Connected Stocks: Evidence from Tehran Stock Exchange

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Motivation

Research Question

- Can the common ownership cause stock return comovement ?
 - We connect stocks through the common ownership by blockholders (ownership > 1%)
 - We focus on excess return comovement for a pair of the stocks
 - We use common ownership to forecast cross-sectional variation in the realized correlation of four-factor + industry residuals

Why does it matter?

- Covariance
 - Covariance is a key component of risk in many financial applications. (Portfolio selection, Risk management, Hedging and Asset pricing)
 - Covariance is a significant input in risk measurement models (Such as Value-at-Risk)
- Return predictability
 - If it's valid, we can build a profitable buy-sell strategy

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Main Effect

 Common-ownership and comovement efect [Antón and Polk (2014)]

Stocks sharing many common investors tend to comove more strongly with each other in the future than otherwise similar stocks.

• Common-ownership and liquidity demand

[Koch et al (2016), Pastor and Stambaugh (2003), Acharya and Pedersen (2005)] Commonality in stock liquidity is likely driven by correlated trading among a given stock's investors. Commonality in liquidity is important because it can influence expected returns

• Trading needs and comovement

[Greenwood and Thesmar (2011)]

If the investors of mutual funds have correlated trading needs, the stocks that are held by mutual funds can comove even without any portfolio overlap of the funds themselves

Stock price synchronicity and poor corporate governance

[Boubaker et al. (2014), Khanna and Thomas (2009), Morck et al. (2000)] Stock price synchronicity has been attributed to poor corporate governance and a lack of firm-level transparency. On the other hand, better law protection encourages informed trading, which facilitates the incorporation of firm-specific information into stock prices, leading to lower synchronicity

Papers' Detail

Commonownership measurements

Model-based measures

- ullet HJL $_I^A(A,B)=\sum_{i\in I^{A,B}}rac{lpha_{i,B}}{lpha_{i,A}+lpha_{i,B}}$ [Harford et al.-JFE-2011]
 - Bi-directional
 - Pair-level measure of common ownership
 - Its potential impact on managerial incentives
 - Measure not necessarily increases when the relative ownership increases
 - Accounts only for an investor's relative holdings
- $\bullet \quad \mathsf{MHHI} = \textstyle \sum_{j} \sum_{k} s_{j} s_{k} \frac{\sum_{i} \mu_{ij} \nu_{ik}}{\sum_{i} \mu_{ij} \nu_{ij}} \text{ [Azar et al.-JF-2018]}$
 - Capture a specific type of externality
 - Measured at the industry level
 - Assumes that investors are fully informed about the externalities
- $\operatorname{GGL}^A(A,B) = \sum_{i=1}^I \alpha_{i,A} g(\beta_{i,A}) \alpha_{i,B}$ [Erik et al.-JFE-2019]
 - Bi-directional
 - Less information
 - Not sensitive to the scope
 - Measure increases when the relative ownership of firm A increases

Commonownership measurements

Ad hoc common ownership measures

- $Overlap_{Count}(A, B) = \sum_{i \in I^{A,B}} 1$ [He and Huang -RFS(2017)] [He et al-JFE(2019)]
- $Overlap_{Min}(A,B) = \sum_{i \in I^{A,B}} min\{\alpha_{i,A},\alpha_{i,B}\}$ [Newham et al.(2018)]
- $Overlap_{AP}(A,B) = \sum_{i \in I^{A,B}} \alpha_{i,A} \frac{\bar{\nu}_A}{\bar{\nu}_A + \bar{\nu}_B} + \alpha_{i,B} \frac{\bar{\nu}_B}{\bar{\nu}_A + \bar{\nu}_B}$ [Antón and Polk -JF(2014)]
- $Overlap_{HL}(A,B) = \sum_{i \in I^{A,B}} \alpha_{i,A} \times \sum_{i \in I^{A,B}} \alpha_{i,B}$ [Hansen and Lott -JGQA(1996)] [Freeman-(2019)]
- Unappealing properties
 - Unclear is whether any of these measures represents an economically meaningful measure of common ownership's impact on managerial incentives.
 - Both Overlap_{Count} and Overlap_{AP} are invariant to the decomposition of ownership between the two firms, which leads to some unappealing properties.



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Antón and Polk -JF(2014)

$$FCAP_{ij,t} = \frac{\sum_{f=1}^{F} (S_{i,t}^{f} P_{i,t} + S_{j,t}^{f} P_{j,t})}{S_{i,t}P_{i,t} + S_{j,t}P_{j,t}}$$

SQRT

Quadratic

$$\frac{\left[\frac{\sum_{f=1}^{F}(\sqrt{S_{i,t}^{f}P_{i,t}}+\sqrt{S_{j,t}^{f}P_{j,t}})}{\sqrt{S_{i,t}P_{i,t}}+\sqrt{S_{j,t}P_{j,t}}}\right]^{2}}{\sqrt{S_{i,t}P_{i,t}}+\sqrt{S_{j,t}P_{j,t}}}\right]^{2}$$

$$\left[\frac{\sum_{f=1}^{F}(\sqrt{S_{i,t}^{f}P_{i,t}}+\sqrt{S_{j,t}^{f}P_{j,t}})}{\sqrt{S_{i,t}P_{i,t}}+\sqrt{S_{j,t}P_{j,t}}}\right]^{2}\left[\frac{\sum_{f=1}^{F}[(S_{i,t}^{f}P_{i,t})^{2}+(S_{j,t}^{f}P_{j,t})^{2}]}{(S_{i,t}P_{i,t})^{2}+(S_{j,t}P_{j,t})^{2}}\right]^{-1}$$


Intuition

If for a pair of stocks with n mutual owners, all owners have even shares of each firm's market cap, then the proposed indexes will be equal to n. Proof

Example


lpha and eta are the percent of common owner's ownership from firms' market cap. For better observation, assume that lpha+eta=100





Comparison of three methods for calculating common ownership

Example of three common owner



Example of three common owner


Ownership	Type I	Type II	Type III	Type IV	Type V	Type VI	Type VII
α_1	1/3	10	20	5	10	20	1
β_1	1/3	10	10	5	10	20	1
α_2	1/3	80	10	5	10	20	1
β_2	1/3	80	20	5	10	20	1
α_3	1/3	10	70	5	10	20	1
β_3	1/3	10	70	5	10	20	1
SQRT	3	2.33	2.56	0.45	0.9	1.8	0.09
SUM	1	1	1	0.15	0.3	0.6	0.03
Quadratic	3	1.52	1.85	133.33	33.33	8.33	3333.33


Conclusion

We use the SQRT formula because it has an acceptable variation and has fair values at lower level of common ownership.

Pair Composition and Business Group


Pair in the Business Group






Pair Composition and Business Group

Pair not in any of Business Groups





Pair Composition

- Pairs consist of two firms with at least one common owner
 - 9976 unique pairs which is 17% of possible pairs $(\frac{342*341}{2} = 58311)$

	mean	min	median	max
Number of unique paris	4201	2889	4099	5115

Year	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Mean
No. of Pairs	4130	5113	5808	6221	5805	3971	5175
No. of Groups	41	42	45	45	45	46	44
No. of Pairs not in Groups	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
No. of Pairs in the same Group	633	755	968	1076	1116	832	897
No. of Pairs not in the same Group	3779	4836	5395	5720	5321	3246	4716
Avg. Number of Common owner	1.24	1.22	1.21	1.20	1.20	1.18	1.21
Med. Number of Common owner	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Avg. Number of Pairs in one Group	23	24	25	28	29	22	25
Med. Number of Pairs in one Group	10	10	9	11	12	9	10
Av. Percent of each Blockholder	18.74	19.25	19.41	19.38	19.28	18.82	19.15
Medi. Percent of each Blockholder	10	10.08	10.31	10.17	10.48	10.79	10
Av. Number of Owners	6.06	5.93	5.8	5.91	5.94	6.06	5.95
Med. Number of Owners	6.08	5.96	5.82	5.92	5.92	6.02	5.95
Av. Block. Ownership	81.37	82.21	82.64	83.29	83.48	82.94	82.66
Med. Block. Ownership	80.03	80.6	80.74	81.48	81.63	81.28	80.96

By Group we mean Business Group


Data Summary

- We use blockholders' data from 2015/03/25 (1394/01/06) to 2020/03/18 (1398/12/28)
 - Includes of 1203 Days and 60 Months
 - Consists of 600 firm inculding 342 firm with common owners

Year	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	mean
No. of Firms	353	381	514	545	573	597	494
No. of Blockholders	721	886	1258	1367	1397	1369	1166
No. of Groups	41	42	46	46	46	46	45
No. of Firms not in Groups	112	124	189	195	219	244	181
No. of Firms in Groups	241	264	333	351	354	353	316
Avg. Number of Members	32	39	42	47	46	43	42
Med. of Number of Members	22	26	29	32	32	32	29
Av. Of each Blockholder's ownership	21	21.6	20.4	22.9	25.5	25.1	23
Med. of Owners' Percent	7.66	6.87	6.8	7.25	9.33	9.63	8
Av. Number of Blockholders	5	5	5	5	5	4	5
Med. Number of Owners	4	4	4	4	4	3	4
Av. Block. Ownership	71.9	71.8	68.5	77.9	78.7	69.3	73
Med. Block. Ownership	80.6	80.4	77.5	83.4	82	75.1	80

By Group we mean Business Group

Number of Pairs



FCA vs. FCAP Summary


	variable	count	mean	std	min	25%	median	75%	max
Total	FCA	256296	0.164	0.266	0.002	0.024	0.057	0.174	3.893
TOLAI	FCAP	256296	0.138	0.188	0.002	0.023	0.052	0.157	0.999
Sama Craun	FCA	41199	0.481	0.419	0.003	0.147	0.424	0.690	3.893
Same Group	FCAP	41199	0.388	0.264	0.004	0.124	0.394	0.605	0.999
Not Same Group	FCA	215097	0.104	0.166	0.002	0.022	0.045	0.112	2.813
Not Same Group	FCAP	215097	0.090	0.120	0.002	0.021	0.042	0.106	0.999
Same Industry	FCA	40009	0.375	0.416	0.007	0.059	0.233	0.567	3.893
Same moustry	FCAP	40009	0.288	0.260	0.006	0.054	0.198	0.491	0.999
Not Same Industry	FCA	216287	0.125	0.205	0.002	0.023	0.048	0.128	2.869
	FCAP	216287	0.110	0.156	0.002	0.022	0.045	0.121	0.999


Results


- By the proposed measurement, common ownership increases
- Common ownership is greater in pairs that are in the same business group and insutry

FCA vs. FCAP Distributions

Monthly







Correlation Calculation

4 Factor + Industry

Frist Step:

Estimate each of these models on periods of three month:

• CAPM + Industry (2 Factor):

$$R_{i,t} = \alpha_i + \beta_{mkt,i} R_{M,t} + \beta_{Ind,i} R_{Ind,t} + \boxed{\varepsilon_{i,t}}$$

• 4 Factor :

$$\begin{split} R_{i,t} &= \alpha_i + \beta_{\textit{mkt},i} R_{\textit{M},t} + \\ &+ \beta_{\textit{HML},i} \textit{HML}_t + \beta_{\textit{SMB},i} \textit{SMB}_t + \beta_{\textit{UMD},i} \textit{UMD}_t + \boxed{\varepsilon_{i,t}} \end{split}$$

• 4 Factor + Industry (5 Factor) :

$$\begin{split} R_{i,t} &= \alpha_i + \beta_{\textit{mkt},i} R_{\textit{M},t} + \beta_{\textit{Ind},i} R_{\textit{Ind},t} + \\ &+ \beta_{\textit{HML},i} \textit{HML}_t + \beta_{\textit{SMB},i} \textit{SMB}_t + \beta_{\textit{UMD},i} \textit{UMD}_t + \boxed{\varepsilon_{i,t}} \end{split}$$

Second Step: Calculate monthly correlation of each stock pair's daily abnormal returns (residuals)

Correlation Calculation Results


Factors	mean	std	min	max
SMB	0.19	1.47	-5.64	19.52
HML	-0.12	1.39	-4.90	23.20
Winner – Loser	0.69	1.06	-2.61	8.58
Market	0.24	1.23	-4.71	4.89

$\rho_{ij,t}$	count	mean	std	min	25%	50%	75%	max
CAPM	255222	0.008	0.324	-1	-0.192	0.007	0.206	1
4 Factor	255250	0.040	0.335	-1	-0.170	0.035	0.248	1
4 Factor + Industry	255239	0.006	0.322	-1	-0.192	0.005	0.204	1

Conclusion

We use the 4 Factor + Industry model to control for exposure to systematic risk because it almost captures all correlations between two firms in each pair.

Future Correlation via FCA



Controls

- ρ_t : Current period correlation
- **SameGroup**: Dummy variable for whether the two stocks belong to the same business group.
- ActiveHolder: Dummy variable for whether at least one of the holders is Active. (the active holder is the one whose average percentage change is greater than median)
- SameIndustry: Dummy variable for whether the two stocks belong to the same Industry.
- SameSize : The negative of absolute difference in percentile ranking of size across a pair
- SameBookToMarket : The negative of absolute difference in percentile ranking of the book to market ratio across a pair

Summary of Controls Monthly

Type of Pairs	Yes	No
SameIndustry	1092	8235
Sumemadery	(11.7%)	(88.3%)
	(11.170)	(00.570)
SameGroup	1100	8227
	(11.8%)	(88.2%)
ActiveHolder	2556	6771
	(27.4%)	(72.6%)

	count	mean	std	min	25%	50%	75%	max
Size1	256296	0.75	0.21	0.01	0.62	0.81	0.93	1
Size2	256296	0.48	0.25	0.00	0.29	0.46	0.67	1.00
SameSize	256296	-0.27	0.21	-0.99	-0.41	-0.23	-0.10	0.00
BookToMarket1	256296	0.52	0.26	0.00	0.32	0.53	0.74	1.00
BookToMarket2	256296	0.50	0.24	0.00	0.31	0.49	0.69	1.00
${\sf SameBookToMarket}$	256296	-0.29	0.21	-1.00	-0.42	-0.25	-0.12	0.00

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Estimation model

• Use Fama macbeth to estimate this model


$$\begin{split} \rho_{ij,t+1} &= \beta_0 + \beta_1 * tr(\mathsf{FCA}_{ij,t}) + \beta_2 * \mathsf{SameGroup}_{ij} \\ &+ \beta_3 * tr(\mathsf{FCA}_{ij,t}) * \mathsf{SameGroup}_{ij} \\ &+ \sum_{k=1}^n \alpha_k * \mathsf{Control}_{ij,t} + \varepsilon_{ij,t+1} \end{split}$$


- tr() is transform function
- Estimate that model on a monthly frequency



Future Correlation via FCA

Normalized Rank-Transformed





Model Estimation

Normalized Rank-Transformed

		Depender	t Variable:Fu	ture Monthly	Correlation o	f 4F+Industry	Residuals	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
FCA*	0.00494***	0.00405***	0.00148	0.000149	0.00403***	0.00384***	0.000268	-0.0000289
	(4.97)	(5.50)	(1.80)	(0.17)	(5.39)	(4.09)	(0.28)	(-0.03)
ρ_t		0.127***	0.126***	0.126***	0.126***	0.127***	0.126***	0.126***
		(4.73)	(4.71)	(4.70)	(4.73)	(4.73)	(4.70)	(4.70)
SameGroup			0.0177***	0.0102***			0.0114***	0.0121***
·			(7.43)	(4.32)			(4.60)	(4.89)
(FCA*) × SameGroup				0.0102***			0.0104***	0.0102***
(, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,				(4.13)			(4.13)	(4.06)
ActiveHolder					0.00192	0.00190	0.00102	0.000517
					(1.30)	(1.29)	(0.66)	(0.34)
(FCA*) × ActiveHolder						0.000737	-0.0000357	0.000174
` '						(0.55)	(-0.03)	(0.13)
SameIndustry							-0.00372	-0.00478*
							(-1.83)	(-2.29)
SameSize								0.0115***
								(4.34)
SameBookToMarket								0.00765*
								(2.02)
Constant	0.00652***	0.00554***	0.00282***	0.00255***	0.00498***	0.00495***	0.00249***	0.00793**
	(8.54)	(8.54)	(4.46)	(3.95)	(7.40)	(7.31)	(3.60)	(7.03)
Observations	242577	241839	241839	241839	241839	241839	241839	241839
R ²	0.001	0.034	0.035	0.035	0.035	0.035	0.036	0.037

t statistics in parentheses





[&]quot; $\rho < 0.05$, "" $\rho < 0.01$, """ $\rho < 0.001$

Model Estimation

Normalized Rank-Transformed (Down Market)

	Future Cor	r. of 4F+Ind.	Residuals
	(1)	(2)	(3)
FCA*	-0.0000289	-0.0000289	0.000582
	(-0.03)	(-0.03)	(0.61)
$(FCA^*) \times SameGroup$	0.0102***	0.0102***	
	(4.06)	(4.06)	
$(FCA^*) imes ActiveHolder$	0.000174	0.000174	0.000288
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.21)
${\sf Down\ Market}\times{\sf SameGroup}$		0.000121	0.000121
		(1.05)	(1.05)
$(FCA^*) \times Down Market \times SameGroup$			0.00533**
			(2.84)
Observations	241839	241839	241839
R^2	0.037	0.037	0.037

t statistics in parentheses



 $^{^*}$ p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Business Group Dummy

We use group dummies and its interaction with FCA*

$$\begin{split} \rho_{ij,t+1} &= \beta_0 + \beta_1 * \mathsf{FCA}^*_{ij,t} \\ &+ \beta_2 * \mathsf{SameGroup}_{ij} + \beta_3 * \mathit{FCA}^*_{ij,t} * \mathsf{SameGroup}_{ij} \\ &+ \sum_{1}^{G} \lambda_{1,g} * \delta_{ij,g} \\ &+ \sum_{1}^{G} \lambda_{2,g} * \delta_{ij,g} * \mathsf{FCA}^*_{ij,t} \\ &+ \sum_{1}^{n} \alpha_k * \mathsf{Control}_{ij,t} + \varepsilon_{ij,t+1} \end{split}$$

• $\delta_{ij,g} = \mathsf{SameGroup}_{ij} * \gamma_g$ which γ_g is a business group bummy

Significant lambdas are

Coef.	t-stat	Uo
0.037	2.41	Retirment
-0.017	-2.13	Melli bank
-0.024	-2.53	Sakt Inv.
-0.025	-2.64	TIPICO
-0.030	-2.94	Setad ejraee Imam
-0.031	-3.48	SITA
-0.036	-3.98	Mostazafan
-0.039	-2.01	Alipour Family
-0.056	-2.3	TORKOIS partners
-0.057	-3.69	Sepal Bank
-0.066	-3.37	Tejarat Bank
-0.086	-3.18	Edalat
-0.156	-5.71	Fars
-0.376	-2.11	Tamin

Effective Business Group

Check banking and Investment

- We define three types of groups
 - Bank's Group: Groups that ,at least, consist of one bank
 - Bank In Group: Groups that their ultimate owner is bank
 - Inv. In Group: Groups that ,at least, consist of one investment firm
- Estimated model:

$$\begin{split} \rho_{ij,t+1} &= \beta_0 + \beta_1 * \mathsf{FCA}^*_{ij,t} + \beta_2 * \mathsf{SameGroup}_{ij} \\ &+ \beta_3 * \mathsf{FCA}^*_{ij,t} * \; \mathsf{SameGroup}_{ij} \\ &+ \beta_4 * \mathsf{Bank's} \; \mathsf{Group}_{ij,g} + \beta_5 * \mathsf{Bank's} \; \mathsf{Group}_{ij,g} * \mathsf{FCA}^*_{ij,t} \\ &+ \beta_6 * \mathsf{Bank} \; \mathsf{In} \; \mathsf{Group}_{ij,g} + \beta_7 * \mathsf{Bank} \; \mathsf{In} \; \mathsf{Group}_{ij,g} * \mathsf{FCA}^*_{ij,t} \\ &+ \beta_8 * \mathsf{Inv.} \; \mathsf{In} \; \mathsf{Group}_{ij,g} + \beta_9 * \mathsf{Inv.} \; \mathsf{In} \; \mathsf{Group}_{ij,g} * \mathsf{FCA}^*_{ij,t} \\ &+ \sum_{k=1}^n \alpha_k * \mathsf{Control}_{ij,t} + \varepsilon_{ij,t+1} \end{split}$$

ullet All dummies of each type define by interaction with SameGroup $_{ij}$

Effective Business Group

Check banking and Investment


	De. Variable:Future Monthly Correlation of 4F+Industry Residua							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)			
FCA*	-0.000142	-0.000151	0.000226	-0.0000291	0.00000405			
	(-0.15)	(-0.16)	(0.25)	(-0.03)	(0.00)			
SameGroup	0.0122***	0.0108***	0.0160***	0.0145***	0.0151***			
	(4.90)	(3.83)	(5.41)	(4.39)	(3.58)			
$(FCA^*) \times SameGroup$	0.0102***	0.00905**	0.0119***	0.0101***	0.00776**			
	(4.08)	(3.37)	(4.53)	(3.91)	(2.68)			
(FCA*) × Bank's group × SameGroup		0.00865*			0.0110**			
		(2.22)			(2.72)			
(FCA*) × Bank in group × SameGroup			-0.0202*		-0.0342**			
			(-2.37)		(-3.43)			
(FCA*) × Inv. in group × SameGroup				0.00392	0.0185**			
				(0.80)	(2.67)			
Observations	241839	241839	241839	241839	241839			
R^2	0.037	0.037	0.038	0.037	0.039			


t statistics in parentheses

^{*} p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Future Correlation via FCA

Discontinuity





Fortnightly

Fama MacBeth Estimation

Discontinuity

	Dependent Variable:Future Monthly Correlation of 4F+Industry Residuals									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)			
FCA*	0.00494***	-0.0000967	-0.000489	-0.000777	-0.000468	-0.000764	-0.000848			
	(4.97)	(-0.07)	(-0.39)	(-0.63)	(-0.37)	(-0.62)	(-0.72)			
$(FCA^* > Q3[FCA^*]) \times FCA^*$		0.0119***	0.0107***	0.00601**	0.0106***	0.00596**	0.00589*			
		(5.85)	(5.13)	(3.06)	(5.06)	(2.98)	(2.89)			
$ ho_{ m t}$			0.126***	0.126***	0.126***	0.126***	0.126***			
			(4.72)	(4.71)	(4.72)	(4.71)	(4.70)			
SameGroup				0.0156***		0.0157***	0.0177**			
				(7.06)		(7.15)	(7.40)			
ActiveHolder					0.000723	0.000491	0.000168			
					(0.46)	(0.31)	(0.11)			
SameIndustry							-0.00511			
							(-2.43)			
SameSize							0.0112**			
							(4.22)			
SameBookToMarket							0.00758			
							(2.00)			
Constant	0.00652***	0.00264*	0.00205*	0.00117	0.00176	0.000897	0.00657**			
	(8.54)	(2.66)	(2.37)	(1.35)	(1.95)	(0.99)	(5.04)			
Observations	242577	242577	241839	241839	241839	241839	241839			
R^2	0.001	0.001	0.035	0.035	0.035	0.036	0.037			


t statistics in parentheses




^{*} $\rho < 0.05$, ** $\rho < 0.01$, *** $\rho < 0.001$

4 Factor + Industry Future Correlation via FCA*

Discontinuity & Business Groups





Discontinuity & Business Groups

		Future Month	nly Correlation	of 4F+Indus	try Residuals	i .
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
FCA*	-0.000848	-0.0000289	-0.00109	-0.0000194	-0.000512	-0.000664
	(-0.72)	(-0.03)	(-0.94)	(-0.02)	(-0.44)	(-0.59)
$(FCA^* > Q3[FCA^*]) \times FCA^*$	0.00589**		0.00315		0.00173	0.00193
	(2.89)		(1.38)		(0.74)	(0.85)
$(FCA^*) \times SameGroup$		0.0102***	0.00925***	0.00115		0.00180
		(4.06)	(3.46)	(0.27)		(0.44)
$(FCA^* > Q3[FCA^*]) \times (FCA^*) \times SameGroup$				0.0136*	0.0137***	0.0117*
				(2.60)	(3.96)	(2.41)
Observations	241839	241839	241839	241839	241839	241839
R^2	0.037	0.037	0.037	0.037	0.037	0.037

t statistics in parentheses

^{*} p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Model Estimation


Grouped by size


		All Firms			Big Firms		Bij	g & Small Fi	rms		Small Firms	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
FCA*	-0.0000289	-0.000848	-0.000664	0.000912	-0.000353	-0.000295	-0.000927	-0.000872	-0.000218	-0.00297	-0.00393	-0.0051
	(-0.03)	(-0.71)	(-0.59)	(0.83)	(-0.28)	(-0.21)	(-0.62)	(-0.54)	(-0.13)	(-1.20)	(-1.08)	(-1.49)
$(FCA^+ > Q3[FCA^+]) \times FCA^+$		0.00589**	0.00193		0.00536*	0.00384		0.00201	-0.00287		0.0129*	0.00425
		(2.87)	(0.85)		(2.17)	(1.63)		(0.63)	(-0.59)		(2.10)	(0.72)
SameGroup	0.0121***	0.0177***	0.00746*	0.00670*	0.00780*	0.00121	0.0153**	0.0181***	0.0106*	0.00663	0.0222**	0.00500
	(4.64)	(7.23)	(2.56)	(2.16)	(2.29)	(0.30)	(3.23)	(3.91)	(2.01)	(0.85)	(3.19)	(0.50)
(FCA*) × SameGroup	0.0102***		0.00180	0.00360		-0.00529	0.00518		-0.00344	0.0225***		0.0198
	(4.14)		(0.44)	(1.45)		(-1.11)	(1.24)		(-0.60)	(4.04)		(1.50)
(FCA* > Q3[FCA*]) × (FCA*) × SameGroup			0.0117*			0.0122			0.0147			0.00249
() () () ()			(2.41)			(1.87)			(1.97)			(0.14)
SameIndustry	-0.00478*	-0.00511*	-0.00503*	-0.0214***	-0.0217***	-0.0216***	0.00415	0.00393	0.00433	0.00862	0.00718	0.00833
,	(-2.47)	(-2.62)	(-2.35)	(-7.41)	(-7.48)	(-7.36)	(1.33)	(1.29)	(1.38)	(1.93)	(1.50)	(1.72)
Observations	241839	241839	241839	110944	110944	110944	97637	97637	97637	33258	33258	33258
R^2	0.037	0.037	0.037	0.032	0.031	0.033	0.045	0.045	0.047	0.084	0.083	0.088

^{*} p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Future Correlation via FCA

Logaritmic Transformation





Logaritmic Transformation

		Dependen	t Variable:Fu	iture Monthly	Correlation of	of 4F+Industr	y Residuals	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
In(FCA)	0.00451***	0.00377***	0.00151*	0.0000861	0.00375***	0.00366***	0.000213	-0.000032
	(6.17)	(6.76)	(2.32)	(0.12)	(6.54)	(4.83)	(0.26)	(-0.04)
ρ_t		0.126***	0.126***	0.126***	0.126***	0.126***	0.126***	0.126***
		(4.73)	(4.71)	(4.70)	(4.72)	(4.72)	(4.70)	(4.70)
SameGroup			0.0171***	0.0307***			0.0323***	0.0328***
			(7.14)	(6.54)			(6.44)	(6.61)
(In(FCA)) × SameGroup				0.00792***			0.00803***	0.00793**
				(4.41)			(4.40)	(4.36)
ActiveHolder					0.00164	0.00243	0.000685	0.000567
					(1.07)	(0.73)	(0.19)	(0.16)
(In(FCA)) × ActiveHolder						0.000315	-0.0000937	0.000057
						(0.30)	(-0.09)	(0.05)
SameIndustry							-0.00391	-0.00495
,							(-1.92)	(-2.36)
SameSize								0.0113***
								(4.23)
SameBookToMarket								0.00764*
								(2.03)
Constant	0.0183***	0.0155***	0.00681**	0.00259	0.0149***	0.0147***	0.00294	0.00769*
	(8.35)	(9.15)	(3.44)	(1.18)	(8.08)	(6.17)	(1.13)	(3.11)
Observations	242577	241839	241839	241839	241839	241839	241839	241839
R ²	0.001	0.034	0.035	0.035	0.035	0.035	0.036	0.037


t statistics in parentheses



^{*} p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Future Correlation via FCAP*

Normalized Rank Transformed



Normalized Rank Transformed

		Dependen	rt Variable:Fu	ture Monthly	Correlation o	f 4F+Industry	/ Residuals	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
FCAP*	0.00523***	0.00428***	0.00175*	0.000292	0.00429***	0.00397***	0.000408	-0.000013
	(5.35)	(5.99)	(2.22)	(0.35)	(5.95)	(4.23)	(0.43)	(-0.01)
ρ_t		0.127***	0.126***	0.126***	0.126***	0.127***	0.126***	0.126***
		(4.73)	(4.71)	(4.70)	(4.73)	(4.73)	(4.70)	(4.70)
SameGroup			0.0174***	0.00936***			0.0106***	0.0114***
			(7.51)	(3.98)			(4.45)	(4.71)
(FCAP*) × SameGroup				0.0108***			0.0109***	0.0108***
. , , ,				(3.98)			(3.94)	(3.91)
ActiveHolder					0.00216	0.00213	0.00103	0.000516
					(1.46)	(1.44)	(0.67)	(0.34)
(FCAP*) × ActiveHolder						0.00137	0.0000999	0.000380
						(1.02)	(0.07)	(0.28)
SameIndustry							-0.00380	-0.00483
							(-1.87)	(-2.30)
SameSize								0.0113***
								(4.28)
SameBookToMarket								0.00772*
								(2.03)
Constant	0.00651***	0.00554***	0.00286***	0.00257***	0.00492***	0.00489***	0.00252***	0.00792**
	(8.55)	(8.52)	(4.52)	(3.97)	(7.34)	(7.27)	(3.69)	(7.07)
Observations	242577	241839	241839	241839	241839	241839	241839	241839
R ²	0.001	0.034	0.035	0.036	0.035	0.035	0.036	0.037

t statistics in parentheses





[&]quot; p < 0.05, "" p < 0.01, """ p < 0.001

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Random Pairs





Fama MacBeth Estimation for pseudo pairs

Fortnightly variables for Random group


	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
FCA*	0.000606	0.00333**	0.00261**	0.00206*	0.00244*	0.00202*	0.00190
	(0.99)	(2.60)	(2.71)	(2.11)	(2.49)	(2.04)	(1.94)
$(FCA^* > Median[FCA^*]) \times FCA^*$		-0.00559*	-0.00427*	-0.00316	-0.00377*	-0.00314	-0.00274
		(-2.57)	(-2.56)	(-1.84)	(-2.19)	(-1.82)	(-1.63)
ActiveHolder			0.0000628	-0.000258	-0.000307	-0.000319	0.0000163
			(0.06)	(-0.23)	(-0.27)	(-0.28)	(0.01)
Constant	0.0219***	0.0243***	0.0173***	0.0666***	0.121***	0.0508***	0.0299***
	(5.27)	(5.75)	(6.82)	(11.33)	(18.46)	(10.35)	(8.12)
Main	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Interaction	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No
N	1105543	1105543	1067554	1067554	1067554	1067554	1067554
r2	0.000237	0.000448	0.223	0.227	0.228	0.226	0.225


t statistics in parentheses

^{*} p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001


Random Pairs


$(FCA^* > Median[FCA^*]) \times FCA^*$






Random Pairs from Same Business Group






Random Pairs from Same Business Group

$(FCA^* > Median[FCA^*]) \times FCA^*$





Fama MacBeth Estimation for pseudo pairs


Fortnightly variables for Random group from Same Business Group


	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
FCA*	0.00808***	0.00365*	0.00230	-0.000386	-0.000628	-0.000128	0.000500
	(10.59)	(2.37)	(1.88)	(-0.31)	(-0.50)	(-0.11)	(0.42)
$(FCA^* > Median[FCA^*]) \times FCA^*$		0.00932**	0.00691**	0.000962	0.00104	-0.000242	-0.00233
		(3.24)	(3.18)	(0.46)	(0.49)	(-0.12)	(-1.18)
ActiveHolder			0.00648***	0.00223	0.0000493	0.00285*	0.00325**
			(5.09)	(1.87)	(0.04)	(2.52)	(2.86)
Constant	0.0288***	0.0248***	0.0160***	0.115***	0.232***	0.0821***	0.0418***
	(8.08)	(6.62)	(6.88)	(15.79)	(26.40)	(14.10)	(11.86)
Main	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Interaction	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No
N	1111129	1111129	1073214	1073214	1073214	1073214	1073214
r2	0.000515	0.000796	0.226	0.235	0.240	0.234	0.231

t statistics in parentheses

^{*} p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Random Pairs from Same Size





Fama MacBeth Estimation for pseudo pairs

Fortnightly variables for Pseudo group from Same Size

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
FCA*	0.000524	-0.00205	-0.00126	-0.00335	-0.000312	-0.00314	-0.00114
	(0.47)	(-0.68)	(-0.61)	(-1.71)	(-0.17)	(-1.61)	(-0.55)
$(FCA^* > Median[FCA^*]) \times FCA^*$		0.00510	0.00375	0.000580	-0.00431	0.00113	0.000589
		(0.99)	(1.04)	(0.17)	(-1.26)	(0.33)	(0.17)
ActiveHolder			-0.00180	0.00129	0.00294	0.0000404	-0.00154
			(-0.69)	(0.53)	(1.18)	(0.02)	(-0.60)
Constant	0.0240***	0.0217***	0.0167***	0.116***	0.255***	0.0792***	0.0347**
	(8.56)	(5.65)	(6.25)	(14.36)	(19.32)	(11.49)	(9.81)
Main	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Interaction	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No
N	442279	442279	426218	426218	426218	426218	426218
r2	0.000653	0.00125	0.224	0.238	0.243	0.236	0.232

t statistics in parentheses

^{*} p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

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Conclusion

- We derive a measure that captures the extent to which common ownership distribution.
- The common ownership comovement effect with a extra explanation:
 - Common ownership that crosses a threshold affect on comovement
 - Be in the same business group has a major effect on comovement
 - Business groups of banks affect more than normal business groups

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Measuring Common Ownership

- If two stocks in pair have n mutual owner, which total market cap divides them equally, the mentioned indexes equal n.
 - Each holder owns 1/n of each firm.
 - Firm's market cap is α_1 and α_2 :
 - So for each holder of firms we have $S_{i,t}^f P_{i,t} = \alpha_i$
 - SQRT

$$\left[\frac{\sum_{f=1}^{n} \sqrt{\alpha_1/n} + \sum_{f=1}^{n} \sqrt{\alpha_2/n}}{\sqrt{\alpha_1} + \sqrt{\alpha_2}}\right]^2 = \left[\frac{\sqrt{n}(\sqrt{\alpha_1} + \sqrt{\alpha_2})}{\sqrt{\alpha_1} + \sqrt{\alpha_2}}\right]^2 = n$$

Quadratic

$$\left[\frac{\sum_{f=1}^{n} (\alpha_1/n)^2 + \sum_{f=1}^{n} (\alpha_2/n)^2}{\alpha_1^2 + \alpha_2^2}\right]^{-1} = \left[\frac{\alpha_1^2 + \alpha_2^2}{n(\alpha_1^2 + \alpha_2^2)}\right]^{-1} = n$$





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 - Large controlling shareholder and stock price synchronicity
 - Connected Stocks
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Synchronicity and firm interlocks

JFE-2009-Khanna

- Three types of network
 - Equity network
 - 2 Director network
 - Owner network
- Dependent variables

Using deterended weekly return for calculation

- **1** Pairwise returns synchronicity = $\frac{\sum_{\mathbf{t}} (n_{i,j,\mathbf{t}}^{\text{ups}}, n_{i,j,\mathbf{t}}^{\text{down}})}{T_{i,j}}$
- 2 Correlation = $\frac{Cov(i,j)}{\sqrt{Var(i).Var(j)}}$
- Tobit estimation of

$$f_{i,j}^d = \alpha I_{i,j} + \beta (1 * N_{i,j}) + \gamma Ind_{i,j} + \varepsilon_{i,j}$$

being in the same director network has a significant effect

Large controlling shareholder and stock price synchronicity JBF-2014-Boubaker

• Stock price synchronicity:

$$SYNCH = \log(\frac{R_{i,t}^2}{1 - R_{i,t}^2})$$

where $R_{i,t}^2$ is the R-squared value from

$$RET_{i,w} = \alpha + \beta_1 MKRET_{w-1} + \beta_2 MKRET_w + \beta_3 INDRET_{i,w-1} + \beta_4 INDRET_{i,w} + \varepsilon_{i,w}$$

OLS estimation of

$$SYNCH_{i,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Excess_{i,t} + \beta_2 UCF_{i,t} + \sum_k \beta_k Control_{i,t}^k$$

$$+ Industry Dummies + Year Dummies + \varepsilon_{i,t}$$

- Stock price synchronicity increases with excess control
- Firms with substantial excess control are more likely to experience stock price crashes

Connected Stocks

JF-2014-Anton Polk

- Common active mutual fund owners
- Measuring Common Ownership
 - $FCAP_{ij,t} = \frac{\sum_{f=1}^{F} (S_{i,t}^{f} P_{i,t} + S_{j,t}^{f} P_{j,t})}{S_{i,t}P_{i,t} + S_{j,t}P_{j,t}}$
 - ullet Using normalized rank-transformed as $FCAP_{ij,t}^*$
- $\rho_{ij,t}$: within-month realized correlation of each stock pair's daily four-factor returns

$$\rho_{ij,t+1} = a + b_f \times FCAPF_{ij,t}^* + \sum_{k=1}^{n} CONTROL_{ij,t,k} + \varepsilon_{ij,t+1}$$


Estimate these regressions monthly and report the time-series average as in Fama and MacBeth

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4 Factor + Industry Future Correlation via FCA*

Normalized Rank Transformed for each cross section (Monthly)



Monthly variables

		Depender	ıt Variable:Fu	ture Monthly	Correlation o	f 4F+Industr	/ Residuals	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
FCA*	0.00494***	0.00405***	0.00148	0.000149	0.00403***	0.00384***	0.000268	-0.0000289
	(4.97)	(5.50)	(1.80)	(0.17)	(5.39)	(4.09)	(0.28)	(-0.03)
ρ_t		0.127***	0.126***	0.126***	0.126***	0.127***	0.126***	0.126***
		(4.73)	(4.71)	(4.70)	(4.73)	(4.73)	(4.70)	(4.70)
SameGroup			0.0177***	0.0102***			0.0114***	0.0121***
			(7.43)	(4.32)			(4.60)	(4.89)
(FCA*) × SameGroup				0.0102***			0.0104***	0.0102***
(, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,				(4.13)			(4.13)	(4.06)
ActiveHolder					0.00192	0.00190	0.00102	0.000517
					(1.30)	(1.29)	(0.66)	(0.34)
(FCA*) × ActiveHolder						0.000737	-0.0000357	0.000174
,						(0.55)	(-0.03)	(0.13)
SameIndustry							-0.00372	-0.00478*
,							(-1.83)	(-2.29)
SameSize								0.0115***
								(4.34)
SameBookToMarket								0.00765*
SumeDook Formance								(2.02)
Constant	0.00652***	0.00554***	0.00282***	0.00255***	0.00498***	0.00495***	0.00249***	0.00793***
	(8.54)	(8.54)	(4.46)	(3.95)	(7.40)	(7.31)	(3.60)	(7.03)
Observations	242577	241839	241839	241839	241839	241839	241839	241839
R ²	0.001	0.034	0.035	0.035	0.035	0.035	0.036	0.037





^{*} p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01. **** p < 0.001


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FCA vs. FCAP Distributions







Summary of Controls

Fortnightly


Type of Pairs	Yes	No
SameIndustry	1142	9125
	(11.1%)	(88.9%)
SameGroup	1173 (11.4%)	9094 (88.6%)
ActiveHolder	2819 (27.5%)	7448 (72.5%)

Variable	count	mean	std	min	25%	50%	75%	max
Size1	636641	0.75	0.21	0.01	0.61	0.81	0.93	1
Size2	636641	0.47	0.26	0.00	0.26	0.45	0.67	1.00
SameSize	636641	-0.28	0.22	-0.99	-0.42	-0.24	-0.10	0.00
BookToMarket1	636641	0.52	0.27	0.00	0.31	0.54	0.74	1.00
BookToMarket2	636641	0.50	0.25	0.00	0.29	0.49	0.70	1.00
SameBookToMarket	636641	-0.29	0.21	-1.00	-0.43	-0.25	-0.12	0.00

Monthly

Future Correlation via FCA

4 Factor + Industry (Fortnightly)



Fortnightly variables


	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
In(FCA)	0.0108***	0.00989***	0.00964***	0.00511***	0.00499***	0.00271***	0.00276***	0.00281***	0.00297***
	(8.48)	(9.12)	(8.81)	(5.15)	(4.95)	(4.12)	(4.07)	(4.16)	(3.78)
$\rho_{-}t$		0.0740***	0.0739***	0.0734***	0.0733***	0.0710***	0.0708***	0.0711***	0.0723***
		(5.50)	(5.49)	(5.44)	(5.44)	(5.36)	(5.34)	(5.36)	(5.39)
ActiveHolder			0.00970***		0.00810***	0.00425*	0.00416*	0.00356	0.00410*
			(6.05)		(5.06)	(2.35)	(2.40)	(1.94)	(2.41)
SameGroup				0.0329***	0.0322***	0.0216***	0.0214***	0.0218***	0.0247***
•				(10.98)	(10.80)	(7.32)	(7.29)	(7.47)	(9.32)
SameIndustry						0.0275***	0.0267***	0.0264***	0.0288***
•						(7.00)	(6.73)	(6.55)	(6.45)
Samesize								0.0403***	0.0235***
								(3.53)	(4.35)
SameBookToMarket								0.0127**	0.0146***
								(3.22)	(4.34)
Constant	0.0432***	0.0395***	0.0363***	0.0214***	0.0191***	0.0396**	0.0504**	0.0372***	0.0225***
	(8.14)	(8.73)	(8.10)	(5.32)	(4.71)	(3.13)	(3.20)	(4.04)	(5.91)
Value	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Interaction	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No
N	613875	613875	613875	613875	613875	613875	613875	613875	613875
r2	0.00152	0.0127	0.0131	0.0137	0.0141	0.0184	0.0193	0.0183	0.0164


t statistics in parentheses

^{*} p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

4 Factor + Industry Future Correlation via FCA*

Normalized Rank Transformed for each cross section (Fortnightly)





Fortnightly variables

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
FCA*	0.0124***	-0.00545***	-0.00518***	-0.00450***	-0.00440***	-0.00408**	-0.00537***	-0.00420**	-0.00526***	-0.00448**
	(7.43)	(-3.99)	(-3.90)	(-3.44)	(-3.40)	(-3.19)	(-4.06)	(-3.22)	(-3.98)	(-3.49)
$FCA^* > Median[FCA^*]) \times FCA^*$		0.0360***	0.0332***	0.0314***	0.0240***	0.0232***	0.0228***	0.0156***	0.0231***	0.0231***
		(9.80)	(10.20)	(9.78)	(8.68)	(8.29)	(9.37)	(5.83)	(9.14)	(8.17)
$\rho_{-}t$			0.0738***	0.0737***	0.0727***	0.0727***	0.0711***	0.0708***	0.0712***	0.0724***
			(5.50)	(5.49)	(5.42)	(5.41)	(5.38)	(5.34)	(5.38)	(5.41)
ActiveHolder				0.00792***		0.00494**	0.00362	0.00322	0.00284	0.00354*
				(4.85)		(2.98)	(1.94)	(1.81)	(1.49)	(2.02)
SameIndustry					0.0363***	0.0357***	0.0315***	0.0261***	0.0303***	0.0339***
,					(8.06)	(7.91)	(7.93)	(6.60)	(7.47)	(7.54)
SameGroup								0.0191***		
								(6.14)		
Samesize									0.0416***	0.0213***
									(3.67)	(3.91)
SameBookToMarket									0.0128**	0.0147***
									(3.24)	(4.36)
Constant	0.0150***	-0.000422	-0.000591	-0.00187	-0.00234	-0.00312*	0.0300*	0.0375*	0.0258**	0.00782**
	(6.31)	(-0.25)	(-0.38)	(-1.19)	(-1.70)	(-2.19)	(2.59)	(2.50)	(3.22)	(3.56)
Value	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
nteraction	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No
N	613875	613875	613875	613875	613875	613875	613875	613875	613875	613875
r2	0.00132	0.00208	0.0132	0.0136	0.0149	0.0151	0.0182	0.0196	0.0181	0.0162


t statistics in parentheses




^{*} p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

4 Factor + Industry Future Correlation via FCA*

Normalized Rank Transformed for each cross section (Fortnightly)





Monthly variables

	(1)	(2)
FCA*	-0.00370**	-0.00472***
	(-2.79)	(-3.39)
$(FCA^* > Median[FCA^*]) \times FCA^*$	0.0128***	0.0141***
	(4.34)	(5.15)
$\rho_{-}t$	0.0722***	0.0708***
	(5.39)	(5.35)
ActiveHolder	0.00140	0.000470
	(0.73)	(0.22)
$(FCA^* > Median[FCA^*]) \times ActiveHolder$	0.00338	0.00522
	(1.17)	(1.75)
SameGroup	0.0117**	0.0106**
	(3.29)	(2.87)
(FCA* > Median[FCA*]) × SameGroup	0.0139***	0.0109**
, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	(4.05)	(3.14)
Constant	0.00973***	0.0380*
	(4.57)	(2.51)
Value	No	Yes
Interaction	No	Yes
N	613875	613875
r2	0.0173	0.0202


t statistics in parentheses



^{*} p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Future Correlation via FCA*

4 Factor + Industry (by Business Group)



Fortnightly variables for subset of Same Business Group

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
FCA*	0.0183***	-0.0127*	0.0100***	-0.00219	0.00842***	-0.00535
	(7.04)	(-2.13)	(5.21)	(-0.39)	(5.37)	(-0.98)
$(FCA^* > Median[FCA^*]) \times FCA^*$		0.0460***		0.0186*		0.0210*
		(4.63)		(2.08)		(2.53)
ActiveHolder			0.0162***	0.0149**	0.0188***	0.0174***
			(3.41)	(3.07)	(4.00)	(3.61)
SameIndustry			0.0336***	0.0333***	0.0330***	0.0327***
			(7.85)	(7.78)	(7.95)	(7.83)
Samesize			0.0340**	0.0318**		
			(3.17)	(3.03)		
SameBookToMarket			0.0609***	0.0605***		
			(5.97)	(5.90)		
Constant	0.0344***	0.0149**	0.0399***	0.0314***	0.104***	0.0941***
	(9.76)	(3.01)	(8.38)	(5.53)	(5.71)	(5.16)
Value	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Interaction	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
N	103914	103914	103914	103914	103914	103914
r2	0.00281	0.00488	0.0390	0.0407	0.0494	0.0511

t statistics in parentheses

^{*} p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Fortnightly variables for subset of Different Business Group


Constant Constant							
(3.11) (-1.37) (1.98) (-1.75) (1.93) (-2.26) (FCA* > Median[FCA*]) × FCA* 0.0146*** (4.22) 0.00996*** (3.48) 0.0115*** (4.22) ActiveHolder 0.000676 0.000186 -0.000437 -0.00102 (0.48) (0.13) (-0.30) (-0.70) SameIndustry 0.0238*** 0.0231*** 0.0211*** 0.0202*** (4.34) (4.23) (4.23) (4.05) Samesize 0.0217*** 0.0217*** (3.94) 0.0217*** (3.94) SameBookToMarket 0.00831*** 0.00482 0.00477 (1.49) (1.48) Constant 0.00831*** 0.00285 0.0124*** 0.00886*** 0.0240 0.0202 (4.07) (1.67) (5.03) (4.03) (1.53) (1.32) Value No No No No No Yes Yes No No No No No Yes Yes No No No No No No No No Yes Yes Nes No So9961 509961 509961 509961 509961		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
(FCA* > Median[FCA*]) × FCA* 0.0146*** (4.22) 0.00996*** (3.48) 0.0115*** (3.82) ActiveHolder 0.000676 (0.48) 0.000186 (0.13) -0.000437 (-0.00) -0.00102 (-0.70) SameIndustry 0.0238*** (4.34) 0.0231*** (4.23) 0.0211*** (4.05) 0.0202*** (4.34) (4.23) (4.23) (4.05) SameSize 0.0217*** (3.94) 0.0217*** (3.94) 0.0217*** (1.49) 0.047* (4.07) (1.49) 0.044** (1.48) 0.0040** (1.48) Constant 0.00831*** (4.07) (1.67) (5.03) (4.03) (1.53) (1.32) 0.0222** (4.07) (1.67) 0.0088** (4.03) (1.53) (1.32) 0.0202** (4.07) (1.67) (5.03) (4.03) (1.53) (1.32) Value No No No No Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes No 509961 509961 509961 509961 509961	FCA*	0.00422**	-0.00178	0.00194*	-0.00210	0.00172	-0.00290*
ActiveHolder (4.22) (3.48) (3.82) ActiveHolder 0.000676 (0.48) 0.00186 (-0.000437 (-0.00102 (-0.70)) -0.00102 (-0.70) SameIndustry 0.0238*** (0.231*** (0.231***) 0.0211*** (0.222***) Kamesize 0.0217*** (3.94) 0.0217*** (3.94) SameBookToMarket 0.00482 (0.00477 (1.49)) 0.0047 (1.48) Constant 0.00831*** (0.00285 (0.124***) 0.0086*** (0.0240 (0.202 (1.32)) Value No No No No No No No No No No Yes Yes No 509961 50996		(3.11)	(-1.37)	(1.98)	(-1.75)	(1.93)	(-2.26)
ActiveHolder (4.22) (3.48) (3.82) ActiveHolder 0.000676 (0.48) 0.00186 (-0.000437 (-0.00102 (-0.70)) -0.00102 (-0.70) SameIndustry 0.0238*** (0.231*** (0.231***) 0.0211*** (0.222***) Kamesize 0.0217*** (3.94) 0.0217*** (3.94) SameBookToMarket 0.00482 (0.00477 (1.49)) 0.0047 (1.48) Constant 0.00831*** (0.00285 (0.124***) 0.0086*** (0.0240 (0.202 (1.32)) Value No No No No No No No No No No Yes Yes No 509961 50996	$(FCA^* > Median[FCA^*]) \times FCA^*$		0.0146***		0.00996***		0.0115***
SameIndustry (0.48) (0.13) (-0.30) (-0.70) SameIndustry 0.0238*** 0.0231*** 0.0211*** 0.0222*** (4.34) (4.23) (4.23) (4.05) Samesize 0.0217*** 0.0217*** 0.0217*** (3.94) (3.94) (3.94) SameBookToMarket 0.00482 0.00477 0.0040* Constant 0.00831*** 0.00285 0.0124*** 0.00886*** 0.0240 0.0202 Value No No No No Yes No No No No No Yes N 509961 509961 509961 509961 509961 509961 509961			(4.22)		(3.48)		(3.82)
SameIndustry 0.0238*** (4.34) 0.0231*** (4.23) 0.0211*** (4.05) Samesize 0.0217*** (3.94) 0.0217*** (3.94) 0.0217*** SameBookToMarket 0.00482 (1.49) 0.00477 (1.49) 0.00477 (1.48) Constant 0.00831*** (4.07) 0.00285 (1.67) 0.0124*** (5.03) 0.0240 (1.53) 0.0220 (1.32) Value No No No No No Yes (1.32) No No No No No Yes (1.32) Yes (1.32) N 509961 509961 509961 509961 509961 509961 509961	ActiveHolder			0.000676	0.000186	-0.000437	-0.00102
Samesize (4.34) (4.23) (4.23) (4.05) SameBookToMarket 0.0217*** (3.94) 0.0217*** (3.94) 0.00477 (1.49) 0.00477 (1.49) 0.00477 (1.49) 0.00477 (1.49) 0.00477 (1.49) 0.00240 0.00202 (4.07) 0.00202 (4.07) 0.00202 (4.03) 0.00240 (1.53) 0.00202 (1.32) Value No No No No Yes Yes No No No No No Yes Yes N 509961 509961 509961 509961 509961 509961 509961 509961 509961				(0.48)	(0.13)	(-0.30)	(-0.70)
Samesize 0.0217*** (3.94) 0.0217*** (3.94) 0.0217*** 0.0217*** 0.0217*** 0.0217*** 0.0217*** 0.00482 0.00477 0.00477 0.00482 0.00477 0.00482 0.0047 0.00482 0.00482 0.00482 0.00482 0.0240 0.0202 0.0040 0.00202 0.0040 0.00202 0.00202 0.0040 0.00202 0.00202 0.0040 0.00202 0.00202 0.0040 0.00202 0.	SameIndustry			0.0238***	0.0231***	0.0211***	0.0202***
Constant Constant	•			(4.34)	(4.23)	(4.23)	(4.05)
SameBookToMarket 0.00482 (1.49) 0.00477 (1.48) 0.00482 (1.48) 0.00477 (1.48) 0.0202 (1.48) Constant 0.00831*** (4.07) 0.00285 (1.50) 0.0124*** (0.0086*** (0.024) 0.0202 (1.32) <t< td=""><td>Samesize</td><td></td><td></td><td>0.0217***</td><td>0.0217***</td><td></td><td></td></t<>	Samesize			0.0217***	0.0217***		
Constant 0.00831*** 0.00285 0.0124*** 0.00886*** 0.0240 0.0202				(3.94)	(3.94)		
Constant 0.00831*** (4.07) 0.00285 (0.0124***) 0.00886*** 0.0240 (1.53) 0.0202 (1.32) Value No No No No Yes Yes Interaction No No No No Yes Yes N 509961 509961 509961 509961 509961 509961 509961	SameBookToMarket			0.00482	0.00477		
(4.07) (1.67) (5.03) (4.03) (1.53) (1.32) Value No No No No Yes Yes Interaction No No No No Yes Yes N 509961 509961 509961 509961 509961 509961 509961				(1.49)	(1.48)		
Value No No No No Yes Yes Interaction No No No No Yes Yes N 509961 509961 509961 509961 509961 509961 509961	Constant	0.00831***	0.00285	0.0124***	0.00886***	0.0240	0.0202
Interaction No No No No Yes Yes N 509961 509961 509961 509961 509961 509961 509961		(4.07)	(1.67)	(5.03)	(4.03)	(1.53)	(1.32)
N 509961 509961 509961 509961 509961 509961	Value	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
	Interaction	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
r2 0.000490 0.000899 0.0120 0.0124 0.0148 0.0152	N	509961	509961	509961	509961	509961	509961
	r2	0.000490	0.000899	0.0120	0.0124	0.0148	0.0152

t statistics in parentheses

^{*} $\rho < 0.05$, ** $\rho < 0.01$, *** $\rho < 0.001$

4 Factor + Industry Future Correlation via FCA*

Normalized Rank Transformed for each cross section (Fortnightly)



Fortnightly variables

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
FCA*	0.0124***	0.0126***	0.0114***	0.0112***	0.00613***	0.00618***	0.00634***	0.00717***
	(7.43)	(7.54)	(8.09)	(7.90)	(8.02)	(7.89)	(8.12)	(7.01)
FCA*2		0.0109***	0.0101***	0.00959***	0.00697***	0.00700***	0.00701***	0.00710***
		(10.30)	(10.52)	(10.08)	(9.59)	(9.97)	(9.37)	(8.49)
ρ_t			0.0737***	0.0736***	0.0711***	0.0709***	0.0712***	0.0724***
			(5.49)	(5.48)	(5.37)	(5.36)	(5.38)	(5.41)
ActiveHolder				0.00761***	0.00345	0.00331	0.00267	0.00336
				(4.62)	(1.84)	(1.84)	(1.40)	(1.90)
SameIndustry					0.0310***	0.0301***	0.0299***	0.0334***
					(7.85)	(7.57)	(7.40)	(7.46)
Samesize							0.0416***	0.0214***
							(3.66)	(3.91)
SameBookToMarket							0.0126**	0.0146***
							(3.19)	(4.29)
Constant	0.0150***	0.00429*	0.00372*	0.00224	0.0330**	0.0428**	0.0288***	0.0108***
	(6.31)	(2.35)	(2.24)	(1.35)	(2.82)	(2.85)	(3.52)	(4.76)
Value	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Interaction	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No
N	613875	613875	613875	613875	613875	613875	613875	613875
r2	0.00132	0.00215	0.0133	0.0136	0.0183	0.0191	0.0182	0.0162

t statistics in parentheses



^{*} p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001