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# The Truth About Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa

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ABSTRACT. South Africa's truth and reconciliation process is perhaps the best-known example of an institutionalized attempt to build a more democratic future by confronting human rights atrocities from the past. Yet the South African case is often quite misunderstood, with many misconceptions widely accepted and asserted. This article addresses five facts about the South African experience. Using data from a large national survey of ordinary people, it demonstrates both that the truth and reconciliation process is viewed as effective by most people and that in fact systematic evidence indicates that the process achieved several of its primary goals. From the South African case we learn that, despite their various shortcomings and compromises, truth processes can attain legitimacy among ordinary people in transitional systems and that they can contribute to societal reconciliation.

*Keywords*: • Transitional justice • Collective memory • Democratization • Political culture

## Introduction

South Africa's democratic transition is widely hailed as one of the most successful transformations in the world today. At a simplistic level, the difficult transition from apartheid to democracy was made with minimal bloodshed and political instability, something many regard as nothing short of miraculous.[1] What accounts for this miracle? Most observers are willing to attribute at least some responsibility to the country's truth and reconciliation process, as institutionalized in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), and its leader, Archbishop Desmond Tutu.[2]

At the same time, criticism of the process and various expressions of displeasure are also common (for example, Posel and Simpson, 2002). Many believe that the views of South Africans diverge markedly from the views of the world, with

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discontent and disappointment predominating within the country. For instance, Adam and Adam (2000: 33, emphasis added) assert: "The TRC is regarded as a novel experiment of restorative justice and nation-building through reconciliation; it is often recommended as an international model for similar conflicts elsewhere; and *its achievements are widely overrated outside South Africa, while largely dismissed inside.*" The defects of the process are said to be many, ranging from the production of a truth that is far from truthful (for example, Jeffery, 1999) to the denial of justice in the Faustian bargain trading amnesty for peace (for example, Biko, 2000).

Both those who criticize and those who praise the truth and reconciliation process rarely cite any empirical evidence in support of their positions. Indeed, it is remarkable how little is known about the views of ordinary South Africans toward this important process.[3] Bits and pieces of evidence exist from newspaper polls, but little systematic work has been reported on public views toward the process. More common is the projection of the analyst's own views onto the mass public: amnesty for those committing gross human rights violations is obviously unfair; therefore, South Africans are (must be) dissatisfied with the TRC. This sort of analysis is not a very useful way to draw conclusions about the state of public judgments and preferences.

The purpose of this article is therefore to present systematic evidence on how South Africans judge their truth and reconciliation process. This is an important task, since the South African example is being replicated around the world and since the success of a truth commission depends mightily on its ability to establish legitimacy within the political culture of its country. Based on a large, nationally representative survey conducted in 2001 (see Appendix A for details on the survey), I report rigorous, empirical evidence on five commonly heard assertions about the truth and reconciliation process, as follows:

1. South Africans are generally dissatisfied with the truth and reconciliation process.
2. South Africans view the granting of amnesty to gross human rights violators as fundamentally unfair and they therefore oppose the amnesty process.
3. Granting amnesty to gross human rights violators has undermined respect for the rule of law and the institutions of law in South Africa.
4. The truth and reconciliation process has focused blame on individual miscreants, allowing the major institutions of apartheid to escape condemnation for their deeds.
5. The truth and reconciliation process produced little truth and even less reconciliation.

In each instance, the data from this survey are dramatically at odds with the assertion. Thus, the importance of this article lies in setting the record straight about public views of the South African truth and reconciliation process. Only by understanding the architecture of public reactions to the truth and reconciliation process can the lessons of the South African experience become clear and perhaps useful to others.

I must acknowledge at the outset that this analysis focuses on the views of ordinary people in South Africa via a representative national survey. It does not speak to the perceptions and judgments of leaders; nor do I draw conclusions about how victims (or even perpetrators) judge the process.[4] I am quite willing to concede the possibility that the 20,000 people who registered as victims of gross

human rights violations under apartheid may hold entirely different views than those reported in this article (although I know of no rigorous evidence to that effect); nor do I deny the possibility that specific classes of people (for example, residents of the so-called Bantustans) may subscribe to entirely different assessments. The strength of a national survey is that conclusions about the total population are possible; the weakness of such a survey is that the complaints of specific local communities are not particularly well represented. Thus, I have tried in this article not to over-claim beyond the conclusions supported by the study's research design. Mine is a study of the South African mass public, and nothing more.

One other caveat is necessary before turning to the evidence. South Africa is a divided society, with racial differences apparent on virtually all matters when it comes to apartheid. I therefore report the data from the survey according to the race of the respondent, using "race" in the same way that the current South African government uses the term.[5] The survey was indeed designed to produce representative subsamples of Africans, whites, Coloured people, and those of Asian origin. Readers should also note that since Africans make up the vast majority of the South African population (up to 80 percent), figures for the total South African mass public consequently diverge very little from the figures I report for the African subsample. The wisdom of reporting the results separately for these groups will become obvious with the first glance at the survey data.

Care must always be taken in assigning meaning to race. In South Africa, race is a surrogate for the degree of oppression one was subjected to under apartheid (in addition to other things). For instance, the constitution of 1983 established a tricameral parliament, with chambers representing whites, Coloured people, and those of Asian origin, while black South Africans were expelled from South Africa, consigned to the so-called Bantustans. In addition, race takes on special meaning within the context of the truth and reconciliation process, since most (but far from all) coming forward to seek amnesty were white, and the gross human rights violations to which they confessed were typically (but not always) perpetrated against blacks. In some sense, blacks are the "victors" in the New South Africa and whites are the "vanquished," but only in a very circumscribed sense (since whites still hold disproportionate political, social, and economic power). A key substantive issue addressed by this research is whether the new majority in this transitional system can accept a process that denies accountability for the past and attempts to move on to a more democratic, tolerant, and reconciled future.

## Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: An Overview

Ending apartheid in South Africa came at a considerable cost to those who had long struggled against the oppressive system. In South Africa, in contrast to other nations emerging from a tyrannical past (for example, Argentina and Uganda), the ancien régime was not defeated.[6] This meant that the transition had to be brokered; one of the central issues in the talks over the transformation of the apartheid state was amnesty. The National Party and the leaders of other powerful, white-dominated institutions (for example, the security forces) made amnesty a non-negotiable centerpiece of their demands (see Omar, 1996). Without the promise of amnesty for the crimes (and criminals) of apartheid, the transition to democracy would stall, perhaps even with a resumption of the political violence so widespread in the 1980s and early 1990s.

The TRC was empowered to grant amnesty to those who came forward and admitted to engaging in gross human rights violations. But the truth and reconciliation process was also charged with transforming South African society.[7] The law creating the Truth and Reconciliation Commission specified that the goal "of the Commission shall be to promote national unity and reconciliation in a spirit of understanding which transcends the conflicts and divisions of the past" (National Unity and Reconciliation Act, Section (3) (1)).[8] The leaders of the TRC certainly took this mandate to heart, and unlike most truth commissions in the world, the TRC penetrated the society and spoke directly to ordinary South Africans.[9]

The TRC spent roughly five years examining and documenting atrocities committed during the struggle over apartheid. At one level, the commission was extraordinarily successful: it held countless hearings, interviewed thousands of victims of apartheid, granted amnesty to roughly 850 human rights violators, and produced a massive five-volume "Final Report."[10] Furthermore, in terms of uncovering detailed evidence of what happened under specific circumstances (as in exactly what happened to the "Cradock Four"), the TRC seems to have been effective as well (but see Jeffery [1999], who complains about numerous inaccuracies and bias in the TRC's history of several specific incidents). In many respects, and according to most, South Africa's truth and reconciliation process appears to have been phenomenally successful.

Indeed, the world has acknowledged the success of South Africa's TRC through the numerous attempts to replicate its truth and reconciliation process in other troubled areas of the globe. Truth commissions modeled on the South African experience have proliferated, and one of the leaders of South Africa's experiment has created a major institute in New York to assist countries in developing plans for reconciliation in the world's many festering hot spots. Perhaps the judgment that the TRC succeeded is based on nothing more than the simple (and simplistic) observation that South Africa appears to have made a successful, relatively peaceful, and quite unexpected transition from the apartheid dictatorship to a reasonably democratic and stable regime. Some surely attribute South Africa's transformation to its truth and reconciliation process. If a TRC "worked" in South Africa, perhaps it can work elsewhere.

South Africans themselves are not so sanguine about the process. Many complain that the TRC exacerbated racial tensions in the country by exposing the misdeeds of both the apartheid government and its agents and the liberation forces. Some vehemently reject the conjecture that "truth" can somehow lead to reconciliation, claiming instead that uncovering the details about the horrific events of the past only embitters people, making them far less likely to be willing to coexist together in the new democratic regime (for example, Biko, 2000). Indeed, based on my casual observations of the South African media, complaints and condemnations of the truth and reconciliation process seem to far outnumber laudatory assessments.

Over time, however, the record of the truth and reconciliation process in South Africa has become muddied. For instance, as I documented in the introduction to this article, a commonly expressed view is that South Africans are dissatisfied with the activities of their TRC. It is therefore important to set the record straight, based on rigorous quantitative data. The success of truth commissions (especially those seeking to transform society) depends upon their ability to establish and maintain legitimacy with ordinary citizens. Without legitimacy, the "collective

memories" produced by truth commissions are unlikely to gain acceptance, truth commissions are overly dependent upon pleasing their constituents in the short term, and opponents of such commissions are emboldened. Thus, understanding how ordinary people perceive and evaluate such institutions is an empirical issue of considerable theoretical importance.

## Truth Number One: Views of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission

We first asked our respondents for their overall evaluations of the performance of the TRC. Since very substantial racial differences exist in response to this question, I report the data separately for each racial group (see Table 1).

If we combine the "Strongly approve" and "Somewhat approve" responses in Table 1, we find that a large majority of blacks (75.9 percent) evaluate the TRC favorably, a majority of those of Asian origin (61.2 percent) hold the same view, but only a minority of whites (36.6 percent) and Coloured South Africans (45.1 percent) judge the TRC favorably. Only among white South Africans do we find a majority of people (50.4 percent) holding clearly negative views toward the TRC. Generally, whites are displeased with the TRC; blacks are relatively happy with its performance.

Note should be made of the lack of opinions about the TRC among Coloured people. Indeed, the plurality response to this question among Coloured South Africans is "Don't know." A recurring finding of this research is that it appears that the truth and reconciliation process was not very compelling for large segments of the Coloured population. Although Coloured people were traditionally considered part of the anti-apartheid "Black" coalition, ordinary Coloureds were largely bystanders within the context of the truth and reconciliation process.[11]

The TRC was charged with executing many tasks, so overall evaluations of the commission most likely conceal differences in opinions toward the specific functions of the TRC. Thus, we asked the respondents to evaluate five specific jobs of the TRC, ranging from truth finding to punishment. Table 2 reports the responses.

The data in Table 2 are rife with racial differences. Generally, almost a majority of blacks credit the TRC with doing an "excellent" job on every aspect of the commission's activities: the percentages range from 43.0 to 55.5. Whites, on the other hand, are quite loath to rate the TRC as "excellent" on any dimension, with the highest percentage being 7.6 for the task of helping families to find out what happened to their loved ones. Coloured South Africans and those of Asian origin also rarely judge the TRC to have done an excellent job.

TABLE 1. *Satisfaction with the performance of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission*

| | Strongly approve | Somewhat approve | Somewhat disapprove | Strongly disapprove | Don't know | Number |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| African | 26.6 | 49.3 | 11.9 | 2.6 | 9.5 | 2001 |
| White | 4.1 | 32.5 | 30.2 | 20.2 | 13.0 | 984 |
| Coloured | 13.8 | 31.3 | 10.3 | 6.0 | 38.6 | 485 |
| Asian origin | 10.6 | 50.6 | 23.3 | 5.7 | 9.8 | 245 |

*Note:* The question read: "In general, how do you feel about the activities of the TRC?" Percentages total 100 percent across the rows (except for rounding errors).

TABLE 2. *Satisfaction with specific aspects of the performance of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission*

| | Excellent job | Pretty good job | Pretty bad job | Poor job | Don't know | Number |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Letting families know what happened to their loved ones | | | | | | |
| African | 55.5 | 33.2 | 4.8 | 1.7 | 4.7 | 2002 |
| White | 7.6 | 55.1 | 13.9 | 6.3 | 17.1 | 985 |
| Coloured | 23.0 | 32.4 | 5.1 | 7.2 | 32.2 | 487 |
| Asian origin | 22.0 | 46.5 | 13.5 | 8.2 | 9.8 | 245 |
| Providing a true and unbiased account of the country's history | | | | | | |
| African | 46.2 | 38.9 | 5.3 | 2.1 | 7.6 | 2000 |
| White | 3.6 | 30.9 | 28.0 | 19.7 | 17.9 | 987 |
| Coloured | 13.6 | 34.5 | 9.5 | 4.8 | 37.6 | 484 |
| Asian origin | 18.8 | 53.1 | 10.6 | 5.7 | 11.8 | 245 |
| Awarding compensation to victims | | | | | | |
| African | 43.0 | 30.5 | 9.5 | 7.2 | 9.8 | 2002 |
| White | 4.5 | 25.4 | 26.3 | 16.0 | 27.8 | 984 |
| Coloured | 10.9 | 22.8 | 11.1 | 11.5 | 43.6 | 486 |
| Asian origin | 15.9 | 40.8 | 13.9 | 14.3 | 15.1 | 245 |
| Ensuring that human rights abuses will not happen again | | | | | | |
| African | 48.6 | 36.4 | 4.5 | 1.9 | 8.7 | 1999 |
| White | 6.1 | 32.1 | 21.7 | 18.0 | 22.1 | 982 |
| Coloured | 18.3 | 28.2 | 6.8 | 8.0 | 38.7 | 486 |
| Asian origin | 18.9 | 46.7 | 11.1 | 7.0 | 16.4 | 244 |
| Punishing those guilty of atrocities | | | | | | |
| African | 45.0 | 30.2 | 10.2 | 6.2 | 8.4 | 2001 |
| White | 4.0 | 27.3 | 26.3 | 24.8 | 17.6 | 984 |
| Coloured | 16.2 | 25.9 | 10.7 | 10.5 | 36.8 | 487 |
| Asian origin | 16.3 | 44.1 | 13.5 | 14.3 | 11.8 | 245 |

*Note*: The question read: "The TRC is often said to have several important jobs. We would like your opinion about how well the TRC has done each of these jobs. Would you say that TRC has done an excellent job, a pretty good job, a pretty bad job, or a poor job of . . . ."
Percentages total 100 percent across the rows (except for rounding errors).

Generally, black South Africans are quite pleased with the performance of the TRC. If we collapse the "Excellent" and "Pretty good job" responses in Table 2, we find that the percentage of blacks rating the TRC positively varies from 73.5 percent (for awarding compensation) to 88.7 percent (for helping families to know what happened). Indeed, it is remarkable that nearly three-quarters of the black respondents judge the TRC to have done at least a pretty good job even on (at the time of the survey) the then unresolved issue of awarding compensation to victims. Further, it is also a bit surprising that 75.2 percent of the black respondents judge the TRC to have done at least a pretty good job of punishing

those guilty of human rights abuses. For black South Africans, the TRC seems to have performed marvelously on all aspects of its mandate.

The judgments of whites are entirely different. Though a majority of whites conclude that the TRC has done a pretty good job on helping families to learn what happened to their loved ones (62.7 percent), that is the only task on which whites, on balance, evaluate the TRC favorably. Whites too are least likely to judge the TRC positively on the issue of awarding compensation to the victims (with only 29.9 percent rating the TRC as doing at least a pretty good job).

On each function, a majority of South Africans of Asian origin evaluate the TRC positively, with compensation again being the issue on which the most dissatisfaction exists. A majority of Coloured South Africans rarely evaluates the TRC as having done a pretty good job, with the function of helping families to know what happened to their loved ones being the only task on which a majority is favorably predisposed toward the TRC. On most of their evaluations, Coloured respondents hold views similar to whites, although they are somewhat less negative about the TRC (in part due to the relatively high proportion of "Don't know" responses among Coloured people).

One further question concerns the performance of the TRC. Among elites in South Africa, the view that amnesty and the TRC were essential to avoiding civil war is widely shared.[12] How do ordinary South Africans feel about the matter? We asked our respondents to react to the following statement:

> The TRC was essential to avoid civil war in South Africa during the transition from white rule to majority rule.

The percentages agreeing (either "Somewhat" or "Strongly") with this proposition were: black, 65 percent; white, 18 percent; Coloured, 36 percent; and Asian origin, 47 percent. The difference in the opinions of blacks and whites is startling, with a substantial majority of blacks agreeing that the TRC helped avoid a civil war, but with only a small minority of whites holding a similar opinion. As is typically the case, the opinions of Coloureds and South Africans of Asian origin lie between the percentages for whites and blacks. That so few whites accept a view that seems to be axiomatic among elites of all races suggests that white South Africans likely fail to appreciate how vulnerable their apartheid regime was in the 1980s.

### *Summary*

Vast racial differences exist in how people evaluate the TRC, with the extremes being defined by blacks and whites. For instance, while roughly three-quarters of black South Africans approve of the work of the commission, only slightly more than one-third of whites are so inclined. Coloured respondents hold fairly negative views toward the TRC, although they are not as critical as whites, and Asian respondents tend to be relatively positive, although not as favorable as blacks. The task on which the TRC is most charitably rated is that of helping the families of the victims to find out what happened to their loved ones – uncovering the truth about the past. A majority of South Africans of every race agrees that the TRC has done a very good job on this function. The least positive aspect of the truth and reconciliation process has to do with compensation, although even on this difficult issue, a majority of black and Asian South Africans rate the TRC positively. In general, it appears that blacks are positive toward all aspects of the work of the TRC, while whites judge nearly all of the TRC's work negatively.

Thus, when one hears claims that South Africans are dissatisfied with their truth and reconciliation process, one must recognize that the claim is largely limited to white South Africans. South Africans as a whole are satisfied with virtually all aspects of the process. This finding is important since it shows that granting concessions to the disempowered minority does not necessarily alienate the victorious majority in transitional systems.

## Truth Number Two: Judgments of Amnesty

The above data imply that most South Africans do not penalize the TRC for granting amnesty to those who came forward and admitted gross violations of human rights during the struggle over apartheid. But amnesty is a complex issue that requires further consideration. Thus, we devoted a number of our questions to determining how South Africans feel about allowing perpetrators who admit gross human rights violations to go unpunished.

We first asked a general question about whether the respondent approved of "amnesty being given to those who admitted committing atrocities during the struggle over apartheid." Collapsing the "Strongly approve" and "Approve somewhat" responses, the percentages of those who approved of amnesty are as follows: black, 72 percent; white, 39 percent; Coloured, 42 percent; and Asian origin, 46 percent. Thus, we see in these data a considerable irony: a large majority of blacks approves of amnesty, despite the fact that amnesty was often given to those committing abuses in defense of the apartheid state, while a majority of whites opposes amnesty, despite the fact that whites have profited greatly from the amnesty process. Coloured and Asian respondents tend to disapprove of amnesty, like whites. The responses of black South Africans are particularly noteworthy, since it is widely assumed that they opposed amnesty.

We also asked whether amnesty is thought to be fair to various individuals and groups in South Africa. Table 3 reports the results.

In general, opinions about the fairness of amnesty vary considerably, depending upon about whom the question of fairness is asked. Not surprisingly, amnesty is thought to be most fair to those seeking it; it is judged least fair to those who died during the struggle over apartheid. It is perhaps surprising to note how fair amnesty is seen with respect to the victims. Although a majority views it as unfair, considerable minorities are of the contrary opinion. It is also noteworthy that sizable minorities view the amnesty process as being unfair even to those seeking amnesty.

A majority of blacks rate amnesty as unfair to the victims, to ordinary people, and especially to those who died during the struggle over apartheid. This finding must be understood within the context of the evidence concerning evaluations of the TRC (see above). While people thought the TRC did a pretty good job on amnesty, they also think amnesty is unfair. Perhaps these people judged the TRC to have done as good a job as it could given its mandate. Since most black South Africans recognize the trade-off between civil war and amnesty (see above), perhaps their views of amnesty and the TRC are tempered accordingly.

We have grown accustomed to identifying stark racial differences in these data – such is not the case, however, with regard to fairness judgments. For instance, in contrast to most of our findings, black and white South Africans hold remarkably similar views about fairness, even in terms of judgments of fairness to those who died during the struggle over apartheid (72.1 percent versus 72.7 percent judge it

TABLE 3. *Perceptions of the fairness of amnesty*

| Is amnesty fair to... | Fair | Unfair | Don't know | Number |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| The victims? | | | | |
| African | 34.0 | 62.2 | 3.8 | 2004 |
| White | 16.8 | 74.6 | 8.6 | 981 |
| Coloured | 18.8 | 54.9 | 26.3 | 483 |
| Asian origin | 23.7 | 68.2 | 8.2 | 245 |
| Those seeking amnesty? | | | | |
| African | 63.3 | 29.3 | 7.3 | 2001 |
| White | 56.4 | 28.3 | 15.3 | 982 |
| Coloured | 34.4 | 34.8 | 30.8 | 483 |
| Asian origin | 48.6 | 39.6 | 11.8 | 245 |
| Ordinary people like you? | | | | |
| African | 38.9 | 53.9 | 7.2 | 1998 |
| White | 28.0 | 52.0 | 20.0 | 981 |
| Coloured | 26.0 | 42.6 | 31.4 | 477 |
| Asian origin | 26.1 | 62.9 | 11.0 | 245 |
| Those who died during the struggle over apartheid? | | | | |
| African | 21.4 | 72.1 | 6.5 | 2002 |
| White | 12.9 | 72.7 | 14.4 | 982 |
| Coloured | 7.4 | 66.3 | 26.2 | 484 |
| Asian origin | 6.1 | 86.5 | 7.3 | 245 |

*Note*: The question read: "In general, how fair do you think [the TRC] is to . . . ."
Percentages total 100 percent across the rows (except for rounding errors).

unfair). This may indicate that whites recognize many white victims of the struggle for and against the old regime. Perhaps the truth and reconciliation process has contributed to white perceptions of themselves as victims in this sense.

Coloured South Africans tend to express relatively high levels of uncertainty about the fairness of amnesty, with the percentage of respondents unable to form a judgment exceeding 25 percent in each of the questions. This no doubt reflects some of the ambivalence Coloured people feel about apartheid, the relevance of the truth and reconciliation process to them, and their role in the New South Africa. South Africans of Asian origin are the most likely group to perceive unfairness in amnesty. They are most likely to claim that the process has been unfair to people like them, and especially to those who died during the struggle over apartheid.

### *Summary*

Generally speaking, amnesty is judged by most South Africans to be unfair. Even in terms of fairness to the individuals seeking amnesty, the process is not evaluated as overwhelmingly fair. Moreover, amnesty is thought to be particularly unjust when it comes to those who died during the struggle over apartheid. Attitudes toward amnesty are one of the few instances in which the opinions of black and white South Africans generally converge. Nonetheless, while amnesty is popular among only a small fraction of the South African population, irrespective of race, blacks

(but not those of other races) seem to conclude that amnesty is a price that had to be paid in order to secure a peaceful transition to democratic rule in South Africa, and they therefore support amnesties being given.

Transitional political systems often tend to implement "victors' justice," in which the actions of the victors are judged to be fair while the actions of the vanquished are condemned. Because the South African struggle ended in a stalemate, the forces of apartheid were able to extract concessions from the "victors' justice" model. The findings of this research indicate that such concessions do not necessarily undermine the legitimacy of the truth and reconciliation process itself.

## Truth Number Three: Consequences for the Rule of Law

Aryeh Neier, among others, has expressed concern that truth and reconciliation processes, and amnesty in particular, undermine support for the rule of law. "When the community of nations shies away from responsibility for bringing to justice the authors of crimes against humanity, it subverts the rule of law" (Neier, 1998: 213). It is worth considering, therefore, whether attitudes toward the rule of law or toward legal institutions correlate with views of the truth and reconciliation process.

My approach to investigating attitudes toward the rule of law is twofold. First, I consider a scale measuring general commitment to universalism in the rule of law.[13] Since granting amnesty reflects anything but a commitment to equal treatment before the criminal law (for example, those who committed gross human rights violations with a political motive are exonerated, while those without a political motive are held criminally accountable), I hypothesize that the truth and reconciliation process has undermined support for universalism in the application of the law. Second, I also consider the hypothesis that the truth and reconciliation process has eroded confidence in legal institutions, based on a similar logic. The most direct test of these hypotheses requires data over time (that is, a comparison of surveys conducted before and after the truth and reconciliation process). Unfortunately, such data are not available, so a less direct test of the hypotheses is necessary.

If the truth and reconciliation process undermined support for the rule of law, we should find that supporters of granting amnesty to gross human rights violators are less strongly committed to legal universalism and extend less confidence to South Africa's new legal institutions. Two causal processes are possible: either those with weak commitments to the rule of law in the first place were more attracted to the work of the truth and reconciliation processes or an understanding of the value of the truth and reconciliation process caused a relaxation of support for the law and legal institutions. Under both processes, a correlation between support for amnesty and these rule-of-law indicators should exist.

The correlation between support for granting amnesty and attitudes toward legal universalism is entirely trivial within each of the racial groups in South Africa. The correlations for blacks, whites, Coloured people, and those of Asian origin, respectively, are: –.05, .02, –.04, and .05.[14] The data are definitive: how one judges amnesty has nothing to do with one's valuation of the rule of law.

On the other hand, a significant positive relationship is found within all four racial groups between support for amnesty and confidence in the South African

legal system. For example, among Africans, the correlation is .23, which means that those who support granting amnesty to gross human rights violators tend fairly substantially to have *more* confidence in the legal system. Certainly, there is no evidence whatsoever in these data that approval of amnesty and support for legal universalism and legal institutions are incompatible with each other.

Thus, I can find no evidence that the amnesty process has undermined support for the rule of law in South Africa, and this conclusion applies to Africans, whites, Coloured people, and those of Asian origin with equal force. The corrosive dangers that many see flowing from granting amnesty to gross human rights violators has not been generalized to a global disrespect for the rule of law among ordinary South Africans.

## Truth Number Four: Judgments of Blame for Apartheid

It is sometimes said that the truth and reconciliation process dilutes blame for the sins of apartheid by focusing upon specific acts by individual miscreants while ignoring the systematic injustices wrought by the institutions of apartheid. If this is so, then the lessons of the past are not well learned (at least in South Africa). Consequently, the respondents were asked: "We are interested in your views about who was responsible for creating and maintaining the old apartheid state and its institutions. How much should the following groups be blamed for the creation of and maintenance of the apartheid state in South Africa?" The responses to the nine groups and institutions are shown in Table 4. The percentages listed under "Blame" are those who blame the institution or group "A great deal" or "Somewhat," while "Not blame" refers to responses of "Not very much" and "Little if any blame."

The data in this table provide ample evidence that South Africans are willing to apportion blame widely to the institutions and groups of apartheid. Nearly all Africans blame white Afrikaners and the National Party and very large majorities also blame Afrikaans churches, white English speakers, and the white business community. Whites hold vastly different views, although a large majority blames the National Party, and majorities blame white Afrikaners and communists. Coloured South Africans are considerably more confused about whom to blame (with much larger percentages of "Don't know" responses), but two-thirds attribute responsibility to the National Party and white Afrikaners. Those of Asian origin also find many of these institutions and groups blameworthy. Thus, there is little evidence in these data that the major institutions and groups of apartheid escape responsibility for the repressive political and social system implemented in 1948.

It is perhaps noteworthy that substantial proportions of whites are willing to blame white Afrikaners and white English. Whether this means individuals accept responsibility themselves for the sins of their group is unclear, but certainly it seems that whites as a group shouldered at least some responsibility for the apartheid system.

South Africans seem to accept the truth and reconciliation process as a necessary evil. Plenty of blame for the past exists (and people judge amnesty to be unfair), yet most seem willing to suspend their judgment about the past and look toward a more democratic and reconciled future for the country.

TABLE 4. *Attributions of blame for apartheid*

| Blame | Blame | Not blame | Don't know |
|---|---|---|---|
| National Party | | | |
| African | 92.0 | 5.4 | 2.6 |
| White | 74.2 | 18.5 | 7.3 |
| Coloured | 66.9 | 16.3 | 16.8 |
| Asian origin | 74.3 | 20.4 | 5.3 |
| White Afrikaners | | | |
| African | 95.6 | 3.0 | 1.4 |
| White | 55.3 | 37.9 | 6.7 |
| Coloured | 67.4 | 16.0 | 16.6 |
| Asian origin | 83.7 | 11.4 | 4.9 |
| White English | | | |
| African | 74.3 | 22.8 | 2.9 |
| White | 44.2 | 49.9 | 5.9 |
| Coloured | 50.0 | 31.8 | 18.2 |
| Asian origin | 68.2 | 26.1 | 5.7 |
| Afrikaans churches | | | |
| African | 75.6 | 20.1 | 4.4 |
| White | 41.7 | 48.7 | 9.6 |
| Coloured | 44.5 | 36.2 | 19.3 |
| Asian origin | 59.2 | 27.8 | 13.1 |
| White business community | | | |
| African | 73.1 | 23.6 | 3.3 |
| White | 35.4 | 53.9 | 10.7 |
| Coloured | 54.5 | 26.6 | 18.8 |
| Asian origin | 59.2 | 32.7 | 8.2 |
| Askaris | | | |
| African | 65.6 | 18.4 | 16.0 |
| White | 41.8 | 28.5 | 29.7 |
| Coloured | 55.1 | 13.9 | 31.0 |
| Asian origin | 69.7 | 14.3 | 16.0 |
| Coloured people | | | |
| African | 26.6 | 63.9 | 9.5 |
| White | 14.2 | 73.3 | 12.5 |
| Coloured | 10.4 | 67.7 | 21.9 |
| Asian origin | 15.5 | 71.0 | 13.5 |
| South Africans of Asian origin | | | |
| African | 31.4 | 55.9 | 12.7 |
| White | 17.9 | 67.5 | 14.7 |
| Coloured | 12.4 | 58.1 | 29.5 |
| Asian origin | 9.8 | 79.2 | 11.0 |
| Communists | | | |
| African | 30.2 | 57.0 | 12.8 |
| White | 56.8 | 29.4 | 13.7 |
| Coloured | 42.4 | 30.3 | 27.3 |
| Asian origin | 56.7 | 28.6 | 14.7 |

*Note*: The question read: "We are interested in your views about who was responsible for creating and maintaining the old apartheid state and its institutions. How much should the following groups be blamed for the creation of and maintenance of the apartheid state in South Africa?"
Percentages total 100 percent across the rows (except for rounding errors).

## Truth Number Five: Not Much Truth in Truth and Reconciliation

The most difficult question to address in this article concerns the central issues of truth and reconciliation. Both concepts are entirely ambiguous and contestable. I begin by considering whether the TRC was successful at developing a constituency for its version of the truth about apartheid.

One of the objectives of the truth and reconciliation process was to create a collective memory for South Africa. A collective memory is an accepted version of the truth about the country's past. When a collective memory is established, it becomes difficult (although not impossible) for people to deny that certain activities took place. The TRC's multifaceted truth is not necessarily an officially sanctioned truth, but is instead an amalgamation of ideas about the past with which all South Africans must at least contend.

We asked our respondents to judge the veracity of several substantive statements about South Africa's past.[15] Their responses are reported in Table 5. Several of our propositions directly addressed apartheid, with the first statement in Table 5 stating flatly that "Apartheid was a crime against humanity." This judgment turned out to be widely accepted among South Africans of every race, with large majorities of blacks, whites, Coloured people, and those of Asian origin willing to condemn apartheid. That only a relatively small minority of South Africans rejects this conclusion about apartheid surely constitutes an important element of a collective South African memory shared by all racial groups. Still, whites were significantly less likely than others to judge the statement true, with nearly one-quarter of whites disagreeing with the proposition.

But despite this apparent consensus condemning apartheid, a significant proportion of South Africans of every race also believe that the idea of apartheid was good, even if the implementation of the ideology was not. While this view characterizes a slim majority of whites, it is perhaps somewhat surprising that more than a third of Africans, Coloured people, and South Africans of Asian origin agree that, in principle, apartheid was a good idea. Most likely, reactions to this statement reflect at least in part a reference to the "separate development" implications of apartheid, rather than to the idea that a racial hierarchy is acceptable or desirable. Apartheid was sometimes understood as a system of racial segregation and "separate development" (*aparte ontwikkeling*).[16] This aspect of apartheid is compatible with some elements of black nationalism emphasizing the separation of races and the development of blacks apart from whites. For instance, the Black Consciousness Movement arose in South Africa under the leadership and influence of Steve Biko. The movement had as its main aim the psychological liberation of black people from feelings of inferiority and the restoration of their human dignity (see Sibisi, 1991), and rejected interracial integration as an important goal (at least in the short term). Similarly, the Pan-Africanist Congress has never been committed to building a multiracial South Africa, so it seems quite likely that its supporters would favor at least some form of "separate development." Thus, it is plausible that not all blacks in South Africa view racial separation as a principle of unequivocal evil (for further discussion of these findings, see Gibson, 2004).[17]

In light of these ambivalent attitudes toward apartheid, it is not surprising to find that many South Africans believe that the struggle to preserve apartheid was just. That a greater proportion of blacks than whites hold this view is unexpected, however. Indeed, of all four racial groups, black South Africans are the most likely

TABLE 5. *Acceptance of the TRC's view of South Africa's past*

| | True | Not true | Don't know |
|---|---|---|---|
| Apartheid was a crime against humanity | | | |
| Black | 94.3 | 4.5 | 1.1 |
| White | 72.9 | 23.4 | 3.8 |
| Coloured | 86.4 | 7.6 | 6.0 |
| Asian origin | 89.0 | 8.6 | 2.4 |
| Despite abuses, apartheid ideas were good ones | | | |
| African | 35.5 | 58.7 | 5.8 |
| White | 51.0 | 43.9 | 5.2 |
| Coloured | 34.9 | 51.3 | 13.8 |
| Asian origin | 42.0 | 52.7 | 5.3 |
| The struggle to preserve apartheid was just | | | |
| African | 39.4 | 57.3 | 3.3 |
| White | 33.7 | 58.6 | 7.6 |
| Coloured | 24.4 | 58.8 | 16.8 |
| Asian origin | 35.9 | 55.5 | 8.6 |
| Those struggling for and against apartheid did unforgivable things | | | |
| African | 76.1 | 9.7 | 14.2 |
| White | 73.8 | 6.8 | 19.5 |
| Coloured | 66.0 | 6.2 | 27.7 |
| Asian origin | 82.9 | 3.7 | 13.5 |
| The abuses of apartheid were due to evil individuals, not to the state institutions themselves | | | |
| African | 41.1 | 35.1 | 23.7 |
| White | 43.2 | 28.1 | 28.8 |
| Coloured | 28.2 | 35.3 | 36.5 |
| Asian origin | 46.5 | 34.3 | 19.2 |

*Note*: The full statements were as follows.
"Apartheid was a crime against humanity."
"There were certainly some abuses under the old apartheid system, but the ideas behind apartheid were basically good ones."
"The struggle to preserve apartheid was just."
"Both those struggling for and those struggling against the old apartheid system did unforgivable things to people."
"The abuses under apartheid were largely committed by a few evil individuals, not by the state institutions themselves."
Percentages total 100 percent across the rows (except for rounding errors).

to assert that the struggle to preserve apartheid was just, although it should be noted that a majority of blacks does not subscribe to this view. Again, perhaps this indicates that people accept that each racial community has the right to a separate existence, and if so, it follows that efforts to preserve separateness are legitimate. Still, it is important to acknowledge that a majority of South Africans of every race disagrees that the struggle to preserve apartheid was just.

South Africans of every race accept what was probably one of the most important conclusions of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission: that those

who struggled for and against apartheid committed horrible abuses. The difference between blacks and whites on this issue is entirely insignificant, although Coloured South Africans are slightly less willing to accept the veracity of this statement (due to a higher percentage of respondents who are uncertain), while those of Asian origin are somewhat more likely to believe it to be true. It is noteworthy that, by implication, both blacks and whites endorse the view that "their side" in the struggle over apartheid engaged in horrible actions (even if this should not be taken to mean that people believe that both sides did equally bad things or did them in equal numbers).

Considerable uncertainty exists about whether the failures of apartheid were a function of individuals or institutions, with uncharacteristically high levels of "Don't know" replies appearing in the answers of each of the four racial groups. It is noteworthy that a plurality of blacks, whites, and those of Asian origin is willing to attribute the abuses to individuals, not to the state institutions themselves. This is consistent with the finding that many view apartheid as a good idea poorly implemented (perhaps because the institutions of apartheid were acceptable, but that a handful of rogue individuals did horrific things in the name of apartheid). Coloured South Africans are entirely divided by this question, with roughly equal proportions believing it true, untrue, and being agnostic about its truth. As the data on blame attributions suggest (see above), that South Africans blame individuals does not necessarily imply that they let institutions and groups off the hook for the numerous sins of apartheid.

### *Summary*

Our survey reveals that most South Africans of every race agree that apartheid as practiced in South Africa was a crime against humanity. Nonetheless, views about the country's apartheid past are complicated. In principle, apartheid is not perceived as inherently evil by everyone, even if most agree that the implementation of apartheid ideas was a crime against humanity. In this sense, the collective memory that the TRC promulgated is not widely accepted. Not surprisingly, whites are more forgiving of the failures of apartheid, but blacks, Coloured people, and South Africans of Asian origin hold incredibly tolerant views of the apartheid past (most likely as it pertains to the idea of separate racial development and not racial hierarchy and domination). Generally speaking, the truth and reconciliation process has been successful at exposing human rights abuses by both sides in the struggle over apartheid.

Perhaps what these data indicate is that South Africans of all races have come to accept at least some legitimacy to the claims and values of their opponents. If apartheid is an unequivocal crime against humanity, then compromise, accommodation, and tolerance are difficult. But if the country's collective memory holds that all sides committed atrocities during the struggle (even if not in equal frequency or ferocity), that racial separation is to some degree legitimate, and that at least some of the sins of the past are attributable to individuals not institutions, then the door to reconciliation opens. Perhaps the most important achievement of the truth and reconciliation process in South Africa is that all racial groups have come to see the past in equivocal terms, not as a struggle between absolute good and infinite evil.

## Concluding Comments

Of course, the big question for understanding the activities of the TRC is whether any "reconciliation" was produced by the truth process. This is a very large question (since ultimately it is a question of societal transformation) that is beyond the scope of this article. But *Overcoming Apartheid: Can Truth Reconcile a Divided Nation?* (Gibson, 2004) provides compelling evidence that the truth produced by the TRC may indeed have contributed to greater reconciliation in South Africa. That claim, though too complicated for consideration here, makes the questions addressed in this article all the more important.

In this article, I have reported on a number of truths about the truth and reconciliation process in South Africa. I have not presented the entire truth about the process, since a public-opinion survey of ordinary people can only go so far in illuminating the crucial issues surrounding such institutions of transitional justice. I have not, for instance, presented evidence on the views of South African leaders, perpetrators, or victims of apartheid. Moreover, beyond race, I have not addressed in this article other important cleavages that may divide South Africans on matters of truth and reconciliation (as in differences between Afrikaans- and English-speaking whites).

Nonetheless, this article purports to contribute to understanding the truth and reconciliation process since so little has previously been reported about the content of South African opinion toward this bold South African experiment. Perhaps the single most important finding from this analysis is that South Africans as a whole clearly perceive the truth and reconciliation process quite positively. Though this "whole" overwhelmingly reflects the views of the large, black majority (and whites are far more disgruntled than blacks), this finding is all the more important since it is so often assumed that blacks perceive themselves to have had a "raw deal" out of truth and reconciliation. South Africa's truth and reconciliation process seems to have produced a truth that contributed to reconciliation, and most South Africans recognize and appreciate that.

Far too many unsupported assumptions are made about truth processes, in part because empirical evidence on how they are judged and what consequences they have are so scarce. Conventional wisdom holds that amnesty undermines the rule of law; victors' justice is the only form of justice acceptable to the new majority in transitional systems; and a balanced view of the past cannot be constructed as a collective memory of the past. All of this "wisdom" is untrue in the South African case. Future empirical research must be conducted to determine the veracity of the assumptions in the many other instances of truth and reconciliation in the world today.

## Appendix A

This analysis is based on a face-to-face survey of the South African mass public conducted in 2000/01.[18] The fieldwork began in November 2000 and "mop-up" interviews were completed by February 2001. The sample is representative of the entire South African population[19] (18 years old and older); 3727 randomly selected South Africans were interviewed. The average interview lasted 84 minutes (with a median of 80 minutes). The overall response rate for the survey was approximately 87 percent. The main reason for failing to complete the interview was the inability to contact the respondent; refusal to be interviewed accounted

for approximately 27 percent of the failed interviews. Such a high rate of response can be attributed to the general willingness of the South African population to be interviewed, the large number of callbacks we employed, and the use of an incentive for participating in the interview.[20] Most of the interviewers were females and interviewers of every race were employed in the project. Most respondents were interviewed by an interviewer of their own race. The percentage of same-race interviews for each of the racial groups was as follows: African, 99.8 percent; white, 98.7 percent; Coloured, 71.5 percent; and South Africans of Asian origin, 73.9 percent.

Interviews were conducted in the respondent's language of choice, with a large plurality of the interviews being done in English (44.5 percent). The questionnaire was first prepared in English and then translated into Afrikaans, Zulu, Xhosa, North Sotho, South Sotho, Tswana, and Tsonga.[21] The methodology of creating a multilingual questionnaire followed closely that recommended by Brislin (1970). Producing an instrument in this many languages that is conceptually and operationally equivalent is a very difficult task and we have no doubt that a considerable amount of measurement error was introduced by the multilingual context in which this research was conducted. Nonetheless, we took all possible steps to minimize this error, including using multiple indicators of most concepts.

Because the various racial and linguistic groups were not selected in proportion to their size in the South African population (so as to ensure sufficient numbers of cases for analysis), it is necessary to weight the data according to the inverse of the probability of selection for each respondent. Following standard practice in survey research throughout the world, we have applied post-stratification (minor) weights to the final data in order to make the sample slightly more representative of the South African population.

## Notes

1. For a systematic analysis of the views of experts in the 1980s toward the likelihood of a successful transition to democracy in South Africa, see Tetlock (1998). See also Sparks (2003) on the South African "miracle." The struggle against apartheid was itself bloody (and conventional wisdom is that more South Africans died in political violence in the 1990–94 period than in all other periods of South African history), but few prognosticators expected that the apartheid state would be defeated without anything short of a full-blown civil war.
2. Useful accounts of the day-to-day operation of truth commissions have been published. For instance, Boraine (2000) gives the insider's view of the politics of South Africa's TRC. So too does Orr (2000), although her story is both more personal and more connected to specific cases before the TRC. The transformation of an individual commissioner is documented by Gobodo-Madikizela's (2003) moving account of her meetings with one of apartheid's worst assassins. Several highly informative anthologies on truth commissions have been published. In the South African case, none is better than that compiled by Villa-Vicencio and Verwoerd (2000).
3. As Hayner (2001: 6) asserts: "Unfortunately, many comfortable assumptions have been restated over and again in untested assertions by otherwise astute and careful writers, thinkers, and political leaders ... Some of the most oft-repeated statements, and those that we perhaps most wish to be true, are due careful scrutiny. Indeed, they don't always hold up well even under a test of anecdotal evidence."
4. The distinction between perpetrators and victims is commonly made in South Africa, although Borer (2003) rightly argues that many victims were perpetrators, and vice versa.

5. For a more detailed consideration of race in South Africa, see Gibson and Gouws (2003: 35–8) and Gibson (2004: 24–7). In general, I accept the racial categories as identified by the editor of a special issue of *Daedalus* focused on South Africa: "Many of the authors in this issue observe the South African convention of dividing the country's population into four racial categories: white (of European descent), colored (of mixed ancestry), Indian (forebears from the Indian subcontinent), and African. The official nomenclature for 'Africans' has itself varied over the years, changing from 'native' to 'Bantu' in the middle of the apartheid era, and then changing again to 'black' or, today, 'African/black.' All of these terms appear in the essays that follow." See Graubard (2001: viii). Note as well that Desmond Tutu felt obliged to offer a similar caveat about race in South Africa in the final report of the TRC. Although these racial categories were employed by the apartheid regime to divide and control the population, these are nonetheless labels South Africans use to refer to themselves (see, for example, Gibson and Gouws, 2003). I use the term "Coloured" to signify that this is a distinctly South African construction of race, and "Asian origin" to refer to South Africans drawn from the Indian Subcontinent. Note that just as black South Africans are divided by ethnicity and language (for example, Xhosa and Zulu), so too are whites (English and Afrikaans) and, to a lesser extent, Coloured people (English and Afrikaans speakers). (South Africans of Asian origin overwhelmingly use English as their home language.) Many important ethno-linguistic differences exist on issues of truth and reconciliation; for a more detailed discussion of these, see Gibson (2004).
6. For the most thorough comparison of truth commissions throughout the world, see Hayner (2001). The literature on transitional justice processes is vast, ranging from normative and philosophical treatises (for example, Minow, 1998) to statistical analyses of peace-inducing mechanisms (for example, Snyder and Vinjamuri, 2003) to historical analyses (for example, Elster, 2004) and to largely anecdotal, evaluative studies (for example, James and Van de Vijver, 2000).
7. It is not surprising, therefore, that the most influential anthology on the TRC is entitled *Looking Back, Reaching Forward* (Villa-Vicencio and Verwoerd, 2000).
8. See http://africana.rug.ac.be/texts/publications/Annelies/Survey.doc for a bibliography of nearly 450 works on the South African truth and reconciliation process. See also Borer (2004).
9. Hayner (2000: 33) distinguishes the South African truth and reconciliation process in the following ways: "a public process of disclosure by perpetrators and public hearings for victims; an amnesty process that reviewed individual applications and avoided any blanket amnesty; and a process that was intensely focused on national healing and reconciliation, with the intent of moving a country from its repressive past to a peaceful future, where former opponents could work side by side."
10. In 2001, President Thabo Mbeki charged the TRC with producing additional volumes – a codicil to the original report. Volume 6 was published in March 2003 and, after litigation, Volume 7 in October 2002.
11. A complete analysis of the views of Coloured South Africans is beyond the scope of this analysis. I note, however, that Coloured voters often supported the National Party (the party of apartheid) and that Coloured South Africans are generally fairly conservative. Coloured–black conflict has been, and continues to be, substantial (for example, today it focuses on affirmative action). Moreover, Coloured people escaped the full brunt of apartheid, in part because the apartheid system extended some degree of political representation to the Coloured community.
12. For example, de Lange (2000: 22) writes: "It is a widely held view, by serious commentators, that without [the compromise on amnesty], there would have been no settlement, no interim constitution, no elections, no democracy and a possible continuation of the conflicts of the past."
13. I asked the South African respondents to express their agreement or disagreement with the four statements measuring support for the rule of law shown below (with the response supportive of the rule of law following in parentheses):

Sometimes it might be better to ignore the law and solve problems immediately rather than wait for a legal solution. (Disagree.)
It's all right to get around the law as long as you don't actually break it. (Disagree.)
In times of emergency, the government ought to be able to suspend law in order to solve pressing social problems. (Disagree.)
It is not necessary to obey the laws of a government that I did not vote for. (Disagree.)

Each of these statements juxtaposes an alternative value against strictly following the law. For example, the first item asks the respondent to make a choice between expediency and adherence to the rule of law. The measure I use in this analysis is simply the average response to these four statements.

14. Only the coefficient for blacks achieves statistical significance at the .05 level. However, significance tests are unduly influenced by large numbers of cases (as with the black subsample). The proper conclusion to be drawn from these data is that these relationships vary from trivial to non-existent.
15. These items were constructed in collaboration with Charles Villa-Vicencio, currently director of the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation. These five statements are simple, widely accepted (at least throughout the world, if not necessarily in South Africa), and are interrelated, and the veracity of the statements would undoubtedly not be controversial among the leaders of the truth and reconciliation process themselves. As shown in Gibson (2004), there is a close connection between these propositions and the conclusions of the TRC as chronicled in its "Final Report."
16. H.F. Verwoerd, the principal architect of modern apartheid, propounded the ideology of "separate development." Defending the viewpoint in the 1960s, Prime Minister John Vorster spoke of "recognising the right of existence of distinct nations and colour groups" and of "providing each with opportunities to develop according to their ability and with the maintenance of their identity" (Giliomee and Schlemmer (1989: 64), citing *Die Burger*, May 18, 1968). Note that the African National Congress has always explicitly rejected the ideology of separate development, although other elements of the liberation movement were very much in favor of racial separation.
17. Some empirical evidence on this matter is available. At a different point in the interview, we asked the respondents to judge the following statement (using a five-point, Likert response set): "People should have the right to set up their own communities, and not allow those of a different race to live in their communities." Blacks are entirely divided on this issue, with 44 percent agreeing to the idea of separate communities and 46 percent disagreeing. Indeed, blacks are *more likely* than any other racial group in South Africa to agree to this form of racial segregation. Moreover, there is a reasonably strong relationship between favoring residential racial segregation and believing that the ideas behind apartheid were good: $r = .25$. Among those blacks favoring residential segregation, 48.4 percent claim that apartheid included good ideas; among those disapproving of residential segregation this percentage falls markedly to 24.2 percent. Thus, at least some portion of the anomalous black approval of apartheid is surely a reflection of beliefs about the desirability of separate racial development. This evidence may not be definitive, but it is compatible with the view that those blacks believing apartheid ideas were good may have been reacting mainly to the idea of the physical separation of blacks and whites.
18. For additional details, see Gibson (2004).
19. This is a true, stratified random sample of the entire country (an area probability sample). With one exception (hostels), no areas of the country were excluded from the sampling population. For details on the sample, see Gibson (2004: Appendix A). Note also that the full questionnaire is reported in Gibson (2004: Appendix B).
20. The incentive was a magnetic torch (flashlight), with which the respondents were quite pleased. Some research indicates that providing incentives has few negative consequences for survey responses (Singer et al., 1998).
21. Many of the ideas represented in the survey were developed and refined with the aid of focus groups. In 2000, we ran six focus groups, involving roughly 60 participants.

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