The
$$(x) = \frac{p_{1}}{p_{1}} (x) - [w_{nk}(x) + C_{nk}] + m_{k}(x)$$

$$-\frac{K}{p_{nk}} (x) - [w_{nk}(x) + C_{nk}] + m_{k}(x)$$

The FoC: $\frac{\partial T_{nk}(x)}{\partial H_{nk}(x)} = 0$.

$$\frac{\partial P_{nk}(x) \partial P_{nk}(x)}{\partial H_{nk}(x)} = r_{nk}(x) - w_{nk}(x) + C_{nk}.$$

Nach bargaining:

$$\max \left[r_{ck}(x) - w \right]^{1/2} \left[w - b_{nk} \right]^{1/2}.$$

$$\max \left[r_{ck}(x) - w \right]^{1/2} \left[w - b_{nk} \right]^{1/2}.$$

$$\max \left[r_{ck}(x) - w \right] + \frac{1}{2} \log \left(w - b_{nk} \right) = F(w).$$

FoC: $\frac{\partial F(w)}{\partial w} = \frac{1}{2} \frac{C_{1}}{r_{nk}(k) - w} + \frac{1}{2} \frac{1}{w - b_{nk}} = 0.$

$$w - b_{nk} = r_{nk}(k) - w,$$

$$\frac{\partial W}{\partial w} = r_{nk}(k) - w,$$

$$w - b_{nk} + C_{nk} - (r_{nk}) - (r_{nk}) + r_{nk}(k) -$$

0= 1 1 Try Ex - 1 1 Trir Er. // Lrk·lrk. 0= 2 Li Li Hrk Wrk - Li Li (t-v) kr Wrk (Lrk - Hrk) - = Tr.k + (1-lr.k) br] Wr = Wr.k Br.k Prk = "Tjk" [[(| - + \sigma_k)] Fork

in Carere, Conjuvic & Robert-Nicond.

= [\leftilde{\sigma_k} \left(\frac{\text{Lijk}}{\text{Tik}} \right) - \text{Ole}] - \text{Ole}] - \text{Ok} Ak. [[(| - \frac{\text{Lijk}}{\text{Ok}} \right)] Fork Endogenius variables: - I've written, a model that comprises - internal geography - unemplymont. - I haven't simulated an equilibrium. - Regional variation in overplayment is largely than time variation.

- I've found a quantitative model of MLA. -> trying to extend it macro a many-country retting

-> hat it's difficult, especially trade costs. · ETIL 18 < . ・一トンにメール書く ・コートまく (-employment share. x inequality (-labor union, minimum rage). MEA · trade cost a productivity of 17 基色 "真 productivity 5 destination-specific productivity" - log (Nit) = log (Vit)-log(Lit). Crk = Pr Krk Vrk

Hrk = Mrk (Vrk) +2 (Lrk)2. = Pruk The (VE) Fx (LE) x lx = Hrk. Alta LE = ME (VEK) HA (LE) A-1 1: Ik. (16) 1-2 = (16) 1-2 Vr = Lr . (lr) T-7. (m) 1-7.

2.
$$W_{r,k} = P_r \cdot \left(\frac{1}{H_{br}}\right) \cdot \left[\frac{(l_{r,k})^{\lambda}}{M_{r,k}}\right]^{\frac{1}{H_{br}}}$$

$$= \left(\frac{1}{H_{br}}\left(\frac{1}{H_{br}}\right)^{\frac{1}{H_{br}}}\right) \cdot \left(\frac{(l_{r,k})^{\lambda}}{H_{br}}\right)^{\frac{1}{H_{br}}} \cdot \left(\frac{(l_{r,k})^{\lambda}}{M_{r,k}}\right)^{\frac{1}{H_{br}}}$$

$$0: C_r^k = \left[\left(1 + \frac{1}{\beta_r} \right) w_r^k \right]^{\frac{1}{r}} \prod_{k=1}^{r} \left(p_k^k \right)^{dr^{s,k}}$$

() 2 II I the like - I'll (1-2) br war (Li-Like) = 0. : 2 EL L' WF = (1-2) EL bows (1-li) L. = In brunk (- lk) Lk 2 = AK Lrwr (Hlr)Lr ÄÄLrkr + ÄLbrwr (Hlr)Lr. Wr = ark Br = Pr [lrk + (1-lk) br]

fr.k

1 ~ E & Br Gr E = Br Gr E Wifr the = Wr [lik + (Hlk) br] - Guess Wrk, Wr, Pr., Ek. wrtrtr = (1-br) lr + br. : (I-br) le = wrPrfrk - br I le = [Wr Pr tr br].

- iterate Pr. & Cr - pr & Cr .

New Pr. - Tij.

$$\frac{\int_{t=0}^{t} \beta^{t} \log C_{i,t} + V_{i,t}}{\int_{t=0}^{t} \frac{G_{i,t}}{\int_{t=0}^{t} \frac{G_{i,t}}{f_{i,t}}}} = \frac{\log C_{i,t}}{\int_{t=0}^{t} \frac{G_{i,t}}{f_{i,t}}} + \frac{G_{i,t}}{f_{i,t}} = \frac{\log C_{i,t}}{f_{i,t}} + \frac{G_{i,t}}{f_{i,t}} = \frac{\log C_{i,t}}{f_{i,t}} + \frac{G_{i,t}}{f_{i,t}} = \frac{\log C_{i,t}}{f_{i,t}} + \frac{G_{i,t}}{f_{i,t}} = \frac{G_{i,t}}{f_{i,t}} + \frac{G_{i,t}}{f_{i,t}} + \frac{G_{i,t}}{f_{i,t}} = \frac{G_{i,t}}{f_{i,t}} + \frac{G_{i,t}}{f_{i,t}}$$

Vo = U (No) + max ((1-x) V1, e x V1, u max E V1, L) max eth vin + (1-em) vin

= U (bi)

max

eth vin + (1-em) vin

or +vee

...

eth vin + (1-em) vin

eth vin

eth vin

eth vin

exp (em) vin

ex ·Vt = U (Pt) - John Max + max {(-x)vt+1 + {x}vt+1 gngell-, ns)(1) Mt = exp (1/2) Vt+1 + (1-x) Vt+1 + (1-exp (et+1) Vt+1) Vt+1 + (1-exp (et+1 Etal = M / Mt te Et + mt (Next) (Vext) $= L_{t+1} - E_{t+1}$ $= (l-\chi)Mt^{t} + (N_{t+1} - M_{t+1}).$

the state of the first war of the first Mt = exp(etri Vt+1 + (|-etri) Vt+1 - ton)

[2] exp(etri Vt+1 + (|-etri) Vt+1 - ton)

[2] exp(etri Vt+1 + (|-etri) Vt+1 - ton) Nett = I Me Et + I Me Ve Asp: Ask X> et for any tot. Vt = U(Q pr) + Vlog (tx) Vt+1 + x Vt+1) + [] exp (etri Vtri + (1-etri) Vtri) /v] Vt = U (bt) + wlog [AM [lexp (etil Vt+1 + (1-etil) Vt+1)] gt = Altz (Et) Xt (Mt) + At unit price

It = (Wt) a (Pt) to

It = (Wt) a (Pt) to

It zt

It zt Pr (20) = min { Mar Kincing $Q_{t} = \left(\int_{Z \in \mathbb{R}_{t}} \widetilde{q}_{t}(2)^{t-1/n} d\phi(2)\right)^{n/(n-1)}$ Pt = I' (I (Xt Kt)) (Tt)) -1/0. marginal dist

 $Mt = \frac{\exp(e_{t+1}V_{t+1} + (|-e_{t+1})V_{t+1} - Z_{t}^{j,n})^{1/\nu}}{\sum_{m}^{\nu} \exp(e_{t+1}V_{t+1} + (|-e_{t+1})V_{t+1} - Z_{t}^{j,n})^{1/\nu}}$ $\frac{1}{M_{t+1}} = \frac{M_{t+1}}{M_{t+1}} = \frac{1}{M_{t+1}} \left(\frac{V_{t+1}}{N_{t+1}} \right)^{\frac{1}{2}}$ = = Veri labor martet

Nevi tightness. Ctri = Eti = Xut Et + Mtri

Ltri = Mnnle Em + I Mt Vt.

Mut Et + I Mt Vt. @ Production & Labor market friction. Ct = (wt) (Pn)+B. Think period t. Predetermined variables in period tel: Mt, Mt, Lt, Nt. Endogenous voriables:

Lt, Xt, Vt, Et, Ut, Wt, Pt, (At), At; Xt,

Lt, Xt, Vt, Et, Ut, Wt, Pt, (At), At; Xt, 3N+N2+1.

Wt = D. Wt + Dr Nt = (1-b) Wt. Then the total labor cost is: Wt+ 1+ = (2- b) wt. $\mathcal{G}_{\epsilon}^{r} = \mathcal{G}_{\epsilon}^{r}(\omega) = \mathcal{G}_{\epsilon}^{r}(\omega) \cdot \left(\underbrace{\mathcal{G}_{\epsilon}^{r}(\omega)}_{l - \mathcal{G}_{\epsilon}} \right)^{r} \cdot \left(\underbrace{\mathcal{G}_{\epsilon}^{$ Ct = Tt · (wt) At (Pt) -3. Nt = (Tt) [(wt) b(Pt) HB. day] I (Tt) & [(went At) P(Ptm) - B d mf 7 - 6 Xt = It + (LB) [Wt. HEt + At Et] /= (wt Et + bowt Ut) + I-B [Wt Et + 2" Pt ft. Ne"]. = (We Et + bowe Ut) + FB (2-b) WE Et. It balancel trade. Pt= [(+ 1-6). (It) [((2-6) web) (Pt) 10 dm]-6) 1/6 (3) N Ve I [We fet + b'we Ve"] = to I b'we Ve". Vt = Jrue Vt. I [WE FAR + b WE VE]

 $m_{t}^{\dagger} = \begin{bmatrix} t \cdot (\lambda_{t})^{T} \\ \lambda_{t} \end{bmatrix}$ ht = Vt Et = XMt-1 + Mt = & Mindle Etil + Not met. Ut = Lt - Et . (7) ~ At. Et = vt Pt Vt.

(Lb) Vt. Et = vt Pt Vt. = VPE NE XE (2-bd) we Given Enter, Men, Lt, Nt, Etci, Uti). Det 1: a temporary equilibrium is

{I (14, Xt, Xt) Et) Ut, wet, Pt, At) del, n=1

such that

Not recessory

of. Xt = (wt Et + bt wt Ut) + LB (2-bt) wt Et Xt = Tt Xt The = (Th) & [((2-b)) we) & (Ph) + B - dnd] - B

[(Tt) & [((2-b)) we) & (Ph) + B - dnd] - B

[(Tt) & [((2-b)) we) & (Ph) + D - D - D

[(2-b) & (2-b) & (Ph) + D - D

[(2-b) & (2-b) & (Ph) + D - D

[(2-b) & (2-b) & (Ph) + D - D

[(2-b) & (2-b Pt=G. (It) ((2-b") man) (Pt) + Bdn+]-6)-1/0. Vt = IN IN F. [we Ei + ba we Ut].

Et = XMul Et + Nt. Et (At) 1-3. $(-b^{rd})_{Wt} \stackrel{d}{\to} \stackrel{d}{\to} = \nu^{d} \stackrel{d}{\to} \stackrel{d}{$ $(2-b^{\prime})$ we $f = \beta \prod_{n=1}^{N} \pi_{jn} \times N$ O. Det 2: Given ¿Lo, Et, Ut), a requestial equilibrium is Menle, Minlu de l'Vé, Ve, Ve, Ve, Lei, Let, Et, Uet, Ned tei, let, Xe, Xe, Xe, Xe, Xe, Ret, At Ster, Set. Vt, e U ((- 12 Pt) + vlog [exp((-x) Vti, e + xVti, - Tid) 1/2 Vt. = U((1- 24) b wt) + day [= (1-1) Vt.+1 + (1-1) (2+1) Vt.+1 - 70, 11) Mt = exp (mt+1 Vt+1 + (1-mt+1) Vt+1 - t, n) / v exp (1-x) Vt+1 + x Vt+1 - t d) + 12 exp (mt+1 Vt+1 + (1-mt+1) Vt+1 - t, n) / v. Mt = exp((-x) Vt+1 + x Vt+1 - Td d) // Exp(Mt+1 Vt+1 + (|-mt+1) Vn, u - Td m) // H exp(Mt+1 Vt+1 + (|-mt+1) Vn, u - Td m) // A. Mt = exp (mtri Vtri + (1-mtri) Vtri - Zin) //

| exp (mtri Vtri + (1-mtri) Vtri - Zin) //

| exp (mtri Vtri + (1-mtri) Vtri - Zin) //
| exp (mtri Vtri + (1-mtri) Vtri - Zin) // Lt = I Mt-1 Et-1+ I Mt-1 Ut-1 Nt = I Mt-1 Et-1+ I Mt-1 Ut-1 = Lt - Meri Eti 15