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Added stack protection, PIE, fortify source, etc.
Added various security options that can be enabled at compile time. These options include everything that the "hardening-check" script written by Kees Cook checks for. After this change, the hardening-check script produces the following output against the fwknopd binary: $ hardening-check server/.libs/fwknopd server/.libs/fwknopd: Position Independent Executable: yes Stack protected: yes Fortify Source functions: yes Read-only relocations: yes Immediate binding: yes One of the compile outputs (for example) that shows the new options is: /bin/bash ../libtool --tag=CC --mode=compile gcc -DHAVE_CONFIG_H -I. -I.. -g -O2 -fstack-protector-all -fPIE -pie -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2 -Wl,-z,relro -Wl,-z,now -MT fko_decode.lo -MD -MP -MF .deps/fko_decode.Tpo -c -o fko_decode.lo fko_decode.c From the hardening-check man page, here is a description of each of these options: NAME hardening-check - check binaries for security hardening features SYNOPSIS Examine a given set of ELF binaries and check for several security hardening features, failing if they are not all found. DESCRIPTION This utility checks a given list of ELF binaries for several security hardening features that can be compiled into an executable. These features are: Position Independent Executable This indicates that the executable was built in such a way (PIE) that the "text" section of the program can be relocated in memory. To take full advantage of this feature, the executing kernel must support text Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR). Stack Protected This indicates that the executable was compiled with the gcc(1) option -fstack-protector. The program will be resistant to have its stack overflowed. Fortify Source functions This indicates that the executable was compiled with -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2 and -O2 or higher. This causes certain unsafe glibc functions with their safer counterparts (e.g. strncpy instead of strcpy). Read-only relocations This indicates that the executable was build with -Wl,-z,relro to have ELF markings (RELRO) that ask the runtime linker to mark any regions of the relocation table as "read-only" if they were resolved before execution begins. This reduces the possible areas of memory in a program that can be used by an attacker that performs a successful memory corruption exploit. Immediate binding This indicates that the executable was built with -Wl,-z,now to have ELF markings (BIND_NOW) that ask the runtime linker to resolve all relocations before starting program execution. When combined with RELRO above, this further reduces the regions of memory available to memory corruption attacks.
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