Connected Stocks: Evidence from Tehran Stock Exchange

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- Business Group Effect

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Motivation

Research Question

- Can the common ownership cause stock return comovement ?
 - We connect stocks through the common ownership by blockholders (ownership > 1%)
 - We focus on excess return comovement for a pair of the stocks
 - We use common ownership to forecast cross-sectional variation in the realized correlation of four-factor + industry residuals

Why does it matter?

- Covariance
 - Covariance is a key component of risk in many financial applications.
 (Portfolio selection, Risk management, Hedging and Asset pricing)
 - Covariance is a significant input in risk measurement models (Such as Value-at-Risk)
- Return predictability
 - If it's valid, we can build a profitable buy-sell strategy

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Common-ownership measurements

Model based measures

- HJL $_I^A(A,B) = \sum_{i \in I^A,B} \frac{\alpha_{i,B}}{\alpha_{i,A} + \alpha_{i,B}}$ Harford et al. (2011)
- Top5 $_j=\frac{1}{n-1}\sum_i^5\sum_{j\neq k}\nu_{ik}$ Antón et al. (2020)
- $\kappa_{ij} = \cos(\nu_i, \nu_j) \cdot \sqrt{\frac{IHHI_j}{IHHI_i}}$ Backus et al. (2020)
- GGL^A(A, B) = $\sum_{i=1}^{I} \alpha_{i,A} g(\beta_{i,A}) \alpha_{i,B}$ Gilje et al. (2020), Lewellen and Lewellen (2021)
- MHHI_{Delta} = $\sum_{j=1}^{J} \sum_{k\neq j}^{K} \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{N} w_j * w_k * \mu_{i,j} * \mu_{i,k}}{\sum_{i=1}^{N} \mu_{i,j} * \mu_{i,k}}$ Lewellen and Lowry (2021)

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Ad-hoc measures

- Overlap_{AP}(A, B) = $\sum_{i \in I^{A,B}} \alpha_{i,A} \frac{\bar{\nu}_{A}}{\bar{\nu}_{A} + \bar{\nu}_{B}} + \alpha_{i,B} \frac{\bar{\nu}_{B}}{\bar{\nu}_{A} + \bar{\nu}_{B}}$ Anton and Polk (2014)
- Overlap $Count}(A, B) = \sum_{i \in I^A, B} 1$ He and Huang (2017), He et al. (2019)
- Overlap_{Min}(A, B) = $\sum_{i \in I^{A,B}} \min\{\alpha_{i,A}, \alpha_{i,B}\}$ Newham et al. (2018)
- Overlap_{HL} $(A, B) = \sum_{i \in I^{A,B}} \alpha_{i,A} \times \sum_{i \in I^{A,B}} \alpha_{i,B}$ Hansen and Lott Jr (1996) , Freeman (2019)

Common-ownership measurements

Model based measures

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Selected measure

We need a pair-level measure, which is bi-directional, so we use the AP measure.



Comovement effect




Common-ownership


Anton and Polk (2014)

Comovement effect















Papers






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 - Controls
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Anton and Polk (2014)

$$FCAP_{ij,t} = \frac{\sum_{f=1}^{F} (S_{i,t}^{f} P_{i,t} + S_{j,t}^{f} P_{j,t})}{S_{i,t} P_{i,t} + S_{j,t} P_{j,t}}$$

Anton and Polk (2014)

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SQRT

Quadratic

$$\left[\frac{\sum_{f=1}^{F}(\sqrt{S_{i,t}^{f}P_{i,t}}+\sqrt{S_{j,t}^{f}P_{j,t}})}{\sqrt{S_{i,t}P_{i,t}}+\sqrt{S_{j,t}P_{j,t}}}\right]^{2}$$

$$\left[\frac{\sum_{f=1}^{F}(\sqrt{S_{i,t}^{f}P_{i,t}}+\sqrt{S_{j,t}^{f}P_{j,t}})}{\sqrt{S_{i,t}P_{i,t}}+\sqrt{S_{j,t}P_{j,t}}}\right]^{2}\left[\frac{\sum_{f=1}^{F}[(S_{i,t}^{f}P_{i,t})^{2}+(S_{j,t}^{f}P_{j,t})^{2}]}{(S_{i,t}P_{i,t})^{2}+(S_{j,t}P_{j,t})^{2}}\right]^{-1}$$

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SQRT

Quadratic

$$\left[\frac{\sum_{f=1}^{F}(\sqrt{S_{i,t}^{f}P_{i,t}}+\sqrt{S_{j,t}^{f}P_{j,t}})}{\sqrt{S_{i,t}P_{i,t}}+\sqrt{S_{j,t}P_{j,t}}}\right]^{2}$$

$$\left[\frac{\sum_{f=1}^{F}(\sqrt{S_{i,t}^{f}P_{i,t}}+\sqrt{S_{j,t}^{f}P_{j,t}})}{\sqrt{S_{i,t}P_{i,t}}+\sqrt{S_{j,t}P_{j,t}}}\right]^{2}\left[\frac{\sum_{f=1}^{F}[(S_{i,t}^{f}P_{i,t})^{2}+(S_{j,t}^{f}P_{j,t})^{2}]}{(S_{i,t}P_{i,t})^{2}+(S_{j,t}P_{j,t})^{2}}\right]^{-1}$$

Intuition

If for a pair of stocks with n mutual owners, all owners have even shares of each firm's market cap, then the proposed indexes will be equal to n. Proof

Example



Example



For better observation, assume that


- $\alpha + \beta = 100$
- both firm have equal market cap

Example



For better observation, assume that

- $\alpha + \beta = 100$
- both firm have equal market cap



Comparison of three methods for calculating common ownership

Example of three common owner

Firm Y

Firm X

Example of three common owner

Common owner 1


 $\mathsf{Firm}\;\mathsf{Y}$

Common owner 2

Firm X


Common owner 3

Example of three common owner



Common owner 3

Example of three common owner



Example of three common owner

Ownership	Type I	Type II	Type III	Type IV	Type V	Type VI	Type VII
α_1	1/3	20	10	20	10	5	1
eta_1	1/3	10	10	20	10	5	1
α_2	1/3	10	80	20	10	5	1
eta_2	1/3	20	80	20	10	5	1
α_3	1/3	70	10	20	10	5	1
eta_3	1/3	70	10	20	10	5	1
SQRT	3	2.56	2.33	1.8	0.9	0.45	0.09
SUM	1	1	1	0.6	0.3	0.15	0.03
Quadratic	3	1.85	1.52	8.33	33.33	133.33	3333.33

Comparison

- For better comparison we relax previous assumptions:
 - Two Firms with different market caps.

	$(\alpha_1,\beta_1),(\alpha_2,\beta_2)$								
	(10,40),(10,40)		(15,35)	,(15,35)	(20,30),(20,30)				
MarketCap _x MarketCap _y	SQRT	SUM	SQRT	SUM	SQRT	SUM			
1	0.90	0.50	0.96	0.50	0.99	0.50			
2	0.80	0.40	0.89	0.43	0.96	0.47			
3	0.75	0.35	0.85	0.40	0.94	0.45			
4	0.71	0.32	0.83	0.38	0.92	0.44			
5	0.69	0.30	0.81	0.37	0.91	0.43			
6	0.67	0.29	0.80	0.36	0.91	0.43			
7	0.65	0.28	0.79	0.35	0.90	0.43			
8	0.64	0.27	0.78	0.34	0.90	0.42			
9	0.63	0.26	0.77	0.34	0.89	0.42			
10	0.62	0.25	0.76	0.34	0.89	0.42			

Comparison



Comparison of two methods for calculating common ownership

Conclusion

We use the SQRT measure because it has an acceptable variation and has fair values at a lower level of aggregate common ownership.


Business Group

Ultimate Owner


Business Group




Business Group



Pair in the Business Group





Pair not in any of Business Groups



Data Summary

- \bullet We use blockholders' data from 2015/03/25 (1394/01/06) to 2020/03/18 (1398/12/28)
 - Includes of 1203 Days and 60 Months
 - Consists of 600 firm inculding 548 firm with common owners

Year	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Meann
No. of Firms	355	383	520	551	579	602	498
No. of Blockholders	724	887	1274	1383	1409	1390	1178
No. of Groups	41	42	46	45	40	40	42
No. of Firms not in Groups	113	128	207	224	247	270	198
No. of Firms in Groups	242	265	332	339	332	332	307
Mean Number of Members	6	6	7	8	8	8	7
Med. of Number of Members	4	4	6	5	6	6	5
Mean Of each Blockholder's ownership	21.30	22.00	20.80	20.50	21.90	23.00	21.58
Med. of Owners' Percent	7.94	7.55	6.95	6.34	8.31	9	8
Mean Number of Blockholders	5	5	5	5	5	4	5
Med. Number of Owners	4	4	4	4	4	3	4
Mean Block. Ownership	71.6	71.2	68	67.7	65.4	62.00	67.65
Med. Block. Ownership	79.9	80.1	77	77.1	72.9	69.70	76.12


Pair Composition

- Pairs consist of two firms with at least one common owner
 - 18692 unique pairs which is 10% of possible pairs ($\frac{548*547}{2}$ = 149878)

	mean	min	median	max
Number of unique paris	7448	5642	7451	8759

Year	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Mean
No. of Pairs	8188	9934	11925	12998	12055	8195	10549
No. of Groups	40	41	43	43	38	38	41
No. of Pairs not in Groups	3491	3879	5213	5876	6175	4466	4850
No. of Pairs in the same Group	675	795	1016	1120	1062	807	913
No. of Pairs not in the same Group	3853	4845	5221	5339	4440	2817	4419
Mean Number of Common owner	1.21	1.19	1.19	1.16	1.17	1.16	1.18
Med. Number of Common owner	1	1	1	1	1	1	1.00
Mean Number of Pairs in one Group	24	26	27	29	28	21	25.83
Med. Number of Pairs in one Group	10	11	9	6	7	6	8.17
Mean Percent of each Blockholder	16.53	17.12	16.82	16.87	16.73	16.61	16.78
Med. Percent of each Blockholder	9.92	9.95	9.78	9.65	10.03	10.57	9.98
Mean Number of Owners	5.82	5.79	5.7	5.78	5.91	6.08	5.85
Med. Number of Owners	5.91	5.88	5.77	5.84	5.95	6.09	5.91
Mean Block. Ownership	71.68	72.82	71.38	72.09	71.79	72.55	72.05
Med. Block. Ownership	73.37	74.57	72.89	73.61	73.14	73.79	73.56

Number of Pairs



FCA vs. FCAP Summary


	variable	$count({\scriptstylemonth}_{id})$	mean	std	min	25%	median	75%	max
Total	FCA	454343	0.144	0.235	0.003	0.025	0.058	0.151	3.967
TOLAI	FCAP	454343	0.123	0.164	0.003	0.024	0.054	0.144	0.992
Same Group	FCA	44109	0.491	0.418	0.005	0.170	0.435	0.691	3.967
Same Group	FCAP	44109	0.396	0.259	0.004	0.145	0.405	0.608	0.985
Not Same Group	FCA	410234	0.107	0.168	0.003	0.023	0.050	0.119	3.734
Not Same Group	FCAP	410234	0.094	0.117	0.003	0.022	0.048	0.117	0.992
Same Industry	FCA	56549	0.345	0.409	0.007	0.055	0.189	0.512	3.967
Same moustry	FCAP	56549	0.258	0.242	0.006	0.051	0.165	0.431	0.992
Not Same Industry	FCA	397794	0.116	0.181	0.003	0.024	0.051	0.124	2.619
NOT Same industry	FCAP	397794	0.104	0.140	0.003	0.023	0.048	0.122	0.985

Results

- By the proposed measurement, common ownership increases
- Common ownership is greater in pairs that are in the same business group and insutry


FCA vs. FCAP Distributions


Monthly



FCA vs. FCAP Distributions


Monthly







FCA vs. FCAP Distributions

Monthly







- Kernel Density

Density

Correlation Calculation

4 Factor + Industry

Frist Step:

Estimate each of these models on periods of three month:

• CAPM + Industry (2 Factor):

$$R_{i,t} = \alpha_i + \beta_{mkt,i} R_{M,t} + \beta_{Ind,i} R_{Ind,t} + \boxed{\varepsilon_{i,t}}$$

• 4 Factor :

$$\begin{split} R_{i,t} &= \alpha_i + \beta_{\textit{mkt},i} R_{\textit{M},t} + \\ &+ \beta_{\textit{HML},i} \textit{HML}_t + \beta_{\textit{SMB},i} \textit{SMB}_t + \beta_{\textit{UMD},i} \textit{UMD}_t + \boxed{\varepsilon_{i,t}} \end{split}$$

• 4 Factor + Industry (5 Factor) :

$$\begin{split} R_{i,t} &= \alpha_i + \beta_{\textit{mkt},i} R_{\textit{M},t} + \beta_{\textit{Ind},i} R_{\textit{Ind},t} \\ &+ \beta_{\textit{HML},i} \textit{HML}_t + \beta_{\textit{SMB},i} \textit{SMB}_t + \beta_{\textit{UMD},i} \textit{UMD}_t + \boxed{\varepsilon_{i,t}} \end{split}$$

 Second Step: Calculate monthly correlation of each stock pair's daily abnormal returns (residuals)

Correlation Calculation Results


Factors	mean	std	min	max
SMB	0.19	1.47	-5.64	19.52
HML	-0.12	1.39	-4.90	23.20
Winner – Loser	0.69	1.06	-2.61	8.58
Market	0.24	1.23	-4.71	4.89

$\rho_{ij,t}$	mean	std	min	25%	50%	75%	max
CAPM + Industry	0.01	0.33	-1	-0.194	0.006	0.208	1
4 Factor	0.04	0.34	-1	-0.172	0.035	0.249	1
4 Factor + Industry	0.01	0.33	-1	-0.194	0.005	0.206	1
4 Factor $+$ Industry (With Lag)	0.01	0.32	-1	-0.194	0.006	0.206	1

Conclusion

We use the 4 Factor + Industry model to control for exposure to systematic risk because it almost captures all correlations between two firms in each pair.

Future Correlation via FCA




Controls

- $oldsymbol{
 ho}_t$: Current period correlation
- **SameGroup**: Dummy variable for whether the two stocks belong to the same business group.
- **SameIndustry**: Dummy variable for whether the two stocks belong to the same Industry.
- SameSize: The negative of absolute difference in percentile ranking of size across a pair
- SameBookToMarket : The negative of absolute difference in percentile ranking of the book to market ratio across a pair
- **CrossOwnership**: The maximum percent of cross-ownership between two firms


Industry & Business group

Type of Pairs	Yes	No
SameIndustry	1760 (10%)	16739 (90%)
SameGroup	1118 (6%)	17381 (94%)
SameGroup & SameIndustry	492 (3%)	18007 (97%)



Business group

Pairs' characteristic



Summary of Controls

Variables' distribution

	mean	std	min	25%	50%	75%	max
SameIndustry	0.10	0.29	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00
SameGroup	0.06	0.23	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00
Size1	0.72	0.21	0.01	0.58	0.78	0.91	1.00
Size2	0.43	0.25	0.00	0.23	0.42	0.62	0.99
SameSize	-0.29	0.21	-0.97	-0.42	-0.24	-0.12	0.00
BookToMarket1	0.53	0.26	0.00	0.34	0.54	0.73	1.00
BookToMarket2	0.52	0.24	0.00	0.34	0.52	0.71	1.00
SameBookToMarket	-0.30	0.19	-0.99	-0.42	-0.26	-0.15	0.00
MonthlyCrossOwnership	0.01	0.05	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.96

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Fama-MacBeth Estimation

- Fama-MacBeth regression analysis is implemented using a two-step procedure.
 - The first step is to run periodic cross-sectional regression for dependent variables using data of each period.
 - The second step is to analyze the time series of each regression coefficient to determine whether the average coefficient differs from zero.

Fama-MacBeth (1973)

- Two Step Regression
 - First Step

$$Y_{i1} = \delta_{0,1} + \delta_{1,1}^{1} X_{i,1}^{1} + \dots + \delta_{k,1}^{k} X_{i,1}^{k} + \varepsilon_{i,1}$$

$$\vdots$$

$$Y_{iT} = \delta_{0,1} + \delta_{1,T}^{1} X_{i,T}^{1} + \dots + \delta_{k,T}^{k} X_{i,T}^{k} + \varepsilon_{i,T}$$

Second Step

$$\begin{bmatrix} \bar{Y}_1 \\ \vdots \\ \bar{Y}_T \end{bmatrix}_{T \times 1} = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & \delta_1^0 & \delta_1^1 & \dots & \delta_1^k \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \dots & \vdots \\ 1 & \delta_T^0 & \delta_T^1 & \dots & \delta_T^k \end{bmatrix}_{T \times (k+2)} \times \begin{bmatrix} \lambda \\ \lambda_0 \\ \lambda_1 \\ \vdots \\ \lambda_k \end{bmatrix}_{(k+2) \times 1}$$

• Fama-MacBeth technique was developed to account for correlation between observations on different firms in the same period

Calculating standard errors

- In most cases, the standard errors are adjusted following Newey and West (1987).
 - Newey and West (1987) adjustment to the results of the regression produces a new standard error for the estimated mean that is adjusted for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity.
 - Only input is the number of lags to use when performing the adjustment

$$Lag = 4(T/100)^{\frac{2}{9}}$$

where T is the number of periods in the time series

Fixed effect or Fama-MacBeth


- Both methods rely on zero correlation between the error terms of non-contemporaneous periods. A difference is weighting:
 - The Fama-Macbeth procedure weights each time period equally.
 - A panel regression will effectively give greater weight to periods with more observations or greater variation in right hand side variables
- The econometric analysis of panel data depends in a crucial way on the cross-sectional and timeseries correlation of the regression residuals


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- Results
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Future Correlation via FCA

Normalized Rank-Transformed





Estimation model

Use Fama-MacBeth to estimate this model

$$\begin{split} \rho_{ij,t+1} &= \beta_0 + \beta_1 * \mathsf{FCA}^*_{ij,t} + \beta_2 * \mathsf{SameGroup}_{ij} \\ &+ \beta_3 * \mathsf{FCA}^*_{ij,t} \times \mathsf{SameGroup}_{ij} \\ &+ \sum_{k=1}^n \alpha_k * \mathsf{Control}_{ij,t} + \varepsilon_{ij,t+1} \end{split} \tag{1}$$

- Estimate the model on a monthly frequency
- Adjust standard errors by Newey and West adjustment with 4 lags $(4(60/100)^{\frac{2}{9}}=3.57\sim4)$

Model Estimation

Normalized Rank-Transformed


	Depe	endent Variab	le: Future Mo	onthly Correl	ation of 4F+	Industry Resi	iduals
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
FCA*	0.00320***	0.00251***	0.00253***	0.00121	0.000739	0.000548	0.000948
	(4.05)	(3.99)	(4.26)	(1.80)	(1.08)	(0.80)	(1.37)
(FCA*) × SameGroup					0.00630*	0.00744**	0.00734*
					(2.39)	(3.32)	(3.30)
SameGroup				0.0175***	0.0115***	0.00952**	0.00829
				(6.01)	(3.78)	(2.73)	(2.25)
ρ_t		0.129***	0.129***	0.129***	0.129***	0.129***	0.129***
		(4.94)	(4.94)	(4.92)	(4.92)	(4.92)	(4.91)
SameIndustry			-0.000461	-0.00466*	-0.00473*	-0.00580**	-0.00561
•			(-0.28)	(-2.14)	(-2.16)	(-2.84)	(-2.70)
SameSize						0.00916***	0.00926**
						(4.33)	(4.20)
SameBookToMarket						0.00135	0.00218
						(0.60)	(0.93)
CrossOwnership						0.0201	0.0193
						(1.84)	(1.68)
Observations	436735	434850	434850	434850	434850	434850	434850
Group FE	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
R^2	0.000306	0.0354	0.0356	0.0360	0.0362	0.0366	0.0432

t statistics in parentheses

^{*} p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Future Correlation via FCAP*

Normalized Rank Transformed



Fama-MacBeth Estimation

Normalized Rank Transformed


	Depe	ndent Variabl	e: Future M	onthly Corre	lation of 4F-	+Industry Res	iduals
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
FCAP*	0.00349***	0.00275***	0.00129	0.000761	0.000928	0.000671	0.00108
	(4.69)	(4.75)	(1.98)	(1.09)	(1.46)	(1.05)	(1.70)
(FCAP*) × SameGroup				0.00662*	0.00670*	0.00808**	0.00795*
				(2.20)	(2.21)	(3.12)	(3.15)
SameGroup			0.0154***	0.00919**	0.0110***	0.00871**	0.00753*
			(6.66)	(3.13)	(3.74)	(2.76)	(2.27)
ρ_t		0.129***	0.129***	0.129***	0.129***	0.129***	0.129***
		(4.94)	(4.93)	(4.92)	(4.92)	(4.92)	(4.91)
SameIndustry					-0.00480*	-0.00587**	-0.00568*
•					(-2.16)	(-2.82)	(-2.67)
SameSize						0.00892***	0.00894**
						(4.18)	(4.01)
SameBookToMarket						0.00137	0.00220
						(0.61)	(0.94)
CrossOwnership						0.0223*	0.0215*
						(2.22)	(2.02)
Observations	436735	434850	434850	434850	434850	434850	434850
Group FE	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
R^2	0.000316	0.0355	0.0358	0.0360	0.0362	0.0366	0.0432


t statistics in parentheses

^{*} p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Future Correlation via FCA

Discontinuity





Estimation model

Use Fama-MacBeth to estimate this model

$$\rho_{ij,t+1} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * \mathsf{FCA}^*_{ij,t} + \beta_2 * (\mathsf{FCA}^*_{ij,t} > Q3[\mathsf{FCA}^*_{ij,t}]) \times \mathsf{FCA}^*_{ij,t}$$

$$+ \beta_3 * (\mathsf{FCA}^*_{ij,t} > Q3[\mathsf{FCA}^*_{ij,t}]) \times \mathsf{FCA}^*_{ij,t} \mathsf{SameGroup}_{ij}$$

$$+ \sum_{k=1}^{n} \alpha_k * \mathsf{Control}_{ij,t} + \varepsilon_{ij,t+1}$$
(2)

Estimate that model on a monthly frequency

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Fama-MacBeth Estimation

Discontinuity


	De	p. Variable: F	uture Month	y Corr. of 4l	F+Ind. Resid	uals
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
FCA*	0.00320*** (4.05)	-0.000275 (-0.31)	-0.000339 (-0.39)	-0.000338 (-0.39)	-0.000445 (-0.51)	-0.000151 (-0.19)
$(FCA^* > Q3[FCA^*]) \times FCA^*$		0.00784*** (4.46)	0.00644*** (4.16)	0.00337* (2.08)	0.00376* (2.33)	0.00415** (2.71)
SameGroup				0.0143*** (5.85)	0.0158*** (4.59)	0.0142*** (3.80)
$ ho_{t}$			0.129*** (4.94)	0.129*** (4.93)	0.129*** (4.93)	0.129*** (4.92)
SameIndustry					-0.00603** (-3.05)	-0.00593* (-2.98)
SameSize					0.00915*** (4.39)	0.00924** (4.25)
SameBookToMarket					0.00126 (0.56)	0.00206 (0.87)
CrossOwnership					0.0115 (0.89)	0.0111 (0.83)
Observations	436735	436735	434850	434850	434850	434850
Group FE R ²	No 0.000306	No 0.000579	No 0.0357	No 0.0360	No 0.0366	Yes 0.0432


t statistics in parentheses

^{*} $\rho < 0.05$, ** $\rho < 0.01$, *** $\rho < 0.001$

4 Factor + Industry Future Correlation via FCA*

Discontinuity & Business Groups





Estimation model

Use Fama-MacBeth to estimate this model

$$\begin{split} \rho_{ij,t+1} &= \beta_0 + \beta_1 * \mathsf{FCA}^*_{ij,t} \\ &+ \beta_2 * (\mathsf{FCA}^*_{ij,t} > Q3[\mathsf{FCA}^*_{ij,t}]) \times \mathsf{FCA}^*_{ij,t} \\ &+ \beta_3 * \mathsf{FCA}^*_{ij,t} \times \mathsf{SameGroup} \\ &+ \beta_4 * (\mathsf{FCA}^*_{ij,t} > Q3[\mathsf{FCA}^*_{ij,t}]) \times \mathsf{FCA}^*_{ij,t} \times \mathsf{SameGroup} \\ &+ \sum_{k=1}^n \alpha_k * \mathsf{Control}_{ij,t} + \varepsilon_{ij,t+1} \end{split} \tag{3}$$

Estimate that model on a monthly frequency

Fama-MacBeth Estimation

Correlation of controls

Correlation	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
(1) ρ_f	1.00										
(2) <i>ρ</i>	0.11	1.00									
(3) FCA*	0.02	0.01	1.00								
(4) $(FCA^* > Q3[FCA^*])$	0.02	0.02	0.75	1.00							
(5) $(FCA^* > Q3[FCA^*]) \times FCA^*$	0.02	0.02	0.76	0.98	1.00						
(6) $(FCA^*) \times SameGroup$	0.03	0.03	0.55	0.60	0.68	1.00					
(7) (FCA* $> Q3[FCA*]$) \times (FCA*) \times SameGroup	0.03	0.03	0.53	0.63	0.71	0.95	1.00				
(8) SameGroup	0.03	0.03	0.44	0.49	0.54	0.75	0.82	1.00			
(9) SameIndustry	0.01	0.01	0.28	0.30	0.32	0.33	0.36	0.38	1.00		
(10) SameSize	0.01	0.01	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.06	0.07	0.03	0.12	1.00	
(11) SameBookToMarket	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.04	0.05	0.06	0.06	0.11	0.07	1.00

Fama-MacBeth Estimation

Discontinuity & Business Groups


	Dep	o. Variable: l	uture Mont	hly Correlati	on of 4F+In	dustry Resid	uals
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
FCA*	-0.000445	0.000548	0.000543	-0.000527	0.000557	-0.000323	-0.000318
	(-0.51)	(0.80)	(0.76)	(-0.61)	(0.81)	(-0.37)	(-0.39)
$(FCA^* > Q3[FCA^*]) \times FCA^*$	0.00376*			0.00286		0.00233	0.00233
	(2.33)			(1.67)		(1.31)	(1.30)
$(FCA^*) \times SameGroup$		0.00744**		0.00646**	-0.00122		-0.000361
		(3.32)		(2.71)	(-0.24)		(-0.07)
$(FCA^* > Q3[FCA^*]) \times (FCA^*) \times SameGroup$			0.0111***		0.0126*	0.00971**	0.0103
			(4.02)		(2.02)	(3.15)	(1.60)
Observations	434850	434850	434850	434850	434850	434850	434850
R^2	0.037	0.037	0.037	0.037	0.037	0.037	0.037

t statistics in parentheses

 $^{^*}$ $\rho <$ 0.05, ** $\rho <$ 0.01, *** $\rho <$ 0.001

Future Correlation via FCA*

Grouped by size



Model Estimation

Grouped by size


		All Firms			Big Firms		Big	& Small F	irms	Small Firms		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
FCA*	0.000548 (0.80)	-0.000445 (-0.51)	-0.000323 (-0.37)	0.00140 (1.84)	-0.000726 (-0.66)	-0.000663 (-0.60)	0.000578 (0.60)	0.000639 (0.61)	0.000686 (0.65)	-0.00138 (-0.99)	-0.00391 (-1.87)	-0.00377 (-1.90)
$(FCA^*) \times SameGroup$	0.00744** (3.32)			0.00467* (2.22)			0.00167 (0.36)			0.0178*** (4.25)		
$(FCA^* > Q3[FCA^*]) \times (FCA^*) \times SameGroup$			0.00971** (3.15)			0.00607* (2.16)			0.00337 (0.60)			0.0201* (2.58)
$(FCA^* > Q3[FCA^*]) \times FCA^*$		0.00376* (2.33)	0.00233 (1.31)		0.00564* (2.28)	0.00501 (2.00)		0.000157 (0.09)	-0.000468 (-0.22)		0.0103** (2.77)	0.00647 (1.54)
SameGroup	0.00952** (2.73)	0.0158*** (4.59)	0.00562 (1.61)	0.00429 (1.05)	0.00732* (2.34)	0.000609 (0.14)	0.0112* (2.43)	0.0126** (3.40)	0.00952 (1.76)	0.00269 (0.31)	0.0181° (2.32)	-0.00414 (-0.38)
SameIndustry	-0.00580** (-2.84)	-0.00603** (-3.05)	-0.00617** (-3.07)	-0.0216*** (-7.55)	-0.0222*** (-7.84)	-0.0221*** (-7.76)	0.000731 (0.26)	0.000806 (0.30)	0.000797 (0.29)	0.0109* (2.30)	0.00962* (2.11)	0.00946 (1.92)
Observations R ²	434850 0.037	434850 0.037	434850 0.037	183935 0.032	183935 0.032	183935 0.032	175046 0.041	175046 0.041	175046 0.041	75869 0.065	75869 0.065	75869 0.066


t statistics in parentheses

^{*} p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

FCA* summary

PairType	mean	std	min	25%	50%	75%	max
Small	0.25	0.99	-1.73	-0.57	0.27	1.18	1.73
Hybrid	-0.08	0.98	-1.73	-0.93	-0.10	0.72	1.73
Large	-0.02	1.01	-1.73	-0.91	-0.01	0.88	1.73









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
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 - Random Pairs from Same Size
 - Random Pairs from Same Industry

Random Pairs from Same Business Group


 eta_3 in model 1



 β_2 in model 2




 β_4 in model 3




Random Pairs from Same Size


 eta_{3} in model 1



 β_2 in model 2




 β_4 in model 3




Random Pairs from Same Industry

 eta_3 in model 1



 β_2 in model 2



 β_4 in model 3




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
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 - Effective Business Group
 - Trade Analyze




Business group & Common-ownership graphs

- Generate pairs in business groups that they don't have common-owner
- Pseudo pairs' FCA_{ii,t} equal to zero

•





Business group & Common-ownership

regression

	F . M			. D I. I
	Future Mon	ithly Correlat	ion of 4F+Ind	ustry Residuals
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
FCA*	-0.0516***	-0.0541***	-0.0269***	-0.0291***
	(-24.75)	(-22.55)	(-15.87)	(-16.06)
ρ_{t}			0.560***	0.553***
			(26.32)	(26.15)
SameIndustry			0.0410***	0.0640***
			(14.80)	(18.98)
SameSize			0.106***	0.109***
			(17.16)	(15.00)
SameBookToMarket			0.109***	0.106***
			(11.86)	(12.67)
Observations	61097	61097	60835	60835
Group FE	No	Yes	No	Yes
R ²	0.0175	0.0671	0.379	0.409

t statistics in parentheses

^{*} p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Business group return

		$Return_i - r_f = R_i$							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)				
R _M	0.216***	0.0948***	0.0680***	0.0373***	0.0289***				
	(12.43)	(9.49)	(8.88)	(5.32)	(5.54)				
R _{Industry}		0.661***	0.661***	0.455***	0.455***				
,		(48.52)	(48.52)	(36.53)	(36.53)				
R _{Businessgroup}				0.490***	0.490***				
				(45.52)	(45.52)				
SMB			0.0203***		0.0205***				
			(4.45)		(5.55)				
UMD			0.00156		-0.00407				
			(0.37)		(-1.16)				
HML			0.00633*		0.00446				
			(1.96)		(1.77)				
Constant	0.0162	-0.0150	-0.00631	-0.0169	-0.00701				
	(0.69)	(-1.00)	(-0.90)	(-1.45)	(-1.32)				
Observations	207677	207677	207677	207677	207677				
R^2	0.000	0.097	0.097	0.167	0.167				

t statistics in parentheses

 $^{^*}$ $\rho <$ 0.05, ** $\rho <$ 0.01, *** $\rho <$ 0.001

Correlation summary

$\rho_{ij,t}$	mean	std	min	25%	50%	75%	max
CAPM + Industry	0.007	0.328	-1	-0.194	0.006	0.208	1
4 Factor	0.038	0.338	-1	-0.172	0.035	0.248	1
4 Factor + Industry	0.006	0.326	-1	-0.194	0.005	0.206	1
4 Factor $+$ Industry (With Lag)	0.006	0.325	-1	-0.194	0.006	0.206	1
4 Factor + Industry + Business group	-0.002	0.328	-1	-0.202	-0.001	0.200	1

4Factor + Industry + Bgroup

	Depender	nt Variable: I	Future Monthl	y Correlation	of 4F+Indus	try + Bgroup	Residuals
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
FCA*	-0.000464	-0.000642	-0.0000583	0.00128*	0.000946	0.000788	0.00131*
	(-0.67)	(-1.13)	(-0.10)	(2.08)	(1.56)	(1.29)	(2.05)
(FCA*) × SameGroup					0.00437	0.000855	0.00104
, ,					(1.82)	(0.41)	(0.49)
SameGroup				-0.0161***	-0.0202***	-0.0137***	-0.0159***
				(-7.66)	(-6.92)	(-4.12)	(-4.48)
ρ_t		0.137***	0.137***	0.136***	0.136***	0.136***	0.136***
, .		(5.20)	(5.20)	(5.19)	(5.19)	(5.18)	(5.17)
SameIndustry			-0.00745***	-0.00396*	-0.00401*	-0.00369*	-0.00428*
•			(-4.66)	(-2.30)	(-2.31)	(-2.38)	(-2.72)
SameSize						0.00846**	0.00878**
						(3.35)	(3.28)
SameBookToMarket						0.000874	0.00159
						(0.35)	(0.67)
CrossOwnership						-0.0578***	-0.0551**
						(-4.08)	(-3.87)
Observations	436728	434809	434809	434809	434809	434809	434809
Group FE	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
R^2	0.000168	0.0370	0.0372	0.0375	0.0377	0.0382	0.0436

t statistics in parentheses

^{*} p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

4Factor + Industry + Bgroup

	Den Va	riable: Futur	re Monthly	Corr of 4F⊥	Ind. + Bgroup	Residuals
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
FCA*	-0.000464	0.000415	0.000131	0.000206	-0.00000908	0.0000589
	(-0.67)	(0.42)	(0.16)	(0.25)	(-0.01)	(0.07)
$(FCA^* > Q3[FCA^*]) \times FCA^*$		-0.00198	-0.00174	0.00223	0.00215	0.00339*
		(-1.25)	(-1.26)	(1.62)	(1.59)	(2.47)
SameGroup				-0.0184***	-0.0136***	-0.0163***
				(-10.34)	(-5.23)	(-5.66)
ρ_{t}			0.137***	0.136***	0.136***	0.136***
			(5.20)	(5.19)	(5.18)	(5.17)
SameIndustry					-0.00392*	-0.00468**
,					(-2.58)	(-3.08)
SameSize					0.00838**	0.00863**
					(3.34)	(3.24)
SameBookToMarket					0.000778	0.00145
James John Tolliane					(0.31)	(0.61)
CrossOwnership					-0.0584***	-0.0555***
CrossOwnership					(-3.89)	(-3.71)
Observations	436728	436728	434809	434809	434809	434809
	430728 No	430726 No	434609 No	434609 No	434609 No	434609 Yes
Group FE R ²						
κ-	0.000168	0.000318	0.0371	0.0375	0.0382	0.0436

t statistics in parentheses

 $^{^{*}}$ p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Bearish/Bullish Market

Use Fama-MacBeth to estimate this model

$$\begin{split} \rho_{ij,t+1} &= \beta_0 + \beta_1 * \mathsf{FCA}^*_{ij,t} \\ &+ \beta_2 * \mathsf{Bearish Market} \times \mathsf{SameGroup} \\ &+ \beta_3 * \mathsf{Bullish Market} \times \mathsf{SameGroup} \\ &+ \beta_4 * \mathsf{FCA}^*_{ij,t} \times \mathsf{Bearish Market} \times \mathsf{SameGroup} \\ &+ \beta_5 * \mathsf{FCA}^*_{ij,t} \times \mathsf{Bullish Market} \times \mathsf{SameGroup} \\ &+ \sum_{k=1}^n \alpha_k * \mathsf{Control}_{ij,t} + \varepsilon_{ij,t+1} \end{split}$$

- Bearish/Bullish definition :
 - Bullish Market : $R_{TSE,Monthly} \ge 2\%$: 34 Month
 - Bearish Market : $R_{TSE,Monthly} \leq -2\%$: 11 Month

Model Estimation

Normalized Rank-Transformed (Bearish Market)

	Fu. Monthly Cor. of 4F+Ind. Residuals				
	(1)	(2)	(3)		
FCA*	0.000548	0.000548	0.000704		
	(0.80)	(0.80)	(1.04)		
$(FCA^*) \times SameGroup$	0.00744**	0.00744**			
	(3.32)	(3.32)			
SameGroup	0.00952**	0.00266	0.00495*		
	(2.73)	(1.45)	(2.14)		
Bearish Market × SameGroup		0.000595	0.000595		
		(0.53)	(0.53)		
Bullish Market × SameGroup		0.00626**	0.00626**		
		(2.81)	(2.81)		
(FCA*) × Bullish Market × SameGroup			0.00294		
			(1.99)		
$(FCA^*) \times Bearish Market \times SameGroup$			0.00228*		
,			(2.51)		
Observations	434850	434850	434850		
R^2	0.037	0.037	0.037		

t statistics in parentheses

 $^{^{\}ast}$ p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Effective Business Group

Check banking

- We define bank in group
 - Bank In Group: Groups that ,at least, consist of one bank as a member or ultimate owner
- Estimated model:

$$\begin{split} \rho_{ij,t+1} &= \beta_0 + \beta_1 * \mathsf{FCA}^*_{ij,t} + \beta_2 * \mathsf{SameGroup}_{ij} \\ &+ \beta_3 * \mathsf{FCA}^*_{ij,t} * \; \mathsf{SameGroup}_{ij} + \beta_{10} * \mathsf{Bank} \; \mathsf{In} \; \mathsf{Group} + \beta_{11} * \mathsf{Bank} \; \mathsf{in} \; \mathsf{group} \\ &+ \beta_4 * \mathsf{Bank} \; \mathsf{In} \; \mathsf{Group} * \; \mathsf{SameGroup}_{ij} + \beta_5 * \mathsf{Bank} \; \mathsf{In} \; \mathsf{Group} * \mathsf{SameGroup}_{ij} * \mathsf{FCA}^*_{ij,t} \\ &+ \sum_{k=1}^n \alpha_k * \mathsf{Control}_{ij,t} + \varepsilon_{ij,t+1} \end{split}$$

Effective Business Group

Check banking business groups

	De. Variab	le:Future Corr	of 4F+Indus	try Residuals
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
FCA*	0.000548	0.000510	0.000514	0.000511
	(0.80)	(0.73)	(0.75)	(0.75)
$(FCA^*) \times SameGroup$	0.00744**	0.00595*	0.00605*	0.00573*
(* *) * *	(3.32)	(2.27)	(2.30)	(2.08)
SameGroup	0.00952**	0.0120***	0.0122**	0.0125**
·	(2.73)	(3.95)	(3.40)	(3.27)
Bank in group		-0.00333***	-0.00323***	-0.00324***
		(-3.83)	(-4.08)	(-4.06)
Bank in group × SameGroup			-0.00230	-0.00793
			(-0.36)	(-0.78)
(FCA*) × Bank in group × SameGroup				0.00458
, 34, 5				(0.69)
Observations	434850	434850	434850	434850
_ R ²	0.037	0.037	0.037	0.037

t statistics in parentheses

^{*} p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Trading

Greenwood and Thesmar (2011)


- Trading index for business groups:
 - For business group of k:


$$BGTI_{kt} = \sum w_{ikt} \frac{\Delta BlockOwnership_{it}}{BlockOwnership_{it}}$$

- which w_{ikt} is $\frac{\mathsf{MarketCap}_{it} \times \mathsf{CR}_k}{\sum \mathsf{MarketCap}_{jt} \times \mathsf{CR}_k}$
- Calculate correlation of $\frac{\Delta BlockOwnership_{it}}{BlockOwnership_{it}}$ with $BGTI_{kt}$ for each firm in group

Average correlation between Index and symbols


 $\rho(\frac{\Delta BlockOwnership_{it}}{BlockOwnership_{it}}, BGTI_{kt})$






Trading Index correlation & FCA

Group Level





Trading Index correlation & return correlation Group Level



Simultaneous Trade

Group Level





Trading

Antón et al. (2018):

$$egin{aligned} CQ_{ijt} &= \sum_{d=1}^{D_t} \omega_{dt} corr(NQ_{idt}, NQ_{jdt}) \ \omega_{dt} &= rac{\min(TQ_{idt}, TQ_{jdt})}{\sum_{d=1}^{D} \min(TQ_{idt}, TQ_{idt})} \end{aligned}$$

Ivashina and Sun (2011):

$$\frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N} \frac{\sum_{j=1}^{M_i} D_{ji} CAR_i}{M_i}$$

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June, 2021

Conclusion

- We derive a measure that captures the extent of common ownership distribution.
- The common ownership comovement effect with a extra explanation:
 - Common ownership that crosses a threshold affect on comovement
 - Be in the same business group has a major effect on comovement
 - Business groups of banks affect more than normal business groups

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Measuring Common Ownership

- If two stocks in pair have n mutual owner, which total market cap divides them equally, the mentioned indexes equal n.
 - Each holder owns 1/n of each firm.
 - Firm's market cap is α_1 and α_2 :
 - So for each holder of firms we have $S_{i,t}^f P_{i,t} = \alpha_i$
 - SQRT

$$\left[\frac{\sum_{f=1}^{n} \sqrt{\alpha_1/n} + \sum_{f=1}^{n} \sqrt{\alpha_2/n}}{\sqrt{\alpha_1} + \sqrt{\alpha_2}}\right]^2 = \left[\frac{\sqrt{n}(\sqrt{\alpha_1} + \sqrt{\alpha_2})}{\sqrt{\alpha_1} + \sqrt{\alpha_2}}\right]^2 = n$$

Quadratic

$$\left[\frac{\sum_{f=1}^{n} (\alpha_1/n)^2 + \sum_{f=1}^{n} (\alpha_2/n)^2}{\alpha_1^2 + \alpha_2^2}\right]^{-1} = \left[\frac{\alpha_1^2 + \alpha_2^2}{n(\alpha_1^2 + \alpha_2^2)}\right]^{-1} = n$$





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Main Effect

Common-ownership and comovement effect

[Anton and Polk (2014)]

Stocks sharing many common investors tend to comove more strongly with each other in the future than otherwise similar stocks.

Common-ownership and liquidity demand

[Koch et al. (2016), Pastor and Stambaugh (2003), Acharya and Pedersen (2005)] Commonality in stock liquidity is likely driven by correlated trading among a given stock's investors. Commonality in liquidity is important because it can influence expected returns

• Trading needs and comovement

[Greenwood and Thesmar (2011)]

If the investors of mutual funds have correlated trading needs, the stocks that are held by mutual funds can comove even without any portfolio overlap of the funds themselves

Stock price synchronicity and poor corporate governance

[Boubaker et al. (2014), Khanna and Thomas (2009), Morck et al. (2000)] Stock price synchronicity has been attributed to poor corporate governance and a lack of firm-level transparency. On the other hand, better law protection encourages informed trading, which facilitates the incorporation of firm-specific information into stock prices, leading to lower synchronicity



Synchronicity and firm interlocks

JFE-2009-Khanna

- Three types of network
 - Equity network
 - ② Director network
 - Owner network
- Dependent variables

Using deterended weekly return for calculation

- **1** Pairwise returns synchronicity = $\frac{\sum_{\mathbf{t}} (n_{i,j,\mathbf{t}}^{i,j,\mathbf{t}}, n_{i,j,\mathbf{t}}^{down})}{T_{i,j}}$
- 2 Correlation = $\frac{Cov(i,j)}{\sqrt{Var(i).Var(j)}}$
- Tobit estimation of

$$f_{i,j}^d = \alpha I_{i,j} + \beta (1 * N_{i,j}) + \gamma Ind_{i,j} + \varepsilon_{i,j}$$

being in the same director network has a significant effect

Large controlling shareholder and stock price synchronicity JBF-2014-Boubaker

Stock price synchronicity:

$$SYNCH = \log(\frac{R_{i,t}^2}{1 - R_{i,t}^2})$$

where $R_{i,t}^2$ is the R-squared value from

$$RET_{i,w} = \alpha + \beta_1 MKRET_{w-1} + \beta_2 MKRET_w + \beta_3 INDRET_{i,w-1} + \beta_4 INDRET_{i,w} + \varepsilon_{i,w}$$

OLS estimation of

$$\begin{aligned} \textit{SYNCH}_{i,t} &= \beta_0 + \beta_1 \textit{Excess}_{i,t} + \beta_2 \textit{UCF}_{i,t} + \sum_k \beta_k \textit{Control}_{i,t}^k \\ &+ \textit{IndustryDummies} + \textit{YearDummies} + \varepsilon_{i,t} \end{aligned}$$

- Stock price synchronicity increases with excess control
- Firms with substantial excess control are more likely to experience stock price crashes

JF-2014-Anton Polk

- Common active mutual fund owners
- Measuring Common Ownership
 - $FCAP_{ij,t} = \frac{\sum_{f=1}^{F} (S_{i,t}^{f} P_{i,t} + S_{j,t}^{f} P_{j,t})}{S_{i,t}P_{i,t} + S_{j,t}P_{j,t}}$
 - ullet Using normalized rank-transformed as $FCAP_{ij,t}^*$
- $\rho_{ij,t}$: within-month realized correlation of each stock pair's daily four-factor returns

•

$$\rho_{ij,t+1} = a + b_f \times FCAPF_{ij,t}^* + \sum_{k=1}^{n} CONTROL_{ij,t,k} + \varepsilon_{ij,t+1}$$

Estimate these regressions monthly and report the time-series average as in Fama-MacBeth

Commonownership measurements

Model-based measures

•
$$\mathsf{HJL}^A_I(A,B) = \sum_{i \in I^{A,B}} \frac{\alpha_{i,B}}{\alpha_{i,A} + \alpha_{i,B}}$$
 Harford et al. (2011)

- Bi-directional
- Pair-level measure of common ownership
- Its potential impact on managerial incentives
- Measure not necessarily increases when the relative ownership increases
- Accounts only for an investor's relative holdings
- $\bullet \quad \mathsf{MHHI} = \sum_j \sum_k \mathbf{s}_j \mathbf{s}_k \frac{\sum_i \mu_{ij} \nu_{ik}}{\sum_i \mu_{ij} \nu_{ij}} \; \mathsf{Azar} \; \mathsf{et} \; \mathsf{al.} \; \mathsf{(2018)}$
 - Capture a specific type of externality
 - Measured at the industry level
 - Assumes that investors are fully informed about the externalities
- $\operatorname{\mathsf{GGL}}^A(A,B) = \sum_{i=1}^I \alpha_{i,A} g(\beta_{i,A}) \alpha_{i,B}$ Gilje et al. (2020)
 - Bi-directional
 - Less information
 - Not sensitive to the scope
 - Measure increases when the relative ownership of firm A increases



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Commonownership measurements

Ad hoc common ownership measures

- Overlap_{Count} $(A, B) = \sum_{i \in I^{A,B}} 1$ He and Huang (2017),He et al. (2019)
- $Overlap_{Min}(A, B) = \sum_{i \in I^{A,B}} min\{\alpha_{i,A}, \alpha_{i,B}\}$ Newham et al. (2018)
- Overlap_{AP}(A,B) = $\sum_{i \in I^{A,B}} \alpha_{i,A} \frac{\bar{\nu}_A}{\bar{\nu}_A + \bar{\nu}_B} + \alpha_{i,B} \frac{\bar{\nu}_B}{\bar{\nu}_A + \bar{\nu}_B}$ Anton and Polk (2014)
- $Overlap_{HL}(A,B) = \sum_{i \in I^{A,B}} \alpha_{i,A} \times \sum_{i \in I^{A,B}} \alpha_{i,B}$ Hansen and Lott Jr (1996) , Freeman (2019)
- Unappealing properties
 - Unclear is whether any of these measures represents an economically meaningful measure of common ownership's impact on managerial incentives.
 - Both Overlap_{Count} and Overlap_{AP} are invariant to the decomposition of ownership between the two firms, which leads to some unappealing properties.






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4 Factor + Industry Future Correlation via FCA*

Normalized Rank Transformed for each cross section (Monthly)



Fama-MacBeth Estimation

Monthly variables

	Depe	endent Variab	le: Future Mo	onthly Correl	ation of 4F+	Industry Resi	iduals
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
FCA*	0.00320***	0.00251***	0.00253***	0.00121	0.000739	0.000548	0.000948
	(4.05)	(3.99)	(4.26)	(1.80)	(1.08)	(0.80)	(1.37)
(FCA*) × SameGroup					0.00630*	0.00744**	0.00734*
					(2.39)	(3.32)	(3.30)
SameGroup				0.0175***	0.0115***	0.00952**	0.00829
				(6.01)	(3.78)	(2.73)	(2.25)
ρ_t		0.129***	0.129***	0.129***	0.129***	0.129***	0.129***
		(4.94)	(4.94)	(4.92)	(4.92)	(4.92)	(4.91)
SameIndustry			-0.000461	-0.00466*	-0.00473*	-0.00580**	-0.00561
•			(-0.28)	(-2.14)	(-2.16)	(-2.84)	(-2.70)
SameSize						0.00916***	0.00926**
						(4.33)	(4.20)
SameBookToMarket						0.00135	0.00218
						(0.60)	(0.93)
CrossOwnership						0.0201	0.0193
						(1.84)	(1.68)
Observations	436735	434850	434850	434850	434850	434850	434850
Group FE	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
R^2	0.000306	0.0354	0.0356	0.0360	0.0362	0.0366	0.0432

t statistics in parentheses



 $^{^{*}}$ p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001


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 - Other



FCA vs. FCAP Distributions

Fortnightly



Summary of Controls

Fortnightly


Type of Pairs	Yes	No
SameIndustry	1142	9125
	(11.1%)	(88.9%)
SameGroup	1173 (11.4%)	9094 (88.6%)
ActiveHolder	2819 (27.5%)	7448 (72.5%)

Variable	count	mean	std	min	25%	50%	75%	max
Size1	636641	0.75	0.21	0.01	0.61	0.81	0.93	1
Size2	636641	0.47	0.26	0.00	0.26	0.45	0.67	1.00
SameSize	636641	-0.28	0.22	-0.99	-0.42	-0.24	-0.10	0.00
BookToMarket1	636641	0.52	0.27	0.00	0.31	0.54	0.74	1.00
BookToMarket2	636641	0.50	0.25	0.00	0.29	0.49	0.70	1.00
${\sf SameBookToMarket}$	636641	-0.29	0.21	-1.00	-0.43	-0.25	-0.12	0.00



Future Correlation via FCA

4 Factor + Industry (Fortnightly)



Fortnightly variables


	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
In(FCA)	0.0108***	0.00989***	0.00964***	0.00511***	0.00499***	0.00271***	0.00276***	0.00281***	0.00297**
	(8.48)	(9.12)	(8.81)	(5.15)	(4.95)	(4.12)	(4.07)	(4.16)	(3.78)
$\rho_{-}t$		0.0740***	0.0739***	0.0734***	0.0733***	0.0710***	0.0708***	0.0711***	0.0723***
		(5.50)	(5.49)	(5.44)	(5.44)	(5.36)	(5.34)	(5.36)	(5.39)
ActiveHolder			0.00970***		0.00810***	0.00425*	0.00416*	0.00356	0.00410*
			(6.05)		(5.06)	(2.35)	(2.40)	(1.94)	(2.41)
SameGroup				0.0329***	0.0322***	0.0216***	0.0214***	0.0218***	0.0247***
				(10.98)	(10.80)	(7.32)	(7.29)	(7.47)	(9.32)
SameIndustry						0.0275***	0.0267***	0.0264***	0.0288***
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·						(7.00)	(6.73)	(6.55)	(6.45)
Samesize								0.0403***	0.0235***
								(3.53)	(4.35)
SameBookToMarket								0.0127**	0.0146***
								(3.22)	(4.34)
Constant	0.0432***	0.0395***	0.0363***	0.0214***	0.0191***	0.0396**	0.0504**	0.0372***	0.0225***
	(8.14)	(8.73)	(8.10)	(5.32)	(4.71)	(3.13)	(3.20)	(4.04)	(5.91)
Value	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Interaction	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No
N	613875	613875	613875	613875	613875	613875	613875	613875	613875
r2	0.00152	0.0127	0.0131	0.0137	0.0141	0.0184	0.0193	0.0183	0.0164


t statistics in parentheses

^{*} p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

4 Factor + Industry Future Correlation via FCA*

Normalized Rank Transformed for each cross section (Fortnightly)





Fortnightly variables

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
FCA*	0.0124***	-0.00545***	-0.00518***	-0.00450***	-0.00440***	-0.00408**	-0.00537***	-0.00420**	-0.00526***	-0.00448**
	(7.43)	(-3.99)	(-3.90)	(-3.44)	(-3.40)	(-3.19)	(-4.06)	(-3.22)	(-3.98)	(-3.49)
(FCA* > Median[FCA*]) × FCA*		0.0360***	0.0332***	0.0314***	0.0240***	0.0232***	0.0228***	0.0156***	0.0231***	0.0231***
		(9.80)	(10.20)	(9.78)	(8.68)	(8.29)	(9.37)	(5.83)	(9.14)	(8.17)
$\rho_{-}t$			0.0738***	0.0737***	0.0727***	0.0727***	0.0711***	0.0708***	0.0712***	0.0724***
			(5.50)	(5.49)	(5.42)	(5.41)	(5.38)	(5.34)	(5.38)	(5.41)
ActiveHolder				0.00792***		0.00494**	0.00362	0.00322	0.00284	0.00354*
				(4.85)		(2.98)	(1.94)	(1.81)	(1.49)	(2.02)
SameIndustry					0.0363***	0.0357***	0.0315***	0.0261***	0.0303***	0.0339***
,					(8.06)	(7.91)	(7.93)	(6.60)	(7.47)	(7.54)
SameGroup								0.0191***		
								(6.14)		
Samesize									0.0416***	0.0213***
									(3.67)	(3.91)
SameBookToMarket									0.0128**	0.0147***
									(3.24)	(4.36)
Constant	0.0150***	-0.000422	-0.000591	-0.00187	-0.00234	-0.00312*	0.0300*	0.0375*	0.0258**	0.00782**
	(6.31)	(-0.25)	(-0.38)	(-1.19)	(-1.70)	(-2.19)	(2.59)	(2.50)	(3.22)	(3.56)
Value	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
nteraction	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No
N	613875	613875	613875	613875	613875	613875	613875	613875	613875	613875
r2	0.00132	0.00208	0.0132	0.0136	0.0149	0.0151	0.0182	0.0196	0.0181	0.0162


t statistics in parentheses




^{*} $\rho < 0.05$, ** $\rho < 0.01$, *** $\rho < 0.001$

4 Factor + Industry Future Correlation via FCA*

Normalized Rank Transformed for each cross section (Fortnightly)





Monthly variables

0370** -0.00 2.79) (-3 28*** 0.01	(2))472*** 3.39) 141***
2.79) (-3 28*** 0.01	3.39)
.28*** 0.01	,
	41***
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0338 0.0	0522
.17) (1	.75)
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.29) (2	.87)
.39*** 0.0	109**
.05) (3	.14)
973*** 0.0	380*
	.51)
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
t statistics in parentheses



^{*} $\rho <$ 0.05, ** $\rho <$ 0.01, *** $\rho <$ 0.001

Future Correlation via FCA*

4 Factor + Industry (by Business Group)



Fortnightly variables for subset of Same Business Group

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
FCA*	0.0183***	-0.0127*	0.0100***	-0.00219	0.00842***	-0.00535
	(7.04)	(-2.13)	(5.21)	(-0.39)	(5.37)	(-0.98)
$(FCA^* > Median[FCA^*]) \times FCA^*$		0.0460***		0.0186*		0.0210*
(rest > medianti est j) x rest		(4.63)		(2.08)		(2.53)
A - 11 - 11			0.01.00***	0.01.40**	0.0100***	0.0174***
ActiveHolder			0.0162*** (3.41)	0.0149** (3.07)	0.0188*** (4.00)	0.0174*** (3.61)
			(3.41)	(3.01)	(4.00)	(3.01)
SameIndustry			0.0336***	0.0333***	0.0330***	0.0327***
			(7.85)	(7.78)	(7.95)	(7.83)
Samesize			0.0340**	0.0318**		
Jamesize			(3.17)	(3.03)		
			, ,	. ,		
SameBookToMarket			0.0609***	0.0605***		
			(5.97)	(5.90)		
Constant	0.0344***	0.0149**	0.0399***	0.0314***	0.104***	0.0941***
	(9.76)	(3.01)	(8.38)	(5.53)	(5.71)	(5.16)
Value	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Interaction	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
N	103914	103914	103914	103914	103914	103914
r2	0.00281	0.00488	0.0390	0.0407	0.0494	0.0511

t statistics in parentheses

^{*} p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Fortnightly variables for subset of Different Business Group


	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
FCA*	0.00422** (3.11)	-0.00178 (-1.37)	0.00194* (1.98)	-0.00210 (-1.75)	0.00172 (1.93)	-0.00290* (-2.26)
$(FCA^* > \mathit{Median}[FCA^*]) \times FCA^*$		0.0146*** (4.22)		0.00996*** (3.48)		0.0115*** (3.82)
ActiveHolder			0.000676 (0.48)	0.000186 (0.13)	-0.000437 (-0.30)	-0.00102 (-0.70)
SameIndustry			0.0238*** (4.34)	0.0231*** (4.23)	0.0211*** (4.23)	0.0202*** (4.05)
Samesize			0.0217*** (3.94)	0.0217*** (3.94)		
SameBookToMarket			0.00482 (1.49)	0.00477 (1.48)		
Constant	0.00831*** (4.07)	0.00285 (1.67)	0.0124*** (5.03)	0.00886*** (4.03)	0.0240 (1.53)	0.0202 (1.32)
Value	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Interaction	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
N	509961	509961	509961	509961	509961	509961
r2	0.000490	0.000899	0.0120	0.0124	0.0148	0.0152

t statistics in parentheses

^{*} p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

4 Factor + Industry Future Correlation via FCA*

Normalized Rank Transformed for each cross section (Fortnightly)



Fortnightly variables

	De	pendent Vari	able: Future v	veekly Correla	tion of 4F+Ir	ıdustry Residı	ıals
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
FCA*	0.00453***	0.00409***	0.00335***	-0.0000210	-0.00125	-0.00140	-0.000971
	(5.51)	(5.76)	(4.57)	(-0.03)	(-1.53)	(-1.69)	(-0.99)
$(FCA^*) \times SameGroup$					0.00922***	0.00941***	0.00914***
, ,					(5.19)	(5.36)	(5.04)
SameGroup				0.0236***	0.0158***	0.0158***	0.0143**
				(9.07)	(5.83)	(5.21)	(2.95)
$\rho_{-}t$		0.0582***	0.0582***	0.0579***	0.0578***	0.0577***	0.0573***
		(3.59)	(3.59)	(3.57)	(3.56)	(3.56)	(3.54)
SameIndustry			0.00782***	0.000900	0.000698	-0.000668	-0.00102
			(3.81)	(0.40)	(0.31)	(-0.29)	(-0.46)
SameSize						0.0106***	0.0123***
						(3.72)	(3.92)
SameBookToMarket						0.00934*	0.0105**
						(2.58)	(2.76)
CrossOwnership						0.00697	0.00681
						(0.69)	(0.66)
Observations	520144	520144	520144	520144	520144	520144	520144
R ²	0.000	0.016	0.016	0.017	0.017	0.018	0.029

t statistics in parentheses

^{*} p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

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Model Estimation

Normalized Rank-Transformed

	Dependent	Variable:Futu	ire Monthly	Correlation o	f 4F+Indust	ry Residuals
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
FCA*	0.00486***	0.00413***	0.00132	0.000275	0.000407	0.000219
	(5.38)	(5.52)	(1.43)	(0.27)	(0.41)	(0.22)
ρt		0.127***	0.126***	0.126***	0.126***	0.126***
		(5.01)	(4.98)	(4.98)	(4.98)	(4.97)
SameGroup			0.0174***	0.0111***	0.0123***	0.0129***
			(6.97)	(4.51)	(4.93)	(5.19)
$(FCA^*) \times SameGroup$				0.00764**	0.00776**	0.00756**
				(3.21)	(3.21)	(3.11)
SameIndustry					-0.00384	-0.00484*
					(-1.85)	(-2.28)
SameSize						0.0116***
						(5.96)
SameBookToMarket						0.00488
Same Book Formanier						(1.55)
Constant	0.00583***	0.00515***	0.00233**	0.00214**	0.00249**	0.00715***
	(6.90)	(6.71)	(2.99)	(2.73)	(3.29)	(5.92)
Observations	254640	253828	253828	253828	253828	253828
R ²	0.000	0.034	0.035	0.035	0.036	0.036

t statistics in parentheses

^{*} p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Discontinuity

	Dependent '	Variable:Futu	re Monthly C	orrelation of 4	F+Industry Residuals
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
FCA*	0.00486***	0.0000346	-0.0000865	-0.000440	-0.000462
	(5.38)	(0.03)	(-0.08)	(-0.42)	(-0.44)
$(FCA^* > Q3[FCA^*]) \times FCA^*$		0.0109***	0.00956***	0.00464*	0.00456*
		(5.40)	(5.00)	(2.26)	(2.24)
ρ_t			0.126***	0.126***	0.126***
			(5.00)	(4.98)	(4.98)
SameGroup				0.0156***	0.0175***
•				(5.92)	(6.04)
SameIndustry					-0.00509*
					(-2.51)
SameSize					0.0115***
					(5.83)
SameBookToMarket					0.00475
					(1.51)
Constant	0.00583***	0.00228*	0.00205*	0.00112	0.00610***
	(6.90)	(2.35)	(2.34)	(1.28)	(4.19)
Observations	254640	254640	253828	253828	253828
R^2	0.000	0.001	0.035	0.035	0.036

t statistics in parentheses

^{*} p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Discontinuity & Business Groups

		Future N	Monthly Corr	elation of 4F	+Industry	Residuals	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
FCA*	-0.000462	0.000219	0.000262	-0.000639	0.000229	-0.000227	-0.000309
	(-0.44)	(0.22)	(0.27)	(-0.62)	(0.23)	(-0.22)	(-0.32)
$(FCA^* > Q3[FCA^*]) \times FCA^*$	0.00456*			0.00267		0.00158	0.00169
	(2.24)			(1.06)		(0.58)	(0.64)
$(FCA^*) \times SameGroup$		0.00756**		0.00652*	0.000306		0.000852
		(3.11)		(2.22)	(0.07)		(0.19)
$(FCA^* > Q3[FCA^*]) \times (FCA^*) \times SameGrouop$			0.0107***		0.0106	0.00964*	0.00894
			(3.68)		(1.93)	(2.53)	(1.65)
Observations	253828	253828	253828	253828	253828	253828	253828
R^2	0.036	0.036	0.036	0.036	0.036	0.036	0.037

t statistics in parentheses

^{*} $\rho < 0.05$, ** $\rho < 0.01$, *** $\rho < 0.001$

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Estimation model

Use Fama-MacBeth to estimate this model

$$\rho_{ij,t+1} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * ln(FCA_{ij,t}) + \beta_2 * SameGroup_{ij}$$


$$+ \beta_3 * ln(FCA_{ij,t}) \times SameGroup_{ij}$$


$$+ \sum_{k=1}^{n} \alpha_k * Control_{ij,t} + \varepsilon_{ij,t+1}$$
(5)

Estimate that model on a monthly frequency

Future Correlation via FCA

Logaritmic Transformation





Logaritmic Transformation

	Dependent '	Variable: Futi	ure Monthly	Correlation	of 4F+Indus	try Residuals
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
In(FCA)	0.00316***	0.00252***	0.00108	0.000550	0.000748	0.000574
	(4.76)	(4.80)	(1.68)	(0.80)	(1.19)	(0.91)
$(In(FCA)) \times SameGroup$				0.00446*	0.00451*	0.00528**
				(2.44)	(2.45)	(3.33)
ρ_{-t}		0.129***	0.129***	0.129***	0.129***	0.129***
		(4.94)	(4.93)	(4.92)	(4.92)	(4.92)
SameGroup			0.0152***	0.0217***	0.0235***	0.0237***
,			(6.06)	(5.14)	(4.90)	(5.03)
SameIndustry					-0.00497*	-0.00602**
,					(-2.30)	(-3.00)
SameSize						0.00903***
Sumesize						(4.31)
SameBookToMarket						0.00132
Salliebook folviarket						(0.59)
CrossOwnership						0.0202
CrossOwnership						(1.79)
	0.0107***	0.0111***	0.00500**	0.00400	0.00500**	` ,
Constant	0.0137*** (6.02)	0.0111*** (6.45)	0.00586** (2.77)	0.00433 (1.86)	0.00532** (2.68)	0.00785*** (4.14)
Observations	436735	434850	434850	434850	434850	434850
Group FE	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
R ²	0.000344	0.0355	0.0358	0.0360	0.0362	0.0366

t statistics in parentheses

^{*} p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001