

# Empirical Methods for the Analysis of the Energy Transition

Slide Set 11

Prof. Mar Reguant

IDEA  
Fall 2024



## Inequity impacts of the energy transition

## Energy transition's heterogeneous impacts

- The energy transition can have substantial impacts on households that can be highly heterogeneous.
- Example: Rich households have easier access to solar and batteries. Net-metering of solar can leave poorer households stranded without policy action (more on this next week).
- **Uneven impacts combined with climate change impacts:**
  - ▶ Households most exposed to extreme events tend to have the lowest income (poor building construction and insulation, heat islands).
  - ▶ Also least able to adapt and upgrade with resilience equipment (solar + backup battery, solar + EV as battery).

# Example: adoption of EV and solar in Catalonia

Relació entre ingressos i cotxes elèctrics per municipi



Source: Enrich and Reguant, 2023. "Efectes distributius de la transició energètica: reptes i oportunitats per a una transformació justa." Nota d'Economia.

# Equity impacts recently in the news



The energy crisis is unprecedented and is driving the cost of living crisis. Last October, 4.5 million UK households were in fuel poverty. Now National Energy Action estimates there are 6.7 million. Come April, we are expecting there to be 8.4 million.

[Read the latest policy briefing here](#)

Across the UK, cold homes are already damaging the lives of the poorest households.

## After Days Of Mass Outages, Some Texas Residents Now Face Huge Electricity Bills

February 21, 2021 · 12:01 PM ET



REBECCA HERSHER



# Equity impacts can be devastating

## Excess deaths could rise as vulnerable skimp on heating, UK charities warn

Freezing temperatures and high energy costs lead to fears that more people will die this year without action



WINTER STORM 2021

### At least 111 people died in Texas during winter storm, most from hypothermia

The newly revised number is nearly twice the 57 that state health officials estimated last week and will likely continue to grow.

BY SHAWN MULCAHY MARCH 25, 2021 4 PM CENTRAL

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# Resilience preparedness will not start where most needed

NOVEMBER 16, 2022

## Tax rebates for solar power ineffective for low-income Americans, but a different incentive works

Tax rebates for installing residential solar power have done little to spur adoption in low-income communities in the United States, while a less common incentive seems to succeed, according to new research using AI and satellite images.



BY EDMUND L. ANDREWS

When a new consumer technology makes its debut, whether it's a smartphone or an electric car, its adoption rate typically follows a predictable path. The first buyers come from a narrow slice of high-income users or tech enthusiasts who are willing to pay high prices. Over time, as prices fall and

## Solar Microgrids for Santa Barbara Unified School District are set to move forward

A groundbreaking RFP process and PPA contract ensure massive bill savings and unparalleled resilience value for free at a California school district.




# Broader impacts of climate change

- In this class, we focus on "micro" aspects of the energy transition, focused on already high-energy consuming countries.
- The energy transition and impacts of climate change will be uneven within a country.
- Cross-country differences are even more dramatic, with developing countries being much more affected by climate change and extreme weather events.

## Unequal costs of climate change

Poorer countries face greater risks from climate change and are less able to adapt to them.

(adaptive capacity and exposure indexes, points out of 1)



Source: IMF staff calculations based on 2015–18 data from the European Commission, the United Nations University Institute for Environment and Human Security, the University of Notre Dame, and the April 2020 World Economic Outlook.  
Note: Dotted lines show estimated linear relationships for advanced economies, and for emerging market and low-income countries combined, respectively.

IMF

# Equity and efficiency

- Economists had traditionally not engaged with issues such as inequity, environmental justice, etc.
- However, it is more and more obvious that inequitable policies are not feasible.
- This creates a **link between efficiency and equity**.
- For a policy to be effective, it needs to be **socially implementable**.

Explainer

## Who are the gilets jaunes and what do they want?

What began as a fuel tax protest by French drivers now appeals to wider anti-government sentiment



## Many open questions to address efficiency and equity

- Huge need to think about open topics concerning the energy transition that seem highly suited for economists and that touch distributional issues:
  - ▶ Equity impacts of non-linear and dynamic pricing during energy transition.
  - ▶ Stranded assets and design of tariffs for fixed costs.
  - ▶ Competition with dynamic prices and heterogeneous inattentive consumers.
  - ▶ Solar panel and battery adoption with credit constraints.
  - ▶ Transportation electrification and combustion car phase out.
  - ▶ Heterogeneous ability to engage in reliability and resilience.
  - ▶ Etc.

## Examples of tools/topics in the literature

- Quantification of impacts via detailed **tax/purchase data** (Davis and Borenstein, 2016 – US energy tax credits; Borenstein, 2017 – solar PV).
- Comparisons of **pricing impacts** with micro data and aggregate income/demographic data (Borenstein, 2012 – non-linear pricing; Leslie et al, 2021 – RTP pricing using substation data; Cahana et al, 2022 – RTP pricing using household data).
  - ▶ Today's focus.
- Counterfactual **equilibrium model** of demand and supply based on household data (Wolak, 2016 – water; Feger et al., 2021, DeGroote and Verboven, 2022 – solar panels).
- Responses to uneven impacts of energy policies using **survey/voting** data (Fabre and Douenne, 2022 – Yellow Vests) and electoral data (DeGroote, Gautier and Verboven, 2022 – solar PV).

Quantification via detailed tax/purchase data

## The Distributional Effects of US Clean Energy Tax Credits

Severin Borenstein, University of California at Berkeley and NBER  
Lucas W. Davis, University of California at Berkeley and NBER

- Borenstein and Davis (2016) document tax credits.
- They use tax return data (IRS) to examine characteristics of recipients.
- Results suggests these are highly regressive.
- Plausibly more regressive than carbon taxes, although much more popular (to a certain extent).

### Executive Summary

Since 2006, US households have received more than \$18 billion in federal income tax credits for weatherizing their homes, installing solar panels, buying hybrid and electric vehicles, and other “clean energy” investments. We use tax return data to examine the socioeconomic characteristics of program recipients. We find that these tax expenditures have gone predominantly to higher-income Americans. The bottom three income quintiles have received about 10% of all credits, while the top quintile has received about 60%. The most extreme is the program aimed at electric vehicles, where we find that the top income quintile has received about 90% of all credits. By comparing to previous work on the distributional consequences of pricing greenhouse gas emissions, we conclude that tax credits are likely to be much less attractive on distributional grounds than market mechanisms to reduce greenhouse gases (GHGs).

# Energy tax credits for EVs and solar in the US




Fig. 4. US Sales of Electric and Plug-In Hybrid Vehicles




Fig. 2. US Residential Installations of Solar Panels by Year

# Evolution of overall spending

- Paper focuses on a period of large energy programs via the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (Recovery Act).
- Large programs to subsidize energy efficiency (windows, furnaces, heat pumps), solar panels and alternative vehicles.
- Over \$18 billion over the period of study on residential-focused subsidies alone.

**Table 1**  
Annual Expenditures on US Clean Energy Tax Credits, in Millions

| Year  | Windows and Other Energy-Efficiency Investments (NEPC)<br>(\$) | Solar Panels and Other Residential Renewables (REEPC)<br>(\$) | Hybrids and Other Alternative Fuel Vehicles (AMVC)<br>(\$) | Electric and Plug-In Hybrid Vehicles (PEDVC)<br>(\$) |
|-------|--|---|--|--|
| 2005  | 0  | 0   | 0  | 0  |
| 2006  | 957  | 43  | 50   | 0  |
| 2007  | 938  | 69  | 185  | 0  |
| 2008  | 0  | 217   | 49   | 0  |
| 2009  | 5,177  | 645   | 137  | 129  |
| 2010  | 5,420  | 754   | 93   | 1  |
| 2011  | 755  | 921   | 14   | 76   |
| 2012  | 449  | 818   | 20   | 139  |
| Total | 13,696   | 3,467   | 549  | 346  |


Sources: This table was constructed by the authors using US Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, "Statistics of Income, Individual Tax Returns," 2005–2012 and US Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, "Individual Income Tax Returns Line Item Estimates," 2005–2012.

Notes: See appendix for details. Tax credits across all four categories totaled \$18.1 billion between 2005 and 2012.

## Distributional analysis: access

- Thanks to the very detailed micro data from the US Treasury (IRS), authors can document that adoption of energy tax credits is very low by low income households.
- Due to the nature of these tax credits, some of these tax credits cannot be accessed by low income households.
- This is in addition to several other barriers (credit constraints, renter status, etc.).

A: Share Claiming Credit 2006-2012, by Adjusted Gross Income



## Distributional analysis: concentration curves

- Authors also compute concentration curves of transfers of energy tax credits.
- x-axis: income / y-axis: transfers.
- Concentration is very large, and much larger than the distribution of income (annual gross income or AGI).
- Figure: example from EVs.

C: Qualified Plug-in Electric Drive Motor Vehicle Credit, 2009-2012






Fig. 7. Concentration Curves

## Recent focus on how to include low-income, but difficult in practice

- Bottom line from mounting evidence is that inequality in energy policy is even larger than in income, which can stall progress.
- Many policies try to now explicitly **target low-income households**.
- Example: weatherization assistance program (WAP), community solar programs.
- In practice, difficult to implement in low-income neighborhoods with high participation costs and limits on ability to directly benefit from program (e.g., renters).
- Need to pool across several housing units also makes practical implementation harder (e.g., community solar rooftop: problems with community agreements, also with bureaucracy, limits on property tax credits, etc.).

## But with limits... e.g., Solar PV in California



Source: California Distributed Generation Statistics, <https://www.californiadgstats.ca.gov/>.

- Paper studies the distributional impacts of solar PV in the PG&E territory.
- It uses detailed billing data (same as last class) with solar panel installation and production data to quantify adoption and winning by income quintiles (Census block group, methodology from last class). Also limited hourly consumption data for a sample of households.
- Paper computes relevance of rate design in affecting solar PV adoption.

## Private Net Benefits of Residential Solar PV: The Role of Electricity Tariffs, Tax Incentives, and Rebates

Severin Borenstein


**Abstract:** With dramatic declines in the cost of solar PV technology since 2010, the electricity industry is in the midst of debates about whether to use this low-polluting renewable energy source in grid-scale generation or in distributed rooftop generation (DG). California has led the growth in DG solar in the United States. I use 2007 to early 2014 residential data from Pacific Gas & Electric—the utility with the largest number of residential solar customers in the United States—to examine the full range of private incentives for installing residential solar, from direct rebates and tax credits to indirect incentives that result from the residential tariff design and the crediting of solar production under “net energy metering.” I then study the income distribution of solar adopters and how that has changed over time. I find the skew to wealthy households adopting solar is still significant but began to lessen after 2011. Adoption continued to be dominated by the heaviest electricity-consuming households, probably because the steeply tiered tariff structure greatly increased the private value of solar to such customers while reducing the incentive for consumers who are below median consumption. In fact, the financial incentive for those who actually adopted solar over the sample period may have been due nearly as much to California’s tiered tariff structure as to the 30% federal tax credit. The California experience suggests that rate design can greatly influence the economic incentives for residential solar adoption and which customers receive those benefits.

**JEL Codes:** I.94, Q42, Q58

**Keywords:** Alternative energy, Distributed generation, Energy subsidies

## Concentration indices

- Concentration curves show what was already shown in the previous paper: higher concentration of adoption in high-income categories.



# Factors making solar very attractive in California

- Federal tax credit
- Accelerated Depreciation Value (if under lease)
- State subsidies (CSI program)
- Good solar radiation
- High electricity prices
- Rate structure (net metering)




Figure 1. CSI rebate (per Watt of rated capacity) paid under PG&E program

# What is net metering (NEM)?

- Under net-metering, households will get the energy produced from their solar panels subtracted from their demand.
- They are only charged for their net demand, e.g., at the monthly level.
- Traditionally, energy-based, so the implicit price for solar power is the **retail price**.
- Due to non-linear pricing, net-metering is more attractive to high energy users, which on average, are higher income.




Figure 2. Average PG&E increasing block pricing tariff during 2007–13

# NEM can be a substantial subsidy


- Under traditional NEM expected the net present value (NPV) of solar panels can be much larger.
- This is due to the fact that the retail energy prices can be much larger than the marginal cost of electricity.
- In California, there were **no fixed fees**: all the distribution network is paid via retail prices that are proportional to electricity consumption.

Table 2. Average Bill Savings under Alternative Tariffs for All PG&E Residential Solar

| Year  | Obs.   | Capacity<br>(kW) | NPV of 25-Year Electricity Bill Savings (\$) |                        |                          |                   |
|-------|--------|------------------|--|------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------|
|       |        |                  | IBP with<br>Monthly NEM                      | IBP with<br>Hourly NEM | Flat Rate<br>(\$.19/kWh) | MC<br>(\$.10/kWh) |
| 2007  | 5,601  | 3.67             | 20,965                                       | 18,223                 | 14,576                   | 7,650             |
| 2008  | 5,701  | 3.73             | 21,628                                       | 18,612                 | 14,829                   | 7,783             |
| 2009  | 8,393  | 4.00             | 23,338                                       | 19,794                 | 15,943                   | 8,368             |
| 2010  | 9,110  | 4.42             | 26,270                                       | 22,167                 | 17,634                   | 9,255             |
| 2011  | 11,827 | 4.02             | 23,321                                       | 19,972                 | 16,017                   | 8,407             |
| 2012  | 15,182 | 4.17             | 23,556                                       | 20,074                 | 16,630                   | 8,728             |
| 2013  | 25,654 | 4.46             | 24,726                                       | 21,024                 | 17,793                   | 9,339             |
| 2014* | 8,411  | 4.65             | 25,729                                       | 21,789                 | 18,600                   | 9,762             |

## NEM interacts with income

- Going from traditional NEM to a flat rate per solar output reduces benefits of households.
- It also reduces benefits to higher income households disproportionately more.



## Policy consequences

- As discussed in previous class, net-metering policy can become socially and financially unsustainable.
- California has undergone two reforms of their net-metering policies to balance cost allocation, efficiency, equity.
- Open discussions between the winners and losers from the different alternatives.
- Problem set will give you a starter modeling tour on this.

## Pricing impacts of the energy transition

## Today: Papers about pricing

- Borenstein (2012): Distributive impacts of non-linear pricing.
- Leslie, Pourkhanali, Roger (working paper, 2021): Impact of real-time pricing.
- Cahana, Fabra, Reguant, and Wang (2022): Impact of real-time pricing and energy crisis.

# A data challenge

## Very ideal data

- Individual detailed smart meter data.
- Individual income.
- Individual building/appliance characteristics.
- Individual comfort data.

We will discuss for each paper methods to **link consumption and income data**.

## Usual data limitations

- Monthly billing data; hourly but not individual data.
- Censored income, zip code income.
- Almost never no building/appliance characteristics.
- Almost never comfort data.

## The Redistributional Impact of Nonlinear Electricity Pricing<sup>†</sup>

By SEVERIN BORENSTEIN\*

*Electricity regulators often mandate increasing-block pricing (IBP)—i.e., marginal price increases with the customer's average daily usage—to protect low-income households from rising costs. IBP has no cost basis, raising a classic conflict between efficiency and distributional goals. Combining household-level utility billing data with census data on income, I find that IBP in California results in modest wealth redistribution, but creates substantial deadweight loss relative to the transfers. I also show that a common approach to studying income distribution effects by using median household income within census block groups may be misleading. (JEL D31, L11, L51, L94, L98, Q41, Q48)*

# Can non-linear pricing help?

- Non-linear pricing is quite common in utility tariff design.
- Electricity prices are above marginal cost to pay for other costs.
- These other costs often include at least part of fixed costs, e.g., transmission lines.
- Instead of setting a fixed fee, many regulators set increasing non-linear prices.




FIGURE 1. SCE'S STANDARD RETAIL ELECTRICITY TARIFF IN 2006

## What does the paper do?

- **Question:** Is non-linear pricing progressive? To what extent?
- **Data:** Monthly billing data for the three largest utilities in California (PG&E, SCE, SDG&E), social bonus status (CARE), median and mean income at the Census block group level (precise, small neighborhood area, but not individually).
- **Method:** ecological methods to bound redistributive impacts under assumption of perfect sorting (higher consumption → higher income) vs. no sorting vs. weighted based on survey data (most realistic).
- **Findings:** Non-linear pricing is progressive, but it fails to perfectly target households.

## Basic patterns in the data

TABLE 1—DISTRIBUTION OF SCE RESIDENTIAL CUSTOMER CONSUMPTION ACROSS TARIFF TIERS IN 2006

|   | Residential usage<br>(million-kWh) | Percentage of residential usage |        |        |        |        | CARE/Non-CARE shares |                         |
|---|------------------------------------|---------------------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|----------------------|-------------------------|
|   |                                    | Tier 1                          | Tier 2 | Tier 3 | Tier 4 | Tier 5 | Percentage of usage  | Percentage of customers |
| Non-CARE  | 23,046                             | 52.9                            | 10.7   | 16.5   | 10.9   | 9.0    | 79.3                 | 74.8                    |
| CARE  | 6,016                              | 66.0                            | 10.7   | 13.5   | 6.7    | 3.1    | 20.7                 | 25.2                    |
| Percentage of customers on each tier for marginal consumption |                                    |                                 |        |        |        |        |                      |                         |
|   |                                    | Tier 1                          | Tier 2 | Tier 3 | Tier 4 | Tier 5 |                      |                         |
| Non-CARE  |                                    | 32.4                            | 14.2   | 25.0   | 17.2   | 11.3   |                      |                         |
| CARE  |                                    | 45.4                            | 16.7   | 22.7   | 10.9   | 4.3    |                      |                         |

*Note:* Reported results drop household accounts with consumption of less than 1 kWh/day.

# Non-linear pricing is progressive

- Consumers with high levels of consumption end up paying substantially more at the margin, while consumers with low consumption get the first units at a low price.
- Higher income consumers tend to consume more even using the random approach, driven by higher income Census blocks consuming more.




FIGURE 4. ALTERNATIVE ESTIMATES OF AGGREGATE CHANGE IN PAYMENTS BY INCOME BRACKET

## Main findings: complementary tools?

- Paper examines simulations with and without social bonus.
- Social bonus suspected to not be very well targeted in California.
- Under weighted method, bonus still contributes more to redistribution but non-linear pricing targets best the highest quintile.

TABLE 7—ESTIMATED AVERAGE ANNUAL BILLS WITH AND WITHOUT IBP AND CARE

| Income range | Average annualized bill |                  |             |                  | Bill change from No-CARE/flat |             |                  |
|--------------|-------------------------|------------------|-------------|------------------|-------------------------------|-------------|------------------|
|              | No-CARE                 |                  | with CARE   |                  | No-CARE                       | w/CARE      | w/CARE           |
|              | Flat tariff             | Five-tier tariff | Flat tariff | Five-tier tariff | Five-tier tariff              | Flat tariff | Five-tier tariff |
| \$0–\$20k    | \$785                   | \$653            | \$609       | \$546            | -\$132                        | -\$176      | -\$239           |
| \$20k–\$40k  | \$973                   | \$879            | \$863       | \$804            | -\$94                         | -\$111      | -\$170           |
| \$40k–\$60k  | \$1,128                 | \$1,098          | \$1,163     | \$1,115          | -\$29                         | \$35        | -\$12            |
| \$60k–\$100k | \$1,234                 | \$1,260          | \$1,337     | \$1,327          | \$26                          | \$103       | \$93             |
| >\$100k      | \$1,646                 | \$1,900          | \$1,790     | \$1,996          | \$253                         | \$144       | \$350            |

*Notes:* All calculations using weighted-rank within-CBG allocation method. Excludes bills with daily consumption less than 1kWh/day. Includes all CARE and non-CARE customers.

## Can real-time pricing be progressive? Identifying cross-subsidies under fixed-rate electricity tariffs

Gordon W. Leslie\*

Armin Pourkhanali

Guillaume Roger<sup>†</sup>

October 26, 2021

### Abstract

Wholesale electricity prices can rapidly change in real-time, yet households usually face fixed-price electricity tariffs. These tariffs create implicit cross-subsidies between households, determined by the timing of consumption. We map substation data on electricity use to demographic data to identify the household characteristics associated with this cross-subsidization. We find that households in areas with low house prices and high levels of renters and elderly residents are net funders of this cross-subsidy, and may be the greatest immediate beneficiaries if real-time retail tariffs are made available. Further, cross-subsidy magnitudes are exacerbated by the wholesale price impacts from increasing solar generator penetration.

**JEL classification:** D12, D18, H23, L94, Q41

**Keywords:** Real-time pricing, Cross-subsidies, Tariff design, Clean energy transition, Energy demand.

## What does the paper do?


- **Question:** Is real-time pricing progressive? To what extent?
- **Data:** half-hourly substation consumption data in Victoria (AUS) matched to geographical demographic data including income and other covariates, data on number of businesses and households, weather data.
- **Method:** Regression that separates business vs. household consumption, then focus on household consumption to look at redistribution across substations.
- **Findings:** Real-time pricing favors low-income consumers on average.

## Regression approach


- Use regression with number of households and businesses, allowing hourly consumption to depend on neighborhood characteristics.
- Each substation ranked into terciles (high, medium, low) for 12 measures
  - ▶ Demographics: prop. of people over age 65; av. h'hold size, prop. born o'seas; prop. work from home; unemployment; av. income; prop. Uni.
  - ▶ Housing: prop. rental; median house price; residential density; prop. rooftop solar.
  - ▶ Climate: cooling degree days
- Focus on predicted household consumption  $\beta_h$  interacted with characteristics  $Z_s$ .

$$Q_{s,t} = \alpha_h + \beta_h \cdot \underbrace{Z_s}_{\text{Char's}} \cdot |I_s| + \gamma_h \cdot |J_s| + \epsilon_{s,t}$$

Method seems to extract meaningful signal




Business profiles



Household profiles


Method seems to extract meaningful signal



(e) Cooling degree days

## Results are a bit mixed

- Costs per MWh under RTP go down for some sensitive demographic categories (e.g., elderly, renters).
- RTP is not necessarily regressive, although heterogeneity in impacts is substantial even with aggregate substation data.
- Some open questions:
  - ▶ Victoria has a very large share of rooftop adoption, how does interact with RTP when looking at distributional impacts?
  - ▶ How does it depend on solar pricing design, e.g., net-metering vs. other alternatives?



## The Distributional Impacts of Real-Time Pricing

Michael Cahana

Natalia Fabra

Mar Reguant

Jingyuan Wang\*

October 2022

### Abstract

We analyze the distributional implications of Real-Time Pricing (RTP) for electricity, which economists favor over time-invariant prices for its efficiency properties. With hourly consumption data from Spain, we find that RTP is regressive. Household consumption patterns, electric appliances, and locations explain this finding. Through counterfactuals, we find that these distributional impacts might worsen in the future with the broader adoption of enabling technologies by high-income groups. Methodologically, we propose a novel method for inferring individual household income. Capturing within zip code income heterogeneity is key for uncovering the distributional impacts of RTP.

## What does the paper do?

- **Question:** Is real-time pricing progressive?
- **Data:** smart meter individual data match to zip-code level income and weather data.  
Income quintiles at the zip-code level.
- **Method:** Machine learning methods to infer appliance ownership and income imputation.
- **Findings:** High-frequency RTP variation benefits low income, but low-frequency hurts low-income with very inefficient electric heating.

# Main Findings Expanded

## Main Finding:

- The move towards RTP was slightly regressive, with heating mode and location as the main drivers.

## Main Effects:

- Switch from **annual to monthly prices** is regressive → low-income households tend to consume relatively more during winter when RTP prices are higher.
- Switch from **monthly to hourly prices** is progressive → low-income households consume relatively less at off-peak hours when RTP prices are lower.
- **Building/heating stock** appears to be the major driver of consumption patterns, which is correlated with income but also differs across locations.

## A first look at the data: month vs annual variation




Figure: Summary of price variation

## Computing bills under RTP and time-invariant prices

- Compute bill with and without RTP:

$$\Delta \text{Bill} = \text{Bill}_i^{\text{RTP}} - \overline{\text{Bill}}_i$$

- ▶  $\text{Bill}_i^{\text{RTP}}$ : Bill under hourly prices (RTP)
- ▶  $\overline{\text{Bill}}_i$ : Bill under the annual average price (time-invariant)

- Separate “within month” and “across months” effects:

$$\Delta \text{Bill} = [\text{Bill}_i^{\text{RTP}} - \overline{\text{Bill}}_i^m] + [\overline{\text{Bill}}_i^m - \overline{\text{Bill}}_i]$$

- ▶  $\overline{\text{Bill}}_i^m$ : Bill under the monthly average prices

## The challenge: income data

- We observe the distribution of income at the zip code level.
- Zip codes can be substantially large.
- Inference of income common in other applications: tax fraud, subsidy fraud, refinements to coded income.
- Impacts of RTP depend on highly dimensional vector, so difficult to make intuitive bounding assumptions (e.g., Borenstein, 2012).
- **Research question:** how to better assign households' income exploiting richness of hourly consumption data?

## Some notation and definitions

- Zip code as  $z \in \{1, \dots, Z\}$ .
- Income bins as  $inc_k \in \{inc_1, \dots, inc_K\}$ .
- Households in zip code  $z$  as  $i \in \{1, \dots, H_z\}$ .
  
- Observed zip-code income distribution:  $Pr_z(inc_k)$ .
- Unknown household income distribution:  $Pr_i(inc_k)$ .

## Naïve approach

- Assign income distribution at the zip code level  $Pr_z(inc_k)$  to all households in that zip code.
- Captures across-zip-code heterogeneity, but can miss important within-zip-code heterogeneity.
- One can get somewhat at within-income bin variance, but it might be overstated.
  - ▶ [-] Heterogeneity of policy impacts conditional on the same income can be large, e.g. Cronin, Fullerton and Sexton (2019).

## Assigning a prob. income distribution to households

We introduce new additional objects:

- Zip code as  $z \in \{1, \dots, Z\}$ .
- Income bins as  $inc_k \in \{inc_1, \dots, inc_K\}$ .
- Households in zip code  $z$  as  $i \in \{1, \dots, H_z\}$ .
- Discrete types as  $\theta_n \in \{\theta_1, \dots, \theta_N\}$ .
- Observed zip-code income distribution:  $Pr_z(inc_k)$ .
- Unknown household income distribution:  $Pr_i(inc_k)$ .
- Unknown household type distribution:  $Pr_i(\theta_n)$
- Unknown type-income distribution:  $\eta_n^k$  (probability that type  $n$  has income bin  $k$ ).

## Our approach: intuition


We propose an estimator in two steps:

- 1 Classify consumers into types (deterministic or mixtures).
- 2 Infer income distribution of the types based on zip code level distribution.

**Key:** Allow for sufficient discrete heterogeneity to match income distribution at the zip code level.

**Identifying assumption:** Common types across (subsets of) zip codes.

## Intuition follows similar settings (e.g., BLP, FKRB)



- Assume we have already inferred the distribution of types in each zip code.
- $\eta_A^H$  represents the probability of income level  $H$  for type  $\theta_A$  (similarly for  $\theta_B$ ), unknowns.
- Match zip code moments on the distribution of income, same underlying types across zip codes.

## Step 1: Assigning households to types

- We break the approach in two steps to facilitate the computations: millions of households with individual hourly consumption data.
- Inefficient, but consistent under the proposed assumptions.
- We have explored several classification techniques:
  - ▶ [-] Observable discrete characteristics (contracted power).
  - ▶ [-] Inferred discrete characteristics based on smart-meter data (appliance ownership).
  - ▶ [-] Deterministic classification based on summary stats from high-frequency data.
  - ▶ [-] EM algorithm based on household-level regression outcomes.
  - ▶ [-] **k-means clustering based on load profiles**

## Step 1: k-means clustering of types

- We reduce dimensionality of data into market shares for daily consumption in weekdays and weekends for each individual household.
- We group nearby zip codes and cluster the population of consumers based on these market shares as well as the levels of production. Observable types based on contracted power.
- Our baseline has 12 types per province depending on contracted power, heating mode, and consumption patterns.

## Step 1: Example of type assignment




Figure: Flexible k-mean types with electric heating in a given province

## Step 2: Identifying equations

Conditional on having identified the distribution of types for each zip code:

$$\begin{aligned} & \min_{\eta} \sum_z \omega_z \sum_k \left( Pr_z(\text{inc}_k) - \sum_{i \in z} \sum_n \eta_n^k Pr_z(\theta_n) \right)^2 \\ \text{s.t. } & \sum_k \eta_n^k = 1, \forall n, \end{aligned}$$

where  $\omega_z$  is a sampling weight and

$$Pr_z(\theta_n) \equiv \sum_{i \in z} Pr_i(\theta_n) / H_z.$$

## Step 2: Semi-parametric estimator

- Previous identification results is limited in types by the numbers of zip-codes that share types.
- We consider a semi-parametric estimator that allows the distribution of income to depend on individual and zip-code demographics.
- The distribution of income is individual and zip-code specific even for the same type.


$$\begin{aligned} \min_{\eta, \alpha, \beta} \quad & \sum_j \omega_j \sum_{k=1}^K (Pr_k^j - \sum_{i \in \mathcal{I}_j} Pr_k(\theta_i, x_i, z_j)), \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & Pr_k(\theta_i, x_i, z_j) = \frac{\exp(\delta_{ijk})}{\sum_{k'=1}^K \exp(\delta_{ijk'})}, \quad \forall k \in [1, \dots, K], \\ & \delta_{ijk} = \alpha_k + \beta_0^{\theta_i} \times k + \beta_1^{\theta_i} x_i \times k + \beta_2^{\theta_i} z_j \times k. \end{aligned}$$

## Step 2: Results


- The above estimator gives us an estimated probability of a given household belonging to a certain income bin.
- Estimator does not say exact income of a given households (still measured with error).
- We show it can help correct the association between income and the policy impacts even if income is not perfectly observed, which can be biased with zip-code level income.

## Step 2: Confirm relationship between income and contracted power

- Individual-level of contracted power strongly associated with higher income distribution, but not with naïve zip-code level data.



## Monte Carlo: Income estimation



## Monte Carlo: Policy impacts


We perform a Monte-Carlo simulation to inform this discussion. Assume that the true data generation process behind the distributional impacts is governed by the following equation:

$$impact_{i,z} = \textcolor{red}{t} \times \theta_i + \textcolor{red}{k} \times inc_i + \sigma_z \times (\phi_z + \bar{\phi}_{zipgroup}) + \sigma_e \times \epsilon_{iz}.$$


- $t$ : Heterogeneity captured by the types.
- $k$ : Direct income heterogeneity.
- $\sigma_z$ : Across zip code heterogeneity.
- $\sigma_e$ : Remaining unobserved heterogeneity.

# Monte Carlo: Policy impacts


Figure: Assessing the method with a Monte-Carlo simulation



(a) Full bias correction



(b) Partial bias correction



(c) No naïve bias


## Bringing it back to measuring the policy impacts

We use the inferred distribution of income at the household level to assess the distributional impacts of RTP.

- *What is the impact of RTP across income bins?*
- *How can it be decomposed?*
- *What are the main drivers for the effects?*
- *Does the within-zip-code heterogeneity matter?*


## Heterogeneous impacts by income bins

- RTP is slightly regressive - still, the average impact is small.
- RTP impacts are highly heterogeneous within zip-code because of income heterogeneity.
- Distributional implications are reversed relative to using zip-code level income.



# Decomposing the impacts


- **Within month** price changes have progressive impacts.
- However, **across month** price changes have regressive effects.




# The mechanisms behind these patterns

■ We consider:


- ▶ Consumption patterns by income.
- ▶ Appliance ownership, across and by income.
- ▶ Geographical variation related to weather/appliances.



(a) Share of electric heating owners and AC owners




(b) AC ownership by state



(c) EH ownership by state



# Mechanisms: consumption patterns during the day

- Higher income quintiles consume more electricity.
- They also consume proportionally more at peak hours.
- [→] The within month effect is progressive.




# Mechanisms: appliance ownership

- We infer appliance ownership based on consumption structural breaks to local temperatures.
- Appliance ownership, key for the within-income heterogeneity.
- The bigger bill increases are suffered by households with electric heating due to the across months effect.




# Mechanisms: appliance ownership

- Households with electric heating consume more during peak hours and winter when prices are higher.
- Appliance ownership creates bigger differences than income.
- Conditional on appliance ownership, income still induces substantial differences.




# Mechanisms: geography

- Within month effects are similar across income and geography.
- Seasonal price variation across locations drives the heterogeneous impacts.



(a) Within month effects




(b) Across months effects


## Counterfactual experiments

- The distributional impacts in our sample are limited and bounded (small price variation).
- However, patterns could change going forward, with increasing extreme pricing and volatility (as experienced lately).
- We explore several counterfactuals:
  - ▶ [-] Demand elasticity (under different correlations with income).
  - ▶ [-] Extreme events (under alternative assumptions on price levels and volatility).

# Commodity risks and energy poverty



(a) Simulated prices




(b) Simulated price volatility


- We consider simulated prices (with low, medium, high levels and low, medium, high volatility).
- We re-analyze the distributional implications of RTP.

# Commodity Risks and Energy Poverty

- Low-income households are relatively worse off under high prices and low volatility.
- High price levels have more adverse distributional impacts than high price volatility.
- The across month effects strongly dominate the within month effects.



(a) Redistribution



(b) Decomposition

## Conclusions: energy crisis, RTP, and equity

- Distributional implications of RTP in Spain (2016-2017).
  - ▶ In this context, RTP was **slightly regressive**.
- Bill impacts decomposed in:
  - ▶ within month effects (daily price variation).
  - ▶ across months effects (seasonal price variation).
- Key drivers: **appliance ownership** and **location**.
  - ▶ In Spain, low-income households rely more on electric heating, which exposes them to the high winter prices.

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