Trade and Unemployment

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Comparison

Helpman & Itskhoki (2010)	This model
Melitz+Search	Krugman+Search
Two countries	Many countries

Preferences

- N is the set of countries.
- Individual i in country j has a utility function

$$U_{i,j} = \left(\sum_{k \in N} \int_0^{M_k} C_{i,k,j}(\omega)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} d\omega\right)^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}.$$
 (1)

Her income is

$$I_{i,j} = \begin{cases} w_j & \text{if } i \text{ is employed,} \\ 0 & \text{if } i \text{ is unemployed.} \end{cases}$$
 (2)

▶ Individual *i*'s demand for variety ω shipped from k to j is

$$C_{i,k,j}(\omega) = \left(\frac{p_k(\omega)t_{k,j}}{P_j}\right)^{-\sigma} \frac{I_{i,j}}{P_j}.$$
 (3)

Revenue

▶ If firm ω hires h units of labor, the revenue is

$$R_{j}(\omega,h) = \Phi_{j}(z_{j}h)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}$$
 (4)

where

$$\Phi_j = \left(\sum_{k \in \mathcal{N}} t_{j,k}^{1-\sigma} P_k^{\sigma-1} X_k\right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}}.$$
 (5)

Stole-Zwiebel Bargaining

- ▶ Following Stole & Zwiebel (1996) and Helpman & Itskhoki (2010), workers and the firm engage in wage bargaining with equal weights.
- The firm and a worker equally divide the marginal surplus

$$\frac{\partial}{\partial h}[R_j(\omega,h)-w_j(\omega,h)h]=w_j(\omega,h). \tag{6}$$

Solving the ODE, the wage as a function of labor input is

$$w_j(\omega, h) = \frac{\sigma - 1}{2\sigma - 1} \frac{R_j(\omega, h)}{h}.$$
 (7)

▶ Workers get $\frac{\sigma-1}{2\sigma-1}R_j(\omega,h)$. The firm gets $\frac{\sigma}{2\sigma-1}R_j(\omega,h)$.

Profit Maximization

- Let d_i be the hiring cost per worker.
 - ▶ This is not a parameter, but determined in general equilibrium.
- ▶ Let $f_i P_i$ be the entry cost.
- \triangleright Firm ω in j solves

$$\pi_{j}(\omega) = \max_{h \geq 0} \left\{ \frac{\sigma}{2\sigma - 1} \Phi_{j} z_{j}^{\frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma}} h^{\frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma}} - d_{j} h - f_{j} P_{j} \right\}. \tag{8}$$

- ► The 1st term is $R_j(\omega, h) w_j(\omega, h)h$.
- ► The FOC yields the labor input

$$h_j(\omega) = \left(\frac{\sigma - 1}{2\sigma - 1}\right)^{\sigma} \left(\frac{\Phi_j}{d_j}\right)^{\sigma} z_j^{\sigma - 1}.$$
 (9)

► The wage is

$$w_j(\omega) \equiv w_j(\omega, h_j(\omega)) = d_j. \tag{10}$$

Search and Matching

► The matching function is

$$H_j = L_j^{\chi} V_j^{1-\chi}. \tag{11}$$

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H_j: aggregate employment in j, L_j: aggregate labor force in j, V_j: aggregate vacancies in j.
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- $\blacktriangleright \text{ Let } \theta_j = \frac{V_j}{L_j}.$
- Let ζ_j be the cost of posting a vacancy.
 - This is a parameter.
- ► An identity about the aggregate hiring costs:

$$d_j H_j = \zeta_j P_j V_j$$

$$\Rightarrow (w_j =) d_j = \zeta_j P_j \theta_i^{\chi}.$$
(12)

Optimal Price

▶ The f.o.b. price associated with $l_j(\omega)$ is

$$p_j(\omega) = \left(\frac{2\sigma - 1}{\sigma - 1}\right) \left(\frac{\zeta_j}{z_j}\right) \theta_j^{\chi}. \tag{13}$$

▶ The price index is

$$P_{j} = \left[\sum_{k \in N} M_{k} (t_{k,j} p_{k}(\omega))^{1-\sigma}\right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}$$

$$= \left[\sum_{k \in N} M_{k} t_{k,j}^{1-\sigma} \left(\frac{2\sigma - 1}{\sigma - 1}\right)^{1-\sigma} \left(\frac{\zeta_{k}}{z_{k}}\right)^{1-\sigma} \theta_{k}^{\chi(1-\sigma)}\right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}.$$
(14)

Labor Input, Vacancies and the Mass of Firms

▶ I rewrite labor input as a function of θ_j

$$h_{j}(\omega) = \left(\frac{\sigma - 1}{2\sigma - 1}\right)^{\sigma} \left(\frac{\Phi_{j}}{\zeta_{j} P_{j}}\right)^{\sigma} z_{j}^{\sigma - 1} \theta_{j}^{-\chi \sigma}. \tag{15}$$

• An identity $d_j h_j(\omega) = \zeta_j v_j(\omega)$ leads to the firm's vacancies

$$v_{j}(\omega) = \left(\frac{\sigma - 1}{2\sigma - 1}\right)^{\sigma} \left(\frac{\Phi_{j}}{\zeta_{j} P_{j}}\right)^{\sigma} z_{j}^{\sigma - 1} \theta_{j}^{\chi(1 - \sigma)}. \tag{16}$$

▶ Then $M_j v_j(\omega) = L_j \theta_j$ yields the mass of firms

$$M_{j} = \left(\frac{\sigma - 1}{2\sigma - 1}\right)^{-\sigma} \left(\frac{\Phi_{j}}{\zeta_{j} P_{j}}\right)^{-\sigma} z_{j}^{1 - \sigma} L_{j} \theta_{j}^{\chi(\sigma - 1) + 1}. \tag{17}$$

Aggregate Employment and Income

► The aggregate employment is

$$H_j = M_j h_j(\omega) = \theta_j^{1-\chi} L_j. \tag{18}$$

- ightharpoonup That is, the employment rate is $e_j= heta_j^{1-\chi}$.
- ▶ The aggregate expenditure is

$$X_{j} = w_{j}e_{j}L_{j} + M_{j}f_{j}P_{j} + M_{j}d_{j}h_{j}(\omega)$$

$$= \zeta_{j}P_{j}\theta_{j}L_{j} + M_{j}f_{j}P_{j}$$

$$+ \left(\frac{\sigma - 1}{2\sigma - 1}\right)^{\sigma}\Phi_{j}^{\sigma}(\zeta_{j}P_{j}\theta_{j}^{\chi})^{-\sigma + 1}z_{j}^{\sigma - 1}M_{j}.$$

$$(19)$$

Zero Profit Condition

• Write the profits as a function of θ_j and Φ_j

$$\pi_{j}(\omega) = (\sigma - 1)^{\sigma - 1} (2\sigma - 1)^{-\sigma} \Phi_{j} (\zeta_{j} P_{j} \theta_{j}^{\chi})^{1 - \sigma} z_{j}^{\sigma - 1} - f_{j} P_{j}.$$
(20)

▶ The zero-profit condition $\pi_j(\omega) = 0$ yields

$$\theta_{j} = \left[(\sigma - 1)(2\sigma - 1)^{-\frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1}} \Phi_{j}^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1}} z_{j} \zeta_{j}^{-1} f_{j}^{-\frac{1}{\sigma - 1}} P_{j}^{-\frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1}} \right]^{\frac{1}{\chi}}. \quad (21)$$

Equilibrium

▶ An equilibrium is $\{\theta_i, X_i, P_i, M_i, \Phi_i\}_{i \in N}$ that satisfies

$$\theta_{j} = \left[(\sigma - 1)(2\sigma - 1)^{-\frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1}} \Phi_{j}^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1}} z_{j} \zeta_{j}^{-1} f_{j}^{-\frac{1}{\sigma - 1}} P_{j}^{-\frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1}} \right]^{\frac{1}{\chi}}, \quad (22)$$

$$X_{j} = \zeta_{j} P_{j} \theta_{j} L_{j} + M_{j} f_{j} P_{j} + \left(\frac{\sigma - 1}{2\sigma - 1} \right)^{\sigma} \Phi_{j}^{\sigma} (\zeta_{j} P_{j} \theta_{j}^{\chi})^{-\sigma + 1} z_{j}^{\sigma - 1} M_{j}. \quad (23)$$

$$P_{j} = \left[\sum_{k \in \mathcal{N}} M_{k} t_{k,j}^{1-\sigma} \left(\frac{2\sigma - 1}{\sigma - 1} \right)^{1-\sigma} \left(\frac{\zeta_{k}}{z_{k}} \right)^{1-\sigma} \theta_{k}^{\chi(1-\sigma)} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}},$$

$$M_{j} = \left(\frac{\sigma - 1}{2\sigma - 1}\right)^{-\sigma} \left(\frac{\Phi_{j}}{\zeta_{j} P_{j}}\right)^{-\sigma} z_{j}^{1 - \sigma} L_{j} \theta_{j}^{\chi(\sigma - 1) + 1}. \tag{24}$$

$$\Phi_j = \left(\sum_{k \in N} t_{j,k}^{1-\sigma} P_k^{\sigma-1} X_k\right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}}.$$
 (26)


▶ This is a system of 5n equations with 5n unknowns (n = |N|). $_{12/22}$

Parameterization


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n=3
                       number of countries
  \sigma = 4
                    elasticity of substitution
\chi = 0.5
             labor share in the matching function
 z_{i} = 2
                           productivity
 \zeta_i = 2
                          vacancy cost
 f_i = 1
                            entry cost
 t_{i,i} = 1
                       internal trade cost
t_{i,k} = 1.1
                    international trade cost
 L_i = 2
                               labor
```

- 1. Let z_3 and L_3 vary from 1 to 3.
- 2. Let $t_{j,k}$ vary from 1 to 3.


Real Wages against z₃



Unemployment against z₃




Welfare against z₃




Welfare is $e_j \frac{w_j}{P_j}$.


Real Wages against L₃




Unemployment against L_3




Welfare against L₃



Real Wages against $t_{j,k}$



Unemployment against $t_{j,k}$



Welfare against $t_{j,k}$

