AJPS AMERICAN JOURNAL of POLITICAL SCIENCE

Cleavage Identities in Voters' Own Words: Harnessing Open-Ended Survey Responses

Delia Zollinger University of Zurich

Abstract: *Fundamental transformations of underlying cleavage structures in advanced democracies should become evident in new collective identities. This article uses quantitative text analysis to investigate how voters describe their ingroups and outgroups in open-ended survey responses. I look at Switzerland, a paradigmatic case of electoral realignment along a "second," universalism–particularism dimension of politics opposing the far right and the new left. Keyness statistics and a semi-supervised document scaling method (latent semantic scaling) serve to identify terms associated with the poles of this divide in voters' responses, and hence to measure universalist/particularist identities. Based on voters' own words, the results support the idea of collective identities consolidating an emerging cleavage: Voters' identity descriptions relate to far right versus new left support, along with known sociostructural and attitudinal correlates of the universalism–particularism divide, and they reveal how groups opposed on this dimension antagonistically demarcate themselves from each other.*

Verification Materials: The data and materials required to verify the computational reproducibility of the results, procedures, and analyses in this article are available on the *American Journal of Political Science* Dataverse within the Harvard Dataverse Network, at: https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/RK66RN.

"The future does not belong to the globalists. The future belongs to patriots." Donald Trump's statement to the United Nations General Assembly (Borger 2019) encapsulates group dynamics emerging as part of a transformation of electoral politics across advanced democracies. In the past few decades, a second dimension of political competition opposing the far right and the new left has become increasingly divisive and dominant. This article contributes to research that discusses this universalism–particularism divide (often labeled "cultural") as a full-fledged electoral cleavage rivaling the historical class cleavage, complete not only with clear sociostructural foundations and articulation through party politics, but also with distinctive collective identities linking the two (Bornschier 2018; cf. Bartolini 2005; Bartolini and Mair 1990). Existing research documenting electoral realignment demonstrates structural roots of new left versus far right voting, notably in education and geography (Häusermann and Kriesi 2015; Hooghe and Marks 2018; Iversen and Soskice 2019; Kitschelt 1994; Kriesi et al. 2008). However, research empirically exploring related collective identities is lacking: We know little about whether *voters* actually think about politics as an antagonism between "globalists" and "patriots," or the like. Our knowledge is especially scant regarding multiparty contexts and looking beyond the United States or the United Kingdom (cf. Hobolt, Leeper, and Tilley 2020; Mason 2018). Using open-ended questions from two original surveys fielded in Switzerland (a paradigmatic case of a realigned party system), this article offers a novel approach to empirically integrating social identities into survey research on electoral behavior. I use quantitative text analysis to investigate the following questions: How do voters of new left and far right parties describe their ingroups and outgroups? How do these identities relate

Delia Zollinger is a PhD Candidate, Department of Political Science, University of Zurich, Affolternstrasse 56, CH-8050, Zurich, Switzerland (delia.zollinger@ipz.uzh.ch).

Open access funding provided by Universitat Zurich.
I would like to thank four anonymous reviewers, the editors of the AJPS, Kristina Bakkær Simonsen, Ivo Bantel, Daniel Bischof, Simon Bornschier, Björn Bremer, Theresa Gessler, Zac Greene, Lukas Haffert, Silja Häusermann, Sebastian Koehler, Hauke Licht, Stefan Müller, Dylan Paltra, and Marco Steenbergen for detailed comments, as well as seminar participants at the University of Zurich and the European University Institute, and conference attendants at SVPW (2020), CES (2021), and the ECPR joint sessions (workshop on affective polarization, 2021). I gratefully acknowledge support from the Swiss National Science Foundation through their Doc.CH funding scheme (SNSF Doc.CH Grant No. 188365). Data collection was further supported by the University of Zurich.

American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 00, No. 00, September 2022, Pp. 1–21

DOI: 10.1111/ajps.12743

to and reflect a universalism–particularism dimension of political competition?

By addressing these questions, this article speaks to a wider debate about whether changes in electoral landscapes reflect a long-term restructuring of political conflict or, rather, fragmentation and dissolving voter–party links (De Vries and Hobolt 2020; Kitschelt and Rehm 2015). Working with voters' responses to open-ended questions about people "like them" or "not at all like them" provides a hard test for the existence of collective identities associated with a universalism–particularism "cleavage." Compared to soliciting voters' reactions to predefined categories, this sets a higher bar and gets closer to how group distinctions employed by social scientists or deployed by political actors appear in voters' everyday notions of belonging.

This study further contributes to existing work by exploring how identities of far right *and* new left voters (expressed in their own words) relate to each other. Motivated by the rise of the nativist far right, important contributions in recent years (often based on ethnography) demonstrate how voters' notions of "us" and "them" help make sense of their preferences and responsiveness to political appeals (e.g., Cramer 2016; Hochschild 2016). Much of this work focuses on the identities of objective "losers" of structural transformations (e.g., lower-educated, rural groups). Fewer scholars have studied identities held by "winners" of modernization (e.g., urban, highly educated groups)—typically the support base of culturally progressive new left parties (Florida 2012; Savage 2015). This study combines both perspectives and considers how identities associated with new left/far right support relate to each other.

My empirical approach serves two main purposes: deriving a measure of universalist–particularist identities from open-ended responses *and* gaining an idea of the terms defining ideal types of these identities. I use keyness statistics and semi-supervised document scaling—latent semantic scaling (LSS)—to identify terms in voters' ingroup/outgroup descriptions that are associated with the poles of the universalism–particularism dimension. Methodologically, the results help validate LSS for use on relatively small corpora comprised of short documents. Substantively, the main finding is that voters actually think about society in terms of politicized group identities reflecting theoretical conceptions of the universalism–particularism divide, which implies a fairly durable new conflict structure (for Switzerland, and likely for other countries undergoing similar structural and political transformations). Identity measures based on LSS-informed dictionaries relate to far right versus new left (but not center right) support and to known sociostructural and attitudinal correlates of the universalism–particularism divide. Open-ended responses further indicate how voters draw group boundaries, highlighting that so-called winners *and* losers of modernization (e.g., in terms of education or urban/rural residence) have positive self-concepts. Ingroups are defined in opposition to each other and demarcated from outgroups in a way conferring a sense of dignity, even superiority, for both groups. Group descriptions offered by respondents (e.g., "open-minded," "tolerant," "alternative," "active" "cosmopolitans" versus "down-to-earth," "normal," "honest," "hardworking" "Swiss" citizens) suggest that voters are well aware of a universalist–particularist cleavage; theoretical "ingredients" of this divide frequently discussed by scholars—such as traditionalism, particularism, nativism versus universalism, egalitarianism, and cosmopolitanism—figure prominently in voters' identity descriptions.

Combining Theoretical Perspectives on Group Identity

The development of new identity antagonisms is best theorized by complementing insights from political sociology and social psychology. The former highlight how macrolevel changes in social structure and parties' responses may reshape collective identities, whereas the latter focus on psychological processes of identity formation at the microlevel.

Collective Identities: A Political Sociology Perspective

Collective identities figure prominently in one of the most influential theoretical approaches to understanding changing electoral politics: cleavage theory (going back to Lipset and Rokkan 1967). Cleavage theory posits that sociostructural divides translate into politics through collective identities (Bartolini 2005; Bartolini and Mair 1990; Bornschier 2018). In this perspective, identities result from bottom-up and top-down processes as structural political potentials are activated by political actors.

Opportunities for political actors to mobilize specific identities have changed as long-term developments such as educational expansion or occupational change diminished certain electoral potentials while creating new ones (Bornschier 2018). New left and far right movements and parties have played key roles in mobilizing sociostructural potentials emerging in postindustrial, increasingly globalized, knowledge-based societies. From

the 1970s onward, cultural liberalism, cosmopolitanism, multiculturalism, and environmentalism gained political relevance through the "new social movements" and later through new left (often Green) parties (Inglehart 1990; Kitschelt 1994). From the 1990s onward, far right actors put issues of community, sovereignty, and national identity on the agenda (Häusermann and Kriesi 2015). With these mobilization efforts, parties have responded to demands and grievances arising among those who are commonly called winners and losers of socioeconomic change, and relatedly to shifts in societal composition as manufacturing jobs disappeared, a more highly educated, urban, diverse middle class emerged, gender roles transformed, and family models diversified.

The new left and the far right have hence jointly articulated a second dimension of politics variably known as liberal–authoritarian (Kitschelt 1994), GAL-TAN (green-alternative-left/traditional-authoritarian-nationalist; Hooghe and Marks 2018), integration–demarcation (Kriesi et al. 2008), cosmopolitan–communitarian (De Wilde, Koopmans, and Merkel 2019), or universalist–particularist (Häusermann and Kriesi 2015). This second dimension is distinct from the first state–market dimension, which in Western Europe typically results in a tripolar political space with the (new) left opposing the center right on the first dimension and the far right on the second dimension (Oesch and Rennwald 2018). Albeit with variation in degree, consistency, and emphasis on "new left"—that is, socioculturally progressive—positions, most left parties in Western Europe today combine at least moderately socially progressive stances with economically left-wing positions. In the bigger scheme of cleavage formation, most mainstream left parties (including many social democratic parties) broadly oppose the far right as well as the center right (Oesch and Rennwald 2018; also see the analysis and discussion in Appendix I in the supporting information [SI]). Within this pole, the historically trailblazing "new left" green/left-libertarian parties continue to be the primary standard-bearers of a socially progressive agenda, and hence of primary interest for the formation of new collective identities (along with the far right).

Importantly for expectations about collective identity formation, although far right and new left actors have tapped into emerging structural divides between objective winners and losers of socioeconomic transformations forcefully and early on, the center right especially (at least in multiparty systems) has so far played a minor role tying *new* identities to a political offer (Figure 1 illustrates an ideal-typical tripolar space with a dominant universalism–particularism "cleavage"). Center right parties have typically adopted indecisive positions regarding emerging conflicts over universalism versus particularism, hence hardly mobilizing voters on this dimension. Though segments of knowledge society winners (e.g., pro-market/liberal managers) or losers (e.g., some pro-market/traditionalist small business owners) may support the center right, these parties have not been pivotal in defining a newly forming identity divide.[1] Rather, we should primarily look for distinctive universalist–particularist self-conceptions forming within far right and new left electorates, among which objective knowledge society losers and winners in terms of education (Kriesi et al. 2008), occupation (Kitschelt 1994; Kurer 2020), or urban–rural residence (Hobolt 2016; Iversen and Soskice 2019) are overrepresented respectively.

The emergence of new identities should be most evident where the emphasis of a tripolar political space shifts to the second dimension (see Figure 1), with sociocultural divides eclipsing traditional state–market divides[2] and even incorporating new distributive conflicts. I use the encompassing terms *universalism* versus *particularism* to refer to the poles of the second dimension here, since there is evidence of specific economic-distributive questions becoming aligned and bound up with cultural conflicts (with welfare chauvinism being the prime example, but also think of conflicts over responses to technological change or over the form—rather than the size—of the welfare state; Häusermann and Kriesi 2015). Where the broader left block (because of challenger and/or established parties) is increasingly "new" left in terms of its opposition to the far right, and where left versus center right opposition over traditional issue and identity divides diminishes in salience, the universalism–particularism divide is particularly likely to become char-

[1] In earlier cleavage research, the "undifferentiated positions" of the center right (and of mainstream parties generally) were expected to give way to a program catering to the "winners" of structural transformations, with culturally and economically liberal parties occupying the upper-right corner of a two-dimensional political space (Kriesi et al. 2008). Recent work also emphasizes how several conservative and Christian-democratic parties have converged on increasingly particularist positions, responding to the rise of the far right (Gidron and Ziblatt 2019, 25). The key point here is that while center right parties have started to react to growing politicization of the universalism–particularism divide, this politicization itself was (and is still) driven primarily by far right and left-wing actors.

[2] The argument here is about changing salience, clarity, and weight of political oppositions within the political system. Note that educated middle-class voters supporting universalist "new left" parties tend to also favor redistribution of wealth and income (Abou-Chadi and Hix 2021). Furthermore, new left parties may still draw support from the precariat, although this is not where we would expect a universalist identity to be primarily rooted.

FIGURE 1 Model of a Tripolar Political Space with a Dominant Universalism–Particularism Cleavage



Notes: The weight of (dashed) lines for identity and political opposition indicates relative dominance of the universalism–particularism cleavage in party politics and voters' self-perceptions. Structurally rooted divides over universalism/particularism between knowledge society winners and losers have become mobilized predominantly through far right/new left opposition in many advanced democracies. Increasing dominance of this opposition should bolster the emergence of universalist–particularist identities.

acterized by the cleavage triad of political oppositions anchored in sociostructural divides through identities.

Readily available survey data on political values are suboptimal for investigating whether electoral realignment is underpinned by new notions of group belonging (since measures of different group identities are lacking), but recent work by Bornschier et al. (2021a) provides initial supportive evidence based on *closed-ended* questions. Here, I instead rely on *open-ended* questions. If voters describe politically relevant identities reflecting a new cleavage without being prompted, this would offer stronger evidence of crystallizing universalist–particularist identities. I hence test the following hypotheses, considering ingroups and outgroups, and focusing on the electorates where identities are most likely to take shape:

H1: (Identities and Party Support): Group identities as described in open-ended survey questions relate to preferences for new left versus far right parties.

H2: (Identities' Theoretical Content): Group identities that relate to new left versus far right preferences reflect theoretical aspects of the universalist–particularist divide (traditionalism, particularism, nativism versus universalism, egalitarianism, cosmopolitanism).

Following cleavage theory, voters' identity descriptions should further indicate an antagonistic group relationship. Here, research about psychological motivations of identity formation helps refine expectations, suggesting that voters' own identities are unlikely to correspond to objective categorizations as losers and winners of modernization.

Social Identities: A Social Psychology Perspective

The observation that social identities affect behavior is an old one in social identity theory (Huddy 2001; Tajfel 1981; Tajfel and Turner 1979). Tajfel, who pioneered this strand of research, defines social identity as "that part of the individual's self-concept which derives from their knowledge of their membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance of that membership" (1981, 255). In contrast to cleavage theory, which focuses on aggregate collective identities, this definition starts with the individual and

highlights social identities' psychological value. Key insights from social identity theory are not only that people categorize themselves into social groups and that group attachments matter for behavior, but also that positive distinctiveness or self-esteem—related to group status—is the principal psychological motivation driving identity formation.

Positive self-concepts should hence underpin the universalism–particularism divide. Importantly, even lower-skilled, lower-educated, or rural "losers" of modernization typically supporting the far right should define ingroups in positive terms. Ethnographic studies indeed suggest that so-called losers of socioeconomic change define group belonging in terms of, say, arduous work, moral integrity, or geographical distance to urban centers of power and prosperity (Cramer 2016; Hochschild 2016; Lamont 2000). National identity, for example, may serve as a substitute source of self-esteem among lower-status individuals (Shayo 2009). Hence, new left and far right voters should describe ingroups that are theoretically related to the universalism–particularism divide (e.g., cosmopolitan identity versus national identity), but both should do so in positive terms.

I further expect far right voters to define ingroups in ways demarcating them from new left voters and vice versa. Social identity theory suggests that the (positive) definition of one's ingroup tends to occur in contrast to outgroups (Huddy 2001). As mentioned, cleavage theory also conceptualizes collective identities as antagonistic. If voters are aware of a universalist–particularist divide, this should be reflected in their ingroup descriptions, especially as social psychology suggests that ingroup members will elevate the importance of positive ingroup characteristics to confer superiority over outgroups (e.g., Huddy 2001, 134–36). Hence, ingroups of new left and far right voters should be defined in opposition to each other (e.g., national identity should contrast with cosmopolitan identity).

For outgroups to effectively augment new left and far right voters' own groups' standing, they should be defined in a way demarcating them from these electorates' ingroups (e.g., national identity should contrast with being foreign). Ingroup bias need not imply hostility toward outgroups, but the same factors driving positive definitions of ingroups (e.g., the need for positive distinctiveness) pave the way for derogation of outgroups (Brewer 1999)—especially in a context of polarizing political competition. Affective, identity-based polarization has become much discussed not only in the American context (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012), but also increasingly so from a comparative perspective (e.g., Gidron, Adams, and Horne 2020; Reiljan 2020; Wagner 2021). Typically defined as emotional attachment to ingroup partisans and hostility toward outgroup partisans, affective polarization need not be based on partisanship alone (Hobolt, Leeper, and Tilley 2020). If cleavage identities linking sociostructural and partisan divides are implicated in processes of affective polarization, hostile views of outgroups should contrast with voters' positive self-image. Taken together, these insights from political psychology inform the following hypotheses, again concerning ingroups and outgroups:

H3: (Identity Opposition): The group identities of new left and far right voters are defined in opposition to each other.

H4: (Identity and Self-Esteem): The group identities of new left and far right voters are defined in ways that can bolster self-esteem.

Case Selection, Data, and Methods

Case Selection

I combine a hard test of these hypotheses in terms of method (quantitative text analysis of open-ended survey responses) with the selection of a most likely case for universalist–particularist identities to have crystallized: Switzerland exemplifies electoral realignment along a universalism–particularism divide. The country constitutes a paradigmatic case of a tripolar political space in which the left advocates interventionist and culturally liberal positions, the parties of the center right advocate fiscal conservatism, and the far right adopts a socioculturally conservative, communitarian program (Oesch and Rennwald 2018). Figure 2 illustrates this by locating the main Swiss parties in a two-dimensional political space, with other Western European countries included for comparison.[3] As shown by the circle sizes, the new left and far right blocks in Switzerland are strong and occupy comparatively extreme positions on the universalism–particularism dimension. Historically, the new left impetus in Switzerland led to the adoption of culturally progressive platforms not just by the Greens, but also early on by the Social Democrats (whose core electorate today is the educated middle class), whereas early and forceful countermobilization propelled the Swiss People's Party to its current position as one of the strongest far right parties in Western Europe. As the main oppositions between these dominant new left and far right blocks

[3]Second-dimension positions are based on the CHES variable GAL-TAN.

FIGURE 2 Tripolar Political Space in Switzerland and Western Europe (Swiss Parties Highlighted)



Notes: Based on the Chapel Hill Expert Survey 2019. The figure includes parties in Western Europe that gained at least 5% of the votes in the last parliamentary election before 2019. The circle size is proportional to vote share.

have hinged on second-dimension issues, this dimension has overshadowed traditional class divides along a first state–market dimension and even started to shape new distributive conflicts following a universalist–particularist logic (in line with Häusermann and Kriesi 2015).

While far right and green parties have emerged in most Western European countries, the Swiss Social Democrats' strong new left profile (similar to the Greens') contributes to making Switzerland a particularly clear case of tripolar conflict. However, even within their party family, the Swiss Social Democrats are by no means unique in broadly combining traditional "old left" pro-redistribution stances with "new left" universalism (see SI Appendix I, pp. 22–27). Preliminary evidence based on closed-ended questions about identity further suggests that a broad left pole including many traditionally old left mainstream parties mobilizes universalist identities across different Western European countries (Bornschier et al. 2021b).

Data

I use data from two original online surveys conducted with Swiss voters, the first in September 2018 and the second between September and December 2020, that is, before and after the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, respectively. This allows for some assessment of emerging cleavage identities' stability in light of major shocks. The surveys were implemented by the social research companies GfK and Bilendi, respectively. The target population was Swiss voters (German-speaking Switzerland for the 2018 survey). Quotas for age and gender (crossed) and education were implemented. This article relies on the full sample from the first survey (N = 1,000) and

on all German-language interviews from the second (N = 1,664).[4] See sample characteristics in SI Appendix A (p. 3).

Two open-ended questions included in both surveys asked participants to describe their ingroups and outgroups. The ingroup question read, "If you imagine people with a lifestyle and opinions similar to your own, what kind of people would these be? How would you describe them?" For outgroups, respondents were asked, "And someone who is not at all like you? Someone who lives completely differently and who has very different opinions? How would you describe them?" These questions appeared at the beginning of the surveys to avoid priming effects. Since participants were told that the surveys were about social groups and politics in Switzerland, most respondents were made to think about groups, but not about *specific* groups. A subset of respondents received primes about educational and geographical inequalities as part of a survey experiment included in the 2020 survey (not analyzed here). I deal with this by controlling for treatment status and running analyses separately for the 2018 and 2020 samples. As shown below, place-based and education-related identities show up even in responses of unprimed subjects.

In terms of identities' potential sociodemographic and political correlates, the surveys included almost identical questions about respondents' age, gender, education (below secondary, secondary, tertiary), and postcode, which links to an objective measure of residence in urban/suburban/rural areas (the Eurostat DEGURBA classification). They also both included a question about party choice (2018: the party respondents feel closest to; 2020: vote intention), comparable questions about preferences on second-dimension issues (immigration, European integration, support for "social investment" in education and childcare, and gender roles), and similar closed-ended questions about identity (how close they feel to Swiss people and to cosmopolitans or *WeltbürgerInnen*). The 2020 survey included additional items useful for validation, namely, questions about respondents' propensity to vote for specific parties (i.e., ratings for each party, coming closest to a feeling thermometer) and the frequency with which people "most" or "least" like the respondents evoke certain emotions (used here as indices of ingroup and outgroup affect). The wording for all questions can be found in SI Appendix B (pp. 3–5).

Methods

To analyze responses to open-ended questions using quantitative text analysis, I build text corpora where individual responses to the questions about "similar" or "different" people are the documents, respectively.[5] I preprocess the data by removing stopwords (i.e., frequently used words such as *and* and *the*), removing punctuation, and changing uppercase to lowercase (using the quanteda package; Benoit et al. 2018).

To get an initial idea of universalist–particularist identities, I look at terms mentioned with greatest relative frequency by new left and far right voters (i.e., keyness statistics). I am interested in voters of the culturally liberal, universalist Social Democrats (SP), and Greens (GPS; and the smaller parties AL, Solidarités, and PdA), on the one hand, and the particularist, right-wing Swiss People's Party (SVP; and EDU and SD), on the other.

Next, I develop dictionaries of universalist–particularist identity markers using a semi-supervised document scaling method: latent semantic scaling (LSS). This method scores words on an underlying dimension based on contextual similarities to predefined "seed words"(Watanabe 2020).[6] Figure 3 illustrates the intuition behind LSS: Based on predefined seed words, LSS assigns a continuous universalism–particularism score to all terms in the corpus. Previously used for analyzing larger corpora with longer documents (fostering highly accurate estimates of semantic proximity), meaningful results from this application of LSS to short, targeted, open-ended survey responses can help validate it as a scaling method on a new type of data.

As the goal here is to identify words in voters' answers that are associated with the poles of the universalism–particularism divide, I define seed words relating to these poles. I do this in two ways, one theory-driven and more parsimonious, the other more data-driven and expansive. First, I provide minimal guidance to the LSS-model by setting seed words expected to theoretically capture the essence of the contrast between traditionalist/particularist/national identities (associated with the far right) and universal-

[4] Although this study focuses on German-language interviews, the structural and political changes discussed concern the entire country. In past decades, urban–rural divides (related to educational divides) over sociocultural issues *throughout* Swiss-language regions have gained salience relative to traditional political divides *between* them (Seitz 2014). The far right Swiss People's Party started its ascent in German-speaking Switzerland, but far right/new left opposition by now characterizes politics across the country.

[5] The mean number of tokens per response is 10.62 for ingroups and 10.02 for outgroups.

[6] LSS calculates the distance between seed words and entry words in a semantic space given by the text corpus. Contextual similarity is calculated as cosine similarity in a space represented by a reduced matrix of terms and text-units, that is, responses. For details on LSS, also see the online appendix of Watanabe (2017).

FIGURE 3 Dimension Defined Using Seed Words (Swiss and Cosmopolitan) for LSS



Notes: Schematic depiction of the intuition behind LSS.

ist/egalitarian/cosmopolitan identities (associated with the new left). Specifically, I set words meaning *Swiss* (particularist pole) and *cosmopolitan* (universalist pole) for ingroups and *nonconformist/unadapted* (particularist pole) and *intolerant/closed-minded* (universalist pole) for outgroups (aiming at a broad contrast between more/less authoritarianism or embracing/rejecting diversity). Here, I avoid selecting words that could draw the models toward any one specific issue (as the interest is in encompassing identity antagonisms). Hence, the theory-based seed words purposefully do not refer, for instance, to immigrants as a potential outgroup.

A second approach to selecting seed words relies on the keyness statistics described above. In other words, I use terms mentioned most distinctively by new left and far right voters to score *further* terms that might contribute to demarcating universalist–particularist boundaries. This approach is more data-driven and sensitive to the vernacular in which voters' demarcate identities. To define the ends of the scale here, I select the 10 terms mentioned with greatest relative frequency by new left and far right electorates (again, separately for ingroups and outgroups). I discard only terms that are themselves meaningless (e.g., *minded* or *hardly*) or that refer explicitly to ideological or political parties (as this comes close to what I am interested in explaining).[7]

While the theory-based, parsimonious selection of seed words makes for a hard test of whether LSS-based identity scores can explain new left versus far right party preference (no information about party preference goes into these models), more extensive keyness-based sets of seed words are well-suited to getting a broader, more accurate sense of the terms feeding into universalist–particularist boundaries. However, because the latter approach introduces some circularity when using LSS-based identity measures to predict new left/far right preferences in a multivariate setting, I use keyness statistics based on the 2018 sample to derive universalism–particularism scores for the 2020 sample, and vice versa (meaning that terms predictive of party support should also be substantively meaningful). As a last, most comprehensive set of seed words, I combine the theory-driven and data-driven selections. I hence calculate identity scores from four sets of seed words each, for ingroups and outgroups: (1) parsimonious and theory-driven (later denoted "pars.''),'' (2) based on keyness statistics from the first survey (denoted "2018''),'' (3) based on keyness statistics from the second survey "("2020''), and (4) a comprehensive set of seed words combining the previous selections ("comp.'').[8]

To derive identity scores for each respondent, I build separate ingroup and outgroup dictionaries comprised of all terms in the respective corpora, each accompanied by a continuous LSS score. Overall document scores (i.e., for each individual) are calculated by taking the sum of the scores of words included in the document weighted by the frequency of words in the document. I rescale these continuous scores to range from 0 (universalist) to 1 (particularist) and use them as independent and dependent variables in multivariate regressions to investigate how they relate to other aspects of a universalism–particularism divide.

My empirical approach allows for formal tests of Hypothesis 1 on the identity–party link (by treating identity scores as predictors of party preference) and to some extent Hypothesis 3 on identity opposition (by extracting a dimension from the data). However, I also rely on qualitative interpretations of results from keyness and LSS analyses to address Hypothesis 2 (regarding identities and universalist–particularist content), Hypothesis 3 (identity opposition), and Hypothesis 4 (identities as a source of self-esteem). Substantive interpretation is routinely used to validate quantitative text analyses, alongside correlating text-based scores with other available measures. I pursue both strategies here. In addition, qualitative interpretations of quantitative text analyses are themselves center stage in this study, since responses to open-ended questions provide novel insights into *how* a universalism–particularism divide figures in voters' minds. While quantitative text analysis methods help distill the essence of an emerging conflict from open-ended responses, subsequent qualitative interpretation allows me to (1) contextualize emerging terms against the background of existing theory and (2) discuss terms and phrasings that depart from the vocabulary typically

[7]I exclude terms used in the theory-based seed words, ensuring that different seed words lead to meaningful results.

[8]SI Appendix C (p. 6) lists all seed words.

FIGURE 4 Keyness Statistics on Ingroups: Comparing New Left versus Far Right Voters' Responses



Notes: Shows terms mentioned with greatest relative frequency by far right voters to descripe their ingroups, relative to new left voters.

used by scholars. Because the quantitative text analyses are designed to capture key aspects of an emerging conflict, qualitative interpretations notionally rest on ideal-typical universalist–particularist responses.

Results

This section starts with a discussion of terms identified as universalist versus particularist identity markers based on keyness statistics and LSS wordscores, which provide support for Hypotheses 2 through 4 (all of which concern the *substance* of identities) as well as suggestive evidence for the overarching Hypothesis 1 (concerning the *relationship* between identities and electoral preferences). This then builds up to a formal test of the relationship described in Hypothesis 1, showing results from regressions of party preferences on LSS-based identity scores. The last part presents additional analyses of identities' socio-structural, programmatic, and affective correlates. The sequence in which the results are presented reflects the steps of the analyses: (1) interpreting and scoring individual words, which also provides important face validity that responses reflect universalist–particularist identity; (2) deriving scores for individuals and relating these scores to party choice; and (3) further validating identity scores as relating to an emerging cleavage.

Universalist–Particularist Identity Markers Based on Keyness Statistics and LSS Wordscores

Figures 4 and 5 show terms used distinctively by far right voters to describe their identities compared to new left voters (and vice versa), based on the pooled sample. Figure 4 is based on voters' responses about

FIGURE 5 Keyness Statistics on Outgroups: Comparing New Left versus Far Right Voters' Responses



Notes: Shows terms mentioned with greatest relative frequency by far right voters to descripe their outgroups, relative to new left voters.

ingroups, and Figure 5 is about outgroups. SI Appendix D (pp. 7–10) breaks these relative term frequencies down for the 2018 and 2020 samples (generally showing consistency across pre- and post-COVID surveys).[9] LSS allows me to expand these insights into distinctive universalist/particularist identity markers by scoring further terms supplied by respondents along a universalism–particularism dimension. SI Appendix Tables E.1 (p. 11) and E.2 (p. 12), summarized here alongside the keyness statistics, show terms scored as most universalist/particularist based on the comprehensive seed word selection (for ingroups and outgroups, respectively).[10] As this extensive set of seed words combines theoretically selected and data-driven inputs, it should most accurately score components of universalist–particularist identities.

I start by discussing results for ingroups (see Figure 4, as well as SI Figures D.1 and D.2 and Table E.1, pp. 7–11). While the appearance and ranked position of any one specific term in the keyness statistics and LSS scoring should not be overrated, the general picture emerging from these analyses is strikingly coherent; this provides preliminary evidence for Hypothesis 1 and, more directly, insights into identities' content (Hypothesis 2): Beyond ideological labels (*right/left*),[11] distinctive identity markers delineate a prototypical

[9]SI Appendix F (p. 13) shows absolute term frequencies.

[10]Since the keyness terms enter into this specific LSS scoring as seed words, they are also ranked in SI Tables E.1 and E.2 (pp. 11–12).

[11]Parties (e.g., SVP, Green) show up less distinctively than broad ideological labels. This justifies looking at identities underpinning

particularist identity centered around (national) rootedness and patriotism, conservative adherence to tradition (and Christian heritage), a *normal/simple/quiet/frugal (rural)* life, honesty, and pragmatism. The emerging ideal-typical universalist identity is characterized by open-mindedness and tolerance, (youthful) curiosity, studying, a thirst for knowledge, and an urban, active, "alternative," healthy, environmentally aware (including *vegetarian/vegan*) lifestyle.[12]

Universalists and particularists appear to define ingroups largely in cultural terms. However, for instance, the relative importance of being *hardworking* for far right voters and *socially minded* for new left voters indicates that these groups' collective identities are not devoid of economic content. In line with accounts of realignment, hard work is more important to the far right than to the new left. Meanwhile, given the terms with which *socially minded* co-occurs in universalist/new left voters' responses (*tolerance, open-mindedness*, etc.), it might be interpreted as signaling identification with a broader egalitarian vision of a society: one that provides traditional economic-redistributive justice but also equal rights and opportunities for all. While by no means providing the last word on this question, this analysis speaks to whether a universalism–particularism divide might come to merge economic and cultural oppositions (Bornschier et al. 2021a; Häusermann and Kriesi 2015).

These analyses of ingroups also provide support for the hypothesis that both so-called winners and losers of modernization describe identities in positive terms (Hypothesis 4). The typical far right voter is often placed on the losing side of structural change, and yet these voters construe their identity positively by emphasizing ties to "home" and dignified self-reliance on hard work and common sense. New left voters, meanwhile, highlight self-perceived openness, tolerance, and dynamism. These identities are to some extent mirror images, supporting Hypothesis 3 (identity opposition): Far right voters' identities appear inwardly focused on the nation and on respectably earning one's own livelihood, whereas new left voters' identities have an outward, cosmopolitan orientation professing concern for others and for the environment.

I next turn to outgroup identity markers (see Figure 5, as well as SI Figures D.3 and D.4 and Table E.2, pp. 9–12). Beyond direct references to ideological groups, new left voters distinctively distance themselves from people who are *racist*, *xenophobic*, *conservative*, *intolerant*, *obstinate* or *closed-minded*, and *antisocial*, all terms antithetical to universalism in sociocultural *or* socioeconomic terms. They also describe their outgroup as *ignorant* (but without direct reference to lower education). Particularist voters, meanwhile, distance themselves from urban people or those failing to fit in, *lazy* people, *freeloaders* and (as indicated in SI Figures D.3 and D.4 as well as SI Table E.2, pp. 9–12) *foreigners*, *snobbish/aloof/(university-)educated* people, and *know-it-alls*. These findings are in line with Hypothesis 2 and echo ethnographic accounts of "losers" of structural changes deriving self-esteem from "hard work" or belonging to majority groups (Cramer 2016; Lamont 2000). Interestingly, although demarcation from racists, xenophobes, and defense of diversity is prominent in new left voters' identity descriptions (in line with Sobolewska and Ford 2020), foreigners do not figure consistently in the outgroup keyness statistics across the 2018 and 2020 samples. This suggests that particularist identity extends beyond negative identification with foreigners.

These insights about outgroups lend further support to Hypothesis 3 (identities are defined in opposition to each other) and Hypothesis 4 (identities are defined such that they bolster self-esteem). For instance, self-described "socially minded cosmopolitans" distance themselves from "selfish xenophobes," whereas "hard-working normal people" dissociate themselves from "lazy people and non-conformists." However, certain stray terms are not directly interpretable as evidence of universalist–particularist opposition. For instance, reference to *Switzerland* in descriptions of far right outgroups does not make immediate sense. Such "misfits" not only indicate that individuals' identities align imperfectly with theory, but they also highlight the limitations of these text analysis methods. A look at the context in which the term *Switzerland* occurs in outgroups descriptions shows, for example, that respondents distance themselves from people who "know the whole world but hardly know Switzerland" or "people who only come to Switzerland to benefit, such as migrants." Considering that standard methods of quantitative text analysis discard word order and are ill-equipped to capture more complex meaning (perhaps particularly important for demarcation from outgroups), the results presented here generally convey an impression of group boundaries that is broadly coherent and consistent with theory.

electoral preferences in a multiparty context, rather than focusing directly on party identities.

[12]Beyond the keyness statistics displayed here, LSS scores terms such as *traditional/traditions, frugal*, and *pragmatic* as particularist and *adventurous, university degree, curious, eager for knowledge, healthy*, or *without religious affiliation* as universalist (SI Table E.1, p. 11). Further, some terms show up only in keyness statistics calculated separately for the 2018 and 2020 samples (SI Figures D.1 and D.2, pp. 7–8), such as *urban, vegetarian/vegan* (new left) and *patriots* or *Christians* (far right).

One could object that respondents refer not only to *groups* narrowly defined (e.g., *Swiss*, *young*) but also to values, traits (e.g., *down-to-earth*, *hardworking*), or lifestyle markers (e.g., *vegetarian*). However, associating values or practices with specific groups is fundamental to sociological processes of drawing (symbolic) group boundaries (Lamont 2000; Lamont and Molnár 2002). Stereotyping in terms of individual traits is also consistent with social identity theory, which posits that individuals accentuate intergroup differences when categorizing themselves and others into social groups (Rothschild et al. 2019; Tajfel and Turner 1979).

In sum, this investigation of identity descriptions' substance broadly supports Hypotheses 2 to 4: Ingroup descriptions reflect theoretical aspects of the universalism–particularism divide (Hypothesis 2), such as traditionalism (e.g., *traditional/traditions*) and patriotism/nationalism (e.g., *patriots*, *eidgenossen*) versus cosmopolitanism (e.g., *weltoffen*) and post-materialist concern for self-realization (e.g., *alternative*, *adventurous*, *inquisitive*), but also spatial and educational divides (e.g., *rural*, *urban*, *university-educated*). They indicate identities defined partly in opposition to each other, suggesting an antagonistic relationship (Hypothesis 3; e.g., *nationally rooted/Swiss/down-to-earth* versus *cosmopolitan/adventurous*; *conservative/traditional* versus *alternative/critical of society*; *urban* versus *rural*). They also plausibly bolster self-esteem by highlighting positive ingroup characteristics and presenting voters' own group(s) as morally superior. In line with Hypothesis 4, this is the case both for the particularism typically associated with "losers" of structural change and the universalism of the "winners" (e.g., *down-to-earth*, *honest*, *patriots*, *Christians*, *frugal/economical*, on the one hand, and *environmentally conscious*, *vegan/vegetarian*, *tolerant*, *lively/fun-loving*, *interested/curious* on the other). We can discern analogous patterns for outgroup identity markers: Particularist references to *aloof*, *snobbish*, *university-educated*, *urban* people alongside *foreigners* and *lazy* people contrast with universalist outgroup identity markers signaling *nationalist*, *racist*, *xenophobic*, *conservative*, *ignorant* people.

Relationship between LSS-Based Identity Scores and Far Right/New Left Support

That the keyness statistics can be meaningfully interpreted already suggests that open-ended survey responses about identity contribute to explaining new left/far right support (Hypothesis1). I next test this formally, using identity scores derived from LSS results as explanatory factors of party preference. Tables 1 and 2 show results from binary logistic regressions predicting far right (Models 1–4) and new left (Models 5–8) preference, where respondents' ingroup (Table 1) or outgroup (Table 2) identity scores are the main predictors alongside a number of controls. The coefficients are logits, with standard errors in parentheses (the SI also shows average marginal effects and results based on OLS regressions; see SI Tables G.1–G.4, pp. 14–15). As summarized in the tables, the identity scores in Models 1 and 5 are derived from the theory-based seed words ("pars.") and the pooled sample is used in the estimation. The seed words underlying the identity scores in Models 2 and 6 are based on 2020 keyness statistics, and the models are fitted using the 2018 subsample. For Models 3 and 7, this is reversed (i.e., seed words based on 2018 keyness statistics, estimation using the 2020 subsample). Models 4 and 8 are again estimated using the pooled sample, and the identity scores are derived from the comprehensive ("comp.") set of theory-based and data-driven seed words. Depending on the sample used, models include year fixed effects and controls for treatment status.

The results in Table 1 and (less clearly) Table 2 support Hypothesis 1. Table 1 shows that ingroup scores based on four sets of seed words are significantly related to new left/far right support in a multivariate setup: More particularistic identity scores increase (decrease) the odds of supporting the far right (new left), controlling for factors such as education and urban/rural residence. Results for outgroup identities (Table 2) provide further albeit weaker support for Hypothesis 1. Again, the signs of all identity coefficients point in the expected directions (positive for Models 1–4, negative for Models 5–8). However, they are generally smaller and not significant across all models. Only scores based on the comprehensive set of seed words (Models 4 and 8) are of comparable magnitude to the ingroup identity scores in Table 1. Generally, the R-squared across both tables is small (between 0.06 and 0.10). There are methodological and substantive explanations for this: Methodologically, we must keep in mind that the main explanatory variables are based on open-ended responses in which respondents were entirely free in what they wrote and how they wrote it (making for rather noisy measures). Substantively, the formation of politically relevant collective identities should be driven by mobilized voters at the extremes of the universalism–particularism divide (while identity scores have less explanatory power for voters who are more moderate or less mobilized in terms of this new divide).

TABLE 1 Binomial Logistic Regressions: Ingroup Identity Scores and New Left/Far Right Party Preference

	(1) Far Right	(2) Far Right	(3) Far Right	(4) Far Right	(5) New Left	(6) New Left	(7) New Left	(8) New Left
Particularist (vs. universalist) ingroup identity	4.51** (0.96)	6.41** (1.59)	4.58** (0.93)	6.61** (0.81)	−3.81** (0.89)	−5.82** (1.58)	−5.12** (1.02)	−6.32** (0.77)
Age	0.01** (0.00)	0.01 (0.00)	0.01** (0.00)	0.01** (0.00)	−0.02** (0.00)	−0.01 (0.01)	−0.02** (0.00)	−0.01** (0.00)
Male	0.19* (0.10)	0.26 (0.16)	0.16 (0.12)	0.19* (0.10)	−0.20* (0.10)	−0.15 (0.17)	−0.24 (0.12)	−0.18 (0.10)
Less than secondary education	0.64** (0.16)	1.02** (0.29)	0.39 (0.21)	0.62** (0.17)	−0.38* (0.17)	−0.46 (0.29)	−0.30 (0.21)	−0.31 (0.17)
Secondary education	0.63** (0.12)	0.87** (0.25)	0.53** (0.14)	0.61** (0.12)	−0.29** (0.11)	−0.23 (0.20)	−0.30* (0.13)	−0.24* (0.11)
Tertiary education	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Urban	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Suburban	0.37** (0.11)	0.06 (0.19)	0.55** (0.15)	0.30** (0.11)	−0.65** (0.11)	−0.72** (0.18)	−0.62** (0.13)	−0.60** (0.11)
Rural	0.63** (0.14)	0.42 (0.23)	0.70** (0.19)	0.57** (0.15)	−0.67** (0.16)	−0.94** (0.27)	−0.46* (0.20)	−0.61** (0.16)
Tokens	−0.01 (0.00)	0.01 (0.01)	−0.00 (0.00)	−0.01 (0.00)	0.01* (0.00)	0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.00)	0.01 (0.00)
(Intercept)	−5.01** (0.56)	−6.72** (1.08)	−5.05** (0.56)	−6.79** (0.57)	2.02** (0.51)	3.20** (1.06)	3.03** (0.58)	3.90** (0.52)
Sample	Pooled	2018	2020	Pooled	Pooled	2018	2020	Pooled
Year fixed effects	x			x	x			x
Treatment (control)	x		x	x	x		x	x
Seed words	Pars.	2020	2018	Comp.	Pars.	2020	2018	Comp.
Pseudo R^2	0.06	0.08	0.08	0.09	0.07	0.09	0.09	0.10
N	2,632	972	1,660	2,632	2,632	972	1,660	2,632

Notes: Identity scores are based on four different sets of seed words: (1) parsimonious and theory driven (pars.), (2) based on keyness statistics from the 2018 survey, (3) based on keyness statistics from the 2020 survey, and (4) a comprehensive set of seed words combining the previous selections (comp.). Models including identity scores based on keyness statistics from 2018 are estimated using the 2020 sample, and vice versa.
*$p < .05$, **$p < .01$.

To judge the substantive importance of self-described identities for party preferences, I show predicted probabilities of far right and new left support by universalist–particularist identity (Figure 6 for ingroup scores, based on the eight models in Table 1; Figure 7 for outgroups, based on Table 2). Moving across the plotted range of ingroup identity scores within three standard deviations of the mean, Figure 6 indicates that increases in the probability of supporting the far right are between 26 and 47 percentage points (with these smallest and largest estimated changes deriving from the parsimonious and comprehensive sets of seed words, respectively, displayed in the top and bottom panels). Changes in the predicted probability of supporting the new left are similarly substantive, with the largest change across the plotted range of identity scores indicating a drop

FIGURE 6 Predicted Probabilities of Far Right/New Left Preference by Universalist–Particularist Ingroup Identity



Notes: The panels are based on, from top to bottom, Models 1/5, 2/6, 3/7, and 4/8 in Table 1; 95% confidence intervals. Identity scores are plotted within three standard deviations of the mean.

FIGURE 7 Predicted Probabilities of Far Right/New Left Preference by Universalist–Particularist Outgroup Identity



Notes: The panels are based on, from top to bottom, Models 1/5, 2/6, 3/7, and 4/8 in Table 2. Identity scores are plotted within three standard deviations of the mean.

TABLE 2 Binomial Logistic Regressions: Outgroup Identity Scores and New Left/Far Right Party Preference

	(1) Far Right	(2) Far Right	(3) Far Right	(4) Far Right	(5) New Left	(6) New Left	(7) New Left	(8) New Left
Particularist (vs. universalist) outgroup identity	2.92** (1.06)	2.62** (1.01)	2.90** (0.97)	7.10** (0.91)	−1.24 (1.05)	−1.77 (0.93)	−2.90** (0.93)	−4.65** (0.84)
Age	0.01** (0.00)	0.01 (0.00)	0.01** (0.00)	0.01** (0.00)	−0.02** (0.00)	−0.01 (0.01)	−0.02** (0.00)	−0.02** (0.00)
Male	0.20* (0.10)	0.24 (0.16)	0.18 (0.12)	0.20* (0.10)	−0.23* (0.10)	−0.15 (0.17)	−0.26* (0.12)	−0.22* (0.10)
Less than secondary education	0.69** (0.16)	1.15** (0.29)	0.37 (0.21)	0.67** (0.17)	−0.44** (0.17)	−0.65* (0.29)	−0.30 (0.21)	−0.41* (0.17)
Secondary education	0.65** (0.12)	0.93** (0.24)	0.56** (0.14)	0.63** (0.12)	−0.32** (0.11)	−0.33 (0.20)	−0.33* (0.13)	−0.29** (0.11)
Tertiary education	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Urban	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Suburban	0.38** (0.11)	0.10 (0.18)	0.57** (0.15)	0.38** (0.11)	−0.65** (0.11)	−0.74** (0.18)	−0.61** (0.13)	−0.66** (0.11)
Rural	0.65** (0.14)	0.48* (0.22)	0.74** (0.19)	0.64** (0.15)	−0.68** (0.16)	−0.94** (0.26)	−0.48* (0.20)	−0.66** (0.16)
Tokens	−0.00 (0.00)	−0.00 (0.01)	−0.01 (0.00)	−0.01* (0.00)	0.01 (0.00)	0.02* (0.01)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
(Intercept)	−4.16** (0.61)	−4.30** (0.77)	−4.41** (0.63)	−6.15** (0.51)	0.71 (0.59)	0.66 (0.68)	2.14** (0.60)	2.33** (0.46)
Sample	pooled	2018	2020	pooled	pooled	2018	2020	pooled
Year fixed effects	x			x	x			x
Treatment (control)	x		x	x	x		x	x
Seed words	Pars.	2020	2018	Comp.	Pars.	2020	2018	Comp.
Pseudo R^2	0.05	0.06	0.06	0.08	0.06	0.06	0.08	0.08
N	2,632	972	1,660	2,632	2,632	972	1,660	2,632

Notes: Logic of seed word selection is identical to Table 1 (see note on Table 1).
*$p < .05$, **$p < .01$.

in probability from over 40% to below 10% (bottom-most panel). These comparisons concern fairly extreme identities, but substantively (as discussed above), people with clearly defined identities are important in a process of cleavage formation. Imagine that we are comparing highly mobilized voters who describe ideal-typical universalist–particularist identities as presented in the last section. Note that in an open-ended question, even highly politicized voters may happen to mention only a few of the highly scored terms that would perhaps resonate with them in a closed-ended question, which contributes to only a few voters reaching such extreme identity scores. However, even at moderate identity scores within one standard deviation of the mean (i.e., comparing less politicized voters with weaker, less cohesive universalist–particularist identities), the estimated change in far right support ranges between 9 and 16 percentage points and that in new left support between 6 and 12 percentage points (top and bottom panels, Table 1).

Looking at the same ranges of identity scores, Figure 7 visualizes what was already evident from Table 2, namely, that the various outgroup identity scores are much less consistently strong predictors of far right and especially new left support. However, scores based on the comprehensive set of seed words do result in an impressive increase in the probability of far right support (over 40 percentage points, moving within three standard deviations of the mean; 15 percentage points within one standard deviation of the mean), suggesting that these seed words (jointly indicating nonconformity, foreignness, arrogance/snobbery, and urbanity as particularist outgroup markers and closed-mindedness, intolerance, racism, xenophobia, or selfishness as universalist outgroup markers) may capture key aspects of universalist–particularist identity.

These binomial models give an impression of how distinctive new left/far right voters' identities are within the wider electorate (mobilized and non-mobilized voters). SI Tables G.5–G.6 and Figures G.1–G.2 (pp. 16–18) further show results from multinomial regressions in which far right/new left support is contrasted with center right support. Also in this setup, far right (new left) support increases (decreases) with more particularist identity scores, and we again see that this is somewhat more consistent for ingroup than outgroup identity across various models based on different seed words and samples. Overall, in line with center right parties' so far minor role in activating a universalism–particularism divide, support for these parties varies much less with universalist–particularist identity. Further, in binomial regressions analogous to Tables 1 and 2, universalist–particularist identity scores consistently fail to significantly predict center right support (not shown).

The results so far indicate that ingroup identity scores more consistently and strongly relate to new left and far right preference than outgroup scores. Variation in the distribution of identity scores based on different sets of seed words (Figures 6 and 7) is informative in this regard. Some seed words result in many neutral scores, that is, responses that were hard or impossible to scale based on the information provided to the LSS models. This is the case for scores based on the most parsimonious seed word selections (top panels in Figures 6 and 7), but also generally more so for outgroup than ingroup scores. The distributions for ingroup scores suggest that these seed words are meaningful and frequent enough to scale most individual responses along a universalism–particularism dimension. In fact, 62% of respondents directly mention at least one term included in the comprehensive set of ingroup seed words (underlying the bottom panel in Figure 6), in contrast to 40% mentioning an outgroup seed word.

Taken together, these results indicate that we can glean a good idea of ingroup identity markers separating new left and far right voters from a combination of keyness and LSS analyses. This is less clear for outgroup identity markers, where subsets of seed words less consistently inform meaningful identity scores. I see three possible reasons for this: First, outgroup boundaries may be less pronounced; second, outgroup identities may be more narrowly defined, hinging on a few identity markers (such as those captured in the comprehensive seed words, discussed above); or third, bag-of-words text analysis may be less well-suited to capturing outgroup descriptions, where negation and greater variation in the wording and syntax through which demarcations are expressed may elude keyness statistics and LSS scoring.

Identities as an Element of a New "Cleavage" (Validation Based on Structural, Attitudinal, and Affective Correlates)

Since the results inspire greater confidence in my ability to capture ingroup identity markers, I now focus on these as I look beyond party support to the broader question of whether voters' identity descriptions can be seen as evidence of an emerging cleavage (I more briefly discuss results for outgroups, shown in the SI, pp. 19–21). Specifically, I am interested in whether ideal-typical universalist–particularist identities relate to socio-structural and attitudinal aspects of the universalism–particularism divide (both extensively studied in existing work). Further validation analyses can also bolster confidence that voters' responses truly reflect identity. I focus here on identity scores based on the comprehensive seed word selection, which should capture identity boundaries most accurately and comprehensively.

Regression results in Table 3 (where universalist–particularist identity is the dependent variable) show that lower education levels as well as suburban and rural residence are indeed significantly associated with more particularist identity, compared to higher education and urban residence (this is less clear for outgroup identity; see SI Appendix H, p. 19). Particularist identity is also positively and significantly associated with anti-immigrant and Euroskeptic attitudes, negative attitudes toward social investment through public education or childcare, and the view that families suffer when women work full-time—all well-established attitudinal/programmatic expressions of the universalism–particularism divide (all but one of these items are also significantly associated with outgroup identity scores; see SI Table H.1, p. 19). Once again, the R-squared and effects are generally small (remember that identity scores range from 0 = universalist to 1 = particularist).

TABLE 3 OLS Regressions of Universalist–Particularist Identity Scores (Ingroups) on Socio-Structural Factors, Attitudes, and Closed-Ended Measures of Identity

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Social Structure and Demographics								
Age	0.000**	0.000**	0.000**	0.000**	0.000**	0.000**	0.000**	0.000**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Male	0.007*	0.006*	0.006*	0.006*	0.006*	0.006*	0.006*	0.007**
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Less than secondary education	0.016**	0.010*	0.012**	0.016**	0.017**	0.012**	0.011*	0.016**
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Secondary education	0.012**	0.007*	0.009**	0.011**	0.011**	0.009**	0.009**	0.011**
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Tertiary education	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Urban	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Suburban	0.014**	0.011**	0.013**	0.013**	0.013**	0.012**	0.012**	0.013**
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Rural	0.015**	0.013**	0.014**	0.015**	0.014**	0.014**	0.014**	0.014**
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Attitudes								
Anti-immigration		0.013**						
		(0.001)						
Euroskeptic			0.010**					
			(0.001)					
Less public education				0.005**				
				(0.002)				
Less public childcare					0.007**			
					(0.001)			
Traditional gender roles						0.010**		
						(0.001)		
Identity (Closed-Ended)								
Cosmopolitan identity							−0.035**	
							(0.005)	
National identity								0.026**
								(0.006)
Tokens	−0.000*	−0.000	−0.000	−0.000	−0.000	−0.000	−0.000	−0.000*
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
(Intercept)	0.616**	0.590**	0.596**	0.608**	0.603**	0.599**	0.641**	0.599**
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Year fixed effects	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Treatment (control)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
R^2	0.034	0.071	0.053	0.036	0.043	0.052	0.051	0.041
N	2,632	2,629	2,627	2,620	2,628	2,629	2,619	2,617

Notes: Attitudes are measured on a 4-point scale. Closed-ended identity items were measured at different scales in the two surveys and are rescaled here to range from 0 (not close) to 1 (very close).
*$p < .05$, **$p < .01$.

However, we must continue to bear in mind that we are looking at measures of identity based on voters' unrestricted responses to an openly formulated question. Combined with the preceding examination of the *content* of voters' responses, invariably significant coefficients pointing in expected directions are reassuring: In relation to common measures of the universalism–particularism divide's structural foundations and attitudinal expression, these identity scores behave as expected.

From a more social–psychological perspective, there is also evidence that voters' responses truly reflect identity. Models 7 and 8 in Table 3 show that more particularist scores are associated with stronger national and weaker cosmopolitan identity as reported in closed-ended questions. SI Appendix H.2 (p. 20) further shows that these identity scores contribute to predicting voters' *propensity* to support new left and far right parties, net of actual party preference, suggesting that strong identities are related to (dis)liking these party blocks. Lastly, more extreme identity scores are significantly associated with positive ingroup affect and negative outgroup affect (as shown in SI Appendix H.3, p. 21), indicating that more pronounced universalist–particularist identities are implicated in affective polarization (these validation analyses also suggest that outgroup scores capture identity; see the SI).

Discussion

Polarization between new left and far right parties is often viewed as reflecting a fully mobilized electoral cleavage, given these electoral preferences' clear *objective* socio-structural foundations. This article has looked at whether the universalism–particularism ("cultural") divide in Switzerland is also underpinned by *subjective* identities, as cleavage theory suggests. I analyzed responses to open-ended questions about voters' ingroups and outgroups using quantitative text analysis. Specifically, I used keyness statistics and a scaling model (LSS) to identify terms in voters' identity descriptions that are associated with universalism versus particularism. Methodologically, this article explores a novel approach to harnessing open-ended survey responses for electoral research using quantitative text analysis (in addition to Roberts et al. 2014 or Rothschild et al. 2019). Despite the limitations of bag-of-words approaches, these quantitative analyses of voters' responses appear to capture the essence of an emerging conflict. They provide a basis for qualitative descriptions of ideal-typical universalist–particularist identities.

Substantively, the results support the notion that the divide opposing new left and far right parties in Switzerland is underpinned by collective identities—especially because respondents were not prompted to think about specific groups. Judging from how new left and far right electorates describe their identities, it seems plausible that they are well aware of a universalism–particularism divide in society. These electorates' descriptions of "people like them" are in many ways mirror images of each other. Far right voters' responses can be summed up as emphasizing the dignity of a simple, honest life built around self-reliance on hard work and common sense, whereas new left voters highlight their self-perceived openness, tolerance, dynamism, and unorthodox lifestyle.

Importantly, even far right voters who—given their socio-structural profile—are often characterized as "losers" of socioeconomic transformations construe their identities positively. On both sides of the universalism–particularism divide, voters describe ingroups in ways that can confer a sense of superiority over outgroups. These same psychological motivations are reflected in voters' descriptions of "people not at all like them." Universalists and particularists describe outgroups predominantly in negative terms, emphasizing contrasts to ingroup characteristics. In stylized terms, self-described "socially minded, tolerant cosmopolitans" distance themselves from "selfish xenophobes" while "hard-working Swiss citizens" dissociate themselves from "lazy people and non-conformists." Perceived group conflict—inherent to the cleavage concept—infuses these identities. The animosity reflected in voters' responses suggests that, especially in a multiparty context such as Switzerland, cleavage identities associated with broader political camps (and not just with individual parties) may provide a basis for affective polarization.

Gaining a better understanding of emerging collective identities is important for several reasons. First, this article indicates that—at least in Switzerland—we are dealing with a stable new conflict structure where the mobilization market is "narrowed" (Rokkan 1999) by collective identities capable of anchoring voters into new left and far right camps. Three decades of antagonistic mobilization along the universalism–particularism divide have given rise to fairly clear-cut notions of "us" and "them." As long as these patterns of mobilization remain dominant, voters' sense of who they are politically will develop in a field of tension between prototypical universalist and particularist identities. Second, studying group boundaries drawn by voters sheds light on how economic and cultural change are intermeshed in people's perceptions, and how status hierarchies are contested by different groups striving to achieve or

maintain the moral high ground. Third, knowing how people see their place in a changing society enhances our understanding of their programmatic demands. For instance, a lower-skilled parent is perhaps less likely to prioritize expanding academic higher education if university-educated people (*Studierte*) are viewed as the "other."

What can the Swiss case tell us about the formation of a new cleavage in advanced democracies generally? As a paradigmatic case of electoral realignment, Switzerland is ideal for assessing the potential of the universalism–particularism divide to become a full-blown, dominant, possibly pervasive cleavage. Variation in the strength and timing with which the universalism–particularism divide has been mobilized across Western Europe means that it has likely not consolidated into a cleavage everywhere (indeed, it need not do so). However, the emergence of the far right and new left (often spearheaded by the Greens) in most advanced knowledge societies suggests the existence of structurally rooted universalist–particularist identity potentials that may become firmly articulated and tied in with primary divides in party politics. The Swiss Social Democrats, combining "new left" and traditionally "old left" stances, further exemplify how mainstream parties may contribute to articulating these new potentials, especially when they take a clear stance on newer as well as established conflicts. Overall, the Swiss case may be seen as comparable with other cases of relatively strong and early electoral realignment (e.g., France) and indicative of possible developments where realignment is more recent and less entrenched (e.g., Germany).

References

Abou-Chadi, Tarik, and Simon Hix. 2021. "Brahmin Left versus Merchant Right? Education, Class, Multiparty Competition, and Redistribution in Western Europe." *British Journal of Sociology* 72(1): 79–92.

Bartolini, Stefano. 2005. "La formations des clivages." *Revue internationale de politique comparée* 12(1): 9–34.

Bartolini, Stefano, and Peter Mair. 1990. *Identity, Competition and Electoral Availability: The Stabilisation of European Electorates 1885–1985.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Benoit, Kenneth, Kohei Watanabe, Haiyan Wang, Paul Nulty, Adam Obeng, Stefan Müller, and Akitaka Matsuo. 2018. "quanteda: An R Package for the Quantitative Analysis of Textual Data." *Journal of Open Source Software* 3(30): 774.

Borger, Julian. 2019. "*Donald Trump denounces 'globalism' in nationalist address to UN.*" The Guardian, September 24, 2019. https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2019/sep/24/donald-trump-un-address-denounces-globalism (accessed 5 May 2020).

Bornschier, Simon. 2018. "Globalization, Cleavages, and the Radical Right." In *The Oxford Handbook of the Radical Right*, ed. Jens Rydgren. New York: Oxford University Press.

Bornschier, Simon, Silja Häusermann, Delia Zollinger, and Céline Colombo. 2021a. "How 'Us' and 'Them' Relates to Voting Behavior: Social Structure, Social Identities, and Electoral Choice." *Comparative Political Studies* 54(12): 2087–122.

Bornschier, Simon, Lukas Haffert, Silja Häusermann, Marco Steenbergen, and Delia Zollinger. 2021b. "Identity Formation between Structure and Agency – How 'Us' and 'Them' Relates to Voting Behavior in Contexts of Electoral Realignment." *Paper prepared for European Political Science Association (EPSA) Conference* 2021.

Brewer, Marilynn B. 1999. "The Psychology of Prejudice: Ingroup Love or Outgroup Hate?" *Journal of Social Issues* 55(3): 429–44.

Cramer, Katherine J. 2016. *The Politics of Resentment - Rural Consciousness in Wisconsin and the Rise of Scott Walker.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

De Vries, Catherine E., and Sara B. Hobolt. 2020. *Political Entrepreneurs: The Rise of Challenger Parties in Europe.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

De Wilde, Pieter, Ruud Koopmans, and Wolfgang Merkel. 2019. *The Struggle Over Borders: Cosmopolitanism and Communitarianism.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Florida, Richard. 2012. *The Rise of the Creative Classe, Revisited.* New York: Basic Books.

Gidron, Noam, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2019. "Center-right Political Parties in Advanced Democracies." *Annual Review of Political Science* 22: 17–35.

Gidron, Noam, James Adams, and Will Horne. 2020. *American Affective Polarization in Comparative Perspective.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Häusermann, Silja, and Hanspeter Kriesi. 2015. "What Do Voters Want? Dimensions and Configurations in Individual-Level Preferences and Party Choice." In *The Politics of Advanced Capitalism*, eds. Pablo Beramendi, Silja Häusermann, Herbert Kitschelt, and Hanspeter Kriesi. New York: Cambridge University Press, 202–30.

Hobolt, Sara B. 2016. "The Brexit Vote: A Divided Nation, a Divided Continent." *Journal of European Public Policy* 23(9): 1259–77.

Hobolt, Sara B., Thomas J. Leeper, and James Tilley. 2020. "Divided by the Vote: Affective Polarization in the Wake of the Brexit Referendum." *British Journal of Political Science* 51: 1476–93.

Hochschild, Arlie R. 2016. *Strangers in Their Own Land.* New York: The New Press.

Hooghe, Liesbet, and Gary Marks. 2018. "Cleavage Theory Meets Europe's Crises: Lipset, Rokkan, and the Transnational Cleavage." *Journal of European Public Policy* 25(1): 109–35.

Huddy, Leonie. 2001. "From Social to Political Identity: A Critical Examination of Social Identity Theory." *Political Psychology* 22(1): 127–56.

Inglehart, Ronald. 1990. *Cultural Shift in Advanced Industrial Society*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Iversen, Torben, and David Soskice. 2019. *Democracy and Prosperity: Reinventing Capitalism Through a Turbulent Century*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Iyengar, Shanto, Gaurav Sood, and Yphtach Lelkes. 2012. "Affect, Not Ideology: A Social Identity Perspective on Polarization." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 76(3): 405–31.

Kitschelt, Herbert. 1994. *The Transformation of European Social Democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Kitschelt, Herbert, and Philipp Rehm. 2015. "Party Alignments: Change and Continuity." In *The Politics of Advanced Capitalism*, eds. Pablo Beramendi, Silja Häusermann, Herbert Kitschelt, and Hanspeter Kriesi. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Kriesi, Hanspeter, Edgar Grande, Romain Lachat, Martin Dolezal, Simon Bornschier, and Timotheos Frey. 2008. *West European Politics in the Age of Globalization*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kurer, Thomas. 2020. "The Declining Middle: Occupational Change, Social Status, and the Populist Right." *Comparative Political Studies* 53(10–11): 1798–835.

Lamont, Michèle. 2000. *The Dignity of Working Men. Morality and the Boundaries of Race, Class, and Immigration*. New York: Russel Sage Foundation.

Lamont, Michèle, and Virág Molnár. 2002. "The Study of Boundaries in the Social Sciences." *Annual Review of Sociology* 28(1): 167–95.

Lipset, Seymour M., and Stein Rokkan. 1967. *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: CrossNational Perspectives*. New York: Free Press.

Mason, Lilliana. 2018. *Uncivil Agreement - How Politics Became Our Identity*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Oesch, Daniel, and Line Rennwald. 2018. "Electoral Competition in Europe's New Tripolar Political Space: Class Voting for the Left, Centre-right and Radical Right." *European Journal of Political Research* 57: 783–807.

Reiljan, Andres. 2020. "'Fear and Loathing Across Party Lines' (also) in Europe: Affective Polarisation in European Party Systems." *European Journal of Political Research* 59(2): 376–96.

Roberts, Margaret E., Brandon M. Stewart, Dustin Tingley, Christopher Lucas, Jetson Leder-Luis, Shana Kushner Gadarian, Bethany Albertson, and David G. Rand. 2014."Structural Topic Models for Open-Ended Survey Responses." *American Journal of Political Science* 58(4): 1064–82.

Rokkan, Stein. 1999. *State Formation, Nation-building, and Mass Politics in Europe: The Theory of Stein Rokkan*. Oxford: Oxford Universtiy Press.

Rothschild, Jacob E., Adam J. Howat, Richard M. Shafranek, and Ethan C. Busby. 2019. "Pigeonholing Partisans: Stereotypes of Party Supporters and Partisan Polarization." *Political Behavior* 41(2): 423–43.

Savage, Mike. 2015. *Class in the 21st Century*. London: Pelican Books.

Seitz, Werner. 2014. *Geschichte der Politischen Gräben in der Schweiz: Eine Darstellung Anhand der Eidgenössischen Wahl- und Abstimmungsergebnisse von 1848 bis 2012*. Rüegger Verlag.

Shayo, Moses. 2009. "A Model of Social Identity with an Application to Political Economy: Nation, Class, and Redistribution." *American Political Science Review* 103(2): 147–74.

Sobolewska, Maria, and Robert Ford. 2020. *Brexitland: Identity, Diversity and the Reshaping of British Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tajfel, Henri. 1981. *Human Groups and Social Categories*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Tajfel, Henri, and John C. Turner. 1979. "An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict." In *The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations*, eds. William G. Austin, and Stephen Worchel. Monterey: Brooks/Cole, 33–48.

Wagner, Markus. 2021. "Affective Polarization in Multiparty Systems." *Electoral Studies* 69: 102199.

Watanabe, Kohei. 2017. "Measuring News Bias: Russia's Official News Agency ITAR-TASS' Coverage of the Ukraine Crisis." *European Journal of Communication* 32(3): 224–41.

Watanabe, Kohei. 2020. "Latent Semantic Scaling: A Semisupervised Text Analysis Technique for New Domains and Languages." *Communication Methods and Measures* 15(2): 1–22.

Supporting Information

Additional supporting information may be found online in the Supporting Information section at the end of the article.

Appendix A: Sample characteristics
Appendix B: Detailed question wordings (2018 and 2020 surveys)
Appendix C: Seed words
Appendix D: Keyness statistics 2018 and 2020
Appendix E: Most 'universalist' and 'particularist' identity-markers (LSS)
Appendix F: Absolute term frequencies
Appendix G: Identity scores and electoral choice: supplementary analyses
Appendix H: Further validation of identity scores
Appendix I: The Swiss political space in comparative perspective: extended discussion and supplementary analyses