

**Do you know what your containers are
made of?**

@mossnz






h*ck yeah containers

[@alicegoldfuss](#) says that
containers are *processes*
born from *tarballs*
anchored to *namespaces*
controlled by *cgroups*

Abstractions are friends

Today we'll be dealing with

- docker pull
- docker push
- docker build
- docker run
- docker-compose up



All good code needs a good problem

you have 1337 limes. definitely hax but ok.

let's solve this by uploading the limes to the cloud.



<https://try.redis.io>

```
> incr limes  
(integer) 1  
> incr limes  
(integer) 2
```

https://hub.docker.com/_/redis/

```
$ docker run --name some-redis -d redis:latest
```

```
aa83e03d773a559f8a020e8d0b8068b797551f58060bb2a77476bb559e51b5ae
```

```
$ docker run -it --link some-redis:redis --rm redis redis-cli -h redis -p 6379
```

```
redis:6379> incr limes
(integer) 1
redis:6379> incr limes
(integer) 2
```

\$ node index.js

```
const express = require('express');
const redis = require('redis');
```



```
express.put('/limes', (res) => {
  redis.incr('limes', (reply) => {
    const limes = reply || 0;
    res.json({
      limes,
    });
  });
});
```





```
GET /limes  
{limes: "0"}
```

```
PUT /limes  
{limes: 1}
```

```
POST /limes  
Cannot POST /limes/
```

Dockerfile

```
FROM node:8 as base

WORKDIR /app
RUN npm install -g npm@6.4.1
COPY package*.json ./

FROM base as dependencies
RUN npm ci --production --loglevel http

FROM base as production
COPY --from=dependencies /app/node_modules ./node_modules
COPY . .
EXPOSE 1337
CMD ["node", "index.js"]
```

docker-compose.yml

```
services:  
  app:  
    image:      limes:local  
    container_name: limes_app  
    depends_on:  
      - redis  
  
  redis:  
    image:      redis:latest  
    container_name: limes_redis
```



How to draw an Owl.

"A fun and creative guide for beginners"




Fig 1. Draw two circles



Fig 2. Draw the rest of the damn Owl

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Reflections on Trusting Trust

To what extent should one trust a statement that a program is free of Trojan horses?
Perhaps it is more important to trust the people who wrote the software.

— Ken Thompson. 1984. (Turing Award Lecture)



1. Programs can write programs.



2. The C compiler is written in C



3. We can modify a compiler to deliberately alter programs

The actual bug I planted in the compiler would match code in the UNIX "login" command. The replacement code would miscompile the login command so that it would accept a particular known password.



3. We can modify a compiler to deliberately alter programs

... including the compiler, that compiles the compiler.



The moral of this story is you can't trust code you didn't build yourself.



If you wish to make an apple pie from scratch, you must first invent the universe.

— Carl Sagan. *Cosmos*.





Minimally Viable Pipeline

By introducing a CI Pipeline, we can make small steps towards trusting our containers

Dockerfile

```
FROM redis:latest
```



```
$ docker build -t purplecon-redis:production  
app/services/redis/.
```



CI Pipeline

After we build an image, we can gain trust by running

- **container-diff**, a Google open source tool
- **inspec**, Compliance as Code tooling
- **anchore** or **clair**, vulnerability scanners for Docker





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Updates


Support



Workflows » mossnz » purplecon-docker » c32dcf6d-bff6-49bd-950f-a3e5b2ce946e



9 jobs in this workflow



<https://github.com/GoogleContainerTools/container-diff>

```
$ container-diff diff redis.tar remote://mossnz/
```

purple-redis:production --type=file

These entries have been added to /redis.tar: None

These entries have been deleted from /redis.tar: None

These entries have been changed between /redis.tar and purple-redis: None

<https://www.inspec.io/>

```
describe command('redis-cli ping') do
  its(:stdout) { should match(/PONG/) }
end
```

```
$ inspec exec test -t docker://purple-redis
```


Command: `redis-cli ping`
✓ stdout should match /PONG/

Test Summary: 1 successful, 0 failures, 0 skipped

← ⚒ mossnz/purplecon-redis



e8ca43ad4739



Quay Security Scanner has detected **45** vulnerabilities.

Patches are available for **1** vulnerabilities.

- ⚠ **10** High-level vulnerabilities.
- ⚠ **5** Medium-level vulnerabilities.
- ⚠ **8** Low-level vulnerabilities.
- ⚠ **20** Negligible-level vulnerabilities.
- ⚠ **2** Unknown-level vulnerabilities.

Vulnerabilities

 Filter Vulnerabilities... Only show fixable

CVE	SEVERITY ↓	PACKAGE	CURRENT VERSION	FIXED IN VERSION	INTRODUCED IN LAYER
▶ CVE-2017-16997	9.3 / 10	glibc	2.24-11+deb9u3	(None)	file:f8f26d117bc4a9289b7cd7447ca36e1a70b...
▶ CVE-2017-8804	⚠ High	glibc	2.24-11+deb9u3	(None)	file:f8f26d117bc4a9289b7cd7447ca36e1a70b...
▶ CVE-2017-1000408	⚠ High	glibc	2.24-11+deb9u3	(None)	file:f8f26d117bc4a9289b7cd7447ca36e1a70b...
▶ CVE-2018-6551	⚠ High	glibc	2.24-11+deb9u3	(None)	file:f8f26d117bc4a9289b7cd7447ca36e1a70b...
▶ CVE-2018-6485	⚠ High	glibc	2.24-11+deb9u3	(None)	file:f8f26d117bc4a9289b7cd7447ca36e1a70b...
▶ CVE-2018-1000001	⚠ High	glibc	2.24-11+deb9u3	(None)	file:f8f26d117bc4a9289b7cd7447ca36e1a70b...
▶ CVE-2017-18269	⚠ High	glibc	2.24-11+deb9u3	(None)	file:f8f26d117bc4a9289b7cd7447ca36e1a70b...

:latest is not your friend

The **:latest** tag isn't what it seems.

The **:latest** tag is applied to any build that *doesn't* have a tag.

Which breaks people's expectations and environments if you rely on it.



Dockerfile

- FROM redis:latest
- + FROM redis:5.0.1-alpine3.8



```
$ container-diff diff redis.tar remote://mossnz/
```

```
purple-redis:production --type=file
```

These entries have been added to redis.tar: None

These entries have been deleted from redis.tar:

```
FILE  
/bin  
/bin/arch  
/bin/base64  
/bin/busybox  
...
```

```
$ inspec exec test -t docker://purple-redis
```

```
Command: `redis-cli ping`  
✓ stdout should match /PONG/
```

```
Test Summary: 1 successful, 0 failures, 0 skipped
```

[← Repositories](#)

mossnz / purplecon-redis



Repository Tags

[Compact](#)[Expanded](#)

TAG

SECURITY SCAN

SIZE

EXPIRES

IMAGE

 stage6

Passed

14.2 MB

Never

SHA256 [1a0c599b422f](#) stage5

10 High • 1 fixable

33.6 MB

Never

SHA256 [e8ca43ad4739](#)

docker-compose.yml

```
services:  
  app:  
    image:          quay.io/mossnz/purplecon-limes:stage6  
    container_name: limes_app  
    depends_on:  
      - redis  
  
  redis:  
    image:          quay.io/mossnz/purplecon-redis:stage6  
    container_name: limes_redis
```





from **redis:latest**

to **mossnz/purplecon-redis:stage6**

- Differencing
- Compliance as Code
- Vulnerability Scanning

<https://github.com/mossnz/purplecon-docker>