LOGIC AND THEORETICAL FOUNDATION OF COMPUTER SCIENCE

LATFOCS

Pamela Fleischmann

fpa@informatik.uni-kiel.de

Winter Semester 2019

Kiel University Dependable Systems Group



SEMANTICS OF PROPOSITIONAL

Logic



Let's think about the natural language and our understanding of it:

○ I like bananas and chocolate.



- I like bananas and chocolate.
 - Decomposition into atomic propositions tells us that I like bananas and I like chocolate.



- I like bananas and chocolate.
 - Decomposition into atomic propositions tells us that I like bananas and I like chocolate.
- I don't like rain and being on the bike.



- I like bananas and chocolate.
 - Decomposition into atomic propositions tells us that I like bananas and I like chocolate.
- I don't like rain and being on the bike.
 - intuitively: being on a bike **during** rain is nothing what I like



- I like bananas and chocolate.
 - Decomposition into atomic propositions tells us that I like bananas and I like chocolate.
- I don't like rain and being on the bike.
 - intuitively: being on a bike during rain is nothing what I like
 - o logic: ¬ (rain and bike) equals ¬ rain or ¬ bike



- I like bananas and chocolate.
 - Decomposition into atomic propositions tells us that I like bananas and I like chocolate.
- I don't like rain and being on the bike.
 - intuitively: being on a bike during rain is nothing what I like
 - o logic: ¬ (rain and bike) equals ¬ rain or ¬ bike
 - o if I just don't like rain at all, the formula is true



- I like bananas and chocolate.
 - Decomposition into atomic propositions tells us that I like bananas and I like chocolate.
- I don't like rain and being on the bike.
 - intuitively: being on a bike during rain is nothing what I like
 - o logic: ¬ (rain and bike) equals ¬ rain or ¬ bike
 - o if I just don't like rain at all, the formula is true
- we have to formalise this!



Truth values and Models

Definition

 \bigcirc The set of truth values is defined as $\mathcal{T} = \{\text{true}, \text{false}\}.$



Truth values and Models

Definition

- The set of truth values is defined as $\mathcal{T} = \{\text{true}, \text{false}\}.$
- \bigcirc A valuation, interpretation, or model of a formula φ is a total mapping $\beta:A\to\mathcal{T}$



Truth values and Models

Definition

- \bigcirc The set of truth values is defined as $\mathcal{T} = \{\text{true}, \text{false}\}.$
- \bigcirc A valuation, interpretation, or model of a formula φ is a total mapping $\beta:A\to\mathcal{T}$

other notations for true and false: 1 and 0, t and f



Truth value of a Formula

Definition

Let $\varphi \in \Phi$ and β an interpretation. Then $\hat{\beta}(\varphi)$ is inductively defined by

 $\hat{\beta}(p) = \beta(p)$ for atoms $p \in A$

$$\hat{\beta}(\neg \psi) = \text{true iff } \hat{\beta}(\psi) = \text{false}$$

$$\hat{\beta}(\psi \land \chi) = \begin{cases} \text{true} & \text{if } \hat{\beta}(\psi) = \text{true and } \hat{\beta}(\chi) = \text{true} \\ \text{false} & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

$$\hat{\beta}(\psi \lor \chi) = \begin{cases} \text{false} & \text{if } \hat{\beta}(\psi) = \text{false and } \hat{\beta}(\chi) = \text{false} \\ \text{true} & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

$$\hat{\beta}(\psi \to \chi) = \begin{cases} \text{false} & \text{if } \hat{\beta}(\psi) = \text{true and } \hat{\beta}(\chi) = \text{false} \\ \text{true} & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

LaTFoCS

Truth value of a formula (Cont.)

Definition

$$\begin{split} \hat{\beta}(\psi \leftrightarrow \chi) &= \text{true iff } \hat{\beta}(\psi) = \hat{\beta}(\chi) \\ \hat{\beta}(\psi \dot{\vee} \chi) &= \text{true iff } \hat{\beta}(\psi) \neq \hat{\beta}(\chi) \\ \hat{\beta}(\psi \downarrow \chi) &= \text{true iff } \hat{\beta}(\psi \vee \chi) = \text{false} \\ \hat{\beta}(\psi \uparrow \chi) &= \text{true iff } \hat{\beta}(\psi \wedge \chi) = \text{false} \end{split}$$



Partial Interpretation

Definition

Let $\varphi \in \Phi$ be a propositional formula with the atoms $A_{\varphi} \subseteq A$. A function $\overline{\beta}$ is a partional interpretation of φ if its domain is a subset of A_{φ} .



Partial Interpretation

Definition

Let $\varphi \in \Phi$ be a propositional formula with the atoms $A_{\varphi} \subseteq A$. A function $\overline{\beta}$ is a partional interpretation of φ if its domain is a subset of A_{φ} .

For $\varphi = p \vee q \ (p, q \in A)$ we have $\hat{\beta}(\varphi) = \text{true}$ if the interpretation of at least one atom is true. Thus with $\overline{\beta}(p) = \text{true}$ we have $\overline{\beta}(\varphi) = \text{true}$ although $\overline{\beta}$ is not total on A_{φ} .



Truth Tables - a convenient way to deal with truth

Definition

A truth table for $\varphi \in \Phi$ with the atoms $A_{\varphi} \subseteq A$ and $|A_{\varphi}| = n \in \mathbb{N}$ is a $2^n \times (n+1)$ -matrix where the first n columns indicate one atom (assuming an (unimportant) order) and the last column indicates φ . Each row is associated with an interpretation of the atoms; the interpretation of the formula is stated in the last entry of a row.



Some truth tables

		p	q	$p \vee q$	p	q	p∨q
p	$\neg p$	0		0	0		0
0	1		1	1	О	1	1
1	О		О	1	1	О	1
		1	1	1	1	1	О

<i>p</i>	q	$p \wedge q$	p	q	$p \rightarrow q$	p	q	$p \leftrightarrow q$
O	0	О	О	О	1	0	О	1
0	1	О	О	1	1	0	1	О
1	О	О	1	О	0	1	О	О
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1



p	q	$p \rightarrow q$	$\neg p$	$\neg p \lor q$	$(p \to q) \leftrightarrow (\neg p \lor q)$
0	О				
0	1				
1	0				
1	1				



p	q	$p \rightarrow q$	$\neg p$	$\neg p \lor q$	$(p \to q) \leftrightarrow (\neg p \lor q)$
0	0	1			
O	1	1			
1	О	0			
1	1	1			



p	q	$p \rightarrow q$	$\neg p$	$\neg p \lor q$	$(p \to q) \leftrightarrow (\neg p \lor q)$
0	0	1	1	1	
O	1	1	1	1	
1	О	0	О	О	
1	1	1	0	1	



p	q	$p \rightarrow q$	$\neg p$	$\neg p \lor q$	$(p \to q) \leftrightarrow (\neg p \lor q)$
0	О	1	1	1	1
О	1	1	1	1	1
1	О	0	0	О	1
1	1	1	0	1	1



p	q	$p \rightarrow q$	$\neg p$	$\neg p \lor q$	$(p \to q) \leftrightarrow (\neg p \lor q)$
0	О	1	1	1	1
О	1	1	1	1	1
1	0	0	0	О	1
1	1	1	0	1	1



p	q	$p \rightarrow q$	$\neg p$	$ \neg p \lor q $	$(p \to q) \leftrightarrow (\neg p \lor q)$
0	О	1	1	1	1
0	1	1	1	1	1
1	0	0	0	О	1
1	1	1	0	1	1

- Each row stands for a different interpretation.
- Is the procedure for determining the interpretation of a formula efficient?



Let's think about the operators: Disjunction

I buy milk or I buy bread.

- Do I lie if I buy only milk or only bread?
- Do I lie if I buy both?
- Do I lie if I buy nothing?



Let's think about the operators: Disjunction

I buy milk or I buy bread.

- Do I lie if I buy only milk or only bread? No!
- Do I lie if I buy both? No!
- Do I lie if I buy nothing? Yes!



Let's think about the operators: Disjunction

I buy milk or I buy bread.

- Do I lie if I buy only milk or only bread? No!
- Do I lie if I buy both? No!
- Do I lie if I buy nothing? Yes!

I buy either milk or I buy bread.

- Do I lie if I buy only milk or only bread? No!
- Do I lie if I buy both? Yes!
- Do I lie if I buy nothing? Yes!



Let's think about the operators: Implication

If I buy milk, then I buy bread.

- Do I lie if I buy only milk?
- Do I lie if I buy only bread?
- Do I lie if I buy both?
- Do I lie if I buy nothing?



Let's think about the operators: Implication

If I buy milk, then I buy bread.

- Do I lie if I buy only milk? Yes!
- Do I lie if I buy only bread? No!
- Do I lie if I buy both? No!
- \bigcirc Do I lie if I buy nothing? No!



Let's think about the operators: Implication

If I buy milk, then I buy bread.

- Do I lie if I buy only milk? Yes!
- Do I lie if I buy only bread? No!
- Do I lie if I buy both? No!
- Do I lie if I buy nothing? No!

We defined **material implication**: the premise/antecedent (LHS of \rightarrow) does not cause necessarily the conclusion (RHS of \rightarrow)



We have syntax and semantic of propositional formulae - what have we gained?



We have syntax and semantic of propositional formulae - what have we gained? let's have a look what we do in other artifical languages



We have syntax and semantic of propositional formulae - what have we gained? let's have a look what we do in other artifical languages

We have syntax and semantic of propositional formulae - what have we gained? let's have a look what we do in other artifical languages

what are the programmes doing?



And now?

We have syntax and semantic of propositional formulae - what have we gained? let's have a look what we do in other artifical languages

what are the programmes doing? the same



Revisiting an Example

What can we deduce from this truth table?

p	q	$p \rightarrow q$	$\neg p$	$\neg p \lor q$	$(p \to q) \leftrightarrow (\neg p \lor q)$
0	О	1	1	1	1
0	1	1	1	1	1
1	0	0	0	О	1
1	1	1	0	1	1



Logical Equivalence

Definition

Two formula $\varphi_1, \varphi_2 \in \Phi$ are called logically equivalent $(\varphi_1 \equiv \varphi_2)$ iff $\hat{\beta}(\varphi_1) = \hat{\beta}(\varphi_2)$ for all interpretations β .



How to prove logical equivalence?

For checking if φ_1 , φ_2 are logical equivalent, we have to check $\hat{\beta}(\varphi_1) = \hat{\beta}(\varphi_2)$ for all interpretations β .



How to prove logical equivalence?

For checking if φ_1 , φ_2 are logical equivalent, we have to check $\hat{\beta}(\varphi_1) = \hat{\beta}(\varphi_2)$ for all interpretations β .

 Do we have to take every single interpretation and check the property? (exponentially many!)



How to prove logical equivalence?

For checking if φ_1 , φ_2 are logical equivalent, we have to check $\hat{\beta}(\varphi_1) = \hat{\beta}(\varphi_2)$ for all interpretations β .

- Do we have to take every single interpretation and check the property? (exponentially many!)
- What if we take an arbitrary one, having only the properties each interpretation has, and checking the equality?





For proving general statements, we use the method of representatives.

 $\, \bigcirc \,$ by the name representatives represent something



- O by the name representatives represent something
- o notice: politicians are a bad example!



- by the name representatives represent something
- notice: politicians are a bad example!
- better: among a group of objects or living beings find out all properties they have in common



- by the name representatives represent something
- notice: politicians are a bad example!
- better: among a group of objects or living beings find out all properties they have in common
- then define a new object or living being (representative, prototype) having only these properties



- by the name representatives represent something
- notice: politicians are a bad example!
- better: among a group of objects or living beings find out all properties they have in common
- then define a new object or living being (representative, prototype) having only these properties
- whatever statement you are claiming about the group, if the new object has it, the group will have it

Lemma

The operator \vee *is commutative.*



Lemma

The operator \vee *is commutative.*

Proof.

 \bigcirc we have to show $\varphi \lor \psi \equiv \psi \lor \varphi$ for all $\varphi, \psi \in \Phi$.



Lemma

The operator \vee *is commutative.*

- \bigcirc we have to show $\varphi \lor \psi \equiv \psi \lor \varphi$ for all $\varphi, \psi \in \Phi$.
- \bigcirc let φ , $\psi \in \Phi$, β an arbitrary interpretation



Lemma

The operator \vee *is commutative.*

- \bigcirc we have to show $\varphi \lor \psi \equiv \psi \lor \varphi$ for all $\varphi, \psi \in \Phi$.
- \bigcirc let φ , $\psi \in \Phi$, β an arbitrary interpretation
- Oby definition $\hat{\beta}(\varphi \lor \psi) = \text{false iff } \hat{\beta}(\varphi) = \text{false and}$ $\hat{\beta}(\psi) = \text{false}$



Lemma

The operator \vee *is commutative.*

- \bigcirc we have to show $\varphi \lor \psi \equiv \psi \lor \varphi$ for all $\varphi, \psi \in \Phi$.
- \bigcirc let φ , $\psi \in \Phi$, β an arbitrary interpretation
- Oby definition $\hat{\beta}(\varphi \lor \psi) = \text{false iff } \hat{\beta}(\varphi) = \text{false and}$ $\hat{\beta}(\psi) = \text{false}$
- \bigcirc this is equivalent to $\hat{eta}(\psi)$ = false and $\hat{eta}(\varphi)$ = false



Lemma

The operator \vee *is commutative.*

- \bigcirc we have to show $\varphi \lor \psi \equiv \psi \lor \varphi$ for all $\varphi, \psi \in \Phi$.
- \bigcirc let φ , $\psi \in \Phi$, β an arbitrary interpretation
- Oby definition $\hat{\beta}(\varphi \lor \psi)$ = false iff $\hat{\beta}(\varphi)$ = false and $\hat{\beta}(\psi)$ = false
- \bigcirc this is equivalent to $\hat{eta}(\psi)$ = false and $\hat{eta}(\varphi)$ = false
- \bigcirc by definition this is equivalent to $\hat{\beta}(\psi \lor \varphi) = false$



Lemma

The operator \vee *is commutative.*

- \bigcirc we have to show $\varphi \lor \psi \equiv \psi \lor \varphi$ for all $\varphi, \psi \in \Phi$.
- \bigcirc let φ , $\psi \in \Phi$, β an arbitrary interpretation
- Oby definition $\hat{\beta}(\varphi \lor \psi) = \text{false iff } \hat{\beta}(\varphi) = \text{false and}$ $\hat{\beta}(\psi) = \text{false}$
- \bigcirc this is equivalent to $\hat{eta}(\psi)$ = false and $\hat{eta}(\varphi)$ = false
- \bigcirc by definition this is equivalent to $\hat{\beta}(\psi \lor \varphi) = false$
- \bigcirc since all steps are equivalent we have proven $\hat{\beta}(\varphi \lor \psi) = \hat{\beta}(\psi \lor \varphi)$



 in the last proof we used the word *equivalent* for stating that two claims imply each other

$$(\hat{eta}(\varphi)=$$
 false and $\hat{eta}(\psi)=$ false) is equivalent to $(\hat{eta}(\psi)=$ false and $\hat{eta}(\varphi)=$ false)



in the last proof we used the word *equivalent* for stating that two claims imply each other

$$(\hat{\beta}(\varphi)= {
m false} \ {
m and} \ \hat{\beta}(\psi)= {
m false}) \ {
m is} \ {
m equivalent} \ {
m to} \ (\hat{\beta}(\psi)= {
m false} \ {
m and} \ \hat{\beta}(\varphi)= {
m false})$$

 \supset don't confuse this with the logical operator \leftrightarrow



in the last proof we used the word *equivalent* for stating that two claims imply each other

$$(\hat{\beta}(\varphi) = \text{false and } \hat{\beta}(\psi) = \text{false})$$
 is equivalent to $(\hat{\beta}(\psi) = \text{false and } \hat{\beta}(\varphi) = \text{false})$

- \supset don't confuse this with the logical operator \leftrightarrow
- \bigcirc a metalanguage is a language L_2 for talking about a language L_1 : verb, noun, format-free etc.



in the last proof we used the word *equivalent* for stating that two claims imply each other

$$(\hat{eta}(\varphi) = {\sf false} \ {\sf and} \ \hat{eta}(\psi) = {\sf false}) \ {\sf is} \ {\sf equivalent} \ {\sf to} \ (\hat{eta}(\psi) = {\sf false} \ {\sf and} \ \hat{eta}(\varphi) = {\sf false})$$

- \supset don't confuse this with the logical operator \leftrightarrow
- \bigcirc a metalanguage is a language L_2 for talking about a language L_1 : verb, noun, format-free etc.
- if we want to talk about formulae (like comparing) we need a language for that



 in the last proof we used the word *equivalent* for stating that two claims imply each other

$$(\hat{eta}(\varphi) = {\sf false} \ {\sf and} \ \hat{eta}(\psi) = {\sf false}) \ {\sf is} \ {\sf equivalent} \ {\sf to} \ (\hat{eta}(\psi) = {\sf false} \ {\sf and} \ \hat{eta}(\varphi) = {\sf false})$$

- \supset don't confuse this with the logical operator \leftrightarrow
- \bigcirc a metalanguage is a language L_2 for talking about a language L_1 : verb, noun, format-free etc.
- if we want to talk about formulae (like comparing) we need a language for that
- we don't have necessarily different words (bad habit but reality)

in the last proof we used the word *equivalent* for stating that two claims imply each other

$$(\hat{eta}(\varphi)= {
m false} \ {
m and} \ \hat{eta}(\psi)= {
m false}) \ {
m is} \ {
m equivalent} \ {
m to} \ (\hat{eta}(\psi)= {
m false} \ {
m and} \ \hat{eta}(\varphi)= {
m false})$$

- \supset don't confuse this with the logical operator \leftrightarrow
- \bigcirc a metalanguage is a language L_2 for talking about a language L_1 : verb, noun, format-free etc.
- if we want to talk about formulae (like comparing) we need a language for that
- we don't have necessarily different words (bad habit but reality)
- \bigcirc equivalence in our logic language is \leftrightarrow (in Φ)

in the last proof we used the word *equivalent* for stating that two claims imply each other

$$(\hat{\beta}(\varphi) = \text{false and } \hat{\beta}(\psi) = \text{false})$$
 is equivalent to $(\hat{\beta}(\psi) = \text{false and } \hat{\beta}(\varphi) = \text{false})$

- \bigcirc don't confuse this with the logical operator \leftrightarrow
- \bigcirc a metalanguage is a language L_2 for talking about a language L_1 : verb, noun, format-free etc.
- if we want to talk about formulae (like comparing) we need a language for that
- we don't have necessarily different words (bad habit but reality)
- \bigcirc equivalence in our logic language is \leftrightarrow (in Φ)
- equivalence in the metalanguage is \equiv (talking about Φ)

Why do we use twice the same word?

Theorem

Let $\varphi_1, \varphi_2 \in \Phi$. Then $\varphi_1 \equiv \varphi_2$ iff $\varphi_1 \leftrightarrow \varphi_2$ is true for all interpretations β .



Why do we use twice the same word?

Theorem

Let $\varphi_1, \varphi_2 \in \Phi$. Then $\varphi_1 \equiv \varphi_2$ iff $\varphi_1 \leftrightarrow \varphi_2$ is true for all interpretations β .

Before we can prove the theorem, we need a little bit of work and two definitions for convenience.



Why do we use twice the same word?

Theorem

Let $\varphi_1, \varphi_2 \in \Phi$. Then $\varphi_1 \equiv \varphi_2$ iff $\varphi_1 \leftrightarrow \varphi_2$ is true for all interpretations β .

Before we can prove the theorem, we need a little bit of work and two definitions for convenience.

Definition

A formula φ that is true for all interpretations β is called a tautology; if it is false for all interpretations β it is called a contradiction.

LaTFoCS

iff means if and only if and contains two statements



iff means if and only if and contains two statements



iff means if and only if and contains two statements

I buy milk if and only if I buy bread.

 I buy milk if I buy bread is only true if I buy always milk when I buy bread.



iff means if and only if and contains two statements

- *I buy milk if I buy bread* is only true if I buy always milk when I buy bread.
- but we know that the statement is also true if I don't buy bread, but milk.



iff means if and only if and contains two statements

- *I buy milk if I buy bread* is only true if I buy always milk when I buy bread.
- but we know that the statement is also true if I don't buy bread, but milk.
- the *and only if* excludes these other options!



iff means if and only if and contains two statements

- I buy milk if I buy bread is only true if I buy always milk when I buy bread.
- but we know that the statement is also true if I don't buy bread, but milk.
- the *and only if* excludes these other options!
- I buy milk if I buy bread, and I do so exactly in the cases when I by bread - never else!

iff means if and only if and contains two statements

- *I buy milk if I buy bread* is only true if I buy always milk when I buy bread.
- but we know that the statement is also true if I don't buy bread, but milk.
- the *and only if* excludes these other options!
- I buy milk if I buy bread, and I do so exactly in the cases when I by bread never else!
- \odot thus I buy milk if I buy bread, and if I buy milk, I buy bread

 we have reduced the proof of an equivalence to two proofs of implications



- we have reduced the proof of an equivalence to two proofs of implications
- $\, \bigcirc \,$ how to prove an implication?



- we have reduced the proof of an equivalence to two proofs of implications
- how to prove an implication?
- by definition: an implication is true if the conclusion is true in the case that the premise is true



- we have reduced the proof of an equivalence to two proofs of implications
- how to prove an implication?
- by definition: an implication is true if the conclusion is true in the case that the premise is true
- we do not have to consider the case when the premise is false!



- we have reduced the proof of an equivalence to two proofs of implications
- o how to prove an implication?
- by definition: an implication is true if the conclusion is true in the case that the premise is true
- we do not have to consider the case when the premise is false!
- we can assume that the premise is true and then we prove that the conclusion is also true

Theorem

Let $\varphi_1, \varphi_2 \in \Phi$. Then $\varphi_1 \equiv \varphi_2$ iff $\varphi_1 \leftrightarrow \varphi_2$ is true for all interpretations β .



Theorem

Let $\varphi_1, \varphi_2 \in \Phi$. Then $\varphi_1 \equiv \varphi_2$ iff $\varphi_1 \leftrightarrow \varphi_2$ is true for all interpretations β .



Theorem

Let $\varphi_1, \varphi_2 \in \Phi$. Then $\varphi_1 \equiv \varphi_2$ iff $\varphi_1 \leftrightarrow \varphi_2$ is true for all interpretations β .

- we have to prove the statements
 - 1. $\varphi_1 \equiv \varphi_2 \text{ if } \varphi_1 \leftrightarrow \varphi_2$
 - **2.** $\varphi_1 \leftrightarrow \varphi_2$ if $\varphi_1 \equiv \varphi_2$



Theorem

Let $\varphi_1, \varphi_2 \in \Phi$. Then $\varphi_1 \equiv \varphi_2$ iff $\varphi_1 \leftrightarrow \varphi_2$ is true for all interpretations β .

- we have to prove the statements
 - 1. $\varphi_1 \equiv \varphi_2 \text{ if } \varphi_1 \leftrightarrow \varphi_2$
 - **2.** $\varphi_1 \leftrightarrow \varphi_2$ if $\varphi_1 \equiv \varphi_2$
- \bigcirc ad 1. Assume $\varphi_1 \leftrightarrow \varphi_2$.



Theorem

Let $\varphi_1, \varphi_2 \in \Phi$. Then $\varphi_1 \equiv \varphi_2$ iff $\varphi_1 \leftrightarrow \varphi_2$ is true for all interpretations β .

- we have to prove the statements
 - 1. $\varphi_1 \equiv \varphi_2 \text{ if } \varphi_1 \leftrightarrow \varphi_2$
 - 2. $\varphi_1 \leftrightarrow \varphi_2$ if $\varphi_1 \equiv \varphi_2$
- \bigcirc ad 1. Assume $\varphi_1 \leftrightarrow \varphi_2$.
 - by definition of \leftrightarrow : $\hat{\beta}(\varphi_1) = \hat{\beta}(\varphi_2)$ for all interpretations β .



Theorem

Let $\varphi_1, \varphi_2 \in \Phi$. Then $\varphi_1 \equiv \varphi_2$ iff $\varphi_1 \leftrightarrow \varphi_2$ is true for all interpretations β .

- we have to prove the statements
 - 1. $\varphi_1 \equiv \varphi_2 \text{ if } \varphi_1 \leftrightarrow \varphi_2$
 - 2. $\varphi_1 \leftrightarrow \varphi_2$ if $\varphi_1 \equiv \varphi_2$
- \bigcirc ad 1. Assume $\varphi_1 \leftrightarrow \varphi_2$.
 - by definition of \leftrightarrow : $\hat{\beta}(\varphi_1) = \hat{\beta}(\varphi_2)$ for all interpretations β .
 - by definition of \equiv : $\hat{\beta}(\varphi_1) = \hat{\beta}(\varphi_2)$ for all interpretations β implies $\varphi_1 \equiv \varphi_2$

Theorem

Let $\varphi_1, \varphi_2 \in \Phi$. Then $\varphi_1 \equiv \varphi_2$ iff $\varphi_1 \leftrightarrow \varphi_2$ is true for all interpretations β .

- we have to prove the statements
 - 1. $\varphi_1 \equiv \varphi_2 \text{ if } \varphi_1 \leftrightarrow \varphi_2$
 - **2.** $\varphi_1 \leftrightarrow \varphi_2$ if $\varphi_1 \equiv \varphi_2$
- \bigcirc ad **2**. Assume $\varphi_1 \equiv \varphi_2$.



Theorem

Let $\varphi_1, \varphi_2 \in \Phi$. Then $\varphi_1 \equiv \varphi_2$ iff $\varphi_1 \leftrightarrow \varphi_2$ is true for all interpretations β .

- we have to prove the statements
 - 1. $\varphi_1 \equiv \varphi_2 \text{ if } \varphi_1 \leftrightarrow \varphi_2$
 - **2.** $\varphi_1 \leftrightarrow \varphi_2$ if $\varphi_1 \equiv \varphi_2$
- \bigcirc ad **2**. Assume $\varphi_1 \equiv \varphi_2$.
- \bigcirc by definition of \equiv : $\hat{\beta}(\varphi_1) = \hat{\beta}(\varphi_2)$ for all interpretations β



Theorem

Let $\varphi_1, \varphi_2 \in \Phi$. Then $\varphi_1 \equiv \varphi_2$ iff $\varphi_1 \leftrightarrow \varphi_2$ is true for all interpretations β .

- we have to prove the statements
 - 1. $\varphi_1 \equiv \varphi_2 \text{ if } \varphi_1 \leftrightarrow \varphi_2$
 - **2.** $\varphi_1 \leftrightarrow \varphi_2$ if $\varphi_1 \equiv \varphi_2$
- \bigcirc ad 2. Assume $\varphi_1 \equiv \varphi_2$.
- \bigcirc by definition of \equiv : $\hat{\beta}(\varphi_1) = \hat{\beta}(\varphi_2)$ for all interpretations β
- by definition of \leftrightarrow : $\hat{\beta}(\varphi_1) = \hat{\beta}(\varphi_2)$ for all interpretations β implies $\varphi_1 \leftrightarrow \varphi_2$.

