

HOME WORK #2

Problem	Marks
1	
2	
3	
4	
5	
6	
7	
Total	

Problem 1. Conditional entropy

1.a)

$$H(M|C) = \sum_{c \in C} p(C) \sum_{m \in M} p(M|C) \log_2\left(\frac{1}{p(M|C)}\right)$$

$$H(M|C) = \sum p(C) \sum p(M|C) \log_2\left(\frac{1}{p(M|C)}\right)$$

$$= 4 * \frac{1}{4} \left(\frac{1}{2} \log_2(2) + \frac{1}{2} \log_2(2) \right)$$

$$= 1$$

1.b)

$$H(M|C) = \sum p(C) \sum p(M|C) \log_2\left(\frac{1}{p(M|C)}\right)$$

Since the cryptosystem provides perfect secrecy, $p(M|C) = p(M)$.

$$= \sum p(C) \sum p(M) \log_2\left(\frac{1}{p(M)}\right)$$

We know $\sum p(M) \log_2\left(\frac{1}{p(M)}\right) = \log_2\left(\frac{1}{p(M)}\right)$, when a cryptosystem provides perfect secrecy.

$$= \sum p(C) \log_2 \left(\frac{1}{p(M)} \right)$$

With perfect secrecy, every M is equiprobable, so every C is equiprobable. Since $|C| = |M|$ (as every unique C comes from encrypting some unique M), so we have $p(C) = p(M)$.

Thus,

$$= \sum p(M) \log_2 \left(\frac{1}{p(M)} \right) \\ = H(M)$$

1.c)

No, since $p(M|C) = \frac{1}{2} \neq \frac{1}{4} = p(M)$.

→ Answer

Problem 2. Binary polynomial arithmetic

2.a.i)

$$\begin{aligned} x^3 \\ x^3 + 1 \\ x^3 + x \\ x^3 + x + 1 \\ x^3 + x^2 \\ x^3 + x^2 + 1 \\ x^3 + x^2 + x \\ x^3 + x^2 + x + 1 \end{aligned}$$

2.a.ii)

$$\begin{aligned} x^3 &= x * x * x \\ x^3 + 1 &= (x + 1)(x^2 - x + 1) \\ x^3 + x &= x(x^2 + 1) \\ x^3 + x + 1 &= \text{irreducible} \\ x^3 + x^2 &= x^2(x + 1) \\ x^3 + x^2 + 1 &= \text{irreducible} \\ x^3 + x^2 + x &= x(x^2 + x + 1) \\ x^3 + x^2 + x + 1 &= (x + 1)(x^2 + 1) \end{aligned}$$

2.a.iii)

Let $A(x)$ be a degree 3 polynomial. If $A(x)$ is reducible, then it must be the product of a degree 1 polynomial and some other polynomial(s) (of degree 2 or 1). In either case, there is a polynomial of degree 1 as a factor. The two possible polynomials of degree 1 are $P_1 = x + 1$ and $P_2 = x$. If A is reducible, then either P_1 or P_2 is a factor of A. Notice P_1 and P_2 are respectively equal to zero when $x = -1$ or $x = 0$. If $A(x)$ is reducible with P_1 as a factor, then $A(-1) = 0$. If $A(x)$ is reducible with P_2 as a factor, then $A(0) = 0$. Otherwise $A(x)$ is irreducible.

Let $A_1(x) = x^3 + x + 1$, then

$$A_1(0) = 0 + 0 + 1 = 1 \text{ and } A_1(-1) = -1 - 1 + 1 = -1$$

Let $A_2(x) = x^3 + x^2 + 1$, then

$$A_2(0) = 0 + 0 + 1 = 1 \text{ and } A_2(-1) = -1 + 1 + 1 = 1$$

Neither $A_1(x)$ or $A_2(x)$ have P_1 or P_2 as factors, and are therefore irreducible.

2.b.i)

$$\text{Since } x^4 + x + 1 \equiv 0 \pmod{x^4 + x + 1}$$

$$x^4 \equiv x + 1 \pmod{x^4 + x + 1}$$

$$x^5 \equiv x^2 + x \pmod{x^4 + x + 1}$$

$$x^6 \equiv x^3 + x^2 \pmod{x^4 + x + 1}$$

$$\begin{aligned} f(x)g(x) &= (x^2 + 1)(x^3 + x^2 + 1) \\ &= x^5 + x^3 + x^4 + x^2 + x^2 + 1 \\ &= x^5 + x^3 + x^4 + 1 \\ &= (x^2 + x) + (x + 1) + x^3 + 1 \\ &= x^3 + x^2 \end{aligned}$$

2.b.ii)

$$\text{Since } x^4 + x + 1 \equiv 0 \pmod{x^4 + x + 1}$$

$$x^4 + x \equiv 1 \pmod{x^4 + x + 1}$$

$$x(x^3 + 1) \equiv 1 \pmod{x^4 + x + 1}$$

$$\text{So given } f(x) = x, \text{ then } f^{-1}(x) = (x^3 + 1)$$

d.i)

$$\begin{aligned} y * [ay^3 + by^2 + cy + d] \\ &= ay^4 + by^3 + cy^2 + dy \\ &= by^3 + cy^2 + dy + a \text{ (since } y^4 = 1) \end{aligned}$$

d.ii)

Prove that in this arithmetic, $y^i = y^j$ for any integer $i \geq 0$, where $j \equiv i \pmod{4}$ with $0 \leq j \leq 3$

Base cases:

$$i = 0: y^i = y^j \text{ since } 0 \equiv 0 \pmod{4} \text{ and } j = 0$$

$$i = 1: y^i = y^j \text{ since } 1 \equiv 1 \pmod{4} \text{ and } 0 \leq j \leq 3$$

$$i = 2: y^i = y^j \text{ since } 2 \equiv 2 \pmod{4} \text{ and } 0 \leq j \leq 3$$

$$i = 3: y^i = y^j \text{ since } 3 \equiv 3 \pmod{4} \text{ and } j = 3$$

Induction Hypothesis:

Assume that $y^i = y^j$ for all $i \in \mathbb{Z}$, where $i \geq 0$ such that $j \equiv i \pmod{4}$ and $0 \leq j \leq 3$.

Suppose $4 \leq k$, where $k \in \mathbb{Z}$.

Since $(k+1) \geq 0$ and $(k+1) \in \mathbb{Z}$, by the induction hypothesis, we have $y^{k+1} = y^j$ where $j \equiv (k+1) \pmod{4}$ and $0 \leq j \leq 3$.

d.iii)

Let $ay^3 + by^2 + cy + d$ represent any 4-byte vector as polynomial.

Base case:

$$i = 0: y^0(ay^3 + by^2 + cy + d) = ay^3 + by^2 + cy + d$$

No bytes have been shifted, so this is a circular left shift of 0 bytes. Using the proof from d.ii we get that this is a shift of $j = 0$ bytes.

$i = 1: y^1(ay^3 + by^2 + cy + d)$ Using the proofs from d.i and d.ii, this is a left circular shift of $j = 1$ bytes.

Induction Hypothesis:

Assume for $i \geq 0$ that $y^i(ay^3 + by^2 + cy + d) = ay^{3+i} + by^{2+i} + cy^{1+i} + dy^i$ is a left circular shift of j bytes where $j = i \pmod{4}$ and $j \geq 0$.

Suppose $k \in \mathbb{Z}$ and $k \geq 2$.

$$\begin{aligned} y^{k+1}(ay^3 + by^2 + cy + d) &= y^k(y^1(ay^3 + by^2 + cy + d)) \\ &= y^k(ay^{3+1} + by^{2+1} + cy^{1+1} + dy^1) \\ &= ay^{3+(k+1)} + by^{2+(k+1)} + cy^{1+(k+1)} + dy^{k+1} \text{ (by IH)} \end{aligned}$$

Since $k + 1 \geq 0$ and $y^{k+1} = y^j$ where $j = k + 1 \pmod{4}$ and $0 \leq j \leq 3$, the multiplication of any 4-byte vector with y^{k+1} is a left circular shift of j bytes.

→ Answer

Problem 3. Arithmetic with the constant polynomial of MixColumns in AES

3.a)

$$c(1) = 1$$

$$c(2) = x$$

$$c(3) = x + 1$$

$$b.i) (01)(b) = 1(b_7x^7 + \dots + b_1x + b_0)$$

$$d_i = b_i$$

b.ii)

$$x^8 \equiv x^4 + x^3 + x + 1 \pmod{x^8 + x^4 + x^3 + x + 1}$$

$$(02)(b) = x(b_7x^7 + \dots + b_1x + b_0)$$

$$= b_7x^8 + b_6x^7 + \dots + b_1x^2 + b_0x$$

$$= b_7(x^4 + x^3 + x + 1) + b_6x^7 + \dots + b_1x^2 + b_0x$$

$$d = b_6x^7 + b_5x^6 + b_4x^5 + (b_7 + b_3)x^4 + (b_7 + b_2)x^3 + b_1x^2 + (b_7 + b_0)x + b_7$$

$$d_7 = b_6$$

$$d_6 = b_5$$

$$d_5 = b_4$$

$$d_4 = b_7 \oplus b_3$$

$$d_3 = b_7 \oplus b_2$$

$$\begin{aligned}
d_2 &= b_1 \\
d_1 &= b_7 \oplus b_0 \\
d_0 &= b_7
\end{aligned}$$

b.iii)

$$\begin{aligned}
(03)(b) &= (x+1)(b_7x^7 + \dots + b_1x + b_0) \\
&= (b_7x^8 + b_6x^7 + \dots + b_1x^2 + b_0x) + (b_7x^7 + \dots + b_1x + b_0) \\
&= b_7(x^4 + x^3 + x + 1) + (b_6 \oplus b_7)x^7 + \dots + (b_0 \oplus b_1)x + b_0 \\
d_7 &= b_6 \oplus b_7 \\
d_6 &= b_5 \oplus b_6 \\
d_5 &= b_4 \oplus b_5 \\
d_4 &= b_3 \oplus b_4 \oplus b_7 \\
d_3 &= b_2 \oplus b_3 \oplus b_7 \\
d_2 &= b_1 \oplus b_2 \\
d_1 &= b_0 \oplus b_1 \oplus b_7 \\
d_0 &= b_0 \oplus b_7
\end{aligned}$$

c.i)

$$\begin{aligned}
y^4 &\equiv 1 \pmod{y^4 + 1} \\
y^5 &\equiv y \pmod{y^4 + 1} \\
y^6 &\equiv y^2 \pmod{y^4 + 1}
\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
t(y) &= c(y)s(y) \pmod{y^4 + 1} \\
&= [(03)y^3 + (01)y^2 + (01)y + (02)](s_3y^3 + s_2y^2 + s_1y + s_0) \pmod{y^4 + 1} \\
&= (03)(s_3y^6 + s_2y^5 + s_1y^4 + s_0y^3) \\
&\quad + (01)(s_3y^5 + s_2y^4 + s_1y^3 + s_0y^2) \\
&\quad + (01)(s_3y^4 + s_2y^3 + s_1y^2 + s_0y) \\
&\quad + (02)(s_3y^3 + s_2y^2 + s_1y + s_0) \pmod{y^4 + 1}
\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
&= (03)s_3y^6 \\
&\quad + ((03)s_2 + (01)s_3)y^5 \\
&\quad + ((03)s_1 + (01)s_2 + (01)s_3)y^4 \\
&\quad + ((03)s_0 + (01)s_1 + (01)s_2 + (02)s_3)y^3 \\
&\quad + ((01)s_0 + (01)s_1 + (02)s_2)y^2 \\
&\quad + ((01)s_0 + (02)s_1)y \\
&\quad + (02)s_0 \pmod{y^4 + 1}
\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
&= (03)s_3y^2 \\
&\quad + ((03)s_2 + (01)s_3)y \\
&\quad + ((03)s_1 + (01)s_2 + (01)s_3) \\
&\quad + ((03)s_0 + (01)s_1 + (01)s_2 + (02)s_3)y^3 \\
&\quad + ((01)s_0 + (01)s_1 + (02)s_2)y^2 \\
&\quad + ((01)s_0 + (02)s_1)y \\
&\quad + (02)s_0 \pmod{y^4 + 1}
\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
&= ((03)s_0 + (01)s_1 + (01)s_2 + (02)s_3)y^3 \\
&\quad + ((01)s_0 + (01)s_1 + (02)s_2 + (03)s_3)y^2 \\
&\quad + ((01)s_0 + (02)s_1 + (03)s_2 + (01)s_3)y \\
&\quad + ((02)s_0 + (03)s_1 + (01)s_2 + (01)s_3) \pmod{y^4 + 1}
\end{aligned}$$

c.ii)

$$C = \begin{bmatrix} 3 & 1 & 1 & 2 \\ 1 & 1 & 2 & 3 \\ 1 & 2 & 3 & 1 \\ 2 & 3 & 1 & 1 \end{bmatrix}$$

→ Answer

Problem 4. Error propagation in block cipher modes

Let C_i denote the encryption of the i -th message block, M_i .

Let P_i denote the plaintext obtained from the decryption of C_i .

a.i)

ECB: Only P_i is affected since the decryption of each block is just a simple block substitution (independent of each other).

ii)

CBC: P_i and P_{i+1} are affected since C_i will be combined with P_{i+1} via an exclusive-OR.

iii)

OFB: Only P_i is affected since any given decryption state has been generated exclusively from the previous state (eventually originating from the IV).

iv)

CFB: When using only one register, P_i and P_{i+1} are affected since only the last k previous ciphertext blocks (in this case $k = 1$) are kept in the register for decryption.

v)

CTR: Only P_i is affected since CTR_i (the source of the output block that gets XORed with C_i) is simply an independent counter value.

b)

All message blocks following (and including) M_i are affected, since in CBC mode C_i is used in the encryption of C_{i+1} (and then C_{i+1} gets used when encrypting C_{i+2} and so on).

→ Answer

Submitted by Brian Yee - 00993104 on October 26, 2016.