night, the army arrived at St. Tron with all the artillery, where we have taken a very advantageous position, protecting the retreat of our magazines and hospitals, as well as some slight detachments, who from the difficulty of giving them timely notice, or by the negligence of the commanders, have not as yet joined the army.

We

We have given the necessary orders this day to cover their retreat, and sent them fresh instructions.

Our troops are well inclined; and we should hope that if an occasion offers, their bravery and love of their country will surmount every obstacle, and make them triumph over their numerous enemies.

General Valence has without doubt informed you of the attack on the cantonments of the Roër and Aix-la-Chapelle: he will write to you again this day. I beg you to excuse this delay, the state of things having obliged me to be constantly in the field, and chiefly on horse-back.

Signed

MIRANDA.

L E T T E R XLIII.

General MIRANDA to General DUMOURIER.

St. Tron, 8 o'Clock, March 6, 1793.

MY DEAR GENERAL,

I NOW inform you with satisfaction, that all our posts in the rear and in the environs

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viroids

virons of Liege, are come in, and having joined the army last night, augments its force to 10000 men, horse and foot.—The brave General Ylker collected and led them on with undaunted courage; this morning, with six battalions forming his rear guard, he defeated a body of cavalry which had attempted to interrupt them.—It is not a little remarkable, that last night he kept possession of one of the gates of Liege while the enemy were within, without their having dared to dislodge him.

Our troops are again in high spirits, and the enemy flying before them.—They now wish to come to an action, that by their gallantry they may make amends for the disagreeable affair of Aix-la-Chapelle.

You may be assured, my dear General, should an opportunity offer, we will sufficiently revenge ourselves on the enemy: I therefore see no occasion for your coming here; but continue to execute your great plans in Holland. If you do not consider it as detrimental to the service, I much wish for a short interview, or that I may be permitted to join you with 15,000 men; which will by no means endanger the safety of Belgium. The troops stationed at Louvain are very sufficient to repel any attack. Farewell,
my

my dear General ! may Minerva protect your success, and Mars crown your illustrious exploits.

P. S. I have directed Champmorin to join you, in case he cannot effect his retreat to Louvain, and hope you will approve of this measure. The annexed letter is to the Minister of War.

I am giving, in orders, your very forcible address to the army, which cannot fail of producing the effect you desire.

Signed

MIRANDA.

LETTER XLIV.

General DUMOURIER to General MIRANDA

Moredyck, 7th March, 1793.
Second Year of the Republic.

BY comparing your two letters, my dear Miranda, you may easily imagine how agreeable your second must have been, as little hopes were left by the impression of your first. Ready to pass the Moerdyck, to surmount all obstacles, and on the point of securing for ever, the liberty and glory of my country, and of Holland,

land, I saw every thing was lost, if you had not exhilarated my spirits by an accurate state of your position, and the good disposition of the soldiery. The letter from Valence threw me almost into despair. I saw nothing in it but a scene of confusion, without a single resource; Now my hopes revive, and dangers lessen. We have sufficient time before us; and if you promise me on your side, of which I cannot entertain the smallest doubt, I have every hope on mine.

You acted judiciously in giving orders to Champmorin and Lamorliere to fall back on Antwerp and Breda. They will there find General Deflers, when we shall be able to form, in that quarter, an army covered by several rivers, which will discourage the enemy on your left from attempting a narrow pass, to expose themselves to the most imminent danger. Let me know, in plain terms, how the General in Chief conducts himself; if he incommodes you by his vague, irresolute manner, an express will do his business. You, my friend, and Thouenot, can alone save the republic.

Tell me, if it is true that —— has deserted his colours? If that is the case, we need not look elsewhere for the cause of our late misfortune.

I desire

I desire, and repeat it, that some of the separate corps shall unite at Antwerp, which will naturally be one of the points to attack, if the enemy are as strong as some incline to believe.

The evacuation of Liege and Aix-la-Chapelle is nothing. The enemy can no more retain that position than we. Expedite the fortifications of Mechlin; let a river be before you, choose your ground, and keep it a fortnight; but, as I have repeatedly said, collect an army at Antwerp, which, being supported by the garrison of Breda, will form part of that great one destined to drive the Austrians from the Low Countries. I have requested the Minister of War to send forces that way, without, however, lessening the number specified before. In 15 days we shall be superior to our enemies, and thanks to you, Miranda, with the addition of Holland. By your excellent arrangements I reckon I shall be there the day after to-morrow. If I succeed, the Prussians will leave you to fall upon me; and if I fail, my army will join yours. As we are now in possession of one of the keys of the country, we shall soon find means to penetrate into the heart of it.

I will not allow you to come to me with 15,000 men, until a republican spirit and courage

rage have invigorated the army, and when reinforcement shall have made our forces superior to the enemy.—My success should even assist you; as you may easily convince my brave brother soldiers, that whether I am present, or absent, their conduct should always be influenced by me. Assure them of the satisfaction I feel in finding that they merit the victories we have reaped together.—Farewell, my friend, and more than ever my friend; let us be worthy of each other, and be convinced that two or three heads are sufficient to save a Republic.

The Commander in Chief,

Signed

DUMOURIER.

LETTER XLV.

General MIRANDA to General DUMOURIER.

Tirelmont, 8 March, 1793.

MY DEAR GENERAL.

ANNEXED is a copy of my letter written this day to the Minister of War. It contains an account of the present state of the army, and all our operations.—Things assume

sume a more favourable aspect, and it only depends on us to derive singular advantages, even from misfortune itself.

We are now in the best condition to second your heroic enterprize.—The army is abundantly supplied, in great order, and animated with a true republican courage.—I am sorry that your address to our comrades was not given with the orders, or published, as I proposed it.—Valence started some objections; and a desire to keep up a spirit of harmony, so necessary in the present circumstances, induced me to give way, though on another occasion, I would not have submitted.—I will soon however see him, when it is possible he may be able to give me the best reasons for a difference in opinion, which at present, I think, appears to be altogether inexplicable

You may depend my dear General, that we shall hold our present position at Louvain, as long as you wish, with only the same force we brought with us.

Lamorliere and Champmorin are happily arrived at Louvain and Diest, having made a skilful retreat, as you will be enabled to judge by the annexed reports.

I shall

I shall make the necessary arrangements with Thowenot for forming an army at Antwerp. I thought that Lamorliere's and Champmorin's troops were to march to-morrow for that city, but it does not meet the approbation of General Valence. Are we to wait *bis will and pleasure?*—but I will take care to enforce it.

Signed

MIRANDA.

L E T T E R XLVI.

*General MIRANDA to General BEURNONVILLE,
Minister of War.*

St. Trô, 8 March, 1793.

SINCE my last letter, Citizen General, all the separate detachments of the army, under the command of Generals Ybler, Lamorliere, and Champmorin, are collected, having been more or less engaged with their pursuers; they however effected their retreat with the greatest success. When their particular reports have reached me, I will do myself the honour to transmit them to you. The advanced guard of the army has likewise repulsed, towards Tongres, a body of observation, placed there to watch our motions.

On

On the 6th and 7th the army kept the position before St. Tron, to give rest to the troops, and protect the junction of the different detachments: they will move this day towards Tirlemont, where we have field-equipage and provisions in abundance: to-morrow probably they will encamp before Louvain, which entirely covers Belgium, and affords us an opportunity to act offensively on all points. Here we will wait for orders from General Dumoutier, and from the Executive Council.

I have just heard that a messenger, sent from Paris to General Valence; has been detained in several places, under the pretence that he was carrying dispatches to the Generals who were betraying their country. This infamous accusation, beneath my dignity to notice, shall only be answered by the most sovereign contempt.

The Nation is too generous to give any credit to the injurious reports of base deserters, who, abandoning their post in the moment of danger, pretend to cover with shame, and calumniate Citizens faithful to their duty, and gloriously defending their country. I hope you will make known these sentiments to the Nation. The whole of the army, and the Officers in general, give proofs of patriotism, subordination and respect: the national gendarmerie

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alone

alone (and particularly the thirty-second division), holds discourse of the most scandalous nature, of the most inflammatory tendency, which has been communicated to me by some of the principal Officers in the army.

It would be but an act of justice and necessity to inflict on this corps a severe punishment. I have ordered them to be escorted to the frontiers of France, and have sent the annexed order to Generals Lamorliere and Champmorin, to prevent the bad effects a similar conduct may produce in the army.

A copy of the letter of General D'Angest, and the deliberation of the principal Officers of the artillery, with my answer, are submitted to your consideration.

Signed

MIRANDA.

LETTER

LETTER XLVII.

General DUMOURIER to General MIRANDA.

Moerdyck, March 9, 1793. Second year of the
French Republic.

YOU, my worthy friend, and Thowenot are the only persons who can give me consolation and hope. The capture of Gertruydenberg has enriched me with at least 50 capital pieces of cannon, besides about 150,000 weight of gunpowder, and 50 transports. The retreat of Lamorliere and Champmorin is very fortunate ; but it is absolutely necessary for you to push them, one towards Herenthals, the other towards Lier : Colonel Westerman, with his legion and the 31st brigade of gendarmerie, with which I am not much satisfied, I have sent to Turnhout. This small corps, amounting to 2500 men, will clear that part of La Campine where it is possible the enemy may meditate an attack on my rear, should they learn the real distance between our armies. In passing by Antwerp, I will give General Marassé instructions to deliver General Champmorin, who will command the small corps, of which Westerman's

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constitutes

constitutes a part. I have determined to join you, as the letters I receive from Valence are of the most desponding nature, particularly that brought this day by your messenger. To-morrow morning I shall be at Antwerp, in the evening at Brussels, and immediately after with you.

On the receipt of this letter, send Champmorrin to Lier, and Lamorliere into Herenthals. Throw a battalion into Diest, 30 horse, and a Governor of spirit and resolution. This point, as well as Lier, must be fortified.

One motive determines me to this journey : To animate the people of the Low Countries, to make them more favourable to our cause, through the confidence they place in me, and, above all, by overturning that system of injustice and tyranny they have hitherto groaned under. I am determined to keep my word with them, notwithstanding every effort of Cambon*

* Cambon, the great financier of the Convention, who, upon the first irruption of the French under Dumourier in the Low Countries, procured a general seizure of church plate, ordering detachments of Jacobins to sequester and confiscate estates as in France. The simple Belgians gave credit at first to their fraternal declarations, but this most arbitrary measure at once opened their eyes, and in general they became their declared enemies.

and

and his satellites. I have sent orders for General D'Anghest to go to Douay. I will punish General —— for having abandoned Huy, which must be retaken.

The passage of the Moerdyk will be effected, in my absence, by General Deflers and Thowenot the younger. Order all your artillery to join you. I promise myself much pleasure from our intended interview. The siege of Williamstadt still continues—it defends itself well, probably because the besiegers did not at first attack with spirit and energy. Two days hence we will converse together on the subject, therefore I need enlarge on it here. My horses will soon be at Louvain, but I shall borrow some, *en passant*, at Brussels. Adieu (*in Spanish*) my friend!

The Commander in Chief,

Signed

DUMOURIER.

P. S. Insert immediately in the orderly book, my Proclamation to the Army, and cause it to be printed.

LETTER

LETTER XLVIII.

General MIRANDA to General DUMOURIER,

Tirlemont, March 9, 1793.

DEAR GENERAL,

YESTERDAY I made you fully acquainted with every particular relative to the present situation of the army—that part of it under the command of General Lamorliere will march to-morrow, and that under Champmorin on the 12th, for Antwerp, till they receive your further orders. The annexed statement will shew you the disposition of the two corps, which in every respect cannot be better.

Captains Dambarrière and Marescot, of the engineers, are appointed to put Mechlin in a posture of defence.

The general position of the army, with other subordinate circumstances are agreed on, as you will see by the subjoined minutes. The troops march with alacrity and firmness to their respective posts, where a sufficiency of camp equipage and provisions are already arrived.

Farewell, my brave and worthy General,

Signed

MIRANDA.

LETTER XLIX.

*The MINISTER AT WAR to Citizen MIRANDA,
Commander of the Army in Belgium.*

Paris, March 19, 1793, Second Year of the French Republic.

I HAVE laid before the Executive Council your request of the 8th instant, for a speedy and severe punishment of the national Gendarmerie employed in the army of Belgium, particularly of the 32d division. The Executive Council applaud the measures you have taken, in sending this division back to the frontiers of France, as an example to the rest of the army, and to prevent the dangerous influence such conduct might otherwise be productive of. The Council request you will inflict a similar punishment wherever there may be the same cause for complaint, or it appears that their connection with the army, may in the least endanger the public safety.

In the 32d division there are evidently delinquents, whom the Executive Council empowers you to try by a court-martial; and whatever may be the determination, dictated by a necessary act of justice, you will please to inform me without delay.

Whether

Whether you send the other divisions of the Gendarmerie back to France, or otherwise dispose of them, you are alike authorized to inflict military punishment on the guilty. It may be necessary, however, to acquaint General Dumourier with the measures you think proper to adopt, for the re-establishment of order and discipline in the National Gendarmerie.

Signed BEURNONVILLE.

L E T T E R L.

The MINISTER OF WAR to General MIRANDA.

Paris, March 23, 1793, Second Year of the French Republic.

THE National Convention, by their decree of the 22d inst. have ordered me to lay before them without delay, a statement of those battalions under your command, who in the action of the 18th, basely deserted their colours, and by this act of cowardice, endangered the safety of the country.

I particularly recommend to you, General, that no time may be lost in complying with the above request, that the Convention may be satisfied, and the traitors brought to condign punishment.

Signed BEURNONVILLE.

LETTER LI.

PETITION to General MIRANDA.

Paris, March 13, 1793, Second Year of the
French Republic.

I BELIEVE, my good friend, there are traitors in our armies, and the most dark conspiracies are forming against the safety of the Republic. Give me your opinion frankly of the general officers who command the advanced guard, under General Valence, and your sentiments on their conduct during the late events. Do not, I beseech you, nay conjure you by the love you bear your country, use any reserve. My anxiety is for the public weal; yours, I am convinced, is no less so.

Your friend,

Signed PETION.

LETTER LII.

*MIRANDA to Citizen PETION, Member of the
National Convention.*

Louvain, March 21, 1793.

MY DEAR AND WORTHY FRIEND,

I HAD just begun to answer your letter of the 13th instant, but the unceas-

R ing

ing attacks of the enemy on our advanced posts, have prevented me from giving you the desired information, relative to the engagement of the advanced guard at Aix-la-Chapelle, &c. Since then not a moment of leisure has offered, of which you will be but too well convinced, when you have heard the unhappy consequences of our further operations, combined and directed by General Dumourier, and his intimate friend and adviser, Thowenot.

Your friend had no share in all these *mæuvres*, which, so far from being consonant to his ideas, have ever received his most pointed disapprobation. Had it been in his power to have rejected them, it would long since have been done.

I do not, however, entertain an opinion, that in the affair at Aix la-Chapelle there was any ground for suspecting a traitorous conduct in the General Officers and others, although such a report has been generally received: Negligence and errors were committed by the troops entrusted with the defence of the Roër. One particularly, the absence of General Valence, who though he should have been at his post, has been at Liege since February 23.

Important

Important Particulars relative to the Battle of Nerwinden and the Defection of General Dumourier.

The subsequent affairs of Nerwinden, which is of far greater consequence, cannot be considered as arising either from negligence or mistake; and I strongly suspect the adviser of the General, who neither possesses principles nor republicanism, which ought to screen him from so serious an inculpation.

It was certainly very extraordinary, that General Dumburier, who always consulted me relative to the military and political affairs of the army, never once mentioned this business. At eleven at night my orders were delivered in writing, and I learnt, in conversation with him, that we were to offer battle to an enemy 51,000 strong, very advantageously posted, and a formidable artillery, with a force inferior to theirs, and with every disadvantage of situation and encampment—all this was to be effected without having previously reconnoitered the ground, or the particular position of the enemy. In short, I had only time to say to him—*You may depend on me, and we shall not fail to execute your orders, by making a vigorous attack in five different columns—three of which were led on by myself.* Numberless difficulties were to be overcome on

the commencement of the action, for the want of local knowledge ; nevertheless we succeeded so far as to bring them to engage about three in the afternoon on five different points : we fought until six with various success, when the troops were obliged to give way to a superior force, admirably posted, and assisted by the galling fire of their very numerous artillery. The other divisions experienced more or less a similar fate, in proportion to the proximity of their attack on the lines and batteries of the enemy, notwithstanding the proclamation of General Dumourier, whose very inaccurate statement of the action can neither change the nature of facts, nor adulterate truth.

Our loss is very considerable in my division alone. One General Officer was killed, and upwards of thirty killed or wounded. Among the former was my aid-de-camp, whom you knew ; he was shot by my side ; near 2000 men have been killed or wounded. By the loss in my division, you may estimate that of the two others.

Next morning the enemy attacked us in a vigorous manner, and we were at length obliged to retreat behind Tirlemont, and successively as far as Louvain, where I led, about three in the morning, the centre and left division of the army.

This

This check must necessarily produce very fatal consequences to our influence in Belgium, and our political affairs in general. I am astonished how Dumourier could suffer himself to be led into so fatal an error.

Thus, my dear friend, have I truly stated the present situation of our military affairs in this country. You may rely on what I have advanced, notwithstanding the tergiversation and sophistry of those whom reproach will naturally point out as the authors of our misfortunes. Many more important things remain to be said, which I would be happy to communicate to you, but cannot trust to paper.

When I learnt from your letter that the ramification of a plot, lately discovered against our dear liberty, extended even to the army, I confess I imagined it to be more the effect of your fears, than as having existence in reality ; now, however, I am convinced, there is but too good foundation for believing it to be the case, and suspicion rests on more than one, who is the principal agent in bringing about our present disasters. I can tell you more, my friend, those persons have made indirect proposals, with great art and caution, highly offensive to my patriotism, and my unshaken love for liberty.

I therefore

I therefore lament that we are agitated by vile intriguers, who have already done much mischief, and who may, in the end, overturn our liberties.

Could an interview be procured, either by your coming to the army (which, I believe, at this moment would be of the highest importance), or obtaining leave for me to meet you elsewhere, I could communicate what I imagine to be of the utmost consequence to the safety of the Republic. It is to you alone, whose integrity, principles, and sincere love of liberty I so well know, that I can freely and openly communicate them. I even believe there is a cabal to get rid of me, as they wished to do with you before the 10th of August. I do not correspond with the Minister, or any other person, and shall let Dumourier and others make out their reports as they think fit. Virtue and truth will bear down all before them with so irresistible a sway, that the mask of intrigue cannot long withstand their united power.

You will make a prudent use of this letter, and send me an answer by return of the messenger, whom I have expressly sent for that purpose, and who will deliver it to none but yourself.

Signed

MIRANDA:

'22d March.

P. S. Our retreat towards France, and the evacuation of the Netherlands are determined on, as I learnt this day from General Dumourier, who shewed his letter to the Minister on this subject; at the same time he communicated to me the actual *military position* of our army. This is the first time, since his return, that he has entered into any conversation with me on the subject. He appears willing to bring me in for a share in the disaster which has overtaken us, through ill-concerted plans and bad management. You will therefore naturally suppose, I did not enter into any explanation with him. Nevertheless, nothing on my part shall be wanting for the preservation of the army, for the support and defence of the Republic, to which I have devoted myself sincerely to the latest period of my life.

Signed

MIRANDA.

ORDERS

O R D E R S

OF

*General DUMOURIER to General MIRANDA.*Camp—Gutzenhoven, 17th. March,
9 in the Morning.

IMMEDIATELY on the receipt of my letter, my dear Miranda, you are to give your instructions to General Champmorin, that he is to guard all the curtain of Oplinter and Neerlinter. If you think he may want another brigade of infantry, let him have it. It is possible the Prince of Cobourg intends to attack us in return; in that case, I desire that the army under General Champmorin, may be more useful. You will give him orders to examine in person the passages before his bridges over the Grete, by which, in case of an attack, he may fall on the right flank of the enemy, by reaching the height before Wommersom. If the bridges are damaged, they must be repaired in the course of the day, that a free communication may be kept up with us. With regard to yourself, my dear General, I beg you will instantly march off your whole division. You are to pass through Tirlemont, and proceed in a column

lumn by the high road, where you will find your proper encampment, or the open air.

If Champmorin has no 12 pounders, you will leave him two. I reckon at least on twelve battalions in your division, supposing you to leave a brigade of infantry with Champmorin. Farewell!

Signed

DUMOURIER.

O R D E R II.

Hautmarre, March 17, 1793.

THE troops under the command of General Miranda are to ascend the height between Wommerson and the road to St. Tron, and take their ground. The forest of Walabergen and of the castle of Wommerson are to be occupied. A considerable post at Orsmael; another at Heelen, and a guard at the bridge of the chapel of Bethanie.

General Miranda is to give orders to General Champmorin to take a position to the left of Neerlinter, and occupy the three villages of Driesche, and those of Vissicot, Terhaegen, and Roere. If it is possible to give tents to the battalions

S

tallions

talions destined to occupy the heights, they may encamp.—The main body of the army has a position on the right.

The spot for delivering rations is to be determined by the officers on the staff of each division, and sent to the Commissaries' Office at Tirlemont, to ensure every necessary supply.

The Commander in Chief,

Signed

DUMOURIER.

O R D E R III.

March 18.

GENERAL Miranda is to attack by the left, between Orsmael, and the chapel of Bethanie, with his troops and those of General Champmorin—to pass the river over all the bridges, and to attack vigorously in as many columns. He is informed that the attack is general from Overwinden to the chapel of Bethanie.

The entire attack of the left is positively part of his orders.

General Champmorin is necessarily to guard the bridge of Budingen, and place there a sufficient

cient force to threaten the flank of the enemy, if requisite, towards Leau, where this force should march in a column.

Signed

DUMOURIER,

O R D E R IV.

Head quarters, Tirlemont, March 19, 1793,
Second Year of the French Republic.

Watch word—*Cato—Vengeance—Rallying—Patriotism.*

ALL the divisions of General Miranda which are at Wommersom, and before Hæckendover, are to retreat in good order, at the moment of the general movement of the army. To pass through Tirlemont and take a position on the heights of Cumptich, the right inclining to the high road.

The Commander in Chief,

Signed

DUMOURIER.

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ORDER

O R D E R V.

March 20.

GENERAL Miranda is to retreat by the high road of Louvain, to the cross between the height of Bautersem, and the wood of Struys Block-Bosch. There he is to rest all his infantry, and place his artillery at the opening of the wood, and in the wood—and he is to order *abattis* to be made.

The General is to take notice, that General Egalité will occupy with his infantry the height of Bautersem, and that the Generals Champmorrin and Rualt are to retreat, the first by Wever, the second by Kerchem, in order to occupy the wood *des Lievres*, and the heights of Binkom.

The Commander in Chief,

Signed

DUMOURIER.

O R D E R VI.

Certified Received at half past eleven.

The Adjutant General,
Signed ARNAUDIN.

THE body of the army under
the command of Generals Miranda, Chancel,
Stetenhost,

and Egalité, will form in two columns; one is to pass by the road, and retreat towards the heights, behind Louvain, where the camp was; the other to march by Lovenjoul, Corbeeck-Overloo and Heverlé, and take a position behind Louvain, the right inclining to the river Vaer, and the left to the wood of the Communauté.

The Commander in Chief,

Signed

DUMOURIER.

Louvain, March 21, Second year of the French Republic

This movement is to take place at 11 o'clock precisely.—General Miranda is to take the command of the two columns, and see order observed.

Head quarters, Louvain, March 22 1793, Second
Year of the French Republic.

Watch word—*Frenchmen's Courage—Rallying—
Constancy.*

THE General is extremely satisfied to have received proofs of the confidence placed in him by such of the privates of the army as he spoke to.—He expects the same degree of confidence from the *whole army*: it is by that alone that we can hope to shew to the enemy, and to all nations, who have their eyes

eyes fixed on us, that we are the same French who conquered at Jemappe, at Anderleck, at Liege, and who drove back the enemies from the heart of France, with heroic patience and courage.

The army, no doubt, suffers hardships, notwithstanding the great care the Generals have taken to supply all their wants ; but the enemies, although of late somewhat successful, (and which has cost them very dear,) suffer still more. They are spread all over a country which is exhausted, from the constant presence of armies; they have no magazines, and we might hope it may be soon our turn again to conquer.

The Adjutant General,

Signed

EMMONOT.

O R D E R VII.

From General Orders, 23d March, 1793,
Second Year of the Republic.

Watch word—*Country—firmness—rallying—Dumourier.*

The troops under the command of Generals Miranda and Champmorin, are to move at 7 this night : they must go through the city of Brussels, by the gate of Schaerebeeck, and

and out by that which leads to Hal, when the divisions commanded by Generals Stetenhoft, Chancel, and Champillon have filed off. Then follow the high road to Hal and Enghien, to the height of the village of Saintes, and there take a position, the right inclining to the divisions which march before them, and the left to the wood of Strie-Houx. The Generals are informed that the left flankers occupy the heights of Haute-Croix and Bogaerden. He positively orders the Generals not to quit their troops, when they shall have chosen their respective grounds.

The Commander in Chief,

Signed

DUMOURIER.

O R D E R VIII.

Head-Quarters—Enghien, 24th. March, 1793.
Second Year of the Republic.

Extract from the general Orders of the Army.

Watch word—*Republic—Government—rallying—peace at home.*

THE army under the command of Dumourier and Champmorin is to move at four, to-morrow morning, and take the road to Enghien, as far as the town. The column to proceed by the village of Marck, Moulin-du

Chê

... , Rombecq, Kellbecq, Meslin-l'Eveque, ... , Hermitage, Roux. Pass the bridge of the Dendre above Ath, and the village of Brantignes; there to take a position on the height, behind this village; the right inclining to the high road of Lauze, and the left stretching along the elevation behind la Croix-de-Bilhee.

The Commander in Chief,

Signed

DUMOURIER.

P. S. The Generals are to remain with their divisions, and send their returns to Head-quarters, which will be to-morrow at Ath.

General Miranda is informed, that Lieutenant General Rozieres, and Major General Kermorvan are going to serve in the left division, each according to his rank.

The General of Brigade, Chief on the Staff
of the Northern Army.



F I N I S.

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