

## HOME WORK #2

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Problem	Marks
1	
2	
3	
4	
5	
6	
7	
Total	

### Problem 1. Conditional entropy

1.a)

$$H(M|C) = \sum_{c \in C} p(C) \sum_{m \in M} p(M|C) \log_2\left(\frac{1}{p(M|C)}\right)$$

$$H(M|C) = \sum p(C) \sum p(M|C) \log_2\left(\frac{1}{p(M|C)}\right)$$

$$= 4 * \frac{1}{4} \left( \frac{1}{2} \log_2(2) + \frac{1}{2} \log_2(2) \right)$$

$$= 1$$

1.b)

$$H(M|C) = \sum p(C) \sum p(M|C) \log_2\left(\frac{1}{p(M|C)}\right)$$

Since the cryptosystem provides perfect secrecy,  $p(M|C) = p(M)$ .

$$= \sum p(C) \sum p(M) \log_2\left(\frac{1}{p(M)}\right)$$

We know  $\sum p(M) \log_2\left(\frac{1}{p(M)}\right) = \log_2\left(\frac{1}{p(M)}\right)$ , when a cryptosystem provides perfect secrecy.

$$= \sum p(C) \log_2\left(\frac{1}{p(M)}\right)$$

With perfect secrecy, every  $M$  is equiprobable, so every  $C$  is equiprobable. Since  $|C| = |M|$  (as every unique  $C$  comes from encrypting some unique  $M$ ), so we have  $p(C) = p(M)$ .

Thus,

$$\begin{aligned} &= \sum p(M) \log_2\left(\frac{1}{p(M)}\right) \\ &= H(M) \end{aligned}$$

1.c)

No, since  $p(M|C) = \frac{1}{2} \neq \frac{1}{4} = p(M)$ .

→ Answer

## Problem 2. Binary polynomial arithmetic

2.a.i)

$$\begin{aligned} &x^3 \\ &x^3 + 1 \\ &x^3 + x \\ &x^3 + x + 1 \\ &x^3 + x^2 \\ &x^3 + x^2 + 1 \\ &x^3 + x^2 + x \\ &x^3 + x^2 + x + 1 \end{aligned}$$

2.a.ii)

$$\begin{aligned} &x^3 = x * x * x \\ &x^3 + 1 = (x + 1)(x^2 - x + 1) \\ &x^3 + x = x(x^2 + 1) \\ &x^3 + x + 1 = \text{irreducible} \\ &x^3 + x^2 = x^2(x + 1) \\ &x^3 + x^2 + 1 = \text{irreducible} \\ &x^3 + x^2 + x = x(x^2 + x + 1) \\ &x^3 + x^2 + x + 1 = (x + 1)(x^2 + 1) \end{aligned}$$

2.a.iii)

Let  $A(x)$  be a degree 3 polynomial. If  $A(x)$  is reducible, then it must be the product of a degree 1 polynomial and some other polynomial(s) (of degree 2 or 1). In either case, there is a polynomial of degree 1 as a factor. The two possible polynomials of degree 1 are  $P_1 = x + 1$  and  $P_2 = x$ . If  $A$  is reducible, then either  $P_1$  or  $P_2$  is a factor of  $A$ . Notice  $P_1$  and  $P_2$  are respectively equal to zero when  $x = -1$  or  $x = 0$ . If  $A(x)$  is reducible with  $P_1$  as a factor, then  $A(-1) = 0$ . If  $A(x)$  is reducible with  $P_2$  as a factor, then  $A(0) = 0$ . Otherwise  $A(x)$  is irreducible.

Let  $A_1(x) = x^3 + x + 1$ , then

$$A_1(0) = 0 + 0 + 1 = 1 \text{ and } A_1(-1) = -1 - 1 + 1 = -1$$

Let  $A_2(x) = x^3 + x^2 + 1$ , then

$$A_2(0) = 0 + 0 + 1 = 1 \text{ and } A_2(-1) = -1 + 1 + 1 = 1$$

Neither  $A_1(x)$  or  $A_2(x)$  have  $P_1$  or  $P_2$  as factors, and are therefore irreducible.

2.b.i)

$$\text{Since } x^4 + x + 1 \equiv 0 \pmod{x^4 + x + 1}$$

$$x^4 \equiv x + 1 \pmod{x^4 + x + 1}$$

$$x^5 \equiv x^2 + x \pmod{x^4 + x + 1}$$

$$x^6 \equiv x^3 + x^2 \pmod{x^4 + x + 1}$$

$$f(x)g(x) = (x^2 + 1)(x^3 + x^2 + 1)$$

$$= x^5 + x^3 + x^4 + x^2 + x^2 + 1$$

$$= x^5 + x^3 + x^4 + 1$$

$$= (x^2 + x) + (x + 1) + x^3 + 1$$

$$= x^3 + x^2$$

2.b.ii)

$$\text{Since } x^4 + x + 1 \equiv 0 \pmod{x^4 + x + 1}$$

$$x^4 + x \equiv 1 \pmod{x^4 + x + 1}$$

$$x(x^3 + 1) \equiv 1 \pmod{x^4 + x + 1}$$

So given  $f(x) = x$ , then  $f^{-1}(x) = (x^3 + 1)$

d.i)

$$y * [ay^3 + by^2 + cy + d]$$

$$= ay^4 + by^3 + cy^2 + dy$$

$$= by^3 + cy^2 + dy + a \quad (\text{since } y^4 \equiv 1 \pmod{y^4 + 1})$$

d.ii)

$$\text{Since } 1 \equiv y^4 \pmod{y^4 + 1},$$

$$y^i \equiv y^i y^4 \equiv y^{i+4} \equiv y^j \pmod{y^4 + 1} \text{ where } j \equiv i + 4 \equiv i \pmod{4}.$$

d.iii)

Let  $ay^3 + by^2 + cy + d$  represent any 4-byte vector as polynomial.

Base case:

$$i = 0: y^0(ay^3 + by^2 + cy + d) = ay^3 + by^2 + cy + d$$

No bytes have been shifted (ie. a circular left shift of 0 bytes). Using the proof from *d.ii* we get that this is a shift of  $j = 0$  bytes.

$i = 1: y^1(ay^3 + by^2 + cy + d)$  This is a left circular shift of  $j = 1$  bytes (proven by d.i and d.ii).

Induction Hypothesis:

Assume for  $i \geq 0$  that  $y^i(ay^3 + by^2 + cy + d) = ay^{3+i} + by^{2+i} + cy^{1+i} + dy^i$  is a left circular shift of  $j$  bytes where  $j \equiv i \pmod{4}$  and  $0 \leq j \leq 3$ .

Suppose  $k \in \mathbb{Z}$  and  $k \geq 1$ .

$$\begin{aligned} y^{k+1}(ay^3 + by^2 + cy + d) &= y^k(y^1(ay^3 + by^2 + cy + d)) \\ &= y^k(ay^{3+1} + by^{2+1} + cy^{1+1} + dy^1) \\ &= ay^{3+(k+1)} + by^{2+(k+1)} + cy^{1+(k+1)} + dy^{k+1} \text{ (by IH)} \end{aligned}$$

Since  $k + 1 \geq 0$  and  $y^{k+1} = y^j$  where  $j \equiv k + 1 \pmod{4}$  and  $0 \leq j \leq 3$  (proof d.ii), the multiplication of any 4-byte vector with  $y^{k+1}$  is a left circular shift of  $j$  bytes.

—→ Answer

**Problem 3.** Arithmetic with the constant polynomial of MixColumns in AES

3.a)

$$c(1) = 1$$

$$c(2) = x$$

$$c(3) = x + 1$$

$$\text{b.i) } (01)(b) = 1(b_7x^7 + \dots + b_1x + b_0)$$

$$d_i = b_i$$

b.ii)

$$x^8 \equiv x^4 + x^3 + x + 1 \pmod{x^8 + x^4 + x^3 + x + 1}$$

$$(02)(b) = x(b_7x^7 + \dots + b_1x + b_0)$$

$$= b_7x^8 + b_6x^7 + \dots + b_1x^2 + b_0x$$

$$= b_7(x^4 + x^3 + x + 1) + b_6x^7 + \dots + b_1x^2 + b_0x$$

$$d = b_6x^7 + b_5x^6 + b_4x^5 + (b_7 + b_3)x^4 + (b_7 + b_2)x^3 + b_1x^2 + (b_7 + b_0)x + b_7$$

$$d_7 = b_6$$

$$d_6 = b_5$$

$$d_5 = b_4$$

$$d_4 = b_7 \oplus b_3$$

$$d_3 = b_7 \oplus b_2$$

$$d_2 = b_1$$

$$d_1 = b_7 \oplus b_0$$

$$d_0 = b_7$$

b.iii)

$$(03)(b) = (x + 1)(b_7x^7 + \dots + b_1x + b_0)$$

$$= (b_7x^8 + b_6x^7 + \dots + b_1x^2 + b_0x) + (b_7x^7 + \dots + b_1x + b_0)$$

$$= b_7(x^4 + x^3 + x + 1) + (b_6 \oplus b_7)x^7 + \dots + (b_0 \oplus b_1)x + b_0$$

$$d_7 = b_6 \oplus b_7$$

$$d_6 = b_5 \oplus b_6$$

$$d_5 = b_4 \oplus b_5$$

$$d_4 = b_3 \oplus b_4 \oplus b_7$$

$$d_3 = b_2 \oplus b_3 \oplus b_7$$

$$\begin{aligned}
d_2 &= b_1 \oplus b_2 \\
d_1 &= b_0 \oplus b_1 \oplus b_7 \\
d_0 &= b_0 \oplus b_7
\end{aligned}$$

c.i)

$$\begin{aligned}
y^4 &\equiv 1 \pmod{y^4 + 1} \\
y^5 &\equiv y \pmod{y^4 + 1} \\
y^6 &\equiv y^2 \pmod{y^4 + 1}
\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
t(y) &= c(y)s(y) \pmod{y^4 + 1} \\
&= [(03)y^3 + (01)y^2 + (01)y + (02)](s_3y^3 + s_2y^2 + s_1y + s_0) \pmod{y^4 + 1} \\
&= (03)(s_3y^6 + s_2y^5 + s_1y^4 + s_0y^3) \\
&\quad + (01)(s_3y^5 + s_2y^4 + s_1y^3 + s_0y^2) \\
&\quad + (01)(s_3y^4 + s_2y^3 + s_1y^2 + s_0y) \\
&\quad + (02)(s_3y^3 + s_2y^2 + s_1y + s_0) \pmod{y^4 + 1} \\
&= (03)s_3y^6 \\
&\quad + ((03)s_2 + (01)s_3)y^5 \\
&\quad + ((03)s_1 + (01)s_2 + (01)s_3)y^4 \\
&\quad + ((03)s_0 + (01)s_1 + (01)s_2 + (02)s_3)y^3 \\
&\quad + ((01)s_0 + (01)s_1 + (02)s_2)y^2 \\
&\quad + ((01)s_0 + (02)s_1)y \\
&\quad + (02)s_0 \pmod{y^4 + 1} \\
&= (03)s_3y^2 \\
&\quad + ((03)s_2 + (01)s_3)y \\
&\quad + ((03)s_1 + (01)s_2 + (01)s_3) \\
&\quad + ((03)s_0 + (01)s_1 + (01)s_2 + (02)s_3)y^3 \\
&\quad + ((01)s_0 + (01)s_1 + (02)s_2)y^2 \\
&\quad + ((01)s_0 + (02)s_1)y \\
&\quad + (02)s_0 \pmod{y^4 + 1} \\
&= ((03)s_0 + (01)s_1 + (01)s_2 + (02)s_3)y^3 \\
&\quad + ((01)s_0 + (01)s_1 + (02)s_2 + (03)s_3)y^2 \\
&\quad + ((01)s_0 + (02)s_1 + (03)s_2 + (01)s_3)y \\
&\quad + ((02)s_0 + (03)s_1 + (01)s_2 + (01)s_3) \pmod{y^4 + 1}
\end{aligned}$$

c.ii)

$$C = \begin{bmatrix} 3 & 1 & 1 & 2 \\ 1 & 1 & 2 & 3 \\ 1 & 2 & 3 & 1 \\ 2 & 3 & 1 & 1 \end{bmatrix}$$

→ Answer

**Problem 4.** Error propagation in block cipher modes

Let  $C_i$  denote the encryption of the  $i$ -th message block,  $M_i$ .  
 Let  $P_i$  denote the plaintext obtained from the decryption of  $C_i$ .

a.i)

ECB: Only  $P_i$  is affected since the decryption of each block is just a simple block substitution (independent of each other).

ii)

CBC:  $P_i$  and  $P_{i+1}$  are affected since  $C_i$  will be combined with  $P_{i+1}$  via an exclusive-OR.

iii)

OFB: Only  $P_i$  is affected since any given decryption state has been generated exclusively from the previous state (eventually originating from the IV).

iv)

CFB: When using only one register,  $P_i$  and  $P_{i+1}$  are affected since only the last  $k$  previous ciphertext blocks (in this case  $k = 1$ ) are kept in the register for decryption.

v)

CTR: Only  $P_i$  is affected since  $CTR_i$  (the source of the output block that gets XORed with  $C_i$ ) is simply an independent counter value.

b)

All message blocks following (and including)  $M_i$  are affected, since in CBC mode  $C_i$  is used in the encryption of  $C_{i+1}$  (and then  $C_{i+1}$  gets used when encrypting  $C_{i+2}$  and so on).

→ Answer