ANIL BARAN RAY

Communal Attitudes to British Policy: The Case of the Partition of Bengal 1905

BENGAL was partitioned in 1905, the scheme of partition, as devised by the British government of India, was denounced by the Hindu community of Bengal and supported by the Muslim community. This paper attempts to examine the reasons behind the conflicting attitudes adopted towards the partition by the different communities—Hindu, Muslim and British.

According to the British government the principal motive for the partition was that of administrative convenience. Bengal, with a population of seventy-eight million and an area of 189,000 square miles (Bihar, Chota Nagpur and Orissa being included in it) was too large a province to be efficiently administered. Therefore, when in 1903, A H L Fraser, the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, proposed that the Dacca and Mymensingh districts should be separated from Bengal and transferred to Assam, Lord Curzon readily agreed with him. Fraser's motive was, of course, not purely administrative. It was political, too. Dacca and Mymensingh districts should be separated from Bengal, he pointed out to Curzon, because these two were "the hotbed of the purely Bengali movement, unfriendly if not seditious in character, and dominating the whole tone of Bengali administration."[1] Curzon agreed with Fraser's assessment and proposed to relieve Bengal of its "elements of weakness

and dissension". At the same time, the transfer of these parts of Bengal to Assam, he believed, would result in the reinvigoration of the so far neglected Assam. Thus, from the government's point of view, the two main objects of the partition were the relief of Bengal and the reinvigoration of Assam.

Lord Curzon's original scheme for the partition published in the Gazette of India on December 12, 1903, proposed to transfer the Chittagong Division, Dacca and Mymensingh districts and Hill Tippera to Assam, and Chota Nagpur to the central provinces. It proposed to compensate Bengal to some extent by adding some Oriya-speaking areas from Madras and the Central Provinces to Bengal. This scheme, if carried out, would have relieved the Bengal government of the burden of administering eleven million people. The scheme, however, aroused the anger of the Hindu community of Bengal and drew no support from the Muslim community. Further, the scheme was unacceptable to the Muslims of the Eastern part of Bengal because they feared that the government wanted to turn them into Assamese.[2]

Curzon's Strategy

Curzon obviously had no doubt in his mind that his partition scheme would meet with the opposition of the Hindus of Bengal. But the government could not afford to be alienated from both the communities - Hindus and Muslims. If one was angry, the other's support must be sought, if necessary, by modifying the partition scheme. With this object in view, Curzon undertook a tour of the Muslim majority districts of Eastern Bengal in February 1904. During his visit to Dacca, he openly hinted that he was thinking of creating a new province out of Bengal whose capital would be Dacca which he emphasized, "would invest the Mohamedans in Eastern Bengal with a unity which they have not enjoyed since the days of old Musalman Viceroys and Kings"[3]. He also made it understood that Assam would be "an adjunct rather than the most prominent feature".[4] Lord Curzon was thus able to allay the Muslim suspicion and win over the Nawab of Dacca, the leader of Muslims, to the cause of partition.[5]

Assured of Muslim support, Curzon decided to ignore the Hindu opposition and took the firm decision of creating a new province of Eastern Bengal and Assam, almost equal in size to that of Bengal, by drawing a new boundary line through central Bengal. A larger area than proposed in the original scheme was transferred to the new province with its capital at Dacca.[6]

This raises doubts regarding the British claim that their intention was purely one of ensuring administrative efficiency. Such efficiency would have been ensured by accepting either of the two alternative proposals suggested by the nationalist Hindu leaders of Bengal. The first recommended the separation of non-Bengali areas such as Orissa, Chota Nagpur

and Bihar from Bengal, instead of the division of the Bengali-speaking areas; and the second suggested that Bengal could be given a governor with a Council in order to lighten the burden of administration.[7] In revoking the partition of Bengal in 1911, the British government acted on the first proposal of the nationalist leaders. But in 1905 it could not accept either of these two proposals because its motive was not purely administrative. It wanted, in addition, to weaken the political integration achieved by the Hindu politicians of Bengal by distributing them between the two provinces[8] and also to reduce the influence of Calcutta over the rest of Bengal, which it considered disproportionate. It was not to the liking of the governments of India and Bengal that the mandate of Calcutta should be echoed all over Bengal. A dislike which they phrased in philosophical terms as follows:

> It cannot be for the lasting good of any country or any people that public opinion or what passes for it should be manufactured by a comparatively small number of people at a single center and should be disseminated thence for universal adoption, all other views being discouraged or suppressed.[9]

They, therefore, wanted to establish local centres of independent opinion by giving a majority to the Muslims in the new eastern province and to Biharis and Oriyas in the west. Thus, the motives behind British policy were quite practical : to divide the Hindu politicians and also to divide the Muslims and the Hindus.

It would, of course, be unfair and partisan to say that Curzon had modified his original scheme for partition and decided to create a new province of Eastern Bengal only to purchase Muslim support for his policies. He was also actuated by a desire to bring about some improvement in the miserable administration of Eastern Bengal which had been neglected since the beginning of British rule and in which, as Lovat Fraser, the biographer of Curzon, points out, "Crime was rife, the peasantry were crushed beneath the exactions of absentee landlords, the police system was feeble, education a mere shadow, and internal communications disagreeably inadequate." All this could happen, because "the old government was engrossed" with Calcutta and the surrounding areas where they were spending practically the whole revenues of Bengal.[10] The need for administrative reform in Eastern Bengal was genuine, no doubt; but as Hardinge confessed in his letter to Crewe, the Secretary of State, "The desire to aim a blow at the Bengalis (he meant the Bengali Hindus) overcame other considerations in giving effect to that laudable object".[11] Hardinge felt that a grave injustice had been done to the Bengali Hindus whom the partition had left in a minority in both the provinces (Bengal, and Eastern Bengal and Assam). In the Legislative Council of Bengal, the Bengali Hindus were outnumbered by the Biharis and Oriyas and in Eastern Bengal, they were outnumbered by the Muslims and Assamese.

The Attitude of the Home Government

What was the attitude of the Secretary of State or, so to say, the Home Government to the Curzon scheme for the partition of Bengal? There are reasons to believe that the Home Government did not like it. The Secretary of State, Brodrick, suggested a short postponement of the partition in view of the tremendous agitation against it. Curzon pleaded that "if any concessions were made at the eleventh hour to such an agitation, it would at once assume a serious character; the Government of India would forfeit the respect of all classes and a premium would be placed on similar tactics in the future."[12] Finally, Brodrick reluctantly agreed to push the Bill through the Council only because of, he wrote to Curzon, "the strong view you have taken upon this".[13] Brodrick did not consider the agitation against partition unnatural. Nor did he believe that the agitation against the partition was "organized by a small and disloyal faction on anti-British lines."[14] One could easily perceive a sympathetic tone from his dispatch on the partition dated, June 9, 1905:

> That a large and upon the whole homogeneous community of forty-one and a half millions, with Calcutta as their centre of culture and political and commercial life, should object to the transfer of three-fifths of their number to a new administration with a distant capital, involving the severance of old and historic ties and the breaking up of racial unity, appears to me in no way surprising.[15]

We get a further inkling of Brodrick's mind from the telegram he sent to Curzon on August 16,1905 in accepting his resignation. The opening words of the telegram were as follows:

> I have learned your decision to resign with very deep regret. Throughout your administration, since your appointment as Governor-General in 1898, my colleagues and I have endeavoured to give you constant support in the many measures of administrative reform which you have initiated, including the partition of Bengal, upon which we recently adopted your proposals.[16]

Brodrick's emphasis upon "including the partition of Bengal" was interpreted in Bengal "as a specific and public indication that the Home Government was not at one with Lord Curzon about the partition".[17] The belief of the Bengali Hindus that the Home Government was sympathetic with their cause undoubtedly led them to intensify the agitation. Thus Fraser, the biographer of Curzon, bitterly complains, "By far the most serious and potent influences which fermented and kept alive the agitation against the partition of Bengal came from England."[18]

A far more vociferous critic of Curzon's partition of Bengal was the Prince of Wales who after his visit to India in 1905-06 became convinced that it was a grave wrong. In fact, he was so bitter about it that he said to Charles Hardinge that "Curzon had never done a single thing right in India."[19] No wonder that the Prince of Wales as King George V, annulled the partition of Bengal in 1911 and thus satisfied the uneasy

conscience of the Home Government in this connection.

Needless to say, the British non-officials in Bengal, as a community, had full support in what their government did. There is therefore, no point in discussing separately their attitude to the partition question.

Origins of Hindu Dissent

In the opinion of most Hindus, Lord Curzon might have been a strong administrator but he lacked the vision of a statesman. He was in the habit of riding roughshod over Indian opinion. A dictator by temperament, he never learned to use power by suggestion and never cared to enlist popular support for his policies. He tried to extend government control over municipalities and universities at a time when nationalist sentiment was opposed to that. For instance, in the case of the Municipality Act (1898) by establishing government control over the Calcutta Corporation, he so antagonised Surendranath Banerjea, the then undisputed Hindu leader of the Bengalis, that Banerjea led "twenty-eight Indian members out of the Calcutta Corporation with an oath never to return until the non-official control was restored."[20] Similarly, Curzon's Universities Act (1904) stipulated that the government would appoint Vice Chancellors and had necessarily to approve the appointment of lecturers and professors. The Act made education restrictive and expensive. In so doing, it aroused the universal condemnatian of teachers, students and the people at large. "University reform", say Thompson and Garratt, "cannot be effective in an atmosphere of suspicion and resentment, and everyone combined to make the new Act inoperative".[21]

To such bitterness and resentment, Curzon added hostility by making offhand comments about the character of the oriental people. P G Ray writes:

> He (Curzon) took the Bengali people by storm, at a convocation of the University of Calcutta (February 11,1905), by a sweeping indictment of their love for vile flattery and disregard for truth. In proceeding to elaborate his proposition, Lord Curzon laid considerable emphasis on the fact that the highest ideal of truth was to a larte extent a Western conception, and that the Easterners more often than not paid vicarious homage to truth through tortuous and diplomatic ways.[22]

Thus Lord Curzon was a reactionary dictator and his administration "gall and worm-wood" in the eyes of the Hindus of Bengal. It is, therefore, natural that the Hindus reacted strongly to the division of Bengal into two provinces.

The Response of the Hindus

The partition was regarded by the Hindus as a deliberate attack on the Bengali 'nation' united by a common history, language and

race. It was regarded "as a national calamity, in the sense that it would alienate Hindus and Mohamedans, interfere with the solidarity of the Bengali-speaking population, and weaken their political influence"[23] The Hindu leaders of Bengal accused the British government of following a "divide and rule" policy, of playing one community off against the other. Apart from the emotional factors, there were some practical reasons which inspired the Hindu opposition to the partition of Bengal. In the government's open dislike for the predominance of Calcutta, the Hindu leaders saw a desire to punish Calcutta and its citizens for the prominent part they had played in the Congress.[24] On the other hand, the division of Bengal affected some professional and commercial interests. Thus the lawyers of Calcutta were disturbed at the prospect of the establishment of a separate high court in Dacca and the business interests were vexed at the reduction of the size of their market. Such elements were agitated at the partition of Bengal for practical reasons.

Far from weakening the unity of the Hindu politicians of Bengal, Lord Curzon, through the partition, strengthened their unity more than ever before and consolidated their opposition to British rule. In the first stage of the agitation against the partition scheme, starting in December, 1903, Surendranath Banerjea, the leader of the movement "used the same weapons he had employed in opposing Curzon's earlier measures—press articles, public meetings of protest, petitions, and deputations—and he had the same lack of success in deflecting the British from their purposes."[25]

Boycott as a Weapon

Realizing the inadequacy of his methods by early 1905, Surendranath now looked for a more effective weapon to exert pressure upon the British government and he found it in the boycott. "Who first conceived the idea of a boycott of British goods" Surendranath writes in his autobiography, "I cannot say — by several, I think, at one and the same time. It first found expression at a public meeting in the district of Pabna, and it was repeated at public meetings held in other Mofussil towns; and the successful boycott of American goods by the Chinese was proclaimed throughout Asia and reproduced in Indian newspapers".[26]

Boycott was a double-edged weapon. On the one hand, it would hurt the economic interests of the British and on the other it would promote the development of indigenous industries by increasing the demand for home production. The boycott and *Swadeshi* were thus recognized as, sources of power and wealth. "We recognized that boycott of foreign goods", wrote Rabindranath Tagore, "was a means for strengthening us not a mere instrument for annoying others."[27] *Swadeshi* was, of course, no new thing to Bengal. As early as 1867, the Hindu Mela was started, mainly through the initiative of the Tagore family, with the following

objectives: "The manufacture and use of indigenous products, encouragment to the growth and use of national language, and the development of the physique of the nation's manhood for a persistent struggle against foreign domination."[28]

The boycott and *Swadeshi* movement created a spirit of sacrifice among the Hindus of Bengal. They would purchase inferior home-made goods at a higher price than the British goods. New industries were founded, Swadeshi stores were opened and educational institutions for imparting national education were established. Most of them failed due to lack of experience. But people now had developed a new sense, a realization that, however difficult it might be, there was no alternative to building up their own strength.

Countervailing Measures

Initially, the British government did not take the boycott and *Swadeshi* movement seriously, hoping that it would collapse over time. But as the movement gained momentum, they responded with repressive measures such as the prohibition of picketing, ban on meetings, censorship of the press, passing of severe sentences, and so on.

How was the reaction of the non-official British community? We have it on the authority of Surendranath Banerjea that the intial reaction of the European press to the boycott resolution was not hostile. "All that the *Englishmen* newspaper said about it was that 'the policy of boycott must considerably embitter the controversy if it is successful; while in the opposite event it will render the movement and its supporters absurd'. The *Statesman* was inclined to ridicule the whole movement, but there was not a trace of any resentment on the ground that an anti-British agitation had been inaugurated".[28] The tone of the British newspapers, of course, soon changed as the movement intensified and they joined the government and non-official British public in condemning the boycott movement.

The refusal of the British government to budge an inch from their stand discredited the Constitutionalist politicians such as Surendranath Banerjea and Gopal Krishan Gokhale. They were moderates. They were regarded as too pacifist and too cautious by the extremists among the Congressmen such as Bipin Chandra Pal of Bengal, Tilak of Maharashtra and Lajpat Rai of Punjab who pointed out that good government is no substitute for self-government and proclaimed *Swaraj* as the goal of India. The boycott and *Swadeshi* were only the means to that end. The two groups differed not only in their attitude to self-government but also in their interpretation of boycott. Surendranath and Gokhale looked upon the boycott as an economic weapon to be used temporarily against the British government until the injustice was undone, that is, the partition was revoked. Thus, "The boycott was a temporary measure adopted for a particular object, and was to be given up as soon as that

object was attained,"[29] Surendranath writes. With the extremists, it was not to be so. For them, boycott was not only an economic weapon but also a political weapon. It was not to be discarded with the attainment of a particular object; it was to be continued. In the words of Bipin Chandra:

> It is a movement of the determination of the people not only to save the industries of the nation but also to create those forces in our community which...will work out the problem of Swaraj.... In this boycott and by this boycott, we propose to create in the people a consciousness of the Pararaj on the one hand, and the desire for Swaraj on the other. It is by the assertion of the determination of the people against the despotism of the government, within absolutely legal bounds, we can hope to kill the Maya that has overcome us. And that is the end of boycott politically. By it we shall reduce the government to the pound-of-flesh rule.[30]

The divergence of attitudes and difference of methods led the two groups to a clash in the 1907 Surat Session of the Congress resulting in the division of the Congress into two parties — Moderates and Extremists. "The most celebrated casualty of the Bengal Partition," Broomfield observes, "was the unity of the Indian National Congress."[31]

Rise of Political Terrorism

The failure of the boycott movement to produce any effect on the British government led a section of the Bengali youth to resort to political terrorism. They borrowed their method from Europe, especially from Ireland where shooting had long been recognized as a legitimate political weapon in the fight against an unpopular government. They drew their inspiration from the Gita—its philosophy of selfless action—and also from the writings of Bankim Chandra, Vivekananda and Aurobindo. The writings of Bankim Chandra and Vivekananda kindled in them "a kind of military courage and selfless service for the *daridra narayan* and for the motherland."[32] Following the teachings of Aurobindo, they conceived the motherland as the Goddess Kali and believed that supreme sacrifice for the motherland was a religious duty.

What was the reason for the rise of political terrorism in Bengal? We shall first cite the opinion of some British administrators. Most British administrators regarded terrorism as a law and order problem to be stamped out by repressive measures. That was the view of Lord Craddock the Home Member in the Viceory Lord Hardinge's Executive Council, who believed that terrorism was the product of some disease inherent in Bengali society. That was also the view of Lord Ronaldshay who believed that terrorism was a product of the cultural reaction of Indians against European institutions and values. Men like Carmichael, the Governor of Bengal, and his Executive Councillor, Lyon, on the other hand, believed that the roots of terrorism lay in the nationalist

feeling and in the frustrated ambition of terrorists for political freedom. They believed that it was a political problem, not simply a law and order problem and that one way to remove the cause of terrorism was to introduce administrative reform and make concessions to the Indians.

Revolutionary terrorism was undoubtedly an outgrowth of the partition of Bengal and the repressive measures which followed it. "The forces of disorder", Surendranath wrote, "had been let loose, and by the authorities themselves, in a great and newly constituted province. The popular faith in constitutional methods was shaken; and young and ardent spirits, writhen under disappointment, but eager to serve their country, were led into the dangerous paths of lawlessness and violence, unrestrained by their elders."[33] Tagore, too, held that revolutionary terrorism in Bengal was due to the "provocative acts" of the British authorities. Instead of removing the cause of grievance and soothing the natural reaction of the people against the partition of Bengal, the authorities adopted more and more repressive measures. In the words of Tagore: "They (the British government) sought to still the waves raised by their own blows by beating the waters more violently. Such conduct may indicate their power but does not prove them to be wise rulers".[34] Both Surendranath and Tagore believed that a murder is a murder from whatever motives it is committed and that extremism does not pay in the long run. They had little belief in the efficacy of terrorist methods, nor did they approve of it and yet they could not but admire the terrorists who were second to none in their love for the motherland. Thus, Tagore wrote: "They (the terrorists) cast themselves as a sacrifice into the fire they had lighted and, on that account, deserve salutation not from us alone but from all the world".[35]

The Bengali Hindu community, in general, worshipped the terrorists as heroes for another psychological reason; they were removing the stigma of effiminacy attributed to the Bengalis by persons like T B Macauley and John Strachey. Macauley wrote: "The physical organization of the Bengali is feeble even to effiminacy...His mind bears a singular analogy to his body. It is weak even to helplessness for purposes of manly resistance".[36] In a similar vein, John Strachey wrote:

> Bengal is the only country in the world where you can find a great population among whom personal cowardice is looked upon as in no way disgraceful... It is for such reasons that Englishmen who know Bengal, and the extraordinary effiminacy of its people, find it difficult to treat seriously many of the political declamations in which English speaking Bengalis are often fond of indulging.[37]

The "blood deeds" of the Bengal terrorists were conceived as an answer to the "charge of nationol impotence". Susanne H Rudolph comments, "Indeed, there seems to have been some perverse historical dialectic in violent Bengali nationalism as though the young men of Calcutta were saying 'No' to Macauley's and Strachey's assertions of

their physical ineffectualities".[38] The terrorist activities of the Bengal revolutionaries thus satisfied a deep psychological need of their personality and for the same reason, it was highly gratifying to the Bengali Hindus in general.

Attitude of the Muslim Community

Terrorism failed to enlist any support from Bengali Muslims There were social, economic, and religious reasons for this. The leaders of the movement were Hindu by religion. Their glorification of the Hindu past of India and especially the terrorists' worship of the motherland as the Goddess Kali alienated the anti-idolatrous Muslims. Socially and economically, terrorists belonged to the middle class while the Muslims were mostly poor peasants. Educated as terrorists were, they failed to bridge the gap separating them from the uneducated masses, again mostly Muslim. They were essentially *bhadraloks* aristocratic in their outlook and did not care for politicizing the masses, the *chhotaloks*. Nor were they bothered about the social revolution. Political emancipation was their aim; violence was their method. They were idealists and their attempt to find a short cut to their goal through bomb and revolver met with the superior force of the British and collapsed. Though the terrorists failed to bring about a revolution, it must be said to their credit that they were able to create among the people a spirit of sacrifice for the cause of the country by sacrificing their own lives. "Unless this background were prepared, thousands would not have rallied around Gandhi in 1920 when he had just begun his political career in India".[39]

In discussing the British motives in the partition of Bengal, we referred to Lord Curzon's winning the Muslims over to the cause of partition. But why did the Muslims of Eastern Bengal support the partition? In order to answer this question one must take into account the fact that Muslims were educationally and economically a very backward and depressed community, compared with the Hindus. Thus, "in Bengal, in 1901, only 22 out of every 10,000 Muslims knew English compared to 114 out of 10,000 Hindus. They held only 41 of the 'high appointments' under the government while the Hindus, who were less than twice as numerous as the Muslims, held 1,235".[40]

The 1911 census gives us another set of comparative figures.[41]

	Proportions		
	Hindus	*to*	*Muslims*
Tenants	5		9
Landlords	7		3
Lawyers	9		1
Doctors	5		1
Teachers	7		2
Policemen	2		1
Civil servants	3.5		1

The figures quoted above show the overwhelming backwardness of the Muslims compared with the Hindus. The government hinted and the Muslims believed that in the new Muslim-majority province of Eastern Bengal, they would have better education, most government jobs, and a larger share of state patronage and thus would be able to improve their lot. The creation of the new province was, therefore, supported by them.

To explain fully the Muslim support for the partition, it has to be also kept in mind that the Hindu character of the nationalist movement kept the Muslims away from it. We have already referred to the writings of Bankim Chandra, Vivekananda and Aurobindo which were Hindu in character and from which the terrorists who were the worshippers of the *Sakti* cult (Goddess *Kali*) drew their inspiration. "A Hindu nationalism, broadbased on Hindu religion and the tradition of the past glory and greatness of the Hindus, loomed large in Bengal since the third quarter of the 19th century."[42] The Muslims did not take any part in the renaissance, reformation and political awakening of Bengal.[43] There was not a single Muslim member on the Committees of Landholders' Society, British India Society and the British Indian Association—the different political associations established in Bengal prior to the founding of the Indian National Congress.[44] The Indian National Congress was, of course, a national and secular organization, but led as it was by Hindu leaders, the Muslims did not feel very enthusiastic about it. That is proved by the establishment of the Muslim League in 1906 of which the Nawab of Dacca, the leader of the Muslims of Eastern Bengal, was a prominent member.

Surendranath Banerjea, the Hindu leader of the anti—partition movement writes in his autobiography: "Swadeshi had evoked the fervour of a religious movement. It has become part of our Dharma."[45] Naturally, the Muslims could not be expected to subscribe to something which had become a part of the Hindu Dharma. Surendranath describes an incident in which he administered the *Swadeshi* vow to a Hindu audience in the presence of the god of their worship.[46] Such incidents and the use of Hindu symbols to identify nationalism could not but be offensive to the Muslims.

Hindu-Muslim communal antagonism was intensified as a result of the partition of Bengal. Muslim separatism became a permanent feature of Indian politics from then onwards. Such separatism, institutionalized through the Muslim League and at different times overtly and covertly supported and encouraged by the British, and the Congress failure to bring the Muslims back into the mainstream of the nationalist movement led to the partition of Bengal and the country in 1947.

1 Quoted in John R McLane, "The Decision to Partition Bengal", *Indian Economic and Social History Review*, Vol 2, No 3, July 1965, p 224.

2 Lovat Fraser, *India Under Curzon and After*, Henry Holt and Co., New York 1911, p 381.

3 *Speeches* by Lord Curzon of Kedleston, Vol 3, Address at Dacca, February 18, 1904 p 303, Quoted in McLane, *op. cit.*, p 228.

4 Lovat Fraser, *op. cit.*, p 381.

5 Amales Tripathi writes, "He (Curzon) roped in Nawab Salimullah Khan of Dacca by promising him a loan of Rs 100,000 at nominal interest and the latter had little difficulty in assembling a huge gathering of Muslims to cheer the Viceroy's plan for a Moslem province". *The Extremist Challenge*, Orient Longmans, Calcutta 1967, p 97.

6 "The new province included, in addition to Assam, the three great Bengal divisons of Chittagong, Dacca, and Rajshahi, and a few minor pieces of territory. It had an area of 106, 540 square miles, and a population of thirty-one millions, of whom eighteen millon were Mahomedans and twelve million Hindus". Fraser, *op. cit.*, p 382. Fraser further points out that Curzon personally was in favour of naming the new province as "The North Eastern Provinces", but the name Eastern Bengal was finally adopted to make concession to Bengali feeling.

7 McLane, *op. cit.*, p 230.

8 *Ibid.*, p 234.

9 Government of India to the Secretary of State, February 2, 1905. Quoted in *Ibid.*, p 233.

10 Lovat Fraser, *op. cit.*, p 19.

11 Hardinge to Crewe, July 13, 1811, *Crewe Papers* Cambridge University Library. Quoted in Tripathi, *op. cit.*, p 102.

12 Curzon to Brodrick, October 9, 1905, Quoted in David Dilks, *Curzon in India*, vol 2 Taplinger Publishing Co., New York 1969, p 245.

13 *Ibid.*

14 *Ibid.*

15 Dispatch No 75 (public), June 9, 1905, Home Department Publications, quoted in Amales Tripathi, p 101.

16 Quoted in Fraser, pp 386-387.

17 Fraser, p 387.

18 *Ibid.*, p 386.

19 David Dilks, *op. cit.*, p 249.

20 J H Broomfield, *Elite Conflict in a Plural Society : Twentieth Century Bengal*, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles 1968, p 29.

21 Edward Thompson and G T Garratt, *Rise and Fulfillment of the Bitish Rule in India*. Central Book Depot, Allahabad 1969, p 573.

22 P C Ray, *Life and Times of C R Das* Oxford University Press, Calcutta 1927, p 49. Lord Curzon qualified his statement with the following words: "I do not thereby mean to claim that Europeans are universally or even generally truthful, still lest do I mean that Asiatics deliberately or habitually deviate from the truth. The one proposition would be absurd, and the other misleading". The qualification went unheeded. See David Dilks, *op. cit.*, p 203.

23 Surendranath Banerjea, *A Nation in Making* Oxford University Press, Calcutta 1963. (First published 1925), p 215.

24 That Curzon had a thorough dislike for the Congress which he believed was operating mainly from Calcutta was a fact. He wrote: "Its best wirepullers and its most frothy orators all reside here (in Calcutta). The perfection of their machinery and the tyranny which it enables them to exercise are truly remarkable. They dominate public opinion in Calcutta; they affect the high court; they frighten the local government; and they are sometimes not without serious influence upon the

government of India. The whole of their activity is directed to creating an agency so powerful that they may one day be able to force a weak government to give them what they desire". See Curzon to Brodrick, February 2, 1905, *Correspondence with the Secretary of State*, 1904-1905, British Museum, pp 51-52. Quoted in David Dilks, p 202. In the same letter Curzon wrote: "Any measure in consequence that would divide the Bengali-speaking population that would permit independent centres of activity and influence to grow up; that would dethrone Calcutta from its place as the centre of successful intrigue, or that would weaken the influence of the lawyer class, who have the entire organization in their hands is intensely and hotly resented by them" See Amales Tripathi, p 98.

25 Broomfield, *op, cit.*, p 29.

26 Surendranath Banerjea, *op. cit.*, p 176.

27 Rabindranath Tagore, *Towards Universal Man*, Asia Publishing House, New York 1969, p 112.

28 Soumyendranath Tagore, "Evaluation of Swadeshi Thought", in Atul Gupta (ed), *Studies in the Bengal Renaissance.* The National Council of Education, Jadavpur 1958, p 208.

29 Surendranath, *op. cit.*, p 180.

30 Surendranath, *op. cit.*, p 170.

31 Quoted in Soumyendranath Tagore, "Evolution of Swadeshi Thought" in Atul Gupta (ed), *Studies in the Bengal Renaissance* The National Council of Education, Jadavpur 1958, pp 221-222.

32 Broomfield *op. cit.*, p 34.

33 Gopal Halder, "Revolutionary Terrorism", in *Studies on tho Bengal Renaissance, op. cit.*, p 222.

34 Surendranath, p 219.

35 Tagore, *op. cit.*, p 101.

36 *Ibid.*, p 258.

37 T B Macaulay, Critical and Historical Essays, "Warren Hastings", Boston, 1900. Quoted in S Rudolph, "Profile in Courage", *World Politics*, October, 1963, p 101.

38 Quoted in Rudolph, "Profile in Courage", *World Politics*, October, 1963, p 101.

39 *Ibid.*, p 101.

40 R C Majumdar, "Gandhi's Place in the History of Indian Nationalism" in M D Lewis (ed), *Gandhi: Maker of Modern India*, D C Heath and Co., 1968, p 61.

41 McLane, *op. cit.*, p 229.

42 Quoted in Broomfield, *op. cit.*, p 44.

43 R C Majumdar, *Glimpses of Bengal in the Nineteenth Century* K L Mukhopadhyay, Calcutta 1960, p 76.

44 Gopal Halder, *op. cit.*, p 230.

45 Majumdar, *Glimpses of Bengal in the Nineteenth Century*, p 101.

46 Surendranath, *op. cit.*, p 212.