

# FORMAL VERIFICATION OF TLS IN THE SECURE SOCKET API

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# THE SECURE SOCKET API

- Using TLS is hard
- Symbols in libssl: 504
- Lines of code: 317

```
int socket = socket(PF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_TCP);
```



```
int socket = socket(PF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_TLS);
```

The background is a dark purple field with large, lighter purple geometric shapes. A pink ringed planet with three small dots is on the right. Several pink stars of different sizes are scattered across the upper half. A pink cat head with a single whisker is in the upper left.

# THE PROBLEM

How do we know the Secure Socket API  
actually makes your socket secure?

# FORMAL VERIFICATION PROCESS

Contracts

Determine what state changes are necessary to maintain security.


Dafny


Implement contracts and state changes in dafny code.

Code verification

Verify that the codebase implements the contracts.

# CERTIFICATE CHAIN





```
// loads a certificate chain from B<file> into B<ctx>.  
method SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file  
  (file : string, ctx : SSL_CTX?)  
  returns (ret : int)  
  requires file != ""  
  requires ctx != null  
  ensures ctx.num_certs != old(ctx.num_certs)  
{  
  var x509 := new X509.Init();  
  ctx.addX509(x509);  
  ret := 0;  
}
```

```
71
72 ✓ method addX509(cert : X509?)
73 |   modifies `num_certs
74 |   modifies cert_store
75 |   requires cert != null
76 |   requires 0 <= num_certs < cert_store.Length - 1
77 |   ensures num_certs == old(num_certs) + 1
78 |   ensures num_certs < cert_store.Length
79 | ✓ ensures forall i : int :: 0 <= i < old(num_certs)
80 |   ||| ==> cert_store[i] == old(cert_store[i])
81 |   ensures cert_store[old(num_certs)] == cert
82 ✓ {
83 |   cert_store[num_certs] := cert;
84 |   num_certs := num_certs + 1;
85 | }
86
```



## CONCLUSION

- The Secure Socket API is an effective way of guaranteeing a secure TLS connection
- Formal verification of meaningful (non-trivial) code is hard

## AND

## WHAT NEXT?

- We lack formal verification that our model represents the codebase
- Solution: Integrate proof into the codebase

# THANKS!



Any questions?