CS553: Cryptography

Assignment 5: Solutions

Rohit Das (11910230)

September 22, 2019


1. DC of Sypher002

12-bit key = (4||e||6)

Since we need the characteristic $f \xrightarrow{S} d$, the difference for the message pairs taken is "f".

Below is the matrix generated for guesses of k_2 , for which $v_0^{'} \oplus v_1^{'} = d$:

k_2 guess msg pairs	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	a	b	c	d	e	f
0 - f	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0
1 - e	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2 - d	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0
3 - c	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
4 - b	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
5 - a	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
6 - 9	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1
7 - 8	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0
$\sum_{over all pairs}$	2	0	1	2	2	1	5	2	1	2	2	4	1	0	2	1



From the matrix and SNR graph, it is evident that the signal for $k_2 = 6$ is highest, which is correct given our selection of keys.

2. Hamsi vs CryptWizard001

The Hamsi S-box is:

x	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	a	b	c	d	е	f
S(x)	8	6	7	9	3	c	a	f	d	1	е	4	0	b	5	2

The DDT for Hamsi S-box is:

$in \backslash out$	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	a	b	c	d	е	f
0	16	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	_
1	_	-	-	-	-	2	-	2	-	-	2	2	2	-	4	2
2	_	-	-	4	-	4	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	4
3	_	4	2	-	-	-	2	-	-	2	-	-	2	-	2	2
4	_	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	4	4	-	4	-	-
5	_	4	-	2	2	2	2	-	2	-	-	-	2	-	-	-
6	_	-	2	2	2	2	-	-	2	2	-	-	-	-	2	2
7	_	-	-	-	4	2	-	2	-	-	2	2	2	-	-	2
8	_	-	-	2	-	2	-	4	-	2	-	-	-	4	-	2
9	_	-	-	2	-	-	-	2	4	2	2	2	2	-	-	-
a	_	-	2	-	2	-	4	-	2	-	4	-	-	-	2	-
b	_	4	-	-	2	-	2	-	2	2	-	-	2	-	-	2
c	_	-	2	-	2	-	-	-	2	-	-	4	-	4	2	-
d	_	4	2	2	-	2	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	2	-
е	_	-	2	-	2	-	-	4	2	-	-	-	-	4	2	-
f	_	-	4	2	-	-	-	2	-	2	2	2	2	-	-	-

There are 72 places with entry: "2" and 24 with entry: "4".

 ${
m CryptWizard001}$'s S-box is:

x	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	a	b	С	d	е	f
S(x)	c	6	7	9	4	8	a	f	5	1	е	3	0	b	d	2

The DDT for CryptWizard001's S-box is:

$in \setminus out$	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	a	b	c	d	е	f
0	16	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1	_	-	-	-	2	2	-	-	-	-	2	2	2	2	2	2
2	_	-	2	-	-	-	-	2	-	2	-	4	-	2	2	2
3	_	2	4	-	-	2	4	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	2
4	_	2	-	2	-	2	2	-	2	-	2	-	-	2	2	-
5	_	2	2	2	2	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	2	-	4	-
6	_	2	-	4	-	-	2	-	4	2	-	-	-	-	2	-
7	_	-	-	4	-	2	-	2	-	-	-	-	4	2	-	2
8	_	-	-	2	2	-	-	4	-	4	2	-	-	2	-	-
9	_	-	2	2	2	-	-	2	4	-	-	-	-	2	-	2
a	_	-	4	-	2	2	-	-	2	2	4	-	-	-	-	-
b	_	2	-	-	-	2	4	-	2	-	-	-	2	-	-	4
С	_	2	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	2	2	2	4	2	-	-
d	_	2	-	-	2	4	2	2	-	2	-	-	-	2	-	-
e	_	2	2	-	2	-	-	2	-	-	2	2	-	-	2	2
f	_	-	-	-	-	-	2	2	-	2	2	4	2	-	2	-

There are 84 places with entry: "2" and 18 with entry: "4".

A fixed point in an S-Box is a property where S[x] = x. For CryptWizard001's S-Box, there is one fixed point, where S[4] = 4. This can be used to launch Fixed Point Attack on ciphers (Bard G.V. (2009) The Fixed-Point Attack. In: Algebraic Cryptanalysis. Springer, Boston, MA, pp 17-28). Algorithms that generate highly secure and non-linear S-Boxes work to avoid creating fixed points.

Since CryptWizard001's S-Box creats a fixed point, it is more vulnerable to attacks. Hence, CryptWizard001 is a liar.

3. Conforming Message Pairs

```
The 16-bits keys used for Sypher004 are = ('c253', '0466', 'affe', '645e', '0509', 'fff2'). Python code (Python 3): conform msg.py
```

```
\# messages taken as input from input.txt
import numpy as np
import sys
\# \ orig\_stdout = sys.stdout
\# f = open(`output\_cnfrm.txt', `w')
\# sys.stdout = f
sbox1 = \{0x0: 0x6, 0x1: 0x4, 0x2: 0xc, 0x3: 0x5, 0x4: 0x0,
          0x5: 0x7, 0x6: 0x2, 0x7: 0xe, 0x8: 0x1, 0x9: 0xf,
          0xa: 0x3, 0xb: 0xd, 0xc: 0x8, 0xd: 0xa, 0xe: 0x9,
          0xf: 0xb
\mathbf{def} \operatorname{sbox}_{4}(\operatorname{msg}, \operatorname{bits}): \# 4-input \operatorname{sbox}
     \mathbf{if} \ \mathbf{len} (\mathrm{msg}) \ != \ \mathbf{int} (\mathrm{\ bits\ }, 0) \! : \# \ \mathit{check\ for\ message\ length}
          exit("Plaintext size should be of " + bits + " bits")
     subs = | |
     for m in msg: # check for invalid literal
          if m not in [format(i, 'x') for i in sbox1]:
               exit("Invalid literal")
          subs.append(format(sbox1[int(m,16)], 'x'))
     return subs
def pbox(sbox out, bits):
     if len(sbox out) != int(bits, 0):
```

```
exit ("Too small sbox output!!")
    perm = [b for a in sbox out # changing hex to binary
            for b in list ("{0:04b}]".format(int(a,16)))
    \# pbox = sbox \ output \ in \ numpy \ array \ and \ transposing
    perm = np.asarray(perm)
    perm = np.reshape(perm, (4,4)).transpose()
    return "".join ([format(int("".join(a),2), 'x')
                    for a in perm | )
def sypher004 (msg, bits):
    \# uncomment below lines for more verbose output
    \# keys = ['c253', '0466', 'affe', '645e', '0509', 'fff2'] \# keys
    keys = ['340b', '3ffc', 'edfd', '8c7d', '0696', 'ffff']
    if len(msg) != int(bits, 0):
        exit ("Plaintext size should be of "
             + bits + " bits")
    \#print("Round 0:", msq)
    msg = "\{:04x\}". format(int(msg,16) ^ int(keys[0],16), 'x')
    #print("Round 0 (XOR) : ", "{0:016b}".format(int(msg,16)))
    for i in range (1, len(keys) - 1):
        msg = "".join(sbox_4x(msg, bits))
        \# print("Round", str(i), "(Sbox):", "\{0:016b\}"
        \# . format(int(msg, 16)))
        msg = pbox(msg, bits)
        # print("Round", str(i), "(Perm):", "{0:016b}"
        \# . format(int(msg, 16)))
        msg = "{:04x}". format(int(msg,16)^int(keys[i],16), 'x')
```

```
\# print("Round", str(i), "(XOR):", "{0:016b}"
         \# . format(int(msg,16)))
    return msg
def conform pairs ():
    print(" m0 "," m1 "," c0 "," c1 ",)
    \mathbf{print} \, (\, "\!-\!" * 19)
    count = 0
    with open("./input.txt") as file:
         for line in file:
             m0, m1 = line.strip().split(" ")
             c0 = sypher004 (m0, "4")
             c1 = sypher004 (m1, "4")
             if int(c0,16)^int(c1,16) = int('8000',16):
                  \mathbf{print} (m0, m1, c0, c1)
                  count += 1
    \# sys.stdout = orig\_stdout
    # f. close()
    print("There are", count, "conforming message pairs.")
conform pairs ()
# print(sypher004('0001', '4'))
```

Actual output (file generated by code contains conforming message pairs and cipher pairs): output cnfrm.txt

Number of conforming message pairs = 356

... Probability of differential
$$(8,0,0,0) \xrightarrow{S} ? \xrightarrow{S} (8,0,0,0) = \frac{356}{2^{16}} = 0.00543$$
.

The conditions for filtering here are to remove message-pairs which activate S-Boxes for nibbles 2,3 and 4, as well as those which give differences that do not match that of

differential for S-Box 1.