Resource Reallocation with Carbon Emission Policies

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Motivation

- Climate crisis intensifies: rising temperatures, extreme weather.

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- Key policies: carbon pricing, renewable subsidies to curb emissions.
- Economic impacts:
  - Limitation in fossil fuel usage.
  - Adoption of renewable technologies.

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- Economic impacts:
  - ■ Limitation in fossil fuel usage.
  - ■ Adoption of renewable technologies.
  - ■ **Reallocation of resources to greener firms/industries.**

- **What is the Economic Outcomes of environmental policies due to resources reallocation?**
    - Industry output
    - Firm-level productivity
    - Sector size
    - Emission intensity
    - Total Emission

- Effectiveness of Carbon policies
  - Contribution: **Quantify substitution between green and brown capital**
    (Martinsson et al., 2024; Shapiro and Walker, 2018; Ahmadi, Yamazaki, and Kabore, 2022; Andersson, 2019)

Literature and Contribution

- Effectiveness of Carbon policies
  - Contribution: **Quantify substitution between green and brown capital**
    (Martinsson et al., 2024; Shapiro and Walker, 2018; Ahmadi, Yamazaki, and Kabore, 2022; Andersson, 2019)
- Misallocation
  - Contribution: **Misallocation (Reallocation) in the context of environmental policies**
    (Whited and Zhao, 2021; Hsieh and Klenow, 2009; Ai, Li, and Yang, 2020; Asker, Collard-Wexler, and De Loecker, 2014)

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- Climate Policy Design
  - Contribution: **Assess alternative instruments in Emission Intensity / resource reallocation**
    Acemoglu, Gancia, and Zilibotti (2012); Acemoglu et al. (2016); Oehmke and Opp (2023)

Road map

1. Develop Economic model with Emission
2. Characterize the allocation of resources
3. Estimate the model by Swedish data
4. Compare the optimal Policy with resource reallocation
5. Discuss the cost of the environmental policies

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Standard Framework
Hsieh and Klenow (2009)

- Heterogeneous monopolistic competitive firms
- Partial equilibrium
- Cobb-Douglas Production function
- CES aggregator for output
- Normal aggregation of emissions

$$Y_{si} = \hat{A}_{si} \hat{K}_{si}{}^{\beta_s} L_{si}^{1-\beta_s}$$

- $\hat{A}_{si}$: total factor of productivity

Firm's profit

$$Y_{si} = \hat{A}_{si} \hat{K}_{si}^{\beta_s} L_{si}^{1-\beta_s} \quad , \qquad \hat{K} = (\alpha_s G_{si}^{\frac{\gamma_s-1}{\gamma_s}} + (1-\alpha_s) B_{si}^{\frac{\gamma_s-1}{\gamma_s}})^{\frac{\gamma_s}{\gamma_s-1}}$$

$$E_{si} = \tilde{A}_{si} B_{si}$$

Emission General Model

- $\hat{A}_{si}$: total factor of productivity
- α_s: importance of Green capital in the production
- γ_s: elasticity of substitution between Green and Brown capital
- $\tilde{A}_{si}$: emission inefficiency
- Firms maximize over G, B, and L

Firm's profit

Estimation / Calibration

- I just reasonably calibrate the model to match the summary statistics of Martinsson et al. (2024)

Parameter	Value	Source/Moment
Panel A: Estimated Value		
γ	10.34	$\Delta(\frac{E}{PY})/\Delta(\frac{C}{PY})$
$\tilde{A}$	0.018	E/PY
Panel B: Inputs		
σ	∞	Fully competitive
r	5%	-
w	500 TSEK	-
L	250 (sd = 900)	Martinsson et al. (2024)
Panel C: Calibrated Value		
β_s	0.6	Martinsson et al. (2024)
α_s	0.25	G/B, Wiedemann (2023)

Sensitivity of α

Future Steps

1. Develop Economic model with Emission
   - Firms could R&D
   - Add Household and Government
   - Firms could enter and exit the market
2. Characterize the allocation of resources
3. Provide a definition of Green and Brown capital
4. Estimate the model by Swedish data
5. Compare the optimal Policy with resource reallocation
6. Discuss the cost of the environmental policies

Thank you!

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Emission General Model

- The firm's emission is:

$$E_{si} = \tilde{A}_{si} \tilde{K}_{si}^{\theta_s} L_{si}^{1-\theta_s} \quad , \qquad \tilde{K} = (\mu_s G_{si}^{\frac{\eta_s-1}{\eta_s}} + (1-\mu_s) B_{si}^{\frac{\eta_s-1}{\eta_s}})^{\frac{\eta_s}{\eta_s-1}}$$

- The nominal profit for firms:

$$\pi_{si} = (1 + \tau_{si}^p) P_{si} Y_{si} - \left(\left[(1 + \tau_{G_{si}}) r_{si}^G G_{si} + (1 + \tau_{B_{si}}) r_{si}^B B_{si} + (1 + \tau_{l_{si}}) w_{si} l_{si} \right] + \tau_E E_{si} \right)$$

Back

- The nominal profit for firms:

$$\pi_{si} = (1 + \tau_s^p)P_{si}Y_{si}$$

- where
  - τ_s^p is the tax / Demand preference for the firm

Firm's profit

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  - τ_s^G is the Green capital subsidy / ESG preference of Financier

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  - τ_s^W is the Labor market preference to work in the green/brown sector (Krueger, Metzger, and Wu, 2023)

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  - τ_s^W is the Labor market preference to work in the green/brown sector (Krueger, Metzger, and Wu, 2023)
- The firm chooses the optimal capital and labor to minimize the cost of production and then chooses the price level to maximize the profit

Back

$$\max_{G_{si}, B_{si}, L_{si}} \quad -Cost \quad \text{s.t.} \quad \hat{A}_{si} \hat{K}_{si}^{\beta_s} L_{si}^{1-\beta_s} = \bar{Y}_{si}$$

General Model Solution

$$\max_{G_{si}, B_{si}, L_{si}} \quad -Cost \quad \text{s.t.} \quad \hat{A}_{si} \hat{K}_{si}^{\beta_s} L_{si}^{1-\beta_s} = \bar{Y}_{si}$$

$$\frac{G_{si}}{B_{si}} = z_{si}^k$$

General Model Solution

$$\max_{G_{si}, B_{si}, L_{si}} \quad -Cost \quad \text{s.t.} \quad \hat{A}_{si}\hat{K}_{si}^{\beta_s}L_{si}^{1-\beta_s} = \bar{Y}_{si}$$

$$\frac{G_{si}}{B_{si}} = z_{si}^k = \left(\frac{\alpha_s}{1-\alpha_s}\frac{(1+\tau_s^B)r_s + \tau_s^E\tilde{A}}{(1+\tau_s^G)r_s}\right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma_s}}$$

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General Model Solution

Firm Decision

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$$E_{si} = \frac{\tilde{A}_{si}}{\hat{A}_{si}} \left(\alpha_s z_{si}^{k\,\gamma_s-1} + (1-\alpha_s) \right)^{\frac{\gamma_s}{1-\gamma_s}} z_{si}^{l\,1-\beta} \bar{Y}_{si}$$

Firm Decision

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General Model Solution

Firm Decision

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$$E_{si} = \frac{\tilde{A}_{si}}{\hat{A}_{si}} \left(\alpha_s z_{si}^{k\,\gamma_s-1} + (1-\alpha_s) \right)^{\frac{\gamma_s}{1-\gamma_s}} z_{si}^{l\,1-\beta} \bar{Y}_{si} = \psi_{si} \bar{Y}_{si}$$

- Firm will then charge markup over the marginal cost

General Model Solution

$$\max \quad -Cost \quad \text{s.t.} \qquad \hat{A}_{si}\hat{K}_{si}^{\beta_s}L_{si}^{1-\beta_s} = \bar{Y}_{si}$$

$$z_{si}^k \equiv \frac{G_{si}}{B_{si}} = \left[\frac{\alpha_s}{1-\alpha_s}\frac{\frac{\partial}{\partial B}Cost_{si}}{\frac{\partial}{\partial G}Cost_{si}}\right]^{\gamma_s}$$

$$z_{si}^l \equiv \frac{L_{si}}{\hat{K}_{si}} = \frac{1-\beta_s}{\beta_s}\frac{1}{1-\alpha_s}(\alpha_s z_{si}^{k(\gamma_s-1)} + (1-\alpha_s))^{\frac{1}{1-\gamma_s}}\frac{\frac{\partial}{\partial B}Cost_{si}}{\frac{\partial}{\partial L}Cost_{si}}$$

$$= \frac{1-\beta_s}{\beta_s}\frac{1}{\alpha_s}(\alpha_s + (1-\alpha_s)z_{si}^{k(1-\gamma_s)})^{\frac{1}{1-\gamma_s}}\frac{\frac{\partial}{\partial G}Cost_{si}}{\frac{\partial}{\partial L}Cost_{si}}$$

$$E_{si} = \frac{\tilde{A}_{si}}{\hat{A}_{si}}(\frac{\phi_{si}}{z_{si}^l})^{\theta_s}z_{si}^{l\ \beta_s}\bar{Y}_{si} = \psi_{si}\bar{Y}_{si}, \quad \text{where} \quad \phi_{si} = \frac{(\mu_s + (1-\mu_s)z_{si}^{k(1-\eta_s)})^{\frac{\eta_s}{\eta_s-1}}}{(\alpha_s + (1-\alpha_s)z_{si}^{k(1-\gamma_s)})^{\frac{\gamma_s}{\gamma_s-1}}}$$

Model
Optimal firm level price

- Now Firm need to choose the price level to maximize the profit:

$$\max_{P_{si}} \quad \pi_{si} = P_{si}F_{si} - C_{si}F_{si}$$

- Firm-level real output is a function of the sector price, firm price, and sector real output (i.e. $F_{si} = (\frac{P_s}{P_{si}})^{\sigma_s} F_s$)

- Therefore, because the optimal ratio does not depend on the price, the ratio can be maximized out of the problem of the optimal determination of the price, leaving the firm's real output as just a function of price

$$P_{si} = \frac{1}{1 + \tau_{si}^p} \frac{\sigma_s}{\sigma_s - 1} C_{si}$$

Estimation / Calibration

- My goal is to estimate the parameters sector by sector for Sweden
- I just reasonably calibrate the model to match the summary statistics of Martinsson et al. (2024)

Parameter	Value	Source/Moment
	Panel A: Inputs	
σ	∞	Fully competitive
r	5%	-
w	500 TSEK	-
L	250 (sd = 900)	Martinsson et al. (2024)
	Panel B: Calibrated Value	
β_s	0.6	Martinsson et al. (2024)
α_s	0.25	G/B, Wiedemann (2023)
	Panel C: Estimated Value	
γ	10.34	$\Delta(\frac{E}{PY})/\Delta(\frac{C}{PY})$
$\tilde{A}$	0.018	E/PY

# Sensitivity analysis

Production vs Emission with different Carbon Tax on different α and γ

Carbon Intensity and Tax

Counterfactual

- Now, we need to find the optimal allocation of resources in the economy under two scenarios:

Back

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$$\hat{L}_{si} = \frac{\hat{A}_{si}^{\sigma-1}}{\sum_j \hat{A}_{sj}^{\sigma-1}} L_s$$

$$\hat{G}_{si} = \frac{\hat{A}_{si}^{\sigma-1}}{\sum_j \hat{A}_{sj}^{\sigma-1}} \frac{z_s^k}{1 + z_s^k} K_s$$

$$\hat{B}_{si} = \frac{\hat{A}_{si}^{\sigma-1}}{\sum_j \hat{A}_{sj}^{\sigma-1}} \frac{1}{1 + z_s^k} K_s$$

Back

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$$\hat{B}_{si} = \frac{\hat{A}_{si}^{\sigma-1}}{\sum_j \hat{A}_{sj}^{\sigma-1}} \frac{1}{1 + z_s^k} K_s$$

$$\tilde{L}_{si} = \frac{\hat{A}_{si}^{\sigma-1}/\tilde{A}_{si}^{\sigma}}{\sum_j \hat{A}_{sj}^{\sigma-1}/\tilde{A}_{sj}^{\sigma}} L_s$$

Back

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$$\hat{G}_{si} = \frac{\hat{A}_{si}^{\sigma-1}}{\sum_j \hat{A}_{sj}^{\sigma-1}} \frac{z_s^k}{1+z_s^k} K_s$$

$$\hat{G}_{si} = \frac{\hat{A}_{si}^{\sigma-1}/\tilde{A}_{si}^{\sigma}}{\sum_j \hat{A}_{sj}^{\sigma-1}/\tilde{A}_{sj}^{\sigma}} \frac{z_s^k}{1+z_s^k} K_s$$

$$\hat{B}_{si} = \frac{\hat{A}_{si}^{\sigma-1}}{\sum_j \hat{A}_{sj}^{\sigma-1}} \frac{1}{1+z_s^k} K_s$$

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Back