Brian Yee - 00993104 Introduction to Cryptography CPSC 418 Fall 2016 Department of Computer Science University of Calgary

October 27, 2016

## HOME WORK #2

Problem	Marks
1	
2	
3	
4	
5	
6	
7	
Total	

## **Problem** 1. Conditional entropy

$$\begin{split} &1.a)\\ &H(M|C) = \sum_{c \in C} p(C) \sum_{m \in M} p(M|C) log_2(\frac{1}{p(M|C)})\\ &H(M|C) = \sum p(C) \sum p(M|C) log_2(\frac{1}{p(M|C)})\\ &= 4 * \frac{1}{4} (\frac{1}{2} log_2(2) + \frac{1}{2} log_2(2))\\ &= 1\\ &1.b)\\ &H(M|C) = \sum p(C) \sum p(M|C) log_2(\frac{1}{p(M|C)}) \end{split}$$

Since the cryptosystem provides perfect secrecy, p(M|C) = p(M).

$$=\sum p(C)\sum p(M)log_2(rac{1}{p(M)})$$

We know  $\sum p(M)log_2(\frac{1}{p(M)}) = log_2(\frac{1}{p(M)})$ , when a cryptosystem provides perfect secrecy.

$$=\sum p(C)log_2(rac{1}{p(M)})$$

With perfect secrecy, every M is equiprobable, so every C is equiprobable. Since |C| = |M| (as every unique C comes from encrypting some unique M), so we have p(C) = p(M).

Thus,

$$= \sum_{} p(M)log_2(\frac{1}{p(M)})$$

$$= H(M)$$
1.c)
No, since  $p(M|C) = \frac{1}{2} \neq \frac{1}{4} = p(M)$ .

 $\longrightarrow \mathcal{A}$ nswer

**Problem** 2. Binary polynomial arithmetic

```
2.a.i)
x^3
x^3 + 1
x^3 + x
x^{3} + x + 1
x^{3} + x^{2}
x^3 + x^2 + 1
x^3 + x^2 + x
x^3 + x^2 + x + 1
2.a.ii)
x^3 = x * x * x
x^{3} + 1 = (x+1)(x^{2} - x + 1)x^{3} + x = x(x^{2} + x)
x^3 + x + 1 = irreducible
x^3 + x^2 = x^2(x+1)
x^3 + x^2 + 1 = \text{irreducible}
x^3 + x^2 + x = x(x^2 + x + 1)
x^3 + x^2 + x + 1 = (x+1)(x^2+1)
```

2.a.iii)

Let A(x) be a degree 3 polynomial. If A(x) is reducible, then it must the product of a degree 1 polynomial and some other polynomial(s) (of degree 2 or 1). In either case, there is a polynomial of degree 1 as a factor. The two possible polynomials of degree 1 are  $P_1 = x + 1$  and  $P_2 = x$ . If A is reducible, then either  $P_1$  or  $P_2$  is a factor of A. Notice  $P_1$  and  $P_2$  are respectively equal to zero when x = -1 or x = 0. If A(x) is reducible with  $P_1$  as a factor, then A(-1) = 0. If A(x) is reducible with  $P_2$  as a factor, then A(0) = 0. Otherwise A(x) is irreducible.

```
Let A_1(x) = x^3 + x + 1, then
    A_1(0) = 0 + 0 + 1 = 1 and A_1(-1) = -1 - 1 + 1 = -1
Let A_2(x) = x^3 + x^2 + 1, then
    A_2(0) = 0 + 0 + 1 = 1 and A_2(-1) = -1 + 1 + 1 = 1
Neither A_1(x) or A_2(x) have P_1 or P_2 as factors, and are therefore irreducible.
Since x^4 + x + 1 \equiv 0 \pmod{x^4 + x + 1}
x^4 \equiv x + 1 \pmod{x^4 + x + 1}

x^5 \equiv x^2 + x \pmod{x^4 + x + 1}

x^6 \equiv x^3 + x^2 \pmod{x^4 + x + 1}
f(x)g(x) = (x^2 + 1)(x^3 + x^2 + 1)
= x^5 + x^3 + x^4 + x^2 + x^2 + 1
= x^5 + x^3 + x^4 + 1
= (x^2 + x) + (x + 1) + x^3 + 1
= x^3 + x^2
Since x^4 + x + 1 \equiv 0 \pmod{x^4 + x + 1}
x^4 + x \equiv 1 \pmod{x^4 + x + 1}
x(x^3+1) \equiv 1 \pmod{x^4+x+1}
So given f(x) = x, then f^{-1}(x) = (x^{3} + 1)
y*(ay^3+by^2+cy+d)
Since 1 \equiv y^4 \pmod{y^4 + 1}, y^i \equiv y^i y^4 \equiv y^{i+4} \equiv y^j \pmod{y^4 + 1} where j \equiv i + 4 \equiv i \pmod{4} and 0 \leq j \leq 3.
Let b = ay^3 + by^2 + cy + d represent any 4-byte vector as polynomial.
Since we have d.ii, this can be split into 4 cases.
Case y^i \equiv y^0 \pmod{y^4+1}: y^i * b = y^0 (ay^3 + by^2 + cy + d) \equiv ay^3 + by^2 + cy + d \pmod{y^4+1}
    This is a left circular shift of j = 0 bytes.
```

Case  $y^i \equiv y^1 \pmod{y^4 + 1}$ :

 $y^{i} * b = y^{1}(ay^{3} + by^{2} + cy + d)$   $\equiv by^{3} + cy^{2} + dy + a$  (by d.i) This is a left circular shift of j = 1 bytes.

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Case y^{i} \equiv y^{2} \pmod{y^{4} + 1}:

y^{i} * b = y^{2}(ay^{3} + by^{2} + cy + d)

= y^{1}(y^{1}(ay^{3} + by^{2} + cy + d))

\equiv y^{1}(by^{3} + cy^{2} + dy + a) \text{ (by d.i)}

\equiv cy^{3} + dy^{2} + ay + b \pmod{y^{4} + 1} \text{ (by d.i)}

This is a left circular shift of j = 2 bytes.

Case y^{i} \equiv y^{3} \pmod{y^{4} + 1}:

y^{i} * b = y^{3}(ay^{3} + by^{2} + cy + d)

= y^{1}y^{1}(y^{1}(ay^{3} + by^{2} + cy + d))

\equiv y^{1}(y^{1}(by^{3} + cy^{2} + dy + a)) \text{ (by d.i)}

\equiv y^{1}(cy^{3} + dy^{2} + ay + b) \text{ (by d.i)}

\equiv dy^{3} + ay^{2} + by + c \pmod{y^{4} + 1} \text{ (by d.i)}

This is a left circular shift of j = 3 bytes.
```

In all cases, it is shown that multiplying any 4-byte vector by  $y^i$  ( $i \ge 0$ ) is a circular left shift of j bytes where  $j \equiv i \pmod{4}$  and  $0 \le j \le 3$  (d.ii).

 $\longrightarrow \mathcal{A}$ nswer

Problem 3. Arithmetic with the constant polynomial of MixColumns in AES

```
3.a)
c(1) = 1
c(2) = x
c(3) = x + 1
b.i) (01)(b) = 1(b_7x^7... + b_1x + b_0)
d_i = b_i
b.ii)
x^8 \equiv x^4 + x^3 + x + 1 \pmod{x^8 + x^4 + x^3 + x + 1}
(02)(b) = x(b_7x^7 + \dots + b_1x + b_0)
= b_7 x^8 + b_6 x^7 \dots + b_1 x^2 + b_0 x)
= b_7 (x^4 + x^3 + x + 1) + b_6 x^7 + \dots + b_1 x^2 + b_0 x)
d = b_6 x^7 + b_5 x^6 + b_4 x^5 + (b_7 + b_3) x^4 + (b_7 + b_2) x^3 + b_1 x^2 + (b_7 + b_0) x + b_7
d_7 = b_6
d_6 = b_5
d_5 = b_4
d_4=b_7\oplus b_3
d_3 = b_7 \oplus b_2
d_2 = b_1
d_1 = b_7 \oplus b_0
d_0 = b_7
b.iii)
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```
(03)(b) = (x+1)(b_7x^7 + \dots + b_1x + b_0)
= (b_7x^8 + b_6x^7 + \dots + b_1x^2 + b_0x) + (b_7x^7 + \dots + b_1x + b_0)
=b_7(x^4+x^3+x+1)+(b_6\oplus b_7)x^7+...+(b_0\oplus b_1)x+b_0)
d_7 = b_6 \oplus b_7
d_6 = b_5 \oplus b_6
d_5 = b_4 \oplus b_5
d_4 = b_3 \oplus b_4 \oplus b_7
d_3 = b_2 \oplus b_3 \oplus b_7
d_2 = b_1 \oplus b_2
d_1 = b_0 \oplus b_1 \oplus b_7
d_0 = b_0 \oplus b_7
c.i)
y^4 \equiv 1 \pmod{y^4 + 1}
y^5 \equiv y \pmod{y^4+1}
y^6 \equiv y^2 \pmod{y^4 + 1}
t(y) = c(y)s(y) \pmod{y^4 + 1}
= [(03)y^3 + (01)y^2 + (01)y + (02)](s_3y^3 + s_2y^2 + s_1y + s_0) \pmod{y^4 + 1}
= (03)(s_3y^6 + s_2y^5 + s_1y^4 + s_0y^3)
+(01)(s_3y^5+s_2y^4+s_1y^3+s_0y^2)
+(01)(s_3y^4+s_2y^3+s_1y^2+s_0y)
+(02)(s_3y^3+s_2y^2+s_1y+s_0) \pmod{y^4+1}
=(03)s_3y^6
+((03)s_2+(01)s_3)y^5
+((03)s_1+(01)s_2+(01)s_3)y^4
+((03)s_0 + (01)s_1 + (01)s_2 + (02)s_3)y^3
+((01)s_0+(01)s_1+(02)s_2)y^2
+((01)s_0+(02)s_1)y
+(02)s_0 \pmod{y^4+1}
=(03)s_3y^2
+((03)s_2+(01)s_3)y
+((03)s_1+(01)s_2+(01)s_3)
+((03)s_0 + (01)s_1 + (01)s_2 + (02)s_3)y^3
+((01)s_0+(01)s_1+(02)s_2)y^2
+((01)s_0+(02)s_1)y
+(02)s_0 \pmod{y^4+1}
= ((03)s_0 + (01)s_1 + (01)s_2 + (02)s_3)y^3
+((01)s_0+(01)s_1+(02)s_2+(03)s_3)y^2
+((01)s_0+(02)s_1+(03)s_2+(01)s_3)y
+((02)s_0+(03)s_1+(01)s_2+(01)s_3) \pmod{y^4+1}
c.ii)
```

$$C = \begin{bmatrix} 3 & 1 & 1 & 2 \\ 1 & 1 & 2 & 3 \\ 1 & 2 & 3 & 1 \\ 2 & 3 & 1 & 1 \end{bmatrix}$$

 $\longrightarrow \mathcal{A}$ nswer

## **Problem** 4. Error propagation in block cipher modes

Let  $C_i$  denote the encryption of the i-th message block,  $M_i$ . Let  $P_i$  denote the plaintext obtained from the decryption of  $C_i$ .

a.i)

ECB: Only  $P_i$  is affected since the decryption of each block is just a simple block substitution(independent of each other).

ii)

CBC:  $P_i$  and  $P_{i+1}$  are affected since  $P_{i+1}$  is the result of  $C_i \oplus C_{i+1}$  but  $P_{i+2}$  is the result of  $C_{i+1} \oplus C_{i+2}$  (does not depend on  $C_i$ ).

iii)

OFB: Only  $P_i$  is affected since any given decryption state has been generated exclusively from the previous state (which eventually originates from the IV).

iv

CFB: All plaintext blocks starting from  $P_i$  are affected since the  $C_i$  will be added to the register for encrypting  $P_{i+1}$  into  $C_{i+1}$ . As a result, even if the plaintext blocks after  $P_i$  are error-free, they will still be encrypted using ciphertext that was created from the errant plaintext block,  $P_i$ .

 $\mathbf{v})$ 

CTR: Only  $P_i$  is affected since  $CTR_i$  (the source of the output block that gets XORed with  $C_i$ ) is simply an independent counter value.

b)

The error happens before any encryption takes place, so the entire plaintext would be encrypted and decrypted normally, as if the plaintext had no errors in it. Thus, only  $M_i$  would be affected.

 $\longrightarrow \mathcal{A}$ nswer

Submitted by Brian Yee - 00993104 on October 27, 2016.