The Melitz-Chaney Model

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Motivation

- ▶ In the Krugman model, all firms have the same productivity, and all firms export.
- But, in reality, only a small fraction of firms export, and exporting firms are larger and more productive.
 - Large employment (the number of employees or total work hours),
 - Large sales,
 - High value-added per worker.
 - See, for example, Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and Schott (2007), p.125.
- ► Therefore, we introduce firm heterogeneity.
 - So that only productive firms export in the model.

Setup

- ► In the following, we discuss a simple version of the Melitz-Chaney model following Allen and Arkolakis's lecture notes.
- ▶ The set of countries is *S*.
- Each country $i \in S$ is populated by an exogenous measure L_i of workers/consumers.
- Each worker supplies a unit of labor inelastically.
- Labor is the only factor of production.

Varieties and firms (1)

- Each firm produces a different variety.
- ▶ The set of varieties produced in country i is denoted by Ω_i .
 - \triangleright Ω_i is an endogenous object.
- ▶ The set of varieties produced in the world is $\Omega = \bigcup_{i \in S} \Omega_i$.
 - ightharpoonup But, in equilibrium, a subset of Ω is not consumed by consumers in a country if the subset is not exported to the country.
- ▶ There is a mass M_i of firms in country i.
- Firms in country i must incur a fixed cost f_{ij} to export to destination j.

Varieties and firms (2)

- Firms are heterogeneous.
- ▶ Each firm in country *i* draws productivity φ from a cumulative distribution function $G_i(\varphi)$.
 - lt costs a productivity- φ firm $1/\varphi$ units of labor to produce one unit of its variety.
 - ightharpoonup Henceforth, we say "firm φ " because firms that have the same productivity behave in the same way.
- ▶ All firms are subject to iceberg trade costs $\{\tau_{ij}\}_{i,j\in S}$.

Preferences and budget constraints

ightharpoonup The utility of consumers in j is

$$U_j = \left(\sum_{i \in S} \int_{\Omega_{ij}} (q_{ij}(\omega))^{rac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} d\omega
ight)^{rac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}.$$

- $ightharpoonup \Omega_{ij}$: the set of varieties produced in *i* and available in *j*.
- $ightharpoonup q_{ij}(\omega)$: the demand of variety ω shipped from i to j.
- $ightharpoonup \sigma$: the elasticity of substitution.
- ► The budget constraint is

$$\sum_{i\in\mathcal{S}}\int_{\Omega_{ij}}p_{ij}(\omega)q_{ij}(\omega)d\omega=Y_j.$$

- $ightharpoonup p_{ij}(\omega)$: the price of ω from j that consumers in i face.
- $\triangleright Y_j$: the total expenditure in j.

Optimal demand

 \blacktriangleright The demand for ω produced in *i* by consumers in *j* is

$$q_{ij}(\omega) = \left(\frac{p_{ij}(\omega)}{P_j}\right)^{-\sigma} \frac{Y_j}{P_j}.$$

where

$$P_j = \left(\sum_{i \in S} \int_{\Omega_{ij}} p_{ij}(\omega)^{1-\sigma} d\omega\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}.$$

ightharpoonup The amount spend on variety ω is

$$x_{ii}(\omega) = p_{ii}(\omega)q_{ii}(\omega) = p_{ii}(\omega)^{1-\sigma}Y_iP_i^{\sigma-1}.$$

 \triangleright Integrating this across all varieties, the aggregate trade value from i to j is

$$X_{ij} = \int_{\Omega_{ii}} x_{ij}(\omega) d\omega = Y_j P_j^{\sigma - 1} \int_{\Omega_{ii}} p_{ij}(\omega)^{1 - \sigma} d\omega.$$
 (1)

Optimal prices

ightharpoonup Firm φ in i sets the optimal prices (across various destinations) to maximize its profits

$$\max_{\{p_{ij}(\varphi)\}_{j\in\mathcal{S}}}\sum_{j\in\mathcal{S}}\left(p_{ij}(\varphi)q_{ij}(\varphi)-\frac{w_i}{\varphi}\tau_{ij}q_{ij}(\varphi)-f_{ij}\right)$$

such that

$$q_{ij}(\varphi) = p_{ij}(\varphi)^{-\sigma} Y_j P_i^{\sigma-1}.$$

Substituting the demand functions into the maximand yields

$$\max_{\{p_{ij}(\varphi)\}_{j\in\mathcal{S}}}\sum_{i\in\mathcal{S}}\left(p_{ij}(\varphi)^{1-\sigma}Y_jP_j^{\sigma-1}-\frac{w_i}{\varphi}\tau_{ij}p_{ij}(\varphi)^{-\sigma}Y_jP_j^{\sigma-1}-f_{ij}\right).$$

ightharpoonup The first-order consition characterizes the optimal price that firm φ from i sets in j

$$p_{ij}(\varphi) = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} \frac{w_i}{\varphi} \tau_{ij}.$$

Trade values and operating profits

 \blacktriangleright Firm φ 's trade value from i to j conditional on it serving j is

$$x_{ij}(\varphi) = p_{ij}(\varphi)q_{ij}(\varphi) = \left(\frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} \frac{w_i}{\varphi} \tau_{ij}\right)^{1 - \sigma} Y_j P_j^{\sigma - 1}. \tag{2}$$

▶ The operating profits that firm φ from i earning in j is

$$\pi_{ij}(\varphi) = \left(p_{ij}(\varphi) - \frac{w_i}{\varphi}\tau_{ij}\right)q_{ij}(\varphi)$$

$$= \left(\frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1}\frac{w_i}{\varphi}\tau_{ij} - \frac{w_i}{\varphi}\tau_{ij}\right)\left(\frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1}\frac{w_i}{\varphi}\tau_{ij}\right)^{-\sigma}Y_jP_j^{\sigma - 1}$$

$$= \frac{1}{\sigma}\left(\frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1}\right)^{1 - \sigma}\left(\frac{w_i}{\varphi}\tau_{ij}\right)^{1 - \sigma}Y_jP_j^{\sigma - 1}$$

$$= \frac{1}{\sigma}x_{ij}(\varphi).$$
(3)

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Price indices and trade values

- Let $h_{ij}(\varphi)$ be the probability density function of productivity of firms from country i that sells to j.
- ► Then we have

$$\int_{\Omega_{ij}} p_{ij}(\varphi)^{1-\sigma} d\omega$$

$$= \int_{0}^{\infty} M_{ij} \left(\frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} \frac{w_{i}}{\varphi} \tau_{ij} \right)^{1-\sigma} h_{ij}(\varphi) d\varphi$$

$$= M_{ij} \left(\frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} w_{i} \tau_{ij} \right)^{1-\sigma} (\tilde{\varphi}_{ij})^{\sigma - 1},$$
(4)

where $\tilde{\varphi}_{ij} = \left(\int_0^\infty \varphi^{\sigma-1} h_{ij}(\varphi) d\varphi\right)^{1/(\sigma-1)}$ is what Melitz called the "average" productivity of firms that sell from i to j.

▶ Then we can rewrite the aggregate trade flow, (1), as

$$X_{ij} = \left(\frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1}\right)^{1 - \sigma} \tau_{ij}^{1 - \sigma} w^{1 - \sigma} M_{ij} (\tilde{\varphi}_{ij})^{\sigma - 1} Y_j P_j^{\sigma - 1}.$$

Selection into exporting and cutoff productivity

Firm φ in country i exports to j if and only if its operating profits exceeds the fixed cost to export there

$$\pi_{ij}(\varphi) \geq f_{ij}$$
.

▶ Using (2) and (3), we rewrite this condition as

$$\frac{1}{\sigma} \left(\frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} \frac{w_i}{\varphi} \tau_{ij} \right)^{1 - \sigma} Y_j P_j^{\sigma - 1} \ge f_{ij}.$$

That is, productivity φ exceeds the cutoff productivity φ_{ii}^*

$$\varphi \ge \varphi_{ij}^* = \left(\frac{\sigma f_{ij}(\frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} w_i \tau_{ij})^{\sigma - 1}}{Y_j P_i^{\sigma - 1}}\right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma - 1}}.$$
 (5)

What's h_{ij} ?

- $\qquad \qquad \mathsf{For} \ \varphi < \varphi_{ii}^*, \ h_{ij}(\varphi) = 0.$
- $\blacktriangleright \text{ For } \varphi \geq \varphi_{ii}^*,$

$$h_{ij}(\varphi) = rac{g_i(\varphi)}{\int_{\varphi_{ii}^*}^{\infty} g_i(\varphi) darphi} = rac{g_i(arphi)}{1 - G_i(arphi_{ij}^*)}.$$

Cutoffs pin down masses of exporters

ightharpoonup The "average" productivity of firms selling from i to j is

$$ilde{arphi}_{ij} = \left(rac{1}{1-\mathit{G}_{i}(arphi_{ij}^{*})}\int_{arphi_{ij}^{*}}^{\infty}arphi^{\sigma-1}d\mathit{G}_{i}(arphi)
ight)^{rac{1}{\sigma-1}}.$$

 \triangleright The mass of firms selling from i to j is

$$M_{ij} = (1 - G_i(\varphi_{ij}^*))M_i.$$

▶ The aggregate trade value from i to j is

$$X_{ij} = \left(\frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1}\right)^{1 - \sigma} \tau_{ij}^{1 - \sigma} w_i^{1 - \sigma} M_i \left(\int_{\varphi_i^*}^{\infty} \varphi^{\sigma - 1} dG_i(\varphi)\right) Y_j P_j^{\sigma - 1}. \tag{6}$$


The Pareto distribution (Chaney)

- ▶ So far we have not specified $G_i(\cdot)$.
- For simplicity, suppose that productivity φ is no less than 1 in any country $\varphi \in [1, \infty)$.
- Assume that productivity of firms in i follows the Pareto distribution with shape parameter θ_i

$$G_i(\varphi) = 1 - \varphi^{-\theta_i}. \tag{7}$$

▶ Assume $\theta_i > \sigma - 1$ so that trade flows are finite.

Examples of the Pareto distribution



See pareto.jl for the code to produce this figure.

The Pareto distributed productivity leads to the gravity equation (1)

► A part of the average productivity is

$$\int_{\varphi_{ij}^{*}}^{\infty} \varphi^{\sigma-1} dG_{i}(\varphi) = \int_{\varphi_{ij}^{*}}^{\infty} \varphi^{\sigma-1} \left(\frac{d(1-\varphi^{-\theta_{i}})}{d\varphi} \right) d\varphi$$

$$= \theta_{i} \int_{\varphi_{ij}^{*}}^{\infty} \varphi^{\sigma-\theta_{i}-2} d\varphi$$

$$= \frac{\theta_{i}}{\theta_{i}+1-\sigma} (\varphi_{ij}^{*})^{\sigma-\theta_{i}-1}$$

$$= \frac{\theta_{i}}{\theta_{i}+1-\sigma} \left(\frac{\sigma f_{ij} (\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} w_{i} \tau_{ij})^{\sigma-1}}{Y_{j} P_{j}^{\sigma-1}} \right)^{\frac{\sigma-\theta_{i}-1}{\sigma-1}}, \tag{8}$$

where the last equality follows from the cutoff (5).

The Pareto distributed productivity leads to the gravity equation (2)

▶ (6) and (8) yield

$$X_{ij} = \left(\frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1}\right)^{1 - \sigma} \tau_{ij}^{1 - \sigma} w_{i}^{1 - \sigma} M_{i} \left(\frac{\theta_{i}}{\theta_{i} + 1 + \sigma} \left(\frac{\sigma f_{ij} \left(\frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} w_{i} \tau_{ij}\right)^{\sigma - 1}}{Y_{j} P_{j}^{\sigma - 1}}\right)^{\frac{\sigma - \theta_{i} - 1}{\sigma - 1}}\right) Y_{j} P_{j}^{\sigma - 1}$$

$$= C_{1,i} (\tau_{ij} w_{i})^{-\theta_{i}} f_{ij}^{\frac{\sigma - \theta_{i} - 1}{\sigma - 1}} M_{i} (Y_{j} P_{j}^{\sigma - 1})^{\frac{\theta_{i}}{\sigma - 1}},$$

$$(9)$$

where
$$C_{1,i} = \sigma^{\frac{\sigma - \theta_i - 1}{\sigma - 1}} \left(\frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} \right)^{-\theta_i} \left(\frac{\theta_i}{\theta_i + 1 - \sigma} \right)$$
.

Free entry (1)

- \triangleright Firms have to incur an entry cost f_i^e before they learn their productivity.
- ▶ The free entry condition is that the expected profits are equal to the entry cost

$$f_i^e = E_{arphi} \left[\sum_{j \in \mathcal{S}} \max \{ \pi_{ij}(arphi) - f_{ij}, 0 \}
ight].$$

Then we can rewrite the equation above as

$$f_i^e = \int_1^\infty \sum_{j \in S} \max \{ \pi_{ij}(\varphi) - f_{ij}, 0 \} dG_i(\varphi)$$

$$= \sum_{j \in S} \int_{\varphi_{ij}^*}^\infty (\pi_{ij}(\varphi) - f_{ij}) dG_i(\varphi).$$
(10)

Free entry (2)

▶ With the Pareto distribution (7), we can rewrite (10) as

$$f_i^e = \sum_{i \in S} \frac{\sigma - 1}{\theta_i + 1 - \sigma} \left(\frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} w_i \tau_{ij} \right)^{-\theta_i} \sigma^{-\frac{\theta_i}{\sigma - 1}} f_{ij}^{\frac{\sigma - \theta_i - 1}{\sigma - 1}} Y_j^{\frac{\theta_i}{\sigma - 1}} P_j^{\theta_i}.$$

Country i's only source of income is wages, so we have

$$Y_j = w_j L_j. (11)$$

Therefore we have

$$f_i^e = \sum_{i \in S} \frac{\sigma - 1}{\theta_i + 1 - \sigma} \left(\frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} w_i \tau_{ij} \right)^{-\theta_i} \sigma^{-\frac{\theta_i}{\sigma - 1}} f_{ij}^{\frac{\sigma - \theta_i - 1}{\sigma - 1}} (w_j L_j)^{\frac{\theta_i}{\sigma - 1}} P_j^{\theta_i}. \tag{12}$$

Rewriting price indices (1)

► The average productivity is

$$\tilde{\varphi}_{ij}^{\sigma-1} = \frac{1}{1 - G_i(\varphi_{ij}^*)} \int_{\varphi_{ij}^*}^{\infty} \varphi^{\sigma-1} dG_i(\varphi)
= \frac{1}{(\varphi_{ij}^*)^{-\theta_i}} \frac{\theta_i}{\theta_i + 1 - \sigma} (\varphi_{ij}^*)^{\sigma-\theta_i - 1}
= \frac{\theta_i}{\theta_i + 1 - \sigma} \frac{\sigma f_{ij} (\frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} w_i \tau_{ij})^{\sigma - 1}}{Y_j P_j^{\sigma - 1}}.$$
(13)

▶ (4) and (13) yield

$$P_j^{1-\sigma} = \sum_{i \in S} M_{ij} \left(\frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} w_i \tau_{ij} \right)^{1-\sigma} \frac{\theta_i}{\theta_i + 1 - \sigma} \frac{\sigma f_{ij} \left(\frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} w_i \tau_{ij} \right)^{\sigma - 1}}{Y_j P_j^{\sigma - 1}}.$$

Rewriting price indices (2)

► The last equation is rewritten as

$$Y_{j} = \sum_{i \in S} M_{ij} \frac{\theta_{i}}{\theta_{i} + 1 - \sigma} \sigma f_{ij}$$

$$= \sum_{i \in S} (1 - G(\varphi_{ij}^{*})) M_{i} \frac{\theta_{i}}{\theta_{i} + 1 - \sigma} \sigma f_{ij}$$

$$= \sum_{i \in S} (\varphi_{ij}^{*})^{-\theta_{i}} M_{i} \frac{\theta_{i}}{\theta_{i} + 1 - \sigma} \sigma f_{ij}$$

$$= \sum_{i \in S} \left(\frac{\sigma f_{ij} \left(\frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} w_{i} \tau_{ij} \right)^{\sigma - 1}}{Y_{j} P_{j}^{\sigma - 1}} \right)^{-\frac{\theta_{j}}{\sigma - 1}} M_{i} \frac{\theta_{i}}{\theta_{i} + 1 - \sigma} \sigma f_{ij}$$

$$= \sum_{i \in S} (\sigma f_{ij})^{-\frac{\theta_{j}}{\sigma - 1}} \left(\frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} w_{i} \tau_{ij} \right)^{-\theta_{j}} Y_{j}^{\frac{\theta_{j}}{\sigma - 1}} P_{j}^{\theta_{j}} M_{i} \frac{\theta_{i}}{\theta_{i} + 1 - \sigma} \sigma f_{ij}.$$

$$(14)$$

Rewriting price indices (3)

► Solving (14) for $P_i^{-\theta_j}$, we have

$$P_{j}^{-\theta_{j}} = \sum_{i \in S} \frac{\theta_{i}}{\theta_{i} + 1 - \sigma} M_{i}(\sigma f_{ij})^{\frac{-\theta_{j} + \sigma - 1}{\sigma - 1}} \left(\frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} w_{i} \tau_{ij}\right)^{-\theta_{j}} (w_{j} L_{j})^{\frac{\theta_{j} - \sigma + 1}{\sigma - 1}}. \tag{15}$$

Trade balance

Assume that the income is equal to the expenditure (trade balance)

$$Y_j = \sum_{i \in S} X_{ij}$$
.

► This, (9), and (11) yield

$$w_{j}L_{j} = \sum_{i \in S} C_{1,i}(\tau_{ij}w_{i})^{-\theta_{i}} f_{ij}^{\frac{\sigma - \theta_{i} - 1}{\sigma - 1}} M_{i}(w_{j}L_{j}P_{j}^{\sigma - 1})^{\frac{\theta_{i}}{\sigma - 1}}.$$
 (16)

Equilibrium system

- Now we end up with a system of 3N equations (12), (15), (16) with 3N unknowns $\{w_i\}_{i\in S}$, $\{M_i\}_{i\in S}$, and $\{P_i\}_{i\in S}$.
- ► This characterizes an equilibrium.