

# Connected Stocks via Business Groups: Evidence from an Emerging Market

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
Tehran Institute for Advanced Studies

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
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# Co-movement and common ownership



This figure shows the stock return comovement and common ownership.

# Co-movement and common ownership



This figure shows the stock return comovement and common ownership.

- **Does direct or indirect common ownership cause stock return co-movement?**
  - common ownership:
    - We connect stocks through the common ownership by blockholders (ownership  $> 1\%$ ) for direct common ownership
    - We connect stocks through the ultimate owner for indirect common ownership
  - We focus on excess return co-movement for a pair of the stocks
  - We use common ownership (direct or indirect) to forecast cross-sectional variation in the realized correlation of four-factor + industry residuals
  - We demonstrate that correlated trading can be a channel of co-movement

# Why does it matter?

- Covariance

- Covariance is a key component of risk in many financial applications.
  - Portfolio selection
  - Hedging
  - Asset pricing
- Covariance is a significant input in risk measurement models
  - Such as Value-at-Risk

- Return predictability

- If it's valid, we can build a profitable buy-sell strategy

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- All pairs

## 5 Evidence for correlated trading

- Turnover
- Institutional Imbalance


## 6 Conclusion

# Main effect


Comovement




# Main effect




# Main effect




# Main effect



# Main effect




# Main effect




# Main effect


Common ownership



# Main effect



# Main effect






- We use daily records of block-holder ownership for firms
- We are not restricted to mutual funds ownership
- 85% of market belongs to the business groups
  - Would business groups be able to raise the co-movement of stock returns?
    - Cho and Mooney (2015):  
The strong co-movement between group returns and firm returns is explained by correlated fundamentals.
    - Kim et al. (2015):  
The increase in correlation appears to be driven more by non-fundamental factors such as correlated trading, rather than fundamental factors such as related-party transactions
  - Common ownership or business group (indirect common ownership) ?
  - Channel?

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# Pair composition


- Firms with at least one common owner



- Business group


# Pair composition

- Firms with at least one common owner




- Business group

- In a business group, how can one pair be defined?




# Pair Composition and Business Group

## Pair in the Business Group



# Pair Composition and Business Group

## Pair in the Business Group



# Data Summary

- Data: 2014/03/25 (1393/01/06) - 2020/03/18 (1398/12/28)
  - 72 Months
  - 618 firm including 562 firms with common owners

Year	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Average
No. of Firms	337	356	392	479	499	560	437
No. of Blockholders	1563	1656	1893	2510	2701	2991	2219
No. of Groups	37	40	42	43	39	42	40
No. of Firms in Groups	233	254	278	311	323	357	292
Ave. Number of group Members	6	6	7	7	8	8	7
Ave. ownership of each Blockholders (%)	17	18	18	17	18	19	17
Med. ownership of each Blockholders (%)	5	4	4	4	4	5	4
Ave. Number of Owners	7	7	7	7	7	6	6
Med. Number of Owners	5	5	5	6	5	5	5
Ave. Block. Ownership (%)	77	77	76	76	75	72	75

# Pair Composition


- Pairs consist of two firms with at least one common owner
  - 17522 unique pairs which is 11% of possible pairs ( $\frac{554 \times 553}{2} = 153181$ )

	mean	min	Median	max
Number of unique paris	5983	4610	5983	7079


Year	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Average
No. of Pairs	9051	8980	9288	11147	11199	12171	10306
No. of Pairs not in Groups	3293	2979	3058	4427	4168	4571	3749
No. of Pairs not in the same Group	4727	4993	5129	5400	5464	5770	5247
No. of Pairs in the same Group	850	857	949	1126	1316	1556	1109
Ave. Number of Common owner	1.18	1.18	1.17	1.17	1.17	1.15	1.17



# Number of Pairs




# FCA's time series




# FCA's time series


Common Ownership Time Series




Common Ownership Time Series



Common Ownership Time Series



Co-movement Time Series



# Measuring Common-ownership

Anton and Polk (2014)

$$FCAP_{ij,t} = \frac{\sum_{f=1}^F (S_{i,t}^f P_{i,t} + S_{j,t}^f P_{j,t})}{S_{i,t} P_{i,t} + S_{j,t} P_{j,t}}$$


SQRT

$$MFCAP_{ij,t} = \left[ \frac{\sum_{f=1}^F (\sqrt{S_{i,t}^f P_{i,t}} + \sqrt{S_{j,t}^f P_{j,t}})}{\sqrt{S_{i,t} P_{i,t}} + \sqrt{S_{j,t} P_{j,t}}} \right]^2$$

# Measuring Common-ownership

Anton and Polk (2014)

$$FCAP_{ij,t} = \frac{\sum_{f=1}^F (S_{i,t}^f P_{i,t} + S_{j,t}^f P_{j,t})}{S_{i,t} P_{i,t} + S_{j,t} P_{j,t}}$$




$$FCAP = \frac{50\% + 50\%}{100\% + 100\%} = 0.5$$

$$MFCAP = \frac{\sqrt{50\%} + \sqrt{50\%}}{\sqrt{100\%} + \sqrt{100\%}} = 0.71$$

SQRT

$$MFCAP_{ij,t} = \left[ \frac{\sum_{f=1}^F (\sqrt{S_{i,t}^f P_{i,t}} + \sqrt{S_{j,t}^f P_{j,t}})}{\sqrt{S_{i,t} P_{i,t}} + \sqrt{S_{j,t} P_{j,t}}} \right]^2$$



$$FCAP = \frac{90\% + 10\%}{100\% + 100\%} = 0.5$$

$$MFCAP = \frac{\sqrt{90\%} + \sqrt{10\%}}{\sqrt{100\%} + \sqrt{100\%}} = 0.63$$


More example

# Measuring Common-ownership

Subset	MFCAP					FCAP				
	mean	std	min	median	max	mean	std	min	median	max
All	0.15	0.24	0.00	0.06	4.62	0.12	0.16	0.0	0.05	0.97
Same Group	0.47	0.41	0.00	0.41	4.04	0.38	0.25	0.0	0.37	0.97
Not Same Group	0.10	0.16	0.00	0.04	2.90	0.08	0.11	0.0	0.04	0.97
Same Industry	0.34	0.41	0.01	0.18	4.04	0.25	0.24	0.0	0.16	0.96
Not Same Industry	0.12	0.19	0.00	0.05	4.62	0.10	0.14	0.0	0.05	0.97





# MFCAP vs. FCAP Distributions

## Monthly



# MFCAP vs. FCAP Distributions







Monthly





# MFCAP vs. FCAP Distributions

## Monthly



# Correlation Calculation

## 4 Factor + Industry

### 1 First Step:

Estimate this model on periods of three month (From two months earlier):

- 4 Factor + Industry :

$$R_{i,t} = \alpha_i + \beta_{mkt,i}R_{M,t} + \beta_{Ind,i}R_{Ind,t} + \beta_{HML,i}HML_t + \beta_{SMB,i}SMB_t + \beta_{UMD,i}UMD_t + \boxed{\varepsilon_{i,t}}$$

### 2 Second Step:

Calculate monthly correlation of each stock pair's daily abnormal returns (residuals)

	mean	std	min	median	max
CAPM + Industry	0.016	0.127	-0.950	0.014	0.818
4 Factor	0.033	0.136	-0.875	0.024	0.869
4 Factor + Industry	0.013	0.124	-0.875	0.010	0.779
Benchmark	0.008	0.145	-0.933	0.006	0.860

- **SameGroup** : Dummy variable for whether the two stocks belong to the same business group.
- **SameIndustry** : Dummy variable for whether the two stocks belong to the same Industry.
- **SameSize** : The negative of absolute difference in percentile ranking of size across a pair
- **SameBookToMarket** : The negative of absolute difference in percentile ranking of the book to market ratio across a pair
- **CrossOwnership**: The maximum percent of cross-ownership between two firms

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

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## 6 Conclusion

# Co-movement and Common Ownership



- Use Fama-MacBeth to estimate this model

$$\begin{aligned}\rho_{ij,t+1} = & \beta_0 + \beta_1 * \text{MFCAP}_{ij,t}^* + \beta_2 * \text{SameGroup}_{ij} \\ & + \beta_3 * \text{MFCAP}_{ij,t}^* \times \text{SameGroup}_{ij} \\ & + \sum_{k=1}^n \alpha_k * \text{Control}_{ij,t} + \varepsilon_{ij,t+1}\end{aligned}\tag{1}$$

- Estimate the model on a monthly frequency
- Adjust standard errors by Newey and West adjustment with 4 lags  
 $(4(70/100))^{\frac{2}{9}} = 3.69 \sim 4$

Methodology

# Model Estimation

## Normalized Rank-Transformed

	Dependent Variable: Future Pairs's Comovement					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
MFCAP*	0.0149*** (11.56)	0.00413*** (5.18)			-0.000406 (-0.54)	-0.000579 (-0.79)
SameGroup			0.0907*** (20.63)	0.0470*** (13.05)	0.0474*** (12.51)	0.0443*** (11.15)
SameIndustry		0.118*** (24.64)		0.107*** (21.48)	0.107*** (22.17)	0.107*** (22.32)
SameBM		0.0442*** (10.65)		0.0421*** (10.28)	0.0422*** (10.34)	0.0406*** (10.04)
SameSize		0.0231*** (4.42)		0.0260*** (4.91)	0.0262*** (5.00)	0.0448*** (6.00)
CrossOwnership		0.126*** (10.91)		0.0716*** (5.36)	0.0714*** (5.34)	0.0796*** (5.72)
Constant	0.0342*** (15.88)	0.0375*** (10.60)	0.0241*** (12.34)	0.0343*** (9.76)	0.0343*** (9.76)	0.0493*** (9.47)
PairType Control	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	389591	389591	389591	389591	389591	389591

# Model Estimation

## Normalized Rank-Transformed

	Dependent Variable: Future Pairs's Comovement			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
MFCAP*	0.00613** (3.39)	-0.00140 (-1.71)	-0.00151 (-1.86)	-0.000944 (-1.17)
SameGroup			0.0342*** (9.36)	0.0264*** (6.37)
MFCAP* $\times$ SameGroup			0.0106*** (5.15)	0.0110*** (5.77)
Sub-sample	SameGroup	Others	All	All
Business Group FE	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	47076	342515	389591	389591



*t* statistics in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$



# Co-movement and Common Ownership

High level of common ownership



# Fama-MacBeth Estimation

High level of common ownership (sub-sample)

Dependent Variable: Future Pairs's Comovement							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
SameGroup	0.0254*** (8.45)		0.0249*** (8.21)			0.00477 (1.32)	0.00252 (0.66)
(MFCAP > 75th Percentile)		0.00660*** (5.48)	0.000777 (0.73)	0.0230*** (7.09)	-0.00258* (-2.00)	-0.00157 (-1.29)	-0.000513 (-0.46)
(MFCAP > 75th Percentile) × SameGroup						0.0248*** (7.24)	0.0237*** (7.34)
Sub-sample	All	All	All	SameGroup	Others	All	All
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Business Group FE	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	389591	389591	389591	47076	342515	389591	389591

t statistics in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

# All pairs

Dependent Variable: Future Pairs' co-movement							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
SameGroup	0.0184*** (8.46)		0.0185*** (9.00)			0.0154*** (6.00)	0.0138*** (5.26)
MFCAP*		0.000404 (1.56)	-0.0000630 (-0.26)	0.00191 (1.97)	-0.000289 (-1.19)	-0.000832** (-3.36)	-0.000314 (-1.27)
MFCAP* × SameGroup						0.00281** (3.43)	0.00261** (3.12)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sub-Sample	Total	Total	Total	SameGroups	Others	Total	Total
Business Group FE	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	4566594	4566594	4566594	94035	4472559	4566594	4566594

t statistics in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

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$$\Delta \text{TurnOver} = \ln\left(\frac{\text{TurnOver}_{i,t}}{\text{TurnOver}_{i,t-1}}\right) = \ln\left(\frac{\text{volume}_{i,t}}{\text{MarketCap}_{i,t}}\right) - \ln\left(\frac{\text{volume}_{i,t-1}}{\text{MarketCap}_{i,t-1}}\right)$$

	Dependent Variable: $\Delta \text{TurnOver}_i$			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$\Delta \text{TurnOver}_{\text{Market}}$	0.416*** (12.25)	0.326*** (5.35)	0.252*** (6.41)	0.228*** (4.24)
$\Delta \text{TurnOver}_{\text{Industry-}i}$	0.142*** (3.79)	0.213*** (6.29)	0.0335 (1.34)	0.167** (2.87)
$\Delta \text{TurnOver}_{\text{Group-}i}$			0.330*** (12.74)	0.218*** (3.80)
Control	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	854662	851772	333789	331263
$R^2$	0.285	0.543	0.433	0.712

*t* statistics in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

# Business group and correlation in Turnover

	Dependent Variable: Monthly Correlation of Delta turnover						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
SameGroup	0.0177*** (5.56)		0.0176*** (5.24)			0.0144*** (4.39)	0.0167*** (5.26)
MFCAP*		0.00168 (1.99)	0.0000714 (0.09)	0.00110 (0.57)	-0.000141 (-0.15)	-0.000201 (-0.21)	-0.00108 (-0.92)
MFCAP* × SameGroup						0.00347 (1.42)	0.00395 (1.63)
Sub-sample	All	All	All	SameGroup	Others	All	All
Business Group FE	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	327447	327447	327447	40605	286842	327447	327447

# Correlation in Turnover and Co-movement

Dependent Variable: Future Pairs's Comovement					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
$\rho(\Delta \text{TurnOver})_{-t+1}$	0.0856*** (14.09)	0.0742*** (13.91)	0.152*** (15.57)	0.0611*** (11.82)	0.0743*** (13.94)
$\rho_{-t}$	0.0456*** (11.44)	0.0373*** (10.58)	0.0944*** (13.66)	0.0262*** (6.57)	0.0356*** (10.71)
Control	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sub-sample	Total	Total	SameGroup	Others	Total
Business Group FE	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	338895	338895	41955	296940	338895

*t* statistics in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

# Residual of Monthly Turnover

- $\text{Turnover}_{i,t} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \times \text{Turnover}_{i,avg} + \alpha_2 \times \text{Turnover}_{m,t} + \alpha_3 \times \text{Turnover}_{ind,t} + \boxed{\varepsilon_{i,t}}$ 
  - $\text{Turnover}_{i,t}$ : Monthly Turnover (Average of daily turnovers in each month)
  - $\text{Turnover}_{i,avg}$ : Annual average of monthly turnover
  - $\text{Turnover}_{m,t}$ : Market turnover
  - $\text{Turnover}_{ind,t}$ : Industry turnover
- Assign residuals to the business groups


	Firm $\times$ Month	mean	std	min	25%	50%	75%	max
Ungrouped	8206	-0.004	0.783	-4.702	-0.471	-0.013	0.466	5.061
Grouped	18022	0.002	0.712	-5.997	-0.416	-0.009	0.424	3.392



# Residual of Monthly Turnover

Standard error

	Group $\times$ Month	mean	std	min	25%	50%	75%	max
Ungrouped	72	0.776	0.113	0.504	0.685	0.781	0.867	1.030
Grouped	2441	0.601	0.313	0.001	0.403	0.567	0.763	3.274



# Low residual standard error

	Dependent Variable: Future Pairs's Comovement					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
SameGroup	0.0438*** (11.50)	0.0348*** (10.63)			0.0124* (2.35)	0.0168** (3.17)
LowTurnoverStd		0.00315 (1.94)	0.0501*** (5.84)	-0.00111 (-0.70)	-0.00281 (-1.63)	0.0125*** (5.24)
LowTurnoverStd $\times$ SameGroup					0.0559*** (5.59)	0.0503*** (5.10)
Sub-sample	Total	Total	SameGroup	Others	Total	Total
Business Group FE	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	389591	389591	47076	342515	389591	389591

- Seasholes and Wu (2007)


$$Imbalance_{ins} = \frac{Buy_{ins} - Sell_{ins}}{Buy_{ins} + Sell_{ins}}$$

	Group × Month	mean	std	min	25%	50%	75%	max
Ungrouped	20896	0.004	0.626	-1.0	-0.478	0.013	0.462	1.0
Grouped	12177	-0.043	0.574	-1.0	-0.453	-0.011	0.330	1.0

# Ins Imbalance std

Standard error

	Group $\times$ Month	mean	std	min	25%	50%	75%	max
Ungrouped	72	0.619	0.054	0.481	0.594	0.627	0.655	0.734
Grouped	2062	0.497	0.247	0.000	0.334	0.495	0.636	1.414



# Low Ins Imbalance Group

Dependent Variable: Future Pairs's Comovement						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
SameGroup	0.0438*** (11.50)	0.0444*** (11.57)			0.00457 (1.25)	0.00262 (0.59)
LowImbalanceStd		0.00422* (2.50)	0.0844*** (9.71)	-0.00824*** (-4.13)	-0.00740*** (-3.65)	0.0122*** (4.34)
LowImbalanceStd × SameGroup					0.0967*** (10.29)	0.0893*** (9.42)
Sub-sample	Total	Total	SameGroup	Others	Total	Total
Business Group FE	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	389591	389591	47076	342515	389591	389591

*t* statistics in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

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# Conclusion

- Direct common ownership affects firms' co-movement.
- Firms in the business groups co-move more than other pairs
- Direct common ownership only matters for firms in the business groups.
- In the Business groups, firms are traded in the same time and also in the same direction.

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# Measuring Common Ownership

## Proof

- If two stocks in pair have  $n$  mutual owner, which total market cap divides them equally, the mentioned indexes equal  $n$ .
  - Each holder owns  $1/n$  of each firm.
  - Firm's market cap is  $\alpha_1$  and  $\alpha_2$ :
  - So for each holder of firms we have  $S_{i,t}^f P_{i,t} = \alpha_i$
  - SQRT

$$\left[ \frac{\sum_{f=1}^n \sqrt{\alpha_1/n} + \sum_{f=1}^n \sqrt{\alpha_2/n}}{\sqrt{\alpha_1} + \sqrt{\alpha_2}} \right]^2 = \left[ \frac{\sqrt{n}(\sqrt{\alpha_1} + \sqrt{\alpha_2})}{\sqrt{\alpha_1} + \sqrt{\alpha_2}} \right]^2 = n$$

- Quadratic

$$\left[ \frac{\sum_{f=1}^n (\alpha_1/n)^2 + \sum_{f=1}^n (\alpha_2/n)^2}{\alpha_1^2 + \alpha_2^2} \right]^{-1} = \left[ \frac{\alpha_1^2 + \alpha_2^2}{n(\alpha_1^2 + \alpha_2^2)} \right]^{-1} = n$$

Back

# Measuring Common-ownership

Anton and Polk (2014)

$$FCAP_{ij,t} = \frac{\sum_{f=1}^F (S_{i,t}^f P_{i,t} + S_{j,t}^f P_{j,t})}{S_{i,t} P_{i,t} + S_{j,t} P_{j,t}}$$

# Measuring Common-ownership

Anton and Polk (2014)

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SQRT

$$\left[ \frac{\sum_{f=1}^F (\sqrt{S_{i,t}^f P_{i,t}} + \sqrt{S_{j,t}^f P_{j,t}})}{\sqrt{S_{i,t} P_{i,t}} + \sqrt{S_{j,t} P_{j,t}}} \right]^2$$

Quadratic

$$\left[ \frac{\sum_{f=1}^F [(S_{i,t}^f P_{i,t})^2 + (S_{j,t}^f P_{j,t})^2]}{(S_{i,t} P_{i,t})^2 + (S_{j,t} P_{j,t})^2} \right]^{-1}$$

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$$FCAP_{ij,t} = \frac{\sum_{f=1}^F (S_{i,t}^f P_{i,t} + S_{j,t}^f P_{j,t})}{S_{i,t} P_{i,t} + S_{j,t} P_{j,t}}$$

SQRT

$$\left[ \frac{\sum_{f=1}^F (\sqrt{S_{i,t}^f P_{i,t}} + \sqrt{S_{j,t}^f P_{j,t}})}{\sqrt{S_{i,t} P_{i,t}} + \sqrt{S_{j,t} P_{j,t}}} \right]^2$$

Quadratic


$$\left[ \frac{\sum_{f=1}^F [(S_{i,t}^f P_{i,t})^2 + (S_{j,t}^f P_{j,t})^2]}{(S_{i,t} P_{i,t})^2 + (S_{j,t} P_{j,t})^2} \right]^{-1}$$

## Intuition

If for a pair of stocks with  $n$  mutual owners, all owners have even shares of each firm's market cap, then the proposed indexes will be equal to  $n$ . [Proof](#)


# Measuring Common Ownership

## Example



# Measuring Common Ownership

## Example




For better observation, assume that

- $\alpha + \beta = 100$
- both firm have equal market cap





# Measuring Common Ownership

## Example



For better observation, assume that

- $\alpha + \beta = 100$
- both firm have equal market cap



Comparison of three methods for calculating common ownership

# Measuring Common Ownership


Example of three common owner

Firm Y

Firm X


# Measuring Common Ownership

Example of three common owner




# Measuring Common Ownership

Example of three common owner



# Measuring Common Ownership

Example of three common owner



# Measuring Common Ownership

Example of three common owner

Ownership	Type I	Type II	Type III	Type IV	Type V	Type VI	Type VII
$\alpha_1$	1/3	20	10	20	10	5	1
$\beta_1$	1/3	10	10	20	10	5	1
$\alpha_2$	1/3	10	80	20	10	5	1
$\beta_2$	1/3	20	80	20	10	5	1
$\alpha_3$	1/3	70	10	20	10	5	1
$\beta_3$	1/3	70	10	20	10	5	1
SQRT	3	2.56	2.33	1.8	0.9	0.45	0.09
SUM	1	1	1	0.6	0.3	0.15	0.03
Quadratic	3	1.85	1.52	8.33	33.33	133.33	3333.33

Back

# Measuring Common Ownership



## Comparison

- For better comparison we relax previous assumptions:
  - Two Firms with different market caps.

MarketCap <sub>x</sub> MarketCap <sub>y</sub>	$(\alpha_1, \beta_1), (\alpha_2, \beta_2)$					
	(10,40),(10,40)		(15,35),(15,35)		(20,30),(20,30)	
	SQRT	SUM	SQRT	SUM	SQRT	SUM
1	0.90	0.50	0.96	0.50	0.99	0.50
2	0.80	0.40	0.89	0.43	0.96	0.47
3	0.75	0.35	0.85	0.40	0.94	0.45
4	0.71	0.32	0.83	0.38	0.92	0.44
5	0.69	0.30	0.81	0.37	0.91	0.43
6	0.67	0.29	0.80	0.36	0.91	0.43
7	0.65	0.28	0.79	0.35	0.90	0.43
8	0.64	0.27	0.78	0.34	0.90	0.42
9	0.63	0.26	0.77	0.34	0.89	0.42
10	0.62	0.25	0.76	0.34	0.89	0.42

# Measuring Common Ownership

## Comparison



Comparison of two methods for calculating common ownership

## Conclusion

We use the SQRT measure because it has an acceptable variation and has fair values at a lower level of aggregate common ownership.



# Common Ownership measure

	Dependent Variable: Future Monthly Correlation of 4F+Industry Residuals							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Common Ownership Measure	0.00370*** (5.58)	0.00325*** (4.97)	0.00155* (2.61)	0.00109 (1.84)	0.000333 (0.54)	-0.000105 (-0.17)	0.000550 (1.07)	0.000283 (0.58)
SameGroup			0.0229*** (7.89)	0.0234*** (7.93)	0.0100** (3.26)	0.0103** (3.17)	0.00626 (1.79)	0.00668 (1.79)
Common Ownership Measure $\times$ SameGroup					0.0134*** (9.47)	0.0135*** (10.65)	0.0127*** (9.23)	0.0126*** (9.71)
Observations	398818	398818	398818	398818	398818	398818	398818	398818
Group FE	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Measurement	Sum	Sum	Sum	Sum	Sum	SQRT	Sum	SQRT
$R^2$	0.00433	0.00427	0.00518	0.00515	0.00554	0.00551	0.0182	0.0182

*t* statistics in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

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- Common-ownership and comovement effect

[Anton and Polk (2014)]

Stocks sharing many common investors tend to comove more strongly with each other in the future than otherwise similar stocks.

- Common-ownership and liquidity demand

[Koch et al. (2016), Pastor and Stambaugh (2003), Acharya and Pedersen (2005)]

Commonality in stock liquidity is likely driven by correlated trading among a given stock's investors. Commonality in liquidity is important because it can influence expected returns

- Trading needs and comovement

[Greenwood and Thesmar (2011)]

If the investors of mutual funds have correlated trading needs, the stocks that are held by mutual funds can comove even without any portfolio overlap of the funds themselves

- Stock price synchronicity and poor corporate governance

[Boubaker et al. (2014), Khanna and Thomas (2009), Morck et al. (2000)]

Stock price synchronicity has been attributed to poor corporate governance and a lack of firm-level transparency. On the other hand, better law protection encourages informed trading, which facilitates the incorporation of firm-specific information into stock prices, leading to lower synchronicity

Graph

# Synchronicity and firm interlocks

JFE-2009-Khanna

- Three types of network

- 1 Equity network
- 2 Director network
- 3 Owner network

- Dependent variables

Using detrended weekly return for calculation

- 1 Pairwise returns synchronicity =  $\frac{\sum_t (n_{i,j,t}^{up} n_{i,j,t}^{down})}{T_{i,j}}$

- 2 Correlation =  $\frac{Cov(i,j)}{\sqrt{Var(i) \cdot Var(j)}}$

- Tobit estimation of

$$f_{i,j}^d = \alpha l_{i,j} + \beta(1 * N_{i,j}) + \gamma Ind_{i,j} + \varepsilon_{i,j}$$

being in the same director network has a significant effect

# Large controlling shareholder and stock price synchronicity

JBF-2014-Boubaker

- Stock price synchronicity:

$$SYNCH = \log\left(\frac{R_{i,t}^2}{1 - R_{i,t}^2}\right)$$

where  $R_{i,t}^2$  is the R-squared value from

$$RET_{i,w} = \alpha + \beta_1 MKRET_{w-1} + \beta_2 MKRET_w + \beta_3 INDRET_{i,w-1} + \beta_4 INDRET_{i,w} + \varepsilon_{i,w}$$

- OLS estimation of

$$SYNCH_{i,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Excess_{i,t} + \beta_2 UCF_{i,t} + \sum_k \beta_k Control_{i,t}^k \\ + IndustryDummies + YearDummies + \varepsilon_{i,t}$$

- Stock price synchronicity increases with excess control
- Firms with substantial excess control are more likely to experience stock price crashes

- Common active mutual fund owners
- Measuring Common Ownership
  - $FCAP_{ij,t} = \frac{\sum_{f=1}^F (S_{i,t}^f P_{i,t} + S_{j,t}^f P_{j,t})}{S_{i,t} P_{i,t} + S_{j,t} P_{j,t}}$
  - Using normalized rank-transformed as  $FCAP_{ij,t}^*$
- $\rho_{ij,t}$  : within-month realized correlation of each stock pair's daily four-factor returns

•

$$\rho_{ij,t+1} = a + b_f \times FCAPF_{ij,t}^* + \sum_{k=1}^n CONTROL_{ij,t,k} + \varepsilon_{ij,t+1}$$

Estimate these regressions monthly and report the time-series average as in Fama-MacBeth

# Commonownership measurements

## Model-based measures

- $HJL_I^A(A, B) = \sum_{i \in I^{A,B}} \frac{\alpha_{i,B}}{\alpha_{i,A} + \alpha_{i,B}}$  Harford et al. (2011)
  - Bi-directional
  - Pair-level measure of common ownership
  - Its potential impact on managerial incentives
  - Measure not necessarily increases when the relative ownership increases
  - Accounts only for an investor's relative holdings
- $MHHI = \sum_j \sum_k s_j s_k \frac{\sum_i \mu_{ij} \nu_{ik}}{\sum_i \mu_{ij} \nu_{ij}}$  Azar et al. (2018)
  - Capture a specific type of externality
  - Measured at the industry level
  - Assumes that investors are fully informed about the externalities
- $GGL^A(A, B) = \sum_{i=1}^I \alpha_{i,AG}(\beta_{i,A}) \alpha_{i,B}$  Gilje et al. (2020)
  - Bi-directional
  - Less information
  - Not sensitive to the scope
  - Measure increases when the relative ownership of firm A increases

# Commonownership measurements

## Ad hoc common ownership measures

- $Overlap_{Count}(A, B) = \sum_{i \in I^{A,B}} 1$

He and Huang (2017), He et al. (2019)

- $Overlap_{Min}(A, B) = \sum_{i \in I^{A,B}} \min\{\alpha_{i,A}, \alpha_{i,B}\}$

Newham et al. (2018)

- $Overlap_{AP}(A, B) = \sum_{i \in I^{A,B}} \alpha_{i,A} \frac{\bar{v}_A}{\bar{v}_A + \bar{v}_B} + \alpha_{i,B} \frac{\bar{v}_B}{\bar{v}_A + \bar{v}_B}$

Anton and Polk (2014)

- $Overlap_{HL}(A, B) = \sum_{i \in I^{A,B}} \alpha_{i,A} \times \sum_{i \in I^{A,B}} \alpha_{i,B}$

Hansen and Lott Jr (1996) , Freeman (2019)

- Unappealing properties

- Unclear is whether any of these measures represents an economically meaningful measure of common ownership's impact on managerial incentives.
- Both  $Overlap_{Count}$  and  $Overlap_{AP}$  are invariant to the decomposition of ownership between the two firms, which leads to some unappealing properties.

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## 7 Appendix I

## 8 Appendix II

- Synchronicity and firm interlocks
- Large controlling shareholder and stock price synchronicity
- Connected Stocks
- Measures' Detail

## 9 Appendix III

- Fama-MacBeth regression analysis is implemented using a two-step procedure.
  - The first step is to run periodic cross-sectional regression for dependent variables using data of each period.
  - The second step is to analyze the time series of each regression coefficient to determine whether the average coefficient differs from zero.

# Fama-MacBeth (1973)

- Two Step Regression

- First Step

$$\begin{aligned} Y_{i1} &= \delta_{0,1} + \delta_{1,1}^1 X_{i,1}^1 + \cdots + \delta_{k,1}^k X_{i,1}^k + \varepsilon_{i,1} \\ &\vdots \\ Y_{iT} &= \delta_{0,1} + \delta_{1,T}^1 X_{i,T}^1 + \cdots + \delta_{k,T}^k X_{i,T}^k + \varepsilon_{i,T} \end{aligned}$$

- Second Step

$$\begin{bmatrix} \bar{Y}_1 \\ \vdots \\ \bar{Y}_T \end{bmatrix}_{T \times 1} = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & \delta_1^0 & \delta_1^1 & \cdots & \delta_1^k \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \cdots & \vdots \\ 1 & \delta_T^0 & \delta_T^1 & \cdots & \delta_T^k \end{bmatrix}_{T \times (k+2)} \times \begin{bmatrix} \lambda \\ \lambda_0 \\ \lambda_1 \\ \vdots \\ \lambda_k \end{bmatrix}_{(k+2) \times 1}$$

- Fama-MacBeth technique was developed to account for correlation between observations on different firms in the same period

# Calculating standard errors

- In most cases, the standard errors are adjusted following Newey and West (1987).
  - Newey and West (1987) adjustment to the results of the regression produces a new standard error for the estimated mean that is adjusted for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity.
  - Only input is the number of lags to use when performing the adjustment

$$Lag = 4(T/100)^{\frac{2}{9}}$$

where T is the number of periods in the time series

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