erased. Yet the *kufiya* still *must* have retained a trace of danger, since it was sold chiefly by street vendors and almost never in fashion boutiques.[15] Even if it functioned only as a "quote," this citation still carried the scent of gunpowder. The *intifada*, and later the Gulf War, endowed it with new, if fleeting, oppositional meanings, as the past was remade once again. The streets of New York and Nablus continue to pass enigmatic messages back and forth.

In contrast to early 1988, when sympathy for Palestinians was on the rise, during the Gulf War of 1991 the public again began to perceive the *kufiya* as the garb of the enemy—despite its nightly appearance on TV atop the heads of "our" most visible Arab coalition allies, the Kuwaitis and Saudis. (And every television correspondent in the Gulf appeared to be outfitted by Banana Republic—as if demonstrating that the war was a late twentieth-century realization of the colonial nostalgia lodged in Banana Republic gear.) Although the *hatta*'s presence in the world of street style may have fallen off a bit by the nineties, it was ubiquitous in the brief but vigorous anti-war movement of the winter of 1991. Its apparent public meaning—identification with Palestinians-Arabs-Muslims-terrorists—was so obvious that Arab friends in New York reported they stopped wearing it for fear of violence. In mid-February, as I pulled a *hatta* over my head for protection from the Seattle rain, a group of teenaged boys who spotted me on the street yelled "Nuke Iraq." Yet the *kufiya*'s adoption by the anti-war movement perhaps demonstrated a new level of solidarity with Palestinians, and an assertion of the need to make explicit the linkages that U.S. official discourse refuses to admit, the linkage that is essentially U.S. foreign policy.

I am suggesting that the *kufiya*'s uses are embedded in a U.S. politics of style that works along an unstable continuum. The range of uses includes (1) political solidarity or romantic alignment with the Palestinian struggle; (2) a critique of official U.S. policy; (3) a "quotation" with a whiff of danger; (4) exoticism. To comprehend these various meanings of the *kufiya* requires thinking two histories—U.S. and Palestinian together: connected not through equivalence but through difference and dislocation, attraction and repulsion. As cultures bound together by networks of economy, migration, information, exploitation, and violence. To think or see these relations requires double or even multiple—not euro-vision. Rather than rest or focus on a single centered narrative, double