Foundations of Programming Languages, Verification and Security (SoSe 2025)







Lecturers: Jana Hofmann and Cătălin Hriţcu

Teaching assistants: Federico Badaloni and Yonghyun Kim

Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy (MPI-SP)

Foundations of ...

Programming Languages

- formalize simple imperative and functional languages in Coq
- type systems, program transformations, simple compilers
- semantics, metatheory (e.g. type safety of the language)

Verification

- Hoare Logic: verify imperative programs
- Relational Hoare Logic: program equivalence and security

Security

- Information flow control: preventing direct + indirect leaks
- Preventing timing side channels for crypto code:
 cryptographic constant time, speculative constant time







Why formalize programming languages?


CompCert C compiler

verified in Coq to compile correctly

- each language given a semantics
- transformations and optimizations
 - implemented as pure functions
 - proved to preserve semantics

Cătălin's group building secure compilers

- including a secure variant of CompCert
- inaugural lecture on April 30, at 4pm




The CompCert compiler is a <u>purely functional program in Coq</u>

- verification of purely functional programs often much easier
- yet some programs are hard to implement efficiently in functional languages (e.g. crypto, operating systems)


Verifying <u>imperative programs</u>

- proving formally (in Coq) that an <u>imperative program</u> satisfies a <u>functional/logical specification</u>
- Hoare Logic specifications, in terms of <u>pre- and post-conditions</u>
 - if the <u>pre-condition</u> holds for the initial state, then running the program will produce a final state satisfying the <u>post-condition</u>
- Relational Hoare Logic specifications:
 - relating 2+ executions: <u>information flow properties</u> (more on next slide)
 - relating 2+ programs: <u>program equivalence</u> (compiler optimizations)



Secure information flow

- What does it mean that a program doesn't leak secrets?
- Noninterference for simple imperative programs:
 - secrets don't flow from secret variables to public variables (assumed observable)



- Formally: executing the program <u>twice</u> with different initial values for the secret variables produces two final states whose public variables are still equal
- Can be e.g. enforced <u>statically</u> by <u>simple type system</u> (more today)

More realistic leakage models for information flow


- Cryptographic constant time (i.e. secret independent timing)
 - widely-used programming discipline for writing cryptographic code
 without leaking secrets via obvious cache side channels:
 - no secret-dependent branches and no secret-dependent memory accesses
 - the obtained guarantees formalized as a variant of noninterference
 - can also be checked by a <u>simple type system</u>
- Speculative constant time (MPI-SP folks, including Jana and Cătălin)
 - ution
 - Spectre: constant time code can still leak because of speculative execution
 - Stronger noninterference variant that prevents leaks in speculative executions
 - Speculative load hardening transformation enforcing this security property

This course is very hands on

- Coq proofs can be lots of fun!
- Course based on two textbook volumes
 - lots of exercises in Coq
 - our book versions linked from Moodle:
 https://mpi-sp-foe-2025.github.io/book-plf
 https://mpi-sp-foe-2025.github.io/book-secf

Prerequisite: Proofs are Programs

- Having attended the course last semester
- or knowing to use Coq and having (self-)studied the Logical Foundations book:
 https://mpi-sp-pap-2024-25.github.io/book-lf





Lecture logistics

- 13 lectures: roughly first 1/2 Jana, second 1/2 Cătălin
 - exceptions: first lecture Catalin, before midterm Rob on RHL
- Pentecost Vacation 9-13 June, so no lecture, no tutorials
- We hope for a mostly in-person course
 - So please attend physically whenever possible!
 - When you <u>really cannot</u> attend physically you can use Zoom or watch the recording (see Moodle)
- Join on Moodle for all materials
 - If external to RUB create account with any email address
- Advice: ask questions, interact during the lecture

Exercises

- Solving exercising <u>strongly</u> recommended
 - you will learn the most by writing programs and proofs in Coq
 - very strong correlation between exercise scores and exam scores
 - highly recommended even if you're not taking this for credit
- Exercises count for up to 20% of bonus points
 - not required to do the optional exercises; they don't count for grade
- New exercise sheet will be released on Moodle after most courses
 - there will be around 10 exercise sheets in total
- You have to turn in your solution on Moodle before next course
 - up to Wednesday at <u>11:59 AM</u> (new time, right before noon!)
- Exercises are individual, please don't share solutions in any way!
- Using generative AI to solve homework exercises is not allowed!

Tutorials: Q&A about the exercise sheets

- TAs: Federico Badaloni and Yonghyun Kim
- Tuesdays at 10:15-11:45
- You can come and ask existing questions
 - Can also ask about old assignments, but solutions anyway on Moodle
- You can also work on your own during tutorials
 - and ask questions as they arise
- If you manage to solve an exercise sheet and don't have any questions, then no problem, you are not forced to come
- Zoom participation in Q&A sessions possible (same Zoom room)
 - if you cannot make it in person, but in-person participants get priority


Exams

- Midterm exam (optional)
 - practice for the final exam
 - also written, on paper
 - duration: 60 minutes
 - bonus points: up to 10%
 - date: Wed, 28 May
 - time: 14:30-15:30
 - usual lecture slot, just in larger lecture hall

Final exam

- written, on paper
 - so we will also teach you how to write down proofs informally
- duration: 120 minutes
- 100% of the grade
- date: 8 August
- re-exam: 16 September

Credit and grade



Adding up everything, you need 49.01% to pass and get credit, and you need at least 94.01% to get highest grade