"You Talk Of Terrible Things So Matter-of-Factly in This Language of Science": Constructing Human Rights in the Academy

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How does the everyday politics behind scientific inquiry impact what we come to know about the world? Here I consider this question in the context of my own fieldwork on the human rights response to children born of war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. First, I reflect on how the academy functions to direct researchers' attention and skill sets to certain types of human rights problems in certain ways, inevitably affecting what we can know about our subject matter. Second, I consider the practical politics by which human rights scholars interface with policy-makers, the media, and the public, and the extent to which members of the human rights scholarly community constitute nodes in the wider networks we are studying.

> "There is no view from nowhere, no secure, isolated academic refuge, away from power, outside politics, economics, society and culture."
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> —Steve Smith[1]

In Spring of 2006, I was nearing the end of data collection on my investigation into the human rights of children born of rape and exploitation in conflict zones, and I presented my preliminary findings on the topic at University of Pittsburgh's Research in International Politics (RIP) monthly brown-bag.[2] In such circles, heavily dominated by empirical approaches, one does not present normative theory (that is, value-laden arguments about how the world *should* look) or policy-oriented sets of recommendations about particular problems. Rather, one identifies empirical puzzles about the world and then goes about solving them by applying or modifying existing theories. Theories, in this sense, are lenses said to explain and predict major patterns in world affairs.

Therefore, I had organized this particular paper not as a problem-focused human rights argument about children born of war, but rather as an empirical study on "issue non-emergence" within advocacy networks. I presented the subject of "children born of war" as a negative case and demonstrated why, from the perspective of agenda-setting theory, this might be considered an interesting puzzle. The case, I argued, showed that we needed a different understanding of the obstacles to issue emergence. This was the working paper version of a longer book project exploring why children born of war rape had received so little attention from advocacy organizations aiming to protect war-affected children.

My colleagues provided a variety of suggestions on the theory, the methods, and the structure of the argument. But one piece of advice particularly sticks out in my mind. "You'd better stop talking to international organizations about this issue until you publish," said one senior faculty member. "Otherwise, before you know it, you will no longer have a puzzle to explain, because these children will be *on* the agenda."

Two things struck me about this comment. First was the suggestion that in researching the non-emergence of "children born of war," I might in fact be engaged in a form of issue entrepreneurship that could alter the research findings. Second was the suggestion that the idea that more attention to this population should have been less preferable to me (or anyone) than the ability to advance my career by publishing an interesting paper. Here I

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grapple with those two problematiques as a way of thinking about what we aim for when we choose political science as a vocation, and to what extent our answers to that question are implicated in the social constructions we study.

Indeed, I found as I completed my work on Bosnia that the process of researching human rights is in fact intimately connected with the practice of constructing human rights in and around a variety of policy arenas. Far from existing outside their subject matter, human rights intellectuals are part of the human rights movement and actively shape it, whether or not our methodology demands it. But my colleagues did not advise me to explicitly account for this factor in my research or analyze the academy as a source of momentum or resistance to new human rights issues. To turn the spotlight on the academy itself would have been to breach professional norms within the discipline, norms that tell us "real" research is distinct from advocacy.[3] I increasingly realized that this very dynamic itself required analysis.

The book that resulted from this research, *Forgetting Children Born of War,* explored the absence of attention to children born of wartime rape on the human rights agenda in the 1990s. During the research and writing, I sought to exploit the recursive relationship between academics and practitioners methodologically. The research process for me consisted largely of poking around the human rights regime asking questions about what is not on the agenda and asking practitioners to justify their answers.[4] This provided insight into the regime itself, as well as its silences and the cultures within which different practitioners move. It is a methodology I continue to use in my new project.

But such a method constitutes a notable, if modest, agenda-setting function in its own right. Simply raising a new issue in a conversational setting "makes people think" and stirs up dialogue. Communicative action can lead to organizational innovation. It also introduces the individual researcher to the network of gatekeepers who can stop an issue from emerging, as well as to those "true believers" who might push for it.[5] The practitioners may come to see the researcher, through these discussions, as an expert on the substantive topic. The researcher might be invited by true believers to consult or share findings with the practitioner community. If the researcher writes op-eds or uses blogs as a way to crowd-source ideas on his/her case-studies, s/he may also inadvertently contribute to the ongoing discussion s/he is simultaneously studying.

The choice of whether and how to exercise this role has implications both for the research and for the organizations under study, and eventually for the population of concern. It is therefore impossible and irresponsible to pretend that the research process itself has not influenced the very communities of practice we study. Acknowledging this required me to reflect on my own role in the human rights network, and that of like-minded colleagues and academia as a whole, as I completed the manuscript for my former book and my new one. For no scholarly work—least of all one that plays at the boundary between *politik* and *wissenschaft*—can be fully understood without an honest interrogation of the author's relationship to her subject matter, mediated through the institutions in which she is embedded.

This argument is not original.[6] Critical theorists have long asserted that it is intellectually dishonest to avoid accounting for one's role in the social construction of world events.[7] Yet while calls for greater reflexivity in the discipline are now commonplace, they are rarely implemented in mainstream IR research.[8] Even rarer are empirical studies of the IR discipline as a site in which global politics gets constructed. This is because taking seriously the idea that we are part of the world we are studying requires more than a few paragraphs in our methods section. It requires a willingness to turn the analytical lens uncomfortably inward.

There are examples of this. James Rosenau offers such a situated approach to studying IR in the final chapter to his 2003 book *Distant Proximities,* detailing his intellectual journey throughout the sociology of IR as a discipline. Patrick Jackson and Stuart Kaufman also provide an account of their interactions, as scholars, with the political debate over the US occupation of Iraq.[9] Armed with the encouragement of such writers, I wrote a final chapter for my human rights book documenting the academy's role, including my own, in and around the issue I had been studying.

But when I submitted the manuscript, peer reviewers told me it was unsuitably autobiographical for a scholarly text, and the editors at Columbia University Press insisted it be cut. With the tenure clock ticking I reluctantly agreed—but came away from that experience even more certain that the practical politics of knowledge construction in the academy was an important part of the answer to my own research question.

Here I try again to provide that missing account of the intellectual genealogy of my book *Forgetting Children Born of War,* its evolution bumping up against the contours of the human rights regime on the one hand, and the academy on the other, as a lens into these wider dynamics of issue creation in the human rights movement. I reflect on the many ways that institutions of higher learning also serve as both entrepreneurs and gatekeepers, governing what does or does not get on the global agenda—and how scholars think about and navigate their own inevitable role in that process.

I proceed in two sections, each embellished with first-person examples from my fieldwork in the human rights movement and my location in the profession of IR. The first section examines how the academy functions to direct researchers' attention and skill sets to certain types of human rights problems and not others. The second examines the politics by which academic researchers interface with the

human rights community and the extent to which our scholarly epistemic communities constitute nodes in the wider human rights network.

Constructing "Human Rights Research" in the Academy

My initial discussion serves three goals. First, it illuminates for students and interested readers the everyday politics behind scientific inquiry. Second, it provides an honest supplement to the drier characterization of my methodological choices in the formal book version of this project, highlighting the gap between what we actually do and how we are taught to characterize it in scholarly writing. Third, it illustrates the ways in which the academy is also a site of human rights agenda-setting and agenda-vetting—a missing causal influence in my study on the subject.

Articulating a Research Question

The choice of human rights subject matter is one of the first moments in which human rights intellectuals exercise power over the global human rights agenda. Shall the topic of study be the determinants of torture? The effectiveness of torture? Whether a certain practice constitutes torture? These decisions are shaped by a variety of factors, including the availability of existing research or data on which to build, the availability of funding, the disciplinary norms in which the researcher is situated, the researcher's relative rank in the academic hierarchy (younger scholars are under more pressure to publish within the "mainstream") and such mundane factors as whether the researcher is relatively mobile. Some of these factors work against one another. Younger scholars are likelier to be itinerant and adventurous, but they also face the greatest professional disincentives to study unorthodox topics.[10]

A second important question is how to frame a particular topic. In the IR field, a very heavy emphasis rests on empirical scholarship that explains something new about the world.[11] Students are seldom trained in or encouraged to think about normative theory; there are few positions available in political science for researchers who study or teach applied ethics. Students interested in philosophy or "political theory" might study ethics, but IR remains largely an explanatory discipline.[12]

When I first began to dabble in the subject of "war babies" during my first year of doctoral work in political science in 1998, I immediately ran up against this disconnect between the ostensible purpose of my research—to expose the failure of the human rights community to respond to some very vulnerable individuals—and the disciplinary norms about the nature and *raison d'être* of academic research. My mentor and great friend Ronald Mitchell impressed upon me the importance of beginning not with a "should" question but with a "why" question that could lead to an explanation of some empirical puzzle about the world.

This emphasis on explanatory rather than normative research is a wider phenomenon in the discipline, and therefore no advisor does his or her student a service by allowing him or her to write too far outside of this mainstream.[13] I myself socialize my students in this way. What this means, however, is that human rights "scholarship" published in good IR outlets is often very far removed from the kinds of questions that activists are asking themselves and indeed from the very questions that motivate many young scholars to pursue political science before they are properly socialized, professionalized, and disciplined by our "expert" training.

Consider Beth Simmons' recent book on human rights treaties. Simmons does not question whether human rights treaties are adequate or whether there is something dysfunctional about the human rights regime, since it has contributed only to marginal improvements in human security over the course of the last seventy years.[14] Rather, she is interested in exploring what accounts for the observable variation within those margins. This is something that can be studied using previously compiled datasets and regression analysis. Similarly, while Joel Oestreich's book *Power and Principle* includes a bold chapter explicitly theorizing ethical questions about rights programming in international organizations, it comes at the end and includes a rather lengthy justification of this divergence from the mainstream subject matter.[15]

I am not saying that purely explanatory work is invalid. Quite the contrary. As Paul Krugman argues in a quote that hung on Ron Mitchell's door during my years at University of Oregon, an important line must be drawn between serious scientific study, in which the scholar's mind can conceivably be changed by the evidence, and sheer advocacy.[16] Robert Keohane makes a similar point in his important essay "Political Science as a Vocation": "In our particular investigations we need to seek objectivity . . . because otherwise people with other preferences . . . will have no reason to take our findings seriously."[17] I too drill this into my students' heads at every opportunity.

But what I am saying, and what I take pains to impress upon my students, is that the "cult of explanation" also causes scholars to miss much of importance in the world. It not only inures us to "should" questions but causes us to miss certain "why" questions, of which "why not" questions are an important subset. The methods commonly used for explanatory work tend to lead scholars toward datasets that exist, to events that have happened, and to issues that are politically salient already. These practices direct our attention away from "dogs that don't bark" and raise the barriers to gathering new data.[18] They cause us to occupy ourselves with topics we think might be of most interest to policy-makers, rather than taking the marginalized as our frame of reference.

As critical theorists have long claimed, disciplinary norms such as these affect the nature and type of research we do.

My early career can easily be used as a case in point. Presenting to my classmates and mentors an early draft of an article on "children born of war" that was later published in *Human Rights Quarterly,* I quickly recognized on the basis of the feedback that this was not a dissertation-worthy topic. While I did publish the piece at the encouragement of another mentor, it was made clear to me that this article, and the journal in which it was published, would not be of particular help to me in my early career as a political scientist. Since I was interested in a variety of other topics as well, it was easy to abandon this project for the four years it took me to finish doctoral work.

Funders also heavily impact the type of work that is done in the social scientific study of human rights, and how this work is framed. Returning to this topic after I completed my Ph.D. resulted largely from the availability of funding, namely a MacArthur Foundation Research and Writing grant that allowed me to conduct exploratory field research in Bosnia and in human rights hubs. Judging from the reviews from MacArthur as well as later panelists associated with the National Science Foundation, funders are much readier to invest in "sexy" but unexplored topics than are dissertation chairs or scholarly journals.

But funders also have a set of guidelines regarding how money may be used that impacts how research may be framed and carried out, and thus shapes the practice of human rights knowledge construction in the academy. One example is the unwillingness of funders to associate themselves too directly with sensitive subject matter. The National Science Foundation (NSF) is particularly concerned about this, as it is beholden to taxpayers and reliant on Congressional appropriations for its ongoing investment in the natural and social sciences. So although the NSF was pleased to fund my proposal entitled "Mass Rape, Forced Pregnancy and Children's Human Rights" in the summer of 2004, the Program Officer insisted that the title be changed before the project was entered into their database. It would not do, I was told, for the project to attract too much attention from certain constituencies, nor did the NSF have an interest in its projects sounding hyperbolic or "political." Although by this time mass rape, forced pregnancy and children's human rights were simply descriptive terms of reference already defined in international discourse, to the Program Officer they sounded "unscientific."[19] This anecdote shows how disconnected the language of science can be from real human beings and their struggles. This disconnect has consequences. But that abstraction is also absolutely necessary: it protects the scientific community and the idea of research for its own sake from the kind of politicization that can undermine the scientific enterprise.[20]

Obtaining Human Subjects Clearance

My research on sexual violence and child rights was contingent on interactions with other human beings who had more insight and expertise than myself into these sensitive subjects. Before a researcher affiliated with a major university may undertake any research involving other human beings, s/he must go through a heavily bureaucratic process called a Human Subjects Review. The process is mandated by the federal government under rules established by the Department of Health and Human Services and the Food and Drug Administration to govern medical testing on humans. In US institutions, it is now impossible to conduct research involving any sort of human interaction until the researcher undergoes ethics training and obtains institutional approval. One is barred professionally from using interviews even for a project in which clearance was eventually obtained, if the interviews occurred before the university signed on the dotted line.

The Institutional Review Board (IRB) process, while important, itself is daunting and can sometimes pose an impediment to research. If a researcher fails to dot an *i* or cross a *t* the processing of necessary forms can be held up for weeks, and grant money can be lost. Work in foreign countries can be even more complicated, sometimes requiring formal permission from the government involved—a difficult hurdle if the research project is designed to document human rights abuses against vulnerable populations.

Early in my career, I welcomed the human subjects process as an opportunity to educate myself, prepare professionally and receive oversight from specialists in how to manage ethical dilemmas in my work—something else for which there was no required course in my social studies graduate education. Over time, however, I clued in: the process is largely designed not to protect human subjects, but to protect universities from malpractice suits. Because human subjects clearance is based on addressing the types of dilemmas faced by medical practitioners, neither the training nor the oversight is of much relevance to scholars conducting interviews among traumatized or violently divided populations in post-conflict societies. Nor does the IRB concern itself too much with these kinds of questions.

Nothing better illustrates this than my decision to interview a certain minor child in the former Yugoslavia. This was a decision of considerable gravity for me. I had decided early on not to include interviews with children. I knew there would be problems gaining access to an appropriate sample and I was concerned about stirring up contention within their families and communities. I preferred to leave primary data-gathering on children themselves to others who were trained in social work or had the resources to maintain an ongoing presence in the children's lives. So this limited my methodology to those involved in the human rights regime around the children.

I reconsidered this general decision when I realized that this particular boy had explicitly become such an actor when he publicly launched a documentary about his life.

It seemed incongruous to write about the social construction of "children born of war" as a political problem, and champion a child rights perspective, while excluding those players in this process who happened to be under 18. This young man had identified himself as a child of war, and signaled a capacity and willingness to tell his own stories. I felt it only ethical to include him in my respondent pool—not as a war child but as an activist for children born of war. Since my original application for human subjects clearance had specified only adults in the respondent pool, I had to submit a "revised protocol" in order to secure permission to interview a minor child.

I contacted my source at the IRB office before submitting the revisions to make certain I had all my *t*'s crossed. But to my surprise, he seemed nonchalant about the revisions. He seemed to interpret his job as *not* to ensure that I conducted myself ethically, but rather to streamline the process for me in any way possible. He asked, "Is this the only child you'll be interviewing?" Yes, I said. "Will you be testing any hypotheses?" No. "Will you be generalizing from the interview?" Hardly. "In that case," he said, "You don't need permission. You're not really doing scientific research, so it doesn't really come under our jurisdiction." One child's well-being as a research subject was too insignificant for the IRB office at University of Pittsburgh or the US federal government to be concerned with.

Never mind the fact that I would very much have liked to have had my hands tied! New to research in violently divided societies, untrained in ethnographic methods, with no background in social work or child psychology, I felt rather unprepared for the work of befriending and interviewing a war-affected family. Of course, I was grateful to have the go-ahead, since I very much wanted to corroborate information I'd already gathered from other sources. But when issues did arise with this family, I had little support from my university in sorting out how to balance my professional identity with what I felt was a growing web of personal friendships.[21]

The process of human subjects clearance should, in principle, be the scholarly community's version of what international organizations call "rights-based programming," which as Joel Oestreich writes, involves "thinking about whether policies are morally defensible and whether they help individual people."[22] The institution of human subjects clearance certainly constitutes the former: it is a set of rules, procedures, and ethical standards that aim to protect the dignity and rights of individuals who contribute to research studies. One might imagine, therefore, that the IRB *process* would invoke the latter as well, that it would be a site for an ongoing consideration of the relationship between human rights and the scholarly enterprise and how the latter could be brought to bear on improving the former. It is thus an irony that the human subjects process itself can pose such barriers to rights-based research on international human rights violations.

The Data-Gathering Process

Framing a research topic and securing permissions affects the nature of science, and many have argued that this process is affected by academic norms, bureaucratic rules and the political economy of funding. But the selection and implementation of a methodology for pursuing the study further delimits the nature of the research enterprise, the types of questions that can be asked, and the findings that will emerge, and to a large extent dictates the type of written output that will result. And as with the question formulation stage, the academy privileges certain methodologies over others.

This has implications. If the subject of research is human rights, the choice of method as well as question affects what can be said about human rights. For example, my decision to never interview children as such shaped what I could and could not say about children born of war; my decision to expand my methodology beyond interviewing to participant-observation affected not only my conclusions but also the ways in which I later interpreted my interview data. Both decisions also affected my caché with human rights practitioners, sometimes negatively and sometimes positively.

In the IR subfield specifically, there are many debates about what constitutes an appropriate methodology for what question, and scholars are under normative, strategic, and practical pressures to carefully consider and justify their methodological choices. Post-positivist scholars have often lamented the weight attached to getting it "right."[23] I experienced an example of what they are talking about when I described this project idea to a senior faculty member at a job interview near the beginning of the research, when I was thinking of the book primarily as normative theory. He asked me: so what is the research question, and my answer at the time—to document how the babies were faring—tallied poorly with the language and raison d'être of IR as a discipline.

Over time the project evolved in a direction that better fit the theoretical concerns of my subfield: it became less about the babies per se and more about what their absence from the human rights agenda meant for the study of international regimes. This was not only a result of various subtle career pressures, but also the path-dependency of Western academia's emphasis on specialization. My original project would have required a set of methodological tools in which I was ill-trained. The latter enabled me to engage the methods of elite interviewing with which political scientists are slightly more familiar and in which I had some experience.

Interview research involves establishing a conversational context with another human being. From this, one derives a transcript that may be plied for substantive facts or studied as a narrative artifact. A complication is that aspects of one's social-professional identity and status themselves affect the interview process, whether or not by choice,

and must be accounted for in evaluating the results. As Carol Cohn has written of her ethnographic work in the national security establishment: "There was an 'I' who asked the questions, and inevitably, who I am shaped not only what I noticed and was able to hear, but also what people would say *to* me and *in front* of me."[24]

My various identities—American, political scientist, professor, woman, mother—were interpreted differently in different research contexts and always affected the data I was able to gather. In many cases this worked to my advantage. As a woman (and a woman interested in children), for example, I may have seemed less intimidating to male policy-makers; being a woman with some expertise in gender-based-violence issues simultaneously helped me when I interviewed women's organizations.

But these very same attributes may have induced some trepidation by diplomats associated with the Holy See who I interviewed about their role in blocking reproductive health legislation in multilateral settings. (In those cases, I stressed my status as a mother and interest in family issues and children's rights.) Elsewhere, I was repeatedly reminded of my outsider status—as an American in Bosnia-Herzegovina and as a non-practitioner when I entered the professional spaces of the UN system. This status enabled me to "play naïve" in such a way as to gain information that might not have been articulated as such to insiders, but it also limited what people would tell me openly. And to the extent that I *was* naïve—that is, never as fluent in the subtle norms and jargon of each community of practice through which I drifted as were my informants—there are certainly many things I missed or misread. To compensate for this, I asked those informants with whom I was able to maintain a correspondence to review drafts of my work as it emerged, a practice I continue on my new project.[25]

In any case, my personal attributes surely colored what was shared with me and how, as well as how I interpreted it. Interviewing is never objective and interview data never entirely accurate. This became clear to me in part because I had been hoping that the opposite would be the case—I went looking for information on war babies not from the children or families themselves but from gatekeepers in civil society surrounding them. As it became more and more obvious to me that second-hand stories of war babies could not be relied upon to provide credible details about specific cases, my agenda shifted to identifying broad patterns and more importantly, narratives about what rights violations against war babies *meant* to those with whom I spoke. Thus, the choice and limitations of my methodology ended up reconstituting my research questions.

Besides these kinds of normative, tactical, and social influences, the research process may also be affected by more pedestrian matters. Grant funding influences academics, research processes, and scientific outputs, by governing the types of expenses that may be written into a budget. For example, there are limits to what may be considered an appropriate payment to a research subject for the time it takes to contribute to a study and the cap is invariably lower than what populations in conflict zones feel their time and stories are worth. Similarly, dependent care expenses are not typically considered reimbursable research expenses by funders, so young parents conducting fieldwork in the academic profession must choose between covering the costs of their minors to accompany them in the field, or leaving them at home.[26] In my case, I opted for many short trips to the field rather than long periods away from my children.[27]

Beyond questions about the validity of a methodological approach, a different set of concerns drives ethical critiques of research methods in IR. Among qualitative researchers, feminist IR scholars and those cynical about the overly-positivist leanings of political science more generally, a strong norm toward participatory research has emerged.[28] A central tenet of this approach is that research participants themselves should be provided some degree of control over the research process. As Julie Mertus wrote in her endorsement of participatory research for future studies of children born of war, "by having the research process conducted . . . with significant input from local actors, the potential for participating individuals to be empowered in defining their role is greater."[29] On balance, humanitarian practitioners agree with Mertus; our focus groups found that any consideration of a global study carried out by international agencies was conditioned on the assumption that beneficiary populations should be empowered to assist in designing, conducting, interpreting, and disseminating the research.[30]

I found, however, that such a research strategy is complicated by work on topics like children born of war. Children are the population of concern, but it may be inappropriate to require their close involvement in research design. Nor can "the local community"—generally meaning adult gatekeepers—be uncritically empowered when the goal is to tease out the experience of marginalized groups. My research subjects generally were adults, but my research *topic* was children. I could hardly have allowed these adults to design and interpret my results while remaining true to the goals of the study. In his concluding chapter to *Born of War,* a separate volume of essays I edited on the human rights of war babies, Michael Goodhart articulated this dilemma clearly: "Participatory research . . . presumes a model in which clear, objective distinctions exist between members of the oppressing and oppressed groups . . . in cases involving children born of war, where oppression of children and mothers stems from oppression of the wider group to which the mothers belong, this felicitous alignment of values and interests breaks down."[31]

In addition, I found that research participants often do not wish to be burdened with analysis of data or questions

about research design they often feel are beyond their competence. Though I offered all informants an opportunity to review drafts or hold veto power over how their words were to be used, very few availed themselves of these opportunities. In the end, I was satisfied that my research informants from the organizations that articulated the clearest child-rights approach seemed comfortable with my methods. As a psychotherapist from one woman's organization told me, "I am happy that your research methodology is thoughtful and careful and you're not harassing these victims for their stories."[32] My constant second-guessing of my methods, however, was strong evidence to me of where disciplinary norms about research in conflict zones are aligned, and I wonder how these may impact researchers' willingness to tackle complex subjects for which these norms were not designed.

Besides participatory research, a current norm among researchers of violently divided societies is to "give something back" to those being studied.[33] And for good reason: a participant in one of my focus groups said, "People often say to me . . . that they feel extremely exploited by the research community. Yes, they came out, they saw us, and they never talked to us again. Yes, they came out, they put their names on whatever they wrote, and we don't know anything about it." So researchers who take seriously the humanity of their subjects will avoid "parachuting in" on conflict zones and then disappearing, and will rather aim for a more meaningful and politically active engagement with those individuals whose time they share through the research process.[34]

In this too, I discovered that ethically appropriate fieldwork was not quite as cut-and-dried as book chapters in methodology volumes might suggest. In some cases, it was easy to negotiate ways that I and my research could give back. The most clear-cut case was Medica Zenica, who asked simply for me to send copies of my writing when it was done, to read draft grant applications, and to share contacts I might have with donors as needed. But sometimes it was complicated. The film director who produced the documentary whose politics I analyzed offered me an interview on the condition that I would write a review of his new film for publicity purposes. Although I was not told it had to be a positive review, the implication was obvious, as was my presence as a human agent within my own subject matter.

I chose to accept. I wanted the interview, and I felt confident I could write an honest review.[35] However, the incident started me thinking about how political the process of "giving back" can be. There is nothing uncomplicated in providing endorsements for one party or another's construction of a social problem, particularly when a debate is afoot within a community. My rule of thumb on this project was that I would never do or say anything in exchange for information that I did not genuinely believe served the cause of promoting children's human rights as I understood them.

Finally, there is a fine line between "giving back" to the community one studies and becoming part of that community in a way that causes a *rethinking* of one's methodology. When I was invited by UNICEF twice to consult on the development of a fact-finding study, and invited to advise the War and Children Identity Project (WCIP) in their efforts, I faced choices between continuing to observe and collect narratives versus actively participating in and shaping those narratives.

I chose to reconstitute my project as action research. It seemed unethical to me to study a human rights nonissue without contributing to well-intentioned efforts to turn it *into* an issue. I decided my insights into the complexity and pitfalls could be of help to issue entrepreneurs at UNICEF and WCIP. But this hardly represented a sacrifice of my research project to normative concerns. Rather, I realized that there was no better way to study the barriers to issue construction than to participate in efforts at issue construction and document the resistance encountered.

Publishing in the Academy

When they heard I was writing a book, my respondents in Bosnia-Herzegovina usually assumed that I had already secured a publisher and had been awarded a large advance to conduct research. As academics quickly learn, scholarly writing is not done for money and is rarely considered for publication until it is complete. And successfully publishing an academic book on human rights often requires altering the message to fit the perceived market, the conceptual and normative orientations of the reviewers, and the editor's vision of how the book should "fit" with others in the house's series.[36]

The process of publishing an academic book manuscript begins with a short proposal to a publishing house in the discipline. If an editor is interested, the manuscript goes out to a number of reviewers selected for their expertise in the area, or often on the basis of their willingness to read the manuscript.[37] The author does not know the reviewers' identities; and the reviewers attempt to provide feedback on the manuscript solely on their assessment of its suitability for the press and its scholarly merit. The type of factors reviewers consider in determining this "fit" can play a strong role in shaping the social construction of scientific "knowledge."[38]

Feminist scholars, for example, have long emphasized the way in which gendered assumptions about "acceptable" types of knowledge and "appropriate" research methods have mitigated against studying the gender dimensions of world politics, or, more generally, those on the "bottom rungs." In a landmark study on social norms, Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink cite the paucity of gender scholarship for 50 years in the flagship journal of the IR discipline, *International Organization,* as an example of "norms" at work: "We suggest that there may have been a

well-internalized norm (with a taken-for-granted quality) that research on gender and women did not constitute an appropriate topic for IR scholarship."[39]

But feminist scholars themselves now serve as gatekeepers for certain topics in the discipline. If a manuscript is perceived by an editor as a "gender" manuscript, it will invariably be sent near-exclusively to IR feminists for review because of the assumption that feminists are the "experts" when it comes to gender work, even though feminists have long encouraged mainstream IR scholars to also develop gender expertise. This gives establishment feminist scholars a tremendous amount of influence over the way that younger scholars, feminist or non-feminist, can write or think about topics perceived as being relevant to "gender studies" in IR. Studies that do not fit the mold are often rejected.[40]

Though I developed this book as a child rights project rather than a work of gender theory, when I began sending out parts of the project for review, I discovered that editors would assume that a study concerning wartime rape is a subject best reviewed by feminist scholars. And feminist gate-keepers were not uniformly enthusiastic about the work, because it did not take as its starting point the perspective of women. So gate-keeping practices within the academy, as well as within the human rights network more broadly, pose obstacles to reframing human rights in new or unexpected ways.

There is also a more general prohibitionary norm in academia of identifying oneself too clearly as a real-world person rather than as a professional writing objectively about some subject matter. One bumps into these norms when writing up professional biographies to accompany scholarly books or articles. A detailed genealogy of my dissertation work, drafted as a preface to the book version, was cut down by the editor, who insisted in particular that I not admit the book had previously been a dissertation. The editor of a respected IR journal insisted I excise a reference to my role as a mother from my professional bio before an article of mine appeared in the journal. And although I argued with him over this, I found myself making similar demands on the contributors to my edited volume as we prepared the manuscript for submission.[41]

How much do these practices cause IR scholars to disassociate ourselves from the worlds we are studying? How much does this color an accurate interpretation by our readers of our interrelationship with the subjects of which we write? How much does it contribute to a false distinction between the sheltered world of Western academia and the world "out there" we writers, teachers and thinkers help to construct through our painting of it? How much do they convince us to "study" human rights violations without taking responsibility for building a world in which they are lessened?

When I was in the early stages of field research, one of the key questions asked by friends I developed in Bosnia-Herzegovina was who would publish my book. Another was will it be translated into Bosnian? I was at a very naïve and idealistic stage of my professional development, and my initial reaction was to think *I'll insist on a publisher who will translate it.* As the tenure clock ticked, however, I found myself worrying much more about whether the press that published the book would be considered "good enough" by my tenure committee.

I had learned through trial and error as a junior scholar that the hierarchy among academic publishing houses weighs heavily on one's tenure prospects and market value in the discipline. A number of colleagues have said to me that my one professional "misstep" was not criticism of the feminist canon (nor blogging while untenured, nor showing up at an International Studies Association panel dressed as a Cylon), but rather publishing my first book with a *commercial* press. In 1999, Larry Goodson, Bradford Dillman, and Anil Hira conducted a survey of political scientists' understandings of the press rankings in the discipline. They found that "major university presses enjoy the highest level of prestige and greatest familiarity."[42]

Some commercial presses bridge the gap between scholars and practitioners adroitly, but this is not an attribute that is rewarded in the academy. Such publishers seek policy-relevant work that is academically informed but practical, and pitched in a jargon-free style so as to be understandable by those working in policy rather than in the classroom. My decision to publish the volume of essays *Born of War* with Kumarian instead of a university press lay partly out of a sense of duty to get the research in the hands of practitioners.

But one's career advancement in political science hinges on publishing with university presses, as I was gently but firmly reminded by some (not all) senior faculty at University of Pittsburgh in the aftermath of signing the Kumarian contract. And publishing a book in a *top* university press (particularly if you are a junior scholar) generally means making it relevant to other social scientists, not to policy makers.[43] The editor at Kumarian liked the edited book idea and immediately began thinking of how to sell it to the humanitarian sector. By contrast, editors I spoke with at university presses were concerned with which theoretical debates my manuscript was speaking to and in which kinds of political science classes it might be assigned. Publishing in the academy requires making one's work relevant to professional political scientists and their students, not to the policy community, not to everyday people who might be interested in understanding an issue better, and certainly not to those being researched. In short, the pressure to talk and think and write about human rights in particular ways poses subtle pressures on academics. This contributes, I think, to scholars' tendency to focus on certain topics—data-rich, well-theorized, suitably abstract—and not on others.[44]

Constructing Human Rights Practice through Scientific Research

So far, I've been talking about ways that the academy as an institution—with its norms, procedures, and political economy—subtly impacts what we know and how we think about human rights. I have argued that the academy contributes to human rights agenda-setting in ways that ought to be acknowledged if we care about why some human rights get attention and others do not. In this section, I want to shift gears and talk about the ways that scholars interface intentionally with the practitioner world as scholars in the service of normative goals. This is also important for two reasons. First, we need to do it better. But second, we also need to think about what we're doing and be prepared to do it *responsibly,* for this is an enterprise fraught with trade-offs. It is also one that runs the risk of feeding back into and affecting research itself.

Hanging Out on the Theory-Policy "Divide"

Much is made of the theory-policy gap, and I think it is fair to say that the academy institutionalizes barriers to policy-relevant research in multiple ways. It privileges value-neutrality, whereas policymakers want prescription.[45] It incentivizes careful, lengthy, esoteric analysis, while policymakers need concise, jargon-free, actionable proposals.[46] Academics work up to several years on each paper; policymakers need short briefs produced on much shorter timelines and they care less about scientific rigor than about the nature of the specific issue at hand.[47] As Christopher Hill has said, "The more scholars train for policy relevance, even if only to justify our existence to society at large, the more difficult it becomes to maintain intellectual integrity."[48] This has led some IR scholars to argue that "what is needed is a conscious effort to alter the prevailing norms of the academic IR discipline."[49]

I'm not so sure. In Spring 2008, I gave a job talk at the University of Massachusetts-Amherst. Because my audience was a department of political scientists, I gave the scholarly version of my talk, based on the theoretical papers I had recently published in the journals *International Studies Quarterly* and *International Organization.* As I had done at my own university, I spoke of advocacy networks, issue emergence, negative cases, hypothesis-testing and generalizability. I made cursory mention of the topic of children born of war, and framed the issue as an interesting puzzle rather than a dreadful human rights problem. After an array of comments from the audience about my methods and conclusions, one senior member of the audience raised his hand and said, "The subjects you are raising are very disturbing. You talk about these terrible things so matter-of-factly, in this language of science. I think you have some great armor built up around you to help you do this. But I want to ask you what you actually think about it. *What should be done*?"

At first, I was taken aback by the question. Later I realized it was one of the richest I had received in years of giving that presentation at universities and conferences. I answered, "I don't mean to seem morally agnostic about the problems of these children. But I've tailored this talk to a scientific audience. Perhaps you'd like to see the other version of my talk, the briefing I give to humanitarian workers, to UNICEF, and to conferences on children and armed conflict."

I meant *don't worry.* I'm not merely cold and rational about these things—only when I perceive that it suits the context. We wear different masks in different settings. But what I myself realized as a result of answering his question is that while it's sometimes hard to speak the languages of science and policy simultaneously, it's neither impossible nor, as my colleague at Pitt had feared, undesirable; and certainly it's possible for the same researcher to alternate between pitching the same argument in different ways for different audiences.

And the entrenched academic norms do in fact leave even junior scholars some room to maneuver. I have encountered practitioners willing to listen to me as an academic, and academics hungry for me to articulate a clear policy stance. Joseph Lepgold has written, "There is a wider range of IR groups than the theorist-practitioner dichotomy implies, and the infrastructure that supports their activities has created a framework for useful exchanges . . . more such interactions take place already than is commonly acknowledged."[50] Indeed, I have found on this project that the gap between theory and policy, between academics and practitioners, is as much one of habit as of necessity. And habits can, and should be broken when unhelpful—or, at least, reconsidered and renegotiated.

It's all a question of learning the right skills. Unfortunately, these skills are seldom taught in political science graduate programs. I was lucky to land my first teaching job in a professional school of international affairs, where my students would go on to work for the intelligence community or State Department, rather than to become researchers. Teaching in a professional school helped me develop the skills needed to translate insights from social science into meaningful prescriptions for policy-makers. These are indeed different audiences speaking different languages, but the barrier is not insurmountable—as Alexander George puts it, it is "more of a chasm than a gap."[51] Indeed, as some colleagues and I discussed at a recent ISA roundtable, University of Massachusetts-Amherst's IR program is striving to incorporate bridge building between the theory and policy worlds actively into our doctoral curriculum.

But experiments of this type make clear that bridging this chasm is not without its consequences for the way academics think about research, interpret the results, and make sense of our responsibilities as political creatures. What skill sets do we need to cultivate, and to pass to our

students, if we are to do so successfully while avoiding traps? I discuss here three ways in which I sought, as a researcher, to interface with the practitioners I was studying, and then I conclude with how these interactions affected the research itself.

Disseminating Outputs to Policymakers

Although over time I redefined my project as an academic book rather than a policy treatise, I resolved to disseminate versions of my findings to the practitioner communities with some capacity to solve the problems I was documenting. As I moved through the spaces of the humanitarian network, popping into UN and NGO offices, gift shops, and waiting rooms for interviews, I took note of the sorts of reading materials that lay on desks, shelves, or coffee tables. Few academic books by Cambridge University Press appeared in these spaces. But I saw lots of paperbacks published by "low-tier" presses such as Kumarian, many practitioner-oriented journals like *Disasters,* and many, many sleek, colorful research "reports" with images, graphs, charts, call-outs, and sidebars. I began to envision a version of my research findings that was not about building IR theory at all, but about protecting children born of war, that would speak of the gap in programming and advocacy not as a critic or a theorist, but as a helpful observer with some concrete suggestions.

Who would publish such a piece? Not conventional IR journals.[52] Even if they did, who would read it? Other scholars perhaps, their students if I were lucky, but not likely these busy professionals in policy and planning departments of humanitarian agencies. To create a slick version of the argument, I realized I would need funds to self-publish. Though it hadn't occurred to me to put such a line item in the original budget, the NSF permits researchers to request up to 20 percent of the amount of their grant as a "supplement" to carry research further, and one of the permissible expenditures is "other direct expenditures related to publication, documentation and dissemination."[53] I was able to secure matching funds from the University of Pittsburgh's Graduate School of Public and International Affairs (GSPIA), which was only too happy to put its logo on a sleek policy report authored by one of its junior scholars, as well as both cash and in-kind assistance from the Ford Institute of Human Security, a research institute at GSPIA.

Self-publishing on a sensitive, politically salient topic necessitates a number of important and intensely political decisions by the researcher. For example, what policy recommendations could my team conceivably put forth? The focus groups on which we were reporting in the document essentially showed a lack of consensus among practitioners as to how to proceed, as well as a lack of serious prior consideration of the problem. In such a venue, what could researchers without field experience credibly suggest? Plus, by taking explicit policy positions, would we not cross the line from research to advocacy, complicating our role as objective experts?

In the end, we limited ourselves to describing the state of knowledge and practice in the humanitarian sector, and arguing simply for *some* policy attention to the children, without concrete proposals.[54] We provided basic information on children born of war, using illustrative case studies rather than broad generalizations, and to the extent possible, allowed the practitioners' comments to speak for themselves. We concluded that serious fact-finding was the appropriate next step to generate a set of policy options from which humanitarian planners could choose.[55]

Ethical dilemmas also arose. Since reports of this nature rely on imagery as much as analysis for their impact, they constitute an exercise both in scholarship and marketing. The cover photo represented the most difficult problem. University of Pittsburgh's graphic designer proposed a variety of evocative images. Most included a crying child in a war-torn land, a tearful female refugee, or a mass of women and children in a camp. I disliked all of them. I wanted something haunting, but non-descript; something uplifting. I wanted a picture of a child playing, not weeping. Or perhaps a child watching other children play. I wanted anonymity, a blurry image: no actual child's identity should be used for this report, I insisted.

Back and forth I went with the Marketing Office. In the end we settled on a photo of a child looking out a door, most of his face hidden. It could have been a child anywhere; these were in fact orphans in Sri Lanka and not children born of war at all. It was the closest I could come to evoking the kind of thoughtfulness I hoped the report would engender without the absurd, voyeuristic, pitying sensationalism I saw in much media coverage of war children. I wanted the report to make humanitarians go, *hmm,* without cringing: *here is a population who is hiding in plain sight.* I had learned from the focus groups what a delicate task that could be. It was the limit of my role as a researcher, but that I owed it to my research subjects to do that much.[56]

Another strategy I used for engaging with the human rights and human security community as a scholar during the life of this project was through political weblogs. I was inspired to blog toward the end of this project, in the fall of 2007, largely due to encouragement from other political bloggers in the profession.[57] Of course, until very recently, blogging had been rather a suspect activity for political scientists, especially those not yet tenured. A somewhat alarming article entitled "Bloggers Need Not Apply" was published pseudononymously in the *Chronicle of Higher Education* in 2005, outlining the potential risks to a scholar's professional reputation of spouting off political views in cyberspace.[58] These alleged risks, coupled with the growing trend toward maintaining weblogs, particularly among junior scholars, has led to a number of commentaries on

the topic.[59] Supposed "risks" of blogging for junior scholars include offending senior scholars, appearing too partisan, or being perceived to invest too much time in a non-scholarly activity to the detriment of research, teaching, and service.

Such factors were mitigated in my case, however, by my location in a school of public and international affairs, rather than a political science department, in which it was generally considered not only acceptable but desirable for me to communicate my research in a policy-relevant way. My faculty generally saw blogs as a legitimate way to do this, even hip and cutting-edge. (Or, at least, so they said openly, and I believed them.) In fact, I had been invited to contribute to *Security Sweep,* a blog established by the Ridgway Center for Security Studies at GSPIA. So I felt less pressure than some junior faculty, and at any rate, confined my activities (at first) to a group blog (*Duck of Minerva*) with minimal time or content commitments.[60]

The bigger dilemma for me was not some perceived trade-off between teaching, writing publishable articles, doing committee work, and blogging. Rather, I worried about the political impact that my blog posts might have and the way that I was affecting my subject matter by writing about my work still in progress. In a sense, it was just another way to disseminate my understanding of children born of war to a wider audience—not just the human rights community per se, but human rights-minded liberal policy elites in Washington who periodically read the ruminations of the *Duck of Minerva* bloggers. But as before, I reconciled my dual role by allowing the grim facts to speak for themselves. I did not openly advocate for global attention to children born of war in these venues, but rather simply suggested that the lack of it was a very interesting puzzle.[61] The same is true on my new project following other low-profile campaigns; I am likelier to write analytically about the campaigns or the issues themselves than to make the case for any particular policy solution.

Finally, I disseminated my findings directly to policy practitioners when I presented briefings to the human rights and humanitarian community. On several occasions I was invited to brief members of this community: at the UNICEF Innocenti Center in Florence, Italy; at UNICEF's Child Protection Division in New York; at the Experts' Meeting in Cologne, Germany; and at the United Nations Office of the Special Representative to the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict. One can think of such moments as data-points in a timeline of gradual issue emergence. The solicitation of such briefings by practitioners suggests an emerging acknowledgement of a problem and interest in solving it. It also provides opportunities to collect data on the current spaces for articulating new human rights, and on the boundaries of those spaces, the points at, and ways in which, policymakers listen, and the reasons for which they push back.

But such briefings are undeniably also moments of political engagement.

The role of the responsible scholar, surely, is to avail oneself of every possible opportunity to communicate one's findings to those with the power to change the world with them.[62] Yet to maintain the objectivity on which the authority of experts is based, the researcher must be *seen* as objective, not political. This poses no conundrum, in fact, to the extent that the researcher's project is *about the problem.* The objective research process applies when studying the problem; a position is taken when presenting the findings.

But what about when the research project *is* actually about the reaction of the policymakers, as in this case? Though I was usually brought in to brief practitioners about the children born of war, this was always a limited portion of my project. My underlying interest was the reaction of the international community. And if the point of the research project is to document the failure of the international community to react, then efforts to provoke such a reaction to some extent would appear to muddy the distinction between researcher and researched.

To the extent that I solved this problem at all, I did so at first by limiting my incursions into the policy arena. I provided the information asked—usually about children born of war themselves, not the absence of a policy response; I let these facts speak for themselves, and then observed the reactions of the audience. In situations where I was invited to participate as well as present, I erred on the side of observation. Of course this was harder in focus groups or conversational settings where it must have been obvious what I was fishing for. In those cases, I learned much by genuinely listening and trying to understand why practitioners might not see the child rights issues as clearly as I felt I did. In the end, that is what a researcher can do: keep an open mind.

Handling the Media

A second mechanism for disseminating one's research findings beyond academia can be, if your topic is timely and sexy enough, the media. Seeking (or acquiescing to) media attention can only be described as a fraught and precarious enterprise. When writing policy reports, blogging or doing briefings, the researcher's audience is the non-scholarly community, but the researcher always maintains control over the message.

This is not true at all when you agree to allow the media to "cover" your scholarly pursuits. National papers are on the lookout for research on new, interesting, or galvanizing issues that resonate with readers. Local papers want to report on what local intellectuals are studying and how they are connecting to the world beyond the municipality. Universities want to publicize the research activities of their faculty. All these players seem to assume that a faculty member has a stake in "getting the news out" and

"taking the credit" for research. None of these players has a stake in nuance or in timing the release of stories in such a way as to calm, rather than enhance, the jitters of practitioners working to come to a consensus about a new policy problem. And they often underestimate the way the wrong sort of news coverage can kill the careful deliberation that is often percolating behind the scenes on difficult or sensitive issues.

For these reasons, I avoided media attention for my work as long as possible. When I released my stakeholder report to the humanitarian community, for example, my hope had been that this would be disseminated widely amongst *themselves.* But I had hoped the story of the report would be muted in the media, because I suspected it would be taken less seriously by humanitarian organizations if the media blew it out of proportion or framed it carelessly. When I returned from the briefing at UNICEF at which I distributed the report and presented the findings, I found that a casual remark to my Dean about the urgency of printing copies in time had turned into a major university news story about "Pitt Professor Going to the United Nations."

After a few experiences like this, with reporters calling me up, dropping by my office for sound-bytes on the "war babies" work, and sometimes taking my remarks out of context, I developed a set of guidelines for myself in interfacing with the media. If the source was print media, I demanded one of two options: 1) the right to edit the draft story, which was rarely allowed; or 2) to answer questions in writing instead of orally, so as to choose the wording carefully. If I were to do a radio interview, I insisted on having the questions in advance—though, I learned, on a live show this is no guarantee that one won't be thrown curve balls. Though many of my colleagues told me it's much better to go on live than pre-taped "because you can speak truth to power and they can't edit you out," I discovered that pre-taped shows gave me more flexibility to shape the content. If I knew that only the best sound-bytes would be used, I could simply refuse to answer certain questions or provide awkward, incoherent answers to those where I changed my mind half-way through.

Such are the strategies by which a scholar can maintain some control over the uses to which his/her work is put in the popular consciousness. In each case, though print and radio journalists inevitably wanted me to speak to unanswerables such as "how many of these babies are there" or to prognosticate about whether "more orphanages for these children would help," my story remained simply the lack of programmatic attention to the children. I did not see it as my role to make specific policy recommendations as much as to draw attention to vulnerabilities, expose programmatic gaps, and articulate complexity.

Consulting

Of course, nothing blurs the line between research and advocacy more greatly than becoming a consultant on a policy project in the policy domain whose work one is studying. So it is surprising, given the phobia academics are said to feel toward integrating too obviously with the world of practice, that so many take consulting positions. In choosing to involve myself as a consultant on projects that I was following, I functioned not only as an observer but also as a direct player in agenda-setting efforts regarding children born of war. The extent to which I was able to contribute in a rights-oriented way to the development of this discourse was very much a product of the banal, everyday dilemmas associated with developing and overseeing a research project and drafting written results.

My foray into consulting with UNICEF began as an accident. As a result of the "poking around" by myself and earlier researchers, the Sarajevo UNICEF field office became interested in the possibility that UNICEF was missing a category of vulnerable children. But the Program Officer needed to delegate the task of data-gathering to someone, and an academic "expert" from whom the organization could distance itself if the project turned out to be a failure was a logical choice.[63] It was a win-win situation for me because I would have access to any data gathered by UNICEF. Moreover, as I explicitly outlined in the memorandum of understanding I negotiated, I could use my insights on the project to better understand the relationship between UNICEF and the issue construction process.[64] The following year, when UNICEF's Innocenti Centre picked up on the Bosnia draft study and began hatching ideas for a follow-up study in New York, I was again asked to write a background document that would set the stage for an initial meeting in New York to launch such a study. Now committed to an action research approach, I again agreed.

It seems like a simple and an obvious thing to be willing to do as an outside expert: assist policymakers in developing a framework for beginning to address a problem. But I found it difficult to maintain a specific identity as an independent, objective researcher—an "outside expert"—once accepted as a player within a policy domain.[65] Whereas I had previously been observing UNICEF as it functioned in post-war Bosnia and beyond, suddenly I was inside the game in a way I had been able to pretend I wasn't when I was "simply doing interviews."

This shift to a more participatory methodology caused me some mental discomfort, as the lines blurred between myself as a researcher and as a practitioner. My field notes became much more reflective and the process of interpreting data more complex. I had to take stock of how my dual role was affecting the subject I was researching, how to make sense of that methodologically and even how to reconcile conflicting roles. I minimized this tension as best I could by maintaining a distinction in my mind, and with UNICEF, between my own independent book project and my work as their agent. The memorandum of understanding between myself and UNICEF distinguishes my

long-term, theory-oriented, human-rights-regime-focused book project from UNICEF's short-term, practice-focused, war-baby-focused study and demarcates the areas of overlap between them. It sets out ways of sharing data between the two projects and clarified which data would be cited as UNICEF's rather than my own.[66]

Yet this distinction was more an artifact of our mutual understanding (and the norms of my profession) than a reality, and I found it was subject to reinterpretation by UNICEF officials to suit the needs of the moment.[67] My former translator had originally been hired to assist with my independent interviews. When I recruited her to get involved with the UNICEF fact-finding study as well, I naively assumed she would compartmentalize the two projects as I did. But an exit interview later made it clear that she had never really disassociated the UNICEF project from my broader book project, and saw both of them as inter-related. In fact, I got the sense that she saw the distinction as nonsense, and from a perspective outside Western academia, perhaps she was right.

There was also an interesting politics in consulting, a politics regarding the social construction of knowledge. For one thing, standard scholarly norms governing research methods, ownership over data, and vetting of results were out the window.[68] One of the key points of tension between myself as a supposed "independent expert" and the organization for whom I was producing written outputs, was the purpose of research and expectations about research design. In discussions over the scope of the Bosnia study, for example, UNICEF officials stressed that the kinds of conclusions we could reach on the basis of the interviews had to be related to the types of programmatic services UNICEF was willing to offer.[69]

By contrast, I naively viewed the project as drawing on the knowledge of civil society actors who had some understanding of the families' actual needs, in order to determine a policy direction. I asked whether it wouldn't be more appropriate to determine vulnerabilities first, then decide what programs to develop. But the response was that UNICEF had only certain capabilities, and it couldn't publish a report defining vulnerabilities in a way that it had no capability to meet. Since a different program officer had taken over by the time the draft was ready, I wrote up an exhaustive list of proposals from the survey nonetheless, partly to test what UNICEF as an organization might be willing to leave in the document, and how much of "UNICEF's" perspective was really one individual's perspective. My report included such suggestions from civil society actors as "direct payments to families." Sure enough, the incoming program officer insisted, as his predecessor would have, that these types of recommendations be stricken from the report.

In the end, I aimed to provide as objective and independent a perspective as possible, while deferring to the organization when it pushed back. I was willing to omit things from written outputs that I felt needed to be said, but I drew the line at writing things I genuinely disagreed with.[70] I therefore played some role in constructing UNICEF's understanding of these issues, but also "went along with the gatekeepers" when it came to certain frames and arguments. In this sense, it's not entirely clear to me whether I played a genuine role as an issue entrepreneur through my consulting work, or was essentially co-opted by human rights gatekeepers.[71] Or, for that matter, how much of my uncompromising commitments as an outsider actually impeded UNICEF's ability to find an advocacy frame that suited its organizational ethos. I may never know.

Epistemological Trade-offs

It is, in fact, nearly impossible for a researcher to assess these kinds of impacts on him or herself because of his/her own subjectivity. Nonetheless we can at least reflect upon these matters. Thus, we come full circle to the trade-off which my colleague highlighted in the anecdote that I began with. Robert Keohane argued at the International Studies Association Conference in 2008 that IR scholars have a responsibility to ask questions and do research "that might conceivably matter in the real world."[72] To exercise that responsibility we must engage with the real world. But by doing so, we become part of the processes we wish to study as objective outsiders. By embedding oneself in one's subject matter—by disseminating outputs to policymakers, writing for venues practitioners will read, speaking to the media or consulting—to what extent does the IR theorist abdicate any claims to objectivity, replicability, and methodological rigor?

These are important questions. But I came to acknowledge that, depending on the particular project, researchers are never so separate from the world we are studying as some of us would like to think. The responsibility lies in acknowledging this interrelationship and how it affects the research, rather than pretending it away, and interfacing with the policy sector in a way that is morally consistent with the raison d'être of the project: in my case, in a way that itself is rights-oriented.

In the end, I chose to participate in efforts at issue construction as well as to observe, in order to document the barriers encountered. The access to the human rights community this engendered assisted, rather than compromised, my project methodologically. But it did also alter it. People are likelier to talk openly once they get to know you as a person. A conversation over drinks after a briefing is much different than a formal, professional research interview. But "informants"/colleagues are also likelier to anticipate your questions, to be cognizant of what you're fishing for and how you may interpret their statements. They learn to frame their message to fit what they understand of your normative and causal orientation to the subject matter.[73] And the research becomes a two-way street, almost

a collaboration among colleagues about meanings, strategies, and goals.

I found that the research became richer as it became less, in all these ways, strictly "scientific." I had to abandon my pretense that my project could be replicated by others, or that my interview data could be rigorously coded according to the scientific standards of inter-rater reliability that I had applied to some of my other work. The project became more interpretive, as the insights I gathered were based not on an analysis of text transcripts of multiple standard interviews, but rather based on an ongoing series of interactions—sometimes correspondence, sometimes snippets of conversation over lunch, sometimes snatches of speech overheard in a women's bathroom in the United Nations, sometimes off-the-record remarks.

In this sense my own thoughts, impressions, and roles in these conversations became very much part of the dataset. The practical issues faced when marketing research findings to the humanitarian sector taught me about the nature of issue construction in that sector, about framing, about ethics, about social networks, and about what sorts of language to adopt and what to avoid. These insights reflected and helped me understand much of what I'd been told in my interviews. The process of dealing with the media as an "expert" supplemented my content analysis and historical research on the role of the media in drawing attention to issues. These experiences increased my understanding of what both journalists had told me and what human rights advocates had told me about journalists, even as my own remarks and commentary then became part of the text-data-set I was studying. Consulting provided me practical knowledge of the institutional norms within UNICEF and the humanitarian sector broadly. Such context-based knowledge gained through everyday practice is very different from what one can derive from an interview. It was valuable, even though it required me to theorize my own influence on the communities I was studying.

So I concluded that interfacing with the policy community in order to disseminate research findings itself constitutes a form of participant observation that can supplement and enrich earlier research findings derived from multiple other methods. And participant-observation is a valuable methodology for scholars studying transnational spaces or other policy arenas. But it requires IR scholars to take seriously our own presence in the world of IR. This is not something we've always done well: many IR scholars have alluded to this dynamic, but few have studied this interface empirically, and rare is the IR work that reflects on the author's role in the policy world under study. I argue that such reflection is necessary if researchers are to aim at "the use of evidence to adjudicate between truth claims."[74] The inevitable evidence of researcher influence and researcher bias must be incorporated into analysis, not denied, in order to maintain the independence and objectivity privileged by the mainstream academy. And researchers have a responsibility both to be biased in favor of making the world a better place, and to be transparent about their normative goals and these goals' impact on their empirical findings. I conclude by fleshing out what this means for scholars studying the politics of human rights.

Human Rights Scholars: Epistemic Community or Transnational Advocates?

Where do human rights intellectuals fit into the human rights regime? Do scholars documenting the way human rights are practiced globally themselves influence the politics of human rights? If so, what is our moral responsibility in this regard?

The need to ask this question itself is telling. Had this essay been published as a chapter in my book, it would have seemed very puzzling to any readers outside of the academic community. To friends and colleagues in Bosnia, to scholar-practitioners who move easily between the two worlds with little regard for IR theory, and to informed citizens, such a question must seem unbelievably arcane. That it must be asked says much about the state of the academic enterprise and the ways in which institutions of higher learning deny their power over the human rights agenda.

In IR theory, two separate literatures have alluded to the role played by human rights scholars in world politics, but rarely have we taken the trouble to theorize our role explicitly. On the one hand is the proliferating literature on transnational advocacy networks (TANs).[75] TANs are considered to be transnational networks of activists motivated by shared principled discourse and aiming to affect political behavior through moral argument.[76] All social networks are "network[s] of meanings";[77] advocacy networks are networks of *principled* meanings. In the area of human rights, the principled meanings have to do with the rights and obligations between political actors and human beings.[78] Indeed, human rights have been a significant focus for scholarship on TANs (alongside peace and the environment) precisely because these issues are considered to be primarily normative in character, and desirably so.[79]

On the other hand is a literature on epistemic communities, said to be distinguished not chiefly by principled ideas but also by shared *causal* assumptions and analytical frameworks. According to Peter Haas, an epistemic community is "a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area."[80] Although this concept grew out of studies focusing on physical scientists' role in environmental treaty-making,[81] intelligence studies,[82] and other

"technical" areas, it might well be applicable to human rights scholars as well. Human rights scholars as a community possess shared principled and causal beliefs, shared notions of validity, and a set of shared common practices associated with the general issue area of human rights.[83] And as noted earlier, human rights scholars, like other intellectuals, may interface with states and other institutions of global governance in such a way as to "frame how others interpret problems . . . set the terms of debate . . . lay the groundwork for privileging certain ideas and approaches."[84]

Though both the TAN literature and the epistemic communities literature make references to intellectuals influencing human rights politics, very few studies of normative change in international affairs have focused explicitly on the role of social scientists working at the intersection between the normative and the empirical. Joel Oestreich argues that the activities of international organizations that do rights-based programming are much like epistemic communities, though they would also be considered part of many advocacy networks.[85] Similarly, a scholar may be on the one hand committed to empirical science, aiming to further knowledge about the world as it is and on the other to a moral philosophy, aiming to promote a world as if individuals mattered.

Such are the career trajectories of notable scholar-activists such as Eric Stover, who joined the American Association for the Advancement of Science from the London Secretariat of Amnesty International in 1981, and tirelessly mobilized scientists and technical experts globally in the service of human rights.[86] In his award-winning book *Science in the Service of Human Rights,* Richard Pierre Claude documents many cases where organized communities of scientists used their skills specifically to serve the cause of advancing human rights and freedom, thereby interfacing deliberately with the human rights movement. Forensic anthropologists were pivotal documentarians of political violence behind mass graves in Argentina. Statisticians lent their expertise on a pro bono basis to United Nations investigators documenting rape patterns in the former Yugoslavia. Claude goes on to approvingly document the many ways that communities of experts have sided with NGO advocates for human rights, often against powerful states or multinational corporations.[87]

The question is whether human rights *scholars* can do this as purposively, without losing their objectivity, if the goal is not to uncover human rights abuses, but to document the human rights movement itself. My experience negotiating through the overlapping worlds of science and advocacy is that human rights scholars occupy both worlds even when we choose not to admit it; sometimes we do so uneasily. As a junior human rights scholar studying the network itself and concerned with my professional interests, my instinct was to imagine myself to be outside the network, observing it, or perhaps parachuting in sporadically on field visits to collect data. But taking off my professor's hat at the end of the day, I found myself simply a citizen, deeply committed to the idea of human rights, of child rights, and to the cause of those individuals about whose lives I was writing.

Moreover, I found myself functioning as an advocate whether wittingly or not when I participated in briefings in the policy or research communities. As was suggested by my colleagues at Pitt, one cannot help but exert an agenda-setting effect simply by calling attention to underserved categories of people and contrasting their circumstance to the allegedly universal standards to which human rights advocate claim to subscribe. In this sense, my methodology was inevitably political.

At the same time, the research spoke for itself, requiring little more of me. In briefings and invited talks in the humanitarian community and at universities in North America and Europe, I participated in conversational settings where I both refined my ideas and engaged people for whom these ideas seemed new and radical. Conversations with several humanitarian practitioners confirmed the significance of interactions with researchers in shaping their view of the agenda pool.

Correspondingly, my understanding of "the human rights network" gradually expanded over the course of my study. I came to realize that the transnational sites in which "rights talk" could be heard, measured, interpreted, or dampened down included the halls of academe, conferences, or anywhere that I as a human rights intellectual might give a briefing or invited talk and elicit conceptual or normative feedback. I recognized the power inherent in the project's dependence on the generosity of NSF panelists, conference grant committees at the International Studies Association, and the goodwill of mentors in communities like the International Association of Genocide Scholars. I recognized the gate-keeping power exercised, thankfully often on my behalf, by academics with greater status and access than I, such as those involved in Andy Knight's Children and War Project at the University of Alberta.

By extension, I recognized myself as a participant in the process of social construction about which I was writing. I began to see each encounter with other scholars as an exercise in issue construction and an opportunity to test and press against the conceptual boundaries of the human rights framework. I returned to the proceedings from the working group I had created, out of sheer loneliness and a sense that I was out of my depth, to retrace the process by which we had developed the framework that became the volume of essays *Born of War.* The workshop documents I had produced originally out of an obligation to my funders appeared, upon a second visit, as part of the documentary record by which an understudied issue becomes situated in a human rights frame. Many of the conceptual

arguments and concerns recorded in those proceedings, even simply about how to articulate research questions, echoed the moments of contestation I later observed among practitioners.

Yet academics are not quite like human rights practitioners. We are members of communities apart, even as we interface in the wider sea of the human rights movement.[88] But this relationship contains an important element of complementarity. A UNICEF staffer told me that "UNICEF can't do what independent researchers can do . . . can't use certain terminology, can't do long-term analysis on children and mothers. We need your perspective and expertise to push the envelope forward."[89] It is another way of saying that the human rights network *needs* seemingly objective "experts" beholden to an institutional structure that pretends to privilege objective truth over the pursuit of moral claims.[90]

This means that academics have power in the human rights network: they can function as gatekeepers, as has been well-documented, or they can function as issue entrepreneurs. Henri Dunant's book *A Memoire of Solferino,* disseminated to political and social elites in the nineteenth century, sparked a debate about the treatment of the war-wounded that led to the drafting of the first Geneva Convention in 1864.[91] Over the course of the next century, the radical idea that armed conflict might be regulated through treaties in such a way as to limit the suffering of human beings spread and evolved to culminate in the establishment of a standing court to try individuals accused of atrocities.

Other great advances in human rights also began with a seminal writing by an intellectual. Raphael Lemkin invented and disseminated the concept of genocide in his treatise *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe.*[92] A decade later, he convinced world governments to translate the ideas in his book into new international norms. Charlotte Bunch, a researcher at Rutgers University, sparked the global campaign to treat violence against women as a violation of human rights in a seminal article published in *Human Rights Quarterly.*[93] According to Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, this widely read article was decisive in shifting the frame in the women's rights movement and embedding women's rights firmly in the mainstream human rights movement.[94]

Political scientists who write about, interpret, and reconceive human rights have a kind of political power, power that we too seldom acknowledge as we play with philosophical and theoretical ideas for personal and professional gain, power which our training gives us few skills with which to wield wisely.[95] My identity as a junior social scientist in a policy program in a Western university setting shaped the way I framed and studied this issue and the limits I placed on my own desire to advocate more forcefully for children born of war in policy settings. In this sense, my own institutional location is part of the story of how children born of war have stayed off the agenda, even as it is part of a new story of issue creation within the child rights regime. It is part of the answer to my own research question.

If IR scholars take this claim seriously, it means those of us writing about rights must learn to think of ourselves as inside the network and think carefully about the ethics of that subject position and our actions from within it. It also means that studying the human rights network must be a reflective enterprise. I argue that, like epistemic communities of scientists in other issue areas, the activities, shared causal and normative beliefs, and everyday rules and practices of intellectuals requires closer study by analysts of international normative change.

Let us also take seriously our power as gatekeepers and the influence we exercise when arguing that a certain set of claims fall outside the discourse of "rights." How might human rights scholars contribute responsibly to the development of human rights as a set of social understandings about how to transform injustice into justice? Surely there is not one but many answers to this question. But the willingness to ask the question seems, to me, to be an important starting point.

Notes

1 Smith 2003.
2 This essay was originally written as a final chapter to my book on the topic. See Carpenter 2010.
3 Walt 2005.
4 Such an approach is common in ethnomethodology and forms the basis of the "breaching experiments" popularized by Harold Garfinkel. See Garfinkel 1963.
5 Oestreich 2007.
6 Indeed, feminist theorists routinely situate themselves within their subject matter and methodologies. For example, Baines' 2004 preface to her book *Vulnerable Bodies* includes a detailed autobiographical genealogy of the work; Cohn's 2006 reflective analysis of her ethnographic work on the national security community provides first-hand insight into the process of knowledge construction within the academy. Cockburn 1998 writes "it is more productive to acknowledge the active presence of the researcher than to wish it away."
7 For an excellent discussion of the value of different approaches to theory—as a tool, as critique or as "everyday practice"—see Zalewski 1996.
8 Aydinli and Rosenau 2004.
9 Jackson and Kaufman 2007.
10 Aydinli and Rosenau 2004.
11 Indeed in his detailed study of the profession, Ricci 1984 argues that the norm of novelty has come at the expense of truth and wisdom among political scientists.

12 A good example is the structure of the International Studies Association (ISA), whose 23 sections include only one on "International Ethics." The *Handbook of International Relations,* published by Sage in 2001, contains one chapter out of 28 dealing with *both* "Norms and Ethics in International Relations." In the International Security Studies Section Compendium process with which I was involved, fewer than 12 percent of the topics selected for full chapters revolved around explicitly normative concerns.
13 Indeed, survey data from the Teaching and Research in International Politics project at the College of William and Mary suggests that "American IR scholars share a strong and growing commitment to positivism." See Maliniak et al. 2011. Even James Rosenau, a self-defined advocate of "jailbreaks" from conventional IR methodologies and disciplinary norms, draws the line when it comes to encouraging undue dissidence among students: "Encouraging one's students is anathema for me, but on the other hand, one is reluctant to have them risk their careers because they listened to you . . . and broke with the prevailing orthodoxy prematurely." See Aydinli and Rosenau 2004.
14 Simmons 2009. On the effectiveness of human rights instruments, see Landman 2005, Burton and Ron 2009.
15 Oestreich 2007.
16 Krugman 1993.
17 Keohane 2009.
18 Lewis and Lewis 1980.
19 I was also told at this time to avoid using the term "war babies" in the abstract since the term did not sound scientific.
20 For a discussion of how tenuous this distinction in to those not socialized into political science, see Usckinski and Klofstad 2010.
21 I raised the issue of this disconnect between bureaucratic hurdles and protection of subjects in a working group on Ethics and Research at the National Science Foundation's Human and Social Dynamics Meeting in 2006. NSF staffers in the room had little wisdom to offer on the matter.
22 Oestreich 2007, 20.
23 For example, see Tickner 2005. Weston 2002 has written that "this is a persistent question. One asked with a certain tone of voice, an almost imperceptible sigh of relief that the one asking is not the one answering."
24 Cohn 2006.
25 I am deeply grateful to those who have done so.
26 While this problem particularly impacts women, it affects fathers too. A colleague of mine, for example, who had once done extensive fieldwork in Israel and Bosnia, told me he was now willing to work only with established datasets because he no longer wished to travel away from his wife and small children.
27 In fact, though I would have chosen a more long-term, anthropological approach in Bosnia-Herzegovina had I had the opportunity, I discovered that short field trips worked well for my project in several ways. For projects on sensitive topics where it is necessary to gain trust slowly, the process of leaving and coming back rather than staying awhile and leaving forever can strengthen relationships with local actors.
28 Cassell and Jacob 1987.
29 Mertus 2007.
30 Carpenter et al. 2005.
31 Goodhart 2007.
32 Anonymous interview, 2006.
33 For example, Cockburn 1998 (4) wrote in the introduction to her book on gender and nationalism that she aimed "not only to participate in and observe the everyday life of the projects but also try to contribute in some pro-active way to their goals . . . I could hardly ask the projects to afford me their time were I not to devote some of mine to them."
34 For examples and reflective essays by authors who have aimed to use this approach, see Smyth and Robinson 2002.
35 In the end I did just that. It was more descriptive than laudatory; it suited Gegic without compromising my neutrality.
36 For example, an anonymous reviewer on the edited volume that resulted from my workshops on children born of war encouraged us to alter the original title, on the basis that "child protection agencies (like UNICEF, for example) will reject it outright and that would put your book in tension with its biggest potential market."
37 Myers 2004.
38 So internalized are these practices that they are barely noticed by the individuals who engage in them. At the International Studies Association Annual Conference in 2007, I attended a panel entitled "Meet the Editors." The panel featured several editors from major presses publishing books in the discipline of international relations, giving various remarks on the publishing business. At one point the editors were asked to comment on the role of academic publishers as institutions on constructing the norms of international relations as a discipline, through editorial choices as to what and how to publish. None were genuinely able to tackle the question. Indeed I sensed that none had actually understood it.
39 Finnemore and Sikkink 1998.
40 For example, Jones's 1996 essay on gender and international relations theory in *Review of Inter-*

national Studies was rejected twice by the same three reviewers for being insufficiently feminist before the editor decided to publish it anyway. The article later went on to win the British International Studies Association's award for Best *RIS* Article of 1996. For excerpts from the reviews, see Jones 1999.

41 For a more detailed debate over the benefits and drawbacks of this academic norm, see Carpenter 2008b.
42 Goodson, Dillman, and Hira 1999, 257–62.
43 Walt 2005.
44 Not every instance of such pressure results in projects redirected or foregone. But the combination of these many banal means of shaping scholars' approach to the subject of human rights creates the possibility, I would argue, that the academy itself can stymie creative thinking about emergent topics.
45 Smith 2003, 234.
46 Newsom 1996. Teaching at GSPIA gave me a sense of the real differential in skill sets needed. After my first semester of attempting to teach MPIA students how to write graduate-level research papers, my mentors pulled me aside and taught me the value of the "short-policy-memo" writing assignment. Indeed, no terminal Masters-degree-holding young professional working for the State Department is likely to be tasked with writing a research paper publishable in a scholarly journal.
47 Walt 2005.
48 Lepgold and Nincic 2001.
49 Walt 2005, 41; Newsom 1996.
50 Lepgold 1998, 60.
51 George 1994, 179–181.
52 In fact, a piece essentially making this argument was written and rejected by several academic sources.
53 NSF 2008.
54 Carpenter et al. 2005.
55 This approach maps broadly onto what Jackson and Kaufman 2007 (97) have referred to as "Weberian activism," in which scholars ought to provide empirical information to policy-makers in order to perform a "value-clarification" function, while "refrain[ing] from offering context-independent solutions to thorny social and political problems, but . . . might contribute to the formulation of more nuanced and realistic policies."
56 I have been unable to determine whether the report had any impact. A few individuals who received it wrote me back to compliment me. Several requested additional copies to share with their colleagues. It was disseminated rather widely on the Internet through a number of human security outfits including the Liu Institute, the Humanitarian Practice Network, and the International Security Network, thanks to Ford's marketing savvy. However to my knowledge it has never been cited nor have more than one or two humanitarian officials contacted me solely on the basis of having read it.
57 I am very grateful to Daniel Nexon, Henry Farrell, and Daniel Drezner for their encouragement and mentoring as I tentatively joined the blogosphere.
58 Tribble 2005.
59 Drezner 2008; Hurt and Yin 2006.
60 Duck of Minerva is a politics and international relations theory blog founded by Georgetown University's Daniel Nexon and American University's Patrick Jackson, and now incorporating contributors from across the field. See http://www.duckofminerva.com.
61 See, for example, Carpenter 2008a.
62 Haas 2004.
63 Indeed, this is precisely how it played out. While originally the report was to be published with UNICEF as the author, and my drafts were subject to editing and oversight by UNICEF so as to conform with its organizational mandate and guidelines, once UNICEF decided to bury the report I was told the draft should bear my name instead, as an Independent Study.
64 See MOU, on file with author; UNICEF 2004.
65 Indeed, as Joseph Nye has argued, a consultant's credibility is partly based on being able to shed this hat. "If they call you 'Professor' in Washington, you're finished," he said at a panel at the International Studies Association in 2009.
66 UNICEF 2004.
67 When UNICEF program officers wished to exercise autonomy over the report they did so, editing, directing content, making decisions about which sectors to interview, and controlling the conditions under which the report was leaked to the public, then later choosing to bury it. At the same time, they sometimes behaved as if the report were mine alone, with UNICEF merely a funder—a relationship which, in academia, would have involved a completely different set of rules and norms.
68 An NGO Advisory Board was established on the Bosnia project, in part to review and provide feedback on drafts, but as of 2005 my drafts had never been sent to them.
69 I observed this norm at work in New York as well, an argument that research findings by themselves are useless and even counterproductive if they cannot be linked to services that will address the findings.
70 In the case of my work for UNICEF headquarters, this included language in the background document I had been asked to write that would have treated children born of war as consequences of sexual violence rather than as children first. After my pushing back on this a few times, UNICEF decided to drop the background document for the

consensus-building meeting altogether, since those organizing the meeting felt it would itself end up generating controversy over the frame used.

71 On human rights "gatekeeping," see Bob 2010.
72 Keohane 2008.
73 I am grateful to Peter Haas for this insight.
74 Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krasner 1998, 678.
75 Keck and Sikkink 1998; Khagram, Riker, and Sikkink 2002.
76 Price 2003.
77 White 1992, 67.
78 Risse-Kappen, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999; Hawkins 2002; Joachim 2003.
79 This has led commentators like Oestreich 2007 (18) to remark, for example, that "generally speaking, the literature on bad ideas is poorly developed." See, however, Schrad 2010.
80 Haas 1992.
81 Haas 1989, 377–403; Gough and Shackley 2001.
82 Fry and Hochstein 1993.
83 For the complete definition of an epistemic community, see Haas 1992.
84 Youde 2005, 421.
85 Oestreich 2007, 10.
86 Claude 2002, 137.
87 Ibid. See also MJ Peterson's work on indigenous human rights. Peterson, 2010. The reference to this work is MJ Peterson, 2010. "How the Indigenous Got Seats at the UN Table." *Review of International Organizations.* Volume 5(2): 197–225.
88 One informant articulated this distinction as we discussed some of the tensions we observed in the focus groups: "Programming people have a certain distaste for academics—'ornery' not exactly arrogant but 'ornery'."
89 Informal conversation, February 2005.
90 On "expert-based authority," see Finnemore, Avant, and Sell 2010.
91 Dunant 1939.
92 Lemkin 1944.
93 Bunch 1990.
94 Keck and Sikkink 1998.
95 Unlike medical practitioners, psychologists, and those working in the physical sciences, for whom rights and ethics training is part of the curriculum.

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