

popular struggle, the memories of ruptures, at first evoked by the guerillas' donning of the *kufiya*, were covered over in the interest of national unity. Both the peasantry's former social marginality and the popular character of its struggles were forgotten as the *fallah* achieved symbolic centrality. Indeed, current official accounts present the fedayeen's adoption of the *hatta* in the late 1960s as a matter of military expediency, a means of providing anonymity (al-Muzayyin 1981: 196). Adorned in his elaborately arranged *kufiya*, PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat invests himself with the trappings of the people-nation-peasantry, making himself simultaneously one of the people while asserting his position as their natural representative. On Arafat's head, the *kufiya* dissimulates differences between the leadership and the people, between rich and poor, and unites them all in horizontal comradeship. When worn in the West Bank in the mid-eighties, the *kufiya* signified either rural identity (when put on by older men) or—if donned as a scarf by urban youths—solidarity with the leadership and the fedayeen vanguard “outside” Palestine who, it was hoped, would liberate Palestinians living under occupation. (In the meantime the *tarbush* was gradually abandoned.)

But the nature of national unity, and the relation between the people and the leadership, are being renegotiated as the *intifada* progresses, and in turn the *kufiya* itself takes on new meanings. The image of the *hatta* flashed up again during the *intifada*, as the people of the Occupied Territories redefined the notion of national unity as something imposed from below, and as the heads of the middle-class leadership were, as in 1938, left somewhat exposed. In this moment of rupture, popular organizations in the Occupied Territories play a more determining role in the national movement than at any time since the PLO was founded (cf. Hiltermann 1991).

In the course of the uprising, activists have resemanticized the *kufiya*, which until recently was the symbolic property of the guerilla and the PLO leaders. The youthful activists or *shabab* wrap their faces in *kufiyas* in order to hide their identities when confronting soldiers. The army responded in the summer of 1989 by widening its shooting policy so that anyone so “masked” could be shot on sight; since then, many young men have been shot to death for merely being “masked” by a *kufiya* (Vitullo 1989a).¹⁴ Usually Palestinians (both men and women) wear it today without the *'iqal*, loosely draped over their shoulders—as a badge of national identity