Connected Stocks: Evidence from Tehran Stock Exchange

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Motivation

Research Question

- Can the common ownership cause stock return comovement ?
 - We connect stocks through the common ownership by blockholders (ownership > 1%)
 - We focus on excess return comovement for a pair of the stocks
 - We use common ownership to forecast cross-sectional variation in the realized correlation of four-factor + industry residuals


Why does it matter?

- Covariance
 - Covariance is a key component of risk in many financial applications. (Portfolio selection, Risk management, Hedging and Asset pricing)
 - Covariance is a significant input in risk measurement models (Such as Value-at-Risk)
- Return predictability
 - If it's valid, we can build a profitable buy-sell strategy

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Main effect



Commonownership measurements

Model based measures

- $\mathsf{HJL}^A_I(A,B) = \sum_{i \in I^A,B} \frac{\alpha_{i,B}}{\alpha_{i,A} + \alpha_{i,B}}$ [Harford et al.-JFE-2011]
- $\operatorname{GGL}^A(A,B) = \sum_{i=1}^I \alpha_{i,A} g(\beta_{i,A}) \alpha_{i,B}$ [Erik et al.-JFE-2019]

Ad-hoc measures

- Overlap_{Count} $(A, B) = \sum_{i \in I} A, B 1$ [He and Huang -RFS(2017)] [He et al-JFE(2019)]
- Overlap_{Min}(A, B) = $\sum_{i \in I} A, B \min\{\alpha_{i,A}, \alpha_{i,B}\}$ [Newham et al.(2018)]
- Overlap_{HL}(A, B) = $\sum_{i \in I} A_i B_i \alpha_{i,A} \times \sum_{i \in I} A_i B_i \alpha_{i,B}$ [Hansen and Lott -JGQA(1996)] [Freeman-(2019)]

 Measues' detail

4 D > 4 A > 4 B > 4 B > B | B | 9 Q C

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Antón and Polk -JF(2014)

$$FCAP_{ij,t} = \frac{\sum_{f=1}^{F} (S_{i,t}^{f} P_{i,t} + S_{j,t}^{f} P_{j,t})}{S_{i,t}P_{i,t} + S_{j,t}P_{j,t}}$$

SQRT

Quadratic

$$\frac{\left[\frac{\sum_{f=1}^{F}(\sqrt{S_{i,t}^{f}P_{i,t}}+\sqrt{S_{j,t}^{f}P_{j,t}})}{\sqrt{S_{i,t}P_{i,t}}+\sqrt{S_{j,t}P_{j,t}}}\right]^{2}}{\sqrt{S_{i,t}P_{i,t}}+\sqrt{S_{j,t}P_{j,t}}}\right]^{2}$$

$$\left[\frac{\sum_{f=1}^{F}(\sqrt{S_{i,t}^{f}P_{i,t}}+\sqrt{S_{j,t}^{f}P_{j,t}})}{\sqrt{S_{i,t}P_{i,t}}+\sqrt{S_{j,t}P_{j,t}}}\right]^{2}\left[\frac{\sum_{f=1}^{F}[(S_{i,t}^{f}P_{i,t})^{2}+(S_{j,t}^{f}P_{j,t})^{2}]}{(S_{i,t}P_{i,t})^{2}+(S_{j,t}P_{j,t})^{2}}\right]^{-1}$$


Intuition

If for a pair of stocks with n mutual owners, all owners have even shares of each firm's market cap, then the proposed indexes will be equal to n. Proof

Example


 α and β are the percent of common owner's ownership from firms' market cap. For better observation, assume that $\alpha+\beta=100$ and both firm have equal market cap.





Comparison of three methods for calculating common ownership

Example of three common owner



Example of three common owner


Ownership	Type I	Type II	Type III	Type IV	Type V	Type VI	Type VII
α_1	1/3	20	10	20	10	5	1
β_1	1/3	10	10	20	10	5	1
α_2	1/3	10	80	20	10	5	1
β_2	1/3	20	80	20	10	5	1
α_3	1/3	70	10	20	10	5	1
eta_3	1/3	70	10	20	10	5	1
SQRT	3	2.56	2.33	1.8	0.9	0.45	0.09
SUM	1	1	1	0.6	0.3	0.15	0.03
Quadratic	3	1.85	1.52	8.33	33.33	133.33	3333.33

Comparison

- For better comparison we relax previous assumptions:
 - Two Firms with different market caps.

	(10,40),(10,40)		(15,35)	(15,35)	(20,30),	(20,30)
MarketCap _x MarketCap _y	SQRT	SUM	SQRT	SUM	SQRT	SUM
1	0.90	0.50	0.96	0.50	0.99	0.50
2	0.80	0.40	0.89	0.43	0.96	0.47
3	0.75	0.35	0.85	0.40	0.94	0.45
4	0.71	0.32	0.83	0.38	0.92	0.44
5	0.69	0.30	0.81	0.37	0.91	0.43
6	0.67	0.29	0.80	0.36	0.91	0.43
7	0.65	0.28	0.79	0.35	0.90	0.43
8	0.64	0.27	0.78	0.34	0.90	0.42
9	0.63	0.26	0.77	0.34	0.89	0.42
10	0.62	0.25	0.76	0.34	0.89	0.42

Comparison




Comparison of two methods for calculating common ownership

Conclusion

We use the SQRT measure because it has an acceptable variation and has fair values at a lower level of aggregate common ownership.


Pair Composition and Business Group


Business Group



Pair Composition and Business Group


Pair in the Business Group






Pair Composition and Business Group

Pair not in any of Business Groups





Pair Composition

- Pairs consist of two firms with at least one common owner
 - 9336 unique pairs which is 16% of possible pairs ($\frac{342*341}{2} = 58311$)

	mean	min	median	max
Number of unique paris	4325	3222	4157	5101


Year	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Mean
No. of Pairs	4689	5868	6554	7430	6371	4094	5834
No. of Groups	40	41	43	43	38	38	41
No. of Pairs not in Groups	231	275	318	969	924	544.00	544
No. of Pairs in the same Group	662	793	1012	1118	1055	803	907
No. of Pairs not in the same Group	3778	4746	5183	5273	4308	2741	4338
Mea. Number of Common owner	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2
Mea. Number of Pairs in one Group	24	24	26	27	26	20	25
Med. Number of Pairs in one Group	10	11	9	10	11	8	10
Mea. Number of Pairs in one Group	25	26	27	29	28	21	26
Med. Number of Pairs in one Group	10	11	9	6	7	6	8
Med. Number of Owners	5.96	5.83	5.7	5.77	5.78	6	5.82
Medi. Percent of each Blockholder	10.18	10.27	10.46	10.3	10.69	11	10.49
Med. Block. Ownership	78.45	79.01	79.03	79.65	79.49	79.31	79.16

Data Summary

- We use blockholders' data from 2015/03/25 (1394/01/06) to 2020/03/18 (1398/12/28)
 - Includes of 1203 Days and 60 Months
 - Consists of 600 firm inculding 342 firm with common owners

Year	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	mean
No. of Firms	355	383	520	551	579	602	498
No. of Blockholders	724	887	1274	1383	1409	1390	1178
No. of Groups	41	42	46	45	40	40	42
No. of Firms not in Groups	113	128	207	224	247	602	254
No. of Firms in Groups	242	265	332	339	332	332	307
Mea Number of Members	6	6	7	8	8	8	7
Med. of Number of Members	4	4	6	5	6	6	5
Mea Of each Blockholder's ownership	21.30	22.00	20.80	20.50	21.90	23.00	21.58
Med. of Owners' Percent	7.94	7.55	6.95	6.34	8.31	9	8
Mea Number of Blockholders	5	5	5	5	5	4	5
Med. Number of Owners	4	4	4	4	4	3	4
Mea Block. Ownership	71.6	71.2	68	67.7	65.4	62.00	67.65
Med. Block. Ownership	79.9	80.1	77	77.1	72.9	69.70	76.12

Number of Pairs



FCA vs. FCAP Summary


	variable	$count(month \times id)$	mean	std	min	25%	median	75%	max
Total	FCA	258352	0.167	0.268	0.003	0.024	0.056	0.181	3.967
	FCAP	258352	0.141	0.192	0.003	0.023	0.052	0.164	0.985
Cama Cuana	FCA	41191	0.499	0.425	0.005	0.172	0.441	0.703	3.967
Same Group	FCAP	41191	0.399	0.262	0.004	0.146	0.410	0.615	0.985
Not Same Group	FCA	192551	0.100	0.154	0.003	0.021	0.043	0.109	2.166
Not Same Group	FCAP	192551	0.089	0.121	0.003	0.020	0.041	0.103	0.970
Cama Industry	FCA	40364	0.377	0.416	0.007	0.060	0.242	0.571	3.967
Same Industry	FCAP	40364	0.291	0.259	0.006	0.055	0.209	0.498	0.970
Not Same Industry	FCA	217988	0.128	0.208	0.003	0.022	0.047	0.132	2.555
Not Same industry	FCAP	217988	0.114	0.162	0.003	0.021	0.044	0.125	0.985

Results

- By the proposed measurement, common ownership increases
- Common ownership is greater in pairs that are in the same business group and insutry

FCA vs. FCAP Distributions

Monthly



Correlation Calculation

4 Factor + Industry

Frist Step:

Estimate each of these models on periods of three month:

• CAPM + Industry (2 Factor):

$$R_{i,t} = \alpha_i + \beta_{mkt,i}R_{M,t} + \beta_{Ind,i}R_{Ind,t} + \boxed{\varepsilon_{i,t}}$$

• 4 Factor :

$$\begin{split} R_{i,t} &= \alpha_i + \beta_{\textit{mkt},i} R_{\textit{M},t} + \\ &+ \beta_{\textit{HML},i} \textit{HML}_t + \beta_{\textit{SMB},i} \textit{SMB}_t + \beta_{\textit{UMD},i} \textit{UMD}_t + \boxed{\varepsilon_{i,t}} \end{split}$$

• 4 Factor + Industry (5 Factor) :

$$\begin{split} R_{i,t} &= \alpha_i + \beta_{\textit{mkt},i} R_{\textit{M},t} + \beta_{\textit{Ind},i} R_{\textit{Ind},t} \\ &+ \beta_{\textit{HML},i} \textit{HML}_t + \beta_{\textit{SMB},i} \textit{SMB}_t + \beta_{\textit{UMD},i} \textit{UMD}_t + \boxed{\varepsilon_{i,t}} \end{split}$$

Second Step: Calculate monthly correlation of each stock pair's daily abnormal returns (residuals)

Correlation Calculation Results


SMB 0.19 1.47 -5.64 19.52 HML -0.12 1.39 -4.90 23.20 Winner – Loser 0.69 1.06 -2.61 8.58 Market 0.24 1.23 -4.71 4.89	Factors	mean	std	min	max
Winner – Loser 0.69 1.06 -2.61 8.58	SMB	0.19	1.47	-5.64	19.52
77	HML	-0.12	1.39	-4.90	23.20
Market 0.24 1.23 -4.71 4.89	Winner – Loser	0.69	1.06	-2.61	8.58
	Market	0.24	1.23	-4.71	4.89

$\rho_{ij,t}$	mean	std	min	25%	50%	75%	max
CAPM + Industry	0.007	0.328	-1	-0.194	0.006	0.208	1
4 Factor	0.038	0.338	-1	-0.172	0.035	0.248	1
4 Factor + Industry	0.006	0.326	-1	-0.194	0.005	0.206	1
4 Factor $+$ Industry (With L	_ag) 0.006	0.325	-1	-0.194	0.006	0.206	1
						_	

Conclusion

We use the 4 Factor + Industry model to control for exposure to systematic risk because it almost captures all correlations between two firms in each pair.

Future Correlation via FCA



Controls

- \bullet ρ_t : Current period correlation
- **SameGroup**: Dummy variable for whether the two stocks belong to the same business group.
- **SameIndustry**: Dummy variable for whether the two stocks belong to the same Industry.
- SameSize: The negative of absolute difference in percentile ranking of size across a pair
- SameBookToMarket : The negative of absolute difference in percentile ranking of the book to market ratio across a pair
- **CrossOwnership**: The maximum percent of cross-ownership between two firms

Summary of Controls

Monthly

Type of Pairs	Yes	No
SameIndustry	1110 (11%)	8631 (88%)
SameGroup	1142 (12%)	8599 (89%)
SameGroup & SameIndustry	494 (5%)	9247 (95%)

	mean	std	min	25%	50%	75%	max
SameIndustry	0.16	0.36	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00
SameGroup	0.18	0.38	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00
Size1	0.75	0.21	0.01	0.61	0.81	0.93	1.00
Size2	0.47	0.25	0.00	0.27	0.44	0.66	1.00
SameSize	-0.28	0.21	-0.99	-0.42	-0.23	-0.10	0.00
BookToMarket1	0.53	0.26	0.00	0.33	0.54	0.75	1.00
BookToMarket2	0.51	0.24	0.00	0.31	0.50	0.70	1.00
SameBookToMarket	-0.29	0.21	-1.00	-0.42	-0.25	-0.12	0.00
MonthlyCrossOwnership	0.01	0.07	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.96

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Fama-MacBeth Estimation

- Fama-MacBeth regression analysis is implemented using a two-step procedure.
 - The first step is to run periodic cross-sectional regression for dependent variables using data of each period.
 - The second step is to analyze the time series of each regression coefficient to determine whether the average coefficient differs from zero.

Fama-MacBeth (1973)

- Two Step Regression
 - First Step

$$Y_{i1} = \delta_{0,1} + \delta_{1,1}^{1} X_{i,1}^{1} + \dots + \delta_{k,1}^{k} X_{i,1}^{k} + \varepsilon_{i,1}$$

$$\vdots$$

$$Y_{iT} = \delta_{0,1} + \delta_{1,T}^{1} X_{i,T}^{1} + \dots + \delta_{k,T}^{k} X_{i,T}^{k} + \varepsilon_{i,T}$$

Second Step

$$\begin{bmatrix} \bar{Y}_1 \\ \vdots \\ \bar{Y}_T \end{bmatrix}_{T \times 1} = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & \delta_1^0 & \delta_1^1 & \dots & \delta_1^k \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \dots & \vdots \\ 1 & \delta_T^0 & \delta_T^1 & \dots & \delta_T^k \end{bmatrix}_{T \times (k+2)} \times \begin{bmatrix} \lambda \\ \lambda_0 \\ \lambda_1 \\ \vdots \\ \lambda_k \end{bmatrix}_{(k+2) \times 1}$$

• Fama-MacBeth technique was developed to account for correlation between observations on different firms in the same period

Calculating standard errors

- In most cases, the standard errors are adjusted following Newey and West (1987).
 - Newey and West (1987) adjustment to the results of the regression produces a new standard error for the estimated mean that is adjusted for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity.
 - Only input is the number of lags to use when performing the adjustment

$$Lag = 4(T/100)^{\frac{2}{9}}$$

where T is the number of periods in the time series

Fixed effect or Fama-MacBeth

- Both methods rely on zero correlation between the error terms of non-contemporaneous periods. A difference is weighting:
 - The Fama-Macbeth procedure weights each time period equally.
 - A panel regression will effectively give greater weight to periods with more observations or greater variation in right hand side variables
- The econometric analysis of panel data depends in a crucial way on the cross-sectional and timeseries correlation of the regression residuals

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 - Effective Business Group
 - Discontinuity
 - Logaritmic

Estimation model

Use Fama-MacBeth to estimate this model


$$\begin{split} \rho_{ij,t+1} &= \beta_0 + \beta_1 * \mathsf{FCA}^*_{ij,t} + \beta_2 * \mathsf{SameGroup}_{ij} \\ &+ \beta_3 * \mathsf{FCA}^*_{ij,t} \times \mathsf{SameGroup}_{ij} \\ &+ \sum_{k=1}^n \alpha_k * \mathsf{Control}_{ij,t} + \varepsilon_{ij,t+1} \end{split} \tag{1}$$


- Estimate the model on a monthly frequency
- Adjust standard errors by Newey and West adjustment with 4 lags $(4(60/100)^{\frac{2}{9}}=3.57\sim4)$



Future Correlation via FCA

Normalized Rank-Transformed





Fortnightly

Model Estimation

Normalized Rank-Transformed


	Dep	endent Varial	ole: Future M	onthly Corre	lation of 4F+	Industry Resid	duals
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
FCA*	0.00476***	0.00394***	0.00373***	0.00105	-0.0000511	-0.000233	0.000322
	(4.88)	(5.16)	(5.04)	(1.23)	(-0.06)	(-0.28)	(0.39)
(FCA*) × SameGroup					0.00839**	0.00910***	0.00889**
					(3.29)	(4.03)	(3.81)
SameGroup				0.0194***	0.0123***	0.0113***	0.00748
				(7.86)	(4.30)	(3.73)	(1.71)
ρ_t		0.124***	0.125***	0.124***	0.124***	0.124***	0.123***
		(4.92)	(4.93)	(4.90)	(4.90)	(4.90)	(4.88)
SameIndustry			0.00187	-0.00386*	-0.00402*	-0.00532**	-0.00502
•			(1.15)	(-2.01)	(-2.06)	(-2.86)	(-2.63)
SameSize						0.0117***	0.0121***
						(4.61)	(4.67)
SameBookToMarket						0.00410	0.00603
						(1.21)	(1.57)
CrossOwnership						0.0154	0.0149
						(1.56)	(1.42)
Observations	249030	248118	248118	248118	248118	248118	248118
Group FE	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
R^2	0.001	0.034	0.034	0.035	0.035	0.036	0.046

t statistics in parentheses

 $^{^{*}}$ p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Future Correlation via FCAP*

Normalized Rank Transformed



Fama-MacBeth Estimation

Normalized Rank Transformed

·	Depe	ndent Variabl	e: Future M	onthly Corre	lation of 4F+	-Industry Res	iduals
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
FCAP*	0.00513***	0.00424***	0.00127	0.0000453	0.000188	-0.000101	0.000467
	(5.33)	(5.73)	(1.46)	(0.05)	(0.22)	(-0.12)	(0.56)
(FCAP*) × SameGroup				0.00904**	0.00912**	0.0102***	0.00999**
, , ,				(3.13)	(3.12)	(3.95)	(3.79)
SameGroup			0.0176***	0.0100**	0.0114***	0.0100***	0.00620
·			(8.16)	(3.43)	(3.94)	(3.47)	(1.48)
ρ_t		0.124***	0.124***	0.124***	0.124***	0.124***	0.123***
, .		(4.92)	(4.90)	(4.89)	(4.89)	(4.90)	(4.88)
SameIndustry					-0.00414*	-0.00547**	-0.00517*
*					(-2.12)	(-2.92)	(-2.69)
SameSize						0.0115***	0.0118***
						(4.59)	(4.57)
SameBookToMarket						0.00421	0.00613
						(1.25)	(1.59)
CrossOwnership						0.0183*	0.0178
						(2.01)	(1.83)
Observations	249030	248118	248118	248118	248118	248118	248118
Group FE	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
R^2	0.001	0.034	0.034	0.035	0.035	0.036	0.046

t statistics in parentheses





^{*} p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Bearish/Bullish Market

Use Fama-MacBeth to estimate this model

$$\begin{split} \rho_{ij,t+1} &= \beta_0 + \beta_1 * \mathsf{FCA}^*_{ij,t} \\ &+ \beta_2 * \mathsf{Bearish} \; \mathsf{Market} \times \mathsf{SameGroup} \\ &+ \beta_3 * \mathsf{Bullish} \; \mathsf{Market} \times \mathsf{SameGroup} \\ &+ \beta_4 * \mathsf{FCA}^*_{ij,t} \times \mathsf{Bearish} \; \mathsf{Market} \times \mathsf{SameGroup} \\ &+ \beta_5 * \mathsf{FCA}^*_{ij,t} \times \mathsf{Bullish} \; \mathsf{Market} \times \mathsf{SameGroup} \\ &+ \sum_{t=1}^n \alpha_k * \mathsf{Control}_{ij,t} + \varepsilon_{ij,t+1} \end{split}$$

• 37% of observations are bearish

Model Estimation

Normalized Rank-Transformed (Bearish Market)

	Fu. Monthly	y Cor. of 4F+	Ind. Residua
	(1)	(2)	(3)
FCA*	-0.000233 (-0.28)	-0.000233 (-0.28)	-0.000233 (-0.28)
$(FCA^*) \times SameGroup$	0.00910*** (4.03)	0.00910*** (4.03)	(,
SameGroup	0.0113*** (3.73)	0.00763*** (3.61)	0.00763*** (3.61)
Bearish Market \times SameGroup		0.00372 (1.75)	0.00372 (1.75)
$(FCA^*) \times Bullish Market \times SameGroup$			0.00492** (3.06)
$(FCA^*) \times Bearish \ Market \times SameGroup$			0.00418** (3.18)
Observations R ²	248118 0.036	248118 0.036	248118 0.036

t statistics in parentheses

	Fu. Monthly	y Cor. of 4F+	Ind. Residua
	(1)	(2)	(3)
FCA*	-0.000233 (-0.28)	-0.000233 (-0.28)	-0.000233 (-0.28)
$(FCA^*) \times SameGroup$	0.00910*** (4.03)	0.00910*** (4.03)	
SameGroup	0.0113*** (3.73)		
Bearish Market \times SameGroup		0.00372 (1.75)	0.00372 (1.75)
Bullish Market \times SameGroup		0.00763*** (3.61)	0.00763*** (3.61)
$(FCA^*) \times Bullish \ Market \times SameGroup$			0.00492** (3.06)
$(FCA^*) \times Bearish \ Market \times SameGroup$			0.00418** (3.18)
Observations R ²	248118 0.036	248118 0.036	248118 0.036

t statistics in parentheses

[&]quot; p < 0.05, "" p < 0.01, """ p < 0.001

^{*} p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Effective Business Group

Check banking

- We define two types of groups
 - Bank is Uo Groups that their ultimate owner is bank
 - Bank In Group: Groups that ,at least, consist of one bank
- Estimated model:

$$\begin{split} \rho_{ij,t+1} &= \beta_0 + \beta_1 * \mathsf{FCA}^*_{ij,t} + \beta_2 * \mathsf{SameGroup}_{ij} \\ &+ \beta_3 * \mathsf{FCA}^*_{ij,t} * \; \mathsf{SameGroup}_{ij} + \beta_{10} * \mathsf{Bank} \; \mathsf{is} \; \mathsf{Uo} + \beta_{11} * \mathsf{Bank} \; \mathsf{in} \; \mathsf{group} \\ &+ \beta_4 * \mathsf{Bank} \; \mathsf{is} \; \mathsf{Uo} * \; \mathsf{SameGroup}_{ij} + \beta_5 * \mathsf{Bank} \; \mathsf{is} \; \mathsf{Uo} * \; \mathsf{SameGroup}_{ij} * \mathsf{FCA}^*_{ij,t} \\ &+ \beta_6 * \mathsf{Bank} \; \mathsf{In} \; \mathsf{Group} * \mathsf{SameGroup}_{ij} + \beta_7 * \mathsf{Bank} \; \mathsf{In} \; \mathsf{Group} * \mathsf{SameGroup}_{ij} * \mathsf{FCA}^*_{ij,t} \\ &+ \sum_{k=1}^n \alpha_k * \mathsf{Control}_{ij,t} + \varepsilon_{ij,t+1} \end{split}$$

Effective Business Group

Check banking and Investment

			De. V	ariable:Futur	e Monthly Co	rrelation of 4	F+Industry F	Residuals		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
FCA*	-0.000307 (-0.36)	-0.000294 (-0.35)	-0.000303 (-0.36)	-0.000299 (-0.35)	-0.000189 (-0.22)	-0.000199 (-0.24)	-0.000204 (-0.24)	-0.000161 (-0.19)	-0.000183 (-0.22)	-0.000180 (-0.21)
$(FCA^*) \times SameGroup$	0.00820** (3.22)	0.00830** (3.28)	0.00888*** (3.53)	0.00750° (2.64)	0.00810** (3.19)	0.00818** (3.20)	0.00790** (3.01)	0.00825** (3.27)	0.00884*** (3.52)	0.00698* (2.49)
SameGroup	0.0130*** (4.55)	0.0131*** (4.53)	0.0106** (3.08)	0.0121** (3.30)	0.0125*** (4.38)	0.0130*** (3.96)	0.0132*** (4.00)	0.0127*** (4.41)	0.0110** (2.85)	0.0131** (3.20)
Bank is Uo		0.00140 (1.49)	0.000550 (0.55)	0.000550 (0.55)				0.00214° (2.13)	0.00132 (1.27)	0.00133 (1.27)
Bank is $Uo \times SameGroup$			0.00804 (1.51)	0.00381 (0.70)					0.00711 (1.37)	0.00181 (0.34)
$(FCA^*) \times Bank \ is\ Uo \times SameGroup$				0.00458 (1.33)						0.00570 (1.68)
Bank in group					-0.00392** (-2.97)	-0.00378** (-3.30)	-0.00378** (-3.30)	-0.00431** (-3.12)	-0.00403** (-3.35)	-0.00404** (-3.35)
$Bank\;in\;group\timesSameGroup$						-0.00244 (-0.42)	-0.00760 (-0.80)		-0.00269 (-0.46)	-0.00734 (-0.76)
$\left(FCA^*\right) \times Bank in group \times SameGroup$							0.00435 (0.64)			0.00313 (0.48)
Observations R ²	248118 0.035	248118 0.036	248118 0.036	248118 0.036	248118 0.036	248118 0.036	248118 0.036	248118 0.036	248118 0.037	248118 0.037

t statistics in parentheses

^{*} p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Estimation model

Use Fama-MacBeth to estimate this model


$$\begin{split} \rho_{ij,t+1} &= \beta_0 + \beta_1 * \mathsf{FCA}^*_{ij,t} + \beta_2 * (\mathsf{FCA}^*_{ij,t} > Q3[\mathsf{FCA}^*_{ij,t}]) \times \mathsf{FCA}^*_{ij,t} \\ &+ \beta_3 * (\mathsf{FCA}^*_{ij,t} > Q3[\mathsf{FCA}^*_{ij,t}]) \times \mathsf{FCA}^*_{ij,t} \mathsf{SameGroup}_{ij} \\ &+ \sum_{k=1}^n \alpha_k * \mathsf{Control}_{ij,t} + \varepsilon_{ij,t+1} \end{split} \tag{3}$$


Estimate that model on a monthly frequency

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Future Correlation via FCA

Discontinuity





Fortnightly

Fama-MacBeth Estimation

Discontinuity

	Dep	. Variable: F	uture Month	nly Corr. of	F+Ind. Resid	duals
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
FCA*	0.00476***	-0.000946	-0.000876	-0.00129	-0.00131	-0.000683
	(4.88)	(-0.93)	(-0.83)	(-1.25)	(-1.29)	(-0.71)
$(FCA^* > Q3[FCA^*]) \times FCA^*$		0.0129***	0.0109***	0.00581**	0.00601**	0.00610***
		(6.77)	(6.12)	(3.11)	(3.25)	(3.52)
SameGroup				0.0157***	0.0172***	0.0130**
				(7.09)	(6.12)	(3.17)
ρ_t			0.124***	0.124***	0.124***	0.123***
			(4.92)	(4.90)	(4.91)	(4.89)
SameIndustry					-0.00549**	-0.00528**
					(-3.04)	(-2.88)
SameSize					0.0114***	0.0119***
					(4.49)	(4.59)
SameBookToMarket					0.00398	0.00586
					(1.17)	(1.51)
CrossOwnership					0.00651	0.00654
,					(0.57)	(0.54)
Observations	249030	249030	248118	248118	248118	248118
Group FE	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
R^2	0.001	0.001	0.034	0.035	0.036	0.046

t statistics in parentheses



^{*} $\rho < 0.05$, ** $\rho < 0.01$, *** $\rho < 0.001$

Estimation model

Use Fama-MacBeth to estimate this model


$$\begin{split} \rho_{ij,t+1} &= \beta_0 + \beta_1 * \mathsf{FCA}^*_{ij,t} \\ &+ \beta_2 * (\mathsf{FCA}^*_{ij,t} > Q3[\mathsf{FCA}^*_{ij,t}]) \times \mathsf{FCA}^*_{ij,t} \\ &+ \beta_3 * \mathsf{FCA}^*_{ij,t} \times \mathsf{SameGroup} \\ &+ \beta_4 * (\mathsf{FCA}^*_{ij,t} > Q3[\mathsf{FCA}^*_{ij,t}]) \times \mathsf{FCA}^*_{ij,t} \times \mathsf{SameGroup} \\ &+ \sum_{k=1}^n \alpha_k * \mathsf{Control}_{ij,t} + \varepsilon_{ij,t+1} \end{split} \tag{4}$$


• Estimate that model on a monthly frequency



4 Factor + Industry Future Correlation via FCA*

Discontinuity & Business Groups





Fama-MacBeth Estimation

Correlation of controls

Correlation	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
(1) ρ_f	1.00										
(2) ρ	0.11	1.00									
(3) FCA*	0.02	0.01	1.00								
(4) $(FCA^* > Q3[FCA^*])$	0.02	0.02	0.75	1.00							
(5) (FCA* > $Q3[FCA^*]$) × FCA*	0.02	0.02	0.76	0.98	1.00						
(6) $(FCA^*) \times SameGroup$	0.03	0.03	0.55	0.60	0.68	1.00					
(7) (FCA* $> Q3[FCA*]$) \times (FCA*) \times SameGroup	0.03	0.03	0.53	0.63	0.71	0.95	1.00				
(8) SameGroup	0.03	0.03	0.44	0.49	0.54	0.75	0.82	1.00			
(9) SameIndustry	0.01	0.01	0.28	0.30	0.32	0.33	0.36	0.38	1.00		
(10) SameSize	0.01	0.01	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.06	0.07	0.03	0.12	1.00	
(11) SameBookToMarket	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.04	0.05	0.06	0.06	0.11	0.07	1.00

Fama-MacBeth Estimation

Discontinuity & Business Groups

	De	p. Variable: F	uture Month	nly Correlatio	n of 4F+Indu	ıstry Residi	ıals
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
FCA*	-0.00131	-0.000233	-0.000194	-0.00148	-0.000219	-0.00100	-0.00109
	(-1.29)	(-0.28)	(-0.22)	(-1.46)	(-0.26)	(-0.99)	(-1.21)
$(FCA^* > Q3[FCA^*]) \times FCA^*$	0.00601**			0.00396		0.00272	0.00284
	(3.25)			(1.86)		(1.20)	(1.27)
$(FCA^*) \times SameGroup$		0.00910***		0.00754**	0.0000232		0.000911
		(4.03)		(2.94)	(0.00)		(0.18)
$(FCA^* > Q3[FCA^*]) \times (FCA^*) \times SameGroup$			0.0128***		0.0130*	0.0110**	0.0102
			(4.54)		(2.12)	(3.26)	(1.63)
Observations	248118	248118	248118	248118	248118	248118	248118
R^2	0.036	0.036	0.036	0.036	0.036	0.036	0.036


t statistics in parentheses

Fortnightly

 $^{^*}$ $\rho <$ 0.05, ** $\rho <$ 0.01, *** $\rho <$ 0.001

Future Correlation via FCA*

Grouped by size



Model Estimation

Grouped by size

		All Firms			Big Firms		Bij	g & Small Fir	ms		Small Firm:	s
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
FCA*	-0.000233 (-0.28)	-0.00131 (-1.29)	-0.00100 (-0.99)	0.00318** (3.14)	0.000606 (0.38)	0.000557 (0.35)	-0.000915 (-0.74)	-0.00205 (-1.36)	-0.00197 (-1.32)	-0.00201 (-1.34)	-0.00145 (-0.90)	-0.000331 (-0.20)
$(FCA^*) \times SameGroup$	0.00910*** (4.03)			0.00516 (1.20)			0.00352 (1.14)			0.0212*** (6.00)		
$(FCA^* > Q3[FCA^*]) \times (FCA^*) \times SameGroup$			0.0110** (3.26)			0.00471 (0.67)			0.00358 (0.79)			0.0271*** (5.15)
$(FCA^* > Q3[FCA^*]) \times FCA^*$		0.00601** (3.25)	0.00272 (1.20)		0.00855* (2.44)	0.00761 (1.92)		0.00419 (1.70)	0.00311 (1.10)		0.00599 (1.86)	-0.00402 (-0.99)
SameGroup	0.0113*** (3.73)	0.0172*** (6.12)	0.00773* (2.44)	0.0111 (1.87)	0.0122** (2.72)	0.00886 (1.27)	0.0221*** (3.90)	0.0237*** (5.39)	0.0205** (3.01)	-0.00388 (-0.79)	0.0127** (3.02)	-0.00886 (-1.52)
SameIndustry	-0.00532** (-2.86)	-0.00549** (-3.04)	-0.00573** (-3.08)	0.00212 (0.39)	0.00188 (0.35)	0.00131 (0.24)	-0.0136*** (-5.91)	-0.0138*** (-6.04)	-0.0139*** (-6.07)	0.00338 (1.20)	0.00471 (1.63)	0.00297 (1.06)
Observations R ²	248118 0.036	248118 0.036	248118 0.036	61741 0.044	61741 0.044	61741 0.047	123757 0.039	123757 0.038	123757 0.039	62620 0.042	62620 0.042	62620 0.043


t statistics in parentheses


Fortnightly


^{*} $\rho < 0.05$, ** $\rho < 0.01$, *** $\rho < 0.001$

FCA* summary

PairType	mean	std	min	25%	50%	75%	max
Small	0.25	0.99	-1.73	-0.57	0.27	1.18	1.73
Hybrid	-0.08	0.98	-1.73	-0.93	-0.10	0.72	1.73
Large	-0.02	1.01	-1.73	-0.91	-0.01	0.88	1.73







Estimation model

Use Fama-MacBeth to estimate this model


$$\rho_{ij,t+1} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * \ln(\mathsf{FCA}_{ij,t}) + \beta_2 * \mathsf{SameGroup}_{ij} + \beta_3 * \ln(\mathsf{FCA}_{ij,t}) \times \mathsf{SameGroup}_{ij} + \sum_{k=1}^{n} \alpha_k * \mathsf{Control}_{ij,t} + \varepsilon_{ij,t+1}$$
(5)


Estimate that model on a monthly frequency



Future Correlation via FCA

Logaritmic Transformation





Fortnightly

Fama-MacBeth Estimation

Logaritmic Transformation

	Dependent	Variable: Fut	ure Monthly	Correlation	of 4F+Indust	ry Residuals
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
In(FCA)	0.00420***	0.00351***	0.000907	-0.000249	-0.0000972	-0.000257
	(5.55)	(5.88)	(1.24)	(-0.32)	(-0.13)	(-0.36)
(In(FCA)) × SameGroup				0.00582**	0.00589**	0.00636***
				(3.43)	(3.41)	(4.16)
ρ_t		0.124***	0.124***	0.124***	0.124***	0.124***
		(4.92)	(4.90)	(4.90)	(4.90)	(4.90)
SameGroup			0.0176***	0.0269***	0.0284***	0.0287***
			(7.84)	(7.11)	(6.76)	(6.99)
SameIndustry					-0.00417*	-0.00544**
,					(-2.13)	(-2.92)
SameSize						0.0116***
						(4.58)
SameBookToMarket						0.00406
						(1.20)
CrossOwnership						0.0152
Crosso Wileisinp						(1.49)
Constant	0.0167***	0.0141***	0.00420	0.000755	0.00159	0.00555*
	(7.38)	(7.77)	(1.92)	(0.32)	(0.74)	(2.59)
Observations	249030	248118	248118	248118	248118	248118
R^2	0.001	0.034	0.034	0.035	0.035	0.036

t statistics in parentheses




^{*} p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

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
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- 2 Literature
- 3 Empirical Studies
- 4 Methodology
- 6 Results
- Robustness Check
 - Random Pairs from Same Business Group
 - Random Pairs from Same Size
 - Random Pairs from Same Industry

Random Pairs from Same Business Group


 β_3 in model 1



 β_2 in model 3




 β_4 in model 4




Random Pairs from Same Size


 β_3 in model 1



 β_2 in model 3




 β_4 in model 4




Random Pairs from Same Industry

 β_3 in model 1



 β_2 in model 3



 β_4 in model 4




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- Conclusion



Conclusion

- We derive a measure that captures the extent of common ownership distribution.
- The common ownership comovement effect with a extra explanation:
 - Common ownership that crosses a threshold affect on comovement
 - Be in the same business group has a major effect on comovement
 - Business groups of banks affect more than normal business groups

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Measuring Common Ownership

- If two stocks in pair have n mutual owner, which total market cap divides them equally, the mentioned indexes equal n.
 - Each holder owns 1/n of each firm.
 - Firm's market cap is α_1 and α_2 :
 - So for each holder of firms we have $S_{i,t}^f P_{i,t} = \alpha_i$
 - SQRT

$$\left[\frac{\sum_{f=1}^{n} \sqrt{\alpha_1/n} + \sum_{f=1}^{n} \sqrt{\alpha_2/n}}{\sqrt{\alpha_1} + \sqrt{\alpha_2}}\right]^2 = \left[\frac{\sqrt{n}(\sqrt{\alpha_1} + \sqrt{\alpha_2})}{\sqrt{\alpha_1} + \sqrt{\alpha_2}}\right]^2 = n$$

Quadratic

$$\left[\frac{\sum_{f=1}^{n} (\alpha_1/n)^2 + \sum_{f=1}^{n} (\alpha_2/n)^2}{\alpha_1^2 + \alpha_2^2}\right]^{-1} = \left[\frac{\alpha_1^2 + \alpha_2^2}{n(\alpha_1^2 + \alpha_2^2)}\right]^{-1} = n$$





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 - Synchronicity and firm interlocks
 - Large controlling shareholder and stock price synchronicity
 - Connected Stocks
 - Measures' Detail
- Appendix II
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Main Effect

• Common-ownership and comovement effect

[Antón and Polk (2014)]

Stocks sharing many common investors tend to comove more strongly with each other in the future than otherwise similar stocks.

• Common-ownership and liquidity demand

[Koch et al (2016), Pastor and Stambaugh (2003), Acharya and Pedersen (2005)] Commonality in stock liquidity is likely driven by correlated trading among a given stock's investors. Commonality in liquidity is important because it can influence expected returns

• Trading needs and comovement

[Greenwood and Thesmar (2011)]

If the investors of mutual funds have correlated trading needs, the stocks that are held by mutual funds can comove even without any portfolio overlap of the funds themselves

• Stock price synchronicity and poor corporate governance

[Boubaker et al. (2014), Khanna and Thomas (2009), Morck et al. (2000)] Stock price synchronicity has been attributed to poor corporate governance and a lack of firm-level transparency. On the other hand, better law protection encourages informed trading, which facilitates the incorporation of firm-specific information into stock prices, leading to lower synchronicity



Synchronicity and firm interlocks

JFE-2009-Khanna

- Three types of network
 - Equity network
 - 2 Director network
 - Owner network
- Dependent variables

Using deterended weekly return for calculation

- **1** Pairwise returns synchronicity = $\frac{\sum_{\mathbf{t}} (n_{i,j,\mathbf{t}}^{i,j,n} n_{i,j,\mathbf{t}}^{odwn})}{T_{i,j}}$
- $2 Correlation = \frac{Cov(i,j)}{\sqrt{Var(i).Var(j)}}$
- Tobit estimation of

$$f_{i,j}^d = \alpha I_{i,j} + \beta (1 * N_{i,j}) + \gamma Ind_{i,j} + \varepsilon_{i,j}$$

being in the same director network has a significant effect

Large controlling shareholder and stock price synchronicity JBF-2014-Boubaker

• Stock price synchronicity:

$$SYNCH = \log(\frac{R_{i,t}^2}{1 - R_{i,t}^2})$$

where $R_{i,t}^2$ is the R-squared value from

$$RET_{i,w} = \alpha + \beta_1 MKRET_{w-1} + \beta_2 MKRET_w + \beta_3 INDRET_{i,w-1} + \beta_4 INDRET_{i,w} + \varepsilon_{i,w}$$

OLS estimation of

$$\begin{aligned} \textit{SYNCH}_{i,t} &= \beta_0 + \beta_1 \textit{Excess}_{i,t} + \beta_2 \textit{UCF}_{i,t} + \sum_k \beta_k \textit{Control}_{i,t}^k \\ &+ \textit{IndustryDummies} + \textit{YearDummies} + \varepsilon_{i,t} \end{aligned}$$

- Stock price synchronicity increases with excess control
- Firms with substantial excess control are more likely to experience stock price crashes

Connected Stocks

JF-2014-Anton Polk

- Common active mutual fund owners
- Measuring Common Ownership
 - $FCAP_{ij,t} = \frac{\sum_{f=1}^{F} (S_{i,t}^{f} P_{i,t} + S_{j,t}^{f} P_{j,t})}{S_{i,t}P_{i,t} + S_{j,t}P_{j,t}}$
 - Using normalized rank-transformed as FCAP*
 ii.t
- \bullet $\rho_{ii,t}$: within-month realized correlation of each stock pair's daily four-factor returns

$$\rho_{ij,t+1} = a + b_f \times FCAPF_{ij,t}^* + \sum_{k=1}^{n} CONTROL_{ij,t,k} + \varepsilon_{ij,t+1}$$

Estimate these regressions monthly and report the time-series average as in Fama-MacBeth

Commonownership measurements

Model-based measures

- ullet HJL $_I^A(A,B)=\sum_{i\in I^{A,B}}rac{lpha_{i,B}}{lpha_{i,A}+lpha_{i,B}}$ [Harford et al.-JFE-2011]
 - Bi-directional
 - Pair-level measure of common ownership
 - Its potential impact on managerial incentives
 - Measure not necessarily increases when the relative ownership increases
 - Accounts only for an investor's relative holdings
- $\bullet \quad \mathsf{MHHI} = \textstyle \sum_{j} \sum_{k} s_{j} s_{k} \frac{\sum_{i} \mu_{ij} \nu_{ik}}{\sum_{i} \mu_{ij} \nu_{ij}} \text{ [Azar et al.-JF-2018]}$
 - Capture a specific type of externality
 - Measured at the industry level
 - Assumes that investors are fully informed about the externalities
- $\operatorname{GGL}^A(A,B) = \sum_{i=1}^I \alpha_{i,A} g(\beta_{i,A}) \alpha_{i,B}$ [Erik et al.-JFE-2019]
 - Bi-directional
 - Less information
 - Not sensitive to the scope
 - Measure increases when the relative ownership of firm A increases



Commonownership measurements

Ad hoc common ownership measures

- $Overlap_{Count}(A, B) = \sum_{i \in I^{A,B}} 1$ [He and Huang -RFS(2017)] [He et al-JFE(2019)]
- $Overlap_{Min}(A, B) = \sum_{i \in I^{A,B}} min\{\alpha_{i,A}, \alpha_{i,B}\}$ [Newham et al.(2018)]
- Overlap_AP(A, B) = $\sum_{i \in I^{A,B}} \alpha_{i,A} \frac{\bar{\nu}_A}{\bar{\nu}_A + \bar{\nu}_B} + \alpha_{i,B} \frac{\bar{\nu}_B}{\bar{\nu}_A + \bar{\nu}_B}$ [Antón and Polk -JF(2014)]
- $Overlap_{HL}(A,B) = \sum_{i \in I^{A,B}} \alpha_{i,A} \times \sum_{i \in I^{A,B}} \alpha_{i,B}$ [Hansen and Lott -JGQA(1996)] [Freeman-(2019)]
- Unappealing properties
 - Unclear is whether any of these measures represents an economically meaningful measure of common ownership's impact on managerial incentives.
 - Both Overlap_{Count} and Overlap_{AP} are invariant to the decomposition of ownership between the two firms, which leads to some unappealing properties.






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Normalized Rank Transformed for each cross section (Monthly)



Monthly variables

	Dep	endent Varial	ole: Future M	onthly Corre	lation of 4F+	Industry Resid	duals
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
FCA*	0.00476***	0.00394***	0.00373***	0.00105	-0.0000511	-0.000233	0.000322
	(4.88)	(5.16)	(5.04)	(1.23)	(-0.06)	(-0.28)	(0.39)
(FCA*) × SameGroup					0.00839**	0.00910***	0.00889**
					(3.29)	(4.03)	(3.81)
SameGroup				0.0194***	0.0123***	0.0113***	0.00748
				(7.86)	(4.30)	(3.73)	(1.71)
ρ_t		0.124***	0.125***	0.124***	0.124***	0.124***	0.123***
		(4.92)	(4.93)	(4.90)	(4.90)	(4.90)	(4.88)
SameIndustry			0.00187	-0.00386*	-0.00402*	-0.00532**	-0.00502
•			(1.15)	(-2.01)	(-2.06)	(-2.86)	(-2.63)
SameSize						0.0117***	0.0121***
						(4.61)	(4.67)
SameBookToMarket						0.00410	0.00603
						(1.21)	(1.57)
CrossOwnership						0.0154	0.0149
						(1.56)	(1.42)
Observations	249030	248118	248118	248118	248118	248118	248118
Group FE	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
R^2	0.001	0.034	0.034	0.035	0.035	0.036	0.046

t statistics in parentheses




 $^{^{*}}$ $\rho <$ 0.05, ** $\rho <$ 0.01, *** $\rho <$ 0.001


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
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FCA vs. FCAP Distributions

Fortnightly







Summary of Controls

Fortnightly


Type of Pairs	Yes	No
SameIndustry	1142 (11.1%)	9125 (88.9%)
SameGroup	1173 (11.4%)	9094 (88.6%)
ActiveHolder	2819 (27.5%)	7448 (72.5%)

Variable	count	mean	std	min	25%	50%	75%	max
Size1	636641	0.75	0.21	0.01	0.61	0.81	0.93	1
Size2	636641	0.47	0.26	0.00	0.26	0.45	0.67	1.00
SameSize	636641	-0.28	0.22	-0.99	-0.42	-0.24	-0.10	0.00
BookToMarket1	636641	0.52	0.27	0.00	0.31	0.54	0.74	1.00
BookToMarket2	636641	0.50	0.25	0.00	0.29	0.49	0.70	1.00
${\sf SameBookToMarket}$	636641	-0.29	0.21	-1.00	-0.43	-0.25	-0.12	0.00



Future Correlation via FCA

4 Factor + Industry (Fortnightly)




Fortnightly variables


	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
In(FCA)	0.0108***	0.00989***	0.00964***	0.00511***	0.00499***	0.00271***	0.00276***	0.00281***	0.00297***
	(8.48)	(9.12)	(8.81)	(5.15)	(4.95)	(4.12)	(4.07)	(4.16)	(3.78)
$\rho_{-}t$		0.0740***	0.0739***	0.0734***	0.0733***	0.0710***	0.0708***	0.0711***	0.0723***
		(5.50)	(5.49)	(5.44)	(5.44)	(5.36)	(5.34)	(5.36)	(5.39)
ActiveHolder			0.00970***		0.00810***	0.00425*	0.00416*	0.00356	0.00410*
			(6.05)		(5.06)	(2.35)	(2.40)	(1.94)	(2.41)
SameGroup				0.0329***	0.0322***	0.0216***	0.0214***	0.0218***	0.0247***
				(10.98)	(10.80)	(7.32)	(7.29)	(7.47)	(9.32)
SameIndustry						0.0275***	0.0267***	0.0264***	0.0288***
•						(7.00)	(6.73)	(6.55)	(6.45)
Samesize								0.0403***	0.0235***
								(3.53)	(4.35)
SameBookToMarket								0.0127**	0.0146***
								(3.22)	(4.34)
Constant	0.0432***	0.0395***	0.0363***	0.0214***	0.0191***	0.0396**	0.0504**	0.0372***	0.0225***
	(8.14)	(8.73)	(8.10)	(5.32)	(4.71)	(3.13)	(3.20)	(4.04)	(5.91)
Value	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Interaction	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No
N	613875	613875	613875	613875	613875	613875	613875	613875	613875
r2	0.00152	0.0127	0.0131	0.0137	0.0141	0.0184	0.0193	0.0183	0.0164

t statistics in parentheses

^{*} p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Normalized Rank Transformed for each cross section (Fortnightly)





Fortnightly variables


	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
FCA*	0.0124***	-0.00545***	-0.00518***	-0.00450***	-0.00440***	-0.00408**	-0.00537***	-0.00420**	-0.00526***	-0.00448***
	(7.43)	(-3.99)	(-3.90)	(-3.44)	(-3.40)	(-3.19)	(-4.06)	(-3.22)	(-3.98)	(-3.49)
$(FCA^* > Median[FCA^*]) \times FCA^*$		0.0360***	0.0332***	0.0314***	0.0240***	0.0232***	0.0228***	0.0156***	0.0231***	0.0231***
		(9.80)	(10.20)	(9.78)	(8.68)	(8.29)	(9.37)	(5.83)	(9.14)	(8.17)
$\rho_{-}t$			0.0738***	0.0737***	0.0727***	0.0727***	0.0711***	0.0708***	0.0712***	0.0724***
			(5.50)	(5.49)	(5.42)	(5.41)	(5.38)	(5.34)	(5.38)	(5.41)
ActiveHolder				0.00792***		0.00494**	0.00362	0.00322	0.00284	0.00354*
				(4.85)		(2.98)	(1.94)	(1.81)	(1.49)	(2.02)
SameIndustry					0.0363***	0.0357***	0.0315***	0.0261***	0.0303***	0.0339***
,					(8.06)	(7.91)	(7.93)	(6.60)	(7.47)	(7.54)
SameGroup								0.0191***		
								(6.14)		
Samesize									0.0416***	0.0213***
									(3.67)	(3.91)
SameBookToMarket									0.0128**	0.0147***
									(3.24)	(4.36)
Constant	0.0150***	-0.000422	-0.000591	-0.00187	-0.00234	-0.00312*	0.0300*	0.0375*	0.0258**	0.00782***
	(6.31)	(-0.25)	(-0.38)	(-1.19)	(-1.70)	(-2.19)	(2.59)	(2.50)	(3.22)	(3.56)
Value	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Interaction	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No
N	613875	613875	613875	613875	613875	613875	613875	613875	613875	613875
r2	0.00132	0.00208	0.0132	0.0136	0.0149	0.0151	0.0182	0.0196	0.0181	0.0162


t statistics in parentheses



^{*} $\rho <$ 0.05, ** $\rho <$ 0.01, *** $\rho <$ 0.001

Normalized Rank Transformed for each cross section (Fortnightly)





Monthly variables

	(2)
-0.00370**	-0.00472***
(-2.79)	(-3.39)
0.0128***	0.0141***
(4.34)	(5.15)
0.0722***	0.0708***
(5.39)	(5.35)
0.00140	0.000470
(0.73)	(0.22)
0.00338	0.00522
(1.17)	(1.75)
0.0117**	0.0106**
(3.29)	(2.87)
0.0139***	0.0109**
(4.05)	(3.14)
0.00973***	0.0380*
(4.57)	(2.51)
No	Yes
No	Yes
613875	613875
0.0173	0.0202
	0.0128*** (4.34) 0.0722*** (5.39) 0.00140 (0.73) 0.00338 (1.17) 0.0117** (3.29) 0.0139*** (4.05) 0.00973*** Variable (4.57) No No No Oli (13875)


t statistics in parentheses



^{*} p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Future Correlation via FCA*

4 Factor + Industry (by Business Group)



Fortnightly variables for subset of Same Business Group

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
FCA*	0.0183***	-0.0127*	0.0100***	-0.00219	0.00842***	-0.00535
	(7.04)	(-2.13)	(5.21)	(-0.39)	(5.37)	(-0.98)
$(FCA^* > Median[FCA^*]) \times FCA^*$		0.0460***		0.0186*		0.0210*
		(4.63)		(2.08)		(2.53)
ActiveHolder			0.0162***	0.0149**	0.0188***	0.0174***
			(3.41)	(3.07)	(4.00)	(3.61)
SameIndustry			0.0336***	0.0333***	0.0330***	0.0327***
			(7.85)	(7.78)	(7.95)	(7.83)
Samesize			0.0340**	0.0318**		
			(3.17)	(3.03)		
C. D. ITM I.			0.0000+++	0.0005+++		
SameBookToMarket			0.0609***	0.0605***		
			(5.97)	(5.90)		
Constant	0.0344***	0.0149**	0.0399***	0.0314***	0.104***	0.0941***
Constant	(9.76)	(3.01)	(8.38)	(5.53)	(5.71)	(5.16)
Value	No.	No.	No.	No.	Yes	Yes
Interaction	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
N	103914			103914	103914	
**		103914	103914			103914
r2	0.00281	0.00488	0.0390	0.0407	0.0494	0.0511

t statistics in parentheses

^{*} $\rho < 0.05$, ** $\rho < 0.01$, *** $\rho < 0.001$


Fortnightly variables for subset of Different Business Group

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
FCA*	0.00422**	-0.00178	0.00194*	-0.00210	0.00172	-0.00290*
	(3.11)	(-1.37)	(1.98)	(-1.75)	(1.93)	(-2.26)
(FCA*: A4 (' [FCA*]) FCA*		0.01.46+++		0.00006+++		0.0115***
$(FCA^* > Median[FCA^*]) \times FCA^*$		0.0146***		0.00996***		0.0115***
		(4.22)		(3.48)		(3.82)
ActiveHolder			0.000676	0.000186	-0.000437	-0.00102
Activeriolder			(0.48)	(0.13)	(-0.30)	(-0.70)
			(0.40)	(0.13)	(-0.50)	(-0.70)
SameIndustry			0.0238***	0.0231***	0.0211***	0.0202***
•			(4.34)	(4.23)	(4.23)	(4.05)
			(-)	(- /	(- /	()
Samesize			0.0217***	0.0217***		
			(3.94)	(3.94)		
SameBookToMarket			0.00482	0.00477		
			(1.49)	(1.48)		
Constant	0.00831***	0.00285	0.0124***	0.00886***	0.0240	0.0202
	(4.07)	(1.67)	(5.03)	(4.03)	(1.53)	(1.32)
Value	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Interaction	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
N	509961	509961	509961	509961	509961	509961
r2	0.000490	0.000899	0.0120	0.0124	0.0148	0.0152

t statistics in parentheses

^{*} $\rho < 0.05$, ** $\rho < 0.01$, *** $\rho < 0.001$

Normalized Rank Transformed for each cross section (Fortnightly)



Fortnightly variables

	/1)	(0)	(a)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(0)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
FCA*	0.0124***	0.0126***	0.0114***	0.0112***	0.00613***	0.00618***	0.00634***	0.00717***
	(7.43)	(7.54)	(8.09)	(7.90)	(8.02)	(7.89)	(8.12)	(7.01)
FCA*2		0.0109***	0.0101***	0.00959***	0.00697***	0.00700***	0.00701***	0.00710***
		(10.30)	(10.52)	(10.08)	(9.59)	(9.97)	(9.37)	(8.49)
ρ_t			0.0737***	0.0736***	0.0711***	0.0709***	0.0712***	0.0724***
			(5.49)	(5.48)	(5.37)	(5.36)	(5.38)	(5.41)
ActiveHolder				0.00761***	0.00345	0.00331	0.00267	0.00336
				(4.62)	(1.84)	(1.84)	(1.40)	(1.90)
SameIndustry					0.0310***	0.0301***	0.0299***	0.0334***
-					(7.85)	(7.57)	(7.40)	(7.46)
Samesize							0.0416***	0.0214***
							(3.66)	(3.91)
SameBookToMarket							0.0126**	0.0146***
							(3.19)	(4.29)
Constant	0.0150***	0.00429*	0.00372*	0.00224	0.0330**	0.0428**	0.0288***	0.0108***
	(6.31)	(2.35)	(2.24)	(1.35)	(2.82)	(2.85)	(3.52)	(4.76)
Value	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Interaction	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No
N	613875	613875	613875	613875	613875	613875	613875	613875
r2	0.00132	0.00215	0.0133	0.0136	0.0183	0.0191	0.0182	0.0162

t statistics in parentheses

^{*} p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

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Model Estimation

Normalized Rank-Transformed

	Dependent	Variable:Futu	re Monthly	Correlation o	f 4F+Indust	ry Residuals
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
FCA*	0.00486***	0.00413***	0.00132	0.000275	0.000407	0.000219
	(5.38)	(5.52)	(1.43)	(0.27)	(0.41)	(0.22)
ρ_t		0.127***	0.126***	0.126***	0.126***	0.126***
		(5.01)	(4.98)	(4.98)	(4.98)	(4.97)
SameGroup			0.0174***	0.0111***	0.0123***	0.0129***
			(6.97)	(4.51)	(4.93)	(5.19)
$(FCA^*) \times SameGroup$				0.00764**	0.00776**	0.00756**
, ,				(3.21)	(3.21)	(3.11)
SameIndustry					-0.00384	-0.00484*
•					(-1.85)	(-2.28)
SameSize						0.0116***
SameSize						(5.96)
SameBookToMarket						0.00488
Same Book Tolvial Ret						(1.55)
Constant	0.00583***	0.00515***	0.00233**	0.00214**	0.00249**	0.00715***
Constant	(6.90)	(6.71)	(2.99)	(2.73)	(3.29)	(5.92)
Observations	254640	253828	253828	253828	253828	253828
R ²	0.000	0.034	0.035	0.035	0.036	0.036
	0.000	0.034	0.033	0.033	0.030	0.030

t statistics in parentheses

^{*} $\rho < 0.05$, ** $\rho < 0.01$, *** $\rho < 0.001$

Discontinuity

	Dependent	Variable:Futu	re Monthly C	orrelation of 4	F+Industry Residuals
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
FCA*	0.00486***	0.0000346	-0.0000865	-0.000440	-0.000462
	(5.38)	(0.03)	(-0.08)	(-0.42)	(-0.44)
$(FCA^* > Q3[FCA^*]) \times FCA^*$		0.0109***	0.00956***	0.00464*	0.00456*
		(5.40)	(5.00)	(2.26)	(2.24)
$\rho_{-}t$			0.126***	0.126***	0.126***
,			(5.00)	(4.98)	(4.98)
SameGroup				0.0156***	0.0175***
•				(5.92)	(6.04)
SameIndustry					-0.00509*
,					(-2.51)
SameSize					0.0115***
					(5.83)
SameBookToMarket					0.00475
					(1.51)
Constant	0.00583***	0.00228*	0.00205*	0.00112	0.00610***
	(6.90)	(2.35)	(2.34)	(1.28)	(4.19)
Observations	254640	254640	253828	253828	253828
R^2	0.000	0.001	0.035	0.035	0.036

t statistics in parentheses

^{*} p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Discontinuity & Business Groups

		Future N	Nonthly Corr	elation of 4F	+Industry	Residuals	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
FCA*	-0.000462	0.000219	0.000262	-0.000639	0.000229	-0.000227	-0.000309
	(-0.44)	(0.22)	(0.27)	(-0.62)	(0.23)	(-0.22)	(-0.32)
$(FCA^* > Q3[FCA^*]) \times FCA^*$	0.00456*			0.00267		0.00158	0.00169
	(2.24)			(1.06)		(0.58)	(0.64)
$(FCA^*) \times SameGroup$		0.00756**		0.00652*	0.000306		0.000852
		(3.11)		(2.22)	(0.07)		(0.19)
$(FCA^* > Q3[FCA^*]) \times (FCA^*) \times SameGrouop$			0.0107***		0.0106	0.00964*	0.00894
			(3.68)		(1.93)	(2.53)	(1.65)
Observations	253828	253828	253828	253828	253828	253828	253828
R^2	0.036	0.036	0.036	0.036	0.036	0.036	0.037

t statistics in parentheses

^{*} $\rho < 0.05$, ** $\rho < 0.01$, *** $\rho < 0.001$