

Investor Networks in the Stock Market

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We study the trading behavior of investors in an entire stock market. Using an account level dataset of all trades on the Istanbul Stock Exchange in 2005, we identify investors with similar trading behavior as linked in an empirical investor network (EIN). Consistent with the theory of information networks, we find that central investors earn higher returns and trade earlier than peripheral investors with respect to information events. Overall, our results support the view that information diffusion among the investor population influences trading behavior and returns. (*JEL* G11, G14)

What determines the heterogeneous trading behavior and performance of individual investors in the stock market? One motive for heterogeneous trading is that investors have diverse information, allowing well-informed investors to

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outperform those who are less informed (Grossman and Stiglitz 1980; Hellwig 1980; Kyle 1985). In this paper, we focus on such diverse information as a motive for heterogeneous trading, and study investor behavior through the lens of information networks (Colla and Mele 2010; Ozsoylev and Walden 2011; Han and Yang 2013). Loosely speaking, an information network describes how diverse information signals diffuse over time among a population of investors. Investors who are centrally placed in such a network tend to receive information signals early, whereas investors who are in the periphery tend to receive them later. As a result, the trading behavior and profitability of individual investors are influenced by their position in the network, and the dynamics of aggregate asset prices depend on the network's general topological properties.

Identifying the underlying information network in the entire stock market is of course a major challenge. Our first contribution in this paper is to develop a method to proxy for the market's information network, using observable data. The general idea is that information links may be identified from realized trades, since investors who are directly linked in the network will tend to trade in the same direction in the same stock at a similar point in time, say on the same day or even within an hour of each other. By focusing on such short time periods, we aim to capture information that is diffused into the market over a relatively short horizon, say about a week. Using this approach, we identify an Empirical Investor Network (EIN), and in simulations show that the true information network is indeed well estimated by the EIN. This approach may also be applied to partial data. For example, in simulations we show that when only one-third of the agents in a network are included in a reduced network (corresponding to including about 10% of the links in the full network), the correlation between true centrality and centrality calculated in the reduced network is about 0.5.

We calculate the EIN using account level trading data that covers all trades on the Istanbul Stock Exchange in 2005. We first verify that the EIN is fairly stable over time. We test the stability by dividing our sample period into two six-month sub-periods and define an EIN for each of these periods. The overlap between the two EINs is strongly significantly different from the overlap of two randomly generated networks. We also verify that some investors systematically trade before their neighbors, and that such early trading is positively related to centrality. Together, these results, which provide our second contribution, support the view that the EIN captures information diffusion.

We study the relationship between investor centrality and returns, and find substantial support for a positive relationship. In our multivariate regressions, a one-standard deviation increase in centrality, all else equal, leads to a 0.7%–1.8% increase in returns (over a 30-day period) depending on the specification. These results are obtained after controlling for other variables, such as trading volume, so the tests distinguish investors who are central in the information network from investors who just trade a lot. Documenting the positive relationship between centrality and returns is our third contribution.

Finally, as a fourth contribution, we document that centrality is directly related to acting early on information. We identify several idiosyncratic information events that were associated with large stock price movements, and find that central investors in the network tended to trade—in the right direction—before peripheral investors. We also verify that when central investors' trades were delayed by one day, their excess performance decreased by close to 30%, and that returns to central investors were higher in months with a relatively large number of earnings announcements. All these results are consistent with information diffusion, with central agents gaining early access to information.

Our results suggest that information diffusion is an important determinant of investors' trading behavior and profitability. Specifically, our results have two components: (1) that our network captures information diffusion and (2) that the network is consistent with a decentralized diffusion mechanism, as opposed to diffusion through mainstream media channels. However, there is also the possibility that omitted variables, alternative trading motives, or purely mechanical relationships between variables may generate similar results. In several additional analyses and robustness tests, we find further support for information diffusion over such alternative explanations.

Any alternative explanation of the first component must be consistent with several properties: First, it should generate a network that is stable over time. Second, it should be consistent with the trading behavior of investors over the short time periods that the network is based upon. Third, it should lead to a positive relationship between centrality and returns over 1-3-month horizons. Fourth, it should lead to a positive relationship between centrality and trading early with respect to information events in the market. Several alternative explanations fail at least one of these properties. For example, various style-related explanations broadly defined (e.g., correlated wealth shocks or momentum strategies) may satisfy the first property, but typically not the second, third, or fourth.¹ Similar arguments make it implausible that various biases (e.g., home bias) explain the results. Finally, the first, third and fourth properties make price impact (e.g., arising because of illiquidity) an unlikely explanation. We discuss this extensively throughout the paper.

For the second component, our results are not as conclusive but we do find a couple of pieces of evidence to support a decentralized diffusion mechanism, consistent with, for example, word-of-mouth communication and Internet discussion boards, but not with diffusion through mainstream media channels. First, we verify that the network is consistent with a decentralized structure.

¹ Standard investment "styles" are, for example, defined in Brown and Goetzmann (1997) and Barberis and Shleifer (2003). There is also a large literature that explains heterogeneous portfolio holdings with hedging motives (e.g., Mayers 1973; Bodie, Merton, and Samuelson 1992; Massa and Simonov 2006; Parlour and Walden 2011; Betermeier et al. 2012). Also, heterogeneous preferences, (e.g., different risk aversion) induce trading. We include such trading motives in our broad definition of "investment styles."

The median number of connections for an investor is 159, within the range of what is documented in the literature on social networks (e.g., Dunbar 1992; Hampton et al. 2011; Ugander et al. 2011). More importantly, the number of communities in the network, defined as groups of investors who are tightly connected among themselves but only sparsely connected to other investors, identified by a standard algorithm (Clauset, Newman, and Moore 2004) is 1,109, which is much higher than what we would expect if mainstream media provided the main diffusion channel. Second, we study the timing of trading activity with respect to when an information event was reported in media. We find that most of the increased trading activity occurred before the event was reported, again inconsistent with mainstream media as the main diffusion channel.

We also carry out several variations of the tests to show robustness and to rule out mechanical relations between variables as a driver of the results. We do out-of-sample tests, constructing the centrality measure in the first six months of the trading period, and verifying that the measure is positively related to profits and to trading early with respect to information events in the following six months. We vary window lengths and several other parameters, exclude links between investors in the same brokerage house, and use alternative profit measures, all with very similar results. Finally, to rule out explanations related to the higher sophistication of institutional investors, we run the tests with these investors excluded, with virtually identical results. This, for example, mitigates the likelihood that our results are due to automated high-frequency trading algorithms, since we would expect to mainly find such algorithms among the institutional investor population. Thus, in total our results provide substantial support for decentralized information diffusion among the investor population, although we cannot completely rule out alternative explanations.

Our paper belongs to the literature on heterogeneous information, networks, and trading in stock markets. There is extensive evidence of frequent communication among stock market investors, and this evidence suggests that investors exchange information about the stocks they trade. Shiller and Pound (1989) survey 131 institutional investors in the NYSE and ask them what prompted their most recent stock purchase or sale. The majority asserts that it was their discussions with their peers. Ivković and Weisbenner (2007) find similar evidence for households, while Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2004) provide further evidence that fund managers' portfolio choices are influenced by word-of-mouth communication.² Our paper is also related to the literature on the

² Other studies provide indirect evidence that communication between investors affect their trading behavior. Feng and Seasholes (2004) find that Chinese trades are highly correlated when divided geographically, consistent with local communication among investors. Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2008) posit that communication via shared education networks allows fund managers to earn abnormal returns (see also Das and Sisk 2005; Fracassi 2012; Pareek 2012). Shive (2010) develops an epidemic model of investor behavior that predicts individual investor trading. Duffie, Malamud, and Manso (2009) develop a dynamic equilibrium search model, in which information diffusion occurs when agents with heterogeneous information meet randomly.

relationship between news, investor behavior, and stock returns (e.g., Tetlock 2007, 2010). Our study contributes to the literature by providing—to the best of our knowledge—the first market-wide study of information diffusion in a stock market, along with its effects on the entire investor population's behavior and trading profits.

Our study reinforces a view of the stock market as a place where information is incorporated into asset prices through gradual decentralized diffusion. Information networks provide an intermediate information channel, in between the public arena, where news events and prices themselves make some information available to all investors, and the completely local arena of private signals and inside information. Such a view is consistent with the presence of significant stock market movements unaccompanied by public news events, as studied by Cutler, Poterba, and Summers (1989) and Fair (2002), and with substantially varying stock market returns and trading volume over time, as analyzed by Gabaix et al. (2003).

The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In the next section, we introduce a stylized information network model to describe the connection between investors' network centrality, profits, and timing of trades, and to motivate the methodology used to construct the EIN. In Section 2, we describe the data and provide some summary statistics. In Section 3 we present our main findings on the relationship between centrality, profits, and the timing of trades with respect to information events. Section 4 concludes. Additional analyses are delegated to an Internet Appendix.

1. Framework

We introduce a stylized model of information diffusion in a stock market. Our objectives here are two-fold: (1) to describe how investor centrality is related to profits and timing of trades in the model, and (2) to motivate our definition of the EIN.

1.1 Trading in an information network

Let us for simplicity study a network structure according to Figure 1, in which there are $N_I = 21$ investors in an information network. Each node (circle) represents an agent (investor, trader), and each edge (line) represents a direct link between two agents, i.e., that the two agents are connected. In other words, linked agents are neighbors in the network. These connections are bidirectional, i.e., if agent i is connected to agent j , then j is connected to i . For technical reasons, we assume that each agent is connected to himself.

In addition to the agents in the network, we assume that there is a large number, N_U of uninformed noise traders, whose trading motives we do not model and who randomly take on opposite sides of trades. Altogether there are $N = N_I + N_U$ traders in the model.




Figure 1
Information network

The figure shows an information network of 21 agents in a market. Each agent is represented by a node (a filled circle). An edge (line) between two agents represents that these are connected in the network (i.e., they are neighbors). In addition, there is a large number of liquidity traders.

Trading occurs at discrete times, $t=0, 1, 2, \dots$. At each point in time, each of the N_I agents in the network receives a distinct signal about stocks in the market, i.e., agent i receives signal s_i^t at time t . We denote the set of signals agent i has received up to and including time t by \mathcal{I}_i^t . For simplicity, we assume that only one signal in each time period, agent n_t 's signal, is valuable. Thus, at time t , agent n_t receives a signal and trades. All the other signals at time t are worthless, the other agents in the network understand this, and therefore do not trade. The expected profits from agent n_t 's trade is positive. We assume that there is a noise trader willing to take the opposite position in the trade, whereas agents in the information network only trade when they receive information.

Now, agent n_t may "share" his signal with one of his neighbors between t and $t+1$. Specifically, for each of his neighbors, there is a probability of q_1 that agent n_t shares his information. For example, given the network in Figure 1, if agent 1 received the initial signal, then for each of agents 2, 3, 4, and 5, the probability is q_1 that he will share the signal with that agent. Given that information is shared, a receiving agent—let us call him n_t^2 —then trades at $t+1$; however, his expected trading profit is lower than that of agent 1, in line with

the assumption that, as time passes, the expected profits from trading on the information declines. This could, for example, be because agent n_t has already traded and some of his information is already incorporated into prices. The signal may also be slowly diffusing into the market through other channels. We thus have that $s_{n_t}^t \in \mathcal{I}_{n_t}^{t+1}$. In a similar manner, agent n_t^2 shares his signal between $t+1$ and $t+2$, with probability q_2 , to each of his neighbors, who then trade at $t+2$ and realize even lower expected profits than agent n_t^2 . At $t+3$, the signal is completely incorporated into the stock market's prices and no further profits are possible.³

A general network of N agents can be represented by a neighborhood (adjacency) matrix, $\mathcal{E} \in \{0, 1\}^{N \times N}$, with $\mathcal{E}_{ij} = 1$ if investors i and j are directly connected, and $\mathcal{E}_{ij} = 0$ otherwise.⁴ The bidirectionality of connections implies that \mathcal{E} is symmetric (i.e., $\mathcal{E}_{ij} = \mathcal{E}_{ji}$ for all i and j). Symmetric information sharing arises naturally in the theory of information networks (e.g., Ozsoylev and Walden 2011; Han and Yang 2013; Walden 2013), since both agents need to share information in a relationship for information sharing to be mutually beneficial. Intuitively, with a one-sided relationship, an agent who only transmits information to another agent but never receives information from that agent has no incentive to participate in the relationship.

We use the convention that the first N_I agents are the ones in the information network, and the remaining N_U are the noise traders (each of which is only connected to himself). The matrix representation of the network in Figure 1 is given in Figure 2, where it is assumed that there are $N_U = 29$ noise traders, so that the total number of traders is $N = 21 + 29 = 50$. In Figure 2, the dots represent connections, i.e., elements for which $\mathcal{E}_{ij} = 1$. The upper left part of the matrix represents the agents in the network, \mathcal{E}_I . For example, focusing on the first row, the five first elements are nonzero, showing that agent 1 is connected to himself, and agents 2–5, respectively. The lower right part of the matrix (elements 22–50) is diagonal, representing the unconnected noise traders.

We are now in a position to formally define a general information network, given an information diffusion mechanism among agents:

Definition 1. Consider a population of agents among which heterogeneous information signals, s_i^t , diffuse over time. Then \mathcal{E} defines the *information network* of signals available to the population over time, if for all agents i , j and times t, t' , the probability that $s_i^t \in \mathcal{I}_j^{t'}$ is

- zero when $d^{\mathcal{E}}(i, j) > t' - t$,
- greater than zero when $d^{\mathcal{E}}(i, j) \leq t' - t$.

³ It would of course be easy to extend the model to longer sequences of information diffusion, as well as trading in continuous time.

⁴ We use the following matrix notations: A matrix is defined by the $[\cdot]$ operator on scalars, e.g., $\mathcal{E} = [e_{ij}]_{ij}$. We write $(\mathcal{E})_{ij}$ for the scalar in the i th row and j th column of the matrix \mathcal{E} , or, if there can be no confusion, we drop the parentheses and write \mathcal{E}_{ij} .




Figure 2
Neighborhood matrix

The figure shows the neighborhood matrix, \mathcal{E} , for the network shown in Figure 1, with $N_I = 21$ agents who trade for information purposes (the upper left part), and $N_U = 29$ noise traders (the lower right part). A dot on row i and column j in the matrix means that agent i and j are linked (i.e., that $\mathcal{E}_{ij} = 1$). All other elements are zero.

Here, $d^{\mathcal{E}}(i, j)$ denotes the distance between agents i and j in \mathcal{E} , i.e., the length of the shortest path between the two agents, where we use the convention that $d^{\mathcal{E}}(i, j) = \infty$ if there is no path between the two agents.

It is easy to check that given the information diffusion mechanism between agents just described, the information network is indeed the one shown in Figure 1.

We define the *degree* of investor i as the investor's number of neighbors, including himself, $D_i = |\{j : \mathcal{E}_{ij} = 1\}|$.

1.2 Centrality and profits

Intuitively, investor 1 in Figure 1 seems to be well-positioned to make high profits. Although investors 2-5 have more direct neighbors, investor 1 is within a distance of two from all the other investors, in contrast to the other agents, and will therefore receive many valuable signals. In other words, investor 1 is more *central* than the other investors and is therefore expected to have higher trading profits (Ozsoylev and Walden 2011).

There are several measures of centrality. Common measures include degree, eigenvector, Katz, and closeness centrality (e.g., Friedkin 1991). Eigenvector and Katz centrality are closely related; eigenvector centrality can be viewed

as a limit case of Katz centrality. As shown in Valente et al. (2008), these measures of centrality are typically strongly correlated in real-world networks.

We prefer to use eigenvector centrality as our measure for two reasons. The first reason is computational. It is relatively easy to compute in a large-scale network. Measures like closeness centrality, on the other hand, require keeping track of higher order paths between nodes, which is simply not feasible given the size of our network.⁵ The second reason is theoretical. Walden (2013) shows that the information advantage (i.e., the advantage an investor has because of his position in the network, that allows him to earn excess returns) is closely related to eigenvector centrality, but less so to other measures, (e.g., closeness centrality).

The intuition for why eigenvector centrality works well is simple. In an information diffusion model, eigenvector centrality captures the fundamental properties of what makes an agent well-positioned in the network, namely how much information he receives and how delayed the information is. This is easiest seen by observing that one way to calculate eigenvector centrality is by using so-called power iterations. Specifically, eigenvector centrality is a sum of powers of the degree matrix—in other words, basically a sum of degrees of different orders. The higher the order, the more signals reaches an investor, but the more delayed these signals are. A measure that perfectly reflects information advantage needs to re-weight the importance of different orders of degree somewhat, but eigenvector centrality captures the spirit of the two fundamental properties.

A vector C where the i th element represents agent i 's (eigenvector) centrality is constructed as follows. Let C_i denote the centrality of investor i . By letting i 's centrality score be proportional to the sum of the scores of all the investor's neighbors, we derive:

$$C_i = \frac{1}{\lambda} \sum_j \mathcal{E}_{ij} C_j, \quad \text{or in vector form} \quad C = \frac{1}{\lambda} \mathcal{E} C. \quad (1)$$

The proportionality constant, λ , is an eigenvalue of \mathcal{E} and C is the corresponding eigenvector. The eigenvector corresponding to the largest eigenvalue is the centrality vector.⁶ For large matrices, power iterations provide an efficient way of solving (1).⁷

⁵ To calculate closeness and betweenness centrality, powers of the neighborhood matrix, \mathcal{E}^m , need to be calculated (or some variant thereof), which is a major task if N is large. The reason is that even though \mathcal{E} is a sparse object, \mathcal{E}^m is much less sparse, leading to severe memory and CPU requirements. In contrast, the largest eigenvector can be calculated efficiently, using just \mathcal{E} .

⁶ The neighborhood matrix, \mathcal{E} , has only nonnegative elements. It therefore follows from the Perron-Frobenius theorem that it has a real maximal eigenvalue, and that the associated eigenvector has only nonnegative elements. This is the centrality vector. The only potential issue is uniqueness, since \mathcal{E} may not be irreducible, but this has not caused a problem in our tests.

⁷ Specifically, given an estimate of the centrality vector, C^k , an updated estimate is obtained by performing the iteration $C^{k+1} = \frac{1}{\|C^k\|} \mathcal{E} C^k$, where $\|C^k\|$ is some suitable chosen normalization of C^k (e.g., the mean-square

A closely related measure that we use is *rescaled centrality*, C/D , i.e., the ratio between centrality and degree. This measure may be more robust in capturing informational advantage than pure centrality in an empirically estimated investor network. The reason is that when there are noise traders who trade a lot, they typically also end up with many links in the empirically estimated investor network. This, in turn, increases their centrality, although they do not have an informational advantage. Their rescaled centrality will typically be low though, as it should be since these traders are not central in the information network.

In our empirical tests, our dataset contains the full population of traders in the market. If someone wanted to use our methodology to estimate centrality in other datasets, however, there may be omitted agents in those datasets and an important question is therefore how robust the centrality measure is to omitting some agents. Specifically, given a network with N agents, assume that a centrality measure is calculated using only a subset of the network, with $n < N$ of agents. How closely related is this approximated centrality measure to true centrality among these n agents? To study this question, we simulate a large number of networks. We then randomly exclude a fraction of agents, and calculate a “reduced” centrality of the remaining n agents, based on the reduced network. To see how well true centrality (based on the network with N agents) is approximated by reduced centrality (based on the subnetwork with $n < N$ agents), we plot the average correlation between the two measures, while varying n .

The results are shown in Figure 3, using a network size of $N = 500$ agents. We see that the average correlation (the y -axis) is a smooth function that slowly decreases as n (the x -axis) decreases. When only one-third of agents (about 170) are “kept,” the average correlation is about 0.5. This is quite remarkable, given that only about 10% ($1/3^2$) of the links remain in the reduced network. Even with only 20% of the agents in the reduced network (100 agents, with about $1/5^2 = 4\%$ of the original links), the average correlation is still about 0.35. We have verified that the results are scalable in the size of the network, by varying N . We conclude that the centrality measure is quite robust to omitting a significant fraction of agents.

The randomness and independence of excluded agents is a parsimonious assumption. For instance, if the researcher is interested in measuring the relative centrality of agents within a community (defined as a tightly connected cluster of investors that have fewer connections with investors outside of the community), excluding the network outside of the community may be even less of an issue. On the contrary, systematically excluding central agents in

norm). If \mathcal{E} contains relatively few non-zero elements—in other words, if the matrix is *sparse*—and the largest eigenvalue is significantly larger than the second largest eigenvalue, then each iteration can be calculated quickly and convergence to the true centrality vector is obtained in few iterations.




Figure 3
Exclusion of investors

The figure shows the average correlation between agent centrality when approximated using only a subset of n agents, and agent centrality in the full network. The total number of agents in the network is 500, and each agent is on average connected to 22 other randomly chosen agents. Average correlation between true and approximated centrality is about 0.67 when the fraction of agents is $1/2$ (250 agents out of 500), about 0.5, when the fraction is $1/3$ (170 agents), and about 0.35 when the fraction is 0.2 (100 agents). Number of simulations: 10,000 for each n .

a network may potentially increase the problem. We leave the study of such questions for future research.

1.3 Estimating the neighborhood matrix

In practice, the information network is not observable, but since agents who are connected in the network will tend to trade in similar stocks in the same direction at similar points in time, we can identify an empirical proxy for the true network—an *Empirical Investor Network*, EIN.

A fairly straightforward approach for small networks would be to use maximum likelihood estimation. The EIN would be identified as the network for which the observed trades were most likely. For larger networks, however, simpler approximations are needed. As discussed in Gomez-Rodriguez et al. (2012), exact maximum likelihood estimation is not feasible for large networks because the number of possible networks grows super-exponentially with the number of nodes, making an exact approach computationally infeasible. Gomez-Rodriguez et al. (2012) study infection contagion in a network, and the problem of identifying a network from observed contagions. They develop an approximation method that is computationally feasible for networks with up to several thousand nodes. However, since our network is a couple of orders of magnitude larger than what is computationally feasible with their method and, furthermore, our inference problem differs from theirs, we choose an even further simplified approach to define the EIN:

Definition 2. The EIN, $\mathcal{E}^{\Delta t, M}$, in a stock market that operates over some finite time period, is defined such that for each pair of investors, $i, j \neq i$, $\mathcal{E}^{\Delta t, M} = 1$ if

and only if agents i and j traded in the same stock in the same direction within a time window of Δt at least M times over the total time period.

The EIN can be computed efficiently even for networks with hundreds of thousands (or even millions) of investors, as long as the Δt window is not too large. In our tests, we will vary Δt between a minute and a day. Intuitively, the EIN captures information diffusion by linking investors who trade close in time.⁸ Furthermore, the EIN can be viewed as an approximation of the network one would obtain through maximum likelihood estimation, see Proposition 1. The proof, which is straightforward, is delegated to the Internet Appendix.

Proposition 1. Consider an information network, \mathcal{E}_I , in which each agent, after receiving a signal, immediately trades, and then shares the signal with probability $q > 0$ per unit time within the next Δt time interval, with each of his neighbors. For small Δt , given a realization of trades between 0 and T , the EIN $\mathcal{E}_I^{\Delta t, 1}$ is a maximum likelihood estimator of the true underlying information network. Specifically, it is the unique maximum likelihood estimator that minimizes the total number of links in the information network.

Thus, for small Δt , the EIN is indeed a maximum likelihood estimator, and it is also consistent with a sparse network in that it minimizes the number of links. The intuition behind the result is that for short time windows, the likelihood of information diffusion is relatively low and the likelihood of observing a sequence of trades will therefore be higher if links are formed between any two agents for which diffusion may have occurred. The EIN will therefore be the maximum likelihood estimator. For longer windows, the EIN will be an approximation because of the tradeoff between the increased likelihood of observing an immediate trade when adding a link to the network, and the decreased likelihood such a link introduces of *not* observing a trade in the future. For sparse networks, we would usually expect the former effect to dominate, and the EIN should therefore provide a good approximation for sparse networks even with relatively longer time windows. We next show that the EIN indeed performs well in simulations for such networks.

1.4 Performance of estimation method

In this section, we focus on the case where the threshold for a connection is $M=1$, and the time period is one unit of time, so that agents who trade within the period $[t, t+1]$ for some t are connected, i.e., we focus on $\mathcal{E}^{1,1}$. We simulate trades in the network in Figure 1 with $N=100$ agents, over 50 trading periods, with probabilities $q_1=0.25$, $q_2=0.5$ (defined in

⁸ Note that our definition of EIN is different from the one taken in Adamic et al. (2010), who identify two investors as connected if they traded with each other. Such traders are on the opposite side and will thus not be viewed as connected in our model.




Figure 4
Empirical Investor Network

The figure shows the empirical investor network, EIN, generated from a simulation of 50 trading periods, in a network with $N = 100$ traders, of which $N_I = 21$ belong to the information network and $N_U = 79$ are noise traders as in Figure 1. We assume that probabilities of $q_1 = 0.25$, $q_2 = 0.5$ and the threshold for a connection is $M = 1$.

Section 1.1). We choose a higher per-agent probability for information diffusion at the second stage, since it seems natural to assume that agents are pickier in who they share information with early on, when information is more proprietary.

An example of a realized EIN is shown in Figure 4. We see that the general structure of the true network is identified, although not every link is correct. For example, in the upper left part of the EIN, which represents the agents in the information network, there are several elements just off the diagonal that are nonzero, representing links between agents, although no such links exist in the true information network. This is, for example the case for agents 20 and 21, who are incorrectly linked in the EIN. The reason is that agent 3 received a signal that he shared with agents 20 and 21, who then traded simultaneously and who were thereby falsely identified as directly linked, although they are in practice only indirectly linked through their common connection with agent 3. Similarly, erroneous links occur in the part of the matrix with uninformed agents. These links arise when two agents happen to take the opposite position of their informed counterparts, at similar points in time. In the informed part of the network matrix (the first $N_I \times N_I$ in the upper left corner), there are 42 agents, who are incorrectly identified as being linked. Also, there are 4 agents

who are actually linked, but who are not estimated to be linked. Thus, in total, 46 links are misclassified, corresponding to about 10% of the total number (441) of elements in \mathcal{E}^I . In the noise trader part of the network, there are 126 incorrect links, scattered randomly, corresponding to about 2% of the total number of elements (6,241). Thus, overall the number of misclassified elements is low. The EIN also captures the true centrality of agents in the network well. The average correlation between the centrality vector of the true network and that of the EIN is 0.64.

We verify that the method is scalable (i.e., that the fractions of misclassified elements does not blow up when the size of the network increases) and also that the method works for more general network structures. To do this, we simulate a large number of networks of N agents, where $N_I = 0.2N$ agents are in the information network, and the remaining agents are noise traders, $N_U = 0.8N$. We randomly generate links between investors in the information network. To keep the network sparse, a property that is known to hold for large-scale networks in practice and in this context is consistent with the view that investors on average are only directly connected to a small part of the rest of the population, we choose the probability for a link to be such that the expected number of links of each agent in the information network is $\sqrt{N_I}$. Thus, in an information network of size 100, each agent is on average connected to 10% (10/100) of the rest of the population, whereas in a network of size 250,000, each agent is on average connected to about 0.2% (500/250,000). This is of the same order of magnitude as the network we study in Section 3.

We simulate N_I paths of trading in each randomly-generated network, and calculate the average fraction of misclassified elements over many such networks. By varying N , we verify that the fraction of misclassified elements in the EIN does not grow with the size of the network. For $N = 200$, the total fraction of misclassified links is 0.23%, and the fraction of misclassified links in the information network (excluding the N_U noise traders) is 2.0%. With $N = 2,000$ agents, the fraction of misclassified links is slightly lower: 0.20% of the total links and 1.6% for the information network. Thus, the identification method is scalable.

To summarize, the EIN is scalable, an exact maximum likelihood estimator for short time windows, and performs well in simulations. We therefore use it in our empirical tests.

1.5 Limitations and additional analysis

The EIN can be estimated from account level data on trades, but there are limitations to solely relying on the EIN. We discuss these limitations and additional analyses and tests that can be used to obtain further insight about the role of information diffusion in the market.

Omitted variables and alternative trading motives may potentially generate an empirically estimated network similar to the one driven by information diffusion. However, any alternative explanation needs to satisfy several

additional properties, in addition to generating correlated trades among investors. First, it needs to lead to a positive relationship between centrality and profitability in the 1–3 month horizon, which is the profit horizon we will use in our tests. Second, it should be consistent with investors' trading behavior over short horizons. Specifically, we mainly use a time window of 30 minutes when constructing the EIN. Under information diffusion, central agents systematically trade before their peripheral neighbors within this time window, and an alternative explanation should also have this property. Third, if the EIN represents links in an information network, it will be relatively stable over time. By comparing EINs constructed over different time periods, such stability can be verified. A fourth test is based on actual information events. Given a set of information events identified in the media that moved stock prices, central agents in the EIN should tend to trade earlier with respect to these events than peripheral agents. Such a test provides a direct link between centrality and information, and therefore efficiently separates information diffusion from other explanations. These predictions and associated tests will allow us to fairly confidently conclude that EIN captures information diffusion, although we cannot completely rule out all alternative explanations.

The EIN does not directly identify the underlying channels of information diffusion. Two such channels may be word-of-mouth communication between investors and Internet discussion boards. These are examples of fairly decentralized diffusion mechanisms. An alternative channel would be diffusion through different mainstream media outlets, where some investors get their information earlier than others, for example, from national news broadcasts as opposed to local newspapers. This corresponds to a centralized diffusion mechanism, with a few information hubs.⁹ We propose two approaches to gain additional insight about the underlying channels of diffusion. First, we can measure how centralized the EIN is, using standard methods. Three natural measures are the median number of connections investors have, the so-called network centralization index, and the number of local communities in the network, defined as groups of investors who are tightly connected among themselves but only sparsely connected to other investors. A low median number of neighbors and network centralization index is consistent with a decentralized network, as is a high number of communities. This, in turn, goes against mainstream media as the main source of diffusion. The second approach uses the information events. By studying the increased trading activity around these events, insight about the diffusion channels can be obtained. Specifically, if the bulk of the increase in trading activity occurs before the event is reported in mainstream media, this goes against mainstream media as

⁹ Of course, these different channels have the common property that information is gradually incorporated into agents' trading behavior and asset prices, in line with our results. In its most general form, an information network describes information available to agents in their trading decisions over time, as expressed in Definition 1, regardless of the channel through which information diffusion occurs.

the main channel of diffusion. We will use these tests to better understand the underlying information diffusion channel.

The EIN alone will not be able to determine whether the information being diffused is about fundamentals or about something else. As described in Ozsoylev and Walden (2011), information diffusion can be incorporated into a noisy rational expectations model. In such a model, asset prices are based on fundamentals, and are semi-strong form efficient in that they reflect all public information. However, there may also be information, not about fundamentals, but, for example about investor sentiment and, furthermore, prices are not necessarily efficient. Some of the information could even be that central agents know that peripheral agents will follow suite shortly in their trades, although we show in Section 3.3 that other types of information events are also important.

Finally, our approach is based on a rational framework with information diffusion, in which central agents have an informational advantage, but additional network mechanisms could also be relevant. For example, agents could suffer from persuasion bias or other biases, imposing costs on centrality (e.g., DeMarzo, Vayanos, and Zwiebel 2003; Han and Hirshleifer 2012; Heimer and Simon 2012). Furthermore, it could be that agents with many links need to invest more time in upholding these links, and therefore have less time to invest in their own information acquisition. The latter mechanism would punish direct links to other investors, but still reward higher-order links, again along the lines of our main theme that centrality is valuable.

2. Description of the Data

2.1 The Istanbul Stock Exchange

The Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) was founded as an autonomous, professional organization in early 1986. The ISE is the only corporation in Turkey established to offer trading in equities, bonds and bills, revenue-sharing certificates, private sector bonds, foreign securities, and real estate certificates, as well as international securities. All ISE members are incorporated banks and brokerage houses. There were 100 ISE members in 2005.

The ISE is an order-driven, multiple-price, continuous auction market with no dedicated market makers or specialists. A computerized system matches buy and sell orders on a price and time priority basis. The buyers and sellers enter the orders through their workstations located at the ISE building, or at the member's headquarters. It is a blind order system with ISE members identified upon matching trades. The system enables members to execute several types of orders such as "limit," "limit value," "fill or kill," "special limit," and "good till date" type orders. Members can enter buy and sell orders with various validity periods of up to one trading day. Unmatched orders without a specific validity period are cancelled at the end of the trading session.

The stock trading activities are carried out on workdays in two separate sessions, 9:30–12:00 for the first session and 14:00–16:30 for the second

session. Settlement of securities traded in the ISE is realized by the ISE Settlement and Custody Bank Inc. (Takasbank), which is the sole and exclusive central depository in Turkey. Turkey has a liberal foreign exchange regime with a fully convertible currency. In 2005, the value of one Turkish Lira (TL) varied between 0.7 and 0.8 USD. Since August 1989, the Turkish stock and bond markets have been open to foreign investors without any restrictions on the repatriation of capital and profits. At the start of our sample period, the vast majority (94.7%) of the institutional investors in our sample were foreigners.

The ISE ranks 19th across the world with market capitalization of USD 201 billion in 2005 (Source: World Development Indicators). The average daily trading volume ranged between approximately USD 300 and 700 million. The turnover ratio of the ISE was 155% in 2005, which was comparable to the turnover ratio of 129% for the U.S.

2.2 The data

Our dataset contains all the trades on the ISE over a 12 month period, January 1–December 31, 2005. During this period, 303 stocks were actively traded. In the data, each trader is identified by a unique account number, and for each trade the following information is available: time of trade, stock ticker, number of shares traded, price, account number of purchaser and seller, purchaser and seller types (private, institutional or brokerage house trading on its own account), and whether the trade was a short sale. In total, there were 580,142 active accounts during the time period. Of these, 489 were classified as institutional accounts and the remaining 579,653 were classified as individual accounts. On average, about 200,000 trades were executed per trading day.

2.3 The Empirical Investor Network

We calculate the EIN for the market, using the threshold $M=3$, and varying the length of the time window, Δt , between 1 minute and 30 minutes. We subsequently extend the time window to a whole day, and also vary M between 1 and 10. By using a window length of no more than one day, we separate information-driven “fast” trading from other types of trading, such as portfolio rebalancing, momentum investing, style investing, etc., which we typically think of as occurring over lower trading frequencies. For example, momentum strategies are typically implemented over a three-month to one-year horizon, and the impact of value and size strategies are rarely studied over shorter than monthly horizons. In contrast, the EIN is constructed to capture information diffusion effects at horizons of about a week, taking higher-order effects into account (i.e., degrees of order higher than one). For computational reasons, we use shorter time windows for several analyses.¹⁰

¹⁰ This is justified since it turns out that the structure of the EIN is very similar across different length, as are our main results. This is not surprising since two investors who are directly linked when a window length of ΔT is

Table 1
Summary statistics for EIN

Time window, ΔT	1 min	5 min	15 min	30 min
Number of links	161M	402M	731M	1.03B
Average number of links	277	693	1,260	1,781
Median number of links	14	43	97	159
Fraction of links	0.05%	0.12%	0.22%	0.31%
Maximum number of links	116,720	171,823	219,123	251,943

The table shows summary statistics for the Empirical Investor Network (EIN) calculated by using actual trades from Istanbul Stock Exchange over a 12-month period, January 1–December 31, 2005. Two agents are linked when they trade in the same stock in the same direction within 1-, 5-, 15-, or 30-minute window. Fraction of links is equal to average number of links divided by the number of potential links, which is equal to 580,142 during the time period. The threshold $M=3$ is used.

In Table 1, we provide summary statistics for the EIN, using window lengths between 1 minute and 30 minutes. Overall, the network is very sparse. Even with the 30-minute window, investors are on average only connected to a small fraction, 0.3% (1,781/580,142), of the investor population. This may still seem like a large number. With a narrow interpretation of network connectedness representing communication between investors in a social network, one may expect the number of links to be in the low hundreds, not in the thousands. For example, Ugander et al. (2011) find that the average Facebook user in the U.S. had 214 “friends,” and about one per mil of these users have 5,000 friends (the maximum number allowed by Facebook), as of May 2011. Hampton et al. (2011) report a similar number. They survey 2,255 American adults on their use of social networking web sites, and on their overall social networks. In the sample, the average Facebook user has 229 friends, whereas the average adult has an overall network of 634 social ties, including weak ties (e.g., acquaintances). Dunbar (1992) proposes 150 as being a natural size for social groups. With a stricter definition of social ties (e.g., only including family, close friends, and colleagues) one may expect an even lower number, say less than 50; Internet discussion boards about stocks as channels for information diffusion, on the other hand, may lead to a higher number, perhaps even above 1,000.

The mean number of links in our EIN is relatively high. However, the distribution of links is severely skewed, due to the small fraction of investors with a very large number of links. The most connected investor when the 30-minute window length is used has over 200,000 links, and is thereby directly connected to almost half of the other investors. We suspect that these investors are (unofficial) market makers that provide liquidity—an investor group that is not part of our theoretical model—and therefore come out as extremely connected, although they are not part of the information network. We eliminate the undo influence of such extreme observations by truncating the

chosen, are typically also indirectly connected (at a higher degree than one) with a window length $\Delta T' < \Delta T$. The main difference when varying the windows length is that we find a somewhat stronger relationship between centrality and profitability for longer windows.




Figure 5
Distribution of number of links

The figure shows the cumulative distribution function of the 580,142 investors' number of links (degrees) in the Empirical Investor Network (EIN), calculated by using actual trades from Istanbul Stock Exchange over a 12-month period, January 1–December 31, 2005. Two agents are linked when they trade in the same stock in the same direction within a 30 minute window at least $M = 3$ times. The median number of links is 159. Further, 90% of investors have less than 4,000 links. A small number of investors have an extremely large number of links, leading to a significantly higher average number of links (1,781) than the median.

distribution and by using logs of variables. In Figure 5, we show the cumulative distribution of the number of investor links. We see that 90% of investors have less than 4,000 links. The median number of links thus seems more informative than the mean. The median number of links with the 30-minute window is 159, which is within the lower range of numbers reported in the literature.

A related measure is the number of communities in the network. Briefly, a set of investors who are heavily connected among themselves, but sparsely connected with other investors, form a community. In a decentralized information diffusion process (e.g., representing diffusion through social ties) we would expect a large number—many hundreds or even thousands—of relatively small communities in the network. With a more centralized diffusion process on the other hand, we would expect a smaller number of communities. For example, if the network represents information diffusion through different media channels, we would typically expect the number of communities to be less than 100.¹¹

¹¹ There were four TV news channels and 28 newspapers in Turkey in 2005, with an average daily circulation over 10,000 (source: www.medyatava.com).

We estimate the number of communities, using the method developed in Clauset, Newman, and Moore 2004. This is one of the few methods that can be used for a network of our size; see also Newman (2004). For computational reasons, we exclude the 10% most connected investors. This also helps us avoid influence from outliers. The algorithm detects 1,109 communities with an average size of 523, which is consistent with decentralized information diffusion, but not with centralized diffusion (e.g., through mainstream media).

A third measure of network centralization is the network centralization index, NCI, which is a number between 0% and 100% that measures how centralized a network is compared with a completely centralized star network (see Freeman 1979). Such a star network has a maximal NCI of 100%. The NCI for our EIN is 4.5%, which is quite low. For example, in a network with many local communities where each community has a star structure, an NCI of 4.5% corresponds to having about 1,250 such communities, with about 460 investors in each, again higher than what we would expect from diffusion through mainstream media channels.

In total, the structure of our EIN is thus consistent with decentralized information diffusion through social ties, Internet discussion boards, and local communities rather than through mainstream media.

2.4 Trading volume, number of trades, and returns

For each investor i and trade z , we define number of shares traded (N_{iz}), trading price (P_{iz}), and trading quantity ($Q_{iz} = N_{iz} * P_{iz}$). We first construct a vector of total trading quantity, Q_i , where $Q_i = \sum_z Q_{iz}$ is the total value (in TL) of purchases and sales that investor i executes over the total time period (one year). Similarly, we define the vector of number of trades of each individual investor, N_i , over the total time period. We also define the log-counterparts, q_i and n_i , as vectors with $q_i = \log(Q_i)$ and $n_i = \log(N_i)$.

To measure trading returns, we use the same approach as in Barber et al. (2009), but focus on individual investors' trades rather than on investor groups. Briefly, we define a window length, ΔT , which we set to 30 days but vary for robustness purposes later. For each trade, z , the realized return is:

$$\mu_{iz} = \text{sign} * \frac{P^{t+\Delta T} - P^t}{P^t},$$

where $P^{t+\Delta T}$ is the closing price of the stock 30 days after the trade (or, if the market is closed on that day, the closing price on the nearest open day after), P^t is the price at which the stock was traded and the *sign* indicates the direction of the trade, and is negative for an investor on the sell side of a trade and positive for an investor on the buy side of a trade. Here, P is corrected for stock splits, and takes dividend payments into account. We then define the return of the investor from all trades as the value-weighted average returns from all trades

within a year,¹²

$$\mu_i = \frac{\sum_z \mu_{iz} * Q_{iz}}{\sum_z Q_{iz}}. \quad (2)$$

We use the value-weighted return measure μ_i in our main tests. In robustness tests, we verify that the results are very similar when using average returns instead (i.e., when weighing each transaction equally in determining an investor's profitability).

Our return measure captures returns that are generated within a month after a trade. Given our focus on information that diffuses relatively quickly, we believe that this window is long enough. Returns over longer time horizons will not be captured by this return measure, but investors who trade and realize returns at higher frequencies will be measured correctly, on average. For example, assume that an investor has positive information about a stock, buys it (this is trade z at t), and that it subsequently generates high returns over the next week, after which the investor sells it (this is trade z' at t'). The first trade will be profitable, whereas the second trade will on average yield zero return, so given that current information shocks are uncorrelated with future information shocks, returns realized over a shorter period than a month will also be captured. In subsequent robustness tests, we verify that the results also hold with profit windows that are longer than 30 days, and when using the time when trades are actually closed, by limiting our sample to trades that are closed within the sample period.

Our weighted return measure μ_i also captures market movements, that is, a trader may be profitable even without valuable information, because the market happened to go up during the period in which he traded. To adjust for market movements, we define μ_{iz}^e as the excess return for transaction z ,

$$\mu_{iz}^e = \text{sign} * \frac{P^{t+\Delta T} \frac{P_M^t}{P_M^{t+\Delta T}} - P^t}{P^t},$$

where P_M is the value of the ISE 100 index. Then we calculate value weighted excess returns as:

$$\mu_i^e = \frac{\sum_z \mu_{iz}^e * Q_{iz}}{\sum_z Q_{iz}}. \quad (3)$$

It is unclear whether or not we should adjust for market returns, since it could be that valuable stock information actually happened to apply to all firms in the market. We therefore use both the raw and excess returns in our analysis.

¹² Our data does not contain any information about investors' portfolios, so we can not calculate the return on these portfolios. We also cannot calculate the total value of an investor's portfolio. In principle, over a long enough period, we could "build" the portfolios by adding up investors' trades, but our sample period is not long enough to do this. Another limitation is that we can not identify a trader who uses multiple accounts.

2.5 Summary statistics

We provide summary statistics for the variables in Panels A and B of Table 2, where we have used the 30-minute window for the EIN, $M=3$, and the 30-day return window. Several observations are in place: (i) mean profits, defined as $\Pi_i = \sum_z \mu_{iz} * Q_{iz}$ and mean excess profits $\Pi_i^e = \sum_z \mu_{iz}^e * Q_{iz}$ are both identically equal to zero, since there are always investors on both sides of a trade; (ii) C , D , and N are all severely right skewed, which can be seen from their mean being much higher than their median. Also, their standard deviations are high, consistent with heavy-tailed distributions¹³; and (iii) C and D , as well as their logarithms, c and d , are significantly positively correlated. Nevertheless, we shall see that the additional information provided by centrality beyond what is provided by connectedness is important in explaining investor performance.

In Panel C of Table 2, we divide the total sample into the subgroups of institutional and individual investors. The 489 institutional investors behave quite differently than the individual investors. They are on average more central and connected; the average centrality of institutional investors is 44.6 versus 4.95 for individual investors, and the average degree is 28,347 versus 1,759. Also, not surprisingly, institutional investors trade in much larger quantities. Since individual investors make up the vast majority, the summary statistics of the total investor pool are almost identical to the summary statistics of the individual investors, as is seen by comparing Panels A and C in Table 2. The only number that is significantly different in the two tables is average trading quantity, where the institutional investors, although they make up less than a per mille of the total investor pool, increase the average trading quantity by about 10% when they are included. An implication of the dominance of individual investors is that our results are not affected by whether we include or exclude institutional investors. We will therefore usually include them, but verify that the results do not change when they are excluded—for the sake of robustness.

3. The Centrality in the EIN, Information, and Returns

3.1 Stability of EIN over time

For the EIN to be consistent with an information network, we would expect it to be relatively stable over time. Equivalently, for information networks to provide a meaningful concept and to be measurable, they should not change too fast. A simple test of such stability is to divide the total time period of one year into two sub-periods of six months each, calculate EINs for both sub-periods, \mathcal{E}_1 and \mathcal{E}_2 , and see whether they are more similar than what they would be, if randomly generated.

¹³ In a separate analysis, available upon request, we verify statistically that the distributions are indeed heavy-tailed.

Table 2
Summary statistics for investors

A. All investors									
	Mean	Std. dev.	Median	Correlation					
				<i>C</i>	<i>D</i>	<i>N</i>	Π	Π^e	<i>V</i>
Centrality, <i>C</i>	4.99	12.1	0.64	1					
Degree, <i>D</i>	1,781	5,786	159	0.95	1				
Number of trades, <i>N</i>	149	1,467	8	0.71	0.60	1			
Profits, Π	0	2.0E5	−19.0	0.021	0.040	0.011	1		
Excess profits, Π^e	0	1.3E5	−2.4	0.018	0.039	0.010	0.69	1	
Quantity, <i>Q</i>	9.1E5	20.4E6	11,340	0.27	0.43	0.14	0.21	0.18	1
B. All investors: log-variables									
	Mean	Std. dev.	Median	Correlation					
				<i>c</i>	<i>d</i>	<i>n</i>	μ	μ^e	<i>v</i>
Centrality, <i>c</i>	−1.11	17.0	−0.43	1					
Degree, <i>d</i>	5.23	2.23	5.07	0.23	1				
Number of trades, <i>n</i>	2.41	2.00	2.08	0.17	0.93	1			
Returns, μ	−0.014	0.085	−0.038	0.013	0.067	0.083	1		
Excess returns, μ^e	−0.058	0.074	−0.0012	0.003	0.002	0.018	0.86	1	
Quantity, <i>q</i>	9.34	2.95	9.34	0.16	0.82	0.84	0.050	0.006	1
C. Individual and institutional investor groups									
	Individual			Institutional					
	Mean	Std. dev.	Median	Mean	Std. dev.	Median			
Centrality, <i>C</i>	4.95	12.0	0.64	44.6	41.6	36.1			
Degree, <i>D</i>	1,759	5,632	159	28,347	37,685	14,262			
Number of trades, <i>N</i>	144	1,350	8	6,805	18,390	1,460			
Profits, Π	23.7	2.0E5	−19.0	−28,070	1.0E6	2.98			
Excess profits, Π^e	−31.2	1.3E5	−2.4	37,040	3.6E5	8,680			
Quantity, <i>Q</i>	8.3E5	18.3E6	11,310	9.9E7	2.9E8	1.3E7			

The table shows summary statistics from the Empirical Investor Network (EIN) calculated by using actual trades from Istanbul Stock Exchange over a 12-month period, January 1–December 31, 2005. Two agents are linked when they trade in the same stock in the same direction within a 30-minute window at least $M=3$ times during the period. Degree measures the number of links an agent is connected to, including himself. Centrality is the eigenvector centrality. The variable μ is the value-weighted return for all trades of an investor for the entire year assuming a 30-day holding period for each trade and μ^e is the excess return of the investor calculated similar to μ after adjusting return from each trade by the market return (ISE 100 index return). Quantity is the sum of value of all transactions for an investor. Panels A and B shows summary statistics for all investors and the correlation between the variables. Panel C has two groups, institutions and individual investors, and shows summary statistics.

Obviously, the test will depend on our assumptions about the data-generating process for the EINs. The simplest null hypothesis is that these are completely random (except of course for the self-connection between an investor and himself, which is always present), i.e., that if the matrix \mathcal{E}_1 , with N investors, contains k_1 links, then for each pair of investors, i and $j \neq i$, the chance to be linked is $\frac{k_1}{K}$, where $K=N(N-1)/2$ is the total number of possible (bidirectional) links. This corresponds to a situation where the data-generating process for \mathcal{E}_1 was such that links were randomly added until the matrix had in total k_1 elements.

We let y denote the number of overlaps between the two EINs (i.e., the number of investor pairs that are linked in both \mathcal{E}_1 and \mathcal{E}_2). Given that both \mathcal{E}_1

and \mathcal{E}_2 are completely random (with the given data-generating process), and that $k_1 \ll K$, $k_2 \ll K$, where k_2 is the number of links in \mathcal{E}_2 , it follows that the expected number of overlaps is approximately¹⁴

$$E_{\text{Completely random}}[y] \approx \frac{k_1 k_2}{K}. \quad (4)$$

We compare the realized and expected number of overlaps, for the EINs generated with one-minute and five-minute windows, in Table 3. We do this for different choices of the threshold for the number of trades needed for two investors to be treated as connected in the network, M . We let M vary between 1 and 80. Clearly, the hypothesis of completely random data-generating processes for the EINs can be strongly rejected. In fact, as seen in Table 3, the likelihood of being linked is between 72.2 and 26,200 times higher than what is predicted under the hypothesis of completely random data-generating processes, depending on the window length and the link threshold.

Now, obviously the EINs are not completely random; if they were, the degree distributions would be Poisson distributed. However, the true distribution has heavier tails (see Section 2.5). A more appropriately specified test for stability is therefore to study the number of overlaps, given the (heavy-tailed) degree distributions observed in practice. We define such a *degree-adjusted* measure in the Internet Appendix and show that the overlap with this measure is still substantially higher than under the null: 6.09 times higher with the five-minute window and 7.55 times higher with the one-minute window, both highly statistically significant.

3.2 Centrality and returns

The theory suggests that centrally placed investors, all else equal, are more profitable than peripheral investors. This is a novel prediction, and if it holds empirically, it lends support to the information network story. Specifically, it is quite natural that the degree of an investor—being derived from the investor's trading behavior—is strongly related to other variables (e.g., number of trades, trading volume, and even trading returns) and it is therefore difficult to draw inferences from properties of the degree. Centrality, on the other hand, a priori has no such direct relation to other measures, or stories, of trading behavior—the natural interpretation is that it measures investor advantage from information diffusion.

We regress returns, μ_i , and excess returns, μ_i^e , on log-trading quantity, number of trades, connectedness and centrality, using a 30-minute time window. To avoid influence by outliers, we truncate the data, so that investors in the

¹⁴ Here, the approximation is that we treat the addition of links as “draws with replacement,” whereas in practice there is no replacement (i.e., in practice the probability that a new link in \mathcal{E}_2 overlaps with one in \mathcal{E}_1 depends on how many links already exist in \mathcal{E}_2). The error introduced by this approximation is marginal, given that $k_1 \ll K$ and $k_2 \ll K$.

Table 3
Stability of EIN

A. One minute time window ($\Delta T = 1$)					
Connection threshold	1	10	20	40	80
Number of links in first half, k_1	129,146,847	11,174,905	5,014,735	2,150,618	903,097
Number of links in second half, k_2	136,493,437	12,006,001	5,539,690	2,442,503	1,057,607
Number of overlaps, y	11,860,359	1,347,214	659,874	314,779	148,704
$E_{\text{Completely random}}[y]$	104,750	793	165	31	6
$y/E_{\text{Completely random}}[y]$	113.2	1,690	3,997	10,084	26,200
$E_{\text{Degree-adjusted}}[y]$	1,570,908				
$y/E_{\text{Degree-adjusted}}[y]$	7.55				
B. Five minute time window ($\Delta T = 5$)					
Connection threshold	1	10	20	40	80
Number of links in first half, k_1	259,906,612	33,510,862	16,238,861	7,420,656	326,895
Number of links in second half, k_2	274,034,135	35,975,750	17,924,953	8,449,474	3,817,082
Number of overlaps, y	30,556,857	4,659,221	2,400,323	1,180,224	559,647
$E_{\text{Completely random}}[y]$	423,237	7,164	1730	373	74
$y/E_{\text{Completely random}}[y]$	72.2	650	1,388	3,168	7,548
$E_{\text{Degree-adjusted}}[y]$	5,017,607				
$y/E_{\text{Degree-adjusted}}[y]$	6.09				

The table shows the stability of the empirical investor network across the first and second half year in the sample period of January 1–December 31, 2005. Two agents are linked when they trade in the same stock in the same direction multiple times, determined by the connection threshold, within the time window. In Panel A, the time window is one minute and in Panel B the time window is five minutes. The connection threshold, M , is between 1 and 80 and displayed in columns. The total number of potential connections between investors is $K = N(N - 1)/2 = 1.68 \times 10^{11}$ (counting the relationship that investors i and j are linked as one link, i.e., not double counting bidirectional links), where $N = 580,142$ is the number of investors. Number of overlaps, y measures the number of intersecting links between the first and second half of the year. $E_{\text{Completely random}}[y]$ is the expected number of intersecting link between the first and second half of the year if the networks are random. $E_{\text{Degree-adjusted}}[y]$ is also a measure of expected number of intersecting links between the first and second periods and corrects for the degree distributions observed in practice.

bottom two percentiles and top two percentiles of connectedness are discarded. The results in univariate regressions, shown in Table 4, columns 1–5, generally support the presence of a positive relation between centrality and returns. For example, the coefficients for centrality, rescaled centrality and degree are all positive and significant in explaining returns (Panel A), suggesting that higher degree and centrality are associated with higher returns. When excess returns are regressed (Panel B), the coefficients on centrality and rescaled centrality are positive, but not significant.

To better identify the effect of centrality, we do multivariate regressions, controlling for trading quantity, number of trades, and degree. The multivariate results are stronger. The centrality coefficient comes out positive in all regressions and the economic significance is higher than in the univariate regressions. Specifically, a one standard deviation increase in centrality, all else equal, implies an increase in returns by 0.7%–1.8%, depending on the regression. We have no reason to believe that error terms are normally distributed, so in addition to ordinary least squares, we perform an OLS regression that is robust to heavy-tailed error terms, and an iteratively

Table 4
Centrality and returns

A. Returns										
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	<i>t-error</i>	<i>t-error</i>	Ramsey
Centrality (<i>c</i>)	0.0027					0.0060		0.0032		0.0060
Degree (<i>d</i>)	>20	0.0027				14.1		3.7		13.8
		>20				-0.0091		-0.0062		-0.0091
						-18.6		-6.4		-18.4
Rescaled Centrality (<i>c-d</i>)										
			0.00003				0.0038		0.0008	
			4.13				9.2		0.94	
# of trades (<i>n</i>)				0.0037		0.0092	0.0063	0.0072	0.0041	0.0092
				>20		>20	>20	19.9	19.0	>20
Quantity (<i>q</i>)					0.0014	-0.0017	-0.0019	-0.0013	-0.0015	-0.0017
					>20	<-20	<-20	-8.8	-10.3	<-20
\bar{R}^2	0.0043	0.0041	3.1E-5	0.0040	0.0024	0.0091	0.0083			
$\Delta\mu$	0.6%	0.6%	0.05%	0.7%	0.4%	1.2%	0.1%	0.7%	0.001%	1.2%
										0.1%
B. Excess returns										
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	<i>t-error</i>	<i>t-error</i>	Ramsey
Centrality (<i>c</i>)	0.0001					0.0090		0.0066		0.0090
Degree (<i>d</i>)	1.52	-0.0003				>20		8.8		>20
		-0.43				-0.0136		-0.0114		-0.0137
						<-20		-13.4		<-20
Rescaled Centrality (<i>c-d</i>)										
			0.00001				0.0056		0.0031	
			1.7				15.6		4.3	
# of trades (<i>n</i>)				0.00069		0.0063	0.0019	0.0056	0.0009	0.0063
				13.3		>20	19.7	17.8	4.7	>20
Quantity (<i>q</i>)					0.00014	-0.0004	-0.0008	-0.0004	-0.0008	-0.0004
					4.2	-6.4	-12.2	-3.4	-6.0	-6.7
\bar{R}^2	0.000041	3.5E-9	5.2E-6	0.00031	0.000029	0.0033	0.0010			
$\Delta\mu$	0.01%	-0.004%	0.02%	0.1%	0.04%	1.8%	0.2%	1.3%	0.1%	1.8%
										0.2%

The table displays results from regressions of value-weighted excess returns (Panel A) and value-weighted excess returns (Panel B) on log centrality, log degree, log rescaled centrality, log number of trades and log quantity. Each column represents a regression. The first row displays coefficients while the second row displays the *t*-statistics. Columns 1–7 display results from OLS regressions, columns 8–9 display results from a regression that is robust to heavy-tailed error terms, and columns 10–11 display results from iteratively reweighted least squares regression (using Ramsey's E-function). The variable μ is the value-weighted return for all trades of an investor for the entire year assuming a 30 day holding period for each trade and μ^c is the excess return of the investor calculated similar to μ after adjusting return from each trade by the market return (ISE 100 index return). Degree measures the number of links an agent is connected to, including himself. Centrality is the eigenvector centrality. Trading quantity is the sum of value of all transactions for each investor. And # of trades is the total number of trades for each investor. The variables, $\Delta\mu$ and $\Delta\mu^c$ highlight the economic significance of the results by showing the change in returns (and excess returns), given a one standard deviation increase of the variable in univariate regressions and centrality or rescaled centrality in multivariate regressions, all else equal. The Δt = 30-minutes window is used. The data is truncated, such that investors in the bottom two percentiles and top two percentiles of connectedness are discarded from the data.

reweighted least squares (using Ramsey's E-function) for multivariate regressions. These regressions, displayed in columns 8–11 of Table 4, provide similar results. The coefficients for d in the multivariate regressions are negative, whereas the coefficients for c are positive, suggesting that it is indeed centrality above and beyond degree that is important in determining returns. Indeed, in multivariate regressions, the coefficients of rescaled centrality (Table 4, columns 7, 9, and 11) all come out with a positive sign, and are strongly statistically significant with one exception. These regressions also work as a robustness test that the results are not driven by multicollinearity, given that the correlation between centrality and degree is quite high. Thus, the positive relationship between centrality and returns is well documented.

The previous results are based on a threshold for the number of overlapping trades of $M=3$. It is an open question as to what is the “right” value of this threshold. A too low M may mistakenly identify too many links. On the other hand, a too high M may tend to under-identify links, especially for agents who do not trade much.

To address this concern, we carry out the tests for all M between 1 and 10 and report the results in Table 5. The coefficient of centrality is always positive, and significant for most of the range (the one exception being $M=7$, using raw returns), but of course the actual magnitude of coefficients varies. It is higher for lower M s, and lower for higher M s. However, the relationship between centrality and returns is not monotonically decreasing in M ; it increases for $M > 7$. The fact that the results hold up for a wide range of M mitigates the concern regarding the choice of threshold. We also note that the correlation between the different centrality measures is high when varying M . For example, the correlation between the centrality vector with $M=1$ and with $M=3$ is 0.98, and the correlation between the two vectors with $M=1$ and $M=5$ is 0.95.

With this in mind, going forward, we mainly use the threshold $M=3$ as the base case, corresponding to a median number of links of 159. This is in the low range of the numbers mentioned in Section 2.3. Another rationale for choosing a fairly *low* threshold number is that although this may lead to mistakenly identified links, such over-identification is possible to control for to some extent, by controlling for number of trades, total trading quantity, and degree (which are directly affected by number of trades), and by using rescaled centrality. On the other hand, as M increases, we are more likely to miss connections for agents who do not trade much, and it seems difficult to control for such missed links.

As is common for tests on individual investor performance, the adjusted R-squares (Table 4) are low, because of the noisiness of individual returns. As a comparison, Ivković and Weisbenner (2007) use about 27,000 households to check the correlation between average monthly excess returns and their locality measures (see their Table V, columns 7 and 8). Their main variable of interest is significant and adjusted R-squares vary between 0.0002 and 0.0004 (though they get somewhat higher R-squares in other tests). This is about 10 times

Table 5
Different thresholds

A. Returns										
Threshold (M)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Median # links	673	294	159	119	86	73	58	52	44	39
Centrality (c)	0.012 >20	0.098 19.8	0.0060 14.1	0.0035 9.3	0.0019 5.8	0.0014 6.3	0.0001 0.19	0.00015 6.1	0.00019 13.0	0.00019 16.3
Degree (d)	-0.014 <-20	-0.013 <-20	-0.0091 -18.6	-0.0061 -13.6	-0.0042 -10.5	-0.0033 -10.7	-0.0019 -7.5	-0.0017 -11.1	-0.0018 -11.2	-0.0017 -10.9
# of trades (n)	0.0084 >20	0.095 >20	0.0092 >20	0.0087 >20	0.0085 >20	0.0079 >20	0.0078 >20	0.0076 >20	0.0076 >20	0.0075 >20
Quantity (q)	-0.0017 <-20	-0.0016 <-20	-0.0017 <-20	-0.0017 <-20	-0.0017 <-20	-0.0017 <-20	-0.0018 <-20	-0.0018 <-20	-0.0018 <-20	-0.0017 <-20
\bar{R}^2	0.01	0.010	0.0091	0.0088	0.0086	0.0085	0.0082	0.0084	0.0087	0.0087
$\Delta\mu$	2.2%	1.9%	1.2%	0.7%	0.4%	0.3%	0.01%	0.1%	0.2%	0.2%
B. Excess returns										
Threshold (M)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Median # links	673	294	159	119	86	73	58	52	44	39
Centrality (c)	0.0098 >20	0.013 >20	0.0090 >20	0.0059 17.9	0.0043 15.4	0.0015 7.9	0.0005 3.7	0.0001 3.1	0.0001 5.9	0.0001 6.9
Degree (d)	0.013 <-20	-0.017 <-20	-0.014 <-20	-1.02 <-20	-0.081 <-20	-0.0049 -18.4	-0.0032 -15.1	-0.0026 -19.3	-0.0024 -18.0	-0.0023 -17.0
# of trades (n)	0.0038 >20	0.0059 >20	0.0063 >20	0.0059 >20	0.0055 >20	0.0048 >20	0.0042 >20	0.0040 >20	0.0037 >20	0.0037 >20
Quantity (q)	-0.0004 -6.6	-0.0003 -4.8	-0.0004 -6.38	-0.0004 -6.54	-0.0005 -8.1	-0.0004 -7.1	-0.0006 -8.8	-0.0005 -8.9	-0.0006 -9.1	-0.0006 -8.4
\bar{R}^2	0.0032	0.0044	0.0033	0.0025	0.0020	0.0016	0.0013	0.0012	0.0012	0.0010
$\Delta\mu$	1.8%	2.6%	1.8%	1.2%	0.9%	0.3%	0.1%	0.03%	0.1%	0.1%

The table displays results from OLS regressions of value-weighted returns (Panel A) and value-weighted excess returns (Panel B) on log centrality, log degree, log rescaled centrality, log number of trades, and log quantity, similar to Table 4, when varying the threshold for connections, M , between 1 and 10. Each column represents a regression. The first row displays coefficients while the second row displays the t -statistics. The variable μ is the value-weighted return for all trades of the entire year assuming a 30-day holding period for each trade and μ^e is the excess return of the investor calculated similar to μ after adjusting return from each trade by the market return (ISE 100 index return). Degree measures the number of links an agent is connected to, including himself. Centrality is the eigenvector centrality. Trading quantity is the sum of value of all transactions for each investor, and # of trades is the total number of trades for each investor. The variables, $\Delta\mu$ and $\Delta\mu^e$ highlight the economic significance of the results by showing the change in returns (and excess returns), given a one standard deviation increase of the centrality, all else equal. The $\Delta t=30$ -minutes window is used. The data is truncated, such that investors in the bottom two percentiles and top two percentiles of connectedness are discarded from the data.

lower than the R-square we obtain in univariate regression using raw returns. As another example, Massa and Simonov (2006) study almost 300,000 Swedish households to find the determinants of portfolio choice. In their multivariate individual household regressions (see their Table 4), they report adjusted R-squares of 1%-2%. These are of similar magnitudes as our adjusted R-square of 0.9% in our multivariate regressions for raw returns. We note that we are trying to explain trading returns, which add up to zero by definition, and are noisier than the portfolio returns used in the studies above.

By sorting investors into groups, based on their centrality, we can of course largely cancel the noise out. For example, if we sort investors into 30 groups based on their centrality, and do a univariate regression of average returns on average group centrality across groups, we get an R^2 of 83% and a t -stat of 11.96 for the coefficient of centrality. We avoid such grouping, since we are interested in studying the complete investor population from an information network perspective.

3.3 Centrality, information, and timing of trades

We verify that centrality is related to trading earlier than ones' neighbors, and also to actual information events in that investors who trade earlier with respect to such events are more central than investors who trade later. Also, we show that delaying the trades of central investors by a day decreases their performance, further underlining the importance of the timing of their trades. These results provide additional support for the information diffusion story over alternative explanations (e.g., liquidity provision and style investing).

As a first test, we verify that trading before ones' neighbors is related to centrality.¹⁵ Specifically, we define the vector w , where the i th element represents the average fraction of times investor i traded before his neighbors. We regress w on rescaled centrality, $c - d$, and verify that the two variables are positively related (t -stats above 20 for OLS, and for iterated reweighted robust regressions with Ramsey's E -function, and 12.9 for OLS with t -distributed errors).

To verify that centrality is also related to trading early with respect to real information events, we proceed as follows. Using standard news outlets, we identify 11 events that can be related to large daily stock movements in 2005. Details about the type of event, affected company, and size of stock movement are provided in the Internet Appendix. We have focused on medium-size companies with a couple of exceptions. The companies operate in fairly diverse business areas. There were nine events that led to positive returns and two that

¹⁵ We have also carried out several tests that show that a general property of the EIN is that some investors tend to systematically trade before their neighbors (the analysis is available upon request). This is a distinguishing feature between the information story and several alternative stories of investing, e.g., liquidity provision and style investing (broadly defined). Without further assumptions, two liquidity providers who trade in the same stock will tend to trade ahead of each other about half of the time each, as will two style investors using the same investment style.

led to negative returns. The information events were reported in news outlets within five business days prior to and after stock movement dates. All events were stock-specific (i.e., idiosyncratic for one specific firm).

We choose a time window of seven days before and after the day the event was mentioned for the first time in the media. Within this window, we identify the investors who traded in the right direction (i.e., purchased the stock if the information led to positive returns and sold it if returns were negative). For each investor, we identify the time of the trade relative to the date of the information event (time 0). If an investor traded multiple times (over the time period of one event and/or across events), we use the (unweighted) average time traded for that investor. This leads to a vector, T , of trading times (in the range $[-7, 7]$) for each investor who traded within the window around any of the events, in total 37,779 investors.

We regress T on the logarithms of centrality (c), degree (d), number of trades (n), and trading quantity (q), where c and d were constructed using the 30-minute window, with threshold $M=3$. The results are shown in Table 6, Panel A. We see that there is a strongly significant negative relation between c and T , that is, that central investors trade earlier than peripheral investors, both in multivariate and univariate regressions. The result is robust to several variations. For example, very similar results are obtained if we move c to the left-hand side of the regression and T to the right-hand side, with the reversed causality interpretation that centrality is explained by investors trading early with respect to information events. In the univariate regressions of T on c , the t -statistic in the OLS regression is -19.4 , it is -9.3 in the robust

Table 6
Trading time versus centrality

A. Original set of 11 events

	1 Centrality c	2 Centrality c	3 Degree d	4 Number of trades n	5 Trading Quantity q
β_{OLS}	-0.15	-1.0	1.0	-0.19	-0.03
t_{OLS}	< -20	-15.0	14.9	-11.2	-3.3
$t_{t-error}$	-15.1	-6.4	5.2	-1.9	-2.0
t_{Ramsey}	< -20	-14.8	14.7	-10.8	-3.2

B. Extended set of 27 events

	Centrality c	Centrality c	Degree d	Number of trades n	Trading Quantity q
β_{OLS}	-0.19	-1.1	1.3	-0.31	-0.18
t_{OLS}	-19.4	-10.2	12.7	-11.6	-15.7
$t_{t-error}$	-13.7	-6.4	7.0	-4.3	-9.2
t_{Ramsey}	-19.4	-10.2	12.7	-11.6	-15.6

The table shows the trading time (T) regressed on log-centrality (c) in univariate regressions (Column 1), and in multivariate regressions (Columns 2–5), together with log-degree (d) log-number of trades (n) and log-trading-quantity (q). For a detailed definition of these variables, see Table 4. Panel A includes 11 events, and Panel B includes an extended set of 27 events. In both panels, the first two rows show the coefficients and t -statistics from OLS regressions. Rows 3 and 4 display t -statistics from a regression that is robust to heavy-tailed error terms and from iteratively reweighted least squares regression (using Ramsey’s E-function), respectively.

least squares regression, and -19.3 in the reweighted iterated least squares regression.

To get an indication of the economic significance of this relationship, we note that since the (univariate) coefficient on c is -0.15 , and since the standard deviation of c is 17.0 (from Table 2), a one standard deviation increase in centrality corresponds to trading 2.55 days earlier with respect to the event. The average absolute return in an event is 15.1% , that is, 1.1% per day over the 14-day period. So, a one standard deviation increase in centrality would correspond to higher profits of $1.1\% \times 2.5 = 2.8\%$. This is higher than the economic significance obtained in Table 4, which for the univariate regression was 0.6% .

Of course, it is difficult to directly compare these two return measures, although they do not seem inconsistent. The events we have focused on in this section are special, in that they were reported in the media. This could mean that they were “larger” information events than normal, and thereby more profitable for central investors. It could also mean that they were just more easily identifiable, thereby decreasing the informational advantage and profitability of central investors. Moreover, the events were not rare in terms of their return size. In fact, there were 3,291 events in 2005, in which a stock’s absolute return was over 15% within a 10-day period, so such events could potentially contribute significantly to the performance of central investors.

We also verify that the results are still present when we use a larger set of events. We expand the number of events to 27, in total covering 67,509 investors. Some of the events in the expanded set were less clear-cut than in the original set, because the link between the reported news and the stock movement was (subjectively) somewhat ambiguous. For instance, it could be questioned whether the news on April 22, 2005, that GIMA (a national retail chain) was to open a branch in a mid-sized coastal town could have caused a sizable jump to its stock price, although such a jump was observed around this news event. The results for the expanded set, shown in Table 6, Panel B, are still similar to those of the original set. For example the univariate OLS t -statistic is -19.4 , and the multivariate OLS t -statistic is -10.2 .

We next study the trading activity of investors around the information event, to get an indication of what is the right time horizon for information diffusion. We calculate the number of trades in the stock per hour for each of the original 11 events, where $t=0$ corresponds to the date when the event was reported in the media. For each event, we normalize, by dividing with the average number of hourly trades over the whole year. A number higher than one thus represents a higher-than-average trading activity. We calculate the average of these normalized hourly trading activities across the 11 events and, since there is considerable noise at the hourly level, form a rolling average with a three-day backward-looking time window. This measure of trading activity is shown in Figure 6.




Figure 6
Trading activity

The figure shows the average hourly trading activity over time for the 11 events (described in the Internet Appendix), where Day 0 represents the point in time when each respective event was reported in the news. A level higher than one represents a higher-than-average trading activity. The main increase in trading activity occurs between 3 and 11 trading days before the event is reported in the news.

We see that the activity is above average from about 12 trading days before the news event, until about 2 days after. The main increase in activity, however, lasts between 3 and 11 trading days before the news event. During this period, a sharp increase in trading activity occurs to almost twice the average, followed by an equally sharp decline. We draw two conclusions from this: First, that our conjectured information diffusion horizon of about a week to ten days is in line with observed trading activity. Second, that most of the activity occurs before the event is reported in the media. This provides additional support for that information diffusion occurs through other channels than mainstream media.

We also verify that timely trades by central investors are important. We sort traders into high and low centrality groups (using the median centrality as a cutoff) and delay the trades of the high centrality investors by one day.¹⁶ Using excess returns to measure performance, the hypothesis is then that central investors—who will tend to take the right side of the trade against less central investors around information events—should lose out when their trades are delayed, whereas less central investors should gain (the net effect is zero).

Indeed, we find that excess returns of high (above median) centrality investors decrease by 0.21% when their trades are delayed by a day. In contrast, excess returns of low (below median) centrality agents increase by 0.26% when trades are delayed by a day.¹⁷ The *t*-stats in all of these tests are strongly significant.

¹⁶ We use one day, since shorter delays may introduce micro-structure issues such as bid-ask bounce effects, especially in less liquid stocks.

¹⁷ The changes in returns of high and low centrality agents do not exactly add up to zero since we weight each agent equally, to be consistent with the rest of the paper.

Finally, we regress returns from delayed trades on centrality. The hypothesis is that the relationship between centrality and returns becomes weaker when trades are delayed. Indeed, when trades are delayed, the centrality coefficient decreases from 0.0027 to 0.0019, and the economic significance of a one standard deviation increase in centrality decreases from 0.57% to 0.42%. Thus, close to 30% of the positive relationship between centrality and returns is lost when trades are delayed.

3.4 Alternative explanations and robustness of results

We have shown that centrality is positively related to profitability and to trading early with respect to information events, in line with information diffusion being the driving force behind our results, and we have argued that several other explanations are unlikely. In this section we carry out several additional tests, and find additional support for information diffusion over alternative explanations. Especially, our robustness tests favor information diffusion over spurious mechanical relationships between centrality and other variables, algorithmic trading or other trading strategies by institutional investors, momentum, and price impact from illiquidity, adverse selection, or market micro-structure effects. In the on-line Internet Appendix, we provide further robustness tests, using alternative profit measures and conditioning the regressions on degree.

3.4.1 Out-of-sample tests. Since our dataset is restricted to only one year, we have constructed all variables using the full year of data. A weakness of this approach is that since profits are measured in-sample, there may potentially be a purely mechanical relationship between centrality and returns that is driving the results. To address this concern, we divide the one-year sample into two subperiods. We construct C , D , N , and Q during the first eight months, and then measure μ and μ^e during the remaining four months of the year. The tests are then restricted to include only investors who traded in both sub-periods, and to avoid losing too many investors, we use the threshold $M = 1$. There were 228,538 such investors.

The results, shown in Panel A of Table 7 for the returns and in Panel B for the excess returns, are similar to the previous results, although the statistical significance is somewhat weaker. We attribute this to the shorter time period in combination with smaller sample size. Specifically, all the centrality coefficients have the correct (positive) sign, and most of them are highly statistically significant. The economic impact on returns of a one standard deviation increase in centrality varies between 0.2% and 2.1%, which is similar to the previous tests (see Table 4).

We also study the out-of-sample relationship between trading early on information events and centrality. In the base sample, with 11 events, all events were chosen to be in the second half of 2005, so we construct C , D , N , and Q using the first six months (and a 30-minute window). This reduces the number

Table 7
Out-of-sample tests

A. Returns										
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	<i>t-error</i>	<i>t-error</i>	Ramsey
Centrality (<i>c</i>)	0.0030 >20					0.0110 10.7 -0.0124 -12.1		0.0126 6.1 -0.0146 -7.1		0.0113 10.9 -0.0127 -12.3
Degree (<i>d</i>)		0.028 >20								
Rescaled Centrality (<i>c-d</i>)			0.011 9.8				0.012 11.7 0.0047 >20 -0.0010 -7.4 0.2%		0.014 7.0 0.0037 10.3 -0.0007 -2.7 0.2%	
# of trades (<i>n</i>)				0.0035 >20		0.0057 >20 -0.0009 -7.3 1.8%		0.0053 >20 -0.0007 -2.7 2.1%		0.0058 >20 -0.009 -7.1 1.8%
Trading quantity (<i>q</i>)					0.0018 >20 0.4%					
$\Delta\mu$	0.5%	0.5%	0.2%	0.6%			0.2%			0.2%
B. Excess returns										
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	<i>t-error</i>	<i>t-error</i>	Ramsey
Centrality (<i>c</i>)	0.0008 9.9					0.0010 1.2 -0.0022 -2.5		0.0021 1.2 -0.0037 -2.6		0.0012 1.3 -0.0024 -2.5
Degree (<i>d</i>)		0.0008 9.6								
Rescaled Centrality (<i>c-d</i>)			0.0018 1.6				0.0018 2.1 0.0029 13.8 -0.0006 -5.3 0.2%		0.0035 2.0 0.0024 5.8 -0.0002 -1.0 0.3%	
# of trades (<i>n</i>)				0.0012 12.4		0.0038 >20 -0.0004 -6.6 1.8%		0.0035 >20 -0.0004 -3.5 2.1%		0.0038 >20 -0.0004 -6.8 2.0%
Trading quantity (<i>q</i>)					0.0005 7.7 0.1%					
$\Delta\mu$	0.2%	0.1%	0.03%	0.2%			0.2%			0.2%

(continued)

Table 7
Continued
C. Trading time regressions

T	Centrality c	Centrality c	Degree d	# trades n	Trading quantity q
β_{OLS}	-0.13	-0.03	0.11	-0.15	-0.07
α_{OLS}	-13.8	-1.4	3.4	-5.6	-4.6
$t_{t-error}$	-9.5	-12.9	9.5	-2.8	-2.8
t_{Ramsey}	-13.7	-1.4	3.4	-5.5	-4.6

The table repeats tests in Table 4 and Table 6 Panel A using left-hand side variables calculated out of sample period. The dependent variable is value-weighted returns in Panel A and value-weighted excess returns in Panel B. In Panels A and B each column represents a regression and columns 1-7 display results from OLS regressions, columns 8-9 display results from a regression that is robust to heavy-tailed error terms, and columns 10-11 display results from iteratively reweighted least squares regression (using Ramsey's E-function). The first row displays coefficients while the second row displays t -statistics. In Panel C, column 1 shows univariate regression results, while columns 2-5 show multivariate regression results. The second, third and fourth rows show t -statistics from OLS regressions, a regression that is robust to heavy-tailed error terms and an iteratively reweighted least squares regression, respectively. In Panels A and B, profits are calculated using the final four months of the year, whereas right-hand side variables are constructed using the first eight months. The variable $\Delta\mu$ highlights the economic significance of the results by showing the change in returns and excess returns, given a one standard deviation increase of the variable in univariate regressions and centrality or rescaled centrality in multivariate regressions, all else equal. In Panel C, variables are constructed using the first six months of data, whereas the events occur over the following six-months. The threshold $M = 1$ is used.

of traders in the sample to 32,375. The results are shown in Panel C of Table 7. For the multivariate regressions, all centrality coefficients have the right sign (negative). For the robust least squares regression, the coefficient is strongly significant (t -statistic of -12.9), whereas the coefficients are insignificant for the OLS and reweighed least squares regressions (t -statistic of about -1.4 for both regressions). For the univariate regressions, all results are strongly negatively significant (t -statistic of -13.8 , -9.5 and -13.7 , respectively, for the three regressions).

Thus, our results hold out-of-sample and therefore do not seem to be driven by a mechanical relationship between centrality, returns, and early trading.

3.4.2 Excluding institutional investors. We carry out the same tests as before, but exclude institutional investors. The results (not reported) are virtually identical. That is, we get very similar regression coefficients, statistical and economic significance when institutional investors are excluded as when they are included. That the results are very similar is not surprising, given that each investor has the same weight in the regressions, and individual investors make up more than 99.9% of the investor population in our sample. Our results are therefore not capturing differences between institutional and individual investors, but rather differences among individual investors. This also suggests that (profitable) high-frequency, automated portfolio algorithm-based trading strategies are not the source of our results, since it is unlikely that these are prevalent among the noninstitutional investor population.

3.4.3 High- and low-information periods. Given that the source of higher returns of central agents is information-based, we would expect the effect to be stronger in periods of high information diffusion. The amount of information diffusing into the market at any given time is unobservable, but a reasonable proxy may be given by the number of earnings announcements in a given month. The hypothesis is then that, all else equal, in months with a large number of earnings announcements, central agents should outperform peripheral agents more than in months with few earnings announcements. The number of earnings announcements per month during the year varied as follows:

Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
8	41	178	109	182	87	19	176	120	55	179	80

We see that the numbers in the months of March, May, August, and November are substantially higher than during the rest of the year (averaging 178, versus 65 during the remaining months). We therefore run regressions where profits are based on trades in these months, and compare them with regressions on the remaining months. The results are shown in Table 8. In line with the hypothesis, the effects are much stronger in the high-information months. For example, the centrality coefficient in the OLS regression is 0.019 in the high-information period, with an economic significance of 3.6%, whereas it is 0.0008

Table 8
High- and low-information periods

A. Returns

	High-information periods			Low-information periods		
	OLS	$t-error$	Ramsey	OLS	$t-error$	Ramsey
Centrality (c)	0.019	0.015	0.019	0.0008	0.0025	0.0014
	> 20	12.5	> 20	1.7	2.6	2.9
Degree (d)	-0.016	-0.013	-0.017	0.0015	-0.0018	0.0007
	< -20	-10.7	< -20	3.0	-1.9	1.3
# of trades (n)	0.0064	0.0059	0.0064	0.0007	0.0006	0.0007
	> 20	> 20	> 20	6.8	3.0	7.2
Quantity (q)	-0.0054	-0.0049	-0.0054	-0.0010	-0.0007	-0.0010
	< -20	< -20	< -20	-14.5	-5.0	-14.4
\bar{R}^2	0.016			0.0031		
$\Delta\mu$	3.6%	2.8%	3.6%	0.2%	0.5%	0.3%

B. Excess returns

	High-information periods			Low-information periods		
	OLS	$t-error$	Ramsey	OLS	$t-error$	Ramsey
Centrality (c)	0.010	0.0080	0.010	0.0025	0.0026	0.0029
	19.6	7.9	19.8	5.9	3.0	6.8
Degree (d)	-0.010	-0.0088	-0.011	-0.0023	-0.0033	-0.0028
	< -20	-8.6	< -20	-5.2	-3.8	-6.5
# of trades (n)	0.0023	0.0017	0.0022	-0.0001	0.000003	-0.0004
	19.3	7.0	17.8	-0.7	-2.3	0.05
Quantity (q)	-0.0019	-0.0013	-0.0018	-0.0001	0.00003	-0.0002
	< -20	-7.9	< -20	-2.4	-2.3	-2.8
\bar{R}^2	0.0032			0.00004		
$\Delta\mu$	1.9%	1.5%	1.9%	0.5%	0.5%	0.6%

The table displays results from regressions of value-weighted returns (Panel A) and value-weighted excess returns (Panel B), when total time period is split into high-information months, in which there were many earnings announcements (March 178, May 182, August 176, and Nov 170), and low-information months, in which there were few such announcements (January 8, February 41, April 109, June 87, July 10, October 55, and December 80). The first row displays coefficients while the second row displays the t -statistics. Columns 2–4 display results in high-information months (OLS, heavy-tailed error terms, and iteratively reweighted least squares with Ramsey's E-function). Columns 5–7 display the regressions in the low-information months. The variable μ is the value-weighted return for all trades of an investor for the entire year assuming a 30-day holding period for each trade and μ^e is the excess return of the investor calculated similar to μ after adjusting return from each trade by the market return (ISE 100 index return). Degree measures the number of links an agent is connected to, including himself. Centrality is the eigenvector centrality. Trading quantity is the sum of value of all transactions for each investor. And # of trades is the total number of trades for each investor. The variables, $\Delta\mu$ and $\Delta\mu^e$ highlight the economic significance of the results by showing the change in returns (and excess returns), given a one standard deviation increase of the variable in univariate regressions and centrality or rescaled centrality in multivariate regressions, all else equal. The $\Delta t=30$ -minutes window is used. The data is truncated, such that investors in the bottom two percentiles and top two percentiles of connectedness are discarded from the data.

in the low-information period, with an economic significance of 0.2%. These results further support our findings in Section 3.3 that information diffusion significantly contributes to the returns of central agents.

3.4.4 Realized returns. According to our model, investors trade when information arrives. However, the positions may not necessarily be closed right after the information is incorporated into prices. Rather, the closing date may be determined by other factors, like liquidity needs. In order to measure the

information content of trades in a short time period, we have therefore used a fixed holding period of one month for each trade. This assumption could potentially induce spurious correlation in measured returns of investors.

As a robustness test, to ensure that such spurious correlation is not inflating the significance of our results, we repeat our main test using a return measure that is based on actual realized returns. This specification reduces the number of trades that the return measure is based upon, since many trades are not closed during the sample period, and also the number of traders in the sample, since many investors did not close any trades during the period. The number of remaining traders in the sample is 332,766. As shown in Table 9, the results are similar with the alternative specification. All coefficients except one have the right (positive) sign, and the economic and statistical significance are similar as in the base tests, despite the large reduction in sample size. This indicates that the highly significant values we obtain are not caused by spurious correlation induced by the fixed holding period assumption.

This specification also addresses concerns that the positive relationship between centrality and returns arises because of price impact or other micro-structure effects, since returns in this test are realized. Of course, the time horizon typically assumed for these micro-structure effects, whether due to illiquidity, adverse selection, or other effects, is typically way shorter than our return window of one month (e.g., Campbell, Grossman, and Wang 1993; Chan 1993; Engelberg, Sasseville, and Williams 2012), so it should be of little concern in the base test too, and even less so in our robustness test below, which uses a three-month return window.

3.4.5 Longer return window. We extend the profit window. This shows that our results are robust to longer profit horizons, and also supports information diffusion over some alternative explanations. Specifically, given our time windows, momentum or price impact are unlikely to explain our results.

We extend the profit window, ΔT_P , to three months (our sample period of one year make longer windows infeasible). With the extended window, centrality and returns are positively correlated, and the magnitude is similar as before. For example, the multivariate regression for excess returns, using a three-month profit window, leads to a coefficient of $\beta = 0.0061$ with a t -stat of 10.1 (not reported in a table), compared to $\beta = 0.0060$ with a t -stat of 14.1 when the 30-day window is used (see Table 4). Similar results arise in the other regressions. Thus, the bulk of returns seem to be realized within 30 days.

When stocks are sorted into winner and loser categories based on their past performance in the momentum strategy, one month is skipped (Jegadeesh and Titman 1993, 2001) before investing and holding for 6–12 months. It is therefore implausible that momentum plays a major role behind the results in this study, given the one-month window used when defining trading profits. Indeed, momentum portfolio returns go in the wrong direction for the one-month horizon (Jegadeesh and Titman 1993). Further, as noted above, the

Table 9
Realized returns
A. Returns

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	<i>t-error</i>	<i>t-error</i>	Ramsey	Ramsey
Centrality (<i>c</i>)	-0.012 < -20					0.0007		0.013		0.011	
Degree (<i>d</i>)		-0.012 < -20				0.48 0.0012 0.73		4.1 -0.0010 -3.2		6.7 -0.0091 -5.4	
Rescaled Centrality (<i>c-d</i>)			0.058 > 20				0.0040		0.015		0.013
# of trades (<i>n</i>)				-0.013 < -20		-0.013 < -20 -0.0013 -6.7	2.6 -0.014 < -20 0.0016 8.1	-0.013 -14.8 0.0016 7.8	4.8 -0.011 < -20 0.0048 5.4	-0.013 < -20 0.0016 7.6	0.013 8.4 -0.014 < -20 0.0039 19.3
Quantity (<i>q</i>)					-0.0081 < -20						
\bar{R}^2	0.016	0.022	0.0059	0.022	0.017	0.023	0.023				
$\Delta\mu$	1.9%	2.0%	1.1%	2.2%	2.0%	0.1%	0.08%	2.0%	0.3%	1.7%	0.3%

B. Excess returns

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	<i>t-error</i>	<i>t-error</i>	Ramsey	Ramsey
Centrality (<i>c</i>)	0.0041 > 20					0.016		0.0096		0.018	
Degree (<i>d</i>)		0.0038 > 20				13.2 -0.015 -11.7		4.0 -0.00934 -3.7		14.8 -0.017 -13.7	
Rescaled Centrality (<i>c-d</i>)			0.0059 6.0				0.016		0.0096		0.018
# of trades (<i>n</i>)				0.0038 > 20		0.0048	13.6 0.0057 > 20	0.0025	4.0 0.0026 6.2	15.0 0.0045 14.8	0.018 0.0050 > 20
Quantity (<i>q</i>)					0.0019 > 20	-0.0004 -6.2	-0.0008 -5.6	0.0015	-0.0008 -6.0	0.0004 2.7	0.0005 3.1
\bar{R}^2	0.0031	0.0029	0.0001	0.0033	0.0016	0.0040	0.0040				
$\Delta\mu$	0.7%	0.6%	0.2%	0.7%	0.5%	2.5%	0.3%	1.5%	0.2%	2.9%	0.4%

The table displays results from regressions of value-weighted excess returns (Panel A) and value-weighted excess returns (Panel B) on log centrality, log degree, log rescaled centrality, log number of trades, and log volume. Each column represents a regression. The first row displays coefficients while the second row displays the *t*-statistics. Columns 1–7 display results from OLS regressions, columns 8–9 display results from a regression that is robust to heavy-tailed error terms, and columns 10–11 display results from iteratively reweighted least squares regression (using Ramsey’s E-function). The variable μ is the value-weighted return for all trades of an investor and μ^e is the excess return of the investor. In contrast to Table 4, realized returns of closed positions are used in the return calculations. Degree measures the number of links an agent is connected to, including himself. Centrality is the eigenvector centrality. Trading quantity is the sum of value of all transactions for each investor. And # of trades is the total number of trades for each investor. The variables, $\Delta\mu$ and $\Delta\mu^e$ highlight the economic significance of the results by showing the change in returns (and excess returns), given a one standard deviation increase of the variable in univariate regressions and centrality or rescaled centrality in multivariate regressions, all else equal. The $\Delta t=30$ -minutes window is used. The data is truncated, such that investors in the bottom two percentiles and top two percentiles of connectedness are discarded from the data.

results are somewhat weaker—not stronger—when using the three-month profit window, again at odds with the momentum explanation. Overall, momentum therefore does not seem to be a likely driver of our results.

3.4.6 Longer time window. So far, we have used time windows of up to 30 minutes. The time horizon for information diffusion that we are considering is about a week and the time window should be chosen significantly shorter, since higher-order connections are also taken into account. Focusing on short windows also helps us to differentiate our results from alternative explanations such as traditional style motives, as previously discussed.

It could be argued, however, that a longer time window should be preferred, given the increased trading activity over eight trading days observed in Section 3.3. To verify the robustness of our results, we therefore also extend the time window, Δt , to one day. Because of computational limitations, we are restricted to studying one-third of the investors (about 193,000, randomly chosen) and construct the EIN from three months of trades instead of a year.¹⁸ The results, shown in Table 10, again document a positive relationship between centrality and returns, with similar economic and statistical magnitudes as in our previous tests.

3.4.7 No neighbors in the same brokerage house. If brokers are trading on behalf of their clients, systematic sequencing of trades could mean that the brokers are prioritizing important clients rather than that the clients themselves are trading sequentially. To address this concern, we do not count links between investors who are associated with the same brokerage house when creating the EIN. The results (not reported) are almost identical as before. Thus, such broker sequencing of trades, although potentially present, does not seem to be the mechanism behind our results.

4. Conclusion

Central agents in our empirical information network earn higher profits and trade earlier with respect to information events than their peripheral neighbors. Our results support a view of the stock market as a place where new information is incorporated into asset prices through gradual decentralized diffusion. Information networks provide an intermediate information channel, in-between the public arena where news events and prices themselves make some information available to all investors, and the completely local arena of private signals and inside information. In an information network, the degree of publicness of a signal is determined by how long it has been diffusing, in

¹⁸ Even so, the program took several days to run on UPPMAX, a high performance computer cluster, using multiple servers with up to 72GB of RAM.

Table 10
Longer time window

A. Returns										
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	<i>t-error</i>	<i>t-error</i>	Ramsey
Centrality (<i>c</i>)	0.0091 > 20					0.065 > 20 -0.063 < -20		0.065 > 20 -0.055 < -20		0.056 > 20 -0.063 < -20
Degree (<i>d</i>)		0.0083 > 20								
Rescaled Centrality (<i>c-d</i>)			0.0028 > 20				0.061 > 20 0.0059 > 20 -0.00002 -1.5		0.0526 19.0 0.0039 18 -0.0014 -9.7	0.061 > 20 0.0076 > 20 -0.00002 -1.7
# of trades (<i>n</i>)				0.0071 > 20						
Trading quantity (<i>q</i>)					0.0054 > 20		-0.0019 < -20	0.00002 -0.7		
$\Delta\mu$	1.1%	1.0%	0.3%	1.4%	1.0%	7.7%	0.2%	6.6%	0.2%	7.6%
B. Excess returns										
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	<i>t-error</i>	<i>t-error</i>	Ramsey
Centrality (<i>c</i>)	0.0028 > 20					0.020 15.7 -0.020 -15.5		0.016 6.1 -0.016 -6.3		0.020 15.3 -0.020 -15.7
Degree (<i>d</i>)		0.0025 > 20								
Rescaled Centrality (<i>c-d</i>)			0.0009 7.7				0.061 > 20 0.0085 > 20 -0.0001 -1.2		0.052 19.0 0.0057 18.4 -0.0001 -0.6	0.061 > 20 0.0029 17.5 0.00002 0.23
# of trades (<i>n</i>)				0.0023 > 20		0.0030 17.8 0.00006 0.55		0.0014 4.3 0.00006 0.26		
Trading quantity (<i>q</i>)					0.00046 > 20					
$\Delta\mu$	0.3%	0.3%	0.01%	0.5%	0.4%	2.4%	0.7%	1.9%	0.6%	2.3%

The table repeats the tests in Table 4, using a one-day window to calculate links instead of 30 minutes, and threshold $M = 1$. The dependent variable is value-weighted returns in Panel A and value-weighted excess returns in Panel B. Each column represents a regression. The first row displays coefficients while the second row displays *t*-statistics. Columns 1–7 display results from OLS regressions, columns 8–9 display results from a regression that is robust to heavy-tailed error terms, and columns 10–11 display results from iteratively reweighted least squares regression (using Ramsey’s E-function). The variable, $\Delta\mu$ highlights the economic significance of the results by showing the change in returns and excess returns, given a one standard deviation increase of the variable in univariate regressions, and centrality or rescaled centrality in multivariate regressions, all else equal. In both panels, the sample is restricted to one-third (193,000) of the investors, and centrality and degree are calculated using the first three months of trades. Detailed definitions of variables are provided in Table 4.

which part of the network it initially entered, and by the network's topological properties. This is consistent with significant asset price movements occurring independently of public information events, with investors taking on diverse portfolio positions, and with extensive trading in the market.

Although we cannot identify the exact channels of information diffusion, our results suggest a decentralized diffusion mechanism, more in line with diffusion through localized channels—for example, social networks—than through mainstream media channels. This is the view taken in several recent studies that focus on specific investor groups, for example, in Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2004) and Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2008). Our knowledge is still limited, however. Which factors determine a market's information network? Geographical location? Social networks? Other channels? Given datasets with more detailed information about investors in the market, further research may shed light on this important question.

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